Government 365N/MES 323K |
Instructor: Clement M. Henry |
Spring 2010: unique no. 38954 |
Batts 4.152, chenry@mail.utexas.edu |
Class meets Tu, Th 3:30-5:00 p.m., Benedict 1.122 |
Office hours Tu and Th 2-3:30 p.m., or by appointment via e-mail. |
This course will survey the recent efforts of
the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to adapt to
the global economy. We will compare their respective strategies of
economic and political development and discuss the possible
interrelationships between economic and political change. Everyone
will be expected to develop solid knowledge of the economies and
policies of at least three countries, including one of the major
economies of the Arab region (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Tunisia).
ASSIGNMENTS
In the first three weeks of class you will be expected to select up to three countries and some aspect(s) of political reform or better "governance," such as public sector reform and/or privatization, improving financial transparency, banking reform, fighting corruption, supporting human rights and/or freedom of the press, strengthening parliament, encouraging participation through elections, decentralizing government, or improving the status of women and strengthening civil society. You may focus one or several dimensions of governance. To gain perspective about the various dimensions of governance as they apply to the Arab world, please examine the website of the United Nations Development Program at www.pogar.org. You may also look at the country files of the Carnegie Endowment's Arab Political Systems database, where you can also access their related publications on Arab reform (Bulletin archives) and rule of law in the Middle East. You may also look ahead in your reading assignments to find (available in Blackboard) my Globalization and the politics of development, with Robert Springborg, 2nd edition in press, for chapter 4, focusing on Algeria and Syria, chapter 5, for Egypt and Tunisia, chapter 6 for the monarchies, and chapter 7 for the precarious democracies and Iran.
- Feb 9: Deadline for selecting a research topic and country focus (write 200 to 500 words, consulting with the instructor)
- Feb 23: Annotated bibliography - at least 10 resources, including books, articles, web sites focused on your topic - hard copy in class and posting on Blackboard in your country discussion board.
- March 4: midterm exam
- March 30: 1000-word development of your project to be posted on Blackboard and possibly discussed in class.
- April 8: Rough draft of final paper due - hard copy in class and posting on Blackboard.
- April 22: Final term paper due - hard copy in class and posting on Blackboard in your team portfolio.
- April 27 to May 4: In-class discussions of papers
- May 6: Final quiz, instead of a final exam.
Table of
contents | Main page
GRADING
CRITERIA
- Midterm 20%
- Annotated bibliography 5%
- Outline 5%
- Class Participation 20% (includes class attendence, computer "chat" Blackboard participation with your team, pop quizzes, class discussions, presentations and critiques of papers in class)
- Final paper 35%
- Final quiz 15%
BOOKS AVAILABLE FOR
PURCHASE (* = required)
for spring term
2008
Recommended:
To be made vailable on Blackboard:
Arab Human Development Report 2004 - online (download 2.2 megs) - other years also available at Arab Human Development reports home page
1st week (Jan. 19-21): INTRODUCTION
The challenges of economic globalization to the domestic economies of the MENA. Is globalization a "golden straitjacket" (Thomas Friedman, 13.6.97 NYT op ed) expanding economies and shrinking political space? Despite the shrinking, there is still politics! Indeed, world politics, regional politics, local country politics, and that is what this course is about in this especially volatile region of the world. Our approach: globalization in the post Cold War context of US hegemony is the independent variable, and we wish to document and explain the region's varied responses. There are intervening regional variables, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, new alliances within the region, and special relationships with the United States, the European Community and other outside powers, that also impact upon the individual countries of the region. Another set of intervening variables are the institutions and social forces within each country which affect economic policy making. The MENA states have adapted a variety of responses to globalization--renewed statism and islamism as well as the Washington Consensus. Their policies, in turn, are contributing to new forms of capitalism and generating new social forces and backlashes. What are the prospects for political change (and in which general direction, toward greater democracy or authoritarianism?).
Reading: Here is a map of the region to help you fill out our map exercise that you are expected to download (due Tuesday, Jan 26)
Optional :
2nd
week (Jan. 26-28): The
Principle of Comparative Advantage and Problem of Growing
Inequality
Globalization is rooted in expanding international trade since World War II, but what are the consequences of trade liberalization, diminished tariff and other barriers, upon the domestic politics of the various countries that open their doors? Look carefully at Rogowski's analysis: if more trade benefits capital in capital-rich countries and labor only in countries where labor is abundant, what happens to the USA, what political cleavages emerge? And where abundant labor is denied advantages, is the outcome "Asian fascism"? What has in fact happened to pay scales in the manufacturing sector with increasing world trade?
Practicum: Commanding Heights PBS video in class Thursday, Jan. 28. Expect in-class videos to be followed by brief quizzes designed for you to relate them to previous readings and discussions in this course. Here is the transcript of the entire part II of the program.
Optional :
3rd week (Feb. 2-4):
Introducing the MENA: an economic backwater of the global
economy?
