Introduction
Bush and Bashar: Deteriorating
Relations
Prospects, Options, and
Scenarios
Conclusion: An Alternative,
Incremental Approach
About the Report
Of Related Interest
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SPECIAL REPORT 146
Moshe Ma'oz Washington and Damascus Between Confrontation and Cooperation
Summary
Syrian flag. |
- Soon after both men came to power in 2000, relations between U.S.
president George Bush and Syria’s president Bashar al-Asad began to
deteriorate significantly. Since the Iraq war of 2003, Washington and
Damascus have been on a collision course.
- Washington has resented the indirect assistance provided by Syria to
Saddam’s regime and to his loyalists, both before and after the U.S.
occupation of Iraq.
- The United States has also strongly disapproved of Syria’s
sponsorship of terrorism, particularly after 9/11—even though Damascus
was not involved in those attacks on New York and Washington.
- The White House and Congress have other grievances, too, including
Syria’s development, with help from Iran and North Korea, of weapons of
mass destruction; Syria’s occupation (until April 2005) of Lebanon; and
the "tyrannical" nature of Bashar’s regime.
- In December 2003 President Bush signed the Syrian Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA), which imposes economic and diplomatic
sanctions against Damascus. Conservative circles in Washington have also
advocated adopting military measures if Syria does not comply with U.S.
demands.
- These hard-line, confrontational positions contrast sharply with
good U.S.-Syrian working relations during the 1990s, when Presidents
Bush Sr. and Clinton cooperated with President Asad Sr. on such issues
as the Iraq-Kuwait war and the Syrian-Israeli peace process.
- Bashar, although constrained by his conservative circles, has
suggested renewing peace negotiations with Israel without preconditions,
as well as starting a dialogue with the United States. But both
Washington and Jerusalem have turned down Bashar’s overtures, insisting
that he comply with U.S. demands.
- Washington has intensified its pressure on Damascus since the
assassination in Beirut in February 2005 of a former Lebanese prime
minister, Rafiq Hariri. Washington indirectly blamed Syria for the
killing and withdrew its ambassador from Damascus.
- Washington has three options in its approach toward Damascus. One is
to continue along the current collision course, seeking to force a
change either in Bashar’s policy or in the regime in Damascus. This
option, however, poses significant problems. A second option is to
engage and cooperate with Syria and to promote a renewed peace process
with Israel. This approach could yield a win-win result but seems
unlikely to happen given the opposition of George W. Bush and Ariel
Sharon and Bashar’s weakness. The third option is to adopt an
incremental, pragmatic approach, displaying a big stick but also using
carrots to induce Damascus to gradually change its behavior and to
reward it accordingly. Of the three options, this is both the most
realistic and the most promising.
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Introduction
Washington and Damascus are on a collision course. President
George Bush apparently harbors deep antagonism toward President Bashar
Asad. The U.S. government is applying economic and diplomatic sanctions
against Syria and may be considering military measures. There are many
bones of contention between the two countries:
- Bashar vehemently opposed the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq
in 2003, claiming that U.S. actions have served Israeli strategic
interests while posing a serious potential threat to Syria and other
Arab countries.
- Bashar has continued to provide logistical help to Saddam’s
loyalists and allowed Arab combatants to cross from Syrian territory
into Iraq to join anti-U.S. insurgents/terrorists there.
- Damascus has continued to sponsor other U.S.-designated terrorist
groups, including the anti-Israeli Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad,
hailing them as "national liberation movements."
- Syria has continued to maintain its alliance with Iran and its
military ties with North Korea, both members of Bush’s "Axis of Evil."
According to the Congressional Research Service, aid from Iran, China,
and North Korea is essential to the further development, production, and
stockpiling of Syria’s WMD, notably chemical warheads, apparently to
counterbalance Israel’s nuclear capability. (Alfred B. Prados, Syria:
U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues [Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, March 25, 2005]; and Central Intelligence Agency,
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002).
- Syria continued to control Lebanon until April 2005, despite U.S.
demands from 2003 onward that Damascus pull out its military forces and
secret agents from that country. After the assassination on February 14,
2005, of Rafiq Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, the Bush
administration increased pressure on Syria to withdraw. Two months
later, on April 26, 2005, Syria completed its withdrawal.
- The Bush administration has underscored the need for greater freedom
and democracy in Syria (and in all Arab countries). Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice has labeled Bashar’s regime "tyrannical."
U.S.-Syrian antagonism has accelerated steadily since the
ascendancy of Bashar to the Syrian presidency in July 2000 and the
election of Bush as U.S. president in November 2000, suggesting that the
antagonism is not only based on strategic and political interests but also
motivated by ideology and perhaps by personal animosity. Each leader views
the other as holding a belief system antithetical to his own. Bashar
considers Bush to be anti-Arab and pro-Israel while Bush regards Bashar as
anti-American and a terror-sponsoring tyrant.
The crucial question is, Where is this confrontation leading
and what options does each of the leaders have? Will current tensions
escalate and lead to further U.S. sanctions, to the application of
military pressures, and, in the worst-case scenario, to the U.S.
occupation of Syria? What are Bashar’s options? He can choose to fully or
partly accept U.S. dictates—as he has in the case of the recent Syrian
withdrawal from Lebano—or he can try to resist U.S. demands in the name of
Arabism (and perhaps also Islam), as well as to help create an
anti-American Shi’i axis with Iran and Hezbollah. (The Alawite religious
minority, to which Bashar belongs, considers itself a part of the Shi’i
religion).
