The Case for Civil Society in Yemen

[Brian Jones <misterpink@mail.utexas.edu>]

	Yemen has the reputation for being one of the hopes for democracy in the Arab world.  A history without a colonial legacy in most of the country and a series of central governments with limited control over the tribes of the North and commercial activity in the South has bred a tradition of local organization and self-sufficience in the absence of a strong central bureaucracy.  In recent years, there have been, at times, personal liberties and protections of expression that were extraordinary relative to those in other countries of the region.  However, a civil war in 1994 was followed by restrictions in these areas.  Also, tribal allegiances, particularly in the North, continue to be stronger than in many countries in the region.

The problem in defining civil society in Yemen is twofold.  First, it cannot be expressly dismissed as is typically done in discussion of civil socieety in the Arab region.  The history of relatively strong protection of civil liberties and the independent movement of a commercial elite defy the typical Orientalist language of primordial, traditional societies and Oriental despotisms in the Middle East.  Second, the tribal oritentation of much of Yemeni society requires the acceptance of a vocabulary in dealing with associational life in Yemen that is not typically present in Western discussions of civil society.

Prerequisites for Civil Society                                            

The theoretical motivation for the development of the concept of civil society lies in the search for a mediating social layer between the state and the individual.  The notion of civil society encompasses the tools with which individuals can protect themselves from abuses of authority and can influence the behavior of their governors.  Therefore, one of the primary prerequisites for the existence of civil society is the ability of a people to act independently of their government, whether in open antagonism or benign autonomy.  This requirement does not require a tradition of such behavior, for political changes can have almost immediate contemporary effect in this regard; however, a tradition of independent popular action provides a helpful model for reform.

The twentieth century political history of Yemen shows two things that are important to understanding the tradition of independent popular action in the country:  a weak central government and the self-sufficience of individual Yemenis without government patronage.

The central governments of Yemen have had various problems in controlling their population throughout the century.  The strong tribal organizations in the North of the country have always operated with a significant degree of autonomy.  The imamate of the first half of the twentieth century always relied on the tribal shaykhs of the North to provide it with its military. (Chaudhry 106)  As a result, the Yemeni military consisted almost entirely of Northern tribal mercenaries under the leadership of their tribal leaders, rather than of a military hierarchy subordinate to the state.  The imamate’s resulting lack of a monopoly on the production of violence made for the second major weakness in the control the government maintained over citizens not only in the North, but in the South as well.  This weakness led to the tribal ability to exert further control over the state through blockading and taxing, without fear of retalitation, the trade routes heading to the port cities of the South. (Chaudhry 109)  The existence of the British free port at Aden posed yet another threat to the strength of the central authority in that the Yemeni government had no control over the emigration of its citizens. (Chaudhry 45)  Not being able to control its border meant that the Yemeni government had to compromise at times with elites in order to avoid the mass migration of its most talented citizens.

Despite governmental compromise, there was still significant emigration of southern Yemenis to Aden.  The contemporary result was the creation of an independent commercial elite in Aden that guided economic affairs in Yemen. (Chaudhry 101)  The first Yemeni experiences with organized labor were also in Aden.  Since Aden’s inclusion under the political authority of Yemen, it has persisted as a center of independent economic interests.  It represents the other important aspect of understanding the tradition of autonomous action on the part of Yemeni citizens.

Coupled with the existence of a relatively autonomous commercial elite, the tribal structure in Yemen made for an extensive network of organizations providing state-like social services.  These organizations meant the independence of Yemenis from government patronage.  This independence combined with the weak central authority meant a history of the Yemeni people pursuing both individual and community interests outside the realm of harsh state controls.

There are still problems of independence in Yemen.  For instance, the northern Yemenis’ ability to retain a degree of protection from government control resulted from the strength of their tribal organizations.  Although they mean independence from governmental authority, the tribes still represent a similar kind of rigidly traditional social authority.  However, they are a layer of social organization outside of the state and, therefore, have the potential for inclusion in civil society.  Also, since its formation in the British colony in Aden, the commercial elite has experienced varying degrees of autonomy dependent upon the behavior of the economy.  During the harsh recession years after the oil boom, for example, the commercial elite was subject to more restriction. (Chaudhry 273)  However, despite fluctuations in the level of their independence, it has always been able to dictate to some degree the economic situation in the country. 

