


## Population and Development: The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries



### Population Size

► The total population of the Arab region in 2002 was estimated at 300 million, or 4.8 percent of the world population. Since 1980 the population increased by 130 million, and by 2015 the region's total population is projected to reach 395 million or 5.5 per cent of the world population. Population size varies remarkably between the countries of the region. In 2002, Egypt population alone made up 23.5 percent of the region's total population (70.5 million), followed by Sudan (32.9 million or 11 percent); Algeria (31.3 million or 10.4 percent); Morocco (30.1 million or 10 percent); Iraq (24.5 million or 8.2 percent); Saudi Arabia (23.5 million or 7.8 percent) and Yemen (19.3 million or 6.4 percent). Countries of the smallest population size were Qatar, Djibouti, Bahrain and Comoros with each population making up 0.2 percent of that of the Arab region. By 2015, Egypt population will have grown by 19.5 million to reach a total population of 90 million, thus remaining by far the most populous country in the region (Table 1).



Source: United Nations, 2003. *World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision* (on-line data)

## Population Growth

► In the last two decades, the Arab population grew at an average rate of 2.6 percent per annum, in comparison to 1.5 percent of the rest of the world. However, the rate of growth has been declining and is expected to reach 2.1 percent and 1.9 percent by 2015 and 2025, respectively. The population growth rate also varies considerably between the countries of the region. Between 1980 and 2002, the average population growth rate was highest in the Gulf States such as the United Arab Emirates (4.8%), Qatar (4.4%) and Saudi Arabia (4.1%) followed by Jordan (4.0%), Yemen (3.9%) and The Occupied Palestinian Territories (3.8%) and lowest in each of Tunisia (1.9%), Somalia (1.7%) and Lebanon (1.4%). The high rate of population growth between 1980 and 2002 resulted in an increment of 130 million people to the total population of the region. In other words, an additional 5.9 million people were added every year to the region's population. Egypt ranked first; adding alone 1.2 million people and contributing 20.4 percent to the annual 1980-2002 increments (Table1). Saudi Arabia and Sudan came second and third, with 10.7 and 10.4 percent, respectively, followed by Algeria (9.6%), Iraq (8.9%) and Yemen (8.6%).


## Population Distribution

► Between 1980 and 2000, Arab region's urban population increased from 44 % to 54%. It is projected that the percent share of urban dwellers will increase to reach 57.4 % in 2010 and to 61.4 % in 2020. However it is expected that the dynamism of the process of rural to urban migration will be mitigated between 2000-2020 and its pace will be decelerated. As this process loose momentum, the average growth rate will be declined from 3.6% between 1980-2000 to 2.7% between 2000-2020 (Table 2). The share of urban population varies considerably between the countries of the region. Among the GCC countries, Kuwait has the highest share of urban population, estimated to be of 96% of total population, followed by Bahrain and Qatar, with 92% and 93 % urban population, respectively. For the rest of the Arab countries, Lebanon ranks first with 89.9 % and Libya Arab Jamahiriya comes second with 87.6% urban population. Yemen has the lowest share, as its urban population did not exceed 24.7% in 2000.

## Fertility Level and Trends

► The total fertility rate is defined as the average number of children a woman has during her reproductive life. Figures for the last two decades indicate that the average TFR for the Arab countries declined from 6.2 children per woman in the period 1980-1985 to 4.1 in the period 2000-2005, which means that women are currently having 2.1 fewer children than they did two decades ago. However, the TFR regional average is still above the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, as well as above the world average of 2.7, and is expected to remain higher in the next two decades with a rate of 3.1 children per woman for the period 2015-2020.

► Despite the decline in the regional fertility level, the decline in the TFR of individual countries varied in pace from one country to another (Table 3). For the period 1985-2005, the following patterns have been identified with respect to the pace of decline of the TFR: a sharp drop of more than 4 children per woman in each of Tunisia, Libya and Algeria; a moderate decline of more than 3 children in Syria, Morocco, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait; a slow decline of more than 2 children in Bahrain, Lebanon, Qatar, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; a very slow decline in Oman, Comoros, Sudan, Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Yemen; and finally a zero decline in each of Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia, where fertility rates were highest.



Source: United Nations, 2003. *World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision* (on-line data)

### Population Momentum

► Creating a balance between population and sustained economic growth was the core theme of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development that was held in Cairo in 1994. In order for the Arab region to reach zero population growth (ZPG), the regional TFR will need to drop from its present 4.1 children per woman to the fertility replacement level of 2.1 children. According to the *2002 Revision of the World Population Prospects*, only Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria and Bahrain will reach replacement level by 2015 (Table 3). However, the prospect of the TFR declining to replacement level for the whole region in the near future is not likely, for two reasons. First, even when fertility declines, there is a lag period before the rate of natural increase declines. This is because the people who have already been born add momentum to population growth. Second, even when the fertility replacement level is reached, the population of the region will continue to grow beyond the time when that level is achieved, because the existing momentum creates a lag between achievement of the fertility replacement level and the leveling off of natural population increase. Thus, the hope that the number of births per woman will reach replacement level by 2015 remains unfeasible, since the *2002 Revision* has projected a TFR of 3.1 in 2015, which is well above the replacement level.

