Islamic Brotherhood

[zaina_al-mohtaseb@mail.utexas.edu]

The Success of Islamic Brotherhood in Jordan and the Formation of Civil Society

Islam, the Middle East, and Civil Society:
Civil Society: Social movements require resources and organizations to mobilize 
sustained collective action.  In less tolerant political systems, such as 
monarchies, where overt protest and formal organization risk harsh regime 
action, informal social networks in collective action are seen.  These informal 
social networks or “informal network of relationships,” which Tariq al-Bishri 
says form a civil society, include tribes, patron-client ties, religion, and 
norms of reciprocity and can be used to mobilize groups.  These networks 
permeate civil society and the state and tie individuals together through a web 
of social relationships that sustain and support collectivities (Palgrave 23).
 	As stated in the Sadowski article, many Orientalists believe 
that “Islam promotes political submission and is therefore incompatible with 
democracy.  Gellner believes that civil society is that “set of diverse non-
governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the 
state.”  Thus, in a civil society, a large group of people cooperate and form 
networks or associations.  Although Gellner does not believe Muslim countries 
can ever have a civil society, in reality a nation does not have to be 
democratic to be a civil society. Gellner would agree with Putnam’s exclusion 
of religious associations as ones leading to civil society because of their 
hierarchical 
nature. 
Putnam stresses the importance of the civic nature (character of the citizens) 
in a democratic government. He, as other republicans, emphasized community and 
obligations of citizenship and believed that the democratic 
government depends on the degree to which its surroundings have the ideal of a 
civic community. Civic virtue includes pursuing the public good at the expense 
of individual needs, and thus active participation in public affairs is 
important.  In other words, citizens should not just pursue personal interest, 
but should cooperate. There should be an equality and reciprocity between 
citizens instead of relationship based on authority and dependency.  Leaders 
are not absolute, as Hobbes believes they should be, but are responsible for 
their fellow citizens. Virtuous citizens respect, trust, and tolerate one 
another. 
Tocqueville, on the other hand, explains how religious unity can be a 
successful method of representational selection (theoretically) because when 
all the citizens agree on one view, there is no need for voting or elections. 
Tocqueville describes early Puritan America society as a religious one with 
homogeneous ethic and that "the observance of the divine laws leads man to 
civil freedom."  Goldberg, like Tocqueville, believes that a homogenous 
religious state can have civic values and that democracy is not the only 
government capable of fostering a civil society. Ellis Goldberg in “Smashing 
Idols and the State,” describes in depth the similarities between Calvinism and 
contemporary Sunni movements in Egypt, and discusses how both these cultures 
have a homogeneous system of beliefs that in every day life transcends 
individual concerns and draws on the voluntary compliance of its constituents. 
In Jordan, Islam is the religion of the kingdom and king must be a Muslim and 
of Muslim parents.  Islamic law, as defined in the Constitution, is one of the 
pillars of legislation in Jordan but not the sole source of legislation.  
Family law is exclusively in the hands of the Shari’a, or Islamic law, courts.  
The constitution also guaranteed the rights and equality of non-Muslims.
Thus, although the governments in the Middle-East might not be as open as 
Western ones, in the sense that they might not enjoy as much civil liberties 
and political freedoms that provide social space for collective action, 
informal social networks allow for social movement such as the Islamic 
Brotherhood to flourish in their attempt to define personal behavior and 
political expression under the rubric of Islam (Satloff, 37).  

Brotherhood movements in Jordan and Syria:  
The government in Jordan contrasted sharply with that of Syria and Egypt in its 
dealings with the Islamic Brotherhood.  The Brotherhood in Syria supported a 
parliamentary system and wanted an elimination of the President’s arbitrary 
rule.  In Syria, a strong Islamic opposition movement to the throne resulted 
from the politicization of the culture and the agenda of the Brotherhood.  In 
Jordan, however, the Hashemite regime displayed an ideological and 
institutional pluralism that accommodated a plethora of groups like the 
Palestinians, Muslim Brothers, tribal groups, and the Westernized people.   
Jordan’s authoritarian pluralism, despite some instability especially in the 
1950’s, ensured the heterogeneity of the state.       