Let us establish present base-lines of economic performance to document the proposition that the Middle East and North Africa has, by its own and others' standards, been an economic "underperformer" for at least a generation. Both diachronic and synchronic data related to economic performance will be provided for MENA and comparable countries. Special attention will be given to "pre-revolutionary" patterns of development in selected MENA countries, as well as their respective transitions to patrimonial statist models of development. Data will be presented on both human and physical resource development, as well as on aggregate output and equality. We will examine the data sets, comparing MENA countries with other regions. Look at various indicators of development, how MENA lags despite oil boom years.
Readings:
Optional:
4th
week (Feb. 9-11): ECONOMIC
IMPACTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY UPON THE MENA
Feb 9: Deadline for selecting a research topic and country focus: post 200-500 words on Blackboard and email it to your professor (chenry@mail.utexas.edu)
Readings:
- Galal Amin, finish
- Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the politics of development in the Middle East, begin chap 2
Practicum: Freedom House, Country Reports, and UNDP, POGAR, focus on countries that interest you so as to choose at least one by Feb. 9.
5th week (Feb. 16-18): Regional explanations of
arrested MENA development
Why has the MENA lagged? We look first at global factors. Oil rents and lavish aid (which can be carried further back to colonial times - the Europeans paid off their dependents to keep them quiet) fueled by the Cold War. Now the international rules have been changing since 1980s, leaving MENA adrift or in the throes of adjusment. MENA still gobbles up much of the world arms trade. Oil rents still bolster many of the economies of the region and may explain why needed reforms can be postponed.
Regional dynamics have been peculiarly unconducive to economic growth, political stability, and FDI. Arab Cold Wars and Arab-Israeli conflict, etc. Heavy military expenditures, within a region more interdependent than most because of transnational Arabism and Islam. The security states have had good excuses to stay armed and statist. Rivalries prevent regional trade, much less integration and functional specialization - everyone had to build a steel industry. Rentier states tend to give priority to allocation (and patronage) over production.
Can we dismiss cultural arguments? Yes and no. Puritanism and Islamism are both quite compatible with modernization, as Ernest Gellner argues. But cultural dualism and economic inequality can be especially combustible mixtures in the big cities (comparisons with Latin America on rates of recent urbanization, measures of economic inequality, and within MENA, comparing countries where islamism seems relatively containable - Jordan, Yemen and Morocco - with others?). MENA's social strains (becoming comparable to Latin America's) and an emergent and unruly islamist civil society generate rising costs of internal as well as external security. Compare the repressed popular sectors documented in Guillermo O'Donnell's work on Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s with the repressed islamist sectors of the MENA. Burdened by abnormally high security costs and police mentalities, many of the MENA's states may be peculiarly ill adapted to cope with economic issues raised by globalization.
The world has cared too much and too little about the MENA - too much in that "the Eastern Question" amplified international rivalries (Carl Brown 1984 analysis, and now China's new oil drive and the US occupation of Iraq); too little in that FDI shriveled after brief oil boom flirtations of mid-1970s, apart from the oil sector, which even so was partially disconnected from the major western companies in the 1970s.
Readings:
Optional:
Practicum: Examine recent trends in:
Table of
contents | Main page
6th
week (Feb. 23-25):
The Washington Consensus and the
"Freedom Deficit"
Statist legacies (weak but "fierce" states) which, to be fair, were not only reflections of state weakness but also responses to older forms of imperialism. Statism also fit the Bretton Woods era (1944-1971) of "embedded" (or social justice oriented) liberalism. Statist political forces surviving in the region: public sector officials, patronage networks, labor forces preventing dismantling of the old order. Bureaucratic overgrowth and issues of employment vs, privatization. Comparisons: peculiar convergence between the radical nationalizers and the oil producers.
Focus on the crony capitalist and other rent-seekers: the enclave business elites offer up resources to solidify the patronage networks. Why are the results different from those of equally corrupt polities in East Asia? How autonomous in these patrimonial regimes can economic policy makers be - look at the roles of technocrats, economic teams of reform-oriented ministers, zero in on Egypt and the final Gandzoury triumph in 1996 (for a little while) after stagnation and paralysis under previous ministries (cf Suharto's sound macro-economic management after earlier mistakes). Maybe we can also find little change teams in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan but they are precarious because technocrats just don't have relative autonomy in these patrimonial systems. Maybe more so in Egypt or Tunisia than in Algeria (where even presidents can be assassinated): recall that in Saddam's Iraq the poor petroleum minister had to flee in fall 1990 after being scapegoated for rising prices at the pump during the Kuwait crisis.
Feb. 23: Annotated bibliography due, post it on Blackboard and email it to your professor (chenry@mail.utexas.edu)
Readings:
Practicum: Examine:
Optional:
7th
week (March 2-4): Democracy
and Information for Development?