What are the chances for a more peaceful outcome? Under what
conditions and circumstances can Washington and Damascus cooperate to
advance their vital strategic interests? There is a recent history of
cooperation. President George Bush Sr., and President Bill Clinton
cooperated with Bashar’s father, President Hafiz al-Asad, in fighting the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990–91 and in advancing the Syrian-Israeli
peace process from 1991 to 2000. To be sure, that U.S.-Syrian
collaboration occurred even though Asad was a more brutal tyrant than his
son has proved to be and was guilty of many of the same "transgressions"
of which Bashar is currently being accused: Asad sponsored terrorism,
occupied Lebanon, cultivated Hezbollah, formed an alliance with Iran, and
developed WMD with Russian, Chinese, and North Korean help. Why, then,
does it seem so difficult for Bush and Bashar to cooperate as their
fathers did? Is it because they are heavily influenced by their
conservative circles and their respective ideologies—Bashar by pan-Arabism
and his desire to enhance his legitimacy in the Arab world, and Bush by
his religious beliefs and by the more conservative members of his party,
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and Israel? What
role does the current Iraqi situation—so different from the situation in
1990 when U.S. and Syrian interests coincided—play in contributing to the
clash between Syria and the United States? Does Bush’s tough position on
Syria derive also from his zero tolerance toward terrorism after 9/11?
The chief aims of this report are to examine the causes of
the current U.S.-Syrian confrontation, to compare it with U.S.-Syrian
cooperation under the leadership of Bush Sr., Clinton, and Asad Sr.—and to
outline options and scenarios for the future of relations between
Washington and Damascus. Two scenarios are examined. The first, which
mirrors what seems to be a strong tendency of the Bush administration, is
that Washington punishes Damascus in an effort to force a change in Syrian
policies or perhaps even a change in regime. The second scenario envisages
Washington negotiating with Damascus a framework for bilateral cooperation
based on mutual interests and understandings. This report presents a third
option, one that seems more constructive and nuanced than the first
scenario and more realistic than the second: namely, that the Bush
administration use a mixture of sticks and carrots to induce Syria to
change its behavior and to reward it for doing so.
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Bush and Bashar: Deteriorating Relations
"The U.S. has a growing list of differences with Damascus
. . . relations . . . are worsening."
—Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Washington Post,
February 16, 2005)
When George W. Bush won the U.S. presidential election in
2000, Bashar expected that the new president would continue Bush Sr.’s
legacy of an evenhanded approach to settling the Arab-Israeli conflict.
According to the Syrian Ba’ath newspapers, Bush Jr. would not let the
"Jews who comprise only one percent of the U.S. population continue to be
the political decision makers in the superpower that controls the world
today" (al-Ba’ath, November 4, 2000). But within a short period,
Bashar encountered a new U.S. administration that became more anti-Syrian
and more pro-Israeli than the previous administrations of Bill Clinton and
George Bush Sr. These new attitudes were most manifest in the Defense
Department, as well as in Congress. Initially, while Secretary of State
Colin Powell tried to counterbalance these anti-Syrian tendencies and
court Damascus, President Bush held pragmatic diplomatic positions toward
Damascus. He distanced himself from the Congress-sponsored Syrian
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) of September 2002,
which sought to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against Syria. He
asked the House International Relations Committee to delay the proceedings
regarding this bill lest it narrow U.S. options and affect interests
concerning Syria. But in October 2003, with the U.S. military heavily
engaged in Iraq, Bush dropped his opposition to the SALSA, which was then
approved by almost all members of the Congress and subsequently signed by
the president. Around the same time, Bush approved post facto an
Israeli air strike on an alleged Palestinian terrorist base near Damascus,
the first such strike since the 1970s. This action was in retaliation for
a suicide bombing by Islamic Jihad at an Israeli restaurant in Haifa. Bush
stated after the Israeli raid in Syria, "Israel’s got the right to defend
itself. Israel must not feel constrained in defending its homeland"
(New York Times, October 7, 2003).
By that time, Bush also seems to have developed toward
Bashar a personal and an ideological antipathy, which some observers
contend has since shaped Washington policy toward Damascus (see, for
example, David Brooks’s remarks at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, February 24, 2005). Bashar had certainly contributed to Bush’s
hostile attitude, not least by his vehement opposition to the U.S.
occupation of Iraq. Probably influenced by his conservative old guard,
Bashar responded by and large in a defiant manner to Bush’s requests to
change his behavior and policies, presenting himself as the defender of
Iraq and Arabism. But in mid-2003, when he realized that U.S. forces
deployed in neighboring Iraq were potentially endangering his rule, Bashar
began making halfhearted attempts to mend fences with Washington. He has
partly cooperated with the United States in preventing human and material
assistance from reaching Iraqi insurgents and in detecting al Qaeda
terrorists. Syria, which was not involved in the attacks of 9/11, has also
partly cooperated with the CIA in hunting down al Qaeda activists. In
addition, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Asad sent a cable to
President Bush expressing his condolences (Colin L. Powell, on-the-record
press briefing, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001). Most recently,
Bashar withdrew troops from Lebanon, suggested renewing the peace process
with Israel, promised to close the offices of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in
Damascus, and has periodically restrained Hezbollah. But, as is now
apparent, Bush has not been impressed with what Washington regards as
Bashar’s "hollow measures," holding against Bashar grievances related to
Syria’s positions on terrorism, Iraq, WMD, Israel, Lebanon, and internal
democracy. Let us examine each of these issues in turn.