### Population Policy

► Over the last 30 years population policy has changed in many Arab countries and by 2001 most of the governments began to acknowledge the effect of rapid population growth. In 1976, only Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco had considered their population growth rate as too high and intervened to lower it, while four countries considered their population growth as too low and aimed at raising it (Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). The Governments of the remaining countries did not intervene because they considered population growth in their countries as satisfactory.<sup>1</sup> By 2001 in contrast, all countries that wanted to raise

<sup>1</sup> The Occupied Palestinian Territory was not included in the results of the eight *Inquiry among Governments on Population and Development* carried out by the United Nations Population Division in 2001.


population growth or did not intervene in 1976, except Bahrain and the Syrian Arab Republic, changed their views and policies on population growth either to lower it (Jordan and Yemen) or to maintain it on the current level.

► Positions of Governments regarding fertility levels and policies to modify fertility generally correspond to the pattern regarding population growth. In 1976, six countries viewed their fertility rates as too high, while the other countries either wanted to maintain fertility rates or to raise it as in Libyan Arab Jamahiria. In 2001, however, ten countries viewed fertility level as too high and wanted to lower the rates, ten were satisfied with the current fertility level, yet Saudi Arabia as well as the United Arab Emirates undertook initiatives to raise fertility (Table 4).

### **Mortality and Life Expectancy**

► Mortality decline during the last two decades in the Arab countries has been impressive. The infant mortality rates- defined as the number of children per 1,000 live births who die in the first 12 months of life- decreased significantly during the past two decades (Table 5). In 1980-1985, the infant mortality rate (IMR) of the Arab Region was estimated at 74.7 per 1,000 live births and is projected to drop to 43.7 per 1,000 live births-in 2000-2005, which is lower than the world's average of 55.6 per 1,000 live births. The only exception is Iraq, where the infant mortality rate rose from 73.8 to 83.3 per 1,000 live births between 1980 and 2000. Meanwhile, the lowest infant mortality rates are found in Kuwait (10.8/1000) and Qatar (12.3/1000), but are still above the average of the more developed regions of the world (7.5/1000). During the period 1980-2005, the largest absolute reductions in infant mortality rates were achieved in Egypt, from 107.5/1,000 to 40.6/1,000; in Algeria, from 88/1,000 to 44/1,000; in Morocco, from 96/1,000 to 42/1,000; in Yemen, from 126/1,000 to 70.6/1,000; and in Oman from 58.3/1,000 to 19.7/1,000. It is projected that by 2015, the infant mortality rates in each of Comoros, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Mauritania, Djibouti and Somalia will range between 49.6/1,000 and 94.5/1,000, which will still be above the world average of 45.8/1,000.


► Significant gains in life expectancy were achieved in the Arab region in the past two decades. In 1980-1985 the average life expectancy for the region was estimated at 58 years for males and 61.3 years for females. Today, both women and men live 7 years longer than they did twenty years ago. At country level, life expectancy at birth increased by 12.3 years in Egypt; 10.9 years in Yemen; 10.6 years in Libya; 10.3 years in Morocco; 9.7 years in each of Saudi Arabia and Oman; 9.4 and 9.2 in Syria and Algeria, respectively. In the same period, life expectancy in Iraq dropped by 1.6 years for both sexes (Table 5). At present, the difference between the countries with the highest life expectancy at birth (Kuwait) and the lowest (Djibouti) is 30.9 years, and this difference is likely to remain for the next decade. On the other hand, although life expectancy has increased remarkably since 1980, the projected figures for Djibouti, Somalia, Mauritania, Sudan, Yemen, Iraq and Comoros during 2000-2005 are still below the regional average (66.7 years for both sexes), thus making the probability of these countries to reach the life expectancy target of 65 years in 2005 and 70 years in 2015, set in the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (1994), hard to achieve.



Source: United Nations, 2003. *World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision* (on-line data)

### Population Age Structure

► The traditional demographic balance was based on a high fertility rate coupled with a high mortality rate. This pattern has changed in recent decades with the rapid decline in infant mortality and the increase in life expectancy, causing an imbalance in the age structure of the population, which considerably increased the number of people in the working age group (15-64). Decades of high fertility rates in the Arab region resulted in an ever-increasing number of young people, as depicted by the aggregate population pyramid. Nevertheless, the broad base age structure of the population reflects the mutual impact of high fertility and mortality decline, as the large birth cohorts were and still are produced by the large numbers of women of childbearing age from the previous generation.



Source: United Nations, 2003. *World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision* (on-line data)


► Even though the absolute number of children aged 0-14 increased from 75 million in 1980 to 109 million in 2000, and is projected to reach 124.4 million in 2010, the proportion of children aged 0-14 has actually declined from 44.2 percent in 1980 to 38 percent in 2000 and will reach 34.8 percent in 2010 (Table 6). This young age structure, in which more than one third of the region's population is under age 15, gives population growth an unexpected momentum. The 15-24 age group represents the transition period from childhood to adulthood in most societies. This youth age group in the Arab region totaled 33 million in 1980 and 58.3 million in 2000, and is

projected to increase to 69.9 million and 78.3 million by 2010 and 2020, respectively. Over the next decade, the proportion of youth in the Arab region will remain constant, after which it will decline gradually to reach 19.5 per cent in 2010 and 18.2 per cent in 2020.

