Civil Society

[Brian Jones <misterpink@mail.utexas.edu>]

	The term ‘civil society’ refers, in all of its applications, to an extragovernmental and extrafamilial layer of social organization.  It results from the pervasiveness of associational life in a society.  There is, however, disagreement as to the effect of civil society.  This disagreement can be explained by dividing it into two basic trends.  The first argues that civil society is a consensus-building mechanism that coerces participants into social cohesion.  The second argues that civil society breeds voluntary associations and, in doing so, fosters democratic and liberal government.

The origin of these two nearly opposite interpretations of the effect of the same basic phenomenon, namely civil society, shows in Gellner’s discussion of civil society.  Gellner argues that the term ‘civil society’ is often misapplied.  He recognizes that it is necessary that the nongovernmental social organization not be oppressive in order for it to actually constitute civil society.  Therefore, quite simply, those who describe civil society as a coercive consensus builder are not describing civil society at all.

Although he wrote before the coining of the term ‘civil society,’ attributes of the civil society of consensus can be seen in the work of Ibn Khaldun.  His discussion of ‘group feeling’ mirrors in many ways a discussion of civil society.  For Ibn Khaldun, group feeling is a typically kin-based construct that provides a common interest in mutual protection.  Although not truly civil society in the modern context because it relies to a certain degree on familial organizations, group feeling does provide a layer of social organization outside of governmental organization.  As much as group feeling can be described as civil society, however, it falls under the category of the civil society of consensus.  As a result, it is not a true civil society because it relies on the submission of the individual to the group’s needs.

Sheri Berman’s discussion of civil society in the Weimar Republic provides another example of consensus-based civil society.  She argues that civil society is not necessarily the key to liberal democracy because the rise of fascism coopted the associational framework in Germany in order to consolidate power.  She is correct in seeing the associational life of the Weimar Republic as a weakness in its fall to fascism, but Gellner would argue that she is incorrect in describing this associational framework as a civil society.  Because association was essentially a social requisite in Weimar Germany, it was not voluntary and was, therefore, using the term loosely, “oppressive.”

Tocqueville recognizes the distinction that Gellner draws and makes it himself in a slightly less direct way in Democracy in America.  In the first volume, Tocqueville decries the uniformity and tacitly compulsory nature of American associational life much as Berman does for Weimar Germany.  Tocqueville recognizes that this system does not allow for much freedom and wonders about its legitimacy; however, in his second volume, Tocqueville works out the solution to his problem.  The protection of the freedom of association ensures in America that even the most unpopular groups can freely gather.  Therefore, the degree and kind of participation in associational life were up to each individual citizen.  This freedom to choose breaks the bounds of the consensus and allows civil society in Gellner’s sense of the term.

Sami Zubaida observes both definitions of civil society being used in Egypt.  He argues that liberals encouraged the civil society of voluntary associations and links it to NGO’s, human rights, and international organizations, as do Zakaria in “Illiberal Democracy” and Benjamin Barber in “Beyond Jihad vs. McWorld.”  Zubaida argues that conservative Islamists encouraged consensus-based civil society through things like the Islamic investment societies.  Zubaida doubts the legitimacy of this second kind of civil society because of the religious overtones and the effect they have on forcing a common point of view.

Robert Putnam’s work leads the way for proponents of the civil society of voluntary association.  For Putnam, the strength of civil society rests on the pervasiveness, vibrancy, and variety of associations available.  Rather than coercing participants towards a common belief, Putnam’s civil society forms the backbone for liberal democracy by encouraging participation and free speech.  Putnam gives the most elaborate and precise explanation of the trend in defining civil society that Gellner identifies as the correct one.

Civil society breeds a legitimate social and political environment through the participation of citizens.  Some thinkers argue for the dangers of civil society in forcing commonalities on the public; however, this argument is something of a red herring.  The term ‘civil society’ as it is understood in its flagship examples, such as in Putnam’s work, does not apply to the situations to which these thinkers refer.  Gellner clearly explains this discrepancy.  It is important that Gellner’s argument is understood in order to ensure that civil society will not be unreasonably dismissed in the future.