Despite these problems, the Yemeni social structure is still one in which citizens can operate independently of government.  The language of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, primordial traditionalism, oriental despotism, or any other notions that have been used to argue for the outright lack of any potential for civil society in the Middle East does not apply so simply in Yemen.

Associational Life                                                                       

Associational life forms the foundation of most definitions of civil society.  In Yemen, associations are a vital part of everyday life.  The associations present in Yemen, however, do not fit in with typical Western descriptions of associational life seen in Robert Putnam’s Italian sports clubs or Sheila Berman’s German bird-watching societies.  In Yemen, associations fall under two categories: social gathering and local self-help organizations.  Both of these types show signs of the typical problems in defining civil society in Yemen and the potential for its existence.

The primary form of social organization in Yemen is the qat chew.  A daily afternoon gathering of men, the qat chew is a forum for discussion of social and political issues both in the local community and in the nation as a whole.  Putnam’s argument for the necessity of associations is that they provide the opportunity for the development of leadership skills and the formation of connections that can be used to make collective action in the community.  Qat chews certainly serve these purposes.  Status in the community can accrue to men who make impressive contributions to the discussions.  Also, the discussion of local issues in a group setting implies the creation of a network with potential to affect these issues.  In these roles, qat chews serve Putnam’s purpose for associational life, but they also are somewhat related to Habermas’s notion of civil society.  Although not a true part of the public sphere in the sense in which Habermas uses the term, there is the intelligent discussion of issues that Habermas finds important, but that Putnam does not require for associations to be positive contributors to civil society.

There are several attributes of the qat chew that make understanding it in the context of a Wester conception of civil society difficult.  The most obvious among them is the exclusion of women.  The role of women in public participation in Yemen is liberal in the context of the Arabian Peninsula, despite being strongly traditionalist in a global context. (Carapico Women 15)  Despite women’s relative freedom to participate in the public sphere, the traditional foundations of the qat chew preclude their participation.  These traditional foundations lead to other problems that are less immediately obvious.  In a tribal context, deference at a qat chew can be given to people who have power in the tribal structure regardless of the quality of their contributions to the proceedings. (Dresch 417)  This practice directly defeats the purpose of the group in the context of a civil society, namely the development of leaders outside of the traditional structure of authority.

Local self-help organizations form the second half of associational life in Yemen, although they will also play a role in the discussion of the activities of NGO’s in the country.  The discussion of local self-help organizations in the context of associational life is a complicated one.  The organizations took different forms over the second half of the twentieth century, each with their own unique characteristics that both affirm and challenge their classification as civil society.  The constant is that the self-help organization in all of its forms elicited widespread participation.

For the first half of the twentieth century, Yemen was ruled by an imam.  The early twentieth century theocracy did not provide for social services on the local level, partly due ot its inability to establish complete authority in all areas of the country and partly due to its failure to control a constant source of tax revenue.  In response to the lack of services, local communities began waqf foundations which were Islamic charity endowments. (Carapico Civil 69)  The awqaf brought communities together in cooperation for the purposes of building public works projects.  The awqaf were certainly a part of associational life, but their role in civil society was problematic.  Tocqueville’s reservations about the apparent cult of conformity in America could apply equally to the awqaf.  Their connection to the Islamic community made participation something less than voluntary. (Carapico Civil 72)  There were certainly those that did not participate, but they faced censure from their neighbors.  Despite this weakness, the awqaf established a precedent for community self-help organizations that would develop over the course of the remainder of the twentieth century.

The next stage in the development of local self-help organizations could be considered their heyday as a component of civil society.  In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the Local Development Association (LDA) movement began.  These were government institutions that promoted local provision of social services and maintenance of public infrastructure and public works.  Although officially government institutions, the LDAs were only created in order to take advantage of the pre-existing local impulse for self-sufficience and community improvements. (Carapico Civil 108)  The LDAs also tended to retain this local character and control, making them occupy a confusing position somewhere between the state and its citizens.  Despite this connection to the state, it is important, in order to establish their role as associations in civil society, to emphasize that these organizations really had little relationship to the state and were much more independent than their bureaucratic nomenclature would suggest.  In addition to this independence from the state, participation in the LDAs was entirely voluntary, solving the problem of the connection of the awqaf to the religious order 