► The most dramatic increase in the coming decade is likely to occur in the Arab countries where the working age population (25-64 years) will grow in size more rapidly than all other age groups, adding 40.8 million people to the economically active population between 2000 and 2010. The region's working age population in 1980 was 55.9 million, which increased by 52.8 million to reach a total of 108.7 million by the year 2000 and is projected to grow to 149.6 million by 2010 and 194 million by 2020. Similarly, between 1980 and 2010, the proportion of this age group is projected to increase from 32.9 per cent to 41.8 per cent of the total population of the region.

► The projected increase in the working age group is of particular importance for the region. This group embraces three categories that have specific implications for the future development of the Arab countries: (1) it is in the reproductive age, which sustains the population momentum, (2) it is economically active, which increases the number of newcomers into the labour market and creates a labour imbalance where supply is more than demand, and (3) through early marriage and a generally high fertility rate, it will further contribute to population growth and also create greater demand for secondary and higher education. However, recent studies have suggested that the expansion of this age group, when associated with lower economic dependency, will have a positive impact on economic performance at the macro level. The expected decline in fertility, combined with fewer dependents to support, will translate into potential economic growth within a generation.

► Although ageing is not considered a priority issue in the Arab region, the absolute number of people aged 65 and above has doubled from 5.7 million in 1980 to 10.4 million in 2000 and is expected to increase to 14 million by 2010 and 21.3 million by 2020. However, when examining the projected trend in the age structure, it appears that the percentage of the elderly population will not exceed 5 per cent by 2020 (Table 6). In the region, where the onset of fertility decline is a relatively new trend, the process of ageing is also in its early stage. Nevertheless, in the wake of the rapidly changing demographic situation in the region, the need to meet the challenges with regard to the increase in the absolute numbers of old persons cannot be underestimated.



Source: United Nations, 2003. *World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision* (on-line data)



## Future Implication on Development

► Historical evidence shows that the simultaneous process of fertility decline along with the slow growth of the elderly population offers a number of countries in the region—at different points in time, but only for a limited time—a demographic window of opportunity, through which increased personal savings and investment become possible. This opportunity will allow the dependency ratio to decline, since the number of the dependent young population (aged 0-14) will be declining faster than the increase in old-age dependency. In other words, during a specific period of time, the overall dependency ratio—which expresses the proportion of people in need of support from each potential worker—will decline. This particular situation eases the pressure on countries to provide for the dependent young and elderly, thus enabling more investment in economic and social development.

► To assess the potential of the demographic window of opportunity, or the “demographic bonus,”<sup>2</sup> to occur in the Arab region, it is imperative that we examine the capacity of the economic sectors to create a sufficient number of jobs to absorb the increased size of the labour force, i.e. labour force participation. It is true that when the dependency ratio declines (Table 7)—as in the case of the Arab countries, from 90.9 in 1980 to 71.5 in 2000 and to 61 per 100 people aged 15-65 by 2015—more resources will be freed for investment. Yet, as globalization proceeds, the need for a dynamic and flexible labour market will also increase. The need for more investment in education to enable the labour force to acquire the required skills and more investment in health to improve the quality of life, as well as more investment in high technologies, will increase pressure on the country’s economic resources.

► Whether the Arab countries will be able to make the most of the emerging demographic bonus and achieve higher economic growth depends on how efficient their economic and the social policies will be in converting the increased savings into productive investment and whether the increased savings will be enough to generate economic growth. A large labour force requires a larger stock of productive facilities in order to prevent the productivity level from declining. Thus, the percentage of national income that must be invested merely to keep productivity from declining is some three times the annual percentage rate of the increase of the labour force. In other words, if the labour force were growing by three per cent per annum, a net investment of nine per cent of national income would be required to keep productivity from declining.

## Concluding remarks

► Several aspects of the demographic process in the Arab region are not often remarked upon collectively. The first is that even if fertility were to fall rapidly, population growth will continue. Owing to the prevalence of high fertility in the recent past, a large percentage of the population in most of the countries is young. This ensures that the number of people in their reproductive years will continue to increase for several decades and that total births will also continue to rise. Second, even if fertility were to fall immediately to the replacement level of just over two children per woman, the foregoing phenomenon of increased growth would continue for several decades, owing to the population momentum. In other words, previous high rates of reproduction give thrust to population growth because they produced a large number of women who are now of reproductive age.

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<sup>2</sup> Ansley J Coale, *Economic Development Challenge and Promise* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).

► On the other hand, despite the hidden momentum of population growth, the age structure of the population in the region is changing. Currently, the Arab population is youthful, making the youth dependency ratio very high, which means that the working force must support almost twice as many children as it does in the low-fertility countries. Nevertheless, a reduction in fertility will have the immediate effect of reducing the burden of child dependency without affecting the size of the labour force. With the continuing trend in decelerated fertility, an opportunity to compensate for the performance of the recent past could soon emerge. As mentioned before, when fertility begins to decline, the process creates a demographic “window of opportunity,” through which increased personal savings and investment become possible.

