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## The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy

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The political party, unlike factions within a traditional ruling group, is a distinctively modern phenomenon, for it involves "stable organization"<sup>1</sup> enjoining some degree of mass membership or support. Indeed, for Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, parties arise in response to one or a number of crises of political modernization, those of legitimacy, participation, or "integration." "It is in this context of an erosion of traditional belief patterns, particularly as they affect the individual's relationship to authority, that political parties and other types of politically relevant organizations emerge."<sup>2</sup> It is in this context, too, that the single-party phenomenon can be understood.

Whether or not party history always begins as in England (under James I) with a single party (the Puritans) contesting the legitimacy of the traditional order,<sup>3</sup> the rise of parties has usually been associated with crises of legitimacy as well as participation. One possible response, since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, has been the established one-party system. The party not only regulates participation but advances a claim to be the sole source of legitimacy. Of course the very concept of a "single-party system" appears paradoxical, as Sigmund Neumann and others have pointed out,<sup>4</sup> for party implies a plurality of parties. But the paradox merely reflects the failure of Puritans, Jacobins, and other incipient single-party vanguards in the West to achieve hegemony, so that norms of party competition, supplementing other bases of legitimacy, historically preceded the establishment of one-party systems. This evolution helps to explain why some hegemonic parties do not claim to be an exclusive source of legitimacy, for the Western norm of party competition, virtually unquestioned by modernizers before the World War I, was transmitted to other settings. However, the break-

downs even of some Western systems which adapted this norm lent greater international currency to Bolshevik and fascist models. In countries simultaneously facing crises of legitimacy and participation, the single-party "solution" has often been imposed.

Of course not all established single-party systems may be viewed in this perspective. One must exclude dominant one-party systems, even those in which the leading party regularly gains massive majorities, if the legitimacy of the system derives primarily from some other source, such as a widespread commitment to constitutional procedures that the party may therefore not transgress.<sup>5</sup> Thus Democratic Party machines in southern states, even those displaying the continuous organization of a party as distinct from a faction,<sup>6</sup> cannot usefully be compared with single parties which seek to build legitimacy, for the machines have operated in the context of an established constitutional order. Similarly, the True Whig Party of Liberia has held power since 1877—making it the oldest established one-party system in the world—without altering the traditional order until very recently. After its founding in 1869, in the heyday of a vigorous two-party politics within the Americo-Liberian community, it came to reflect the interests of this oligarchy facing the twin threats of foreign intervention and rebellion by a native population outnumbering it twenty to one.<sup>7</sup> In contrast to this established and clearly defined oligarchy, new black bourgeoisies in Africa must seek legitimacy for themselves and their emerging post-colonial regimes. If there is any source of legitimacy, apart from "charisma," it will be the single party, not status within the all-too-new oligarchy. That is why studies of American or American-type party machines can shed only limited light on the political processes of other established one-party systems. They do not face comparable problems. Machines generate power but not legitimacy.

On the other hand, it makes little difference in our perspective whether the party is dominant or unique, that is, whether or not it tolerates marginal opposition parties. What counts is whether the dominant party is committed to other sources of legitimacy or subordinates them to its claim. In a number of communist countries other parties are permitted a nominal existence. So also in Tunisia, rival parties were tolerated until recently, though legitimacy derives from Bourguiba and his ruling party rather than his tailor-made constitution or any other source.<sup>8</sup> In Mexico, by contrast, the priority of legitimating principles is less clear-cut than in either Tunisia or communist countries, on the one hand, or Liberia and Byrd's Virginia on the other. As implied in its very name, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucionalista* is the institutional custodian of the Revolution of 1910—contemporary Mexico's founding myth—yet Mexican political leaders possibly pay more than lip service to the Constitution of 1917—another expression of revolutionary values and one which antedates the party or its predecessors.<sup>9</sup> It is quite conceivable that the National Action Party, which won elections in two provinces in 1968,<sup>10</sup> may eventually destroy the

PRI's monopoly, just as opposition parties in India wore down the Congress Party. Similarly, the commitment of Republican People's Party leaders, especially Ismet Inonu, to constitutional principles took clear precedence over party loyalty in the late 1940s, permitting Turkey's transition to a two-party system.<sup>11</sup> But as in Mexico today, it would have been difficult ten years earlier to have predicted such an evolution; in fact in 1935 Interior Minister Recep Peker appeared bent on consolidating the RPP as the exclusive source of legitimacy justified by an explicit ideology. Had the Germans and Italians won World War II, Peker's alternative would probably have triumphed over Inonu's.

Thus the Turkish and certainly the Mexican single-party experiences are properly included in our perspective; indeed, the respective parties confronted legitimacy crises inherent in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and in the praetorian politics of post-revolutionary Mexico. It is as instructive to discuss why the RPP "failed" to generate the fascist structures that might have ensured its survival as a monopolistic party as it is comparatively to analyze the alternatives that African, fascist, communist, and for that matter the Mexican established single parties face. For, whatever the intentions of the political actors, whether they be tutelary democrats or budding Stalinists, their parties have to generate or maintain legitimacy if the established one-party system is to survive. Unless the Mexican PRI, for instance, can continue to justify itself as the institutional embodiment of the Revolution, Mexico will acquire a multi-party system. Conversely, the PRI's "success" to date in the face of commitment to another, potentially contradictory legitimating principle only underlines the RPP's "failure" in the face of similarly conflicting commitments.

Even the True Whig Party will perhaps join in the single-party search for legitimacy. For President Tubman has taken modest steps toward opening the oligarchy to native tribesmen. Hence, if multi-party politics is to be avoided, the True Whig Party after Tubman's retirement will either have to reverse this tendency or develop a new legitimating principle incompatible with that of Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Party, an intervening variable today, would have to replace social status as the independent variable determining the Liberian structure of authority. But then the True Whig Party would no longer be merely an American-style machine, for it would also be a source of legitimacy. To retain its political monopoly it would probably find it more necessary than the Mexican PRI to transgress the unwritten constitution—perhaps in the name of the written one—by suppressing an Americo-Liberian opposition.

To recapitulate the argument, most established one-party systems can best be understood as responses to simultaneous participation and legitimacy crises. The exceptions, party machines that establish themselves in the context of an already existing legitimate order, are museum pieces that cannot usefully be included in our subsequent analysis. Indeed, there is some doubt that they are real parties. V. O. Key points out that most

southern states were one-party only in the two-party context of national politics, while within each state the Democratic Party masked a factional politics resembling two-party, multi-party, or more often no-party systems. Byrd's machine inside the Democratic Party of Virginia would probably come closest to qualifying as an established one-party system at the state level. The point, of course, is that if party is defined as a relatively stable organization, enjoining some degree of mass membership or support, designed for the purpose of putting candidates into office to serve the material or ideal interests of its members,<sup>12</sup> then most groups contesting Democratic state primaries to put their men in office would have to be called factions rather than parties. Groups durable enough to be called parties have usually engendered durable competition.

But there is more. It is perhaps not accidental that it was Virginia, the most oligarchical of the southern states, that sustained the closest approximation to an established one-party system. As in Liberia, formally competitive politics masked aristocratic privilege. The party machine in part reflected the determination of a traditional oligarchy to exercise its vocation of public service. But the machine was less durable than the True Whig Party, just as the oligarchy was less entrenched and did not even for its members enjoy an unchallenged title to rule. The comparison suggests that the party must be reducible to an established group, such as the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, if it is to survive without becoming a source of legitimacy. Conversely, a single party cannot be an autonomous agency for political recruitment over a long period of time, unless it becomes established as an independent source of legitimacy for the political system.

