It is probably fair to say of labels such as “fundamentalist,” “modernist,” and “secularist,” which are in common use today in writing about modern Islam, that we cannot live very easily with them, but that we certainly cannot live without them.

On one hand, such labels have undoubtedly often functioned as obstacles to understanding the actual people and tendencies involved, in part because they are frequently used without explicit definition, in part because they perforce lump together widely differing phenomena, and in part because they often convey an implicit bias or value judgment. In my view, this is particularly true of the label “fundamentalist.” On the other hand, we cannot avoid labels if we are to talk about things, and we certainly cannot begin to make sense of an area as vast and complex as the modern Muslim world unless we can analyze its manifold phenomena into a manageable number of categories with suitable designations. It is not a question of whether we use labels, but how we use them. One purpose of this article is to contribute to the quest for suitable labels in this area. Another, and of course more important one, is to contribute to an understanding of those so labeled. I shall attempt to do this by presenting and discussing a typology of “ideological orientations.” The main types will be called “secularism,” “Islamic modernism,” “radical Islamism,” “traditionalism,” and “neo-traditionalism,” with subtypes discerned in several cases. It is not claimed, of course, that either the typology or the labels are radically novel. In fact, I think they reflect what is a fair degree of scholarly consensus, but it is hoped that the presentation and discussion will help to refine and clarify, and perhaps at some points modify, that consensus.

It will help to minimize the dangers of labeling if we think of these to some extent as Weberian “ideal-types,” that is analytical constructs which may or may not correspond in detail to actual cases but which help us analyze and compare a large number of cases. I also hope to minimize the dangers by presenting them not as “pigeon-holes” or “boxes” but as points on a two-dimensional spectrum, one axis of which we may label as “Islamic totalism” and the other as “modernity.” It will be argued that the first three types are all very high on the scale of “modernity” but vary widely on the scale of “Islamic totalism,” while traditionalism and neo-traditionalism vary from them primarily on the scale of “modernity.”
By “Islamic totalism” I mean the tendency to view Islam not merely as a “religion” in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behavior. Commonly this takes the form of the claim that Muslims should have an “Islamic State,” that is, a state in which all law is based on the Shari'a. It is not here assumed, however, that those who assert this are necessarily “better” Muslims in a general sense than others.

By “modernity” I mean in the first place a tendency to place a high value upon modern material technology and to use modern techniques of social organization and mobilization, but also a tendency to accept certain modern institutions such as parliaments and political parties, certain attitudes such as a positive orientation toward change, and certain ideas such as a belief in “progress.”4 “Modernity” also includes the highly ambivalent attitudes toward the West that have attended the Western impact of the last two centuries, and the spiritual crisis so eloquently described by Wifred Cantwell Smith:

The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history: to set it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely-guided society should and must.5

Our typology may be said to be a typology of responses to the Western impact and of proposals for rehabilitating Muslim history.6 It is beyond the scope of this article to deal in any detail with the vexed question of whether “modernization” necessarily involves “Westernization.” Suffice it to say that in my view they are conceptually distinct but up till now have been largely identical in practice. Whether they need to be so in the future is perhaps the most important issue on which the types here presented vary. The radical Islamists, in particular, are committed to the proposition that they need not and must not be the same.

The expression “ideological orientation” is used to underline the fact that we are dealing with ideological issues but not necessarily with particular ideologies as such—a type such as “secularism” includes several different and even radically opposed ideologies—while insofar as ideology is a modern phenomenon, the traditionalist positions could not be said to involve ideology in the strictest sense.7 For the tendency to view Islam as an ideology I shall use the term “Islamism.” We could to some extent summarize the presentation that follows by saying that as we move to the “right” along the scale of Islamic totalism from secularism toward radical Islamism, ideology becomes more Islamic, while as we move “up” the scale of modernity away from pure traditionalism, Islam may become more ideological.

The focus here is upon the doctrinal content of the ideologies and teachings involved, and not upon the leadership styles, political methods, or social locations that may be associated with them. Thus, this typology is complementary to other possible typologies, such as James Bill’s distinction between “establishment Islam” and “populist Islam.”8 In principle, at least, each of these ideological orientations may be either “establishment” or “populist.” Likewise each may be more or less oriented toward charismatic leadership, more or less elitist, and most may be...
more or less violent (in word and/or deed) and more or less revolutionary. They may also be either Shi'i or Sunni. It is important to stress, furthermore, that each type may be more or less sophisticated and intellectually consistent, though it does not follow that they are all equally viable, that is, capable of actually becoming the ideological basis of the Islamic community or a significant part of it over the long term. I shall make some suggestions about the viability of these types in the last section of this article.

SECULARISM

The term “secularist” is here applied to any view that would openly follow an ideology other than Islam in most areas of public life. The most radical form of secularism, of course, would be one that wants to replace Islam in all areas, public and private, as in Marxist Albania, whose constitution makes virtually no reference to religion and whose government has closed the mosques and churches. Such a radical secularism has been unusual in Muslim countries, however.

Far more influential has been a “moderate secularism” which seeks to “separate” religion from politics and other areas of public life. In this case the ideology is generally nationalism in diverse alliance with others such as capitalism, socialism, liberalism, etc. In a “moderate secularist” constitution Islam is not the religion of state and sovereignty is not vested in God but in the “nation” or the “people.” The best known example is Turkey, which in 1928 removed from its constitution the clause that made Islam the religion of state. At present the relevant article reads: “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law, . . . loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental principles set forth in the Preamble” (Article 2). The preamble vests sovereignty “unconditionally” in the nation and explicitly separates “the sacred tenets of religion” from “state affairs and politics.”

A still more moderate type of secularism is found in the Indonesian constitution, which affirms belief in “One, Supreme Divinity” as the first of its “five principles” (pancasila), but not Islam nor even “Allah.” Perhaps we might label the Turkish type of secularism “neutral secularism” and the Indonesian type “religious secularism.”

Constitutions that make Islam the religion of state do not conform to the “pure” secular type but may be closer to it than to Islamic modernism on the scale. The Egyptian constitution of 1972 says, “Islam is the religion of the State” and “The principles of the Islamic Shari‘a are primary sources of legislation,” but also says that “sovereignty belongs to the people only, who are the source of authority” (Articles 2 & 3). Popular sovereignty along with the fact that the principles of the Shari‘a are, by implication, not the only source of legislation make this constitution substantially secular. We might label such constitutions, common in the Arab world, “Muslim secularist.”

In the area of legal reform, secularism in its “pure” form replaces the Shari‘a in all areas of public law with codes of other, in practice Western, origin and makes citizens of all religions in principle equal before the law. The best known
example of this is, of course, the Turkish legal reforms of the 1920s. Most other Muslim countries have in fact done the same thing in many areas, usually excepting the more “sensitive” areas relating to family life, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. This, too, is secularism insofar as it establishes substantial areas where the Shari‘a does not apply, although the line between the “religious” and the “secular” is drawn in a different place from where it is drawn in the West.

We may discern two major sets of motives to which the first two different types of moderate secularism to some extent correspond. The first set involves a concern for “progress” and national strength, which, when allied with the conviction that the way to achieve these is to follow an essentially Western model, leads to “neutral” secularism of the Turkish type. The other motive is a concern for national unity where there is a significant non-Muslim minority. In Indonesia, with its Christians and Balinese Hindus, “divinity” is affirmed but not a specific kind of divinity, as noted above. In Egypt, with a significant Coptic minority, political rhetoric often speaks of “religion” rather than “Islam.” Of course, in Egypt and Indonesia the concern for “progress” and national strength is also present.

