News&Analysis

  1. Chas Freeman forced by Israel Lobies to withdraw from NIC Chairmanship, posted by Juan Cole, Informed Comment, Tuesday, March 10, 2009
  2. U.S. choice for top intelligence analyst withdraws, Reuters, Tue Mar 10, 2009 4:56pm EDT
  3. Statement By The Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence
  4. The Freeman Precedent, By Andrew Sullivan | The Atlantic | The Daily Dish, 10 Mar 2009 05:27 pm
  5. The Assault on Chas Freeman, by Joe Klein, Swampland Blog | TIME.com, Sunday, March 8, 2009 at 10:12 am
  6. Middle East reality check, By Roger Cohen, International Herald Tribune, Published: March 8, 2009
  7. Burdening Israel, By Brendan O’Neill, The American Conservative, March 09, 2009 Issue
  8. Here comes socialism, By Mike Madden, Salon.com, March 10, 2009
  9. Don't blame the bankers - deregulation and spending caused it too, says Williams, by Sam Jones, The Guardian, Monday 9 March 2009
  10. Patience and trust - the new economic foundations, By Rowan Williams, guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 March 2009 00.06 GMT - Full text of Ethics, Economics and Global Justice

 

 

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Chas Freeman forced by Israel Lobies to withdraw from NIC Chairmanship

Below is a note former MEPC president, Chas Freeman, sent to friends and supporters.

Begin Text:

To all who supported me or gave me words of encouragement during the controversy of the past two weeks, you have my gratitude and respect.

You will by now have seen the statement by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reporting that I have withdrawn my previous acceptance of his invitation to chair the National Intelligence Council.

I have concluded that the barrage of libelous distortions of my record would not cease upon my entry into office. The effort to smear me and to destroy my credibility would instead continue. I do not believe the National Intelligence Council could function effectively while its chair was under constant attack by unscrupulous people with a passionate attachment to the views of a political faction in a foreign country. I agreed to chair the NIC to strengthen it and protect it against politicization, not to introduce it to efforts by a special interest group to assert control over it through a protracted political campaign.

As those who know me are well aware, I have greatly enjoyed life since retiring from government. Nothing was further from my mind than a return to public service. When Admiral Blair asked me to chair the NIC I responded that I understood he was “asking me to give my freedom of speech, my leisure, the greater part of my income, subject myself to the mental colonoscopy of a polygraph, and resume a daily commute to a job with long working hours and a daily ration of political abuse.” I added that I wondered “whether there wasn’t some sort of downside to this offer.” I was mindful that no one is indispensable; I am not an exception. It took weeks of reflection for me to conclude that, given the unprecedentedly challenging circumstances in which our country now finds itself abroad and at home, I had no choice but accept the call to return to public service. I thereupon resigned from all positions that I had held and all activities in which I was engaged. I now look forward to returning to private life, freed of all previous obligations.

I am not so immodest as to believe that this controversy was about me rather than issues of public policy. These issues had little to do with the NIC and were not at the heart of what I hoped to contribute to the quality of analysis available to President Obama and his administration. Still, I am saddened by what the controversy and the manner in which the public vitriol of those who devoted themselves to sustaining it have revealed about the state of our civil society. It is apparent that we Americans cannot any longer conduct a serious public discussion or exercise independent judgment about matters of great importance to our country as well as to our allies and friends.

The libels on me and their easily traceable email trails show conclusively that there is a powerful lobby determined to prevent any view other than its own from being aired, still less to factor in American understanding of trends and events in the Middle East. The tactics of the Israel Lobby plumb the depths of dishonor and indecency and include character assassination, selective misquotation, the willful distortion of the record, the fabrication of falsehoods, and an utter disregard for the truth. The aim of this Lobby is control of the policy process through the exercise of a veto over the appointment of people who dispute the wisdom of its views, the substitution of political correctness for analysis, and the exclusion of any and all options for decision by Americans and our government other than those that it favors.

There is a special irony in having been accused of improper regard for the opinions of foreign governments and societies by a group so clearly intent on enforcing adherence to the policies of a foreign government – in this case, the government of Israel. I believe that the inability of the American public to discuss, or the government to consider, any option for US policies in the Middle East opposed by the ruling faction in Israeli politics has allowed that faction to adopt and sustain policies that ultimately threaten the existence of the state of Israel. It is not permitted for anyone in the United States to say so. This is not just a tragedy for Israelis and their neighbors in the Middle East; it is doing widening damage to the national security of the United States.

The outrageous agitation that followed the leak of my pending appointment will be seen by many to raise serious questions about whether the Obama administration will be able to make its own decisions about the Middle East and related issues. I regret that my willingness to serve the new administration has ended by casting doubt on its ability to consider, let alone decide what policies might best serve the interests of the United States rather than those of a Lobby intent on enforcing the will and interests of a foreign government.

In the court of public opinion, unlike a court of law, one is guilty until proven innocent. The speeches from which quotations have been lifted from their context are available for anyone interested in the truth to read. The injustice of the accusations made against me has been obvious to those with open minds. Those who have sought to impugn my character are uninterested in any rebuttal that I or anyone else might make.

Still, for the record: I have never sought to be paid or accepted payment from any foreign government, including Saudi Arabia or China, for any service, nor have I ever spoken on behalf of a foreign government, its interests, or its policies. I have never lobbied any branch of our government for any cause, foreign or domestic. I am my own man, no one else’s, and with my return to private life, I will once again – to my pleasure – serve no master other than myself. I will continue to speak out as I choose on issues of concern to me and other Americans.

I retain my respect and confidence in President Obama and DNI Blair. Our country now faces terrible challenges abroad as well as at home. Like all patriotic Americans, I continue to pray that our president can successfully lead us in surmounting them.

Middle East Policy Council
1730 M Street, NW
Suite 512
Washington, DC 20036

End/ (Not Continued)
posted by Juan Cole @ 3/10/2009 07:51:00 PM

http://www.juancole.com/2009/03/chas-freeman-forced-by-israel-lobies-to.html

U.S. choice for top intelligence analyst withdraws

Tue Mar 10, 2009 4:56pm EDT

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The candidate for a top U.S. intelligence post withdrew from the running on Tuesday after angering some in Congress with remarks on Israeli "oppression" of Palestinians, and about China.

The office of Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said in a statement that Charles Freeman, who had been picked to head the National Intelligence Council, had asked not to proceed.

Blair had accepted Freeman's decision with regret, the statement said.

(Reporting by Randall Mikkelsen, Editing by Frances Kerry)

http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5296QZ20090310?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews

Statement By The Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence

Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair announced today that Ambassador Charles W. Freeman Jr. has requested that his selection to be Chairman of the National Intelligence Council not proceed. Director Blair accepted Ambassador Freeman's decision with regret.

http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/03/statement_by_the_office_of_the_director_of_nationa.php?ref=fpbrk

10 Mar 2009 05:27 pm

The Freeman Precedent

By Andrew Sullivan | The Atlantic | The Daily Dish

There are a couple of things worth noting about this minor, yet major, Washington spat. The first is that the MSM has barely covered it as a news story, and the entire debate occurred in the blogosphere. I don't know why. But that would be a very useful line of inquiry for a media journalist.

The second is that Obama may bring change in many areas, but there is no possibility of change on the Israel-Palestine question. Having the kind of debate in America that they have in Israel, let alone Europe, on the way ahead in the Middle East is simply forbidden. Even if a president wants to have differing sources of advice on many questions, the Congress will prevent any actual, genuinely open debate on Israel. More to the point: the Obama peeps never defended Freeman. They were too scared. The fact that Obama blinked means no one else in Washington will ever dare to go through the hazing that Freeman endured. And so the chilling effect is as real as it is deliberate.