Yet the party cannot establish its legitimacy, it would seem, unless it acquires some autonomy as an instrument for recruiting top political leaders. Thus dictators who attain power through other bases of support often have difficulties creating a party to legitimate their regimes. Nasser has failed three times since 1954 to build such an organization.<sup>13</sup> For, relying on military cliques to stay in power, he was unwilling to grant the Liberation Rally, the National Union, or the Arab Socialist Union any autonomy in selecting leaders or even any significant influence, for that matter, over policy-making. Egypt remains a no-party state. So also in Spain, Franco rose to power in alliance with traditional groups, notably the military establishment. As a matter of political convenience during the Civil War, he supported the Falange, a minor and divided anti-Republican party that had no prospects of attaining power or even exerting much influence under the previous regime. After its founding leader, Primo de Rivera, died in a Republican prison, it was easy for Franco to consolidate control over the Falange—the Caudillo's brother-in-law served as the key intermediary. By 1941 "there appeared to be nothing left of it but a noisy propaganda machine, an overgrown bureaucracy, and a few immature students. . . . Although it grew more artificial and more isolated with each passing season, it survived, like the regime, because its enemies could never

agree among themselves on how to remove it or with what to replace it.”<sup>14</sup> According to Stanley Payne, Franco “realized that he could never fully rely upon the party, because its own immaturity and the frustrations continuously imposed on it soon robbed it of any popular backing.” Moreover, “had it not been for the delicate nature of the Caudillo’s juggling act, the party would never have retained a semi-independent identity as long as it did.”<sup>15</sup> What was true of Franco’s Spain was even more true of Salazar’s Portugal. There, too, the fascist model influenced the dictator’s search for legitimacy, but the party was even less autonomous than the Falange, for Salazar continued to rely primarily upon the conservative groups that had put him in power. As a result, legitimacy, what there is of it, rests on other grounds, and it has not been possible either in Portugal or Spain to institutionalize, for instance, the “national syndicalism” and corporatist order advocated by the Falange.

While one would have had to juggle with definitions to call Spain a “no-party system” in 1941, there is an important theoretical distinction to be made between autonomous and heteronomous parties in one-party regimes. To be autonomous, a party must not only be a relatively stable organization enjoining some degree of mass support; it must also retain a significant role in the political recruitment process. This does not mean that the party may not be subordinated, as in fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or Stalinist Russia, to its top leader, but the dictator must at least co-opt most of his key lieutenants through the party apparatus. Otherwise the party will no longer have significant functions to perform that a government propaganda ministry could not equally well carry out. There is in fact a tendency in Africa, as there was in Italy, Germany, and Russia, for one-party states to develop, in this sense, into “no-party” or heteronomous party states.<sup>16</sup> But what African leaders may gain in political convenience by depriving their parties of other functions they may well lose in their efforts to establish some legitimacy. For heteronomous parties quickly lose their identity and support and thus become unlikely sources of legitimacy for their regimes. On the other hand, it may well be, as Aristide Zolberg has suggested, that many of the African single parties are comparable to political machines.<sup>17</sup> Then they in fact retain their autonomy, so far as they continue to be the prime agencies of political recruitment, even though it is unlikely, if they are merely machines, that they can establish legitimacy. But if they do not acquire legitimacy, they are unlikely long to survive, for the new oligarchies they support, unlike that of Americo-Liberian community, have no other source of legitimacy. Thus the military has already jumped into the vacuum that single parties failed to fill in Ghana, Algeria, and Togo, to cite three instances where more or less organized mass parties had at least a quasi-autonomous existence.

It therefore seems useful to conceive of the evolution of *established* one-party systems as the articulation of new legitimating criteria derived by and for the party rather than any other social or political structures. The party

is not only an organization; in the absence or decay of other institutions, its historic task has been to create a new political culture. Though few single parties have succeeded, it is possible in this perspective to compare failures as well as possible successes. The only cases to be excluded are heteronomous parties and the museum pieces which depended on an independently certified and established legitimating principle. In the remaining universe of established single-party systems, ideology and organization are the Janus-faced substance from which legitimacy is to derive if the system is to persist. And just as the organization and functioning of single-party states can be compared, so too can the ideologies the parties generate to legitimate their rule. Differences in ideology in fact reflect and help to explain significant structural variations in the established systems.

It may be generally misleading, and sometimes perverse, to discuss ideology outside the context of political organization.<sup>18</sup> Ideology is not an individual affair. For the ideology to be operative, it must embrace a community of believers organized to achieve their shared goals. And, reciprocally, in established one-party systems the party organization is especially dependent upon the belief systems of cadres and leaders. For the party to be the prime source of legitimacy, its organization must be, in Philip Selznick’s terms, “infused with value”—either valued for itself as an institution or valued as a weapon for the goals it can achieve. Historically the second, or instrumental, mode of legitimacy precedes the first, intrinsic mode; the “administrative ideology” associated with what Selznick calls “institutionalization” is the result of deradicalization or ritualization of ideology in the more generic and genetic sense.<sup>19</sup> Ideology, by origin is radical ideology or, as Daniel Bell puts it, “a way of translating ideas into action.”<sup>20</sup> In this sense the Bolsheviks were the first to successfully convert ideas into “levers” for transforming society, and it was no accident that their chief instrument was a vanguard party. But both partisan organization and radical ideology have earlier—and simultaneous—roots in Western political and intellectual history. Michael Walzer has persuasively reinterpreted Puritanism as the prototype of radical ideology even as others have seen in Puritan organization the prototype of the modern political party.<sup>21</sup> Though the Puritans, displaced by Cromwell’s military, never established a single-party regime, their experience is worth recalling for the light it sheds on the functions of radical ideology.

Unlike more contemporary ideologists, the Puritan “saints” were more concerned with moral order than politics and, so far as they attended to politics, they did not focus exclusively or even primarily upon government at the state level. But, as Walzer suggests, “magistracy is a far better description of the saints’ true vocation than is either capitalist acquisition or bourgeois freedom. It suggests most clearly the activist role that Puritanism called upon the saints to play in the creation and maintenance of a new moral order.”<sup>22</sup> The Puritans were the first political entrepreneurs in Western history. Marginal men—marginal not in the sense that they were

not sociologically competent but rather in that they were alienated from a traditional order that appeared on the verge of collapse—the saints were the first to harness conscience to work in the political arena. Seeking control, hence “government” over self—for their ethics, even their cosmology, was expressed in a political language of war and repression<sup>23</sup>—they externalized their moral and religious concern into an organized and sustained political activity which is perhaps the most startling innovation of the post-medieval world. Though their contemporaries viewed their sustained commitment as hypocrisy and their hard work as meddlesomeness, the Puritans were the prototype of the modern militant—“militant,” in fact, in a special sense that can help us to clarify the nature of ideological activity.

Too often in contemporary political analysis “ideological” parties and individuals are contrasted to the “pragmatic” varieties, usually with bias in favor of the latter. But if we accept Walzer’s description, the saints were more profoundly pragmatic in their approach to politics than any of their contemporaries. Having internalized as anxiety the Machiavellian *fortuna*, they were driven methodically and systematically—without any regard for established forms and hence “free to experiment politically”<sup>24</sup>—to approach their goals in a continual and impersonal way. Not only were they the first to organize voluntary political organizations and the first to present detached appraisals of the existing order; they also achieved programmatic expressions of their political discontent and aspirations. Thus, unlike the true believers of medieval chiliastic sects, they applied their aspirations to political reality, uniting theory and practice as subsequent militants were to do more explicitly.

