



On Theory and Practice Among Arabs

Clement Henry Moore

World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct., 1971), 106-126.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28197110%2924%3A1%3C106%3AOTAPAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2>

World Politics is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/jhup.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Review Articles

ON THEORY AND PRACTICE AMONG ARABS

By CLEMENT HENRY MOORE

Douglas E. Ashford, *National Development and Local Reform: Political Participation in Morocco, Tunisia, and Pakistan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, 439 pp., \$10.00.

Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York, John Wiley, 1964, 287 pp., \$9.95.

Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, 349 pp., \$8.75.

William B. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968*, Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1969, 313 pp., \$8.95.

John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, 368 pp., \$10.00.

THE fact that most Arab countries recently celebrated the centenary of Lenin's birth with varying degree of fanfare only underlines their relative impermeability to his teachings. The fanfare was not in all cases inversely proportional to the country's implementation of practical ideology, but the latter is in scarce evidence. Few of the leadership groups have assimilated the Leninist prescription to unite practice with theory, much less devised or adapted an ideology which is "practical" in the sense of legitimating particular political strategies or tactics in a logical and systematic way. Nor have they, except possibly in Tunisia, developed the necessary concomitant of practical ideology, namely a durable political organization which articulates and implements it.

Most opposition groups, even Marxist ones, share their rulers' failure to coordinate words with organized action. The flow of ideological utterances is heady and incessant, but their relation to political practice is usually fortuitous. Most Arab ideology is expressive rather than practical. Its functions are to reassure both articulator and audience, to engender solidarity, and to resolve problems of personal or group identity. Practical ideology can also fulfill these functions, but it does the practical work which expressive ideology cannot do—of systematically relating ideological goals to political means. Arab na-

tionalism, as has recently been observed, is "secure from the glare of empirical reality . . . precisely because it is not compromised by identity with any specific Arab state."¹ It recalls the Sorelian myth of the general strike, which, counterpointing Leninism, is the perfect illustration of expressive ideology.²

The student of Arab political development must ask why practical ideology—whether of the Marxist-Leninist, Muslim fundamentalist, or any other variety—does *not* flourish, if only because durable organization is less likely to develop without it.³ Recent discussions of ideology in new nations are of little help because they blur the crucial distinction; Clifford Geertz, for instance, sees "cognitive maps" in what we would consider to be expressive as well as practical ideologies. Aristide Zolberg, closely following Geertz's analysis, concludes of selected West African party-states: "Political ideology becomes an incantation which genuinely transforms reality, *even if nothing else happens*, by changing men's view of it."⁴ But when "nothing happens," the ideology, like Sorel's myth, is clearly expressive, not practical. And when nothing happened, did not the incantations give way to military drills? There may, even in West Africa, be a relationship between practical ideology and legitimacy—and hence the ability to withstand military coups—which Zolberg's analysis overlooks.

The Arab-Islamic world can, as Leonard Binder observes of an even wider area, "be delimited for scholarly purposes because of the cultural unity prevailing therein" (p. viii). Though it is still a virtual desert for political science, numerous historical, legal, philosophical, and theological works on Arabs and Islam offer a fertile field for the analysis of ideology. Binder's book is reviewed here, though some of its essays were published more than a decade ago, because he relates traditional materials to contemporary ideology and social theory. Given the relative cultural unity, it seems fair to ask whether, and in what senses, the political culture impedes the emergence of practical ideology in this part of the world. John Waterbury and William

¹ Richard H. Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," *Comparative Politics*, 11 (January 1970), 158.

² Clement H. Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York 1970), 53-56.

³ Thus, predictions about the imminent rise of mass political parties in the Arab world would seem premature, but see William Polk, *The United States and the Arab World* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969), 228.

⁴ Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago 1966), 65; emphasis added. See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964), 46-76. Cf. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York 1961), 125 and note 10.

Quandt offer contrasting hypotheses, while Richard Mitchell provides a case study of a practical ideology that failed. Before discussing these works, however, I will try to defend the significance of the inquiry, because the distinction between practical and expressive ideology is not usually made by non-Marxists.

I

Douglas Ashford presents the case for practical ideology and its relevance for development by comparing the Tunisian with the Moroccan and Pakistani experiences. By "national development" he usually means "a process whereby the citizen begins to reconstruct the value placed on the nation in such a way as to enhance his chances of leading a more productive life and living happily in a more complex environment" (p. 13), or "a process by which government and nation are brought into some kind of harmony" (p. 9). The definition, intended to apply to most new nations, assumes that "national identity has indeed been firmly internalized as the evidence suggests, but only as a value bereft of operational meaning and content" (p. 8). Governments concerned with development, then, must introduce widespread social change which puts nationalist fervor to use by giving citizens concrete tasks and channels for participating in the process. In this perspective Ashford examines the efforts of the three governments to build local authorities, engage in economic planning, redistribute land, carry out public works in the countryside, reform the administrative and educational systems, convert Islam to modern needs, and draft constitutions.

Actually, Ashford's assumptions are misleading in the context of the Arab-Islamic world. National identity may be "firmly internalized" in Mexico, at least in its towns of over 10,000 inhabitants from which Almond and Verba derived the evidence Ashford cites.⁵ But does the nation supersede all other loyalties for Jordanians or Iraqis? Or, for that matter, for most Pakistanis and Moroccans? Even assuming that most parochial peasants and tribesmen have acquired emotional attachments to wider communities,⁶ the new effective identifications are more likely than in other new nations to transcend the borders of their

⁵ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 101-22, cited by Ashford on page 8.