When Obama told us that the resistance to change would not end at the election but continue every day after, he was right. But he never fought this one. He's shrewder than I am.

http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/03/the-freeman-pre.html

 

The Assault on Chas Freeman
Posted by Joe Klein
Swampland Blog | TIME.com
Sunday, March 8, 2009 at 10:12 am

I've been loathe to join the argument about whether the veteran diplomat Chas Freeman should be hired to lead the National Intelligence Council. I don't know the man, am only vaguely aware of his reputation--very smart but unothodox, a bit too close to the Saudis, a root canal 'realist' whose cold analysis of the Tiananmen uprising suggested that the Chinese government would have been better served to nip the student uprising 'in the bud.' At the same time, there was the rabid opposition of the professional Jewish community--some of them moderates like Jeff Goldberg, others full-fledged members of the Israel lobby, like former AIPAC honcho Steven Cohen Rosen, others from the neo-hysterical Commentary crowd...perpetrators of the OMG nutsiness about Obama on a range of issues, in this case: OH MY GOD, he's selling out Israel!

In recent days, however, two very reliable sources--at least, I find them so--have made strong arguments in Freeman's defense. The first was James Fallows, who made the absolutely essential argument that Freeman's contrarian nature is precisely what you need at the National Intelligence Council. (One can only imagine the sort of rigor Freeman would have brought to the disgraceful October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq...or even to the 2007 NIE about Iran's cessation of its nuclear program.)

The second argument comes from Andrew Sullivan, who reconstructs the history of the campaign against Freeman--and finds it launched primarily by neoconservatives, who don't like Freeman's position on Israel. Sullivan notes that Jeff Goldberg, who favors a two-state solution and has criticized the Israeli settler movement, bases his case against Freeman on a single speech. It's a pretty tough speech, filled with the sort of, well, candor, that rarely is heard in Washington when it comes to Israel. Here's a slice of it:

Demonstrably, Israel excels at war; sadly, it has shown no talent for peace.

For almost forty years, Israel has had land beyond its previously established borders to trade for peace. It has been unable to make this exchange except when a deal was crafted for it by the United States, imposed on it by American pressure, and sustained at American taxpayer expense. For the past half decade Israel has enjoyed carte blanche from the United States to experiment with any policy it favored to stabilize its relations with the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbors, including most recently its efforts to bomb Lebanon into peaceful coexistence with it and to smother Palestinian democracy in its cradle.

The suspension of the independent exercise of American judgment about what best serves our interests as well as those of Israelis and Arabs has caused the Arabs to lose confidence in the United States as a peace partner. To their credit, they have therefore stepped forward with their own plan for a comprehensive peace. By sad contrast, the American decision to let Israel call the shots in the Middle East has revealed how frightened Israelis now are of their Arab neighbors and how reluctant this fear has made them to risk respectful coexistence with the other peoples of their region. The results of the experiment are in: left to its own devices, the Israeli establishment will make decisions that harm Israelis, threaten all associated with them, and enrage those who are not.


Except for the bit I've highlighted above, which I believe is quite unfair (I'd distinguish Israeli attitudes toward the Jordanians and Egyptians, and even the Saudis, recently, from their view of the Palestinians), I think Freeman's been caught in the flagrant commission of a truth here.  Especially now, as Israel concocts a new government that will probably include an anti-Arab bigot (Avigdor Lieberman) in a key cabinet position, will probably allow the cancerous spread of Jewish settlements on Arab lands and will oppose a two-state solution, I think it's absolutely necessary that the US government, finally, makes it clear when Israel is behaving badly (as Hillary Clinton did recently, when she chastised the Israelis for not allowing humanitarian supplies into Gaza).

So, in sum, a guarded vote for Chas Freeman--not that any votes will be necessary for this appointive position. It's time we had some candor and intellectual noncomformity, some abrasiveness in the too-smooth collegiality of the intelligence bunker. It is also time to resume the relative balance that existed before George W. Bush gave veto power to Israel's neoconservative supporters have over US government policy and appointees in the region.

http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/03/08/the-assault-on-chas-freeman/

Middle East reality check

By Roger Cohen

International Herald Tribune

Published: March 8, 2009

NEW YORK: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton grabbed headlines with an invitation to Iran to attend a conference on Afghanistan, but the significant Middle Eastern news last week came from Britain. It has "reconsidered" its position on Hezbollah and will open a direct channel to the militant group in Lebanon.

Like Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah has long been treated by the United States as a proscribed terrorist group. This narrow view has ignored the fact that both organizations are now entrenched political and social movements without whose involvement regional peace is impossible.

Britain had aligned itself with the U.S. position on Hezbollah, but has now seen its error. Bill Marston, a Foreign Office spokesman, told Al Jazeera: "Hezbollah is a political phenomenon and part and parcel of the national fabric in Lebanon. We have to admit this."

Hallelujah. Precisely the same thing could be said of Hamas in Gaza. It is a political phenomenon and part and parcel of the national fabric there.

One difference is that Hezbollah is in the Lebanese national unity government, whereas Hamas won the free and fair January 2006 elections to the Legislative Council of the Palestinian Authority, only to discover Middle Eastern democracy is only democracy if it produces the right result.

The United States should follow the British example. It should initiate diplomatic contacts with the political wing of Hezbollah. The Obama administration should also look carefully at how to reach moderate Hamas elements and engineer a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation.

A rapprochement between the two wings of the Palestinian movement was briefly achieved at Mecca in 2007. The best form of payback from America's expensive and authoritarian allies - Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan - would be help in reconciling Gaza Palestinians loyal to Hamas with West Bank Palestinians loyal to the more moderate Fatah of Mahmoud Abbas.

It won't be easy. Resolve is not the most conspicuous characteristic of those three allies. But it's not impossible. As long as Palestinians are divided, peace efforts will flounder.

With respect to Hamas, the West is bound to three conditions for any contact: Hamas must recognize Israel, forswear terrorism and accept previous Palestinian commitments. This was reiterated by Clinton on her first Mideast swing.

The 1988 Hamas Charter is vile but I think it's wrong to get hung up on the prior recognition of Israel issue. Perhaps Hamas is sincere in its calls for Israel's disappearance - although it has offered a decades-long truce - but then it's also possible that Israel in reality has no desire to see a Palestinian state.

One view of Israel's continued expansion of settlements, Gaza blockade, West Bank walling-in and wanton recourse to high-tech force would be that it's all designed precisely to bludgeon, undermine and humiliate the Palestinian people until their dreams of statehood and dignity evaporate.

The argument over recognition is in the end a form of evasion designed to perpetuate the conflict.

Israel, from the time of Ben-Gurion, built its state by creating facts on the ground, not through metaphysics. Many of its leaders, including Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni, have been on wondrous political odysseys from absolutist rejection of division of the land to acceptance of a two-state solution. Yet they try to paint Hamas as irrevocably absolutist. Why should Arabs be any less pragmatic than Jews?

Of course it's desirable that Hamas recognize Israel before negotiations. But is it essential? No.

What is essential is that it renounce violence, in tandem with Israel, and the inculcation of hatred that feeds the violence.

Speaking of violence, it's worth recalling what Israel did in Gaza in response to sporadic Hamas rockets. It killed upward of 1,300 people, many of them women and children; caused damage estimated at $1.9 billion; destroyed thousands of Gaza homes and 80 percent of crops. It continues a radicalizing blockade on 1.5 million people squeezed into a narrow strip of land.

At this vast human, material and moral price, Israel has achieved almost nothing, beyond damage to its image throughout the world.

Israel has the right to hit back when attacked, but any response should be proportional and governed by sober political calculation, not violence for its own sake. The Gaza war was a travesty; I have never previously felt so shamed by Israel's actions.

