In 2002, the Freedom House organization awarded Saudi Arabia the ranking of '7' in the categories of 'Political Rights' and 'Civil Liberties'. This is the lowest rank on the freedom scale and indeed, in addition to being classified unequivocally as "not free", the kingdom made the organization's 2002 list of "World's Most Oppressive Regimes". For Saudi Arabia, this is no new development. The monarchy has maintained a consistent forbiddance on the development of NGOs, as well as any political activity, since its creation. Although there is an active religious dialogue, even this remains within the confines of the state brand of Islam- Sunni fundamentalism based on the Wahhabi interpretation. Other religious sects within the state, most notably the Shi'a, are isolated and persecuted by the government. What is new, at least since the Gulf War, is the rise of open opposition- including several media savvy groups who stand opposed to the iron grip on power exercised by the royal family.
In this paper, I intend to discuss both the structure of Saudi Arabian governance and society, the relationship between the monarchy and its opposition, and how one might perceive these institutions and organizations in respect to the concept of civil society. Due to lack of access to the kingdom, information on dissent in Saudi Arabian does not exist in abundance; one recent book on this topic entitled, "Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent" by Prof. Mamoun Fandy, provided me with a solid primary source and thus I reference the work somewhat frequently.
In 1932, after over a century and a half of struggle with competing powers, Saudi Arabia as it is recognized today came into being. The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was born of an 18th century alliance between a powerful tribal chief named Muhammad bin Saud and a fundamentalist religious reformer, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab. Saudi Arabia is both an absolute monarchy and an Islamic state. "The Holy Quran (governed according to Islamic law)" is listed by the State Department as the Saudi Arabian constitution. The Saudi government is composed of three main institutions: an administrative bureaucracy known as the Council of Ministers, a Consultative (or "Shura") Council created in 1993 and a system of Islamic courts- as well as other advisory and enforcement agencies. The Council of Ministers was created in 1953 and is "appointed by and responsible to the king". Ministers act as policy advisors to the king, administer the offices of the bureaucracy, and create legislation in accordance with the Shari'a, which must then be approved by the king. Positions within the ministry are typically staffed by members of the royal Sa'ud family, the Sheikh family (descendents of al-Wahhab) or other members of the nobility loyal to the king. The Shura Council was organized as a 60 member council in 1992, and has since expanded to 120 members. The council is empowered to advise the king on "issues of public interest", as well as review the decisions of the Council of Ministers and create counter-legislation for submission. It's composition will be discussed later, in greater detail. The Supreme Council of Justice, and Islamic Courts of First Instance and Appeal, comprise the Saudi Arabian judicial system. The judges inhabiting the Saudi Arabian Islamic courts are 'ulama appointed by the king based on their piety and religious education. In theory, they are autonomous- responsible only to the divine principles spelled out in the Shari'a- with their independence from the state legally protected. However, by all critical accounts, their adherence to the Shari'a in matters concerning the welfare of the state is nominal at best. More often they are accused of using Islamic law to legitimate acts of royal will. According to Freedom House, "the king has broad powers to appoint or dismiss judges", and he also (according to the State Department) "acts as the highest court of appeal and has the power to pardon." Thus the judicial system also represents an extension of royal power.
Law enforcement in Saudi Arabia is carried out officially by the police (including the secret police, who are notorious human rights violators) and border patrols under the Ministry of the Interior. Additionally, the "Mutawaa'in" or "The Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue" -a quasi governmental organization- act to enforce day-to-day adherence to correct Islamic behavior and practice according to their fundamentalist interpretation. The police and the Mutawaa'in both act to obstruct group interaction. In the case of the Mutawaa'in, this includes interference in any festivities involving intermingling of the sexes. The state police, then, act to monitor and disrupt any large gatherings in accordance with the government's total forbiddance of non-governmental organizations and political parties outside of the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The Council of Saudi Chambers is the only NGO permitted under the government's restrictions. It functions as an umbrella group for various economic interests.