At the same time as the LDAs were developing, tribal organizations in the North, called ta’awun, were operating along the same lines, but entirely independently from the state.  They served much the same purpose as LDAs in that they provided social services to local populations.  They too were entirely voluntary and so served as a valid forum for associational life.  However, they were tribal institutions, once more making reconciliation with Western conceptions of civil society difficult.  In order to do so, it is necessary to dissociate the term ‘tribal’ from an automatic connection with terms such as ‘traditionalist’ or ‘primordial’.  These associations were very modern in their organization and in their methods.  Despite the fact that most of the money that funding the works of ta’awun came from labor remittances, it was not the migrant laborers, but the local associations, that were developing the ideas and plans for services. (Carapico Civil 113)  That the tribal institutions were developing modern systems of their own accord should be adequate evidence of their flexibility.  This flexibility allows one to accept the possibility that an organization might be both ‘tribal’ and ‘modern’ at the same time.  Also, these organizations were providing services for communities of homogenous tribal composition.  Therefore, their tribal affiliation did not exclude any participants and was, therefore, not an impediment to their playing a role in civil society in this way either.

The end of the the local self-help organizations as a viable component of civil society began in the 1980’s and continues through the present.  The government reorganized the LDAs and created LCCDs which were a more centralized bureaucracy that controlled all local developments. (Carapico Civil 117)  The local self-help organizations were no longer truly local, nor were they any longer non-governmental.  Therefore, they could not offer the means for members of communities to form associations and, therefore, could not be considered a part of civil society.  Despite this unfortunate conclusion, local self-help organizations show the potential for the thorough penetration of associational life in Yemeni society.

Non-Governmental Organizations                                           

Few foreign NGOs operate in Yemen.  Most of the large international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the Red Cross, and Amnesty International deal with Yemen, but there are no NGOs of note that deal with Yemen exclusively.  One exception, although not an important one, is the British-Yemeni Society; however, the organization provides no aid or assistance to Yemen.  Its purpose is only to educate British citizens about Yemeni culture.

The local self-help organizations have already been discussed as a forum for the associational life of Yemenis, but they also function as important non-governmental organizations as well.  The self-help organizations such as the LDAs , awqaf, and ta’awun have been the only providers of locally-oriented aid in Yemen because of the lack of attention of foreign NGOs.   However, the characteristics of the self-help organizations that were problematic for understanding them in the context of associational life are even more problematic when considering them as NGOs building a civil society.  For example, the LDAs and LCCDs are affiliated directly with the government and by definition are not non-governmental.  More importantly, the waqf and ta’awun organizations are tied to the religious and tribal structures of the society.  Although technically non-governmental, they are affiliated to other important sources of authority in Yemeni society and, therefore, can only be included as NGOs in a vision of civil society in a very limited way.

The Public Sphere                                                                      

The public sphere in Yemen has in the past been a free and vibrant exhange of ideas, but more recently has been under much harsher restriction more similar to situations in other countries of the region.  With the unification of the Yemeni Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990, there was a dramatic political opening that included with it strong protections of freedom of expression and a wide array of opinions being made in a public forum.  After the civil war in 1994, however, harsh restrictions were made which make the current situation less positive.

The most important aspect of the public sphere in Yemen is the press.  The press is also the best indicator of the changes wrought by the 1994 crackdown of freedom of expression.  In the years between unification and the civil war, there was an explosion of press that was both political and independent, mainstream and oppositionist.  At one point during this period, including the three major political parties, there were over forty political parties, most with their own newspaper, not to mention the politically non-affiliated newspapers. (Carapico Civil 152)  In the building of tensions preceding the civil war, the newspapers were catalysts to a great sharing of ideas and political mobilization.  In short, they served as an organ for popular opinion.  Although not of the size of the American press or the press of European countries, the Yemeni press was sufficient for a country of only eighteen million people.

In 1994, the civil war changed everything.  The civil rights report of the US Department of State on Yemen for 2001 describes “an atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party journals.”  The report goes on to list many cases in which journalists were arbitrarily detained for questioning and books and journals were confiscated.  A Human Rights Watch press release referred to many of the same cases, but dealt mostly with new developments such as the closing of a prominent weekly paper and the flogging of a journalist convicted on defamation charges.  The State Department does report that circumstances are improving in some areas, but the freedom of the press is clearly not protected in the same way it was before 1994.  In addition to these abuses of the press, there is only one printing press in the country that is not in government ownership.  An alternative to the lack of printing presses is online publishing, but online journals are not exempt from government abuses.  For example, a reporter for the online, English-language Yemen Times was detained without disclosure of his location for months without charges.  In the absence of any independent radio and television broadcasting and only low levels of access to the Internet, this heavyhanded regulation of the press means that the public sphere in Yemen is currently in serious trouble. (US State Dept, HRW Journalist)