To speak of secularism as “separation” of religion from public life is misleading, however, since Muslim secularism has not involved a separation of “mosque” and state on the pattern of the American separation of church and state. Secularist governments both support and control religious teaching and institutions to a considerable degree. Essentially, secularism has meant state control of religion and state effort to use religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental goals. Furthermore, particularly in its nationalist form, secularism is by no means inconsistent with an appreciation of Islam as cultural heritage, and may even see it as a necessary component of the national identity. No one is considered a “Turk” who is not also a Muslim, while Shi‘ism was an important element in the Iranian identity pushed by the late Shah. Likewise, Arab nationalists, whether Christian or Muslim, have emphasized the role of Muhammad and his companions as Arab national heroes. What makes all of these secular is the subordination of Islam to national identity and the tendency to view the Islamic heritage as a human cultural achievement rather than a response to Divine initiative.

Likewise, Pan-Islamism may be secularist, insofar as it means loyalty to and/or feeling for Muslim peoples, but does not call on them to rule themselves by the Shari‘a. Since Pan-Islamism is also consistent with Islamic modernism and radical Islamism, it can provide an ideological basis for cooperation among adherents of these types, in spite of their major differences.

It is important to stress that moderate secularism is not necessarily “irreligious.” A secularist may perform faithfully all of the Islamic rituals and follow an Islamic code of ethics in his or her personal life. They may be actively concerned with da‘wa, whether in the sense of calling Muslims to more faithful ritual and ethical practice or non-Muslims to Islam. They may actively promote Muslim charitable organizations and the like. Secularists may also, quite consistently, view religion as a desirable or even necessary support for personal ethics and,
thus, for public order and well-being. They may hold the common idea that religion is necessary for the cultivation of the feelings, as distinct from reason. In fact, under certain circumstances, secularist styles and rhetoric may be highly Islamic. Ataturk resisted the Greeks under Islamic colors and even received the Islamic title “Ghazi” for his efforts. Having established such Islamic “credentials” was undoubtedly another condition of his later success in “reforming” Islam. On similar grounds, I suspect that close analysis would lead us to consider Colonel Qaddafi a secularist, for all his “fundamentalist” rhetoric. These considerations mean that to the extent that Islamic “resurgence” involves increased devotional practice, concern with cultural heritage and Pan-Islamic feeling, it can be expressed within a secularist framework.

ISLAMIC MODERNISM

In formal contrast to secularism, Islamic modernism insists that Islam does provide an adequate ideological base for public life. The Egyptian statesman, Abd al-Rahman ‘Azzam, whose book, The Eternal Message of Muhammad, may be taken as representative of this orientation, states:

The difference between Islam and most other religions is that it did not content itself with merely establishing acts of worship and abandon the needs of society to a Caesar or any form of temporal governing body. Rather, Islam established ways of conduct, relationships, and rights and obligations for the individual vis-à-vis members of his family and the nation and for the nation vis-à-vis other nations.

The 1973 constitution of Pakistan, likewise modernist in my view, asserts that “sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone” and that the authority of the people is a “sacred trust” exercised “within the limits prescribed by Him” (Preamble).

This Islamist position is, however, qualified by a very strong tendency to emphasize the flexibility of Islam in the public sphere and to use this flexibility to interpret Islam in terms congruent with, or at least in very positive dialogue with, one or more Western ideologies. Among Sunnis this commonly includes the insistence that the “gate of ijtihad” be reopened, that Muslims not rely on the “medieval synthesis” represented by the four schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) but that they go back directly to the Qur’an and the Sunna to seek a fresh interpretation and synthesis for modern times, and also, of course, that “superstitions” derived from local pre-Islamic cultures be eliminated. ‘Azzam says:

When we look at the Scripture, the Sunnah, and Muslim history in the days of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, we find that Islam is definite and conclusive on all general principles suitable for all times, places, and peoples. When it comes to implementing these principles, one can see clearly the flexibility of the Islamic Shari’ah and the authority it gives to our reason and our ijtihad. The Shari’ah in effect upholds the guidance given by the Prophet when he said, “You know best about your earthly matters.” Thus there is wide scope for human opinion and it is up to reason and experience to distinguish correct from incorrect action, to show the road to the general welfare and to steer clear of harm.
The latter part of this quote may appear to be virtually a justification for secularism and, in fact, some Islamic modernism comes very close to this. Furthermore, ʿAzzam’s “general principles,” which include justice, freedom, brotherhood of man, the value of work, religious tolerance, and the redistribution of excess wealth, sound very Western, as does the order envisaged by the Pakistan constitution, “wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed” (Preamble). Modernists may also insist that Islamic social principles are capable of development and able to “keep up with the times.” The crucial point, however, is that, unlike the secularists, the modernists are at pains to justify the general principles and the developments in terms of the Qurʾan and the Sunna.

As suggested earlier, legal reform in the “sensitive” areas of family-related law has commonly been done in a more modernist than secularist way, although to the extent that it has been justified by traditional legal devices rather than an open exercise of absolute ijtihad, it moves in a traditionalist direction.

Modernism achieves flexibility in three main ways. The first is by the tendency to restrict the specific and detailed content of the authoritative tradition as much as possible by limiting it to the Qurʾan and the authentic Sunna and then possibly limiting the latter by a radical Hadith criticism. This does not mean that the later tradition is necessarily ignored, but the tendency is to use it selectively. A few, such as Parwez in Pakistan, would go even further and treat only the Qurʾan as absolutely binding. Still more radical is the teaching of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the recently executed leader of the Republican Brothers in the Sudan, who would restrict it to the Meccan part of the Qurʾan. Open advocacy of these more radical approaches is rare, however.

The second way is a more or less radical (re)interpretation of the authoritative sources. This is particularly the case with the Qurʾanic texts on polygyny, the ḥadd punishments, jihad, and the treatment of unbelievers, which appear to conflict with “modern” views. In some cases modernist (re)interpretation can find considerable support in the text, such as the requirement of four witnesses to adultery, which may have the effect of voiding the hadd in practice, or the well-known argument that the Qurʾanic permission of four wives is conditioned on the ability of the husband to treat them fairly, which ability is denied by another passage. A more subtle form of this argument is that the Qurʾan at the legal level limited the number of wives to four but affirmed monogamy as an ideal toward which the community should strive. This underlines the flexibility of the Shariʿa, which allows polygyny since circumstances sometimes require it but provides a clear impetus toward monogamy. The modernist tendency has been to interpret jihad as defensive war and to stress the texts that call for tolerance of non-Muslims. In some cases modernist (re)interpretation in these and other areas may avail itself of traditional fiqh doctrines, although to the extent that it does so, it may move in a traditionalist direction.

(Re)interpretation in its extreme form would lead to the “neo-modernism” proposed by Fazlur Rahman, in which all the specific cases in the Qurʾan and the Sunna would be in effect converted into moral principles. The specific cases would be studied in the light of their context to see what moral principles they exemplify, and it is these principles that would be considered authoritative.
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The third way is an apologetic which links aspects of the Islamic tradition with Western ideas and practices, and may claim that the Western practices in question were originally derived from Islam. This may be a simple identification, as, for example, the Nasserist writer who defends the adaption of Yugoslavian “direct democracy” in Egypt on the grounds that “This recent concept of ‘direct democracy’ is not original. It was to be found in early Islamic democracy.” More subtly, the claim may be that the Western practice represents the best way to carry out the traditional Islamic injunction under modern conditions. Ahmad Bahgat says of the Qur’anic injunction to the ruler to consult others (shura): “Shura in modern political terminology is democracy. Islam did not explain the form, type, or stages of this democracy but left this to the minds of the Muslims and the considerations of time and place.”