Terrorism
"Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by
closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations."
—President George Bush (speech given on June 24, 2002)
Systematic combat against terrorism has been at the top of
President Bush’s agenda, particularly since 9/11. Dividing the world into
those who support terrorism and those who oppose it, Bush makes no
distinction between international anti-American terror, al Qaeda style,
and the nationalist anti-Israeli terrorism of Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Islamic Jihad. Bashar, in contrast, maintains that these organizations
"are not terrorist movements, but national liberation movements"
(al-Majd, Jordan, October 8, 2001).
Unlike his father, Bashar openly backed these organizations
and was particularly impressed with Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader.
By siding with Hezbollah as well as with Hamas and Islamic Jihad during
the Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada, Bashar aimed to demonstrate his
pan-Arab, anti-Israeli ideology and policy. Such a position served to
build his legitimacy in Syria and among other Arab nations. Bush, however,
unlike his predecessors, has consistently denounced Syria (and Iran) for
their support of terrorism, both before and after the U.S. conquest of
Iraq.
Iraq
"[The] American attack against Iraq is aimed at dividing
this country, which is Israel’s strategic goal." —Syrian vice
president Abd al-Halim Khaddam (Syrian News Agency, September 6, 2002)
From the time he first assumed power, Bashar carried on his
father’s efforts to improve Syria’s relations with Iraq. Violating
U.S.-backed UN sanctions against Iraq, Damascus allowed Iraqi oil to flow
into Syria and Syrian goods into Iraq, for the benefit of both economies.
With the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iraqi oil ceased flowing to Syria.
A nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council from 2001
to 2003, Syria supported Resolution 1441 of November 2002, demanding that
Iraq permit the renewal of UN supervisors’ work; but, according to
Damascus, the support was offered with the intention of preventing a U.S.
offensive against Iraq. Indeed, unlike other Arab capitals, from the start
of the diplomatic prelude to the war, Damascus vehemently opposed the U.S.
"barbaric" attack, alleging that it was launched because the Americans
"wanted oil and . . . to redraw the map of the region in
accordance with Israeli interests" (al-Safir, Beirut, March 27,
2003). Bashar and other senior Syrian leaders sharply denounced the U.S.
conduct, and Faruq al-Shara, the foreign minister, equated it to
"Nazi-German behavior" (quoted by Eyal Zisser, In the Name of the
Father [Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2003], p. 191). Damascus
also tacitly encouraged public demonstrations against and harassment of
U.S. institutions and diplomats in Syrian cities.
Furiously reacting, Washington accused Damascus of harboring
the Saddam regime’s fugitives, weapons, and monies, as well as of helping
armed Arab volunteers to cross into Iraq and join the anti-American
insurgency. On June 18, 2003, U.S. troops attacked a convoy—allegedly
containing Iraqi fugitives—inside Syrian territory, killing many Syrian
soldiers. This might have been a signal to Bashar that he would face
further U.S. military measures if he did not change his behavior. In much
the same vein, a U.S. official labeled Syria a "rogue nation" and accused
it of "behaving badly," phrases suggesting that Syria could become the
next target of U.S. military assault and occupation (al-Hayat, July
28, 2003; New York Times, October 12, 2003).
Although President Bush signed the SALSA in 2003, he
waited—perhaps to give Bashar time to improve his behavior—until May 2004
to order the implementation of economic sanctions against Syria for
failing to cease completely support for the anti-American insurgency in
Iraq and for anti-Israeli terrorism by Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic
Jihad. Bashar became deeply concerned, not about the U.S. sanctions, which
have in fact been rather mild, but about the deployment of U.S. troops in
Iraq, his next-door neighbor. He obviously has hoped for the failure of
the U.S. occupation of Iraq and has been encouraged by the continued
anti-American insurgency. But Bashar has also realized that the United
States has been persistent in implementing its goals in Iraq and has
refused to withdraw its troops under the pressure of the insurgency. Thus
he is still worried that Syria might indeed become the next target of an
American military attack or that Syria could be isolated in the region and
pressured to democratize. In either case, this could mean the demise of
Bashar’s rule in Damascus. Given these concerns, Bashar has endeavored
since mid-2003 to improve relations with Bush by increasing his
cooperation with the United States on closing the Syrian-Iraqi border to
the continued flow of anti-American guerrillas and on investigating the
money Saddam Hussein had deposited in Syrian banks. Damascus also
supported the U.S.-sponsored resolution at the UN Security Council
authorizing UN cooperation with the U.S.-led multinational force in the
reconstruction of Iraq; backed the Iraqi national election in January
2005; and made several conciliatory statements toward the United States,
including at the Ba’ath Party Congress in early June 2005 (Washington
Post, June 10, 2005). But Bush and his administration have not been
impressed and have continued to denounce Bashar sharply for his misdeeds
in Iraq, sponsoring terror, associating with the "Axis of Evil," and
developing WMD.