⁶ For suggestive evidence to the contrary for transitional, rather mobile Moroccans, see Driss Ben Hamed Charhadi, *A Life Full of Holes*, recorded, translated (or possibly imagined) by Paul Bowles (New York 1964). Even if the book is a fake, Bowles has lived many years in Morocco and is in closer touch with the type of person who ostensibly wrote it than most Westerners or educated Moroccans.

respective regimes. Arab and/or Islamic symbols may be dissonant with "national" ones. Hence any particular Arab-Islamic government may find it difficult to elicit "nationalist" fervor, much less to put it to use. It must either neutralize or express within its limited jurisdiction its citizens' wider loyalties. Unfortunately Ashford has too readily assumed popular identification with the nation-state and hence paid only brief attention to the "affective vortex" of Islam and to "international substitutes for national action" (pp. 304-38). Islamic and foreign issues are viewed as distractions from the concrete tasks of development because the fervor they generate is "difficult to translate into affective [*sic*] action at the local level" (p. 321). But isn't this a difficulty inherent in development? Leaders must enlist volatile mass emotions if they are to alter popular values. In Tunisia, for instance, Bourguiba needed a crisis with France over Bizerta in 1961 (though he miscalculated its magnitude) in order to make his party cadres swallow economic planning.

Ashford's conception of development is nevertheless extremely useful for our purposes. Much political rhetoric in the Arab world is empty, yet development requires that concrete meanings be attached to expressive symbols. For better or worse, however remote from the citizen it may be, government is the essential "arbitrator" of the developmental process because "it does in fact make the critical decisions about how the society will be reconstructed" (p. 8). Furthermore, there are linkages between critical decisions, characterized by Ashford as the "political orientations" of the respective regimes. Each regime has displayed a distinctive approach in the various specific areas where choice and policy-making are compared. The Pakistani military bureaucracy was professional and out of touch with the people, while the Moroccan monarchy stimulated great popular emotions but little carry-through. Only the Tunisians have been both generating popular emotion and translating their abstract slogans into sustained efforts of social change. Thus Tunisia's practical ideology ("Destour Socialism") gets the highest marks, but unfortunately political choices here are constrained by the single-party system's survival requirements. Ashford therefore seems at times to be more critical of the "overly cautious" Tunisian policy-makers who try to control the pace of social change than of the scattered Moroccans or impotent Pakistanis.

His conclusion about Tunisia is unexceptionable: "Mobilization of a government should not be confused with mobilization of a populace. . . . The real test of the regime will be its ability to absorb and ac-

commodate the more articulate and responsive citizen now beginning to assert himself" (p. 238). The analysis is flawed, however, by excessive reliance upon theory derived from American clinical experiments in cognitive psychology. Government "orientations" and "attitudinal change" are viewed in psychological rather than political perspective. Citizens are viewed as abstract bundles of attitudes—in the absence, incidentally, of any survey research, despite the fact that attitudinal changes are the subject of the concluding 85 pages of the book—rather than as members of concrete and categorical interest groups. Government policies, too, are abstracted from the complex social bases upon which the respective regimes rely for support. For comparative purposes, more explicit attention should have been given to sheer differences in size: it is obviously more difficult to relate central planning to basic democracies in Pakistan than to Moroccan communes or Tunisian municipal councils.

Basic regime "orientations," if extended to details, may describe but not explain government policies. The "affective" nature of the Moroccan monarchy, for instance, does not explain why it has failed to tackle agrarian reform. However, the nature of the regime, analyzed in terms of its legitimating principles and social bases, will yield explanations. Ashford intuitively reaches for such explanations, but psychological theories distract him. His account of failure in the Moroccan countryside would have been more convincing had he recognized the monarchy's increasing reliance, since 1960, upon the Ministry of Interior to coordinate rural clientele—at the expense of various technical agricultural agencies. So also in the case of Tunisia, a more rigorous analysis of the Destour Socialist Party's bases of support might have helped explain both its caution and occasional recklessness in promoting social change. Surely it was a sign of political sense, not cognitive rigidity, to extend municipal councils slowly, as far as possible to areas where the party might effectively operate them. Ashford, incidentally, misunderstands the import of party reforms in 1963. They were designed to tighten up the party-state apparatus by strengthening the governors, not to loosen it in response to growing social complexity. If anything, there were fewer horizontal transactions after 1963, until the planning minister's downfall in 1969.

The emergence and extension of practical ideology is really synonymous with what Ashford calls development, but his psychological approach both minimizes the complexity of its social context and, what is worse, obscures the connection between ideology and development. Endowed with the politically naive anti-Fascist legacy of *The Authori-*

tarian Personality, the cognitive psychologists and their disciples in political science view ideology much as Marx did, essentially as a distortion of the truth, inducing rigidity, prejudice, and the like, hindering one from developing cognitive skills or engaging in responsible political activity such as voting. They fail to make a distinction between practical and expressive ideology and therefore lose sight of a conceptual tool which may relate people, as Ashford desires, to wider constellations of civic activity.⁷ Drawing upon clinical findings and, implicitly, upon out-dated end-of-ideology literature, he charts "conceptual articulation" and "manifest ideology" as inversely related curves along a developmental continuum from pre-national to national to post-national periods. In this model, individuals are expected to display an increasing level of manifest ideology *and therefore* a decreasing level of conceptual articulation in their attitude as they move into the nationalist age. Then, as society becomes more complex, manifest ideology declines and conceptual articulation increases (p. 370). Ashford even goes so far as to plot the respective positions of Pakistanis, Moroccans, and Tunisians (p. 379), but without basing his impressions on any data or even specifying whose attitudes are so organized. He realizes that manifest ideology may play "a critical part in getting the individual to widen the scope of his perceptual world" (p. 373), but his model excludes the possibility of a practical ideology that sustains affective awareness and commitment while simultaneously attaching cognitive content to emotive meanings.⁸ It is in this sense that Tunisian elites and their followers, educated by the party, have experienced greater development than the fragmented and politically sterile Moroccan elite. In Morocco the cacophony of emotive symbols has cognitive content only for local connoisseurs of political ballet; little more than "God, King, and Country" gets through to the masses. The salience of ideology seems greater in Tunisia. But more important for development than salience is the kind of ideology articulated—whether or not