In Jordan, the traditional social class consisting of merchants, retail, 
artisans, and landowners benefited by the state’s policies, and therefore, 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood stemmed mainly from the new middle class 
made up of the various modern occupational groups including lawyers and 
doctors.  Demographic growth, economic development, and educational expansion 
produced this new class of professionals who supported the Islamic movements.  
In Syria, members from both the traditional social class and the new middle 
class supported the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Syrian regime still maintained 
a basis of support from the workers and the peasants.  
Islamic Brotherhood movement in Syria clearly emphasized its cultural 
differences with the ruling regimes and defined its identity in opposition to 
the ideology of Arab socialism of the Al-Asad regime (Ba’athist).  The 
ideological nature of the state in Syria produced a highly politicized region.  
As a result of its struggle for independence against the Ottomans and later 
against the French after WWI, Syria became a secular state.  As a result, there 
was a separation between religion and politics, which led to the rise of Arab 
nationalism.  According to Muslim intellectuals, though, Arab nationalism 
cannot and should not be totally separate from religion.  Nonetheless, Syrian 
nationalist movements were shaped by secular Arabism.  During Syria’s brief 
independence from 1919-1920, a constitutional democracy and not an Islamic 
state was declared.  Even Syria’s struggle for independence from the French 
from 1920 to 1945 did not take place “within an Islamic framework (Palgrave 
59).”  After independence, the parliamentary democracy that the nationalists 
had hoped for did not formulate.  Instead, a Ba’athist coup took a hold of the 
government.  As a result, officials from the rural, lower middle-class, with a 
minority from Islamic origins replaced the officials from the Sunni 
landlord/merchant bourgeoisie background.  This and the Ba’ath bureaucratic 
authoritarian regime formed a basis for Islamic opposition.  The state 
intervened greatly in the economy and antagonized the traditional landowning, 
mercantile, and artisan classes in Syria.  The Ba’ath ideology was another 
reason for Islamic opposition.  Their ideology was very Arab nationalistic and 
socialistic.  Some extreme people in the movement even attacked religion.  “The 
decline of political pluralism under the Ba’ath, the rise of an authoritarian, 
socialist-oriented state, and the imposition of a monolithic discourse were 
consequential for the development of the Islamic opposition movement and shaped 
its discourse (61).”  Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood was supported by the 
displaced property owning class who was completely deprived of its own 
political parties and organizations.  The Syrian regime tried to undermine the 
financial resources of the Islamic institutions, to take away the social roles 
of the ulama, or Islamic scholars, and to replace religion with a secular 
culture.  The Hashemite regime, on the other hand, displayed a form of 
ideological and institutional pluralism, which allowed for the tolerance of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.
The political association established between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Jordanian government is one that was set in motion and solidified in the 1940’s 
when Jordan was still under the rule of King Abdullah.  During King Abdullah’s 
rule, the “Jordanian elite was neither committed to secularism nor did it 
exclude religious activists from participating in the state’s bureaucracy” 
(Palgrave 32).  The Muslim Brotherhood played an important role as a social and 
political force with great influence in the mosques and schools.  King Abdullah 
himself was considered religious and his conceptions and ideals were deeply 
rooted in religion as well.  He believed that “it was the religion of Islam 
that functioned as a unifying force bonding disparate Arab tribes into a single 
powerful nation” (33).  It was King Abdullah’s religiosity that lead to the 
alignment of the Jordanian government and the Muslim Brothers.  King Hussein 
followed in the footsteps of his grandfather.  Hussein’s domestic policy 
invoked Islam through public manifestations of piety, support of religious 
institutions, and continual reference to the Hashemite claim of direct lineage 
to the Prophet (P.B.U.H.).  This fact and the Brotherhood’s moderate actions 
have helped maintain cordial relations with the monarchy. In 1945, protection 
was rendered to the Muslim Brothers when their secretary, Abdul Hakim Abdeen, 
was given a ministerial position within the government. This led to a creation 
of rapport with one another that only strengthened throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. 