No wonder Hamas and Hezbollah are seen throughout the Arab world as legitimate resistance movements.

It's time to look at them again and adopt the new British view that contact can encourage Hezbollah "to move away from violence and play a constructive, democratic and peaceful role."

The British step could be a game-changer. By contrast, Clinton's invitation to Iran is of little significance. There are two schools within the Obama administration on Iran: the incremental and the bold. The former favors little steps like inviting Iran to help with Afghanistan; the latter realizes that nothing will change until Obama convinces Tehran he's changing strategy rather than tactics.

That requires Obama to tell Iran, as a start, that he does not seek regime change and recognizes the country's critical role as a regional power. Carrots and sticks - the current approach - will lead to the same dead end as Hamas and Hezbollah denial.

Readers are invited to comment at my blog: www.iht.com/passages

http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/03/08/opinion/edcohen.php

Burdening Israel

The weight of being the bulwark of civilization

By Brendan O’Neill

March 09, 2009 Issue

Copyright © 2009 The American Conservative

It is a “beleaguered, courageous little democratic upholder of freedom and enlightenment.” It is defending “the modern world and its achievements” and “the very future of our species.” It stands on “the side of morality, justice, and civilization,” and anyone who criticizes it is a “fellow-traveller of barbarism.” It is possessed of the “values that underscore the Judeo-Christian culture that fostered the Enlightenment” and is a beacon of “political liberty and freedom.”

What could these commentators possibly be gushing about? A plucky new political movement that fights for democracy, liberty, and Truth with a capital T? A humanist journal that faces down the tidal wave of relativism and makes the case for Enlightenment values?

In fact, they’re writing about Israel, that small, militaristic state in the Middle East, which has just executed a bloody war in Gaza and is increasingly seen by culture warriors in the West as the final defense against barbarism; against the unenlightened hordes; against a one-eyed, militant, global conspiracy that would destroy the Western way of life forever.

There are major differences in the way Americans view Israel—most are generally favorable—and the way Europeans view Israel—many are increasingly hostile to the Jewish state. Yet what unites pro-Israel thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic is a view of Israel as a representative of everything progressive and decent. Across the West, more and more anti-relativist, pro-reason writers are projecting their fears for the future of civilization onto the Middle East, imagining that Israel, that last defender of old-fashioned national sovereignty, is fighting not only for its right to exist but for the continued existence of the ideals of the Enlightenment itself.

This is a mad, bad, ill-informed fantasy. A hundred years ago, the German Socialist August Bebel coined the phrase “socialism of fools” to describe those left-wingers who blamed Jews for the ills of modern society. Today, in the elevation of Israel to the position of protector of “the very future of the human species,” we have an “Enlightenment of Fools”—a political posture that both obscures the true origins of anti-Enlightenment sentiments today and places an intolerable burden on the shoulders of the tiny Jewish state.

A new band of writers is continually infusing the squalid wars in the Middle East with a historic, end-of-days momentum. Where many of us recognize that the Israeli-Palestinian clash is a hangover from the national conflicts of the Cold War era, and one that has been exacerbated by the partitionist, divisive politics of the “peace process” instituted by Washington, the Israel-as-Enlightenment lobby sees it as a civilizational war in which Western values might be crushed by the enemies of progress.

During Israel’s attacks on Gaza, writer Ruth Dudley Edwards said Israel had “every right to bomb Hamas” because it is fundamentally fighting to “uphold freedom and enlightenment.” British journalist and author Julie Burchill, who describes herself as a “philosemite,” described Israel as “our Jews,” in the sense that if Israel were to be “wiped out,” then “we will be wiped out, too, all of the modern world and its achievements—swept back into the Dark Ages mulch from whence we came.” Burchill says Israel represents “mankind” and “the very future of our species.” Here, rather than seeing the conflict in the Middle East for what it is—a messy, complex clash over territory, sovereignty, and identity—pro-Israel writers reduce it to a simplistic, cartoon war between progress and darkness, in which the fate of Israel gets dangerously tangled up with the fate of the entire modern world.

Earl Tilford writes in Frontpage magazine about the contrast between Israel, a product of the “Judeo-Christian culture that fostered the Enlightenment” and its neighboring states, which are possessed of a “medieval cultural ethos … more reminiscent of tribalism than civilized society as the West knows it.” In his book The Case for Israel, Alan Dershowitz moves beyond making the case for a specifically Jewish homeland and instead transforms Israel into a civilization symbol. Israel “deserves to exist,” he says, “as a beacon of liberty and democracy in a sea of tyranny and hatred.” Mark Steyn argues that Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis came horribly to life in Israel’s fight against Gaza.

Where once Israel was seen by Republicans and some conservatives as a useful political ally of America, it is increasingly discussed as a cultural ally, even an existential one. In The Objective Standard, John David Lewis says Israel stands at “the front-line of the war between civilization and barbarism.” Echoing Eric Hoffer’s famous Los Angeles Times article of 1968, in which Hoffer argued that “should Israel perish, the holocaust will be upon us all,” another British “philosemite” claimed this year that Israel is at the “defensive frontline against a tyranny that wants to envelop us all. If Israel were to fall, the rest of us would not be far behind.”

Here we can glimpse the fantasy politics, even the conspiracy theory, that underpins the promotion of Israel as the urgent defender of “morality, justice and civilization.” Of course, Israel has local enemies, but Hamas and Hezbollah, two increasingly weak and isolated movements, are hardly a “tyranny” that will “envelop” the world and cause Western civilization itself to “fall.” Yet again and again, Israel’s “enlightened” backers talk up the threat in the Middle East and present themselves and their own ways of life—their values—as also being under attack from the forces of “irrational hatred and genocidal hysteria” lined up against Israel. Indeed, they spread global conspiracy theories that sound similar to those spouted by antiSemites, only this time it’s a cabal of anti-Jews that threatens the world.

Melanie Phillips, one of Europe’s most zealous supporters of Israel, who is now widely published in conservative, pro-Israel publications in the U.S., says, “The issue of Israel sits at the very apex of the fight to defend civilization. Those who want to destroy Western civilization need to destroy the Jews, whose moral precepts formed its foundation stones.” From this mythic perspective, the ragtag militant groups that launch attacks against Israel are not motivated by local or political grievances but by a deep, hidden desire to kill off the Jews in order ultimately to finish off Western civilization. Phillips warns, “Unless people in the West understand that Israel’s fight is their own fight, they will be on the wrong side of the war to defend not just the West but civilization in general.”

What is going on here? How can a conflict that looks to many reasonable people like a long-running national and political clash be described as a grand battle for mankind? In effect, Israel is cynically, and lazily, being turned into a proxy army for a faction in the Western Culture Wars that has lost its ability to defend Enlightenment values on their own terms or even to define and face up to the central problem of anti-Enlightenment tendencies today.

It is striking that many of the newfound, passionate defenders of Israel in the Western public debate are the same people who have raised legitimate concerns about the rise of relativism and the denigration of truth over the past ten to 15 years. Frontpage magazine, Mark Steyn, Melanie Phillips, Ruth Dudley Edwards, and numerous other right-leaning thinkers and writers have, in different ways and with varying degrees of success, tried to counter backward intellectual trends and made the case for rationalism, science, and excellence in the academy and the arts.

In debates about education, for example, they critiqued the trend toward “dumbing down” and “relevance” and defended a Plato-style communication of knowledge and rigorous training of the next generation’s minds. In the discussion about multiculturalism in Europe, or what one pro-Enlightenment, pro-Israel writer describes as “state-sanctioned sectarianism,” they attacked the move toward community separatism and the worship of all cultures as “equally valid.” They criticized the transformation of national museums, products of the Enlightenment, into community outreach centers and for the most part stood up for free speech against the patronizing idea that certain words should be censored to protect the sensitivities of small communities or ethnic minorities.