⁷ Thus John P. Diggins, in "Ideology and Pragmatism: Philosophy or Passion?" *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (September 1970), 899-906, rightly criticizes on historical and philosophical grounds the distinction made by Giovanni Sartori in "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," *APSR*, LXIII (June 1969), 399, between "ideological" and "pragmatic" politics. Sartori is only one of many who ignore the distinction we are making between practical, or "pragmatic," and expressive ideologies. For another recent example, see A. James Gregor, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies* (New York 1968).

⁸ On page 377, Ashford cites Ulf Himmelstrand for support, apparently without realizing that the latter's work is elaborating the precise distinction at issue here between expressive and "instrumental" or practical ideology. See his *Social Pressures, Attitudes, and Democratic Process* (Stockholm 1960), and also his article, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticisation and Political Involvement," *Acta Sociologica*, VI (1-2, 1962), 83-110.

it is practical, that is, whether it serves as both an affective spur and a cognitive guide for action.

II

Thus, though in response to a slightly different psychologizing of politics, Leonard Binder states that “. . . it is difficult to attribute irrationality to Middle Eastern revolutionaries, except insofar as they grossly overestimate their resources. The real problem is not that of coping with irrational reactions to misplaced separation-anxiety, but the more rational one of functional adaptation to environmental changes” (p. 142). Binder shares my concern with practical ideology: “The problem of Arab nationalism is not that it has no ideology, but that the link between abstract ideas and identity sentiments has not been fully forged” (p. 92). He virtually admits that his book is misnamed, in that there has been little, if any, “genuine intellectual inspiration,” and ideological changes have been “almost wholly derived” from changes in material circumstances (p. 84).

Since the Arab-Islamic world constitutes a cultural system of sorts, it should be possible to provide cultural explanations for the relative absence of practical ideology (and concomitant organization) among Arabs. Binder's essays, though somewhat disconnected and occasionally obscure, have the merit of placing the ideological problem within the more universal context of nationalism. In fact, he dismisses, perhaps too easily, the problem Sir Hamilton Gibb and many of his disciples have raised concerning the compatibility of Islam with modern nationalism.⁹ Preferring Louis Gardet,¹⁰ he concludes that “The Islamization of nationalism proceeds, . . . and it is possible to look forward to the eventual accommodation of Islam and the nation-state” (p. 137). Unlike Malcolm Kerr,¹¹ Binder is less concerned with the manifest political thought of Muslim reformers than with how their ideas can be used. Thus he shows that Mohammed Abduh reinterpreted Muslim history, necessity, freedom of the will, and social solidarity in ways that would be compatible with romantic European nationalism, though he personally was neither a nationalist nor a systematic thinker and in fact borrowed many leading ideas without acknowledgment from Ibn Khaldun (see pp. 67-72).

If Arab ideologies remain primarily expressive rather than practical,

⁹ Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago 1947), 115.

¹⁰ Louis Gardet, *La Cité Musulmane* (Paris 1961), 226.

¹¹ Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966).

it is because they suffer from "the weaknesses of all nationalisms, caused by the intrinsic duality of identity and community, of subjective sentiment and the conventional order of human society" (p. 93). Binder traces these weaknesses back to the ambiguities of Rousseau's general will: is the polity to be based on nature, that is, shared historical experience, or on the rational convention of a social contract? Whether or not one accepts such a formulation, the Hegelian synthesis of romantic nationalism resolved problems of identity, but usually failed, as Marx pointed out, to make theory practical. Thus Binder might have argued that nationalism was more nearly a politicization of philosophy than a philosophizing of politics (cf. p. 110). In his own words, "it is not at all self-evident that the romanticism involved in the rejection of recent history and the rationalism whereby that history is to be changed are ideologically compatible" (p. 93). But there were pre-Marxist sources of practical ideology.

Ideology in the West derives from the Puritans, as exemplified in both the English and French Revolutions and, more successfully, in Calvin's Geneva. Binder's comparative baseline should be seventeenth, not nineteenth-century Europe. For the Puritans were the first in the West to translate theological concerns into practical yet radical political activity—just as they were the first modern "militants" to sustain prototypes of political parties.¹² From the standpoint of practical ideology, the interesting historical question, ignored by Binder as well as by Kerr and Gibb, is why Puritanism has apparently failed to take root in the Arab-Islamic world although it succeeded, at least for a time, in Geneva, Cromwellian England, Jacobin France, and Leninist Russia. Posed in this way, the question has a relatively straightforward answer, suggested by Ernest Gellner.¹³ The central religious tradition in the West was Roman Catholicism, an appropriate target under conditions of social upheaval for eliciting a Protestant attack upon tradition, whereas the central Islamic tradition was already protestant. Islam does not await a Reformation; it was born reformed, and, to carry the analogy further, the Prophet Mohammed was the first Puritan radical outside the Judaic tradition to translate the word of God into practical political activity. Islamic orthodoxy could absorb

¹² See Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), and also, concerning political parties, H. G. Koenigsberger, "The Organization of Revolutionary Parties in France and the Netherlands during the Sixteenth Century," *The Journal of Modern History*, xxvii (December 1955), especially 335-36.