It should be noted that fundamentalist religious opinion extends its presence in government and society even further via the work of the Council of Higher 'Ulama, and other official religious agencies. The Council of Higher 'Ulama was created in 1971 by royal decree and are appointed by the king. This council oversees religious education in Saudi Arabia. According to Mamoun Fandy, "This council (also) produces fatwas, books, and sermons designed to legitimate the political order." They are partly responsible, says Fandy, for "maintaining the hegemony of Islamic familialism as an outlook for both state and society."
Fandy asserts that Saudi Arabian society is based on a classist system descending from the royal family (and other loyal aristocratic families) to commercial families, down to ordinary Saudi families and finally bottoming out with foreign workers. He points out that administrative positions, and other advisory roles, are doled out exclusively to loyal and high-ranking allies of the monarchy. Therefore, in his evaluation, position and opportunity in this society are predicated on 'tribal' or 'familial' relations, which create exclusive and vertical bonds. Other authors seem to confirm Fandy's evaluation of the legitimating roles of tribalism and religion in relation to the monarchy. Youssef Choueri, author of "Islamic Fundamentalism" describes Saudi Arabia as "a kingdom without a constitution, political parties or trade unions (which) represents the traditional patronage system in its starkest aspects." "The religious establishment", he claims, "is used to depoliticize society",i.e. to create complacency by giving validity to the government. Fandy, for his part, concludes that it is this patriarchal system, and its use of the submissive "official" 'Ulama, which has spurred the adherents of the new Islamist opposition groups to action. It is true that, in spite of the monarchy's chokehold on civil society through communication and organization restrictions, there has been an unprecedented flourishing of resistance in the last decade. Here I will focus on it in its Islamic forms.
Although all research points to a surge in Islamist reform and revolutionary activity in response to the monarchy's admittance of Western military forces onto their soil during and following the Gulf War, opinions vary on other events which have stimulated this activity. In his work, entitled "Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century", Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies cites "the collapse of most Marxist governments", as well as increasing collusion with the West by Arab leaders in general, as having left "little place for any opposition other than Islamic extremism." One could extend this argument and point out that, in a conservative religious society, one must couch their efforts for reform within the dominant ideology of the society in order to gain a following of any note. Although, this is not to say that there is any indication that leaders of such groups are not sincere in their faith. In Saudi Arabia, the above factors are also said to have combined with decreases in government welfare, and a decline in the job market, to give the Islamists additional ammunition for their opposition.
Fandy, while pointing to Western military presence in as a primary complaint of Islamists, implies that this presence is not so much the heart of the Islamist's discontent; rather, it exposed a vulnerability in the leadership which was fashioned into a doorway to general dissent. Additionally, he denies completely the oft-mentioned "rentier state" theory of Saudi Arabian legitimacy (i.e. legitimacy based on the welfare, or "no taxation, no representation", state) and any relation between dissent and economic downturn. He insists instead that, while oil profits have been used to maintain the classist power structure, economic health has not traditionally corresponded with a rise or decrease in subversive activity. To this end, he points out that the Sa'uds consolidated their power- and ruled two states- prior to the discovery of oil and the great wealth it brought. He further asserts that oil profits have been distributed in shares sized proportionally to a family's nobility and loyalty to the monarchy, thus reinforcing the patronage system. Yet there remains, in my opinion, yet another salient factor in the traditional lack of dissent.
An early incident in the modern history of Islamic rebellion, while not useful as an example of recent opposition, illustrates well methods of response employed by the Saudia Arabian government to such groups. In 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was occupied by an Islamic cult led by a leader whom they claimed was the "Awaited Mahdi". The state responded with a military siege of the compound which resulted in the killing of the proclaimed Mahdi, and the arrest and execution of the 62 other members and their ideological leaders. According to human rights organizations, and dissidents living abroad, other responses to any real or suspected political opposition have included: arrest without trial, torture, threats and harassment of family and extended family and other, similar coercive measures. Suffice it to say that opposition is not taken lightly by the leadership. Additionally, communication both in and outside the kingdom is, as stated before, stunted by government control. Naturally, this makes the task of organizing arduous. These factors- suppression and the high price of rebellion- must also be taken into account when examining the forms of resistance and the actions of dissenting groups.
