Egypt's Human Rights Movement

[anne.w@mail.utexas.edu (WOMER; ANNE K.)]

Egypt’s Human Rights Movement: 
Its Relationship with an Illiberal Government and a Conservative Society

Few will deny that Egypt is ruled by an authoritarian regime.  The oppressive central administration, backed by a ponderously large bureaucracy, is enough to intimidate most Egyptians and to keep them from challenging the power of the government.  Even according to the U.S. State Department, “the President and the entrenched NDP dominate the political scene to such an extent that citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their Government.”  How is civil society to survive in such an environment?  In the face of government oppression, as people are unable to defend their rights, a human rights movement has emerged.  Among the goals of these people and organizations is protecting the civil and political rights of Egyptians.  They seek to create an environment in which civil society may thrive, in which such rights as the freedom of speech, belief, and association are respected.  However, though such organizations usually have good intentions, they routinely encounter resistance to their cause.  On one side, the Egyptian government is wary of their presence and frequently seeks to suppress their influence.  On the other side is a conservative society, which, though it may not actively oppose the cause of human rights, is largely apathetic to a movement that many view as an infringement of Western ideas on their culture.  The Egyptian human rights movement is in a difficult position, caught between an illiberal government and a conservative society.  The purpose of this paper is to examine their role, given these difficult circumstances, in order to see where exactly they fit into the struggle of Egyptian civil society.  
First, I will look at the relationship of the Egyptian government to Egyptian civil society. How exactly does it repress civil society, and why?  Then I will look specifically at the government’s unique relationship with the human rights movement.  As outspoken defenders of civil society and critics of government policy, human rights activists are a thorn in the side of the regime.  Their cause frequently places them in direct conflict with the government, yet the government will only go so far in publicly restricting their activities.  Finally, I will examine the relationship of the human rights movement to the rest of Egyptian society.  For a movement to be successful, it seems that it would need the support of society at large.  However, in Egypt, the cause has little popular support.   

The State and Civil Society
	There exists a multitude of definitions of the term “civil society.”  Generally, it is thought of as the network of organizations that provides a buffer between the individual and the state and between the individual and the rest of society.  It is meant to counterbalance the power of the state and to give the individual or the minority a public voice.  There is, however, much debate over what sort of organizations or other structures may be considered part of this buffering network.  Non-governmental organizations, in which people work together toward a common goal, are generally included in any definition of civil society.  But in defining civil society, particularly in Arab countries, several controversial issues arise, including the roles of kinship ties and other informal networks and religious organizations.  Even among Arab scholars, there is disagreement regarding these issues.  Sami Zubaida wrote an article in which he divided the 
argument into two main world views: the secular-liberal and the Islamic-communal.  Egyptian intellectual and civil society advocate Saad Eddin Ibrahim supports the first view, excluding “primordial organizations” such as kinship ties and religious organizations from his definition of civil society.   This view is similar to those of many Western scholars, such as Putnam and Toqueville.  On the other hand, Tariq al-Bishri argues that civil society is an “informal network of relationships.”  He believes that “social relations of reciprocity” are what make a society strong, and his focus is on property and business transactions.  
	It is easy to understand why many do not want to include informal networks or religious organizations in a definition of civil society.  Like an overpowering government, they may also lead to the suppression of the individual voice.  Nevertheless, given the prominence of such structures in Egyptian society, I think it would be a mistake to overlook them.  Religion plays a large role in the life of many Egyptians, both Muslim and non-Muslim.  There are countless social and political organizations that are centered around religious beliefs, and to discount them from a definition would be ignoring a significant area of cooperation and interaction among Egyptians.  Similarly, kinship ties and informal networks of personal contacts may provide an effective network of support for the individual.  
	For the purposes of this paper, I will use the broad and inclusive definition of political science professor Tareq Y. Ismael: civil society consists of any “organizations that act independently of government control and use non-violent means in the pursuit of political, economic, and social goals.”   