¹³ See his article, "A Pendulum Swing Theory of Islam," *Annales de Sociologie*, 1968, 5-14; reprinted in Roland Robertson, ed., *Sociology of Religion* (Harmondsworth, England 1969), 127-38.

subsequent protestants without undergoing a basic alteration, while coexisting with peripheral Catholic elements (saints, Sufi orders, Shi'ites) that were relatively self-contained and innocuous, alleviating their mundane grievances by means of divine intermediaries and human hierarchies.

The orthodox ulama inherited a practical ideology but divested it of programmatic significance, much as Soviet Party priests allow their ideology to "erode" or, more accurately, become ritualized in expressive symbols. Though all generalizations about ulama are bound to have exceptions, Binder's descriptions stimulate further observations about orthodox Islam, at least among Sunni Arabs. In theory, Islam does not admit of any distinction between religion and politics; ideally, it is equally a religious and a political system, and Islamic theology cannot accept any tension between the two. But in practice, as Binder points out, "the 'religious' ulama are deeply aware of the dangers of too close an involvement with the political institution. Indeed, the position of the 'religious' ulama is highly ambivalent. On the one hand they recognize that favorable attitudes on the part of the political leaders will further their cause, but on the other they realize that too close an association with the political authorities may corrupt the religious institution" (p. 39). Fragmented by selective favors from the rulers and divided into diverse schools, the ulama were too weak to translate the Islamic vision into political practice but were unwilling to admit the *de facto* dualism of religious and political affairs to which they had accommodated themselves. The resulting tradition of political discourse they articulated tended to be expressive, defending the status quo, rather than practical, instigating fundamental change. Given their great prestige, they could, as in eighteenth-century Egypt, constitute an important link between rulers and populace, sporadically mobilizing the latter in political demonstrations,¹⁴ but they lacked the ideology and organization characteristic of Puritans in the West. To maintain the integrity of their Islamic vision, they had to detach it from the corrupt politics that they were unable to purify.

Apparently this traditional mode of thinking persists among Arabs today. Binder's prime example is the all but defunct Ba'ath Party. Although in the early sixties it was ostensibly the most dynamic and progressive non-Communist political organization in the Arab Middle East, the Ba'athist vanguard articulated an expressive, never a practical

¹⁴ See Afaf Loutfi el Sayed, "The Role of the Ulama in Egypt during the Early Nineteenth Century," in P. M. Holt, ed., *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt* (London 1968), 266-70.

ideology.¹⁵ Indeed, its chief ideologist, Michel Aflaq, distrusted rational theorizing because it might divide the Arab Nation (p. 161). Arabism is love, faith, will, yet transcends all these empirical qualities. Like G. E. Moore's goodness, it is an objective but undefinable quality and hence secure from all empirical questioning or testing. The Ba'ath has a mission: to fulfill the potentialities of Arabism. Thus the vanguard party is legitimated, but the mission itself is never spelled out. Militants are given a sense of identity, but no direction. Much like the classic vision of the orthodox ulama—or Sorel's general strike—Arabism could generate solidarity while justifying any political course of action. The very vagueness of its symbols permitted their expropriation by Syrian and Iraqi military desperadoes.

Nasserism, too, permits a dissociation of words and deeds. Ideologically, Nasser was under "no compulsion to do any specific thing at a specific time" (p. 201). His Arab, subsequently "scientific," socialism seemed to most observers to constitute an *ex post facto* justification for policies conceived on nonideological and usually tactical grounds rather than a rational guide for action. The concomitant organizational vanguard was also lacking. While one may agree with Maxime Rodinson that Egypt under Nasser was a rational regime in Binder's sense, the French writer's efforts to infer a coherent ideology from Nasser's speeches and actions since the mid-fifties are not convincing.¹⁶ Whereas Aflaq was committed to a world view which had to be preserved from mundane contamination, Nasser committed himself to specific actions out of which others could manufacture a fashionable "ideology."

Are we to conclude that Arab-Islamic orthodoxy as articulated by the ulama constituted an expressive political culture that continues even today to deflect Arab intellectuals (including Christian secularists like Aflaq) from practical ideology? The ideological congruence and growing convergence between Islam and Arabism suggests such a hypothesis; but there are, after all, countervailing subcultures within Islam. From the standpoint of practical ideology, the most significant is that of the Muslim fundamentalists. As Binder indicates, they reject

¹⁵ Though the issue has become academic, Samuel P. Huntington would have been better advised to place his bets on Nasser than the Ba'ath for this very reason. See his "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, xvii (April 1965), 429.

¹⁶ Maxime Rodinson, "The Political System," in P. J. Vatikiotis, ed., *Egypt Since the Revolution* (London 1968), 87-113. Rodinson refers to the concepts developed by Binder in *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962), 37-45. I would agree with George Lenczowski, however, that "Egypt's National Charter of 1962 impresses one as a coherent document rather remarkable for its consistency." (See his "Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq," *Journal of Politics*, xxviii [February 1966], 56.)

the dualist compromises of the orthodox ulama and, for that matter, of most nationalists. "In their rejection of the dualism of society and government the fundamentalists become modern despite their verbal predilection for the reestablishment of the classical caliphate" (p. 40). In fact they try to be practical ideologists, radicals in the Puritan tradition.