All of this was—and is—an uphill struggle. It is hard work, in our Age of Relativism, to argue for the values of liberty, equality, and excellence. As the cliché goes, where the Right won the economic war, the cultural Left—with its innate hostility toward apparently oppressive and discriminatory “Western values” (always said with a sneer)—won the Culture War. Faced with the relentless denigration of intellectualism, the defenders of Enlightenment values became increasingly discombobulated and allowed their arguments to become shrill caricatures.

Over the past few years, since 9/11 in particular, they have opportunistically hitched their pro-civilization stance to the war against al-Qaeda, against myopic Islamic radicalism, against small groups of religious militants whom they depict as the greatest threat to the Western way of life. Their flagging, battered 1990s struggle to defend the Enlightenment was re-energized by the brutally simplistic war on terror. Eventually they came to see Islamic militancy as the great enemy of the Enlightenment and thus Israel—Public Enemy No.1 of all Islamic militants—as its supreme defender.

This is a worrying development. It distorts the truth about the conflict in the Middle East. The Israel-as-Enlightenment lobby vastly exaggerates the threat posed by Israel’s enemies, which are not capable of destroying Israel, much less the “foundation stones” of Western civilization. It also exaggerates the coherence and vision of the Israeli state. Far from being an outpost for civilizational values, Israel is, in the words of one Israeli commentator, a collection of “frightened people, wishing for someone strong and forceful, who will miraculously fend off the people’s enemies, real and imaginary.”

Worst of all, the “enlightened” pro-Israel lobby now presents the threat to Western values as a purely external one, emanating from the slums of Gaza or the towns of southern Lebanon or the radical mosques of Iran when, in truth, the Enlightenment is being corroded from within the West itself. In describing Israel’s wars with Palestine as a fight to defend “not just the West but civilization in general,” pro-Israel groupies are partaking in a political and theoretical displacement activity of historic proportion.

It is of course true that Jews have contributed enormously to history, literature, and culture. Yet as Richard S. Levy argues in his book Anti-Semitism: A Historical Encyclopaedia of Prejudice and Persecution, simple philosemitism, like anti-Semitism, also treats the Jews as “radically different or exceptional.” Only in this instance, they are looked upon as the saviors of mankind, the lone defenders of civilization rather than as society’s destroyers. Where anti-Semites project their frustrations with the world and their naked prejudices onto the Jews, and frequently onto Israel, too, the new philosemites project their desperation for political answers, for some clarity, for a return to Enlightenment values onto Israel and the Jews. Neither is a burden that the Jewish people can, or should, be expected to bear.

Anyone interested in breathing life back into the enlightened way of life and thinking should be prepared to have some hard arguments, alongside Jews, Muslims, and anyone else who wants to get involved, rather than pushing Israel forward as a kind of canary in the mine of collapsing Western civilization. 

Brendan O’Neill is editor of spiked in London (www.spiked-online.com). 

http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/mar/09/00020/

Here comes socialism

Some kind of bank nationalization is probably inevitable. The Democrats don't want to admit it yet. The Republicans just want you to be scared.

 

By Mike Madden

Salon.com

March 10, 2009 | WASHINGTON -- Until the U.S. economy fell to pieces last fall, the phrase "nationalize the banks" usually conjured up, in the popular imagination, scenes of the early days of a revolution in some far-off land (if it conjured up anything at all). Government takeovers of entire financial systems were something newspapers buried deep inside the foreign news section for the truly diligent readers, complete with sad little photos of mobs gathering outside banks to get their last withdrawals.

Which is why you may feel a little disoriented if you've turned on a TV or flipped through conservative opinion columns lately. All of a sudden, nationalization seems to have come home. These days, a federal takeover of the banking system is practically the only thing Republicans want to talk about. If South Carolina Sen. Jim DeMint isn't declaring that even temporary nationalization of banks is "the same idea as socialization," then his colleague from the same state, John McCain sidekick Lindsey Graham, is telling NBC's "Meet the Press" that Obama needs to consider the idea. Even Alan Greenspan is part of the conversation. The Ayn Rand disciple whose every public utterance for most of his life has been devoted to extolling the virtues of the free market is suddenly pushing nationalization.

Of course, even though the federal government now owns 36 percent of Citigroup, and Citigroup and other massive banks are teetering on the edge of insolvency, the Obama administration swears there's no plan for a government takeover. "This is a very complex set of problems, and bad decisions can result in huge taxpayer expenditures and poor results," President Obama told the New York Times on Friday, bringing up -- and then shooting down -- the idea that bank nationalization would save the financial sector. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner told PBS's Jim Lehrer last week that nationalization is "the wrong strategy."

Yes, some liberal commentators, like Paul Krugman, are pushing the administration to take more control of big banks as a way of clearing bad home loans and related financial detritus out of the system. But much of the conservative chatter seems aimed at freaking people out about creeping socialism, rather than solving the banking crisis. As one Democratic aide on Capitol Hill put it, "The only people talking about nationalization are Republicans -- this is crazy to me, that they have traded their entire ideology within six weeks." Another aide likened the GOP buzz about bank nationalization to the "Joe the Plumber" phase of McCain's campaign -- talking about a federal takeover of banks is like screaming that Obama wanted to "spread the wealth" around. And, as if on cue, conservative firebrand Michelle Malkin called Obama a socialist on Monday, referring back to the McCain campaign's old language about "Barack the Redistributor."

Chances are, of course, that some of the country's biggest banks will fail the "stress tests" the Treasury Department plans to administer soon -- and will effectively prove insolvent, forcing the issue. (Geithner was set to meet with House Democrats Monday night to explain the tests.) The problem with the GOP talking points is that the scenario DeMint sketched out -- government bureaucrats running banks, deciding who gets loans and who doesn't -- isn't what anyone is contemplating. Instead, any nationalization is likely to be brief, narrow and aimed at saving any assets worth saving from banks that would otherwise go under. (Which isn't that different from what the U.S. already does with failed banks.) But to Republicans, the details seem beside the point. "Nationalization" is just another way to make voters fear Obama's stewardship of the economy.

Whether that scare strategy works politically is hard to gauge. But what Republicans apparently believe will work economically would probably frighten even more people. Instead of nationalizing banks, they want to let them fail. "I think that [the Obama administration has] got to close some big banks. They don't want to do it," Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Banking Committee, told ABC's "This Week With George Stephanopoulos" on Sunday. "I don't want to nationalize them. I think we need to close them." If the debate comes down to simply watching banks go under or letting the government sell off any valuable assets they've still got on the books, nationalization may not seem like such a bad idea.

For now, pollsters say the public isn't paying enough attention to the debate over the financial system to have strong feelings about any one proposal or another. "People are more concerned about losing their jobs, losing their house, the change of living standards that they're facing," said Democratic pollster Harrison Hickman. "From a consumer point of view, I don't think it matters, and they're way too caught up in their own situation to be fixated on those sort of mega-questions." As for calling Obama a socialist, that may not be working, either. " If you did a poll and asked people, 'Here are terms, and see if you think they are an accurate description of Barack Obama,' I bet there are 10 times as many people who say 'Muslim' as say 'socialist,'" Hickman said. "It's sort of like calling somebody a carpetbagger, a scalawag -- it's sort of a word that is devoid of meaning for most people, especially anybody who actually voted for Obama."