From the onset, it became a well-established relationship. It was one that 
revolved around the premise that the Jordanian government, particularly its 
king, was the ultimate authority.  The Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, 
and its members in general were allowed to establish themselves and to work 
towards the attainment of their visions with strict monitoring and restriction 
of some of their activities.   As a result—and as a means of self-preservation 
of the organization—the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan did not display either an 
opposition orientation or any cultural difference with the regime.  Despite the 
fact that the regime did limit political freedom and the king exercised 
considerable power, pluralism and debates among political groups over concrete 
issues were serious and did have an effect on the shaping of the policies of 
the government.  The Brotherhood was effective because it addressed concrete 
issues facing the public without adopting generalities such as “Islam is the 
solution.”  The Brotherhood actually formulated rational arguments to resolve 
concrete social problems and set up an organization whose specific functions 
are to address current social problems (Palgrave 145).  The Muslim Brotherhood 
spoke about concrete issues relating to everyday lives of the citizens and 
effectively used the legal framework to better their chances of success. The 
Islamic Brotherhood has enjoyed rights of political expression refused to other 
groups.  From the 1950’s until the allowance of political parties in 1992, the 
Brotherhood was Jordan’s only political organization.  In turn, this caused 
Islamists to be extremely loyal to the King.

Development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan:
The Muslim Brotherhood movement was founded in 1929 in Egypt by Imam Shaykh 
Hasan al-Banna.  He followed the teachings of the Hanbali School of 
jurisprudence, the writings of Ibn Taymiyya, and the Salafi teachings of Rashid 
Rida and Muhammad al-Afghani in his call to Muslims to repent and return to 
Islam.  He wanted a purification of Islam as set down by the Prophet (peace be 
upon him) and the identification of all Muslims as part of one nation or 
Ummah.  The Ikhwan movements built an alternative state within a state with its 
own mosques, charity organizations, schools, and hospitals, with future hopes 
of reforming the state and bring the regime under true Islamic control.  The 
Ikhwan called for an incremental reform of Muslim society in order to achieve 
political power and then to form the Islamic State.  In Jordan, the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement was headed by Shaykh Abu Qura, who registered the group as 
a charitable association in 1935.  In 1945, the Association of the Muslim 
Brotherhood was officially registered and Abu Qura was its first General 
Supervisor.  After the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951, members of the 
movement wanted to expand the activities of the movement, which till that time 
was only considered a charitable organization, to include participation in the 
upcoming Parliamentary elections.  Abu Qura, who held a less politicized agenda 
than most of the members, resigned, and Khalifa became the new General 
Supervisor.  
Khalifa reorganized the movement and received a license from the government as 
a general Islamic Committee.  Khalifa spoke of the Muslims Brotherhood as 
not a political party…nor a charitable society…not a sports club…The decision 
to license the movement has given sanction to spread its call in the mosques, 
public spaces and the Brotherhood’s premises.  It also enables it to be 
administered by general committees to act in absolute freedom without 
intervention of the security authorities, unless a breach of law occurs (Bar, 
15).
The religious, social, and political goals of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
outlined in the May 1948 constitution.  Among the tenets described in the 
constitution are:
	1.To preach the doctrines in the Qur’an
2.To bring Muslim individuals and groups together by familiarizing them with 
the principles of the Qur’an
3.To develop, protect and liberate the national wealth and raise the standard 
of living
		4.To realize social justice, combat poverty, disease, vice, and 
ignorance.
5.To restore Palestine and to liberate the Nile Valley, the Arab countries and 
the Muslim countries from any foreign power, assist Muslim minorities, support 
the unity of Muslims, and work for Islamic federation.
6.To work for the creation of a righteous state, which will implement Islamic 
doctrines and teachings internally and propagate them abroad.
7.To support international cooperation and to participate in the consolidation 
of peace and human civilization.  (Bar 17)
Since their formation, the Brotherhood has tried to find a balance between 
striving for a reconstruction of the Islamic State, following the example of 
the prophet, and working with the Hashemite regime.  From its beginning, there 
was a special bond between the Hashemites and the Ikhwan, who were considered 
a “loyal opposition” to the regime, in Jordan.  In fact, the regime welcomed 
exiled members of the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhoods in Jordan in the 60s.  
In the 1967 Parliament, three were elected to office.       