► Judging the future on the basis of the current socio-economic situation in the Arab region, which is overwhelmed by erroneous economic policies, it seems that the likelihood of benefiting from the opportunity created by the low dependency burden to free more resources for investment may be minimal. To fully utilize that opportunity, the Arab countries will have to adopt more appropriate economic policies that will allow them to redirect net investment to more labour intensive sectors, such as the construction sector, and to expand the absorptive capacity of those sectors.

► Thus, four factors should be considered if the countries of the region hope to succeed in transforming the challenges of the demographic bonus into a success story: 1) Political commitment in resolving regional and domestic conflicts; 2) The initiation of sound economic policies that will improve the capability of the economic sectors to absorb the oversupply of labour and productively employ those additional workers—a capability largely associated with the rate and type of capital accumulation and dependent on the availability of other related factors, such as managerial and administrative skills; 3) Integrating population policies in the process of economic growth and development, which is an important instrumental factor in achieving the demographic dividend; and 4) Keeping the promises made by governments to improve the quality of life for their people.



**Table 1. Population Size and Growth**

Country	Population mid-2002 (thousands)	Births per 1,000 Population	Deaths per 1,000 Population	Rate of Natural Increase	Projected Population			Annual Population Increment 1980-2002	Annual Population Increment 2002-2015	Population Momentum <sup>1</sup>	Annual Growth Rate 1980-2002	Annual Growth Rate 2002-2015
					(thousands)							
					2015	2025	2050	(thousands)	(thousands)			
<b>Total Arab Population</b>	<b>300 165</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>22.4</b>	<b>394 753</b>	<b>467 579</b>	<b>631 218</b>	<b>5 919</b>	<b>7 276</b>		<b>2.6</b>	<b>2.1</b>
Algeria	31 266	23	5.5	17.3	38 142	42 429	48 667	569	529	1.6	2.3	1.5
Bahrain	709	20	3.1	16.7	900	1034	1270	16	15	1.5	3.2	1.8
Comoros	747	37	8.4	28.3	1 042	1 266	1 816	16	23	2.2	3.0	2.6
Djibouti	693	40	17.7	21.8	839	992	1 395	17	11	1.8	3.4	1.5
Egypt	70 507	27	6.2	20.3	89 996	103 165	127 407	1 209	1 499	1.8	2.2	1.9
Iraq	24 510	35	8.8	26.3	34 226	41 707	57 932	525	747	2.1	2.9	2.6
Jordan	5 329	28	4.3	23.7	6 982	8 116	10 154	141	127	2.0	4.0	2.1
Kuwait	2 443	20	1.9	18.3	3 352	3 930	4 926	49	70	1.5	2.6	2.4
Lebanon	3 596	19	5.4	13.7	4 207	4 554	4 946	42	47	1.4	1.4	1.2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	5 445	23	4.2	18.9	6 886	7 785	9 248	109	111	1.7	2.6	1.8
Mauritania	2 807	42	14.2	27.6	3 988	4 973	7 497	54	91	2.2	2.5	2.7
Morocco	30 072	23	6.0	17.2	36 496	40 721	47 064	486	494	1.6	2.0	1.5
Occupied Palestinian Territories	3 433	39	4.3	34.5	5 260	6 903	11 114	89	141	2.8	3.8	3.3
Oman	2 768	32	3.3	28.5	3 908	4 785	6 812	72	88	2.3	3.8	2.7
Qatar	601	17	3.7	13.7	711	790	874	17	8	1.3	4.4	1.3
Saudi Arabia	23 520	32	3.7	27.9	32 728	39 751	54 738	633	708	2.3	4.1	2.5
Somalia	9 480	52	17.7	34.4	15 263	20 978	39 669	136	445	2.5	1.7	3.7
Sudan	32 878	33	11.7	21.3	41 430	47 536	60 133	613	658	1.8	2.4	1.8
Syrian Arab Republic	17 381	28	3.9	23.9	23 018	26 979	34 174	383	434	2.0	3.0	2.2
Tunisia	9 728	17	5.5	11.5	11 116	12 037	12 887	148	107	1.2	1.9	1.0
United Arab Emirates	2 937	17	2.4	14.3	3 588	3 944	4 112	87	50	1.2	4.8	1.5
Yemen	19 315	45	9.2	35.8	30 677	43 204	84 385	508	874	2.7	3.9	3.6

*Source:* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)

<sup>1</sup> Population Momentum refers to the tendency of a population to continue to grow beyond the time when replacement levels of fertility are achieved. A momentum factor of 1 means that natural increase is not contributing to population growth. A momentum >1 means there is positive momentum that will lead to population growth and a momentum factor < 1 means there is negative momentum, or the probability of population decline.