What people are most irritated about is the money the banks have already gotten from the government, not what might happen to them under government control. A Newsweek poll last week found 56 percent of voters would rather have the government take over failing banks than just hand over more tax dollars, and 62 percent think the government has already done too much to help banks. The hostility most voters have to helping the banks could make it hard to do anything more no matter how it's spun. Democrats and Republicans alike say there's no way Congress will give the White House more cash to bail out banks without some sign that the $700 billion already authorized has done some good. And as anyone tracking the stock market knows, finding some good news in the financial system these days might be even harder to do than leading a government takeover of all the nation's banks.

http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/03/10/banks/

Don't blame the bankers - deregulation and spending caused it too, says Williams

• Archbishop delivers attack on impact of globalisation
• Time for everyone to look at own lifestyles, he says

  Sam Jones

  The Guardian, Monday 9 March 2009

Blaming the greed of individual bankers for the financial crisis was too easy and people should instead be asking profound questions about how poorly regulated economies obsessed with ever-growing consumer choice have skewed the judgments of entire countries, the Archbishop of Canterbury has said.

The Right Rev Rowan Williams used a lecture in Cardiff at the weekend to deliver a wide-ranging attack on a globalised economic system which had been "spectacularly successful in generating purchasing power" but which had also led us to "the most radical insecurity imaginable".

As economists struggle to find technical solutions to the recession, which has brought interests rates to their lowest level in 300 years and forced the government to cut VAT in an effort to get shoppers back into the high street, he said ordinary people had to ask themselves difficult questions about their own lives.

"To use one of the more obvious examples, it has become clear that lifestyles dependent on high levels of fossil fuel consumption reduce the long-term opportunities of basic human flourishing for many people because of their environmental cost - not to mention the various political traps associated with the production and marketing of oil in some parts of the world, with the consequent risks to peace and regional stability."

Dr Williams criticised the unthinking pursuit of growth, which had led to an "unhealthily hyperactive" economy. He said: "If it is essential to invest in certain kinds of productive ventures, how does this relate to the broader and longer-term imperative of securing the funding of social care future by way of sustainable shared resources, accumulated wealth?"

The global economic downturn has hurled several powerful bankers from relative anonymity into the limelight.

Chief among them is the former chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Sir Fred Goodwin, who has found himself embroiled in an increasingly bitter row with the government over his £703,000-a-year pension.

Many senior figures in the government have questioned whether he deserved such a large reward given his stewardship of the bank, which lost £24bn last year. But although Harriet Harman, the deputy leader of the Labour party, has described Goodwin's pension as "unacceptable", Dr Williams questioned whether heaping blame on individual bankers served any purpose when much of the fault lies with the financial system itself.

Focusing on the greed of bankers had made people lose sight of the fact that "governments committed to deregulation and to the encouragement of speculation and high personal borrowing were elected repeatedly in Britain and the United States for a crucial couple of decades", he said. "Add to that the fact of warnings of some of the risks of poor (or no) regulation, and we are left with the question of what it was that skewed the judgment of a whole society as well as of financial professionals."

The archbishop is known to have had several meetings with bankers and financial experts as he developed his critique of the way in which - as he sees it - a consumer class in developed countries had helped to a "new group of urban paupers" in unstable developing countries.

He said that governments which promised "maximised choice and minimised risk" encouraged voters to forget the fundamentals of economic reality.

He criticised a financial system which, he said, displayed deep and systemic impatience.

"A badly or inadequately regulated market is one in which no one is properly monitoring the scarcity of credit. And this absence of monitoring is especially attractive when governments depend for their electability on a steady expansion of spending power for their citizens."

The archbishop cautioned against a move towards protectionism, but attacked "opportunistic" offshoring and outsourcing by large international companies. "The present situation favours economic agreements that give little or no leverage to workers and that have minimal reference to social, environmental or even local legal concerns.

"Learning how to use governmental antitrust legislation to break up the virtually monopolistic powers of large multinationals that have become cuckoos in the nest of a national economy would also be an essential part of a strategy designed to stop the slide from opportunistic outsourcing towards protectionism and monitoring or policing the chaotic flow of capital across boundaries," he said.

In future politicians and economists would have to move away from the idea that wealth and profit could be achieved without risk. He called for a "return to the primitive capitalist idea" of risk-sharing. He also demanded that environmental costs should be factored into all future economic calculations.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/09/deregulation-spending-banking

 

Patience and trust - the new economic foundations

In a lecture entitled Ethics, Economics and Global Justice which was given on Saturday in Cardiff, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, called for patience from governments, firms and individuals to renew the trust fractured by the economic crisis.

Rowan Williams

guardian.co.uk, Monday 9 March 2009 00.06 GMT

Full text of Ethics, Economics and Global Justice

In a conversation a couple of months ago at Canary Wharf, a senior manager in financial services observed that recent years had seen an erosion of the notion that certain enterprises necessarily took time to deliver and that therefore it was a mistake to look for maximal profits on the basis of a balance sheet covering only one or two years. There had been, he suggested, a deep and systemic impatience with the whole idea of taking time to arrive at a desired goal – and thus with a great deal of the understanding of both labour and the building of confidence. Either an enterprise delivered or it didn't, and the question could be answered in a brief and measurable time-span.

For all the rhetoric about accountability, getting your money's worth, the effect of such assumptions in all kinds of settings has been a spectacular failure to understand the variety of ways in which responsible practice might be gauged – whether in relation to investment in actual production or in relation to new financial products, whose sustainability and reliability can only be proved after the passage of time. Very much the same kind of impatience has also been part of the tidal wave of assault on the historic professions – including the law, teaching and academic research and some aspects of public service. The short-term curse continues to afflict the voluntary sector in the absurd timescales attached to grant-giving; but all that is material for a lecture in its own right …

But in connection specifically with the financial crisis, the main point is about what appropriate patience might look like where various financial and commercial enterprises are concerned. The loss of a sense of appropriate time is a major cultural development, which necessarily changes how we think about trust and relationship. Trust is learned gradually, rather than being automatically deliverable according to a set of static conditions laid down. It involves a degree of human judgement, which in turn involves a level of awareness of one's own human character and that of others – a degree of literacy about the signals of trustworthiness; a shared culture of understanding what is said and done in a human society.

And this learning entails unavoidable insecurity. I do not control others and I do not control the passage of time and the processes of nature; even the ­processes of human labour are limited by things outside my control (the capacities of human bodies). My lack of a definitive and authoritative or universal perspective means that I may make mistakes because I misread others or because I miscalculate the levels of uncertainty in the processes I deal in. And the further away I get from these areas of learning by trial and error, the further away I get from the inevitable risks of living in a material and limited world, the more easily can I persuade myself that I am after all in control.

Although people have spoken of greed as the source of our current problems, I suspect that it goes deeper. It is a little too easy to blame the present situation on an accumulation of individual greed, exemplified by bankers or brokers, and to lose sight of the fact that governments committed to deregulation and to the encouragement of speculation and high personal borrowing were elected repeatedly in Britain and the United States for a crucial couple of decades.

Add to that the fact that warnings were not lacking of some of the risks of poor (or no) regulation, and we are left with the question of what it was that skewed the judgment of a whole society as well as of financial professionals. John Dunning, a professional analyst of the business world, wrote some six years ago about what he called the "crisis in the moral ecology" of unregulated capitalism (in the editorial afterword to a collection of essays on Making Globalisation Good, p.357); and he and other contributors to his book discussed how "circles of failure" could be created in the global economy by a combination of moral indifference, institutional crisis and market failure, each feeding on the others. Yet warnings went unheeded; people's rational capacities, it seems, were blunted, and unregulated global capitalism was assumed to be the natural way of doing things, based on a set of rational market processes that would deliver results in everyone's interest.