It is not just a matter of identification, however, since Islam is usually claimed to be superior in some respect. It may be that it adds a spiritual dimension to what in the West is a purely materialist institution, or that it provides a via media between opposing Western ideologies or the solution to dilemmas inherent in such ideologies. Mustafa Mahmoud says: “As a dialectical synthesis of two extremes [i.e., communism and capitalism] it [Islam] combines the virtues of both; but then it goes further than either by giving man ineffable bliss—spiritual satisfaction.” According to Ali Shariati, Islam and in particular the first Shi’i Imam, ‘Ali, incorporated the positive aspects of “Mysticism, Equality, and Freedom,” the last two in their separated and thus negative forms being found particularly in Marxism and Western existentialism.

Modernist apologetic has been severely criticized by many scholars as superficial, tendentious, and even psychologically destructive, so much so that the term “apologetics” has almost become a term of abuse in the literature on modern Islam. Apologetics as such, however, is not necessarily bad. Indeed, it must feature in any religion that would defend itself at the bar of reason or recommend itself to outsiders. If modernist apologetics are open in practice to such criticism, its failings are not inherent in the type, but result rather from the difficult psychological position in which modern Muslims have found themselves. Although it may seem at times that apologetic modernism is little more than a cover for what secularists do more openly, it at least allows Islam to act as a principle of selection among competing Western ideologies. This is undoubtedly one reason why ideologies such as nationalism and socialism find more ready reception among Muslims than Marxism or fascism. It will also tend subtly to Islamicize any ideology or practice adopted. To call democracy shura, for example, will encourage an interpretation of the concept in the direction of the traditional Islamic practice of shura, especially in the minds of those who do not speak a Western language.

Modernist ideologies will, of course, vary depending on which of these three ways are most prominent in a given case and which Western models are followed. Thus, one may speak of an “apologetic” modernism which relies heavily on the less subtle forms of “identification,” and a “(re)interpretive modernism,” which seeks to avoid this. One may, likewise, speak of a “liberal-nationalist” modernism, a “socialist” modernism (such as “Islamic Socialism”), or a “third-world radical” or “post-Marxist revolutionary” modernism (e.g., the Shah’s “Islamic Marxism”).
This last uses the Qur'an and the Sunna in a very flexible way and draws on modern tendencies that have major roots in the West, in writers such as Marx, Weber, and Fanon, and is exemplified by Ali Shariati and the Mujahidin-i Khalq of Iran.

RADICAL ISLAMISM

By "radical Islamism" I mean the orientation of many of those who are often called "fundamentalists." This type is especially well represented by Sayed Abul A'la Mawdudi and the later writings of Sayyid Qutb, and in only slightly lesser degree by Imam Khomeini and other current Iranian leaders.

Like modernists, but even more insistently, radical Islamists claim that Islam is for all aspects of social as well as personal life. They agree with the modernists that Islam is flexible and that un-Islamic "superstitions" must be eliminated. They also accept the need for absolute ijtihad, but they are likely to grant it less scope and they emphasize that it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West. Mawdudi says, "The purpose and object of ijtihad is not to replace the Divine law by man-made law. Its real object is to understand the Supreme Law." Sayyid Qutb says that Islam is "flexible" but not "fluid" and stresses that "if there is an authoritative text (nass), then that text is decisive and there is no scope for ijtihad. If there is no nass, then comes the time for ijtihad, in accordance with the established principles of God's own method." Consistently with this, radical Islamists tend to accept more of the past ijtihad of the scholars and to emphasize somewhat less the failings of the community in pre-modern times and somewhat more the distortions caused by Western colonialism.

They also strongly emphasize the distinctiveness of Islam. Mawdudi objects to those who wish to identify Islam with "democracy," "communism," or "dictatorship" on the grounds that such identifications result from "the belief that we as Muslims can earn no honour or respect unless we are able to show that our religion resembles modern creeds." They tend to reject terms like "Islamic socialism," and Khomeini even refused to include the word "democratic" in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran. By contrast, the Mujahidin-i Khalq, for example, do speak of the "Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran." This concern for distinctiveness may manifest itself in an insistence on clearly distinctive Islamic laws, such as the hadd penalties. More subtly, though, distinctiveness is achieved by emphasizing that Islam as a whole is a distinct and integrated system, so that even if individual elements do not seem distinctive, their place in the Islamic system makes them different. Consistently with this approach, some say that punishments like cutting off the hand of a thief should be carried on only after a truly Islamic society is established.

In accord with this concern for authenticity and distinctiveness, radical Islamists place less emphasis on apologetics. In practice this may be only a difference of degree, but in intention it is more than that. Both Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb see an "inferiority complex" in modernist apologetics. Notably, they tend to be uncompromising on the question of non-Muslim minorities.
Mawdudi openly attacks "equality before the law" as a sham and defends the Islamic provision for dhimmi status.57

More than others, the radical Islamists emphasize the urgency of putting the Shari' a into practice. It is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed. This, in fact, is the main burden of Khomeini's lectures on Islamic Government. At this point, though, there are significant variations of strategy. Some are more willing to accept a gradualist approach to Islamic legislation and to cooperate with those of other ideological persuasion. In Egypt in 1984, some Muslim Brothers were elected to parliament as members of the Wafd, the leading secularist party of the pre-Nasser era. Other radical Islamists are more oriented toward violent or revolutionary action, as in the Iranian revolution or the assassination of Anwar Sadat. These may accuse the former type of "selling out."59

In spite of its conscious stress on authenticity, however, radical Islamism is still very modern and accepts much that is borrowed from the West. In some ways this is hardly surprising since it arose primarily as a reaction against Westernizing trends, and reactions commonly take on some of the characteristics of what they react against. Most obviously, it has no difficulty accepting modern material technology, as the role of the cassette tape recorder in the Iranian revolution and the clash of modern weapons in the Iran–Iraq war dramatically illustrate. This does not compromise its authenticity since classical Islamic civilization had little problem borrowing purely material technology. In fact, the hadith quoted above by 'Azzam ("You know best about your earthly matters") refers in context to the pollination of date palms, a matter of agricultural technology. Beyond this, however, radical Islamists have been able to accept and use effectively many modern methods of political and social organization that are of Western provenance and to adapt at least some Western political ideas and symbols. The Islamic Republic of Iran has political parties, elections, and a parliament, and its “Crusade for Construction” (Jihad-i Sazandegi) is at least distantly reminiscent of the U.S. Domestic Peace Corps. The youth organizations and cooperatives developed by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt afford another example. In the realm of ideological concepts, Khomeini may have rejected "democratic" but he accepted "republic," and the ability of the Iranian leaders to use populist and third world revolutionary rhetoric is well known. Mawdudi says that "Muslim is the title of that International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam" and that jihad refers to "revolutionary struggle," while Sayyid Qutb speaks in a similar context of a "vanguard," and describes Islam as "a universal proclamation of the liberation of man."62

Although radical Islamists try to avoid following Western models, these models do undoubtedly exercise some influence on them and lead to some variation among them. Thus Mawdudi is sometimes said to be more "capitalist" and Sayyid Qutb more "socialist," and similar differences have apparently surfaced in Iran. Still, the variations within this type are less than within any of the others.63

Particularly important is the fact that radical Islamists accept the idea of progress. With their zeal for following the Sunna of the Prophet, they are commonly accused of wanting to turn the clock back to seventh century Arabia,
but this is a serious misapprehension. They not only want progress but insist that Islam is the way to get it. Khomeini, for example, describes Islam as “progressive,” and Mawdudi says, “we can accelerate the onward march to progress only on the strength of the moral values enunciated by Islam.” In fact, far from reflecting a rejection of the idea of progress, their zeal reflects an acceptance of it, since the idea of progress cuts the ground out from under one of the most common traditional justifications for inaction, the view that historical decline is more or less inevitable so that the ideal of the “golden age” of the Prophet cannot be realized in later times. Radical Islamists undoubtedly want to undo many of the effects of Western-style “progress,” but this is not the same as wanting to turn the clock back.