First accounted for in Fandy's work on dissent are two traditional Sunni Islamists, described by "The Estimate" intelligence publication as the "two most prominent internal Saudi dissidents"- Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Auda. Both of these men are critics of the government who came into the spotlight during the Gulf War. Hawali focused his criticism on the evils of the West and the shame of Saudi Arabian submission to America, while al-Auda criticized "dictatorship and the muffling of counter-opinion" ,as well as politics "where loyalty is based on the distribution of largess and money..." Hawali earned a reputation a charismatic preacher, while al-Auda fit better the role of Islamist intellectual. Both of them, however, spoke out for greater freedom of expression- but only within the boundaries of acceptable Islamic discourse. Hawali was imprisoned for his efforts, in spite of the fact that he padded the impact of his criticisms- claiming that he sought only to warn the monarchy of the dangers of interacting with the West. Al-Auda also delivered his criticism in the form of warnings. Stifling and corrupt dictatorships were found in other Middle Eastern governments and, according to him, served as an example of what the monarchy needed to avoid. He asserted that citizens would not tolerate leaders "who disrespect their minds." He too was imprisoned. Both of these men distributed their sermons via cassette tapes which were widely sought and very popular. Their popularity does imply, if not a distinct level of agreement, at least an interest in critical discourse on the part of the broader society. The indirectness of their criticism and use of rudimentary methods to disperse their speeches, on the other hand, further illustrates the monarchies successful use of restrictions and intimidation to subvert opposition.
Two organizations which received a greater deal of media attention than the two individual preachers are: the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), and the organization which arose from a split in the CDLR- the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). Both are led by Western-educated Saudi citizens, the former by Mohammad al-Mas'ari and the latter by his one-time partner, Sa'd al-Faqih. Complexity marked the evolution of the CDLR. The first, and arguably the most significant, actions taken by its members were the creation of the 1991 "Letter of Demands" and its 1992 follow-up, the "Memorandum of Advice." The 'Letter' was produced after 30 secret meetings between a group of notables and Islamists andwas "signed by many Islamists and intellectuals." The letter was a call for reform and greater accountability for the monarchy- "It addressed various issues ranging from bureaucratic corruption, to legal codification to Islamic human rights." It quickly came under fire from the official 'Ulama due to its public nature (a cassette, also detailing their demands, was released to the public alongside their letter). The group then issued the memorandum to answer this criticism. According to PBS, the 46-page document "criticized the government for corruption and human-rights abuses and for allowing US troops on Saudi soil." The document advocated the government "follow a stricter adherence to Shari'a and repudiate relations with non-Western governments." The official response to the Memorandum was, predictably, critical. The state 'Ulama sought to portay the groups motives as spurious by arguing that Saudi Arabia was indeed an Islamic state with all of the necessary institutions for citizens wishing to voice complaints and receive justice. Therefore, they asserted, the critiques amounted to little more than a publicity campaign.
The CDLR revealed itself to the public in May of 1993. Its leaders relocated to London shortly thereafter and were received with much fanfare from the media. In London, the group sought to gain as broad a base of support as possible. They took great advantage of media attention, unlike their predecessors, granting interviews with Western media sources including the BBC and the Voice of America. To these groups, the CDLR portrayed itself as an Islamic human rights organization opposing the corruption and oppression at work in their homeland. In their Arabic publications, however, they placed greater emphasis on the conservative religious elements of their program. In both cases, they used their newfound access to the internet to great effect, publishing their website in both English and Arabic language formats. They also used it to gather information on the kingdom for their publications. In order to circumvent controls on the internet within Saudi Arabia, the group distributed informative faxes for general distribution to an estimated 300 followers there. They also established hotlines for the same purposes.