Calvinism, of course, achieved a more explicitly political elaboration in the Jacobin Republic of Virtue. And as radical ideology developed, so too did political organization. Though the Jacobins, who attained power only for a very brief period at the height of the French Revolution, never elaborated a rationale for a single-party system, the Jacobin clubs were forerunners of the single party in established one-party systems. The organizational vehicle of the revolutionary ideology, they practiced periodic purges (*épuration*) and constantly intervened in the functioning of the state administration.<sup>25</sup> Jacobin social goals were limited, for it was assumed that the right political order would more or less automatically produce the right society, but the Republic of Virtue assumed citizens made virtuous through sustained moral introspection that was possible only in the context of a political organization that brought the general will to light. It remained for Lenin, however, to unite theory and practice by explicitly linking radical ideology to an organizational weapon. To the pure ideology of Puritans, Jacobins, and the many other modern radicals who externalize moral or religious concerns into sustained and purposeful political activity is added a practical ideology that legitimates the organizational vanguard as the source of “true” interpretations and determines its operative goals. Thus twentieth century ideology becomes, in Brzezinski’s words, “an action pro-

gram suitable for mass consumption, derived from certain doctrinal assumption about the general nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combining some assertion about the inadequacies of the past and/or present with some explicit guides to action for improving the situation and some notions of the desired eventual state of affairs.”<sup>26</sup> To which one might add that a prime function of the ideology is to hold together the organization that implements its prescriptions.<sup>27</sup> Indeed some contemporary scholars tread dangerously close to defining ideology in terms of organization; thus for Friedrich, “as long as the organization continues, the presumption has to be in favor of the continuity of the ideology.”<sup>28</sup>

But the radical pragmatist’s “union of theory and practice” expresses a methodological aspiration, not an analytic proposition. Organization may survive though ideology no longer guides action, just as churches may survive losses of faith. And, conversely, radical ideologues do not always establish organization. Leninism constitutes only a paradigm for established single-party systems, in that it offers a vocabulary and a methodological postulate for justifying and legitimating party rule. Irrespective of the content of the pure ideology, whether Marxist or non-Marxist and whatever the goals, all single parties in search of legitimacy adopt the vanguard principle and try to justify their strategies and tactics in terms of their goals. But the proposed union of theory and practice that legitimates parties and their leaders can always be questioned. Even Lenin did not escape criticism and occasional reverses at the hands of his fellow Bolsheviks. Leninism as practical ideology imposes the obligation upon those who would use it as a legitimating principle to relate their political actions to the abstract goals posited by their pure ideology. Leninism, like Puritanism, demands a continuous elaboration of means and ends—at once pragmatic and programmatic—that generates a sustained purposiveness for political organization. There is never a final “proof” of the meeting of means and ends.

In practice there is always some disassociation between the pure and practical ideologies, between ends and means, even in the pragmatic Leninist system. But whereas Lenin and Stalin usually sought to bridge the gap by revising the pure ideology—and resorting to terror when rational articulation became impossible<sup>29</sup>—the Sorelian transposition of Marx suggests an alternative that is less painful and equally applicable to other ideological systems. Pure ideology, as Plato foretold, can be translated into myth, which by definition is impervious to rational criticism because it is not action-related and hence not subject to an ongoing appraisal of means and ends. The myth of the general strike is designed to moralize society by engendering proletarian solidarity, but it has no action consequences. In fact Sorel obligingly points out that such “social myths in no way prevent a man profiting by the observations which he makes in the course of his life, and form no obstacle to the pursuit of his normal occupations . . . [just as] . . . English or American sectarians whose religious exaltation was fed by apocalyptic myths were often none the less very practical men.”<sup>30</sup>

The test of myth is not whether what it predicts is true but whether it can be believed. Thus the test of the myth Sorel proposes is “whether the general strike contains everything that the Socialist doctrine expects of the revolutionary proletariat, . . . [that is, whether it is] a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society.”<sup>31</sup> An effective myth in this sense, synthesizing all the noble proletarian sentiments associated with past limited strikes, is “global knowledge” in need of no practical fulfillment. While the social analyst can presumably predict whether a myth will be effective and ineffective, on the basis of objective aesthetic criteria,<sup>32</sup> the political actions of the effective myth-maker can only be appreciated as they *express* the myth, not judged in light of their consequences. Action, in short, has consummatory rather than instrumental value.<sup>33</sup>

Antonio Gramsci criticized the “abstract” character of Sorel’s conception of myth, but his *Modern Prince* points toward a richer and more concrete theory of the vanguard party than a pragmatic ideologist like Lenin would allow. The party is the modern “myth-prince,” an organism “in which the cementing of a collective will, recognized and partially asserted in action, has already begun.”<sup>34</sup> Though Gramsci apparently does not elaborate his own conception of myth—possibly to do so would be like Sorel to question the scientific character of Marxism—Mussolini of course in his crude and undialectical fashion had already extracted the Sorelian conception of myth from its syndical context and applied it to a national constituency. “That which I am,” he claimed after attaining power, “I owe to Sorel.” The myth of the Third Rome was designed to generate solidarity, expressed in the party’s grandiose public spectacles. To be fair to Mussolini, he acknowledged that, in addition to utilizing myth, leadership “requires a specific knowledge that governs and is adequate for action. For those who conceive socialism in terms of Sorel’s myth nothing obtains other than an act of faith.” “Pragmatic realism”—in short, a practical ideology—is also needed, and in this sense Mussolini rejoins Lenin, though the goals realistically to be pursued of course diverge.<sup>35</sup> But despite his boasts of “totalitarian” government and a fully elaborated “doctrine” based on a neo-Hegelian philosophy, Mussolini’s pronouncements never displayed the ideological rigor of a Lenin or Stalin and were “pragmatic” only in the sense of being opportunistic with respect to ends as well as means. Legitimacy depended on myth expressed by the party, not on a programmatic pursuit of goals. Few Italians took “ideology” literally as a lever for transforming society; the party propaganda machine was significant mainly as an expression of the myth of the totalitarian state rather than for its functional consequences. Despite his chiliastic rhetoric, Mussolini himself appears to have had few fixed goals, other than staying in power and displaying it.

Clearly ideology in the twentieth century can have expressive as well as instrumental functions. Though in theory as subject as Leninism to rational

analysis, fascism in Italy was primarily expressive rather than instrumental and hence less vulnerable to rational criticism. All established single parties need to be infused with value to generate legitimacy for their regimes and rulers. But the ideologies of such parties vary significantly not only with respect to the nature of the goals they posit but also with respect to their function. The goals may involve either a total or partial transformation of society, and they may be treated either as expressions of party solidarity or as tasks to be performed. Thus for comparative purposes it is possible to generate a four-fold typology of one-party ideologies, along with examples of each type, as Table 2-1 indicates.