The social and political activism of radical Islamists also bespeaks a much more worldly orientation than has been usual among pious Muslims in the past, and they are strikingly characterized by what Weber called “inner worldly asceticism.” This must be kept in perspective, though. They are not unconcerned for otherworldly things, and to some extent their emphasis on this-worldly things is a function of the fact that it is mainly in the this-worldly sphere that secularism has called Islam into question. The ability of Shi'i radical Islamism, in particular, to combine otherworldly concern with this-worldly action in martyrdom has been dramatically demonstrated on the city streets and on the battlefield.

We may note in passing two other “Protestant” tendencies of radical Islamism. One is a clear tendency to urge a “Weberian” work ethic, and the other is a tendency to “simplify” the Islamic symbol system by concentrating on certain basic elements. Both of these it shares with Islamic modernism, but in the latter case the motivation is different. Whereas modernism simplifies the symbol system in the interests of “flexibility,” radical Islamism does so more in the interests of authenticity. Seeing the basics as under threat, it wishes to reinforce them and relate everything more firmly to them. In fact, its long-range tendency may be more to “rationalize” than to simplify the symbol system.

Its tendency to view Islam as a “system” is also modern, I think. Traditionally, the political provisions of the Shari'a were understood as commands incumbent on the ruler rather than as a “system” in the usual sense of the term. Related to this is their strong tendency to “reify” Islam, which W. C. Smith has argued is a modern phenomenon, although with roots in the past.

The “modernity” of radical Islamism is related to the fact that in the Sunni world radical Islamists have tended to be “laymen,” and thus probably not so fully aware as the ulama of the complexity and resources of the past tradition. Among Shi'is, on the other hand, it has been led by the ulama, partly because the “gate of ijtihad” was not closed among Shi'is. This may have made Shi'i ulama a bit more flexible in interpretation, but more importantly it has given them more authority over their followers and allowed them to maintain much greater independence of Westernizing governments than was possible for their Sunni counterparts. The fact that Shi'i radical Islamism is ulama-led means that it has a greater rootage in the past tradition and tends in a somewhat “neo-traditionalist” direction.

Apart from the area of material technology, it is often hard to say whether “borrowing” is the best way of describing the relationship of radical Islamism to
Western ideas and practices. In many cases it would be more accurate to say that it develops certain aspects of the basic Islamic symbol system in certain ways in response to the Western challenge. In either case, of course, the effect of the modern West is extremely significant and often decisive. In both cases, also, Islamic modernism has played an important mediating role, to the extent that radical Islamism has accepted its "borrowings" or its interpretations. The conscious concern of the radical Islamist, however, is that where there is borrowing it be controlled by the Islamic symbol system. Particularly with ideological symbols, it is important that they have a clear Islamic rootage. We might say that the radical Islamist in a secularist country is like a person who has grown up in a house whose structure he does not like and who would like to take it over and demolish it and rebuild it to a different plan, but is quite willing to use some of the old materials in the process. In Iran the process has begun.

THE SCALE OF "ISLAMIC TOTALISM"

As indicated earlier, the three orientations so far discussed vary primarily along the scale I have labeled "Islamic totalism," that is, the degree to which Islam is accepted as the guide to social action and public legislation. At the extreme "left" of radical secularism, Islam is totally rejected even as "religion," somewhat to the right of this it is accepted as "religion" but rejected as the guide to public life, while at the extreme right of radical Islamism, it is insisted upon as both "religion" and ideology. In between, there is some effort to have it both ways.

If we were to locate the constitutions of several Muslim countries along this spectrum, we might come up with the following order from left to right: Albania (radical secularist), Turkey (neutral secularist), Indonesia (religious secularist), Syria, Iraq, Egypt (Muslim secularist), Pakistan (Islamic modernist), Iran (between radical Islamist and Islamic modernist). When the Egyptian constitution was amended in 1980 to make the principles of the Shari'a "the primary source" rather than "primary sources" of legislation, this represented a slight shift to the right; but it is still closer to the secularist type, since the principles of the Shari'a are still not the only source and it is still presumably "the people" who have the authority to determine when they will and will not be followed.

On the scale of modernity, these three types are fairly close, but there is some difference since radical Islamism would be less willing to sacrifice elements of Islam to the needs of "modernity." For example, they would certainly not be willing to modify the fast of Ramadan in the interests of development, as Bourgiba wanted to.

The discussion so far has drawn mainly on the areas of political ideology and legal reform. The same typology, however, could be applied to other areas. For example, I view the current movement for "interest-free" banking as radical Islamist. The secularist position would be, of course, that economics and religion are separate. A capitalist oriented modernism might justify modern interest by arguing that the Qur'anic term riba does not really apply to modern banking practices, while a socialist oriented modernism might generalize the prohibition into an attack on capitalist economic injustice. The radical Islamist position represents a reaffirmation and in some ways an intensification of the traditional
prohibition and is prepared to restructure the banking system in a major way to accomplish this. The new female Islamic garb is radical Islamist insofar as it involves a traditional prescription but not the traditional styles. It is possible, obviously, for one to be modernist or secularist in some respects, for example, political ideology, and radical Islamist in others, for example, female garb.

TRADITIONALISM

A traditionalist may be defined as one whose allegiance is to what many would consider the particular “mix” of Shari‘a and non-Shari‘a elements characterizing his area on the eve of the Western impact, and who has not significantly internalized the Western challenge, that is, who has not felt the attraction as well as the threat of Western ways, and thus has not fully appreciated the depth of the threat. He will probably be more “otherworldly” than the types so far discussed and certainly more given to traditional “superstitions.”

Traditionalists respond to the Western challenge strictly in terms of the paradigms offered by the tradition for coping with adversity. The Westerners may be kafirs to be resisted by force or to be tolerated as one of the punishments God visits upon his faithful for their sins or one of the trials by which He tests their faith. To some extent the Crusades and the Mongol invasions can offer historical precedents. Some have taken consolation in the thought that God may grant kafirs worldly success but reserves the bliss of paradise for the Muslims. Nevertheless, even the traditionalists are slightly “modern,” insofar as they have had to make this much response. Those who have made no response at all we could call simply “traditional.” In the nineteenth century and decreasingly in the twentieth, the traditionalist orientation has generally characterized the ulama and other traditional elites, the Sufi orders, and the lower classes, especially the peasants, except that many of these last, along with higher classes in areas such as central Arabia and Afghanistan were presumably traditional into the twentieth century.

We may discern a scale of traditionalism from “rejectionist” on the right to “adaptationist” on the left. The rejectionists would be those, particularly in the nineteenth century, who mounted revolts and resistance against the encroaching colonial powers, or violently resisted the reform efforts of the Westernizing Muslim rulers, but without significant efforts to reform the understanding of the Shari‘a or to extend it in practice to areas of life where it had traditionally held less sway, or to assert its relevance to distinctively modern issues.