Before the 1967 Parliament elections, though, the regime and the Muslim 
Brotherhood dealt with some issues that strained their relationship.  The 
beginning of the 1950’s was a time of instability.  Many events contributed to 
the turbulent atmosphere.  The West Bank was annexed, King Abdullah was 
assassinated, Tallal’s reign was uncertain, and there were various border 
clashes with Israel.  The Brotherhood, at this time, organized demonstrations 
against Israel and “Western imperialism.”  By the end of 1954, the Jordanian 
government refused to have the “Islamic Conference” convene and deported the 
Egyptian secretary Kamil al-Sharif.  Later, when ties were strengthened between 
the Brotherhood and the regime and the political climate was less tumultuous, 
King Hussein granted Sharif asylum in Jordan.  In the 1954 elections, the 
Brotherhood did not run but held protests and demonstrations against the 
proposed Western alliance.  The King issued a policy of close surveillance of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and tension between the two groups escalated.  The 
Brotherhood turned militant while the King dissolved Parliament and moved 
elections to October.  From 1956 on, though, the government shifted the way it 
dealt with the Brotherhood.  Because the King wanted a counterweight to the pro-
Nasserist and leftist parties, he permitted the Ikhwan and the officials of 
the “General Islamic Conference” to renew their activities in Jerusalem.  
In the wake of the elections of 1956, the Brotherhood was faced with a 
decision.  The Ikhwan was not sure whether to register as a political party or 
to remain a religious association.  After much deliberation, the movement 
decided to present its candidates on non-party tickets.  Thus, it did not 
declare itself a political party so that it would not forfeit its preferential 
status as a religious association.  In that way, the Brotherhood became the 
second largest faction in Parliament.  In 1957, the Ikhwan, behind the 
leadership of Khalifa, and the King worked together against Communism.  The 
Muslim preachers even assisted the authorities in searching for Communists in 
hiding.  As a result of their loyalty, the Brotherhood was allowed to continue 
to operate despite the shutting down of all political parties.  Although the 
Palestinian issue and the Brotherhood’s anti-British ideology deteriorated 
relations between the regime and the Ikhwan, the fact that the Brotherhood 
favored a Muslim entity over a “Palestinian entity” that was pushed by Iraq and 
the UAR, kept the Ikhwan on the Jordanian regime’s good side.  Although the 
Brotherhood supported the fida’a movement in Palestine (against the Israeli 
regime), its participation was marginal.              
In 1970-197, the regime expelled many of the Palestinian organizations from 
Jordan.  The king, through these actions destroyed the Palestinian military 
threat in Jordan.  To avoid Palestinian nationalistic movements, Hussein 
incorporated Palestinians into the governing system by giving them powerful 
positions in government, trade, finance and industry so that they do not 
demand “national rights.”  (Satloff, 36).  The regime crackdown of the 
Palestinians in 1970 changed the political arena one more time in Jordan.  
During the fighting, the Muslim Brotherhood called on both sides to stop the 
firing, but after the government's victory was established, the Brotherhood 
congratulated them on a job well done.  With the expulsion of most of the left 
wing supporters from Jordan, the Brotherhood's political position strengthened 
(Bar 32).  Its loyalty was rewarded with the appointment of Ishaq al-Farhan, a 
part of the movement, as the Minister of Education.  This gave the Brotherhood 
power in the educational system and in the mosques.  The ban on political 
parties was reinforced in the 1970s and caused the rise of professional 
associations (doctors, engineers, writers, journalists, lawyer) and academic 
clubs.  These associations that formed the civil society in Jordan at that 
time, were a substitute for political parties.  After the leftists, who had 
been in control of these associations, left the country, the Brotherhood became 
involved in the professional associations.  There were many school principles 
and education ministry officials affiliated with the movement.  As a result, 
there was an overall Islamic surge in the country even in the regime.  The king 
even delivered a speech in the second colloquium of the General Islamic 
Conference (Bar 33).  The political clubs and the professional associations 
filled the political vacuum created by the suspension of the Parliament in 
1976.  