	The make-up of Egyptian civil society is diverse, including labor unions, professional organizations, chambers of commerce, social organizations, and advocacy groups.  However, the vast majority of the 15,000 or so organizations that are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (which does not include political parties and labor unions) are “mainly active in the areas of health, child-care, family planning, or in medical centers attached to mosques.”   Those that tend to be most successful are “those adopting apolitical roles, and those centering around an overarching figure who is typically in close touch with the state bureaucracy.”   Thus, though organizations are plentiful, they are encouraged to form a patron-client relationship with the regime in order to survive and are discouraged from any kind of political activity that will challenge the regime.  This defeats one of the main purposes of civil society, which is to provide an effective intermediary between the state and the people.  
	Egypt’s government has become increasingly authoritarian in recent years, tightening its control over Egyptian society.   The current regime in Egypt has been aptly described as paranoid and jealously guards its ruling position.  It seeks to restrict and control civil society, because any organization that is able to gain wide popular support may be able to challenge the central authority.  
	One of the main reasons for the increased paranoia of the regime is the so-called “Algeria Complex.”  They fear that political liberalization will give radical Islamists the opportunity to seize power.  They point to the violence in Algeria following elections in the early 1990s as the result of free elections and have successfully justified their authoritarianism to both their allies in the West and to the Egyptian elite.   Hosni Mubarak told Egyptian intellectuals in 1993 that “he was trying to spare Egypt the fate of Algeria.”   There have indeed been significant clashes between radical Islamists and the Egyptian government.  Islamists attack the police in retaliation for police brutality, and the police respond with still more violence.  There have been several terrorist attacks by Islamist radicals, such as the Luxor massacre of foreign tourists in 1997.  And it is no doubt always in the back of President Mubarak’s mind that former president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by members of the militant Islamist group Jihad.
As a result of this paranoia, the regime indiscriminately targets all Islamists and attempts to discredit the more moderate organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood has been outlawed, and though it still operates without authorization, its members continue to be harassed by the government.  Besides watching out for organized, political entities, the state also attempts to keep mainstream Islam under tight control.  In 1996, a law was passed requiring all imams of “independent” mosques (mosques that are not run by the state Ministry for Religious Affairs) to be approved by the government.   This way, the state could keep a close watch on exactly what the imams were preaching during the Friday sermons.  
Unfortunately, the regime’s Algeria Complex has led to the suppression of not only moderate Islamist organizations, but of all non-governmental organizations, especially those that are critical of the government.  In the past decade, Egyptians have seen an overall decrease in their personal freedoms.   The state uses a number of methods to restrict Egyptian society.  The most blatant example of governmental restriction of civil society is Law 32.  Originally enacted in 1964, this law requires a would-be organization to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs, which in turn requires a commitment from the organization to refrain from engaging in “political activities.”   If it is illegal to form an organization with political goals, there is no intermediary buffer between Egyptians and the state.  There is no way that they may have a voice in government policy.  Law 32 is clearly a direct attack on civil society.  In 1999, the government enacted Law 153, which restricted the external funding of NGOs, but this law was stuck down by the Constitutional Court.  Law 32, however, continues to apply.   
Egypt has also been operating under the Emergency Law since Sadat’s assassination in 1981.  This law provides the president with sweeping powers in the name of national security, including press censorship and the detention without trial of suspected “security threats.”   According to Amnesty International, there are currently thousands of these “administrative detainees” in Egyptian prisons. 
Using its emergency powers, the state may also try civilians in military courts.  These measures were originally intended for the trials of terrorists, although the line between “terrorist” and “political opponent” may at times be blurred.  These courts have also been used to try people who are not accused of terrorism.   There are also widespread complaints of torture at the hands of the police force.  While technically illegal in Egypt, torture remains common and unchecked.  Rather than addressing the complaints, the government has “reiterated previous denials, criticized the motivations of human rights organizations, and attempted to discredit the alleged victims.”   The harsh measures used by the government to control society no doubt discourage people from engaging in any activity that opposes the government, thereby restricting civil society.