TABLE 2-1 *Single-Party Ideologies*

Functions	Goals	
	Total Transformation	Partial Transformation
Instrumental	totalitarian Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, Nazi Germany, “Stalinist” East Europe	tutelary Tunisia, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Ataturk’s Turkey
Expressive	chiliastic Fascist Italy, Nkrumah’s Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Cuba, Ben Bella’s Algeria	administrative Mexico

Real systems of ideology and organization, of course, are too complex to classify in this simplistic way, for the instrumental and expressive functions are not mutually exclusive. Even Stalin, when appealing to nationalism during World War II, was using ideology expressively as well as instrumentally, and Mussolini did, after all, make the trains run on time.<sup>36</sup> The four boxes only denote very general tendencies, on the bases of which some hypotheses can be drawn about the evolution of established one-party systems. One virtue of the classification, however, is that it includes non-revolutionary as well as revolutionary variants, in contrast to Tucker’s typology.<sup>37</sup> Thus it is possible to discuss adaptive single-party systems as well as those which transform society; chiliastic and administrative systems can adapt like Tucker’s “extinct movement-regimes” without being extinguished, since their legitimacy does not depend primarily upon goal achievement. It will also be possible to discuss the phenomenon of “deradicalization” or ritualization within a given ideological system.

Totalitarian systems are inherently unstable in that they attempt the logically impossible task, in Brzezinski’s words, of “institutionalizing revolutionary zeal.”<sup>38</sup> Totalitarian ideology is inherently incompatible with bureaucratic routine or legal order, for it demands the perpetual movement of permanent revolution. Whether the party absorbs other bureaucrats and technicians or creates its own, they will tend to undermine its revolutionary

purpose unless they are periodically purged, in which case bureaucratic order is constantly jeopardized—even, and especially, within the party. Purges and terror may also be necessary to ensure the internal consistency of the ideology, and hence the legitimacy of the rulers, despite widening, and ultimately unbridgeable, gaps between the ideology and social reality. Without terror and widespread purges the pure ideology may become dissociated from the party's organizational goals, or practical ideology. This has happened in China, resulting in a temporary breakdown of the established one-party system.<sup>39</sup> It would seem that totalitarian systems cannot endure without terror or some functional equivalent; instead, the ideology “erodes” or changes in ways we shall subsequently discuss.

Despite their inherent instability, and though the Soviet Union is no longer totalitarian, these systems generate remarkable power to transform society. Problems which plague other established single-party systems are not permitted to arise. Thus party membership is kept closed and exclusive; even the Nazi ideology provided relatively clear-cut criteria for defining the vanguard. Party cohesion is not undermined by factionalism; indeed, with the striking exception of the Chinese Communist Party, even opinion groups are banished, and in theory all of society is regimented though guerrilla pockets of autonomous groupings, for the most part illegitimate, may persist outside the monolith. Social as well as political pluralism, in short, is abolished unless, as in Poland, totalitarian breakthrough was prevented.

The conceptual revolution went furthest in China, perhaps because the gap there was greatest between the Western ideology and the traditional society. If Marxism could, as Adam Ulam suggests, harness anarchic former peasants to industrial order,<sup>40</sup> the Chinese had the further cultural task of making a modern revolution “against the world to join the world, against their past to keep it theirs, but past,”<sup>41</sup> whereas the other totalitarians already belonged to a modern European heritage. All totalitarian ideologies are communications systems employing at least two interrelated languages, an esoteric code for members of the organization and an exoteric set of slogans for the public.<sup>42</sup> The esoteric code serves as a shorthand for communicating political information upward, coordinating the organization, and expanding hierarchical power linkages even under decentralized conditions,<sup>43</sup> while the slogans are supposed to mobilize the public and generate popular support. A distinctive feature of the Chinese system, however, has been its effort to generalize thought reform, and hence the esoteric code, beyond the confines of the party. Mao has tried to command Chinese language and thought as well as reality and thereby break out of organizational barriers to revolution. But dialectically the effort is bound to fail for, if thought reform succeeds, minds become mere superstructure conditioned by the material factors of organization and brainwashing—vulnerable, in short, to what the Chinese call bureaucratic “commandism.”

Despite its injunction to link theory and practice, totalitarian ideology cannot “predict” policy. That it makes a difference for policy-making seems to be either a self-evident or nonsensical proposition—self-evident in that without ideology the Russians would not have performed a revolution<sup>44</sup> and nonsensical in that only misguided philosophers or social scientists make Humean correlations between thought and action.<sup>45</sup> But not even the perfectly pragmatic ideologist can with certainty deduce a particular policy from the esoteric code. Rational disagreements among the ideologists are bound to arise, as the Chinese recognize by permitting opinion groups. Thus, as David Comey properly points out, “if Marxist-Leninism can equally well justify collectivization *and* increasing the private sector of agriculture, then it is no longer the consistent guide to action which some people claim it is.”<sup>46</sup> Yet totalitarian legitimacy rests precisely upon this premise. It is of small consolation to the totalitarian to excuse inconsistency by recognizing with Barrington Moore that “the power of ideas does not depend upon their logical coherence alone, but also upon the social functions that they perform.”<sup>47</sup> For that is already to invoke the antithetical principle of legitimacy of an expressive ideologist like Sorel or Mussolini. To be sure, abetted by confessions, brainwashing, or sheer terror, a totalitarian ideology can retain a semblance of consistency over a long period of time. But when “glaring inconsistencies are tolerated, the complete acceptance of the doctrine is endangered”<sup>48</sup> unless ritualization sets in. Revolutionary zeal embodied in a vanguard party then carries with it the seeds of its own decay and supercession by another type of ideology.

Chiliastic systems have the convenience of being immune to rational criticism, for ideology expresses solidarity but has no practical consequences and is therefore quite compatible with bureaucratic routine, even with the rule of law so far as this does not interfere with partisan whims. But the chiliastic myth is a highly unstable source of legitimacy, even though one of its expressions is an organized mass party. For the party lacks operative guidelines, a practical ideology of even limited goals to define its tasks, select its members, and coordinate its organizational networks. The Algerian Front of National Liberation is a perfect example—a “party of detached parts,” according to one of its regional leaders who like most Algerian militants bemoans the absence of a practical ideology. Without ideological guidelines, the party is simply a vehicle for individualist patrimonialism, for the chiliastic goal justifies all “counter revolutionary” measures. Chiliastic parties are, in Frantz Fanon's words, “syndicates of individual interests.”<sup>49</sup> In this way other social and economic forces acquire illegitimate access into political system. In fact chiliastic ideology, enjoining no concrete goals, is peculiarly vulnerable to social pressures. Hence the party expressively dedicated to total transformation is in fact the most flexible and “adaptive” of established single-party types. The myth rapidly loses its credibility, and even the vanguard becomes cynical. Imaginary threats of



"neocolonialism" and the like become functional necessities, and military charades may become rituals expressing the new myths. But international miscalculations can be costly.

In the last analysis the stability of the chiliastic system depends not so much upon the plausibility of the myth as upon social forces outside the party. If these are weak and readily exploitable or strong but bought off or in other ways satisfied, the system may endure though its legitimacy is feeble, *faute de mieux*. But the party is likely not as in the totalitarian case to clash with bureaucrats and experts but rather to evaporate into a bloated party-state. The established single-party system, unable to build legitimacy, becomes a no-party system with a heteronomous party. Was it accidental, for instance, that Mussolini sent most of his best party cadres off to the front in 1941? The party was superfluous—even at the regime's most critical period. Without an ideological principle of exclusion, the party indeed becomes the nation—and hence nothing. If, on the other hand, the party remains a vanguard of expressive ideologists, attempting to intervene against other social forces, it is likely to be overthrown unless these forces are feeble as in Mali or Guinea. Where, as in Ghana, the private sector and the ex-colonial civil service were strong, the vanguard failed. And Mussolini, of course, was eventually deposed by the traditional groups with which he had compromised.<sup>50</sup>

In the face of social pressures, chiliastic parties may introduce "corporatist" structures for the articulation and aggregation of sectoral interests. But chiasm is incompatible with institutional bargaining; the national myth presupposes a general will and hence cannot legitimate political pluralism, even though it masks a *de facto* social pluralism and dispersion of power. Hence the effort to build a structural source of legitimacy is bound to fail. As in totalitarian regimes, the various sectoral organizations lack plausibility as representative groups, but they furthermore fail to mobilize because they are not animated by practical ideology. Thus the party is unable to embalm its myth in legitimate institution; in fact corporatism can succeed only in the context of ritualized or administrative ideology.