This was not just about greed. At least some apologists for the naturalness of the unregulated market pointed – quite reasonably in the circumstances – to the apparently infallible capacity of the market to free nations from poverty. It may help to turn for illumination to an unexpected source. Acquisitiveness is, in the Christian monastic tradition, associated with pride, the root of all human error and failure: pride, which is most clearly evident in the refusal to acknowledge my lack of control over my environment, my illusion that I can shape the world according to my will. And if that is correct, then the origin of economic dysfunction and injustice is pride – a pride that is manifest in the reluctance to let go of systems and projects that promise more and more secure control, and so has a bad effect on our reasoning powers.

This in turn suggests that economic justice arrives only when everyone recognises some kind of shared vulnerability and limitation in a world of limits and processes (psychological as well as material) that cannot be bypassed. We are delivered or converted not simply by resolving in a vacuum to be less greedy, but by understanding what it is to live as an organism which grows and changes and thus is involved in risk. We change because our minds or mindsets are changed and steered away from certain powerful but toxic myths.

Now, you could say that ethics is essentially about how we negotiate our own and other people's vulnerabilities. The sort of behaviour we recognise as unethical is very frequently something to do with the misuse of power and the range of wrong or corrupt responses to power – with the ways in which fear or envy or admiration can skew our perception of what the situation truly demands of us. Instead of estimating what it is that we owe to truth or to reality or to God as the source of truth, we calculate what we need to do so as to acquire, retain or at best placate power (and there is of course a style of supposedly religious morality that works in just such an unethical way). But when we begin to think seriously about ethics, about how our life is to reflect truth, we do not consider what is owed to power; indeed, we consider what is owed to weakness, to powerlessness.

Our ethical seriousness is tested by how we behave towards those whose goodwill or influence is of no "use" to us. Hence the frequently repeated claim that the moral depth of a society can be assessed by how it treats its children – or, one might add, its disabled, its elderly or its terminally ill. Ethical behaviour is behaviour that respects what is at risk in the life of another and works on behalf of the other's need. To be an ethical agent is thus to be aware of human frailty, material and mental; and so, by extension, it is to be aware of your own frailty. And for a specifically Christian ethic, the duty of care for the neighbour as for oneself is bound up with the injunction to forgive as one hopes to be forgiven; basic to this whole perspective is the recognition both that I may fail or be wounded and that I may be guilty of error and damage to another.

It's a bit of a paradox, then, to realise that aspects of capitalism are in their origin very profoundly ethical in the sense I've just outlined. The venture capitalism of the early modern period expressed something of the sense of risk by limiting liability and sharing profit; it sought to give limited but real security in a situation of risk, and it assumed that sharing risk was a basis for sharing wealth. It acknowledged the lack of ultimate human control in a world of complex processes and unpredictable agents and attempted to "negotiate vulnerabilities", in the terms I used a moment ago, by stressing the importance of maintaining trust and offering some protection against unlimited loss. By sharing risk between investor and venturer, it also shared power.

The problems begin to arise when the system offers such a level of protection from insecurity that risk comes to be seen as exceptional and unacceptable. We take for granted a high level of guaranteed return and so come to prefer those transactions in which the actual business of time-taking and the limits involved in material labour and scarcity of goods are less involved. It has been persuasively argued that things begin to go astray, morally, in the early and intimate association between capitalism and various colonial projects, in which abundant new natural resources and abundant new reserves of labour (notably in the shape of slavery) could be counted on to minimise some kinds of risk.

In the post-colonial climate, it has been the world of financial products that becomes the favoured basis for both personal and social economy. A badly or inadequately regulated market is one in which no one is properly monitoring the scarcity of credit. And this absence of monitoring is especially attractive when governments depend for their electability on a steady expansion of spending power for their citizens. Increasingly, to pick up the central theme of Philip Bobbitt's magisterial works on modern global and military politics, government rests its legitimacy upon its capacity to satisfy consumer demands and maximise choices – its capacity to defer or obscure that element of the uncontrollable which in earlier phases of capitalist production dictated the habits of mutual trust and shared jeopardy, the habits that made sense of the otherwise morally controversial idea that the use of money was itself in some sense a chargeable commodity, something that needed to be paid for.

Maximised choice is a form of maximised control. And it presupposes and encourages a basic model of the ideal human agent as an isolated subject confronting a range of options, each of which they are equally free to adopt for their own self-defined purposes. If an economy resting on financial services rather than material production offers more choice, a government will lean in this direction for electoral advantage, since its claim to be taken seriously is now grounded in its ability to enlarge the market in which individuals operate to purchase the raw materials for constructing their identities and projects.

As I hope will be clear, this is a deeper matter than just "greed". It is a fairly comprehensive picture of what sort of things human beings are; and to recognise it as a reasonably accurate model of late modern "developed" society, especially in the north Atlantic world, is not to suggest any blanket condemnation of market principles, any nostalgia for pre-modern social sanctions and so forth – only to begin to sketch an analysis of where and how certain quite intractable problems arise.

As already indicated, the modern market state, in Bobbitt's sense of the term, the state that promises maximised choice and minimal risk, is in serious danger of encouraging people to forget two fundamentals of economic reality: scarcity as an inexorable truth about a materially limited world, and concrete productivity and added value as the condition for increasing purchasing power or liberty, and thus sustaining any kind of market. The tension between these two things is, of course, at the heart of economic theory, and imbalance in economic reality arises when one or the other dominates for too long, producing an unhealthily controlled economy (scarcity-driven) or an unhealthily hyperactive and ill-regulated economy (based on the simple expansion of purchasing power).

But forget that tension and what happens is not stability but plain confusion and fantasy. We have woken up belatedly to the results of behaving as though scarcity could be indefinitely deferred: the ecological crisis makes this painfully clear. We have woken up less rapidly and definitively to the effects of displacing labour costs to undeveloped economies. The short-term benefits to local employment in these settings and in lower prices elsewhere cannot offset longer-term issues about security of employment (jobs will move when labour is cheaper in other places) and thus also the problematic social changes brought by large-scale movement towards new employment patterns that have no long-term guarantees. One effect of this pattern is the creation not of a new consumer class but of a new group of urban paupers in unstable developing economies – a phenomenon visible in some east Asian contexts.

The move away from a realistic focus on scarcity and productivity/added value and towards the virtualised economy of money transactions has been deeply seductive, and, over a limited time-frame, spectacularly successful in generating purchasing power. Given that credit is not something that is naturally 'scarce' in precisely the same sense that material resources are, inadequate regulation can, as already noted, foster the illusion that the money market is effectively risk-free; that money can generate money without constraint.

In contrast to an economic model in which the exchange of goods is the basic process being analysed or managed, we have increasingly privileged and encouraged a model in which the process of exchange itself has become the raw material, the motor of profit-making. But, to repeat the point made so many times in the last few months, the problem comes when massively inflated credit is "called in": when the disproportion between actual, measurable material security and what is being claimed and traded on the market is so great that confidence in the institutions involved collapses. The search for impregnable security, independent of the limits of material resource, available labour and the time-consuming securing of trust by working at relationships of transparency and mutual responsibility, has led us to the most radical insecurity imaginable.

This is not the only paradox. In a recent essay in Prospect, Robert Skidelsky discusses why it is that a globalised economy has produced a resurgence of protectionism and nationalism, not to mention the political and economic domination of a single state, the US. We have, he suggests, been seduced into thinking that the mere lack of frontiers in global technology means that we accept a common destiny with other societies and are firmly set on the path to integrated economic operations. "Globalisation – the integration of markets in goods, services, capital and labour – must be good because it has raised millions out of poverty in poorer countries faster than would otherwise have been possible (p.39)." But the Whiggish idea that all this represents an irreversible movement towards an undifferentiated global culture and that a world without economic frontiers is natural, inevitable and by definition benign, rests on several very doubtful assumptions, rooted in an era that is passing – an era in which it was taken for granted that we began from a position of grave scarcity and moved towards unimpeded growth. But we are now in a position of "partial abundance" (i.e. a generally higher standard of living globally) which at the same time is more conscious of the limits of our material and environmental resources. As a result, globalisation is less obviously good news for the "developed" world. "The economic benefits of offshoring are far from evident for richer states," says Skidelsky (ibid.): jobs drain away to places where labour costs are cheaper, and we end up paying more to foreign investors than we earn in international markets. And the temptation for such wealthier economies is thus towards protectionism, with all its damaging consequences for a world economy. It is one of the most effective ways to freeze developing economies in a state of perpetual disadvantage; it makes it impossible for poorer economies to trade their way to wealth, as the rhetoric of the global market suggests they should.