In its campaign of repression, the government has also targeted modes of public expression, specifically newspapers and the Internet.  Under the Emergency Law, the president is allowed to censor the press.  Law 93 of 1995 mandates fines or imprisonment for journalists who publish “untrue or malicious news, information, or rumors, sensational propaganda,” or anything else that threatens the national interest.   The government has the power to shut down a newspaper, as it did last year with al-Shaab, a leading opposition paper.  The state has also begun to move against the Internet.  In the trial of 52 gay men arrested in Cairo, a lawyer argued that the regime was trying to alienate people from the Internet.  “Prominence was given to gayegypt.com, the Web site through which security officers posing as homosexuals made dates with hapless men, arresting them when they showed up for the rendezvous.”    By intimidating the press and discouraging use of the Internet, the state is seeking to restrict the ways in which people communicate and interact.  They are also able to effectively control public criticism of the regime.

The State and the Egyptian Human Rights Movement
	Of the aspects of Egyptian society that the government attempts to regulate, the human rights movement seems to receive special attention.  The movement occupies a unique place in civil society.  Not only is it a part of civil society, but one of its main purposes is to defend the civil rights that allow civil society to function.  Without such rights as freedom of belief, speech, and association, it would be difficult for people to live and interact freely.  The Egyptian human rights movement consists of over a dozen organizations.  Some of them operate legally as “civil companies.”  The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), the oldest and largest human rights organization in Egypt, is the “mother organisation.”   Perhaps because of its size and tenacity, the Egyptian government continues to deny it legal status. 
	The main goal of most of the human rights movement is to bring Egypt into line with international covenants to which it is a signatory.  Egypt has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This declaration acknowledges a number of rights which are not respected in Egypt, including, but not limited to, the freedom of thought, freedom of association, the right to a fair trial, and freedom from torture.  It has also ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
The Egyptian human rights movement focuses on the protection of civil and political rights, to the apparent irritation of the ruling regime.  Minister of Social Affairs Mervat Tellawi “lashed out at the press” when asked whether the NGO laws were meant to target human rights work.  “You don’t pick one right and amplify it over other rights. So why the emphasis on the political?”    The state is clearly uncomfortable with the idea of civil and political rights.  Social and economic rights, however, are less of a politically charged issue.  These rights do not give people the power to challenge the authority of the state.  Tellawi says the regime wants to “rid human rights of politicisation used as a pretext to interfere in the domestic affairs of some countries.  We look forward to the provision of economic and social rights, which should be given priority to complement civil and political rights.”   Nevertheless, it is understandable that the human rights movement should gravitate toward civil and political rights, as their own political rights are frequently violated.  In addition, while economic and social rights are important, it seems that the government has a greater incentive to honor these rights than the civil and political rights.  A society may tolerate infringements of political rights for long periods of time; these infringements do not affect the masses of people who are apathetic to politics. When it comes to such issues as health care and other social rights, however, everyone is affected, and they will notice if their rights are being violated.  It is in the regime’s best interest to work for the social and economic rights of the people.  For example, in the late 1977, the government tried to cut food subsidies, which led to the “bread riots.”   Thus, while social and economic rights themselves may be equally as important as civil and political rights, it makes more sense that an independent organization focus on civil and political rights.  If they do not, it is likely that no one else will, either.
The EOHR and other human rights organizations have had numerous run-ins with the state.  Since the government seeks to impede the growth of civil society, it is logical that it should target those who seek to protect civil society.  The government attempts to control the movement through Law 32, denying official status to overly-political groups such as the EOHR.  Since its formation in 1985, the EOHR has repeatedly applied for official authorization.  In 2001, the courts ruled in favor of the EOHR’s demand for recognition as an NGO under Law 153.  The Ministry of Social Affairs had sought to deny them a license “at the request of security authorities.”   Nevertheless, EOHR secretary-general Hafez Abu-Se’eda doubts that the ministry will implement the ruling.  The Egyptian bureaucracies do not always comply with court rulings.  
The EOHR thus continues to operate illegally, as it always has.  In fact, despite its illegal status, the EOHR has operated publicly and, to a certain extent, has been tolerated by the government.  This is something of a contrast to Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members are subjected to far more frequent intimidation and imprisonment.  Human rights organizations are in a special position.  The regime tries to portray itself as a democracy, and it would be embarrassing if word got out that it forcibly shut down human rights organizations.  After all, Egypt is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Also, Egypt receives large amounts of aid from the United States, and it would also be embarrassing for the United States to be allied with a country that openly attacked a human rights organization. 	