The Axis of Evil and Weapons of Mass Destruction
For years Syria was considered by Washington to belong,
together with Libya and Cuba, to a "junior varsity Axis of Evil," mainly
because it has developed WMD. In the wake of its vociferous opposition to
the U.S. war against Iraq, and its initial assistance to Saddam’s war
efforts, Syria has been de facto "upgraded" and has replaced Iraq as a
full-fledged member of Bush’s "Axis of Evil," alongside Iran and North
Korea. The United States and Israel may also consider Syria an important
member in a regional alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. This alliance has
cooperated mainly in carrying out anti-Israeli and, during the 1980s,
anti-American terrorist and guerrilla actions. Damascus has also obtained
Iranian help in providing weapons, training, and intelligence to
Hezbollah, as well as in developing Syria’s long-range missile system.
Following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in Beirut on February 14,
2005, Damascus and Teheran declared a common front vis-à-vis the U.S.
threat to dislodge Syrian control of Lebanon (Financial Times,
February 17, 2005). Syria has been assisted not only by Iran but also by
North Korea in building its long-range ballistic missiles. A December 2001
report by the CIA claims that "Damascus also continued its efforts to
assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid fueled
Scud C missiles," which can reach Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and most of
Israel. Syria has also developed chemical and possibly biological weapons
and allegedly started a civic nuclear power program with Moscow’s help
(Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues).
Significantly, previous U.S. administrations had overlooked Syrian
missiles and chemical programs, possibly regarding them as part of a
justified deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Israel’s nuclear capability. These
administrations considered President Hafiz al-Asad as a potential regional
partner who could help contain Iran and Iraq, stabilize Lebanon, and make
peace with Israel. But as we know, this U.S. grand design was not
implemented, in part because Syria and Israel could not reach a peace
settlement.
Israel
"The Golan has a place in the people’s heart more than
Judea and Samaria." —Ariel Sharon (Ha’aretz, December 28,
2003)
The collapse in March 2000 of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks
taking place under U.S. auspices paved the way for the renewal of the long
and bitter conflict between Damascus and Jerusalem. And when the
Palestinian intifada erupted later that year, Bashar hailed it and
subsequently permitted Hamas and Islamic Jihad to use Damascus as a base
from which to launch terrorist attacks against Israel (including a suicide
bombing in Tel Aviv on February 25, 2005). To foster his legitimacy as a
pan-Arab leader, Bashar complemented his logistical support for the
Palestinian cause with crude anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish rhetoric. Bashar
said that Israel was an "illegitimate state" and "a racist society, even
more racist than the Nazis." In May 2001, in the presence of Pope John
Paul II near the Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line, Bashar urged that
"Christians and Muslims should join in confronting Israel" and denounced
"Jews who try to kill the principles of all religions with the same
mentality with which they betrayed Jesus Christ and the same way they
tried to kill the Prophet Muhammed" (New York Times, May 11, 2001).
Washington strongly protested these unprecedented slurs,
while anti-Syrian feelings deepened among Israeli Jews and American Jews.
And when, in December 2003, eight months after the beginning of the U.S.
occupation of Iraq, Bashar suggested renewing peace negotiations with
Israel, most Israeli Jews doubted Bashar’s sincerity. His enhanced
alliances with Hezbollah and with Iran—archenemies of Israel and
America—have increased mistrust of Bashar in both of those countries.
Sharon and Bush rejected Bashar’s proposal to renew peace talks with
Israel, asserting that Damascus must first stop sponsoring Palestinian and
Lebanese terrorist organizations and withdraw from Lebanon. But Bashar
would not comply until April 2005 (see below), even though he had already
lost his justification for supporting the Hezbollah cause, given that
Israel withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon in May 2000.
Lebanon
"Syria must also end its occupation of Lebanon."
—President George Bush (speaking in Brussels, reported in the New
York Times, February 22, 2005)
Historically and ideologically, Damascus has thought of
Lebanon as "Western" Syria, part of "Greater Syria," and has never had
formal diplomatic relations with Beirut. Damascus has also regarded
Lebanon, particularly the Biqa valley, as a vital strategic asset in case
of a war with Israel, as well as highly valuable to the Syrian economy.
After the eruption of Lebanon’s civil war in 1975, the Lebanese
Maronite-led government asked Damascus to intervene militarily to defeat
the Muslim-Palestinian insurgency. Syria responded by dispatching its
troops to Lebanon in 1976, and in a series of bloody battles Syria
defeated the insurgents and assumed control of the country. The Ta’if
Agreement, reached in 1989 under the auspices of the Arab League, and the
Syrian-Lebanese Brotherhood and Friendship Pact of 1991 in many respects
prolonged Syrian control over Lebanon. (Syria agreed in the Ta’if
Agreement to relocate its troops to the Lebanese Biqa valley by 1992, but
it did not implement the plan fully, withdrawing less than half of its
troops from Lebanon). Although the Ta’if Agreement gave the Lebanese
government the option to request Syrian military withdrawal, successive
Lebanese governments—each of them practically formed by Damascus—did not
invoke that option. Meanwhile, Syria continued strengthening its indirect
domination.