The adaptationists would be those who have gone along or at most used delaying tactics. Their actions make sense within the framework of a view that the times are inherently corrupt, due to the distance from the ideal time of the Prophet, and that necessity, therefore, makes such adaptation appropriate. They may in fact prefer to allow the ruler the traditional, but implicitly secularizing, expedient of removing certain classes of cases from ulama jurisdiction, than to allow Islamic modernist reformers to tamper with the ideal. It may be such an attitude that explains the opposition of the Azharis to the reforms of Muhammad Abduh and his followers.
Traditionalists have often been accused of a rigid conservatism (*jumud*), but such an accusation may be unfair. The tradition has always had its ways of gradually coping with change. Even if the gate of “absolute” *ijtihad* had been closed, *ijtihad* within the framework of tradition has always been possible. The traditionalists have been those who felt that the time-honored ways of change were adequate or, if they became rigid, did so in reaction to the modernizing pressures put upon them.

The most conservative elements in Saudi Arabia are best described, I think, as traditionalist, and certainly those who opposed the introduction of television, for example, were at the rejectionist extreme. The fact that Saudi Arabia does not even have a constitution, in the modern sense, argues for considering it traditionalist. Analysis of present thinking and practice in Saudi Arabia would, I think, uncover both modernist and radical Islamist, and perhaps even secularist tendencies, with modernist tendencies probably strongest in official circles. Those who took over the sanctuary in Mecca in 1979 may have been radical Islamists reacting against other trends, although “rejectionist neo-traditionalist” may be a better label.

**NEO-TRADITIONALISM**

When the traditionalist begins to come more deeply to grips with the Western challenge, he may become a “neo-traditionalist.” Here, too, we may discern “rejectionist” and “adaptationist” extremes. Neo-traditionalism may be viewed as a transitional stage on the way to secularism, modernism, or radical Islamism, but it is also possible that it may generate more permanent and distinctive types. The neo-traditionalist accepts the need for modern technology, but is likely to be more selective than the modern types in appropriating it, and likely to give it less symbolic, as distinct from functional, value. He is also likely to have internalized other Western ideas and values somewhat less, particularly the idea of progress and the “Weberian” work ethic. To the extent that he is less committed to the idea of progress, he may feel it less urgent that the Islamic ideal be translated at once into social practice, and, if he is of the adaptationist sort, he may feel that the traditional ways of coping with change are adequate in the long run though perhaps not in the short run and thus that it is better to have a temporary secularist gap between ideal and reality for a time than to have an overhasty modernist or radical Islamist tampering with the ideal. At the same time, he may feel it appropriate to use “obstructionist” tactics to slow down a secularist government’s ill-considered rush to certain forms of modernity. He will prefer gradual to revolutionary change. The rejectionist neo-traditionalist, on the other hand, may feel the need for more revolutionary action but may derive the motivation for this more from traditional Mahdist ideas than from the modern idea of progress.

The adaptationist neo-traditionalist may see positive value in local traditions *qua* local traditions, over against Western ways and also over against the more unitary Islamic model advocated by the radical Islamists. He is more likely than the other types to recognize that certain local customs are both non-Islamic in
origin and non-"modern," and yet still value them. One of the leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia has criticized radical Islamism for its "rejection of the past adaptive ways of Islam as a religion ‘living’ in a concrete local tradition."86

The neo-traditionalist is likely to value the depth and complexity of the past Islamic tradition as represented by the learning of the ulama and the wisdom of the Sufi sheikhs more than the more modern types. Thus, a case might be made for considering the Iranian revolution more rejectionist neo-traditionalist than radical Islamist, both because of the place of the ulama and because of its distinctively Shi‘i and Iranian elements. In fact, I would be inclined to place it somewhere on the scale between the radical Islamist and rejectionist neo-traditionalist types. The same may be true of some of the recent violent or potentially violent manifestations of Sunni "fundamentalism" in the Arab world.87

I believe that many of the ulama and members of Sufi orders in Egypt today are best seen as adaptationist neo-traditionalists.88 The Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya order, as described by Gilsenan, fits this type quite well.89 Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Iran could probably best be placed here. I believe that writers such as Sayyid Hossein Nasr and Martin Lings90 are best seen as neo-traditionalists, and this suggests that neo-traditionalism may be able to draw support from more recent Western doubts about aspects of "modernity," such as reservations about "progress" and the effects of technology on the environment.

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPECTRUM

We can now fill out our spectrum and present it in its two dimensions (see Figure 1). On the scale of "modernity," we have already seen some differences among the non-traditionalist types, but obviously it is on this scale especially that the traditionalist types vary from all of them, with pure traditionalism at the lowest point and neo-traditionalism intermediate. I see no reason for placing the rejectionist and adaptationist types of pure traditionalism any differently on this scale, but adaptationist neo-traditionalists will rank a bit higher than rejectionist neo-traditionalists for reasons like those that put secularists higher than radical Islamists. On the scale of "Islamic totalism" rejectionist traditionalism is considerably to the left of radical Islamism because of the many areas of life that even the "fundamentalist" forms of traditional Islam did not seek in practice to bring strictly under the sway of the Shari‘a. Probably rejectionist traditionalism should be placed even to the left of the strictest forms of Islamic modernism (whether in the "apologetic" or "neo-modernist" mode). The sides of the diagram are skewed to the right because I think rejectionist types have probably moved more quickly to the "right" on the Islamic totalism scale than "up" on the modernity scale, while positions corresponding to a strict secularism of even the moderate type have not been part of the traditionalist option. The term "fundamentalism" is sometimes used to refer to everything to the right of a line drawn vertically from rejectionist traditionalism to modernism, but if it were to be used at all, I would rather limit it to radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism (see Figure 1), since these are the positions that have both the radicalness and the modernity that seem to me implicit in the term. In fact,
however, this term seems to me a seriously misleading one and I would suggest that “Islamic radicalism” be used instead.

It may be observed that the types will tend to show more ideological diversity within them the further they are from the extreme of radical Islamism in either direction. Secularism, in principle at least, can include a wide variety of Western-derived ideologies, while traditionalism will reflect the diversity of the traditional Islamic world. Radical Islamism should show the least diversity both because it most strictly insists on making “Islam” its ideology and because it tends to “simplify” that Islam and stress the widely shared basics.
While this diagram may suggest a greater degree of precision than is in fact possible, it should be possible to plot various modern Islamic phenomena on it in a rough way, and it should help us to avoid the danger of "pigeon-holing." In Figure 2, I have very provisionally suggested locations for (1) Gamal Abdel Nasser, (2) Anwar Sadat, and (3) Imam Khomeini. A writer such as Sayyid Qutb may be said to have moved on the scale over the course of his life in a manner suggested by the line (4).

BY WAY OF EVALUATION

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various types here described, and what might the future hold? The following remarks represent a very tentative effort at assessment, based on the assumption that to be viable in the long term an ideology must have a somewhat realistic assessment of the actual situation and must be able to call forth a high degree of moral commitment.

Undoubtedly the greatest strengths of secularism lie in the "practical" areas. It follows what are, to a considerable degree, tried and proven models. While Western prestige in the third world is undoubtedly not what it once was, it is still undeniable that many nations have been able to develop technologically on the
basis of ideologies such as liberal nationalism and Marxism, whereas no fully non-Western ideology has yet demonstrated its capacity in this regard.

Furthermore, with its ideals of religious freedom and equality before the law, modern secularism provides a widely accepted way of dealing with religious plurality. The presence of non-Muslims has probably been the most important single factor in pushing countries such as Indonesia and Egypt toward secularism. Likewise, secularism would seem the best ideology for Muslims who are minorities in the countries in which they live. A discussion of Muslim minorities is beyond the scope of this article, but their relevance is undeniable. Beyond this is the fact that the Muslim umma is a minority in the world population as a whole and even the most anti-secularist Muslim regimes have to contend with this. Presumably when Iranians convince North Koreans to sell them arms or proclaim solidarity with Nicaraguans, they do not advance Islamist arguments.