III

Richard Mitchell presents an authoritative study of the most important of these groups in the Arab world, the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. At its peak in 1948 the Society could boast a highly articulated hierarchical organization of some half million Egyptians grouped in intensely active "families" of five to ten members each, together with some 40,000 paramilitary "rovers" and an elite "special apparatus" for terrorism. In addition, the Society managed a network of schools, dispensaries, and various economic enterprises that virtually constituted a state within the state, for practicing its Islamic ideal. There is some question, however, as to whether the agglomeration of ideas it so insistently propounded through its ultra-modern communications system actually constituted a practical ideology. Mitchell suggests that it failed to provide "any reliable intellectual road maps" (p. 324), but his careful description of the Society's ideology and organization is evidence against Nadav Safran's less balanced view that the Brothers "had no clear idea of the intricate problems of a modern state and a modern society."¹⁷ Mitchell's evidence also suggests, at least to me, that the Muslim Brothers were more akin to the practical, this-worldly Puritans than to the medieval chiliasts to whom Manfred Halpern, citing Norman Cohn, compares them.¹⁸

Practical ideology, as I have characterized it, legitimates particular strategies or tactics in a logical and systematic way. The paradigm is Leninism. Particular courses of action are justified as means to the hierarchy of ends posited by the ideology. These ends involve God,

¹⁷ Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961), 231. Mitchell, it is true, reiterates this rather commonplace view of the Brothers on page 324: the Society was "ill-informed about the dynamics, both of its own Muslim society and of that of the West." But his descriptions of their ideas and activities are sound and dispassionate. He avoids pulling their writings out of context and twisting their meaning as Safran does on page 241, for instance, interpreting Muhammad al-Ghazzali as recommending that "power and the sword decide what is right," when he was in fact criticizing morally indecisive Muslims. See al-Ghazzali, *Our Beginning in Wisdom* (Washington, D.C. 1953), 20.

¹⁸ Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton 1963), 136. Cohn's book, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, discusses these utopian movements to which the Puritans were a startling contrast.

or His functional equivalent, in that they are matters of ultimate concern, yet they also constitute a vision of social order. The practical ideologist is not content to contemplate, but must implement the vision, and he accepts that there is only one "correct" (or "scientific") way. In addition to a pure theory that expresses ends, practical ideology contains a doctrine relating abstract ends to concrete means. Further, such an ideology presupposes the existence of an authority for interpreting the doctrine correctly and an organization for expressing and implementing it.

To the uncommitted observer there is, obviously, no one "correct" doctrinal interpretation of Islam, Marxism, or, for that matter, of the King James Bible. But the Brothers, under Hassan al Banna, acquired such authority in the eyes of numerous Muslims, just as Lenin did for at least an important minority of Russian Marxists. Banna's doctrine seems no less plausible or out of touch with the modern world than Lenin's, much as the skeptic may question the respective postulates, logical derivations, and internal consistency of each. Mitchell demonstrates that Banna was seeking a government and social order inspired by Islam, not a reactionary carbon copy of the seventh-century Muslim state. Mitchell takes "essentially at face value the view attributed to Banna . . . that the [then] existing constitutional parliamentary framework in Egypt, if reformed, would satisfy the political requirements of Islam . . ." (p. 235). Nor was the Society's demand that the shari'a (Islamic law) be fully enforced inconsistent with Egyptian political and social realities, given the Brothers' imaginative exegesis of the law. Actually, most extant legislation was acceptable (see p. 241). In fact it is tempting to conclude that they were too ready to compromise with existing realities to provide any real direction for change.

But Banna's doctrine was rigid and intolerant of any deviation by "free-thinkers," even if the Islamic theory inspired by Mohammed Abduh was sufficiently amorphous to legitimate as Islamic virtually everything but bars and brothels. Banna was not a theorist or theologian; he preferred deed to idea, program (*minhaj*) to ideology (*fikra*). The Society's program displayed relative coherence and consistency over the years, and in Leninist fashion Banna could assert that it had been derived from an identifiable set of texts which it was the duty of all Brothers to study zealously with help from their Supreme Guide. If the texts in fact provided few guidelines for building Islamic society, the same could be said of Marxism for Communist society.

Banna provided the guidelines and, so far as conditions under the monarchy permitted, implemented them through an organization that is proof against the contention that the Brothers failed to appreciate "the mechanical side of politics."¹⁹ If politically the ultimate objective was an Islamic one-party state (see p. 261), the society was moving toward its goal by educating dedicated cadres and perfecting their organization. Economically, its enterprises (including an advertising agency which presumably catered to the appetites of a consumer society), demonstrated the possibility of an Islamic approach to economic affairs, awarding profits to the membership and dignity to labor. The psychological objectives, as with Maoism in China and Bourguibism in Tunisia, were the most fundamental: "Eject imperialism from your souls, and it will leave your land" (p. 230). To form a good Muslim society presupposed forming good Muslims; spiritual *jihad* took precedence over, but was no mere substitute for, the political and military *jihad* (holy struggle) against unbelievers. "Family" life within the Society offered the required psychic discipline.