The Lebanese people have been divided between those (mostly
Maronites, Druze, and Sunnis) who want full independence from Damascus and
those (mostly Shiites and especially Hezbollah) who support a continued
Syrian presence. Until recently, the international community—including
Arab states, the United States, and France (the oldest friend of
Lebanon)—preferred to maintain the status quo. Only since the accession of
Bashar and Bush have matters gradually changed. Domestic Lebanese
opposition to Syrian domination has increased noticeably, owing in part to
Bashar’s weakness and his growing sympathy for Hezbollah, while the 9/11
megaterror provoked Bush’s intense antagonism to any kind of terrorism and
his antipathy to Bashar’s conduct.
The U.S. Congress initially took the lead in an attempt to
dislodge Syria from Lebanon, launching, with American Jewish and American
Lebanese backing, the legislative process that led eventually to Bush
signing the SALSA in December 2003. Earlier in 2003, senior U.S. officials
called upon Syria to withdraw its "occupation army" from Lebanon. In July
2003, Damascus redeployed its troops in Lebanon and withdrew several
thousand soldiers, but some fourteen thousand troops remained, in addition
to many hundreds of Syrian intelligence agents. Subsequently, more
pressure was exerted on Syria by the United States, the United Nations,
Arab states, and, for the first time, France. In September 2004, the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1559, jointly sponsored by the United
States and France, calling for "all remaining foreign forces [i.e., Syrian
and Iranian] to withdraw from Lebanon" and for Hezbollah’s armed faction
to be dismantled.
Damascus, however, would not comply, claiming that its
troops in Lebanon were not foreign and that Hezbollah was a "liberation
movement." Lebanon’s prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, resigned several weeks
later on October 20, 2004, ostensibly in protest of the Syrian-imposed
three-year extension of Lebanese president Emile Lahoud’s term in
office—an extension, in effect, of Syrian indirect control. Less than four
months later, Hariri was assassinated in Beirut by an unknown
organization. Many Lebanese believe that Damascus, seeking to eliminate a
serious opponent to its continued domination of Lebanon, was involved in
the assassination. Washington reacted by promptly recalling its ambassador
from Damascus, linking Syria’s occupation of Lebanon to Hariri’s
assassination. The United States led, with Arab and European support, an
intense diplomatic campaign against Syria’s continued occupation of
Lebanon, threatening to accelerate its economic and diplomatic sanctions
against Damascus, and requested a fresh UN resolution against Syria.
Bashar reacted by "redeploying" several thousand of his troops in Lebanon,
but until April 2005 continued to evade Bush’s demand to withdraw also
Syrian secret service agents and to end the occupation of Lebanon. Many
Lebanese from different religious communities staged several peaceful
demonstrations in Beirut, demanding that Syria leave and that the
pro-Syrian government resign. On March 1, 2005, the Lebanese government of
Umar Karami did so, further weakening Bashar’s position. On March 5, 2005,
Bashar announced the phased withdrawal of his army, first to Lebanon’s
Biqa valley, and eventually, on April 26, 2005, across the Lebanese-Syrian
border. But he stated that "Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon does not mean
the absence of Syria’s role. Syria’s strength and its role in Lebanon is
not dependent on the presence of its forces in Lebanon" (Washington
Post, March 6, 2005).
Indeed, Bashar can ill afford to give up all his influence
in Lebanon—Syria’s strategic asset—lest this also damage Syria’s economy
and particularly Bashar’s own prestige at home. He is deeply concerned
about Bush’s attempt to use the Lebanese crisis to isolate him—and,
perhaps, to eliminate him. Bashar appears to have authorized some indirect
but crude demonstrations of Syria’s important role in maintaining
Lebanon’s political security. On March 8, 2005, Damascus’s close Lebanese
ally Hezbollah staged a huge pro-Syrian demonstration in Beirut. During
that same month, a series of deadly explosions occurred in Christian
neighborhoods of Beirut, perhaps intended to signal the security hazards
attendant upon Syria’s departure. And on June 5, 2005, an anti-Syrian
journalist, Samir Kassir, was assassinated in Beirut.
Beyond Lebanon, Bashar faces another crucial challenge, or
demand, posed by Bush: namely, introducing freedom and democracy in Syria.
Pressure on Bashar to move in this direction has been intensified by the
democratic elections that were conducted in January 2005 in both Iraq and
Palestine, by the four-stage elections held in Lebanon in May and June
2005, as well as by President Hosni Mubarak’s decision to change the
constitution of Egypt to allow more than one candidate to run in the
presidential election scheduled to take place in Egypt in September
2005.
Tyranny vs. Democracy
"Syria [is] one of several ‘outposts of tyranny’ in the
world." —Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (New York
Times, February 15, 2005)
Bashar Asad’s ascendancy in Damascus in July 2000 prompted
Western expectations of significant reforms in Syria. A British-trained
ophthalmologist, Bashar had been exposed to Western notions of democracy
and modernization. Two months before his "election" as Syria’s president,
Bashar gave an interview to the Washington Post and underscored his
ties to Western culture and his commitment to introduce far-reaching
reforms in Syria, although at a slower pace than that hoped for by the
West. He also explained that democracy would be tailored to suit Syrian
traditions. In his inauguration speech, he stated, "We cannot apply the
democracy of others to ourselves. Western democracy, for example, is the
outcome of a long history . . . we have to have our democratic
experience which is special to us" (Syrian News Agency, July 17, 2000).