The closeness of secularists to Western ways of thinking is both a strength and a weakness. On one hand, they are more likely than others to know how to deal with Westerners and to have an appreciation of the sources of Western strength. On the other hand, they are more likely to have an indiscriminate admiration for all things Western, or at least to appear to, although this is perhaps less true today than it once was. The foreign provenance of basic secularist ideas is clearly a disadvantage in today's climate.

The clarity and consistency of secularism's position on the Shari'a may also be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Clarity is often not an advantage in day-to-day politics, where conceptually vague slogans may appeal to a wider range of people. But an uncompromising clarity and consistency may mobilize a greater depth of commitment in a revolutionary situation and may help assure that a program of radical social change is carried through consistently and effectively in the long run.

Still another aspect of secularism that cuts both ways is the fact that its constituency has been largely among the social, political, and economic elite. On one hand, this has meant that its adherents have been better positioned to put their beliefs into practice, but on the other hand, the weakness of secularism among the masses makes its position always somewhat insecure, and contributes to the sort of gap between the Westernized elite and the rest of society that exploded so dramatically in Iran.

A particular problem for secularism is its relatively weak roots in the Muslim past, although these are not totally absent. Some precedent for the separation of religion from other areas of life can be found in the fact that the Shari'a was spelled out in far more detail and far more regularly followed in areas of personal ritual and family matters than in other areas of public law. Particularly if secularism allows the areas of family law to be placed on the sacred side of the sacred-secular divide, it can be argued that secularism merely carries traditional practice a logical step further. In a similar way, equality before the law can find precedent in the high degree of tolerance given to non-Muslims in the periods of greatest Islamic cultural flourishings, such as Abbasid Baghdad, Umayyad Spain, and Akbar's Mogul India; and nationalism certainly can find nourishment in ethnic feelings and local loyalties that have existed for centuries. On the other hand, down through the ages the most pious and committed Muslims have
probably felt their ethnic identity less than others, certainly viewed the failure to enforce the Shari‘a as a sign of corruption, and tended to be restive when rulers gave too much freedom and recognition to non-Muslims. In general, the elements in traditional Muslim practice upon which secularism can call for support are those that have been least well integrated into the central Islamic symbol system.

In fact, a very major reinterpretation of Islam will be necessary before it can be congenial to secularism. A step in this direction is a reinterpretation of Islamic history that puts the relatively secular Umayyads in a much better light than pious Muslims have usually seen them, that emphasizes the secular elements in the ‘Abbasid period of glory, and deemphasizes the cultural (as distinct from more strictly “religious”) significance of the early Medinan state and the Rightly Guided Caliphate;94 but I doubt if this is sufficient. Beyond this, it would be necessary to develop a secularist interpretation of the basic Islamic symbol system as found in the Qur‘an and the Sunna, both of which have a lot to say about public life. Reinterpretations of this magnitude needed are by no means unknown to the history of religion, and secularists sometimes point to the Protestant Reformation as a possible model.95 The best known effort is ‘Ali Abd al-Raziq’s al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm, published in Cairo in 1925.96 The violent attacks to which the book and its author were subjected effectively stifled further public developments along this line in Egypt, and the climate today in the Muslim world seems even less conducive to such an effort.97

In the past, it has been Islamic symbols that have mobilized moral commitment in the Muslim world, and I do not think any secularist ideology has yet given a really convincing demonstration of its ability to do this in other terms. The Palestinians might be an exception to this point, but their situation is distinctive and even among them of late an increase in Islamism is reported. The record of secularism so far in providing a basis for development and social integration in the Muslim world is much poorer than was widely expected a generation ago, and it is not surprising that many are seeking an alternative. Secularism is currently on the defensive, but the vast majority of Muslims still live under secularist governments and these governments will not yield power easily.

By contrast, the strength of radical Islamism lies precisely in its claim to Islamic authenticity and its consequent ability to call forth commitment; radical Islamists are commonly respected by others for their sincerity and willingness for self-sacrifice if for nothing else. Since it combines this with many modern characteristics, it has an appeal to those who have been exposed to “modernity” in a major way, but still value tradition, and to those who may have experienced more of the disruption than the benefits of modernization. These include many young people and recent immigrants from the countryside to the city, groups undoubtedly crucial for the future of developing countries.

The fact that radical Islamism takes a position on the place of the Shari‘a clearly and diametrically opposed to secularism and its tendency to be intolerant of other views allows it easily to be labeled “fanaticism” or “extremism,” but also helps make it a suitable vehicle for movements of protest or revolution.

Perhaps the greatest long-run challenge for radical Islamism is the very size of the task to which its inner logic impels it. As already suggested, the undertaking
implicit (and sometimes explicit) in it is to “dismantle” Western civilization and rebuild using many of its elements. The resulting society would be at least as different from present “free world” and communist societies as each of them are from the other, perhaps more so. Few radical Islamists, I think, realize the size of this undertaking. Whether this is possible in today’s shrinking world in the face of the continued vitality of both the liberal and Marxist forms of Western civilization is not clear. On the other hand, the very size of the task may force radical Islamists to be more creative than either they or others expect. Their combination of a central concern for authenticity with a very real openness to change may well be the best recipe for a genuinely Islamic creativity. In fact, radical Islamists might conceivably generate changes in the Islamic symbol system of the magnitude, if not of the kind, that secularism needs. The doctrine of vilayat-i faqih in Iran today suggests such a possibility. If they should accomplish this, the implications could be no less earth-shaking than was the Protestant Reformation, which in many ways sought to “go back” but in fact released energies that impelled society forward. To realize this possibility, however, radical Islamism will have to show that it can elicit moral commitment not only for oppositional efforts but for constructive ones as well.

In short, radical Islamism has the strengths and weaknesses of any revolutionary ideology. Its power is great and the obstacles to it formidable; its potential for long run significance is probably greater than most observers are prepared to recognize.

Modernism may be said to attempt to combine Islamic authenticity with adherence to the “tried and proven” models for development drawn from the West. To the extent that it can do this, it can draw on traditional sources of moral commitment more effectively than secularism, while avoiding the disruption and “risk” involved in radical Islamism. On the other hand, it often involves a desire to “have one’s cake and eat it too” and is apt to be used as a “cover” for essentially secularist programs. “Modernist” legislative reform has tended to be a matter of finding Islamic precedents for laws desired on essentially secularist grounds, rather than a serious reformulation of the tradition by absolute ijtihad. To this extent, its claim to authenticity loses credibility.

The apologetic effort to interpret Islam in “Western” terms is not without significant basis, for Western and Islamic civilizations are historically affiliated and have much in common, and the West did in fact borrow much from the Muslims. This all too often, however, developed in a shallow and intellectually inadequate way. Modernist apologetic is particularly inadequate at the point where secularism has one of its greatest strengths, and radical Islamism is at least forthright, in the response to religious plurality. Despite its insistent proclamation of Islamic tolerance and its ability to adduce some impressive examples from past Muslim history, it rarely if ever comes to real grips with the fact that traditional dhimmi status is simply not the same as modern “equality before the law.” Hence, it is less than convincing to skeptical non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately, the pressures of the modern situation make this sort of thing almost unavoidable. This issue is so sensitive that it is hard to allow the kind of frank public discussion that is necessary to arrive at less superficial positions.
It seems to me that Islamic modernism may play a useful role in easing some of the psychological and social strains of modernization by giving it a less alien face, but that it is unlikely to provide a really sound basis for social development in the long term unless it can develop the sort of radical reinterpretation proposed by Fazlur Rahman as "neo-modernism." There is undoubtedly an awareness of the need for this in some quarters, but whether the climate is much more ripe for it than for a "secularist" reinterpretation may be doubted. Short of this, modernism is likely to remain an essentially unstable stopgap or halfway house.