**Table 2. Estimated and Projected Rural and Urban Populations and Urban Growth Rates**

Country	Percentage of Rural Population					Percentage of Urban Population					Urban Growth Rate 1980-2000	Urban Growth Rate 2000-2020
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020		
<b>Total Arab Population</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>50.2</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>38.6</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>53.7</b>	<b>57.4</b>	<b>61.4</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>2.7</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	56.5	48.6	42.9	37.4	32.5	43.5	51.4	57.1	62.6	67.5	3.8	2.3
<b>Bahrain</b>	19.5	12.4	7.8	5.6	4.7	80.5	87.6	92.2	94.4	95.3	4.0	2.0
<b>Comoros</b>	76.8	72.1	66.8	60.6	54.1	23.2	27.9	33.2	39.4	45.9	4.8	4.1
<b>Djibouti</b>	25.8	19.0	16.0	14.0	12.3	74.2	81.0	84.0	86.0	87.7	4.2	1.8
<b>Egypt</b>	56.2	56.4	57.3	56.0	51.8	43.8	43.6	42.7	44.0	48.2	2.0	2.4
<b>Iraq</b>	34.5	30.4	32.5	32.3	29.9	65.5	69.6	67.5	67.7	70.1	3.1	2.6
<b>Jordan</b>	39.8	27.8	21.3	19.9	17.8	60.2	72.2	78.7	80.1	82.2	5.4	2.2
<b>Kuwait</b>	9.2	5.1	4.0	3.3	2.9	90.8	94.9	96.0	96.7	97.1	2.7	2.5
<b>Lebanon</b>	26.3	15.8	10.3	7.9	6.9	73.7	84.2	89.7	92.1	93.1	2.3	1.4
<b>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</b>	30.7	18.2	12.4	10.3	9.1	69.3	81.8	87.6	89.7	90.9	3.9	1.9
<b>Mauritania</b>	72.3	56.0	42.3	30.3	23.1	27.7	44.0	57.7	69.7	76.9	6.2	4.1
<b>Morocco</b>	58.7	51.6	44.5	38.3	33.3	41.3	48.4	55.5	61.7	66.7	3.5	2.3
<b>Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>	38.9	36.0	33.2	30.0	26.5	61.1	64.0	66.8	70.0	73.5	4.3	3.7
<b>Oman</b>	68.5	37.9	24.0	19.2	16.1	31.5	62.1	76.0	80.8	83.9	8.3	3.0
<b>Qatar</b>	14.4	10.2	7.3	5.5	4.6	85.6	89.8	92.7	94.5	95.4	5.0	1.4
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	34.1	21.8	13.8	10.0	8.4	65.9	78.2	86.2	90.0	91.6	5.5	2.8
<b>Somalia</b>	77.8	75.8	72.5	67.4	60.8	22.2	24.2	27.5	32.6	39.2	2.5	5.4
<b>Sudan</b>	80.0	73.4	63.9	55.0	48.2	20.0	26.6	36.1	45.0	51.8	5.4	3.5
<b>Syrian Arab Republic</b>	53.3	51.1	48.6	44.6	39.4	46.7	48.9	51.4	55.4	60.6	3.6	2.9
<b>Tunisia</b>	48.5	42.1	34.5	28.7	24.8	51.5	57.9	65.5	71.3	75.2	3.1	1.7
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	28.5	19.8	13.3	9.5	7.6	71.5	80.2	86.7	90.5	92.4	6.1	1.8
<b>Yemen</b>	80.8	77.2	75.3	71.5	65.6	19.2	22.8	24.7	28.5	34.4	5.2	5.2

*Source:* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)

**Table 3. Fertility trends and Contraceptive Use**

Country	Total Fertility Rate					Replacement Level	Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	Year	any method, 2001 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Algeria</b>	6.4	5.2	4.1	3.2	2.8	2015-2020	56.9
<b>Bahrain</b>	4.6	4.1	3.4	3.0	2.7	2015-2020	61.8
<b>Comoros</b>	7.1	6.5	5.8	5.4	4.9	> 2050	21.0
<b>Djibouti</b>	6.6	6.4	6.3	6.1	5.7	> 2050	..
<b>Egypt</b>	5.3	4.8	4.0	3.5	3.3	2030-2035	56.1
<b>Iraq</b>	6.4	6.2	5.7	5.3	4.8	2040-2045	13.7
<b>Jordan</b>	6.8	5.9	4.9	4.1	3.6	2030-2035	52.6
<b>Kuwait</b>	4.9	3.9	3.2	2.9	2.7	2025-2030	50.2
<b>Lebanon</b>	3.8	3.4	2.8	2.3	2.2	2005-2010	61.0
<b>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</b>	7.2	5.7	4.1	3.4	3.0	2020-2025	39.7
<b>Mauritania</b>	6.3	6.2	6.1	6.0	5.8	>2050	3.3
<b>Morocco</b>	5.4	4.5	3.6	3.0	2.7	2025-2030	50.3
<b>Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>	7.0	6.4	6.5	6.0	5.6	..	..
<b>Oman</b>	7.2	6.9	6.5	5.4	5.0	>2050	23.7
<b>Qatar</b>	5.5	4.7	4.1	3.7	3.2	2025-2030	43.2
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	7.2	6.6	5.8	5.1	4.5	2040-2045	31.8
<b>Somalia</b>	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.3	>2050	..
<b>Sudan</b>	6.0	5.6	5.3	4.9	4.4	2045-2050	8.3
<b>Syrian Arab Republic</b>	7.3	6.2	4.6	3.8	3.3	2030-2035	36.1
<b>Tunisia</b>	4.9	4.1	3.1	2.3	2.0	2000-2005	60.0
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	5.2	4.6	3.8	3.2	2.8	2020-2025	27.5
<b>Yemen</b>	8.5	8.3	7.8	7.3	7.0	> 2050	20.8