Although the effectiveness of this campaign within the kingdom is difficult to establish in terms of citizen response, the government's reaction to this "cyberwar" would imply that the threat was taken seriously. The Saudi government responded to al-Mas'ari's efforts by petitioning the British government to have him deported. This response backfired when "al-Mas'ari's asylum case became a cause celebre." Ultimately, the opposition leader was granted political asylum. Unfortunately, the group's critiques of the government were often impossible to substantiate and deemed sensationalistic, depriving it of its much needed legitimacy in the eyes of the media. Internal strife between al-Mas'ari and his partner al-Faqih led the latter to split from the CDLR in 1996 and form the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia in its place. The CDLR took a different course from there as al-Mas'ari aligned himself with the broader "pan-Islamic" movement, and shifted the groups focus to broader issues, such as the negative impact of US foreign policy in the Arab world and the "Zionist conspiracy." Naturally, this lost him most of the support he had garnered from the West. At this time, the CDLR website is either unavailable or "under construction."
Unlike al-Mas'ari, al-Faqih kept his priorities intact and MIRA is described as "The most sophisticated and effective of the Saudi opposition groups." On their website at www.miraserve.org, they state the goals of their organization as "Major reforms in Arabia; in particular, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the abolition of the Secret Police units subverting political movements and activity." Their efforts are carried out using "All peaceful legitimate means including information, communication and political pressure." Although the language used in this description gives one the impression of a liberal advocacy group, al-Faqih remains an Islamist- maintaining a vision of a society more closely based on Shari'a law and led by the 'Ulama.
The two other groups given consideration in Fandy's work on dissent in modern Saudi are a Shi'a reform movement, led by Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, and the now infamous "Advice and Reform Committee", led by Usama bin Laden. The latter will be excluded from this survey of groups because, although Saudi Arabia is one focal point of bin Laden's violent and revolutionary agenda, his group is ultimately both international and terroristic- which disqualify them from consideration in the context of civil society. The Shi'a group, however, seems exceedingly relevant to this topic.
The modern Shi'a Reform Movement seeks an end to governmental discrimination against members of this religious minority within Saudi Arabia. The Shi'a in Saudi Arabia constitute approximately 5% of the total populace and have been excluded from power- their communities left behind in the modernization of Saudi infrastructure. Moreover, they complain of official restrictions on the expression of their culture- "they (claim to be) forbidden from building mosques, funeral homes, or community halls." The movement itself has moderated from its revolutionary origins in the mid-1970s, spurred at that time by the Iranian revolution. Now, under the leadership of Sheikh al-Saffar, the group publishes works concentrating on "human rights, tolerance, problems of public administration in Saudi Arabia, government corruption and abuses of civil rights." They argue for change within an Islamic context, with the Sheikh asserting in his book, "Pluralism and Freedom in Islam", a religious basis for their liberation and representation in the broader society. His push for reform was rewarded with meetings and concessions by the King who, in 1994, made negotiations with Shi'a opposition leaders in exile. The Shi'a were promised "improvements" in the stunted development of their regions, and two of their leaders were appointed to the Shura Council during its subsequent expansion.
It is important to note, however, that these concessions- while arguably enabled by a shift from revolutionary to reformist tendencies in the movement- occurred as the government was suffering both under the critical dialogue created by other Islamist groups, and the situations which contributed to their empowerment (noted above). In a 1996 Shi'a newsletter, complaints were voiced that the government had failed to deliver on its promises. Since the release of this publication, Shi'a leaders have been arrested and held without charge, and the suppression of their religious activities continues. This brings us to the first of several questions I will try to examine in the remainder of this paper: How effective were the aforementioned groups in achieving their ends?
In 1992, following the Gulf War, the Saudi government took several significant steps toward reform. The creation of the Shura Council and the introduction of the Basic Laws of Governance both seemed to be responses to the popular demands which had placed pressure on the government recently. The first offered the people greater representation among the king's advisors. Although spaces on this council were still filled exclusively by appointment from the king, members were chosen "from important tribes and major interest groups", which heretofore had lacked the official access now granted them. Interestingly, the government defended its use of appointment- as opposed to nomination within the groups- by claiming that nominees chosen by tribe members would be selected based on seniority instead of skill and qualification. This, it was proclaimed, would only serve to reinforce inefficient traditional structures. The Basic Laws of Governance served several purposes upon its release by the king. This document codified, for the first time, the Shari'a laws upon which "administration, local government and many other issues" in Saudi Arabia are based. Additionally, it formalized the process of royal succession, stating that the "reigning king (is) to nominate his heir from the 'most upright' of the descendents of the kingdom's founder." The effect of these laws was to give the government and its legal system greater accountability in the running of its institutions. This sort of codification and increased accountability also happened to be among the 'demands' spelled out in the 1991 'letter'. Lastly, the aforementioned negotiations with the Shi'a minority and their exiled leaders certainly exemplified a break in traditional relations- in spite of their apparent failure.