Since forcibly closing these organizations is not an option, the state must resort to other methods of control.  The government has taken two main approaches in its conflict with the human rights movement: intimidating and trying to discredit activists and organizations, and attempting to co-opt the movement.  Although the regime is hesitant to mount an organized campaign against the human rights movement, leading activists have been imprisoned.  This is likely part of a process of intimidation the regime uses to discourage controversial political activities on the part of the human rights groups.  EOHR’s Abu Se’eda was arrested in 1998 as part of a government campaign against foreign funding.  It was investigating the claim that EOHR had accepted money from the British embassy to publish a report on al-Kosheh, where a large number of Copts had been victims of police brutality.  The regime claimed that the report was intended to make Egypt look bad.   In reality, the check had been intended for a project unrelated to the al-Kosheh investigation.  Human rights activists felt that the prosecutor’s office acted with suspicious urgency in beginning its investigation, and that the investigation was intended to hurt their reputation. 
The most recent case of government intimidation was the arrest and imprisonment of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, sociologist and director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies.  The center encouraged people to exercise their civil and political rights by running voting registration campaigns. It also ran minority rights programs.   The Center had been planning to monitor the upcoming elections when the state shut it down and arrested Ibrahim and three of his colleagues. Ibrahim was charged with accepting unauthorized foreign funds, bribing TV officials to cover his activities, defrauding EU funds, and disseminating false and harmful information about Egypt.  The authorities also stated that they were considering charging him with espionage on behalf of the United States.   These accusations were meant to be damaging to Ibrahim’s reputation.  He was sentenced to seven years in prison, a sentence that was probably meant to intimidate other activists who were critical of the government.  Hisham Kassem, president of EOHR, noted that after Ibrahim’s sentencing, “everyone who had been active in the civil liberties movement chickened out. It was accompanied by an unprecedented smear campaign.”   After much lobbying by foreign governments and human rights organizations, Ibrahim was granted a retrial.  However, few activists are likely to forget what happened and will probably watch their actions more closely.  Also, the charges against Ibrahim and Abu Se’eda regarding foreign funding have forced human rights organizations to forgo large amounts of foreign aid in order to preserve their reputations, which greatly decreases their effectiveness. 
The government has also tried to co-opt the movement by establishing official departments to address human rights in Egypt.  The Foreign Ministry has a human rights desk, and the prosecutor-general’s office also has a human rights division.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is meant “to deal with allegations received from abroad only.”   It also presents reports to the UN concerning Egypt’s compliance with the human rights agreements it has signed.  While the office has made efforts to raise awareness of human rights issues within the other ministries, its main role is foreign relations on behalf of the state.  It tries to portray Egypt in a positive light to the international community, and thus cannot be fully trusted to give an accurate assessment of the human rights situation in Egypt.  The prosecutor-general’s office is supposed to investigate claims of human rights abuse from within Egypt, but local organizations claim that it never responds to their complaints. 
 Most recently, in 2000, the government announced plans for a National Human Rights Council, which would “protect human rights…and conduct human rights research,” in addition to representing Egypt at international human rights events.   Human rights activists were divided over the issue.  Many, including the Centre for Human Rights Legal Aid, felt that it was “unreasonable that the government should form a human rights council in a country where human rights are violated by the government.”   Others felt that, if managed correctly, it might be an effective way for activists to work together with the government toward an improvement in Egypt’s human rights record.  Among the tentative supporters of the council was Hafez Abu-Se’eda.   While the idea of an official government council working with human rights activists is an appealing one, it is difficult not to remain suspicious of its true intentions.  It seems unlikely that this council, affiliated as it is with the presidency, will be able to freely criticize the actions of the state.  

The Human Rights Movement and Egyptian Society
	While it battles the government on one side, the human rights movement faces an entirely different kind of challenge from the side of Egyptian society.  It would not be exactly right to characterize their relationship	as adversarial.  The problem faced by the human rights movement stems more from a general apathy toward the cause and, consequently, lack of grassroots support.  Why is this so?  In a recent al-Ahram article, journalist Pascale Ghazaleh writes “Egypt is a conservative society.  Efforts to modernise it, if judged incompatible with a certain interpretation of the Shari’a, will be defeated—… in terms not of freedoms but of conformity to ‘social norms.’”  The bottom line is that Egyptian society is religiously conservative, and, in many cases, this attitude conflicts with the goals of the human rights organizations.  