*Source* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)  
 United Nations, 2002. World Contraceptive Use, 2001 (Sales No. E.02.XIII.7)

Two dots (..) denotes data are not available

<sup>2</sup> Latest available year

**Table 4. Government Perceptions and Policies on Population Growth, Fertility and Family Planning**

Country	1976					2001				
	Population Growth		Fertility Level		Access to contraceptive methods	Population Growth		Fertility Level		Access to contraceptive methods
	View	Policy	View	Policy		View	Policy	View	Policy	
<b>Algeria</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Bahrain</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Too high	No intervention	Indirect support	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	Lower	Direct support
<b>Comoros</b>	Too high	No intervention	Too high	No intervention	No support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Djibouti</b>	..	..	..	..	..	Too high	Lower	Too high	No intervention	Direct support
<b>Egypt</b>	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Iraq</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	Maintain	Direct support	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support
<b>Jordan</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Too high	No intervention	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Kuwait</b>	Too low	No intervention	Satisfactory	Maintain	No support	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	No intervention	Indirect support
<b>Lebanon</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Indirect support	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Lower	Indirect support
<b>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</b>	Too low	Raise	Too low	Raise	No support	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	No support
<b>Mauritania</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	No support	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support
<b>Morocco</b>	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<b>Oman</b>	Too low	Raise	Satisfactory	Maintain	No support	Satisfactory	Maintain	Too high	Lower	No support
<b>Qatar</b>	Too low	Raise	Satisfactory	Maintain	No support	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Maintain	Direct support
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	Too low	Raise	Satisfactory	Maintain	Limits	Satisfactory	Maintain	Satisfactory	Raise	Indirect support
<b>Somalia</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	No support	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Indirect support
<b>Sudan</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>Syrian Arab Republic</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support
<b>Tunisia</b>	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support	Satisfactory	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	Too low	Raise	Satisfactory	Maintain	No support	Too high	No intervention	Too low	Raise	No support
<b>Yemen</b>	Satisfactory	No intervention	Satisfactory	No intervention	Direct support	Too high	Lower	Too high	Lower	Direct support

Source: United Nations, 2002. National Population Policies, 2001 (Sales No. E.02.XIII.12)

**Table 5. Mortality Levels and Trends**

Country	Infant Mortality Rate				Variation in Infant Mortality	Life Expectancy at Birth						Number of Years Gained in Life Expectancy		
						1980-1985			2000-2005			1980-2005		
	1980-1985	1990-1995	2000-2005	2010-2015	1980-2005	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
Algeria	88.0	56.9	43.9	31.3	44.1	60.0	62.0	60.5	68.1	71.3	69.7	8.1	9.3	9.2
Bahrain	22.0	19.6	14.2	10.9	7.8	67.1	71.4	68.9	72.5	75.9	74.0	5.4	4.5	5.1
Comoros	105.6	83.7	67.0	49.6	38.5	51.0	55.0	52.9	59.4	62.2	60.8	8.4	7.2	7.9
Djibouti	132.5	117.1	102.4	85.4	30.1	43.2	46.4	44.7	44.7	46.8	45.7	1.5	0.4	1.0
Egypt	107.5	65.4	40.6	28.1	66.9	55.3	57.8	56.5	66.7	71.0	68.8	11.4	13.1	12.3
Iraq	73.8	96.0	83.3	49.4	-9.5	61.1	63.7	62.3	59.2	62.3	60.7	-1.9	-1.4	-1.6
Jordan	54.1	33.0	23.9	17.1	30.2	61.9	65.8	63.7	69.7	72.5	71.0	7.8	6.7	7.3
Kuwait	21.8	14.0	10.8	9.2	10.9	69.6	73.7	71.3	74.9	79.0	76.6	5.3	5.3	5.3
Lebanon	44.4	31.5	17.2	14.2	27.2	63.9	68.0	65.9	71.9	75.1	73.5	8.0	7.1	7.6
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	47.0	26.8	20.7	16.2	26.3	60.6	64.2	62.2	70.8	75.4	72.8	10.2	11.2	10.6
Mauritania	119.6	110.1	96.7	79.7	23.0	45.9	49.1	47.4	50.9	54.1	52.5	5.0	5.0	5.1
Morocco	95.9	63.0	42.1	29.3	53.8	56.7	60.1	58.3	66.8	70.5	68.7	10.1	10.4	10.3
Occupied Palestinian Territories	50.6	27.3	20.7	15.9	29.9	62.7	66.2	64.4	70.8	74.0	72.4	8.1	7.8	8.0
Oman	58.3	24.2	19.7	15.4	38.5	61.3	64.3	62.7	71.0	74.4	72.4	9.7	10.1	9.7
Qatar	34.0	20.0	12.3	9.9	21.7	65.4	69.8	67.0	70.5	75.4	72.2	5.0	5.6	5.1
Saudi Arabia	58.4	31.2	20.6	14.7	37.8	61.4	64.1	62.6	71.1	73.7	72.3	9.7	9.6	9.7
Somalia	143.3	163.1	117.7	94.5	25.6	41.4	44.6	43.0	46.4	49.5	47.9	4.9	4.9	4.9
Sudan	110.2	93.2	77.0	61.7	33.2	47.8	50.6	49.1	54.1	57.1	55.6	6.3	6.5	6.4
Syrian Arab Republic	59.3	36.4	22.3	15.8	37.0	60.8	64.4	62.5	70.6	73.1	71.9	9.8	8.7	9.4
Tunisia	59.3	33.5	23.3	17.6	36.0	63.6	66.5	64.9	70.8	74.9	72.8	7.2	8.4	7.9
United Arab Emirates	31.6	18.6	13.6	10.4	18.0	67.1	71.4	68.6	73.3	77.4	74.7	6.3	6.0	6.1
Yemen	125.9	91.5	70.6	52.9	55.3	48.8	49.3	49.1	58.9	61.1	60.0	10.1	11.8	10.9

