Putnam Paper (more readable)

Sara McCuistion (lovesara@mail.utexas.edu)
Mon, 15 Feb 1999 23:57:38 -0600

After a twenty-year long methodical study of Italian regional societies
Robert D. Putnam has concluded that "building social capital…is the key to
making democracies work." (MDW, Putnam, 185) He provides a very thorough
account in his book, Making Democracy Work of how everyday community events
and organizations are the backbone of civil society. Putnam presents the
example of Italy, a country with twenty powerful regional governments that
can be compared and contrasted as separate democratic governments. He
theorizes that the success of northern Italy's governmental institutions is
a result of the long-standing social capital, or "citizen engagement in
community affairs." (Packet, Putnam, 17) These activities range from bird
watching to soccer and are generally categorized as apolitical. Putnam
reinforces his argument with precise research and analysis of each aspect
of both governmental effectiveness and civic activity. Putnam measures
carefully-finding the exact number of sports teams and newspaper buyers in
each Italian community and compares them to that community's rank of
government effectiveness. Each of Italy's regional governments is ranked by
data ranging from bureaucratic responsiveness to the timeliness of their
budget approvals. From the information gathered in Italy, Putnam concludes
that a community's social capital closely correlates with the effectiveness
of its government-and ultimately the satisfaction of its constituents. His
argument is difficult to refute due to its shear breadth of meticulous
detail, though it is possible note its key flaws-and ultimately I remain
unconvinced that Putnam has found a causal relationship. After all that
research, he has not found the answer of how to make democracy work.

In the challenge to discover how to most effectively and efficiently to
construct a successful democracy, Putnam unfortunately attempts to use
Italy as the example for all democratic nations. Although Putnam presents a
well established and convincing argument for the nature of Italian regional
government, his argument fails when applied to the outside world. His data
between high civic activity and governmental effectively certainly
overlaps, but this coincidence does not prove an absolute truth in the
cause and effect nature of these aspects of civil society. In the absence
of data from any other democratic government there is no reason to assume
that Putnum's findings are not exclusive to Italy's governmental system.
Sheri Berman in her article, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar
Republic" shows how Putnum's theory cannot be universally applied to all
democracies. She sights the example of Nazi Germany where "The NSDAP drew
its critical cadres precisely from among bourgeois civil society activists
with few ties to mainstream politics." She writes, "not only did
participation in civil society organizations fail to contribute to
republican virtue, but in fact it subverted it." (Collapse, Berman, 417)
Putnam's assumption that his findings reflect a global model resembles the
arrogance of Huntington and other accused Oreintalists, who view the world
as isolated civilizations that can be autonomously observed, created, and
improved upon. Putnum presents Italy as self-contained and isolated; like
many scientists, he separates the observed from its full context, in this
case, the rest of the world.

Another unconvincing analysis is Putnam's portrayal of the effects of
economics on the success of regional government in Italy. Undeniably,
economic factors are a causal factor for a successful government, but
Putnam seems to bid lightly on their determinance of governmental success.
It is hard, however, to dismiss that the northern half of Italy is a much
more lucrative market for foreign investment because of its interest in
markets that are more universal, such as banking. Its economic structure is
more similar to that of the world's more prosperous countries, and
therefore is more appealing to a global economy. Putnam, himself admits,
"it would be ridiculous to suppose that the civic traditions…are the
only-or even the most important-determinate of economic prosperity." (MDW,
Putnum, 161) and agrees that economics is a causal factor for a
government's effectiveness. He justifies his dismissal of economic factors
by showing that turn of the century civic involvement predicts
socioeconomic development in the 1970's more accurately than even
socioeconomic development in the 1900's. He stubbornly believes that
compared to civic activism, economics does not predict how well a
government will perform. He fails to address that civic activism,
presupposes a certain amount of wealth, free time, inclination, and liberty
given by the government, almost all of which relate to economics. Of the
four factors mentioned above Putnam seems to only focus on inclination and
historical inclination to be civic.

Another economic element that Putnam does not weigh heavily is social
stratification, a factor that seems to be a large indicator of Italian
governmental excellence. Putnam states, "the regional elite in the less
civic regions is drawn almost entirely from the most privileged portion of
the population, whereas a significant number of the political leaders in
the more civic regions come from more modest backgrounds." (101) The north
has a history of communal republics, economically and structurally lending
themselves to having a higher constitution of middle class citizens. If the
middle class, more civic states are more likely to have middle class
representation, they are also likely to have a more accurate representation
in their government and consequently more cooperative and responsive
leaders. This lack of economic stratification could be a reason for the
more efficient governmental aptitude in these areas. The southern, less
civic regions have a history of Monarchal rule which is reflected in their
class structure today, a dominance of elitist rule. Perhaps these economic
and political structures of civically successful regions, are the cause of
governmental success rather than a result of civic-minded attitudes.
When people like their government, when they feel it represents them and
serves them, it is able to be successful.

Logically, political organization within a government, rather than civic
tradition, is a stronger cause of a successful democracy. Putnam does not
address the argument that "civic" activities are the result of a society
led with its constituents in mind-people who are granted liberty, greater
access to wealth, and free time. Also, a lack of political cohesiveness can
be a direct forerunner to a decline in Democracy. Sheri Berman points out
that:
One cannot understand the rise of the Nazi's without an appreciation of
the role played by German civil society, and one cannot understand the
contours of that civil society without reference to the country's weak
political institutionalization. (Collapse, Berman, 425)

An establishment of governmental guidelines and expectations, written or
not, undoubtedly aids a region to operate effectively, in addition to a
commitment from the government to follow these guidelines. A government
begins to fail when either this commitment begins to fail, or the initial
document lacks its required strength in its convictions. The Unites States
Constitution, and the US government's conviction to follow and interpret
it, is a testament to our political organization, something that we can
tangibly look to. This, not social capital, has been the staple factor in
American Democratic success. It fails only when government officials lack
the conviction to follow it, and its initial outline improves every time an
amendment is made. But the US Constitution is only one example, like
Putnam's Italy, of one way Democracy can be seen to thrive. Each country,
each group of people has its own situation, its own challenge to figure out
how to make democracy work. Obviously, "any single-factor interpretation is
surely wrong." (MDW, Putnam, 159)