Skidelsky argues that we need to take steps to reduce the attractions of relocating and "offshoring" in the first place, so that countries can focus afresh on their own processes of production so as to keep both internal and external investment alive. As he says, the present situation favours economic agreements that give little or no leverage to workers and that have minimal reference to social, environmental or even local legal concerns. Learning how to use governmental antitrust legislation to break up the virtually monopolistic powers of large multinationals that have become cuckoos in the nest of a national economy would also be an essential part of a strategy designed to stop the slide from opportunistic outsourcing towards protectionism and monitoring or policing the chaotic flow of capital across boundaries.

We have yet to see how much of this is deliverable, but the thrust of the argument is hard to resist, either morally or practically. Morally, protectionism implicitly accepts that wealth maintained at the cost of the neighbour's disadvantage or worse is a tolerable situation – which is a denial of the belief that what is good for humanity is ultimately coherent or convergent. Such a denial is a sinister thing, since it undermines the logic of assuming that what the other finds painful I should find painful too – a basic element of what we generally consider maturely or sanely ethical behaviour. Practically, protectionism is another instance of short-term vision, securing prosperity here by making prosperity impossible somewhere else; in a global context, this is inexorably a factor in ultimately shrinking potential markets.

And the wider agenda sketched by Skidelsky means also that commercial concerns would be prevented from overturning the social and political priorities of elected governments. The arguments around unrepayable international debt a decade ago repeatedly underlined the destructive effects of imposed regimes of financial stabilisation that derailed governmental programmes in poor countries and effectively confiscated any means of shaping a local economy to local needs. And we hardly need reminding of the distorting effect on a national economy – and public ethics, too - of being seen as a pool of cheap labour and a haven for irresponsible practices.

Several writers have said that a reformed and revitalised WTO ought to be able to move us further towards the monitoring I mentioned a moment ago. Some would be more specific and argue that for this to work effectively, there needs also to be some regulation of capital flow and exchange mechanisms, and this is where a variety of commentators from very diverse backgrounds see the "Tobin tax" proposals as having a place taxing currency exchanges in ways that would serve national economies. We should also need some mechanisms by which it could be guaranteed that a recognisable proportion of "savings", locally generated profits in a national economy, could be ploughed back into investment in local infrastructure, so that we should not constantly have to deal with the consequences of new money in a growing economy roaming around looking for a home and ending up fuelling the pressure on banks to lend above their capacity so as to keep the money moving.

Most such moves would, of course, require a formidable, perhaps unattainable level of global agreement and global enforceability; short of this, they could be counterproductive. But the debate on what kinds of international convergence are possible and necessary is a crucial one. The basic question that Skidelsky and others are posing, however, is how the market as we know it can be restructured so as to make it do what it is supposed to do – i.e. to offer producers the chance of a fair and competitive context in which to trade what they produce and become in turn effective investors and developers of the potential of their business and their society.

The last few months have seen an extraordinary and quite unpredictable shift in the balance, with international financial transactions losing credibility and national governments coming into their own as guarantors of some level of stability. It is a rather ironic mutation of the idea of the market state: when it comes to the (credit) crunch, populations want governments to secure their basic spending power, even if it limits their absolute consumer freedoms. There is also a point, recently underlined in the debate in the Church of England's General Synod on this subject, about securing justice for future generations: any morally and practically credible policy should be looking to guarantee that future generations do not inherit liabilities that will cripple the provision of basic social care, for example. Unregulated 'freedom' in the climate of destructive speculation is not the most attractive prospect, certainly not compared with a guarantee that assets will not be allowed to drop indefinitely in value. The only way of 'maximising choice' is to make sure that it is still possible to choose and to use something, and to secure the possibilities reasonable choice for our children and grandchildren, even at the price of restricting some options. Without that restriction, nothing is solid: we should face a world in which everything flows, melts, dissolves, in a world of constantly shifting and spectral valuations.

If we try to draw some of this together into a few governing principles, what might emerge? The non-economist is bound to be intimidated by the complexity of what we confront, but, as has been said, "we are all economists now"; the specialists are not more conspicuously successful than others in mapping the territory, and this at least encourages some tentative proposals from the sidelines, however broad and aspirational. Certainly, over the last century and a half, Anglican theologians have from time to time taken their courage in their hands and attempted to outline what an ethically responsible economy might look like, and I am conscious of standing in the shadow of some very substantial commentators indeed, from F.D.Maurice to William Temple.

In the background too is the formidable legacy of Roman Catholic social teaching, expressed in some powerful statements from the British and American Bishops' Conferences in recent decades. So with this heritage in mind, I shall suggest five elements, in descending order of significance, that might provide the bare bones of an economic culture capable of delivering something like an ethically defensible global policy.

(i) Most fundamentally: we need to move away from a model of economics which simply assumes that it is essentially about the mechanics of generating money, and try to restore an acknowledgement of the role of trust as something which needs time to develop; and so also to move away from an idea of wealth or profit which imagines that they can be achieved without risk, and to return to the primitive capitalist idea, as sketched above, of risk-sharing as an essential element in the equitable securing of wealth for all.

(ii) As many writers, from Partha Dasgupta to Jonathon Porritt have argued, environmental cost has to be factored into economic calculations as a genuine cost in opportunity, resource and durability – and thus a cost in terms of doing justice to future generations. There needs to be a robust rebuttal of any idea that environmental concerns are somehow a side issue or even a luxury in a time of economic pressure; the questions are inseparably connected.

(iii) We need to think harder about the role – actual and potential – of democratically accountable governments in the monitoring and regulation of currency exchange and capital flow. This could involve some international conventions about wages and working conditions, and cooperation between states to try and prevent the indefinite growth of what we might call – on the analogy of tax havens – cheap labour havens. Likewise, it might mean considering the kind of capital controls that prevent a situation where it is advantageous to allow indefinitely large sums of capital out of a country.

(iv) The existing international instruments – the IMF and World Bank, the WTO and the G8 and G20 countries – need to be reconceived as both monitors of the global flow of capital and agencies to stimulate local enterprise and provide some safety nets as long as the global playing field is so far from being level. They need to provide some protective sanctions for the disadvantaged – not aimed at undermining market mechanisms but at letting them work as they should, working to allow countries to trade their way out of destitution.

(v) Necessary short-term policies to kickstart an economy in crisis – such as we have seen in the UK in recent months – should be balanced by long-term consideration of the levels of material and service production that will provide an anchor of stability against the possible storms of speculative financial practice. This is not simply about "baling out" firms under pressure but about a comprehensive look at national economies with a view to understanding what sort of production levels would act as ballast in times of crisis, and investing accordingly.

Aspirational these may be; but what I hope is not vague here is the moral orientation that lies behind all these points. Ethics, I suggested, is about negotiating conditions in which the most vulnerable are not abandoned. And we shall care about this largely to the extent to which we are conscious of our own vulnerability and limitedness. One of the things most fatal to the sustaining of an ethical perspective on any area of human life, not just economics, is the fantasy that we are not really part of a material order – that we are essentially will or craving, for which the body is a useful organ for fulfilling the purposes of the all-powerful will, rather than being the organ of our connection with the rest of the world. It's been said often enough but it bears repeating, that in some ways – so far from being a materialist culture, we are a culture that is resentful about material reality, hungry for anything and everything that distances us from the constraints of being a physical animal subject to temporal processes, to uncontrollable changes and to sheer accident.