The distinctive strength of the traditionalist and neo-traditionalist positions is their rootage in the past tradition. Particularly insofar as they are members of the ulama, they are likely to have an awareness of and access to the riches of the past tradition that the more "modern" types often lack. Undoubtedly, pure traditionalism does not feel the Western challenge deeply enough to come up with an adequate response, but neo-traditionalism in some cases may feel the challenge sufficiently to respond while at the same time not being so "hung up" on the Western temptation-cum-threat as the more "modern" types. It may therefore be capable of a more balanced and critical assessment of the West in the long run. Adaptationist neo-traditionalism may provide the best framework for an evolutionary adaptation of the Islamic tradition to "modernity," while rejectionist neo-traditionalism may provide a revolutionary radical Islamism with the rootage it needs for long term survival, as may be happening in Iran.

What of the future? At present there is considerable "rightward" and perhaps some "downward" pressure everywhere, but also considerable resistance by the secularized elites. Further Islamic radical (i.e., radical Islamist or rejectionist neo-traditionalist) takeovers could happen in the near future but seem a bit less likely today than a few years ago. In the short term, I would expect secularist ideologies to maintain themselves, though with some "erosion" to the right. In the medium term, much will depend on the ability of the Iranian revolution to institutionalize itself and appeal to Muslims outside Iran. Assuming that it does so and "moderates" to some degree, one might foresee a situation in which the two main options are a very moderate and slightly traditionalist secularism and an Islamic radicalism intermediate between radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism. Equally likely, though, unforeseen developments may confuse the categories of academic observers and confound their prophecies.

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NOTES

Author's note: This article is based on ideas that I have been developing over a period of about seven years. In an earlier version it was presented to a conference in New Zealand in 1981 and later published and circulated locally as "Working Paper No. 2" by the Australasian Middle East Studies Association under the title "Towards a Typology of Modern Islamic Movements?" (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1982). Later versions were presented informally in Jakarta and Yogyakarta in 1984, in Cairo in January 1985, and as a paper at the XVth Congress of the International
Association for the History of Religions in Sydney, Australia, in August 1985. Let me express my appreciation to those who have heard and responded to these ideas and particularly to the unnamed evaluators whose comments, both acerbic and constructive, have provided stimulus and guidance for the final revision. Appreciation is also due to Dr. David Brewster, my predecessor at the University of Canterbury, one of whose class handouts bequeathed to me started my thinking on the subject. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from constitutions are from A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1984).

1Yvonne Haddad rightly complains of “the tendency of Western readers to dismiss ‘fanaticism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ as passing fads that need to be ignored because of their transient nature” (The Link, 15, 4 [September/October, 1982], 4). Also, the term carries with it many associations from its original use in a Protestant Christian context that are inappropriate for an Islamic context. My current preference for an alternative is given below, p. 321 and fn. 91.

2Space prohibits a thorough examination of the literature relevant to this subject, but let me indicate how I see this typology in relation to a few recent treatments. Leonard Binder in The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 31-40, appears to use “secularist” and “modernist” much as I use “secularist” and “Islamic modernist.” His “traditionalist” (or “traditional Islam”) appears to correspond to my adaptationist (neo-)traditionalism, his “early fundamentalism” to my rejectionist traditionalism, and his “[later] fundamentalism” to my radical Islamism and probably the “right-wing” of my Islamic modernism. He claims to find a basically similar analysis in the works of H. A. R. Gibb, W. C. Smith, and Albert Hourani. John Esposito’s “four positions or attitudes toward modernization and Islamic socio-political change,” “secularist,” “conservative,” “neo-traditionalist,” and “Islamic reformist” (along with “modernist”), correspond to my “secularist,” “(neo-)traditionalist,” “radical Islamist,” and “Islamic modernist” respectively (Islam and Politics [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984], pp. 216–18). H. Mintjes uses the terms “secularist,” “modernist,” and “traditionalist” pretty much as I do and his “fundamentalist” corresponds to my “radical Islamist” (“Mawlana Mawdudi’s Last Years and the Resurgence of Fundamentalist Islam,” Al-Mushir, 22, 2 [1980], 46–73). R. Stephen Humphreys’ use of the terms “secularist,” “modernist,” and “traditionalist” seems to correspond to mine (“Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria,” Middle East Journal, 33, 1 [Winter 1979], 1–19). His “fundamentalist” seems to correspond to my “rejectionist neo-traditionalist” but whether it includes my “radical Islamist” is less than clear. He describes Sayyid Qutb as “militantly Fundamentalist in tone, Modernist in content” (p. 6) but he may have in mind his somewhat earlier, more “moderate” works (see fn. 47 below). In describing fundamentalism as a “tendency” and a “set of attitudes” (p. 4) rather than a group or a movement, he appears to be making the same point that I make by speaking of ideological “orientations.” Yvonne Haddad, in Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), esp. pp. 7–23, and “The Islamic Alternative” (The Link, 15, 4 [September/October, 1982], 1–14) presents a threefold typology: “acculturator,” “normativist,” and “neo-normativist.” The first seems to correspond to my “secularist,” the second to my “rejectionist traditionalist,” and the third to my “radical Islamist” and “rejectionist neo-traditionalist.” My “modernist” category would probably be divided between her “acculturator” and “neo-normativist” categories, but I do not know where she would put my “adaptationist (neo-)traditionalist.” My typology in its formal aspect is, I think, particularly close to that of Fazlur Rahman as found in several writings: “Revival and Reform in Islam” (The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], part VIII, ch. 7); “Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives” (IJMES, 1, 4 [October, 1970], 317–33); “Islam: Challenges and Opportunities,” in A. T. Welch & P. Cachia, eds., Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), pp. 315–30; Islam, 2nd edition (Chicago & New York: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chs. 12–14; and “Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism,” in Philip H. Stoddard et al., eds., Change and the Muslim World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 23–35. My “Islamic modernism” corresponds on the whole to the various forms of “modernism” that he discusses, and my “radical Islamism” corresponds to his “neo-revivalism” or “neo-fundamentalism” (sometimes “fundamentalism”) in the earlier writings. While I disagree with his analyses and critiques at some points, I have unfailingly found his views immensely stimulating. Another writer whose categories bear a significant and interesting relation to mine is John Voll (see “The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundamentalist,” IJMES, 10, 2 [May, 1979], 167–86; Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World [Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982]; and “Wahhabism and Mahdism: Alternative
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Styles of Islamic Renewal," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 4, 1 & 2 [1982], 110–26). In *Islam: Continuity and Change* he presents four "styles of action": "adaptationist," "conservative," "fundamentalist," and a style which emphasizes "the more personal and individual aspects of Islam" (pp. 29–31). The first three correlate with my types as follows: his "adaptationist" = my "secularist" and "adaptationist neo-traditionalist," his "conservative" = my "adaptationist traditionalist," and his "fundamentalist" = my "radical Islamist and rejectionist (neo-)traditionalist." It is from him that I have adapted the term "adaptationist." His fourth type seems to me relevant to a different scale, text-oriented/leader-oriented (see fn. 9, below). Thus, like Yvonne Haddad, he in effect divides the spectrum into three rather than four types. An important difference between his treatment and mine is that he is describing "styles of action" while I am describing "ideological orientations." One might say that a given "style of action" issues from or is congenial to a given "ideological orientation," but they are not identical. This may be why he classes as "fundamentalists" figures such as Qaddafi and Ali Shariati whom I will put elsewhere (cf. fn. 46 below). Another difference between our treatments is that his categories are intended to apply to the whole of Islamic history, while mine are designed specifically for the modern period. My "secularism" and "radical Islamism" could be considered as distinctively modern manifestations of his "adaptationism" and "fundamentalism" respectively.