With the exception of the Shi'a negotiations, none of these changes can be linked directly to a dialogue or positive interaction between the government and the Islamists. Such a link- between their activities and the reforms- has nevertheless been implied by several authors. Other authors claim, however, that Crown Prince Abdullah, the de facto leader due to King Fahd's declining health, is the true wellspring of Saudi liberalization. A Time magazine article described Abdullah as "a rare Saudi leader advocating internal reform." In fact, under his instructions, identity cards were issued for the first time to Saudi Arabian women, and vague promises of further expansion of women's rights have been made. The same article states that "Abdullah has sent signals- albeit in the quiet, gradual Saudi way- that Saudis must get their heads out of the sand and become part of the global village." This comment is a clue to what seems an under-represented, but very salient factor in moves toward reform- the inevitable pushing of this kingdom onto the world stage where it has, in recent years, become more thoroughly exposed than ever, before both the international community and its own citizens. The movement of Islamist leaders to, and their continued campaign there, illustrates both the difficulty of managing opposition within the kingdom and the newfound opportunities to mount resistance elsewhere. The increasingly common phenomenon of Western-educated Saudi elites brings Western concepts into the kingdom as surely as do American troops. The criticism from human rights groups and the media abroad, and conservatives from within, coupled with methods for spreading this criticism through technology which is becoming ubiquitous and harder impossible to control, is a new reality for the monarchy which escaped the cultural deformities of Western colonization following the first World War. Essentially, their escape from colonialism seems to have allowed them to maintain a social structure totally at odds with modern Western ideals- ideals to which their citizens are increasingly exposed. Concerning these reforms, certainly it is not unusual to see an authoritarian government bend under the threat of losing its power entirely. What makes Saudi Arabia interesting are the traditions which seem to have left it with a structure so incompatible with such a change. We observe how the current generation, molded both by these traditions, and increasing exposure to Western thought, is trying to juxtapose these seemingly incongruous ideologies. This brings us to the last of the questions I wish to examine: How well do Western concepts of civil society meld with current Saudi governmental institutions and the aforementioned Islamist opposition groups?
The Saudi government appears almost to be something of a caricature of the sort of institution Robert Putnam described as being like a barbed-wire fence to civic engagement. In southern Italy (which has failed as a civic community), Putnam says, "legitimate authority was monopolized by the king...the church was a powerful, wealthy proprietor in the feudal order...(and) crucial social, political and even religious allegiances and alignments were vertical." Certainly all of these factors and more could be said to be conspiring to maintain the impotence of Saudi Arabian civil society as well. On the other hand, Fandy makes an interesting point when he states that "the royal family exists within both civil society and the state simultaneously." He contends that, while a given prince might be part of the formal governmental structure, as head of a ministership he will also establish a 'mini-majlis', "a meeting place where he brings his friends, businessmen and colleagues." In addition, "each amir also takes care of the 10 to 20 families that work for his office, the prince's office is there to help them whenever they are in trouble with the formal structure." The problem with this description is that Fandy never really leaves the "formal structure', because in Saudi Arabia, patronage is part of the formal structure. A prince conspiring with his buddies, or doing special favors for his employees, reinforces the sort of vertical relationships which maintain the exclusive power of the government and its inaccessibility to the majority of competing patrons. Fandy later points this out himself when he says that "the role of the so-called middle class is not to compete with the royal prince's, but to limit access to them." In a hierarchical, competitive structure, the middle class is indeed dependent on befriending officials if they wish to have their needs met. It seems that when resources run thin and needs are neglected, rules and accountability become a more urgent cause; nevertheless, the risk of alienation runs deep, in Saudi Arabia it is compounded with that of imprisonment, torture and other measures one naturally seeks to avoid. Thus, even setting aside the official forbiddance of NGOs, I would not, under any circumstances, qualify the royalty's involvement with their patrons as "civil society." When the petitioner comes to call on the royal minister, he brings desire to the table. He is forbidden from gathering the power of any community. Though he is able to raise his voice directly to his government, he does so only as a servant.