If, ultimately, the Brothers failed to impose themselves on Egyptian society, it was not for a lack of practical ideology. There is even some evidence to suggest that the doctrine became more consciously scientific and substantive, articulated by modern professionals, after Banna's assassination in 1949 (see p. 189). But the Society, no longer held together by the force of its founder's oratory, personality, and organizational skills, was incapacitated by internal schisms. Preposterous as it seems, the divisions were so intense among the qualified candidates for the succession that they could agree only upon King Farouk's favored choice, a mild-mannered provincial judge who had never been an active member of the Society. Thus, in the decisive years between 1951 and its suppression in 1954, the Society was virtually leaderless. The terrorism practiced by its small and dissident "special apparatus" signified political and moral bankruptcy but did not, in its final and uncontrolled stages, derive logically or inevitably from the Society's rigid intolerance and exclusiveness. Mitchell's dispassionate study should mitigate the "convulsive image of conservative radicalism" which he feels "will probably remain the image of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in history" (p. 331).

From this full-length study, however, we learn little—and that only as an apparent afterthought in the last four pages of the book—about the Society's social composition. Its leadership was predominantly urban and white-collar, the so-called *effendiyya*; indeed, one Brother

¹⁹ Safran (fn. 17), 239.

claimed as early as 1935 that the active membership was predominantly *effendi*, in order to distinguish it from lower-class dervish Sufi orders. Mitchell's tentative conclusion from his personal observations is that by the early fifties the Society largely represented "an emergent and self-conscious Muslim middle class" (p. 330). He cites the Society's programs as added evidence, designed as they were to appeal to the bulging Egyptian bureaucracy and salariat. Furthermore, while enjoying some trade-union support, the Society mobilized its most disciplined and active following among the university students, whose unions it controlled by 1952. Were the most active Brothers upwardly mobile social misfits? Could the inner circle of "fanatical believers," as Binder suggests (p. 45), be considered "marginal to the reference groups which they aspired to join," and suffering from "a fundamental cultural insecurity"? Or were they, as Walzer has suggested of the analogous Puritans, among the "sociologically competent?"²⁰ Unfortunately, Mitchell does not address himself to these questions.

Less excusable is his omission of any systematic treatment of personal and political relationships of the leading Brothers among themselves and with the Palace and other political forces. He does not even let us know the fact, mentioned in Halpern's much briefer treatment, that Banna's successor was married to the sister of the private chamberlain of the royal family,²¹ much less discuss the variety of personal links with other Islamic groups and political parties, as well as the Palace. Quite possibly they exacerbated divisions within the Society and hence can contribute to a fuller explanation of its ultimate failure. To pursue the discussion of practical ideology in more general terms, the major obstacle may be cultural, not in the sense of an uncongenial intellectual heritage, but in the sense of deep-rooted reflexes that condition political behavior.

IV

Waterbury's scholarly yet delightful book on Moroccan politics propounds precisely this hypothesis. Moroccans, indeed Arabs more generally, are victims of their political culture as expressed in concrete patterns of behavior of which the actors are not necessarily even aware. Waterbury is not concerned with overt value or belief systems, which vary with regime, ideology, or whatever typology one cares to employ for comparing different Arab political systems, but with the underlying phenomenon of factionalism and immobilism that he takes to charac-

²⁰ Walzer (fn. 12), 309.

²¹ Halpern (fn. 18), 149.

terize Arab politics. Thus, in Morocco, "political groupings are ever on the verge of waging war amongst themselves or against the Palace. . . . Yet in the end almost nothing happens. Tension goes hand in hand with stalemate, and the recognized need for action is paired with a pervasive lack of initiative. It is my contention that this state of affairs can be explained by a common Moroccan attitude towards power and authority" (p. 5). He is ready to extend his analysis to other Arab countries; Morocco can be more meaningfully compared to Algeria, for instance, than to Iran (p. 3). So also in the Middle East, Egypt and Syria, "whose politics are ostensibly very different from those of Morocco, have revealed a continued propensity for factional tension and stalemate" (p. 321).

The problem with this sort of analysis, of course, is that it is too general and could equally well apply to Iran where factionalism and rather similar attitudes toward power and authority exist also. For Waterbury, Moroccans are defense-minded and hence constantly building up alliances, starting with members of their own family. "A man must have a group, for otherwise he is without defenses . . ." (p. 76). Actually he tries to have many groups or potential alliances which he may activate whenever necessary. The cement for building and maintaining alliances is financial and moral debt. The Moroccan spends much of his time buttressing his alliance system and correctly assumes that other Moroccans are doing the same thing. In fact, he must always be on his guard, for "covert machinations, dissimulation and trickery are accepted as the fact of political life, and a man's ostensible motives for a given action cannot be trusted" (p. 77). There are compensations: he "takes an expert's delight in playing the game" (p. 77). The same might be said of many peoples. The most readable case study known to me, apart from Waterbury's, is *The Godfather*, about a Mafia gang in New York.²²

Possibly more Arab than Sicilian, however, is the restraint with which Moroccans in a dominant alliance will exercise their power and press their victories. The gains of the game are always marginal, never decisive, for equilibrium between alliance systems is always restored, and one's enemy is usually a potential ally and vice versa. If Waterbury is right, he has pointed to a major cultural barrier against practical ideology among Arabs. There can be no permanent out-groups. In his paradigm of zero-sum conflict, the members of a given alliance system "must remain ambivalent toward out-groups and towards their own; their enemies and allies being chosen accord-

²² Mario Puzo, *The Godfather* (London and New York 1969).

ing to their own advantage in a particular system. This makes for (although of course never achieves) value neutrality regarding group membership, with an often-ignored ease of movement of individuals among groups . . ." (p. 66).

