Robert Putnam’s research in "Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy" focuses primarily on the creation, expansion and empowerment of the regional governmental institutions implemented there in the 1970s. As the book progresses, however, this research is extended well into centuries past in an effort to draw a positive correlation between traditions of civic engagement, and the success (or failure) of these new institutions. Putnam himself describes his work, in Chapter 4, as a "journey of exploration". This journey is undertaken- using an impressive set of results to ‘explore’ the salient questions posed in each chapter.
Putnam introduces the reader to his work in a scientific fashion- with a statement of purpose, a summary of research methods and an overview of the book. His stated intent is threefold: first, to "explore empirically how institutional change affects…political actors"; then, to "explore how institutional performance is conditioned by history"; and, in conclusion, to illustrate how "the practical performance of institutions…is shaped by the social context within which they operate." The second through fourth chapters concentrate primarily on the first problem.
In the second chapter, Putnam observes the changes wrought with the birth of strong regional governments, drawing several interesting conclusions. For example, using surveys of regional councilors, he shows that the new, diffused structure has increased political cooperation: "ideological distances narrowed (among politicians), tolerance across party lines blossomed"; "the process of reaching accommodation on practical issues is no longer so inhibited by partisan hostility". What is implied here generally is that the increased interpersonal interaction forced upon the political actors under these new circumstances engendered greater tolerance and cooperation. An effect that is important in supporting the thesis which will later emerge.
He moves down the political ladder in the third chapter, using surveys of citizens and community leaders to prove that low-performing regional governments are recognized as such and judged more harshly than their more successful counterparts (although both are preferable to the prior, centralized structure). From these findings, he concludes that "people everywhere recognize the distinction between good government and bad…" and that "they like good government, and they dislike bad". This conclusion serves to "underline the risks of excessive cultural relativism", as well as "the so-called ‘revealed preference’ approach to government outcomes. ( Such a warning could be applied, perhaps, to theorists who cite religious fanaticism- as opposed to governmental suppression of political organization- as the primary source of popularity for Islamic movements in Egypt, for instance).
In the fourth chapter, Putnam begins his struggle to explain "the strong North-South gradient" in earnest. He offers the reader "two broad possibilities"- one based on "socioeconomic modernity", the other on "civic community". In this discussion, he acknowledges first "that effective democracy is correlated with socioeconomic modernization" but then quickly points out that ‘wealth and modernity’ have not consistently determined the degree of effectiveness displayed by the new institutions in his region. This observation provokes further questioning of the "links between modernity and performance". It is at this juncture that the theory of civic engagement is introduced into the equation. The ‘civic community’ is described to the reader both in terms of its attributes (‘horizontal relations’, ‘interpersonal trust’ and widespread associationism leading to a more diluted ‘social trust’) and also its antithesis (‘amoral familism’ and ‘vertical relations of authority’). Essentially, increased interpersonal interaction increases trust exponentially. Proceeding with this theory, he uses several indicators of ‘civicness’ to map out the regions under his observation. He then concludes that the distinctly more civic regions "nourish more effective governments". This is further explained with examples of the hindrances to good government created by the patron-client relationships dominant in the more stratified communities of the South. This hierarchical structure- which is said to promote individualistic self-interest and breed corruption- is contrasted with the more politically egalitarian attitudes of the citizens and their leaders to the North ("Equality is an essential feature of the civic community"). Putnam claims that this northern attitude lays the foundation for a more trusting, cooperative environment- which in turn aids the governing process. Additionally, widespread cooperation in ‘horizontal’ relationships creates an environment of mutual obligation among citizens. The potential for this is nullified when citizens are made to feel powerless by a ‘vertical’ or ‘hierarchical’ structure.
We begin the fifth chapter in medieval Italy- from which origins, patterns of government are to be traced down to the present. The South is described as developing under an autocratic, feudalistic tradition, while the need for security in a chaotic North led its inhabitants into enclaves of "communal republicanism". Putnam summarizes the reality for citizens of these regions when he states: "In the North, the people were citizens. In the South, they were subjects." According to our author, although the communal republics fell entirely to an expanding feudalism by the 17th century, traces of their civic character remained evident in the more civic attitudes of "the local gentry", and also in the survival of a cooperative ethic among the peasantry. The "feudal and autocratic" character of the South also remained static. The degree of civic engagement is reported to have remained stable through the last two centuries in both areas- in spite of "vast social change". This consistency is meant to illustrate that civic engagement, or lack thereof, imbeds itself in communities. Putnam points out that the citizens of the South have engaged in protest and revolt against their institutions- but lack the structure and trust necessary to create the powerful organizations which could force a more permanent change.