The CIVICUS organization is devoted to the study of civil society. In their definition of the term, civil society is "composed of organizations citizens have created with neither the purpose of ruling over other people nor of making a profit for individuals." They include in this definition "faith-based groups" and those with a "reformist element." They exclude "religious extremists who practice the violent punishment of those whose beliefs are not theirs." Other strands in the debate on civil society link groups within it to the promotion of democratic values- or exclude groups which do not seek to forge a "democratic bargain" with the existing government in order to share power. In response to these arguments, which might banish Islamist groups from the realm of accepted definitions of civil society, one could assert that Saudi Arabia is a special case. By our standards, the CDLR and MIRA are "religious extremists." In spite of the fact that MIRA claims to use peaceful means in seeking greater liberty for the citizens of Saudi Arabia- or that men like al-Auda also seek greater freedom of expression- they do so in the context of the fundamentalist framework which dominates Saudi Arabia. However, they are seeking some form of liberal reform within an existing structure and it can be argued that while they do not seek to change the oppressive religious conditions, the country is not at a point where any opposition could survive long outside of this framework. For example, the demand that the government increase its accountability- by codifying the religious law under which it operates- is not a demand for the implementation of religious law, which already exists, but instead a demand for a democratically-minded change within the existing structure. When the preacher simply criticizes the government's involvement with the West and is imprisoned, his civil liberties are harmed, and his struggle to be released and allowed to spread his opinions is a struggle for free speech. The Shi'a movement is a prime example of an organization seeking to act as a buffer between government strength and a group of citizens; however, they too seek their freedom within a broader freedom of Islamic worship- and not that of all faiths. Once again, these groups should not be held accountable for the framework within which they operate.
As for envisioning the ideal of an Islamic society, it is impossible to say if they would include violent punishment of non-believers in their actual agenda. The Shi'a group and MIRA have both adopted peaceful policies, for instance. To counter any reference to violence advocated in the Quran, the reader need look no further than the plethora of non-violent faith-based organizations based on a religion which sanctions taking "an eye for an eye"- among other violent practices.
To the argument that civil society cannot possibly exist in such a non-democratic society, one might ask: if civil society is to act as a buffer between the government and its citizens, then how can one claim that these groups require government sanctioning (i.e. may function only within the parameters delineated by said government), when the government has forbidden any such activity? When this is the case, to deny the element of civil society found in reformist opposition, or even non-violent rebellion, is to deny the possibility that citizens living under such conditions retain a collective will. It is to make the government all powerful. The reforms made in Saudi Arabia were enacted- not out of goodwill- but under pressure from the populace. The potential for their rebellion is a real threat to the monarchies grip on power- one cannot, either in this case or historically, ignore the importance of the collective will. One might argue that the expression of opposition among the activist 'Ulama in Saudi Arabia is primitive, and claim that they seek to recoil from the modern world. One might argue that the early activities of the CDLR and the current activities of MIRA are too far outside the land to be effectual. I would concur that the opposition at present is but a tiny representation of civil society in full bloom; however history has shown how, under the appropriate conditions, these seeds can grow and prod the most entrenched system to change- provided that these representations are just that, an active voice for a quieter collective.
The most successful opposition groups have looked to Western society as a staging place (groups in London), or an ideological source (the Shi'a leader espouses concepts of civil society in his work) for demands housed within an Islamic context. They attempt to construct bridges between the liberties they desire and the religion they cherish. The patriarchal system in Saudi Arabia as it is stifles them at every turn, but this system is not an Islamic tradition, instead a regional one. The opposition then reaches out into a world which has rejected this tradition, and seeks not to draw it in, but to refashion the bits which are to its liking. This world, in its turn, grows increasingly critical of such institutions as it moves farther from them. And these forces surround an embattled tribe. At least this seems to be the case- in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the world.