The paradigm is that of segmentary tribal society.²³ Somehow, the Moroccan political elite internalized the patterns of political behavior associated with the tribal structure, though the elite is no longer predominantly tribal. Waterbury somewhat questionably extends the segmentary pattern to include the traditional urban as well as rural society (p. 7), making his hypothesis of "behavioral lag" (p. 5) more plausible, in that most of the elite are sons of traditional urban notables. Given the fluid interpenetration of rural and urban structures in traditional Morocco, coupled with the continuity, due to the relatively late and selective colonial penetration, between traditional and contemporary Morocco, Waterbury's assumptions seem defensible for his own research. Indeed, he has validated them in that the paradigm has explicitly shaped an absolutely first-rate description of contemporary Moroccan politics. But is his model really as applicable to other Arab societies as he thinks?

Actually, the special intervening conditions that make it fit Morocco prevailed in some of the other Arab countries, but the conditions can explain political tension and stalemate independently. In this connection Waterbury's analysis of the political elite is helpful, though neither systematic nor definitive. He defines it as "a group of Moroccans who, for diverse reasons, have an actual or potential influence on decision-making and the distribution of spoils and patronage, and who articulate, occasionally or persistently, their demands" (p. 82). Thus the elite "is broader than the government and contains the government's opposition." It "breaks down somewhat as follows: 100 army officers; 450 administrators of the Ministry of the Interior; 300 high-ranking officials in the rest of the administration; 130 prominent politicians and union leaders; 100 important members of economic organizations, independents, and 'ulama"—for a total, considering the "high degree of overlap between categories," of under one thousand members (p. 86, note). To all intents they are the political system, and they increasingly monopolize wealth as well as social status.

Waterbury stresses "the astonishing extent to which the members of the Moroccan political elite personally know one another" (p. 86). They usually went to the same elite schools and have married into each

²³ See Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (London 1969), and also E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (London 1949).

other's families. Their very involutedness means that "all is possible in the[ir] little world . . . , and elite factions are so many interchangeable parts without any fixed political connotations" (p. 124). Tension and stalemate are partly due to the fact that their political undertakings are always subverted by personal rivalries and complicities. But Waterbury's impressionistic analysis also suggests a more substantive explanation for stagnation.

Traditional social status plus modern education provide elite status in Morocco. The two are closely related, given the relatively late and selective colonial experience: "The social composition of the educated elite is probably not much different than it would have been had the protectorate never been established" (p. 85). Nationalist militancy and modern education were not, as in Algeria or Tunisia, independent sources of elite status, for most educated Moroccans and nationalist leaders enjoyed high traditional status, and leading traditional elite members who had "guessed wrong" were rehabilitated by the king after independence to neutralize the nationalists. Thus the new elite consists essentially of the same families that dominated the Moroccan political system before 1912. There was no opportunity for any "new middle class"—exemplified by activists like the late Mehdi Ben Barka—to redefine nationalism and transform the system.

The old families consolidated and modernized their commercial and agricultural holdings during the Protectorate and subsequently, under the king's exemplary leadership, converted social connections and political influence into wealth. Waterbury vividly shows us how. He correctly adds that the political elite "is not (yet) recruited, except secondarily, from a class whose power is rooted in material wealth. . . . It seems certain, nonetheless, that there is occurring a process of class development, a process that started with the broad commercial contacts with Europe in the nineteenth century and which gained momentum during the protectorate period and above all since independence" (p. 159). The king is hardly the tool of this nascent bourgeoisie; rather he is its "Godfather." Why, then, is he content to manipulate elite factions rather than destroy them in an Iranian-type White Revolution which could build broader bases of support? After all, the elite members who have been "coaxed into the royal stables one by one" are "too disillusioned to fight the regime themselves and too attached to its benefits to renounce it" (p. 158). Waterbury's cultural paradigm cuts both ways, for the king could be a *za'im* (leader) rather than a mere arbiter.

But to be a *za'im* would require new organization and practical

ideology in conflict with the king's legitimacy, of which the existing elite, however domesticated and corroded, remains the prime custodian. It is in this sense that stagnation is the product of Moroccan political culture, traditional in that the colonial situation did not produce the restratification necessary for its transformation. Traditional legitimacy, not segmentation, explains Morocco's stagnation, while the real tension is not among elite factions but rather between an immobile monarchy and a progressively mobilized society. The probable outcome is a military coup in the name of the dispossessed masses.

There are indeed behavioral obstacles to practical ideology in the Arab world (as elsewhere). Fluid factionalism either prevents effective decision-making or necessitates an authoritarian style of leadership that breaks down, as with the Muslim Brothers, when the charismatic leader no longer prevails. The durable organization presupposed by practical ideology seems virtually unobtainable. But why is this so? I reject the explanation of atavistic Arab behavior in favor of explanations derived from the intervening variable of elite structure. Elites, after all, are the carriers and models of politically central values and modes of behavior.

V

Far more systematically than Waterbury, William Quandt explores this intervening variable in the Algerian context. His data, the product of a more sensitive climate for research, are not as rich, nor is his insight into political style as penetrating as Waterbury's, but he does the best he can, and sometimes too much, with what was at hand. Algeria also has suffered from intense factionalism, tension, and stalemate,²⁴ but for different reasons than Morocco. While it is unfortunate that Quandt dismisses the tribal paradigm in one sentence (p. 12), he is on theoretically sounder ground than Waterbury. Algerian factionalism was not the outcome of the common behavioral style of a homogeneous elite but rather of competing heterogeneous subcultures. The recent trend away from factionalism toward a more rational system, as the elite has become more homogeneous, substantiates Quandt's approach.