The chiliastic myths of culturally deprived, that is, non-Western areas may for short periods engender intense solidarity and apparent revolutionary momentum. The Chinese Cultural Revolution is the most striking example; after the disintegration of practical ideology and organization, the chiliastic "thought of Mao Tse-Tung," elevated to the realm of pure ideology, has become a vital source of legitimacy even without any stable attachment to a political organization. So also in Guinea, the first Three Year Plan may have been "too thunderingly simple about its hopes for a revolutionary transformation of society,"<sup>51</sup> but the myth was believed—for a time. For, though not conceptually reducible to individual neurosis, class interest, cultural strain, or any other analytic category of the social sciences, expressive ideology may—when traditional meanings lose their relevance—be likened to a cognitive map "to make autonomous politics pos-

sible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped."<sup>52</sup> Much of the Third World lives in an age of expressive ideology, but the new revolutionary Puritanism remains an aesthetic aspiration unless it also generates a practical ideology. Yet, as Franz Schurmann suggests, "nationalist movements tend to generate only pure ideology; although they give their members a sense of identity in the world, they do not furnish them with rational instruments for action."<sup>53</sup>

Expressive ideology usually, though not necessarily, distracts the ideological imagination from concrete tasks. Hence durable "tutelary" regimes are rare in the Third World. Here a limited, but instrumental, ideology of social engineering can justify single-party rule which is, therefore, as in the totalitarian case, vulnerable to rational criticism. Programmatic intentions are tailored to social reality, making the ideology more "adaptable" than the totalitarian type though less so than the chiliastic type. Typically such ideologies derive from one of the other types. Thus Bourguiba succeeded, so to speak, in rationalizing nationalist anticolonial chiasm, by giving it concrete expression in "Destour Socialism." Stemming from totalitarian ideology, on the other hand, Titoism once could be viewed as "an attempt at depoliticization of the average citizen's life."<sup>54</sup> In each case the party is to have a limited set of goals whence its legitimacy derives and on the basis of which its performance can be judged. Thus a practical ideology coordinates organizational endeavor and provides the party members with a sense of mission. But retaining the vanguard may mean reifying the limited goals. Then practical ideology is dissociated from its original instrumental or expressive nexus and can no longer be a source of movement once the limited goals are achieved. Moreover, the legitimacy of the limited goals can always be called into question, yet neither ideological reasoning nor mythical recollection can provide justification. Nor can the party itself generate procedures, through corporatism, internally democratic processes, and the like, to legitimate the goals, for then externals supposedly "depoliticized" or pre-political forces would subvert them. As with the totalitarian and chiliastic systems, tutelary legitimacy is incompatible with institutionalized procedures.

As Ulam has noted in the case of Yugoslavia, tutelary ideologies are in a sense "an optical illusion."<sup>55</sup> For limited goals are necessarily confined to particular countries; there can be no claim to certainty based on the doctrine's universality. The method of "Bourguibism," the nationalized socialism of Tito, Nyerere's *ujamaa*, Ataturk's Six Arrows—none of these is an exportable ideology. Conversely, when a totalitarian ideology is no longer exportable, it may become tutelary: there seems to be a necessary connection between the "pluralism" of international communism and domestic evolution, even though for a time a country can, like Rumania, retain more or less Stalinist methods. Yet tutelary ideology also displays inherent contradictions. The party either, as in the case of Turkey, allows itself to be under-

mined by the social forces it did not absorb and domesticate, or it must institutionalize itself, that is, replace substantive instrumental legitimacy with legitimacy derived from a diffuse respect for its internal structure. Then, too, the party risks being swamped by other forces, but it is conceivable that an established party can flexibly absorb them while retaining its identity and its functions of recruiting and legitimating the top political leadership.

Like chiliastic ideology, administrative ideology consists of symbols and myths defused of programmatic significance. It is an expressive rather than an instrumental type of ideology, for sentimentalists rather than revolutionary pragmatists. But, since it does not posit an ultimate goal (however irrelevant the goal may be as a guide to action), administrative ideology is tolerant of a wide range of practical, partial goals. Pluralism and corporate representation are therefore explicitly acceptable as methods for reaching decisions. The party lacks a fixed practical ideology defining organizational purpose; like the chiliastic party it has only a sense of purpose rather than concrete purposes. Indeed, far from remaining a mere organization, the party becomes an institution with procedures which may be likened to the constitution of an established state. To be sure, it retains administrative cadres and a mass membership, but, like the Yugoslav League of Communists, it becomes progressively "divorced from power."<sup>56</sup> The analogy, however, is not with the Christian church but rather with Islam, which theoretically admitted no distinction between religion and politics. Classically, the religious scholars, "the 'men who fasten and loosen,' retain a right of continual supervision, not over the exercise of power, it should be noted, but over the conditions of validity of the Caliphate's part."<sup>57</sup> So also in Yugoslavia, communists may preserve the party and its procedures by recalling and reenacting the myths upon which it is founded.

So far as it retains organizational features, the party-institution resembles the chiliastic party in that the prime function of the organization is politically to socialize the mass membership, even as its procedures recruit top leaders and legitimate their decisions. Like constitutionalism, administrative ideology can be a viable principle of legitimacy—as long as the myths underlying it inspire a sense of purposiveness and respect for the procedures.<sup>58</sup> But paradoxically the stuff of politics within the context of the single-party procedures will acquire a factional or multi-party character. Only the infringement of formal rules justifies exclusion; hence the party is open to all sociologically competent groups and individuals. However, unless the myth of party stewardship underlying the procedures is believed by all politically active members of the society, the party is apt to split among "constitutional" and "anti-constitutional" forces, and the latter will either have to be suppressed (presumably on the basis of tutelary or chiliastic ideology) or tolerated as opposition parties. In either case the character of the established single-party system changes.

Thus each of the four types of established single-party systems—the

totalitarian, the chiliastic, the tutelary, and the administrative—displays dialectical tensions contained in its principle of legitimacy. But, as we have indicated earlier, these are ideal types deductively generated from two dimensions of ideology—its instrumental or expressive character and the nature of the goals it posits. In the real world, however, ideology is a complex set of interrelated normative propositions and beliefs that mean different things to different people. Thus in any particular political system individuals and groups may display differences with respect to both the form and substance of their ideological activities: they may be pragmatic or expressive ideologues and they may be committed to either total or partial goals, to name only the key distinctions. Pockets of chiliastic, tutelary, and administrative ideologists, for instance, can be found in a totalitarian system, and of course uncommitted islands outside the ideological system exist in any society, just as do individuals and groups committed to other ideologies, even in totalitarian societies.