Is the MENA a political backwater (helping to explain the poor quality of economic policy-making?)? To carry the golden straightjacket analogy a step further, is the MENA already especially undemocratic for its levels of economic development and social change? Data will show that much of the region is just reaching critical per capita GDP levels but of course these mean little unless we can get some theoretical explanations behind the supposed correlations between per capita income and type of political regime. How will globalization affect the region's archaic patrimonial regimes? Maybe, though economic development did not necessarily undermine dictatorship in the past (cf Przeworski), globalization seen in its political and imperial as well as economic ramifications puts ever increasing pressure on incumbent patrimonial regimes. Countries can go democratic for geopolitical as well as for modernization reasons. Does the Information Revolution present a new set of threats as well as opportunities?
March 4: Midterm exam
Readings:
Table of
contents | Main page
8th week (March 9-11): Rethinking Globalization
The Commanding Heights,
Part III - the new
rules of the game, [transcript] with Professor Catherine Boone
Spring Break
9th
week
Readings:
- Jillian York, "ONI Releases 2009 Middle East & North Africa Research," Aug 19, 2009, OpenNet Initiative Website
- N. Kristof, Google Takes a Stand, op ed. NYTimes, Jan 14, 2010
- Henry and Springborg, Globalization, ch. 4 (for next week)
10th week (March 30-April 1): Praetorian state
capitalism: Algeria and other bunkers compared to Egyptian and
Tunisian bullies
The veiled bunkers - with heavy states and weak businesses and a phenomenon of "deliberalization" shared by all three despite some efforts to privatize to develop export sectors. Can Egypt and Tunisia dare further to liberalize their financial sectors, a prime mechanism for patronage and support for ailing public sector enterprises? And what about Palestine's nascent state monopolies?
March 30: Early draft of your project (1000 words) due: post it on Blackboard and email it to your professor (chenry@mail.utexas.edu)
Readings:
Practicum: Profiles of Egypt and Tunisia; also see Kamal Labidi, "Tunisia Independent but not Free," Le Monde diplomatique (March 2006). See also, after you read the "Alexandria Statement," RIGHTS-MIDEAST: Govts Ever More Draconian, Group Says, By William Fisher, IPS March 27, 2008.
11th
week (April 6-8): Jordan and
Morocco: political strategies of adjustment ; Developmental rentiers:
the GCC monarchies
May the "German" (oligopolistic form of) capitalism support political pluralism in the context of monarchy. For how long? Common denominators of family regimes, big statist sectors, generous welfare programs, and sustantial oil or strategic rents. Compare and contrast their manpower, financial strength, oil revenues, stock markets, ability to attract foreign capital (or bring back their own). New middle classes or bourgeoisies in search of democracy?
How will monarchy cope with rising bourgeoisies?
April 8: Rough draft of final policy paper due: post it on Blackboard and email it to your professor (chenry@mail.utexas.edu)
Readings:
Practicum:
12th week (April 13-15): Adjustment and Democracy:
Israel, Turkey, Lebanon - and Iran?
What do Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, and Iran have in common? Lots of expatriates and remittances but then so also do Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt. Less of a statist legacy than recalcitrant Algeria and Egypt? But Iran, Israel and Turkey carry heavy statist legacies. Turkey and Israel had to crash (Turkey 1978-80, Israel 1982-83) before beginning to adjust - whereas Iran has reversed the reformers. Lebanon, despite its traditions of free enterprise, has failed to privatize its few state enterprises.
Readings:
Practicum: From the tables (2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.4, 7.1) and figures (2.4, 3.2-3.5, 3.7, 3.8, 4.1, 4.2) in Henry and Springborg, how does Iran compare with the other democracies? with the other bullies?
.
13th
week (April 20-22): Islamic capitalism and the Washington
Consensus
Does Islam act as a shield, mitigating dilemmas between international openness and social welfare? Algeria's reformers tried and failed in 1989-91 to maintain a tacit alliance with the FIS. But Iran already seems well on the way to combining the Washington Consensus with Islamist pluralism. Bonyads (foundations) as sources of civil society? Islamic business sectors will be examined in comparative perspective, including those of other conventional MENA economies, such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf states. Islamic banking will be analyzed.
April 22: Final paper due: post it on Blackboard and email it to your professor (chenry@mail.utexas.edu)
Readings:
Student presentations and discussion: Agenda TBA.
15th week (May 4-6): The prospects for capitalism and
political change in the MENA
More economic accountability can just as well help to rationalize authoritarian practices. Or will the United States take its Middle East Partnership Initiative to build democratic pluralism more seriously, developing those vital capitalist communications, and not be afraid of the spillover into civic domains? Here is the most recent budget for foreign aid in the region. What are the prospects of help from outside - multilateral initiatives pushed by the EU and/or the US - for the Arab world?
May 6: In-class quiz and conclusion.
Last updated 5 February 2010
Department
of Government,
College of Liberal
Arts, University of Texas at
Austin.
Questions, Comments, and Suggestions to
chenry@mail.utexas.edu