During the first several months of his rule, Bashar permitted, or
tolerated, fairly free "discussion of civil society" through newly created
political forums, as well as the distribution of printed petitions by
Syrian intellectuals calling for freedom of assembly, speech, and press.
He also allowed the printing of new newspapers (one satirical), the
opening of private universities, and the unrestricted importation of
movies. These political overtures accompanied policies to reform and
modernize the economy by introducing private banking, opening a stock
exchange, and inviting foreign Arab investment, as well as by appointing
Western-educated economists to senior administrative economic positions.
But this so-called Damascus Spring did not last long. While
the new measures did not produce a significant improvement in the Syrian
economy, Bashar, influenced by the conservative old guard, became
concerned lest the political opening undermine his regime. In 2001, he
ordered an end to political forums and the dismissal or arrest of
intellectual activists, whom he labeled as "opportunists," "Zionist
spies," and "U.S. agents."
As it happened, the U.S. administration became increasingly
interested in issues of democracy and reform in Syria only after the Iraq
war, partly as a justification for eliminating Saddam’s regime. And since
his reelection as president in 2004, Bush, as a would-be world reformer,
has stressed the notions of liberty and freedom from tyranny and has added
to his previous list of demands from Syria by calling for Bashar to
respect these ideals.
If Bush during his current term of office continues to give
priority to democratization and freedom from tyranny in Syria (and in the
broader Middle East), the confrontation between Washington and Damascus is
likely to become more intense. Bush may be morally and ethically right in
his approach to these issues, but such an approach could be problematic.
Even U.S. allies in the region—including the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia—are reluctant to fully embrace such notions, lest their
personal autocratic regimes collapse and be replaced by militant Islamic,
anti-American systems. Furthermore, unless forced by U.S. military power,
Bashar is not likely to relinquish his rule, his ballistic missiles (which
he sees as his vital deterrent force), or his alliance with Iran.
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Prospects, Options, and Scenarios
Yet it would appear that President Bashar prefers to
negotiate a deal with the United States than to further antagonize it.
Such a deal would allow Bashar to stay in power, advance domestic reform
with U.S. assistance, retrieve the Golan Heights from Israel, and
establish constructive relations with the new Iraqi regime. In return,
Bashar would make peace with Israel, give up his WMD—provided Israel
reciprocates in kind—and disengage from Iran, as well as stop supporting
the militants within Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.
However, Bush has so far dismissed Bashar’s overtures and
insists that the Syrian president must first accede to U.S. demands—which,
of course, would mean that Bashar would have to give up his major assets
and bargaining chips. It would appear that Bush, partly because of
Bashar’s initially defiant and evasive conduct, does not want to deal with
Bashar, and instead seeks to subjugate him—perhaps even to eliminate him.
Backed by his new secretary of state, Congress, most of the media, and
some think tanks, Bush seems to be determined to intensify his
confrontation with Damascus. How practicable, though, is such a policy,
and what dangers might it bring? And what are Syria’s options in this
confrontation scenario?
Scenario I: Confrontation and Punishment
"For three transgressions of Damascus and for four, I
will not revoke its punishment." —Amos 1:3
The United States has at least three options in pursuing an
aggressive policy toward Syria: sanctions, military pressure, and
occupation.
Option A: Sanctions. The United States can work to
isolate Syria regionally and internationally, stepping up economic and
diplomatic sanctions while endeavoring to promote domestic democratic
opposition to Bashar’s regime. The aims of such a U.S. policy would be to
bring about the collapse of Bashar’s regime, his capitulation and
cooperation (along similar lines to the case of Libyan leader Mu’ammar
Qaddafi), or a regime change in Damascus. Yet, economic sanctions,
although painful, would not be very effective, since the volume of
Syrian-U.S. trade is small—about $214 million in exports and $259 million
in imports annually (Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp, Syria:
Political Conditions and Relations with the United States after the Iraq
War [Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 10,
2005], p. 23). Syria’s major trading partners are in Europe, and they are
unlikely to impose either economic or diplomatic sanctions on Damascus.
Indeed, despite U.S. requests to impose such sanctions, European
countries, Russia, China, and several Arab states continue to maintain
diplomatic relations with Syria.
In sum, U.S. sanctions, although damaging to the Syrian
economy and Bashar’s prestige, are unlikely to bring about Bashar’s
replacement, especially not by a democratic regime.
Option B: Military Pressure. The United States can
exercise military pressures on Syria—by selective bombings or aggressive
military incursions into Syria. Such measures may induce Damascus to
change its policies on Iraq, Iran, WMD, and terrorism, as well as cause a
regime change. Bashar might respond by adopting more effective measures to
prevent Arab combatants crossing from Syria to Iraq; by further
restraining Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah; and by announcing and
partly introducing more reforms in Syria’s economic and political systems.