*Source:* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)

**Table 6. Distribution of the Population by Broad Age-Groups**

Country	Percentage of Population Aged 0-14					Percentage of Population Aged 15-24					Percentage of Population Aged 25-64					Percentage of Population Aged 65+				
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
<b>Total Arab Population</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>38.1</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>19.5</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>32.9</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>37.9</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>45.0</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.9</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	46.5	42.4	35.1	28.7	25.6	19.6	20.4	21.7	20.3	16.2	30.0	33.5	39.1	46.7	52.4	3.9	3.7	4.1	4.3	5.8
<b>Bahrain</b>	34.7	31.7	29.7	25.5	21.5	21.6	16.2	16.4	16.6	15.6	41.6	49.9	51.4	54.8	57.0	2.1	2.2	2.5	3.1	5.9
<b>Comoros</b>	48.0	47.0	42.9	40.6	35.6	19.0	19.9	21.5	19.8	20.4	30.5	30.7	33.0	36.8	40.7	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.8	3.3
<b>Djibouti</b>	44.6	43.2	43.2	41.8	38.6	19.3	19.8	19.1	20.4	21.3	33.7	34.3	34.7	34.2	36.1	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.6	4.0
<b>Egypt</b>	41.4	41.2	36.3	32.8	29.8	19.4	18.3	20.5	19.5	17.6	35.2	36.6	38.7	42.8	46.4	4.0	3.9	4.5	4.9	6.2
<b>Iraq</b>	46.1	44.4	42.1	39.0	35.1	19.3	20.2	20.0	20.1	19.7	32.1	32.7	35.1	37.8	41.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.8
<b>Jordan</b>	49.4	46.8	38.9	34.4	29.0	19.4	21.8	21.1	19.6	19.1	28.1	28.2	37.2	42.3	47.6	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.7	4.3
<b>Kuwait</b>	40.2	36.6	26.6	24.3	20.8	18.0	17.3	15.3	13.8	14.3	40.4	44.9	56.8	59.5	59.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	2.4	5.4
<b>Lebanon</b>	40.1	34.9	30.8	25.4	22.6	20.4	22.5	18.8	18.5	15.2	34.1	37.4	44.3	49.9	54.9	5.4	5.2	6.1	6.2	7.3
<b>Libyan Arab Jamahiriya</b>	46.7	43.8	32.9	29.4	27.0	17.6	20.0	24.1	18.3	16.1	33.5	33.6	39.5	47.5	50.5	2.2	2.6	3.5	4.8	6.4
<b>Mauritania</b>	43.9	43.9	43.2	42.8	39.8	18.8	19.4	19.6	18.9	20.0	34.3	33.4	33.8	34.9	36.8	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4
<b>Morocco</b>	43.2	39.6	32.9	29.1	26.3	20.3	20.5	21.2	18.4	16.4	32.4	36.2	41.6	47.9	51.2	4.1	3.7	4.3	4.6	6.1
<b>Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>	47.5	46.7	46.4	44.4	39.8	20.0	20.4	18.7	19.8	20.9	29.0	29.5	31.4	32.8	36.1	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.0	3.2
<b>Oman</b>	45.5	44.4	37.6	36.9	33.8	18.3	16.7	19.9	17.9	18.4	33.9	37.0	40.5	42.5	44.1	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.7	3.7
<b>Qatar</b>	32.3	27.7	27.0	24.1	20.9	19.0	12.5	12.5	14.8	15.1	47.6	58.7	59.0	58.2	56.4	1.1	1.1	1.5	2.9	7.6
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	44.3	42.3	39.7	36.7	31.8	18.5	18.4	18.1	18.7	19.0	34.4	37.0	39.7	41.4	45.1	2.8	2.3	2.5	3.2	4.1
<b>Somalia</b>	46.7	47.8	47.8	48.8	47.1	18.8	18.8	19.4	18.7	20.1	31.6	30.7	30.4	30.2	30.4	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.4
<b>Sudan</b>	44.3	42.1	40.1	37.1	32.5	18.9	20.0	19.8	19.8	20.2	34.0	34.8	36.7	39.1	42.5	2.8	3.1	3.4	4.0	4.8
<b>Syrian Arab Republic</b>	49.0	47.9	39.9	34.1	29.9	19.6	20.1	23.0	20.9	18.3	28.7	29.4	34.2	41.7	47.6	2.7	2.6	2.9	3.3	4.2
<b>Tunisia</b>	42.0	38.0	30.3	23.4	22.0	21.1	20.2	20.9	19.1	13.9	33.1	37.3	43.2	51.2	56.2	3.8	4.5	5.6	6.3	7.9
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	28.6	28.5	26.8	22.1	20.1	17.6	14.9	14.1	15.8	13.3	52.6	55.4	57.9	59.8	59.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	2.3	7.2
<b>Yemen</b>	49.8	51.6	49.1	47.6	46.6	20.6	19.0	19.8	20.5	19.8	27.4	27.4	28.7	29.7	31.3	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.3

