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After a twenty-year long methodical study of Italian regional societies
Robert D. Putnam has concluded that that “building social capital…is the
key to making democracies work.” (MDW, Putnam, 185) He provides a very
thorough account in his book, Making Democracy Work of how everyday community
events and organizations are the backbone of civil society. Putnam presents
the example of Italy, a country with twenty powerful regional governments
that can be compared and contrasted as separate democratic governments.
He theorizes that the success of northern Italy's governmental institutions
is a result of the long-standing social capital, or “citizen engagement
in community affairs.” (Packet, Putnam, 17) These activities range from
bird watching to soccer and are generally categorized as apolitical.
Putnam reinforces his argument with precise research and analysis of each
aspect of both governmental effectiveness and civic activity. Putnam measures
carefully—finding the exact number of sports teams and newspaper buyers
in each Italian community and compares them to that community’s rank of
government effectiveness. Each of Italy’s regional governments is ranked
by data ranging from bureaucratic responsiveness to the timeliness of their
budget approvals. From the information gathered in Italy, Putnam concludes
that a community’s social capital closely correlates with the effectiveness
of its government—and ultimately the satisfaction of its constituents.
His argument is difficult to refute due to its shear breadth of meticulous
detail, though it is possible note its key flaws—and ultimately I remain
unconvinced that Putnam has found a causal relationship. After all that
research, he has not found the answer of how to make democracy work.
<BR>In the challenge to discover how to most effectively and efficiently
to construct a successful democracy, Putnum unfortunately attempts to use
Italy as the example for all democratic nations. Although Putnam presents
a well established and convincing argument for the nature of Italian regional
government, his argument fails when applied to the outside world. His data
between high civic activity and governmental effectively certainly overlaps,
but this coincidence does not prove an absolute truth in the cause and
effect nature of these aspects of civil society. In the absence of data
from any other democratic government there is no reason to assume that
Putnum’s findings are not exclusive to Italy’s governmental system.
Sheri Berman in her article, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar
Republic” shows how Putnum’s theory cannot be universally applied to all
democracies. She sights the example of Nazi Germany where “The NSDAP drew
its critical cadres precisely from among bourgeois civil society activists
with few ties to mainstream politics.” She writes, “not only did participation
in civil society organizations fail to contribute to republican virtue,
but in fact it subverted it.” (Collapse, Berman, 417) Putnam’s assumption
that his findings reflect a global model resembles the arrogance of Huntington
and other accused Oreintalists, who view the world as isolated civilizations
that can be autonomously observed, created, and improved upon. Putnum presents
Italy as self-contained and isolated; like many scientists, he separates
the observed from its full context, in this case, the rest of the world.
<P>Another unconvincing analysis is Putnam’s portrayal of the effects of
economics on the success of regional government in Italy. Undeniably, economic
factors are a causal factor for a successful government, but Putnam seems
to bid lightly on their determinance of governmental success. It is hard,
however, to dismiss that the northern half of Italy is a much more lucrative
market for foreign investment because of its interest in markets that are
more universal, such as banking. Its economic structure is more similar
to that of the world’s more prosperous countries, and therefore is more
appealing to a global economy. Putnam, himself admits, “it would be ridiculous
to suppose that the civic traditions…are the only—or even the most
important—determinate
of economic prosperity.” (MDW, Putnum, 161) and agrees that economics is
a causal factor for a government’s effectiveness. He justifies his dismissal
of economic factors by showing that turn of the century civic involvement
predicts socioeconomic development in the 1970’s more accurately than even
socioeconomic development in the 1900’s. He stubbornly believes that compared
to civic activism, economics does not predict how well a government will
perform. He fails to address that civic activism, presupposes a certain
amount of wealth, free time, inclination, and liberty given by the government,
almost all of which relate to economics. Of the four factors mentioned
above Putnam seems to only focus on inclination and historical inclination
to be civic.
<P>Another economic element that Putnam does not weigh heavily is social
stratification, a factor that seems to be a large indicator of Italian
governmental excellence. Putnum states, “the regional elite in the less
civic regions is drawn almost entirely from the most privileged portion
of the population, whereas a significant number of the political leaders
in the more civic regions come from more modest backgrounds.” (101) The
north has a history of communal republics, economically and structurally
lending themselves to having a higher constitution of middle class citizens.
If the middle class, more civic states are more likely to have middle class
representation, they are also likely to have a more accurate representation
in their government and consequently more cooperative and responsive
leaders.
This lack of economic stratification could be a reason for the more efficient
governmental aptitude in these areas. The southern, less civic regions
have a history of Monarchal rule which is reflected in their class structure
today, a dominance of elitist rule. Perhaps these economic and political
structures of civicly successful regions, are the cause of governmental
success rather than a result of civic-minded attitudes.
<BR>When people like their government, when they feel it represents them
and serves them, it is able to be successful.
<P>Logically, political organization within a government, rather than civic
tradition, is a stronger cause of a successful democracy. Putnam does not
address the argument that “civic” activities are the result of a society
led with its constituents in mind—people who are granted liberty, greater
access to wealth, and free time. Also, a lack of political cohesiveness
can be a direct forerunner to a decline in Democracy. Sheri Berman points
out that:
<BR> One cannot understand the rise of the Nazi’s without an appreciation
of the role played by German civil society, and one cannot understand the
contours of that civil society without reference to the country’s weak
political institutionalization. (Collapse, Berman, 425)
<P>An establishment of governmental guidelines and expectations, written
or not, undoubtedly aids a region to operate effectively, in addition to
a commitment from the government to follow these guidelines. A government
begins to fail when either this commitment begins to fail, or the initial
document lacks its required strength in its convictions. The Unites
States Constitution, and the US government’s conviction to follow and
interpret
it, is a testament to our political organization, something that we can
tangibly look to. This, not social capital, has been the staple factor
in American Democratic success. It fails only when government officials
lack the conviction to follow it, and its initial outline improves every
time an amendment is made. But the US Constitution is only one example,
like Putnam’s Italy, of one way Democracy can be seen to thrive. Each country,
each group of people has its own situation, its own challenge to figure
out how to make democracy work. Obviously, “any single-factor interpretation
is surely wrong.” (MDW, Putnam, 159)
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