Interestingly, Putnam spends his effort in the final section of the chapter dispelling the notion that ‘civic networks’ might simply be "froth on the waves of economic progress". He does this by comparing his consistent patterns of regional civic engagement with the unstable patterns of wealth in these same regions: "The civic regions did not begin wealthier, and they have not always been wealthier." He posits instead that "economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict economics…(at least in recent history)." The greater success of regional governments and socioeconomic development in the North is said to be a testament to their common civic character.
The closing chapter builds philosophically on the primary theory expounded in his work. Game theory, for example, is used to explain the rationality of the southern attitude (in light of their political conditions). Dissuaded- sometimes forcibly- from engaging in collective action by those perpetuating their interests from atop the hierarchy, the southern communities have grown up in a ‘vicious circle’ of distrust. Distrust is exacerbated by corruption and cheating, which serve to reinforce the cycle. The Northern community, on the other hand, has developed in conditions of social cooperation. It is made clear that the greater cooperation which developed served security needs in tumultuous times- and also in the absent of a strong governmental authority (i.e. there is no hinting around at an inherent superiority in this group). This cooperation and increased interaction also strengthened interpersonal bonds- increasing levels of communal trust- just as corruption increased distrust elsewhere. This trust is made evident in "norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement" within a community. The prevalence of these things determines its stock of "social capital". This is said to affect the government’s performance in two respects: first, the horizontally cooperative group is better able to exert pressure on its government due to decreased fear of members ‘selling out’ for a deal better-suited to their individual interest. The ramifications of pursuing such a course in the cooperative environment would include (at least) exclusion from the extensive set of benefits provided by the group. Second, the civic community, with its enhanced collaborative capacity, facilitates "the performance of the representative government"- presumably by easing the processes of policy creation and implementation.
In his work, Putnam’s research methods, willingness to tackle different schools of thought, and his humility, are impressive. They likely contribute as much to his persuasive power as do the revealed patterns upon which his theory rests. In his research, many potential factors- whose omission would rightfully throw his theory into question- are accounted for in the section of chapter four entitled "other explanations for institutional success" (as well as elsewhere). However, even after accounting for the roles of other determinants, he still does not place civic tradition in a lonely position at the center of Italy’s modern institutional fortunes or woes. Instead he states: "Civic traditions alone did not trigger (nor, in that sense, cause) the North’s rapid and sustained economic progress…" and further: "To be sure, any single factor interpretation is surely wrong". Thus, he is not asking the reader to swallow an oversimplified analysis with religious zeal, but instead to consider his findings as having a role in a complex question. These qualities are also among those in his work which differentiate it substantially from the work of S. Huntington in "The Clash of Civilizations".
Although both author’s identify a distinct line of cleavage in their respective areas (with Putnam even drawing a parallel between developmental disparities on the North and South American continents) most realistic comparisons end there. Huntington bases his assertion- that huge civilizations are, and will likely forever be, at odds and on the verge of warfare- on a half-spun military history. He omits entirely (as his opponents have pointed out) an equally valid history of peaceful interaction. Putnam does extensive research in order to unearth a stable pattern amidst the kind of chaos upon which Huntington’s entire premise rests. There is no talk of warfare, or the need for one region to dominate another for its own protection. And just as they vary in their research and its purpose, our authors vary greatly in their conclusions. Huntington attributes the civilizational rift to cultural rallying, feeding off of common bonds (religion primary among them) and intensified by exposure to other, threatening civilizations. Putnam, however, relegates the role of religious activity to that of a malleable factor- its power resting on the broader structure within which it operates.
Huntington, in turn, gives little heed to the effects of governmental power structure in developing societies (an arguably essential point when examining modern Middle Eastern history…), while Putnam focuses on just that. For example, the ‘backward’ societies of Putnam’s South are composed of "individuals responding rationally to the social context bequeathed to them by history." The cycle, in which they are trapped, is ‘self-reinforcing’. This is due to the difficulty of changing ingrained rules, which- over centuries- have produced "organizations and groups with a stake in their inefficiencies". Putnam’s are not a people controlled and alienated by a common and incurable cultural virus- they are victims of circumstance. However, Huntington is not really searching for the ‘man behind the curtain’, which divides his civilizations. He directs his efforts instead towards proving the curtain exists and advising the reader on how to prevent it falling on him. Putnam’s interest in the topic clearly lies elsewhere. He investigates the origins of the curtain, its effects on those living on either side of it and- after drawing a reasonable conclusion as to why it exists- necessarily leaves us with the option of taking it down…