	Some argue that the proof of society’s illiberal position is found in the government’s illiberal position, at least regarding social behavior.  As a regime feels itself loosing the popular support, it will appeal to the conservative, traditional values of society in an effort to legitimize itself in the eyes of the people.   When Sadat realized that his infitah policy was alienating the people, he sought to make the sharia a more integral part of Egyptian law.  The Mubarak regime has felt a loss of support to the Islamists, so it has also felt “compelled to defend its Islamic credentials.”   Thus, there are areas of Egyptian law that are based on the sharia, family law being the most prominent of these.   
	Another example of the conservative character of Egyptian society is its reaction to the 1992 film Marriage Egyptian Style, in which the lead character was a woman who had been abandoned by her husband.  Critics were “scandalized and called on the censors to uphold the honour of Egyptian women and of Egypt.”   More recently, feminist writer Nawal al-Saadawi was taken to court to be forcibly divorced from her husband on charges of apostasy.  More than any other case, that of the Queen Boat trial, in which allegedly homosexual men were charged with “habitual debauchery,” illustrates the difficult position of the Eygptian human rights movement in relation to a conservative society.  While international organizations like Human Rights Watch called for the release of these men, the Egyptian movement was unusually silent.  EOHR’s Hisham Kassem explained that despite pressure from international groups, EOHR felt that the case was “a lost battle; we take it up, the government will seize the opportunity to destroy us, and we will be discredited in the eyes of the people.”   
Given the conservative nature of Egyptian society, the question now becomes one of universal human rights versus cultural specificity.  Most Egyptians tend to look at human rights from an Islamic perspective, in which “the umma’s interests take precedence, not those of the ruling class, not those of the state, and not those of the individual…the individual is free in so far as it is of benefit to the community.”   This is at odds with the goals of the Egyptian human rights movement, which defines human rights according to the Universal Declaration.  These rights empower the individual to stand up to the majority.  To most Egyptians, this is a foreign perspective, and there is a general feeling of “frustration and a feeling that the West has taken over this issue.”   From this perspective, the human rights movement might seem like an attack on Egyptian Muslim identity, or at best a distasteful form of imperialism.  
Indeed, there are aspects of this Islamic human rights perspective that are incompatible with the “Western” notion of human rights.  Take, for example, the “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights,” issued in 1981 by the Islamic Council, which calls for respect of human rights, within the framework of the sharia.    Parts of the sharia conflict with the universal notion of human rights.  Examples are in the areas of the rights of women and religious minorities.  The sharia “gives extensive rights of divorce and not to the wife and imposes unequal distribution of inheritance between men and women.”   As for religious minorities, while their presence is tolerated, “they are not allowed to preach openly and proselytise and are forbidden from holding the highest political offices.”   Such discrimination based on gender and religion is incompatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims that everyone has equal rights.  
	The human rights movement maintains that its views on human rights are not Western, but universal.  Egyptian professor Rachad Antonius views the idea of universal human rights as “a moral instrument in my hand as a citizen, not an excuse for foreign intervention.  It is for local consumption.”   Sami Zubaida sees universal human rights as the outcome in a struggle to establish social peace.  “Human rights, seen in this perspective, are not culturally specific, not inherent to any one culture, but a pragmatic imperative in relation to felt needs for social peace and stability.” 
	Ideology aside, the human rights movement in Egypt is in a weak position from a practical standpoint.  It faces a frequently hostile government and an apathetic society.  After several scandals over the acceptance of foreign funds, the EOHR is wary of accepting money from abroad.  Neither does it receive much local funding, as many people view its goals as foreign, or are apathetic to the cause.  With little money and little popular support, the human rights movement must continually struggle for its existence.  While its role as an independent monitor is valuable, it is unlikely that it will effect any significant changes in the government or society unless it is able to gain some social legitimacy.  


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