After 1975, the Islamic Brotherhood became more political and the Brotherhood 
opposed the peace process with Israel and denounced Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem.  Although the king took a more moderate stance towards the Israelis 
in order to leave the door open for the Jordan's possible future involvement in 
the process, he criticized the Isreali-Egyptian negotiations over Sinai and 
thus was tolerant towards the Brotherhood and their stance.  Despite his 
tolerance, the king felt he had to "redraw the red lines of permissible 
dissent," and reestablish his power by arresting Khalifa during a protest 
against the peace process in Jordan and then freeing him after "discussion" 
with the authorities (Bar, 34).  In 1979, the regime supported the Brotherhood 
in their pro-Khomeini demonstrations.  In fact, King Hussein personally 
dedicated a new mosque following those demonstrations.  After the 
demonstrations, the Congress approved two resolutions.  First, it “denounced 
the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty as a stab to the Arab and Islamic nations” and 
endorsed Jordan’s stance as a leader of the Arab rejection of the accord; the 
second resolution praised the stand of the Islamic Iranian revolution and its 
support for the Arab cause (Satloff, 41).”  The regime also continued to 
highlight its own religious credentials and to appease the Islamists.  "In 
1979, the government issued a plan for a 25% income tax exemption for payments 
of the traditional zakat tax and nominated leading Ikhwan figures to key 
positions in government insitutions (Bar, 36)."  In return, the Brotherhood 
refrained from taking sides in the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980's.  
Compromises such as these from both sides led to the acceptance and the 
survival of the Muslims Brotherhood in Jordan.	
The Brotherhood flourished with the absence of overt repression, which hindered 
many of the other movements in different Arab countries.  The Brotherhood was 
evenl allowed to openly support the Brotherhood in Syria in its opposition to 
the Syrian, Ba'thi government.  They had training camps for members of the 
Syrian Brotherhood in Jordan and the Brotherhood supposedly had the backing of 
Jordanian government officials such as Prime Minister Mudar Badran.  During 
this time, the Brotherhood strengthened its hold in the mosques and 
universities.  Despite their growing power, the Brotherhood still exercised 
caution.  It did not support attempts by military movements in Pakistan to 
impose Islamic law, Shari'a, because the Shari'a "had to be an act of society 
and not of an individual acting for political gain."  By making that statement, 
the Brotherhood tried to stay on the regime's good side.    
In the 1984 Parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood won three out of the six 
seats designed for Muslims.  Despite the fact that the Ikhwan opposed the 
king's announcement on disengagement from the West Bank, they still abstained 
from confrontation with the monarchy.  Their power was obvious in the 1989 
Parliamentary elections.  They won 22 seats of the 80 and elected one of their 
members as Speaker of the House.  They were successful because of their 
popularity in Jordan, the bloc voting system, in which each voter cast as many 
votes as there were seats, and of their status as not a political party.  "The 
election law, which still banned political parties, did not disqualify the 
Ikhwan nor prevent their exploitation of the mosques and their organizational 
infrastructure (Bar, 41)." The boom of the 1970s and early 80s, in which 
massive input of foreign capital gave opportunities to people in all sectors of 
society, fueled the Brotherhood's growing influence.  Education, travel, 
foreign employment, cars, and televisions were more available, and there was a 
steady flow of oil money into the economy as a result of the Lebanese civil 
war.  Unfortunately, this economic stability did not last, and inflation 
increased greatly and contributed to social unrest.
The regime began to feel threatened by the growing self-confidence of the 
Brotherhood.  This feeling and the economic depression strained relations 
between the regime and the Brotherhood.  To better the Jordanian-Syrian 
relations, the king offered a public apology for helping the Syrian 
Brotherhood.  He also passed new regulations that prohibited preachers in 
mosques from dealing with political issues so that he can limit the growing 
influence of the Brotherhood.  Despite these acts, the regime and the Ikhwan 
continued to avoid all out confrontation.  Although the regime and the 
Brotherhood seemed to agree on the avoidance of war during the Gulf conflict, 
tension could be felt.  To prevent dissension, the king appointed members of 
the Muslim Brotherhood to offices in the fields of education, justice, health, 
and agriculture.  However, when the Parliament, due to the Brotherhood bloc, 
passed a vote against Jordanian participation in the Madrid peace conference 
despite the King Hussein's support for participation, the king dropped the 
Islamists from government.  What further caused a rift between the regime and 
the Brotherhood was the Palestinian question.  In 1988, Jordan surrendered its 
claim to the West Bank.  The Brotherhood did not want a peace treaty with 
Israel while the King was willing to make one.  