He argues that the factionalism rampant in Algeria from 1962 to 1966 or so was the result of a discontinuous political socialization inherent in the revolutionary process whereby Algeria achieved independence. He distinguishes five major elite types, defined by distinct patterns of political socialization, that in varying proportions con-

²⁴ David and Marina Ottaway, *Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970), gives a first-rate account of Algeria since 1962.

stituted the political elite from 1954 to 1968. The elite is defined as the 87 top leaders who occupied 179 top and 133 secondary positions and the 273 secondary leaders who occupied 379 positions during the period. Quandt obtained biographical data on little more than half of these individuals and placed them in their respective slots as 1) Liberal politicians, 2) Radical politicians, 3) Revolutionaries, 4) Military, or 5) Intellectuals. Each category is defined unambiguously in terms of early political career patterns, but there are some difficulties for particular individuals. How does one define Ben Bella, as a Radical or a Revolutionary? To be considered a Radical, one has to have been either a PPA-MTLD Central Committee member or candidate for office; a Revolutionary must have had some political experience, but in less important roles before 1954. Ben Bella had in fact been a candidate, but is deemed to be a Revolutionary. The distinction between the Military and the Revolutionary is also difficult to make in practice: some political experience before 1954 versus none at all. The ambiguity as to what constituted "political experience" perhaps helps to explain why the Revolutionaries "are harder to generalize about" (p. 71) than Liberals or Radicals, and also why some, for instance, seem rather surprisingly to have been quite unconcerned with "colonialism" or any form of political activity in their youth (pp. 71-77). Quandt's speculations about there being two types of revolutionaries—agitators and organizers—depending on whether or not they turned to politics late to handle some personal problem (p. 74) are fascinating but utterly unwarranted (as are other speculations) by his very small and shadowy number of cases. Some of Quandt's data-squeezing is ingenious and suggestive, but much is superfluous. Especially redundant is his chapter on the National Assembly in which he correlates various sorts of parliamentary behavior (column inches of debate and the like) with his five socialization types and a variety of other independent variables. He fails to show the relation he asserts to exist between socialization and behavior, and pays insufficient attention to the politics of the situation.

If Quandt's methodological baggage makes the book somewhat overweight, he has nevertheless made a valuable contribution. He successfully weaves a methodic account of the actors with a sound historical narrative, and, what is more important, the major premise behind the typology seems correct: "A changing consensus on the possibilities of political action to attain specific goals allowed one group after another to dominate the nationalist movement. And as each group assumed that role, the challenge was to provide effective leadership or

risk being displaced by another set of political actors with other skills and beliefs" (p. 86). The Revolution ultimately required the skills of all five types simultaneously, but it could not organize or translate into practical ideology the energies of the respective components. Although the five types were certainly not the sole basis of cleavage and factionalism, their disparity contributed decisively to the breakdown in 1962.

Another of Quandt's hypotheses suggests why matters were eventually righted in Algeria. Following Frederick Frey's postulate that it is psychologically intolerable for most people of high status to submit to the influence of those with lower status,²⁵ Quandt notes the negative correlation within the Algerian political elite on the eve of independence between power on the one hand and social status and education on the other (pp. 157-58). The disparity helps to explain the rapid turnover of elites that followed and to predict the rise of the Intellectuals under Ben Bella and especially Boumedienne. His analysis also reveals interesting comparisons between the two leaders' political structures that transcend simple contrasts between the former's personal power and the latter's collegial rule or mediation between autonomous organs. Ben Bella included all the types "in virtually every institution, thereby apparently hoping to achieve an informal system of checks on the power aspirations of any one group" (p. 251). Boumedienne, on the other hand, had institutions more or less corresponding with particular types (see p. 252). An increasingly homogeneous group of Intellectuals, the Council of Ministers, has acquired more influence under Boumedienne, while other institutions, accommodating the Military, have been demobilized.

Factionalism may persist in Algeria, but it is not of the kind that almost tore the country apart. Factions may now conform to an agreed game, as in Morocco, rather than tear up the ball park. The game, however, bears little resemblance to Moroccan political ballet. The Algerian system is under tension, in that its social problems are at least as great as Morocco's, but it is not stagnant. Boumedienne and his technocrats have a strategy that may even be evolving into a practical ideology that expresses the ideals of the Revolution while implementing them. It is too early to say.

Elite analysis is more dynamic, hence more suitable for Algeria, than models built on behavioral paradigms. But much of the politics in the Arab world are static and sterile, and therefore fitting subject matter for Waterbury's microscope. Contrasts between the North African cases suggest a more general explanation of practical ideology

²⁵ Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 400 ff.

which complements an observation Leonard Binder made but did not develop. It concerns historical timing. In much of the Arab world, as elsewhere in the Third World, "the converging processes of social mobilization and the philosophizing of politics . . . had not taken place when the vertical political cleavage between colonial and imperialist became too manifest to be resisted" (p. 112). The result was expressive ideology—either liberal nationalism copied from the imperialists or "a traditional, often religious, ideology sustained by a nationalist ontology which has been revised from the theological" (p. 113). Rarely has the colonial dialectic been fully pursued, as in Algeria or Tunisia, where social mobilization and the "philosophizing of politics" coincided with anti-imperialist struggle.²⁶ Most of the backward countries, including Arab ones, were given their independence while still in a pre-ideological age. In Egypt there have been several attempted revolutionary breakthroughs, but all have so far aborted. Pressures from the industrial powers, "imperialist" and Communist, continue to play upon these countries, however, while social tensions rise from within. It is doubtful that the tensions can be managed indefinitely without practical ideology and revolutionary organization. Cultural obstacles, it may be concluded, are not insurmountable.

²⁶ For further treatment of colonial dialectic, see my *Politics in North Africa* (Boston 1970), 34-90.