Given the tensions within each ideological type, ideologies change over time. Within our framework it is possible to analyze the "ritualization" of ideology, the process whereby instrumental ideologies become expressive and concrete goals fade away—possibly giving rise to a general sense of purposiveness. The older the organization, according to theorists of American bureaucracies, the less committed it becomes to any particular goal and the more committed it becomes to maintaining the organizational structure as such.<sup>59</sup> We cannot assume any such built-in organismic tendencies in the organizations of established single-party systems, for the party, far from operating in an American "pluralistic" environment, itself defines the political system.<sup>60</sup> But in a backhanded way organizational theorists can shed light on the institutionalization—not inevitable, to be sure—of established single-party systems.

Thus Philip Selznick's discussion of the evolution of the Tennessee Valley Authority is instructive. Understandably, discussing a mere organization rather than a political system, Selznick's perspective is that of the instrumental ideologist, or what he calls the "moral pragmatist," who never stops asking "whether the end he has in view or the means he uses are governed by truly operative criteria of moral worth."<sup>61</sup> He brilliantly shows how "ideology," or what we have labeled "expressive ideology," can mask an organization's adaptation, or surrender, to external pressures. Thus the "grass roots" doctrine of TVA, while it "simply verbalizes an administrative approach which any agency would follow out of necessity,"<sup>62</sup> also masked the informal cooptation of conservative agricultural interests by the authority. Unanalyzed elements in the doctrine permitted "covert adaptation in terms of practical necessities," for, "since unanalyzed abstractions cannot guide action, actual behavior will be determined not so much by professed ideas as by immediate exigencies and specific pressures."<sup>63</sup>

More generally, organizations over time tend to acquire distinctive character and to adapt to conditions of their environment. Commitment to es-



tablished patterns is generated, and established policy will be institutionalized as doctrine. Unfortunately from Selznick's view, however, "an official doctrine whose terms are not operationally relevant will be given content in action, but this content will be informed by special interests and problems of those to whom delegation is made. Hence doctrinal formulations will tend to reinforce the inherent hazard of delegation."<sup>64</sup> Thus expressive ideology is one defense mechanism whereby an organization adapts to its environment.<sup>65</sup> Another is cooptation: of the formal sort for establishing legitimacy to a relevant public and of the informal sort "when there is a need of adjustment to the pressure of specific centers of power within the community."<sup>66</sup> The ambiguities of expressive ideology can mask the surrender of organizational goals that informal cooptation may entail; indeed, creating an institution out of an organization usually involves the "elaboration of socially integrating myths."<sup>67</sup>

In any established one-party system, it would seem essential that the ideology be expressively as well as instrumentally applied, if the organization is flexibly to adapt to its environment. Tucker's discussion of the "deradicalization" of Marxist movements provides added evidence. Orthodox leaders may "modify the *tactical* part of the ideology by stressing immediate short-term objectives and nonradical means of attaining them," but they must reject the formal revisionism "that would disavow the radical principles or eschatological elements of the movement's ideology." In fact, "intensified *verbal* allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization."<sup>68</sup> Conversely, however, there may covertly occur in a communist party as in TVA what Sidney Tarrow with reference to Italy has called "the institutionalization of strategy"<sup>69</sup> characteristic of tutelary ideology. That is, even while pledging verbal allegiance to irrelevant principles, a party may acquire a practical organizational ideology attuned to its environment—for a time, at least, despite the risks of reifying limited goals.

Much has been written about the "erosion" of totalitarian ideology, especially in the Soviet Union. But what appears as erosion, implying an "end of ideology," may perhaps be better analyzed as a complex set of changes permitting the ideological custodian—the established party—to adapt to its environment. Within our typology the Soviet Communist Party appears to have shifted from a totalitarian ideology to one blending tutelary and chiliastic components. Yugoslav communism has apparently progressed further, evolving a mixture of tutelary, chiliastic, and institutional characteristics. With ideologies as with Aristotelian forms of government, "mixtures" may prove to be more durable bases of legitimacy than the pure types. Just as the mixed polity has more than one principle of legitimacy, so too does the established single-party system with a mixed ideology.

Only totalitarian ideology contains within it the seeds of each other type. Ritualization does connote "erosion" in the sense that it is unilinear, a process whereby total goals are replaced by partial goals and ideological

propositions lose their original instrumental meanings. A totalitarian ideology can become administrative, but an administrative one cannot become totalitarian (unless a new group seizes the institution). Therefore totalitarian systems have better prospects of evolving into mixed systems than do other types. It is conceivable, of course, that a country like Tunisia having a tutelary ideology can mix tutelary and administrative principles. But it would not be able to acquire totalitarian or chiliastic principles without a fundamental change of system. The more complex the mixture, however, the more durable the compound. Parties that retain a chiliastic sense of mission are liable to survive longer than those whose myths rest merely on practical accomplishments. Independence had chiliastic significance during Tunisia's independence struggle, but the vision is only faintly discernible in secular humdrum Destour Socialism.

Moreover, a post-totalitarian society may be more likely to have internalized the ideology and hence be more susceptible to the "socially integrating myths" of a party-institution. The totalitarian leveling of society ensures greater ideological congruence between the party and new social forces that it generated.<sup>70</sup> Hence an administrative principle of legitimacy is less liable to challenges than it would be in less fully "socialized" societies. But the post-totalitarian party is also more likely to retain an ideological capacity to generate goals and myths than parties which never acquired a totalitarian cast. It is therefore less likely to drift into the unconscious adaptation to social forces that organizational theorists as instrumental ideologists seek to avoid by invoking leadership (for this is the message of Selznick's classic, *Leadership in Administration*)—organizational drift being the price of administrative ideology and "institutionalization," for parties even more than for private or semipublic American institutions, as the Mexican PRI, little more than a tool for social forces, clearly illustrates.

How then are apparently contradictory principles of legitimacy blended? In a country like the Soviet Union with a highly complex ideological infrastructure the answer lies in different components of ideology acquiring different uses for different groups of people. Ritualization, in fact ideology generally, cannot be discussed outside the context of audiences, indeed organized audiences such as established parties. David Apter is overly optimistic with respect to expressive African ideologies but on the right track when he suggests that "ritualization allows a transition from consummatory to instrumental values."<sup>71</sup> Expressive ideologies lack the programmatic substance for "instrumental values," but the ritualization of an instrumental ideology can generate both goals and myths.

An instrumental ideology is ritualized as a result of internal inconsistencies that inevitably occur as ideological goals become demonstrably impossible to achieve or else irrelevant to a changed society. Of course terror can also resolve inconsistencies, but if terror is excluded, ritualization must occur—hastened by the decline of Puritan fervor within the vanguard and the rise of "respectable" interests. Ideological change can be expressed in a va-

riety of ways discussed by Barrington Moore. A doctrine, like the equality of rewards in the Soviet Union, can be repudiated outright. But there are more circuitous routes. Goals can be postponed—and forgotten. Or they can be ritually incanted in order to reassure the devotees that principles are not forgotten; in this way an instrumental proposition can be used expressively while its cognitive content is forgotten or—in the case, for instance, of anti-authoritarian populist symbols in an authoritarian state—given new cognitive content.<sup>72</sup> But as long as an established party exists with a vested interest in sustaining it, ideology never simply fades away. Indeed, the need to sustain it generates the “sense of purpose, organizationally expressed,” that guides the party’s functioning.<sup>73</sup>

The ritualization of an ideology—that is, one which is acted on and which justifies action—is the process whereby it loses instrumental meaning. Ideological propositions may be clamorously invoked, but they are no longer a basis for action. “Building socialism” for instance, may still have positive connotations and hence expressive uses, but it is no longer instrumental if it is dissociated from a series of more concrete propositions indicating how the socialist edifice is to be constructed. “Building socialism” becomes a mere slogan, much like the expressive exhortations of “revolutionary transformation” adopted by some single-party chiliasts and segments of the New Left in America. But this is not all that happens. The “ideology” must be retained. Hence, party programs must contain elaborate descriptions of how socialism is to be built. But the program itself will have an expressive rather than instrumental function. Very little of the ideology will remain operative. As Richard Lowenthal has suggested, “Communist ideology will have an effective influence on the policy decisions of Soviet leaders when, and only when, it expresses the needs of self-preservation of the party regime.”<sup>74</sup> Even ideological “consistency” will be a virtue often invoked and rarely practiced.