As stated before, there is limited access to independent sources of information aside from the printed press.  There used to be two major broadcasting companies before the civil war, but now the few radio and television broadcasting stations are owned by the Yemeni government.  The only Internet service provider in the country is owned by the government as well.  The government does not restrict access to political websites, and there are no reported cases of the government intercepting e-mail communication.  However, with costs of computers and access high and with only about 30,000 Internet users (and only about 8,000 subscribers), the government’s light restriction on the Internet in no way makes for the current persecution of members of the press.  However, the penetration of Internet technologies could increase as there are already estimated to be about 100 Internet cafes across the country.  The popularity of this fusion of the Internet and a more typical venue for discussions and community-building, by the way, gives hope for the future of civil society in Yemen. (US State Dept, CIA World Book)

`At the time of unification, there was a third expression of popular opinion in the public sphere.  A series of mass conventions were held to debate the various issues involved with the advent of unification.  These conventions were rural and urban, scholarly and tribal, and everything in between.  They were truly a national expression of popular opinion.  Among the issues discussed was the inability of the limited civil society in Yemen to protect democracy and the resulting need for clear provisions for fair and free elections. (Carapico Civil 167)  The Saleh government has followed the letter, but not the spirit, of these proposals.  There have been elections, but the first was against opponents who were not competitive and recently laws have passed that have extended term limits from five to seven years. (HRW Elections)  As a result, Saleh has the potential to hold on to the presidency for the first 21 years of the country’s history following the 1994 civil war.  The conventions were an expression of popular opinion, but, clearly, popular opinion does not yet have the strength in Yemen that is expected of civil society.

Conclusions                                                                                

	It is easy to see the strong tribal presence or the current restrictions on the press in Yemen and to assume that there are few prospects for civil society.  However, there is a long history of strong associations and the independence of the population from direct governmental control.  These traditions suggest at least the potential for civil society.  The country’s short history of an increasingly diverse public sphere show that that potential can be realized in at least limited ways.  It is clear that civil society is not yet strong in Yemen.  If it were, many activities of the government since the civil war, the current crackdown on the press, for example, would not be possible.  Part of the reason for this weakness has to do with the low levels of penetration of communications technologies.  The problems with technology in particular could be ameliorated by aid from foreign NGOs.

One of the main problems in understanding the existence of civil society in Yemen is getting around traditional, dichotomizing Orientalist language.  Some of the things predicted by an Orientalist viewpoint are true of Yemen such as low levels of access to technology and relatively poor levels of participation by women.  However, the Orientalist dichotomies of democracy and despotism and traditionalism and modernism do not find so simple an expression in Yemen.  In many cases both sides of the spectrum exist at once.  Tribal, and to a lesser degree Islamic, institutions filled some of the roles of modern government and introduced modernizing technologies in rural areas.  At the same time, however, they served as restricting influences on the modernizing potential of these new organizations and practices.  The period of extreme press freedoms existed concurrently with unifying nationalist government that one might expect to exert singular control over the political process for the purposes of stability.

Civil society in Yemen is embryonic, but present.  In providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and the cooperative provision of social services, it is already quite strong.  In providing a layer of protection between the government and its citizens, it is not yet strong enough.  It is clear that there is a tradition of the impulse for independent organization and expression among Yemenis.  For civil society to continue to grow in Yemen, it is necessary for more attention from international NGOs be given to ensuring that there are not further regressions in protections of the public sphere and that a modern, internationally oriented economy be developed in order to put additional controls on the government.  This international participation is the most important step in allowing Yemeni civil society to grow to a point at which it can protect itself from government interference.  

Works Cited

Carapico, Sheila.  Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Carapico, Sheila.  “Women and Public Participation in Yemen.”  Middle East Report.  173: 15.

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz.  The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East.  
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2001.”  U.S. Depart of State.  Retrieved 15 April
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Dresch, Paul and Bernard Haykel.  “Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in 
Yemen.”  International Journal of Middle East Studies. 27(4): 405-431.

“Yemen’s Constitutional Referendum and Local Elections.”  Human Rights Watch.  February 
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“Yemen: Closure of Newpaper, Journalist Flogging.”  Human Rights Watch.  20 June 2001.  
Retrieved 15 April 2002 from http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/06/yemen0620.htm.

“Yemen.”  The World Factbook.  Retrieved 15 April 2002 from 	
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ym.html