He would be unlikely, however, to relinquish his indirect influence in
Lebanon, his WMD, his alliance with Iran, or his own rule by conducting
fully free and democratic elections. He would be more likely to fall from
power if the Alawi military elite were to see the introduction of such
measures and reforms as a sign of Bashar’s weakness and replace him with
an uncompromising Alawi officer.
Another possible repercussion of U.S. military pressure on
Syria is that it could consolidate Bashar’s domestic backing and the
support of Iran and Hezbollah for Bashar’s regime. Such a U.S. policy
might also unleash anti-American terror and worsen the United States’
already unflattering image as a brutal power in the Arab and Muslim world
and beyond. And if Washington chose secretly to encourage Israel to punish
Syria for backing terrorist attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad by, for
example, selectively bombing Syrian military positions, such action might
damage further the American (and Israeli) position in the region and could
undermine the U.S.-sponsored Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
Option C: Occupation. A third option is the U.S.
occupation of Syria. This option has been periodically advocated by the
more extremist factions in the current U.S. administration, by Congress,
and by think tanks such as the Hudson Institute. If the United States were
able to reallocate sufficient forces from Iraq and elsewhere, it could
fairly easily occupy Syria, but it would be unable to control its
population of eighteen million. The U.S. Army would be likely to encounter
fierce insurgency in Syria as well as anti-American terrorist actions (by
Hezbollah and, indirectly, by Iran) outside the country. The United
States’ image would be devastated in the Arab and Muslim world; it would
be seen as a neo-"crusader" power occupying the "beating heart" of Arab
nationalism and an important Islamic center.
As the preceding discussion of these three options has
indicated, a policy of confronting Syria is unlikely to serve U.S.
interests. It is certainly not in U.S. interests to push Bashar into
cementing a militant axis with Iran and Hezbollah, thus promoting anti-
American and anti-Israeli terrorism. Furthermore, the chances of
pro-American democratic Syrian forces toppling Bashar’s regime are very
slim. The U.S.-sponsored Syrian Reform Party does not have much
credibility among Syrians, and democratic elements in Syria are far too
weak to cause a regime change. The strongest popular movements in Syria
are Muslim militants and conservatives, and they are certainly not
pro-American or pro-Israeli. The only group that can depose Bashar is the
Syrian old guard, notably, senior Alawi officers such as Bashar’s
brother-in-law, General Asif Shawkat—but there is no guarantee that they
would be more inclined than Bashar to accept Bush’s terms.
Scenario II: Engagement and Cooperation
If, then, a confrontational policy poses significant
problems for the United States, what about a policy of rapprochement?
U.S.-Syrian rapprochement, based on mutual understanding and
cooperation between leaders of the two countries, would likely become a
win-win situation and serve the interests of Washington and Damascus, as
well as of Jerusalem and other Middle Eastern centers. Such an outcome
could only come about, however, under the following conditions.
- Bush does not insist on a regime change in Damascus, or on fully
democratizing the Syrian political system, but is content with gradual
reforms, such as those already partly instituted by Bashar, as well as
with Syrian steps to safeguard human and civil rights, give greater
freedom to the press, and create better representation of the Syrian
people in state institutions.
- Bashar, as a confidence-building measure, initially commits himself
to stopping his support for Iraqi insurgents, Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Islamic Jihad and to preparing his people for peace with Israel (other
differences could be settled during subsequent U.S.-Syrian
negotiations).
- Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon drops his refusal to renew the
peace process with Syria and is prepared in principle to return the
Golan Heights to Syria within the context of a full peace agreement with
Damascus.
Peace with Syria would serve major interests for Israel:
neutralizing Hezbollah as a military threat, limiting the activities of
Hamas and Islamic Jihad (whose headquarters are in Damascus), helping to
solve the Palestinian issue (for example, by settling in Syria the
Palestinian refugees residing in Syria and Lebanon), and facilitating
Israel’s acceptance in the region.
For Syria, peace with Israel and cooperation with the United
States would remove a dual strategic threat—from the south (Israel) and
the east (Iraq). It would also expand Syrian trade with Iraq and, if U.S.
financial help were forthcoming, significantly improve the Syrian economy.
With a successful peace agreement, Damascus would no longer need Iran’s
support, would lose its rationale for developing WMD, and would have no
reason to sponsor anti-Israeli terrorist groups.
For Washington, rapprochement with Damascus would include,
in due course, erasing Syria from the list of countries sponsoring
terrorism, and committing itself to helping Syria develop its economy. In
return, Syria would contribute to the stabilization of Iraq—through
political and economic cooperation between Baghdad and Damascus, by
combating regional and international terrorism, and by weakening Iranian
influence in the region. Syria thus could gradually become integrated into
a U.S.-led regional strategic network contributing to peace, stability,
and prosperity in the Middle East. It must be noted, however, that a
stable and comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
with U.S. mediation is also an essential component of this new
configuration—and could be advanced by a Syrian-Israeli peace settlement.
Yet there appear to be formidable obstacles on all sides to
reaching such a mutually beneficial regional configuration. For example,
is Bashar willing and capable of taking the bold steps required to
disengage Syria fully from its relationships with Iran and Hezbollah—thus
abandoning ideological tenets and tactical positions? Can Bashar "sell"
peace with Israel and cooperation with the United States to his public and
his conservative old guard, as his father did? Can Ariel Sharon convince a
largely skeptical Israeli public to give up the Golan for peace with
Syria, especially at a time when the major thrust of his policy is
withdrawing from Gaza and part of the West Bank?