*Source:* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)

**Table 7. Estimated and Projected Dependency Ratios**

Country	Total Dependency Ratio					Child Dependency Ratio					Elderly Dependency Ratio				
	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
<b>Total Arab Population</b>	<b>90.9</b>	<b>84.6</b>	<b>71.5</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>58.4</b>	<b>84.5</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>56.8</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>7.8</b>
Algeria	101.6	85.5	64.5	49.3	45.8	93.8	78.7	57.7	42.8	37.3	7.9	6.9	6.7	6.4	8.5
Bahrain	58.2	51.3	47.5	40.1	37.7	54.9	48.0	43.8	35.7	29.6	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.3	8.1
Comoros	102.0	97.6	83.5	76.7	63.7	97.0	92.9	78.7	71.7	58.3	5.1	4.7	4.8	4.9	5.4
Djibouti	88.7	84.8	85.9	83.2	74.2	84.2	79.9	80.3	76.6	67.2	4.5	5.0	5.6	6.6	7.0
Egypt	83.2	82.1	68.9	60.5	56.3	75.8	75.0	61.3	52.6	46.6	7.3	7.1	7.6	7.9	9.7
Iraq	94.6	89.0	81.5	72.7	63.7	89.7	83.9	76.4	67.4	57.4	4.9	5.1	5.1	5.4	6.2
Jordan	110.5	100.0	71.5	61.6	49.9	104.0	93.6	66.7	55.6	43.5	6.5	6.4	4.8	6.0	6.4
Kuwait	71.2	60.8	38.7	36.4	35.5	68.8	58.8	36.9	33.2	28.2	2.4	1.9	1.8	3.3	7.3
Lebanon	83.5	66.9	58.5	46.2	42.7	73.6	58.3	48.8	37.1	32.2	9.9	8.7	9.7	9.1	10.4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	95.7	86.6	57.2	52.0	50.2	91.4	81.7	51.7	44.7	40.5	4.3	4.9	5.5	7.3	9.6
Mauritania	88.3	89.4	87.3	85.9	76.1	82.7	83.1	80.9	79.6	70.1	5.6	6.3	6.4	6.3	6.0
Morocco	89.8	76.4	59.2	50.8	47.9	82.0	69.8	52.4	43.9	38.9	7.8	6.5	6.8	6.9	9.0
Occupied Palestinian Territories	104.1	100.4	99.6	90.1	75.4	96.9	93.6	92.6	84.4	69.8	7.1	6.8	7.0	5.7	5.6
Oman	91.6	86.2	65.6	65.6	60.0	87.2	82.7	62.3	61.1	54.1	4.4	3.5	3.3	4.5	5.9
Qatar	50.2	40.4	39.9	37.0	39.9	48.5	38.9	37.8	33.0	29.2	1.7	1.5	2.1	4.0	10.6
Saudi Arabia	89.0	80.5	73.0	66.4	56.0	83.7	76.4	68.7	61.1	49.6	5.3	4.2	4.3	5.3	6.4
Somalia	98.4	102.0	100.8	104.5	98.0	92.7	96.6	96.0	99.8	93.3	5.8	5.5	4.8	4.7	4.8
Sudan	89.0	82.5	77.0	69.8	59.5	83.7	76.8	71.0	63.0	51.8	5.3	5.7	6.0	6.8	7.7
Syrian Arab Republic	107.0	102.0	74.8	59.7	51.7	101.4	96.8	69.8	54.5	45.4	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.3	6.4
Tunisia	84.5	73.9	56.0	42.2	42.7	77.5	66.1	47.3	33.3	31.4	7.0	7.8	8.7	9.0	11.3
United Arab Emirates	42.5	42.2	38.9	32.3	37.6	40.7	40.5	37.2	29.2	27.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.0	9.9
Yemen	108.3	115.5	106.2	99.2	95.7	103.8	111.2	101.2	94.8	91.2	4.6	4.3	4.9	4.4	4.5

*Source:* United Nations, 2003. World Population Prospects, the 2002 Revision (on-line data)