To preserve the party, practical ideology determining organizational objectives and coordinating its activities is essential. But the only activities that are essential, if the established single-party regime is to survive, are that the party organization perpetuate itself and that it continue to be the prime instrument for recruiting top political leadership. Hence, “ideology” becomes a crucial party activity, generating the impression of a political system that is “consciously striving toward an announced but not exactly defined goal.”<sup>75</sup> For expressive ideological activity gives the organization something to do, a role through which organization can be perpetuated. Even though it loses many of its control functions, the party survives, and indeed its “ideological section” may become paramount. And so, due to increasing specialization, ideology gets separated from politics—politics, that is in the sense of struggle for office and decision-making. Ideological experts acquire autonomy and therefore there can, as Alfred Meyer points out, be a growing conflict in the Soviet Union between ideology and science, as the less ideologically inclined party leaders, the generalists, lose

control over their specialists.<sup>76</sup> But the specialized discipline of ideology can no longer directly affect most policy decisions. Indeed even—and perhaps especially—under Stalin after terror was substituted for rationality, but also today, ritualized ideology should be understood “less as a genuine master plan than as a hollow scheme to which lip service is paid in order to deflect attention from current realities.”<sup>77</sup> Yet neither the party leaders nor the ideologists need become cynical like the disappointed chiliast, for gaps between words and deeds are expected. The catechism, organizationally expressed in a complex educational bureaucracy, is there for all to see; it reassures the faithful, especially the top leaders who seek self-legitimation.<sup>78</sup>

Ritualization permits a totalitarian ideology in breaking down to acquire three dimensions: the chiliastic, the tutelary, and the administrative. While it is no longer philosophy’s task to change the world, the chiliastic component remains, routinely embedded in the political culture that the party continues to articulate and be the main expression of. The symbols remain, engendering enthusiasm upon occasion but usually expressed in Fourth-of-July type rituals. Yet chiliasm is not the sole principle of legitimacy, and therefore the credibility of the myths is not subjected to the sharp aesthetic scrutiny which founders of myth must face. The party seeks to play more than an educational role, for education divorced from practice tends toward overspecialization—in political systems as in universities. The custodian of values, it on occasion seeks to implement them, invoking tutelary legitimacy. To the extent that policy is ideologically derived, the “correct” solution still exists and must be imposed; that is, the party retains some control functions, though in shrinking sectors of social and administrative activity. Where, however, “correct” solutions do not prevail, policies and leaders may acquire another type of legitimacy derived from the very party procedures that generate them. This, of course, is institutional legitimacy based on the administrative principle.

The major constituencies of the three principles of legitimacy overlap but differ sufficiently to obscure their logical incompatibilities. There is a little chiliasm for everybody: in post-totalitarian society most citizens may have absorbed the founding myths. But the party’s educational task is important, for it ensures that active politicians and managers, even if they are not specialized ideologists, are more practiced in articulating the catechism—and suggesting concord between its values and their designs—than the average citizen. One task of statesmanship is to express the unattainable in concrete practical terms. But, given the differentiation in the party between generalists and ideological specialists, the statesman’s concrete alternatives will not be bounded by the practical ideology of indoctrination. The major audience of the tutelary component will be the party hacks, especially the ideologists. The major audience of the administrative component, on the other hand, will be the sociologically and politically component generalists and spokesmen of other groups; respecting the party and its procedures as

an institution infused with value, they may be relatively free to provide new goals and directions to the political community, so far as the set of procedures is detached from tutelary organization. The ideological specialists, however, can be a constructive check upon the politicians, for the tutelary principle corrects the inherent drift of established institutions.

Yet it would be presumptuous and over-hasty to conclude that the established single-party system is here to stay, buttressed by not one but three principles of legitimacy. "Mixed" government is not always durable, and dialectical tensions can be a source of disease as well as health to a body politic. But our task was not to predict specific developments in any established single-party system, only to suggest ways in which the party could be a source of legitimacy for this kind of system. That the party can be the principal source of legitimacy in three ways rather than one—through shared myths, agreed goals, and procedural traditions—is perhaps already to suggest the potential, as well as some of the "contradictions" inherent in this distinctively modern mode of government.

## || Notes

1. Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), p. 508.
2. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 18.
3. Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 514.
4. Sigmund Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). See also Harry Eckstein, "Political Parties," in *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Crowell-Collier and Macmillan, 1968), in which single-party systems are deliberately excluded.
5. More generally with J. P. Nettl, "We must look to parties as substituting for the legitimacy function of the state" in societies having what he calls a "low incidence of stateness." See his article, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics*, XX, No. 4 (July 1968), esp. 581, 588–589.
6. For a discussion of factionalism, see V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 298–310.
7. J. Gus Liebenow, "Liberia," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 448–481.
8. Clement H. Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 41–104.
9. For a discussion of Mexican mythology and its relation to legitimacy, see L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 1–8, 43–46.
10. See *The New York Times*, February 25, 1968.
11. Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) presents a detailed discussion.
12. For a discussion of definitions see Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 508.
13. And, as Leonard Binder adds, "If a popular organization is to be the repository

- of legitimacy, such an organization cannot be frequently or radically changed without mitigating its legitimizing effect." See his "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt," in LaPalombara and Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 217–240.
14. Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 226, 237.
  15. *Ibid.*, pp. 200, 267.
  16. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States," in LaPalombara and Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 201–216.
  17. Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 159–161.
  18. For a good critique of such discussions, see Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (August 1966), esp. 514–520. The positivist tradition of ethical and sociological inquiry is equally irrelevant. See, for instance, Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," *Ethics*, LXI, No. 3 (April 1951), 205–218, esp. 215: "If I am to be consistent, I must call ideology every rationale, no matter how explicit and articulate on the fact-value issue and other fundamental questions, that assimilates facts and values to each other in a way in which the tradition in which I stand insists . . . cannot be done."
  19. Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) alludes to the need for administrative ideology but does not discuss how it might evolve out of the sort of ideology which shaped his *Organizational Weapon* (New York: The Free Press, 1960).
  20. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 370.
  21. See H. G. Koenigsberger, "The Organization of Revolutionary Parties in France and the Netherlands during the Sixteenth Century," *The Journal of Modern History*, XXVII (December 1955), 335–351. These parties were "the logical counterpart of the increased power of the state . . . they were nearly always the result of the efforts of determined minorities who tried to impose their views on the country by force . . . without such organization these minorities could not hope to succeed . . . they did succeed only where the government was temporarily weak. . . . The new factor which made possible these formidable parties was religion. Religious belief alone, no matter whether it was held with fanatic conviction or for political expediency, could bring together the divergent interests of nobles, burghers, and peasants over areas as wide as the whole of France" (pp. 335–336).
  22. Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 307.
  23. For instance, "When God used angels in spiritual warfare, he chose them without reference to any preexisting hierarchy. He did not recognize their status, Puritans insisted, rather he appointed their offices. . . . For most Puritans, employment determined status and employment was at the will of God. The independent sphere of angelic activity had vanished. A system of temporary offices had replaced the old hierarchy; the chain of being had been transformed into a chain of command." *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.
  24. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
  25. See Crane Brinton, *The Jacobins* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), also the same author's *Decade of Revolution* (New York: Harper and Row, 1935).
  26. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 4–5.
  27. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 88.
  28. Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government*, p. 91. See also Franz Schurmann,

- Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 18. On p. 22, Schurmann writes:  
 "For us, every organization has its own ideology. Since there is no such thing as an organized world-wide Communist party, there is no such thing as a 'Communist ideology.'"
29. Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Mistake About Causality in Social Science," in Peter Laslett, *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, Second Series (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 68.
  30. Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 125 and n. 10.
  31. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
  32. Unsystematically, and without being philosophically grounded as is Ernst Cassirer's work in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, Sorel seems to be suggesting objective aesthetic criteria for judging the plausibility of a myth.
  33. Had David Apter tried to make such a distinction, his analysis of "mobilization systems" in *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), which he relates to "consummatory values," would have been more sharply drawn. It is not only the content of the value (whether "instrumental" or "consummatory" in Apter's language) but also its relationship to political behavior that matters in such an analysis, as we shall attempt to show.
  34. Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince* (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 137.
  35. The quotations are drawn from an unpublished manuscript on Italian fascism by James Gregor. See also his book, *Contemporary Radical Ideologies* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 120-165.
  36. But as Gino Germani shows below, fascists who took the doctrine literally, that is, instrumentally, were disillusioned by the early 1930s.
  37. Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement-Regimes," *American Political Science Review* (June 1961), 281-289.
  38. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, p. 20.
  39. Schurmann, *op. cit.*, p. 28, n. 7. The author kindly permitted me to see a draft of his new epilogue to a forthcoming edition, in which he indicates that China no longer has a "practical ideology," as well as the fact that Mao's "thought" has been promoted to the realm of "pure ideology."
  40. Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
  41. Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), III, 124.
  42. See Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). The esoteric code presumably corresponds to Schurmann's "practical ideology." This should not be confused with Nathan Leites's "operational code," discussed in his *Study of Bolshevism* and more systematically elaborated recently by Alexander L. George in *The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making*, Rand Corporation memorandum RM-5427-PR (September 1967). Leites's work, well summarized and criticized by Daniel Bell in his "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," *op. cit.*, pp. 310-320, reduces ideology to psychological dispositions and national character and therefore has a static bias; George makes it clear that the "operational code" is, in part for psychological reasons, highly resistant to change (pp. 7, 45). Tied to organization, on the other hand, Schurmann's "practical ideology" demonstrates its flexibility in the Chinese setting.
  43. See Schurmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-62. Also Frederick Frey discusses ideology as a sort of "programmed control" enhancing the flow of certain types of information. See *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).
  44. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 431.
  45. MacIntyre, *op. cit.*, presents cogent arguments against the Humean (and Weberian) view. His own analysis strengthens Weber's stress of the importance of ideas and uses the connection between Protestantism and the rise of capitalism to illustrate his analysis.
  46. David D. Comey, "Marxist-Leninist Ideology and Soviet Policy," *Studies in Soviet Thought*, II, No. 4 (December 1962), 305.
  47. Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
  48. Comey, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
  49. Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre* (Paris: Maspero, 1961), p. 127.
  50. For some formal similarities between fascism and some of the African variants of "socialism," see A. James Gregor, "African Socialism, Socialism and Fascism: An Appraisal," *The Review of Politics*, XXIX, No. 3 (July 1967), 324-353.
  51. Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
  52. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 63.
  53. Schurmann, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
  54. Adam B. Ulam, "Titoism," in M. M. Drachkovitch, ed., *Marxism in the Modern World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 152.
  55. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
  56. For an extended discussion of the League's evolution, see chap. 16 of this volume.
  57. Louis Gardet, *La cité musulmane, vie sociale et politique* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1961), p. 177.
  58. On the interpretation of Ben Halpern, in "Myth and 'Ideology' in Modern Usage," *History and Theory*, I, No. 2 (1961), 129-149, Sorel traces the diffusion of myth through three historic phases, as a fully alive expression of a will to action, as "ideology . . . in such a rationalized form as to extend its communicability in time and space," and finally, as follows, as an aspect of what we call administrative ideology: "Ideology may develop into something beyond itself—a faith. The transition to this culminating historic phase of myth occurs when a system of proof (or explanation and justification) accepted by a restricted (or partisan) group becomes institutionalized as the conventional view of a whole people or church" (p. 140).
  59. William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development," in James G. March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 474-476.
  60. In *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1960), pp. 352-434, Sheldon Wolin discusses the implications of organizational theory for political theory. In societies where the legitimacy of the political order is not seriously questioned—as in America until very recently—the "sublimation of politics" is possible. But in the Third World the same conditions do not apply, and the "political" is in the process of creation. Single parties, unlike American organizations, are centrally concerned with the problem of legitimacy.
  61. Philip Selznick, *TVA and The Grass Roots* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1966), p. xii.
  62. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
  63. *Ibid.*, p. 59-60.
  64. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
  65. Ulf Himmelstrand, who also distinguishes between instrumental and expressive uses of ideology, agrees that the "politicians with an expressive concern for ideology will tend to use ideology for expressive purposes rather than for specifying the details of policy proposals. Since these details will have to be

- specified anyhow, a politician with an expressive political concern must specify them on the basis of more or less coincidental values from any interests, pressures and traditional ways which happen to make themselves felt at the moment." See his article, "A Theoretical and Empirical Approach to Depoliticization and Political Involvement," *Acta Sociologica*, VI, No. 1-2 (Copenhagen, 1962), 92.
66. Selznick, *TVA and The Grass Roots*, p. 259.
  67. Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, p. 151.
  68. Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Moments," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 350, 358.
  69. Sidney G. Tarrow, "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (March 1967), 41.
  70. In this respect we could, with Chalmers Johnson, consider ideology "to refer to an *alternative* value structure" which "may evolve into a value structure if it is instrumental in resynchronizing the system." See his *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), p. 82, and Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 525-535. Obviously what we call an administrative ideology would be more durable if embedded in a Parsonian "value structure," but Parsons himself is vague, as he admits on p. 534, as to how and when, say in the Soviet Union, such a structure crystallizes. We therefore find it more useful to discuss different modes of ideology and their possible linkages than to presage the "end of ideology" in value structure.
  71. Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 307.
  72. Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 422-424.
  73. The quote comes from Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, p. 82, where, however, he is suggesting that the party must continue to "ideologize" society. But in his exciting subsequent article, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration," *Problems of Communism*, XV (January-February 1966), 1-14, he suggests that social integration need not and cannot be enforced through efforts to "ideologize" society, but rather through new procedures—while the party retains a vested interest in ideological vitality. The distinction between expressive and instrumental ideology would have enriched his analysis.
  74. Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 62.
  75. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, p. 76.
  76. Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," *Soviet Studies*, XVII (January 1966), 281ff.
  77. Comey, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
  78. This is one of Meyer's main points, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

## || Part II

# WEAK AND ABORTIVE ONE-PARTY SYSTEMS