The answers to these open questions are largely in the hands
of President Bush, who holds important cards as the leader of the
superpower with significant political influence, vast economic resources,
and the strongest military force in the region. Bush can, for instance,
build upon the legacy of his predecessors, particularly that of Clinton,
and persuade Israel to give up the Golan in return for full peace with
Syria. He can offer to negotiate with Bashar a "framework for action and
cooperation," an offer Bush Sr. made to Asad Sr. in 1989. Bashar would
probably accept, but Bush is not likely to take such a step.
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Conclusion: An Alternative, Incremental Approach
Given, on the one hand, Bush’s reluctance to engage Bashar
openly in dialogue, and, on the other hand, the potential high risks of a
confrontation with Syria, U.S. policymakers should consider adopting a
third approach to Bashar—one that is pragmatic and incremental, and that
not only wields a big stick but also proffers carrots. The aims of this
policy would be to encourage Bashar’s tendencies to carry out domestic
reforms; to induce Bashar to stop backing anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli
militant elements in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories; and
to signal to Bashar that such constructive Syrian measures will be
rewarded in due course by the lifting of U.S. diplomatic pressures and
sanctions, as well as by the provision of U.S. financial support and U.S.
involvement in negotiating the return of the Golan in exchange for peace
with Israel. This incremental policy should be conducted mainly through
back channels while employing also the influence and good offices of
countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and France.
Such an approach may well prove to be the most realistic and
workable way to avoid a U.S.-Syrian collision, which would be likely to
destabilize the region and prejudice U.S., Israeli, and Syrian interests.
This gradual, pragmatic approach can also bring about in the longer run a
more productive relationship between Washington and Damascus, as will a
peace agreement between Syria and Israel. Differences have been overcome
in the past. Under Asad Sr., Bush Sr., and Clinton, such cooperation
occurred and a Syrian-Israeli peace was almost reached. True, during that
period the Iraqi issue played a different and more positive role in the
U.S.-Syrian relationship, and the United States had not experienced a
megaterror attack. But the United States had suffered a major terror
attack in Lebanon in 1983, when the Syrian-sponsored Hezbollah bombed the
U.S. Marine barracks in reaction to U.S. support for the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon. Despite that attack, Washington and Damascus managed to
cooperate regarding the pacification of Lebanon. Similarly, Israel and
Syria fought each other in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982, but in the 1990s
they seriously negotiated a peace agreement with active U.S. mediation.
Obviously, the current U.S. and Syrian leaders differ from
their fathers in certain respects. Both are more ideologically motivated
and influenced by conservative circles in their respective capitals.
Bashar is a young and fairly immature leader who dared in 2003 to defy
Bush, the leader of the world’s only superpower, over the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. Since then a psychological barrier has been erected between these
two leaders. Still, Bashar has attempted to improve relations with
Washington, helping the CIA in arresting al Qaeda terrorists and
intermittently preventing Arab guerrillas from crossing from Syria to
Iraq. Bashar has also shown his desire to introduce economic and political
reforms in Syria, although he has not been inclined to democratize his
regime fully, despite a request from Bush that he do so. Such a request is
politically unacceptable as far as Syria and other Arab countries are
concerned. Bush Sr. and Clinton demanded much less from Asad Sr., even
though Asad Sr. was a far more brutal dictator than his son has proved to
be. Bashar is more open-minded than his father and can be encouraged over
time to further liberalize his rule and modernize his society. The
alternatives to his rule may be worse as far as Washington is concerned.
In sum, a pragmatic incremental approach may give Bashar and
Bush ample opportunity to change their initial attitudes and to better
understand each other’s concerns and may pave the way for significant
bilateral cooperation based on common U.S. and Syrian interests.
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About the Report
During the 1990s, George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton managed
to achieve strategic cooperation with Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad despite
Syria’s sponsorship of terrorism, development of WMD, alliance with Iran,
and domination of Lebanon. Almost as soon as George W. Bush and Hafiz’s
son, Bashar, became presidents, however, relations between their countries
began to deteriorate significantly. Since then, cooperation has given way
to severe confrontation.
This report examines the reasons for this recent change in
U.S.-Syrian relations, among them the attacks of 9/11, Bashar’s vehement
opposition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and George W. Bush’s ideals of
freedom and democracy and his embrace of certain conservative ideas. Bush,
it seems, has decided to punish Bashar and even, perhaps, to bring about
his downfall. Meanwhile, Bashar, who has been influenced by conservative
circles within Damascus and has publicly embraced pan-Arab ideology, has
contributed by both word and deed to Washington’s antagonism.
The report explores two possible future scenarios—escalated
confrontation and renewed cooperation—and concludes by proposing a third
option: an incremental movement toward a more productive relationship.
Moshe Ma’oz is a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the
United States Institute of Peace. A professor of Islamic and Middle
Eastern studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Ma’oz has published
many works on Syria and has advised Israeli governments on Middle Eastern
affairs.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily
reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not
advocate specific policy positions.
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