To counterweight the Brotherhood's sway in the political arena, the government 
approved the Political Parties Law, which legalized political parties for the 
first time since 1957.  Allowance of political parties changed many things in 
Jordan.  20 political parties appeared, diverse newspapers and periodicals were 
published, electoral competitions occurred, and parliamentary debates took 
place.  Thus, the Brotherhood was not the sole political power, after the 
regime of course, in Jordan anymore.  One of the political parties that formed 
was the IAF (Islamic Action Front Party).  It was a move by the Brothers to 
address the specific problems of the Jordanian society within the legal 
framework set by the state.  The Brotherhood directly addressed issues related 
to Jordan’s national interest and used the political parties law by setting up 
the IAF for the purpose of realizing their Islamic objectives.  Because the IAF 
incorporated both members of the Brotherhood and independent Islamists, it 
reflected a political flexibility in dealing with issues as long as it was 
within the framework of the Islamic Shura (black book).  Friction existed 
between the two groups in the IAF, though.        
	In the 1993 Parliamentary elections, the government tried to limit the 
strength of the Brotherhood.  A new election law was passed by Royal Decree, 
which substituted a one person one vote system for the bloc voting procedure--
which had been advantageous to the Brotherhood.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
participated in the 1993 elections despite the dissolution of parliament before 
the end of its legal mandate and the issuance of the temporary law of “One Man 
One Vote” in 1993, which aimed to diminish and contain the Islamic movement.  
(Palgrave, 33)  Although the IAF won only 16 seats in Parliament, in comparison 
to the 22 seats in the 1989 elections, they were still the most influential 
party in parliament.  
	A schism started to form in the IAF between the "hawks", who wanted to 
challenge the traditional pro-Hashemite orientation of the movement, and 
the "doves", who wanted to continue the tradition of a tacit alliance with the 
regime.  The radicals opposed participation in the 1993 elections under the new 
election law, but were not able to stop the members of the IAF from running in 
them.  With pressure of new leadership, Dhunaybat instead of the moderate 
Khalifa, the IAF openly opposed the king's signed peace treaty with Israel, 
which caused severe confrontation with the regime.  The regime prevented some 
members of the Brotherhood from preaching against the treaty.  There were still 
many members of the Brotherhood who kept trying to affirm the "special bond" 
between the regime and the movement, but the growing rift between the 
government and the Ikhwan was apparent.  
The opposing views in the IAF were evident in the 1997 Parliamentary 
elections.  The Brotherhood called for a boycott of the elections unless the 
government fulfilled its demands.  The demands were that the government "repeal 
the one person, one vote law; to enact constitutional reforms to enhance the 
authority of the legislative branch; to halt "oppressive measures" against the 
political parties and the institutions of the opposition; to implement an 
economic policy which would not accept the "dictates" of the IMF, to enhance 
civil liberties, and to put an end to the "normalization" of relations with 
Israel (Bar 39)."  Others in the IAF called for participation in the elections 
under any circumstances, on the other hand.  Negotiations with the government 
resulted in the government agreeing to discuss the new election law in the 
first session o the newly elected Chamber.  The Brotherhood won only 10 seats 
in the elections of 1997.  The IAF realized that by following the policies 
adopted under the “hawks,” it was leading the movement on a collision course 
with the regime.  Thus, in the 1997 elections of the new IAF Shura and 
Executive committee, “doves” and moderates won 80 percent of the seats.  The 
IAF opted again for action within the legal framework of Jordanian politics, as 
prescribed by the regime.  The Muslim Brotherhood responded positively to the 
new political developments that attempted to serve the society through a 
moderate methodology.

Conclusion: Despite occasional differences with the regime, the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a political force has been generally supportive of the Hashemite 
regime. Thus, through formal, informal, and/or political associations, civil 
society develops, which serves to check the governmental power and protect the 
freedoms of speech, life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.