Implied in what has just been said is a recognition of the dangers of "growth" as an unexamined good. Growth out of poverty, growth towards a degree of intelligent control of one's circumstances, growth towards maturity of perception and sympathy – all these are manifestly good and ethically serious goals, and, as has already been suggested, there are ways of conducting our economic business that could honour and promote these. A goal of growth simply as an indefinite expansion of purchasing power is either vacuous or malign – malign to the extent that it inevitably implies the diminution of the capacity of others in a world of limited resource. Remember the significance of scarcity and vulnerability in shaping a sense of what ethical behaviour looks like.

It is true that modern production creates markets by creating new "needs" – or more properly, new expectations. Human creativity moves on and human ingenuity constantly enlarges the reach of human management of the environment. That isn't in itself an evil; but a mature perspective on this would surely note two things. One is that there is always some choice involved in what is to be developed – and thus some opportunity cost. Not everything can be produced according to the dictates of desire, and so there will still be the need to sort out priorities. Second, we cannot ignore or postpone the question of what we want enlarged management of the environment for. The reduction of pain or of frustration, the augmenting of opportunity for human welfare and joy – again, these are obviously good things. They are good because they connect with a sense of what is properly owing to human beings, a sense of human dignity. And thus if the way in which they are secured for some reduces the opportunities of others, the pursuit of them is not compatible with a serious commitment to human dignity.

All this amounts to a belief that pursuing ethical economic growth, while not systematically hostile to new demands and new markets, while indeed acknowledging the way in which new markets can and should help to secure the prosperity of new producers, necessarily means looking critically at our lifestyle. To make it specific, and to use one of the more obvious examples, it has become more and more clear that lifestyles dependent on high levels of fossil fuel consumption reduce the long-term opportunities of basic human flourishing for many people because of their environmental cost – not to mention the various political traps associated with the production and marketing of oil in some parts of the world, with the consequent risks to peace and regional stability. Growth as an infinitely projected process of better and cheaper access to fossil fuel-related goods, including transport, would not be an impressive ethical horizon. The question which present circumstances are forcing rather harshly on our attention is how self-critical we can find it in ourselves to be about our lifestyle in the more affluent parts of the world – not in order to adopt a corporate monastic poverty but in order to arrive at a sense of the acceptable limits to growth in the context of what might be good for the human family overall and the planet itself.

The five broad principles sketched above could only be fleshed out against a background in which people recognised that talking about the need for growth made no sense except in relation to a world of complex social and political relationships and of limited material resources – a background of willingness to ask not what might be abstractly possible in terms of increasing the range of consumer goods but what might be manageable as part of a balanced global network of forces, basic needs, mutual respect and so on.

Basic to everything we might want to say about the financial crisis from the religious point of view is the question, "what for?" What is growth for? For what and for whom is wealth important? If it is essential to invest in certain kinds of productive ventures, how does this relate to the broader and longer-term imperative of securing the funding of social care future by way of sustainable shared resources, accumulated wealth? And so on. But behind such questions as these is the unavoidable issue of what human beings are for; or, to put it less crudely, what the content is of ideas of human dignity and where we look for their foundation or rationale. The principles outlined a moment ago require a context not only of geopolitical and social analysis, not even of pragmatic recognitions of the limits of material resources or the opportunity costs of certain financial decisions, but of a comprehensive sense of belonging in a world – and a world that is neither self-explanatory nor self-sufficient, but is transparent to a deeper level of agency or liberty, that level that is called God by the religious traditions of humanity.

In Christian belief, the world exists because of a free act of generous love by the creator. God has made a world in which, by working with the limitations of a material order declared by God to be 'very good', humans may reflect the liberty and generosity of God. And our salvation is the restoration of a broken relationship with this whole created order, through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the establishing by the power of his Spirit a community in which mutual service and attention are the basic elements through which the human world becomes transparent to its maker.

The realising of that transparency is, for religious believers of whatever tradition, the beginning of happiness – not of a transient feeling of well-being or even euphoria, but of a settled sense of being at home, being absolved from urgent and obsessional desire, from the passion to justify your existence, from the anxieties of rivalry. And so what religious belief has to say in the context of our present crisis is, first, a call to lament the brokenness of the world and invite that change of heart which is so pivotal throughout the Jewish and Christian scriptures; and, second, to declare without ambiguity or qualification that human value rests on God's creative love and not on possession or achievement. It is not for believers to join in the search for scapegoats, because there will always be, for the religious self, an awareness of complicity in social evil. Nor is it for believers to make light of the real suffering that goes with economic uncertainty and loss – no less real for the formerly affluent Westerner faced with redundancy than for the powerless farmer or woman worker enduring yet another change for the worse in a battered and injured African or Asian economy.

But the task is to turn people's eyes back to the vision of a human dignity that is indestructible. This is the vision that will both allow us to retain a hold on our sense of worth even when circumstances are painful or humiliating and sustain the sense of obligation to the needs of others, near at hand or strangers, so that dignity may be made manifest.

In conclusion, let me suggest three central aspects of a religious – and more specifically, Christian – contribution to the ongoing debate, which may focus some more detailed reflection:

(i) Our faith depends on the action of a God who is to be trusted; God keeps promises. There could hardly be a more central theme in Jewish and Christian scripture, and the notion is present in slightly different form in Islam as well. Thus, to live in proper harmony with God, human beings need to be promise-keepers in all areas of their lives, not least in financial dealings.

(ii) As we have noted more than once already, the perspective of faith understands human beings as part of creation – not wholly in control, though gifted with capacities that allow real and significant powers over the environment, bound to material identity and unable to escape material need. Living in faith is living in awareness of this created and limited identity without resentment or fantasy.

(iii) Living as part of creation brings with it a sense of the common destiny and common predicament of ­humanity. But more specifically, the scriptural understanding of our calling, especially as set out in the letters of St Paul, sees the ideal human community as one in which the welfare and giftedness of each and the welfare of all are inseparable. What is good in God's eyes for human beings not something that is altered by differences in culture or income; we can't say that what is unwelcome or evil for us is tolerable for others.

So: trustworthiness, realism or humility and the clear sense that we must resist polices or practices which accept the welfare of some at the expense of others – there is a back-of-an-envelope idea of where we might start in pressing for a global economic order that has some claim to be just. It can't be too often stressed that we are not talking about simply limiting damage to vulnerable societies far away: the central issues exposed by the financial crisis are everyone's business, and the risks of what some commentators (Timothy Garton Ash and Jonathon Porritt) have called a "barbarising" of western societies as a result of panic and social insecurity are real enough.

Equally it can't be too often stressed that it is only the generosity of an ethical approach to these matters that can begin to relate material wealth to human well-being, the happiness that is spiritual and relational and based on the recognition of non-negotiable human worth. There is much to fear at the moment, but, as always, more to hope for – so long as we can turn our backs on the worlds of unreality so seductively opened up by some of our recent financial history. Patience, trust and the acceptance of a world of real limitation are all hard work; yet the only liberation that is truly worth while is the liberation to be where we are and who we are as human beings, to be anchored in the reality that is properly ours. Other less serious and less risky enterprises may appear to promise a power that exceeds our limitations – but it is at the expense of truth, and so, ultimately at the expense of human life itself. Perhaps the very heart of the current challenge is the invitation to discover a little more deeply what is involved in human freedom – not the illusory freedom of some fantasy of control.

Copyright Rowan Williams 2009

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/09/rowan-williams-lecture-full-text