3Humphreys makes the same point in "Islam and Political Values," p. 2.

4My use of the term "modernity" here fits very well with the definition of modernization as an increase in conscious human control over the environment, especially if that includes the social as well as the physical environment. On this definition certain recent tendencies in the West, connected, e.g., with environmentalism, that question the ideal of complete human control of the environment and prefer to speak of harmony with it, might be called "post-modern."


It is not intended here to imply that only external factors have shaped modern Muslim developments. Obviously internal factors, such as pre-modern revivalist movements, have also been important, but in terms of this typology their importance has been in influencing which types of responses particular Muslims would give, rather than the typology as such.

It seems to me we might define ideology as a systematically developed worldview oriented toward stimulating and guiding social change (cf. the definition proffered by Ronald Bruce St. John, "a system of ideas, beliefs and myths justifying or attacking a given social order," *IJMES* 15, 4 [November 1983], 471). What is new, in relation to traditional Islam, is the greater social and worldly orientation, the conscious and systematic elaboration of a social doctrine, and the expectation of significant social change wrought by human effort.

8"Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, 63, 1 (Fall 1984), 108–27. Bill does not make clear the doctrinal content of "fundamentalism" as he uses the term, but it seems to correspond to my radical Islamism and rejectionist (neo-)traditionalism. Insofar as he identifies fundamentalism with "populist" Islam, he fails to take account of the fact that "fundamentalism" is now the establishment in Iran and to a considerable degree in Pakistan. It also obscures the fact that certain forms of modernism, such as that of Ali Shariati and the Mujahidin-i Khalq (see pp. 313–14) can be "populist" in his sense (see also note 9).

9This is the case also with Voll's distinction between "text-oriented" and "leader-oriented" ("Wahhabism and Mahdism"). Ataturk's movement was a "leader-oriented" secularism and the Iranian revolution was certainly "leader-oriented," while 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's book presents a "text-oriented" secularism and both Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb a "text-oriented" radical Islamism. Similarly, "the Technical Military Academy group" and the "Takfîr wa-Hijra group" as described by Saad Eddin Ibrahim ("Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," *IJMES* 12, 4 [December, 1980], 423–53) would appear to be fairly close in ideological orientation, but the former seems more "text-oriented" and the latter more "leader-oriented."

10Space forbids more than occasional reference to the ways in which Shi'i-Suni differences may affect these types. Suffice it to say that I believe all the types may be found, with the characteristics ascribed to them here, among both Sunnis and Shi'is, although Shi'i is probably tend more toward the extremes of the Islamic totalism scale.

11Fazlur Rahman says, "Secularism in Islam . . . is the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam, i.e., without their being derived, or organically linked
to the principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna... Islamic modernism... means precisely the induction of change into the content of the Shari’a” (“Islamic Modernism,” p. 311).

12The only references to religion in the constitution are in Articles 37 and 55. The former reads: “The state recognizes no religion whatever and supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook in people,” and the latter reads “Fascist, anti-democratic, religious, war-mongering, and anti-socialist activities and propaganda... are prohibited.” Mosques and churches were officially closed in 1967.

13The 1980 Afghanistan constitution speaks of “the resolute following of the principles of the sacred religion of Islam” (Basic Principles) and includes the “rules of Shari’ah law” as residual law (Art. 56). The South Yemeni constitution recognizes Islam as religion of state, although not until Article 46.

14My translation of ketuhanan yang maha esa, though ketuhanan is more literally “lordship” than “divinity.” It is worth noting that the Indonesian phrase not only uses a very abstract term for God but also avoids words of Arabic derivation, which have a more Islamic flavor. The Jakarta Charter of 1945 included a provision that Muslims should be obliged to follow Islamic law, but this was not included in the constitution. For further details see B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 24–39.

15The preamble to the Turkish constitution notes “the determination of the Turkish Republic, an equal and honorable member of the family of nations, to insure its everlasting existence, welfare, and material and spiritual well-being and its determination in attaining the standards of contemporary civilization.”

16For example, the following from Nasser: “We boast that we stick to religion, each one of us according to his religion. The Muslim upholds his religion and the Christian upholds his, because religion represents the right and the sound way... It is the great secret behind the success of this Revolution: the adherence to religion” (D. E. Smith, ed., Religion and Political Modernization [New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974], p. 275).

17For example, the well known statement of Taha Hussein, “In order to become equal partners in civilization with the Europeans, we must literally and forthrightly do everything that they do; we must share with them the present civilization, with all its pleasant and unpleasant sides” (The Future of Culture in Egypt, S. Glazer, trans. [Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954], p. 21).

18Turkey’s efforts to have the adhan recited in Turkish are an extreme example of government interference in religion for nationalist goals, but not the only one there. On the efforts of the Egyptian government to use religion for its own purposes, see especially Daniel Crecelius, “The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt,” chapter 3 in J. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 69–70.

19Noted, for example, by Smith in Islam in Modern History, p. 85. The very firmness and security of this identity must have been one of the factors that made it possible for Atatürk to undertake his radically secularist reforms.


22For example, Taha Hussein’s well known distinction between a “reasoning” personality “that investigates, criticizes, analyses,” and a “sentient” one “that feels pleasure and pain, rejoices, sorrows, ... without criticism, investigation or analysis” (al-Siyasa al-usbu’iyya [Cairo], July 17, 1926, 5, cf. translation in Charles Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt [London: Oxford University Press, 1933], p. 258). See also my discussion of this and similar views held by Taha Hussein’s colleague, Ahmad Amin, in my The Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Islamic Studies in Association with Vikas, 1982), pp. 8–9, 68–83.

23This comment is based on material contained in two recent articles: Ronald Bruce St. John, “The Ideology of Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice,” IJMES, 15, 4 (November, 1983), 471–90, and Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islamic Resurgence or New Prophethood: The Role of Islam in

As a label such as “moderate Islamism” might be more consistent with the next label, “radical Islamism,” but it seems to me that “moderate” may be a bit misleading for a type that includes groups such as the Mujahidin-i Khalk of Iran. “Islamist modernism” would be better and would fit my definition of Islamism as Islam qua ideology, but I stick with “Islamic modernism” as the better known term and one that is generally adequate.

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For convenience, I shall use “modernist” instead of “Islamic modernist” where the context makes the meaning clear. “Modernist” sometimes is used to include secularists as well as Islamic modernists. For example, C. C. Adams includes both ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and Taha Husayn in the chapter on “The Younger Egyptian Modernists” in Islam and Modernism in Egypt (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968, originally published in 1933), pp. 253–68.


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E.g., Mahathir Muhammad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, as quoted in the New York Times, May 16, 1985, 2.


Muhammad ‘Abduh, for example, said that a Muslim was obliged to accept only mutawatir hadith, and was free to reject others about which he had doubts (Risalat al-Tawhid, 17th Printing [Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1379/1960], pp. 201–3; English translation by K. Cragg and L. Masa‘ad, The Theology of Unity [London: Allen and Unwin, 1966], pp. 155–56). Ahmad Amin, in his popular series on Islamic cultural history, cautiously suggested that there were few if any mutawatir hadith (especially, Fajr al-Islam, 10th edition [Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1965], p. 218); see also G. H. A. Juynboll, The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1969), and my Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual, p. 113.


According to him, the Medinan part of the Qur’an, which contains the legal details, is the “First Message of Islam,” which was necessary at the time of the Prophet but is now superseded by the “Second Message” of Islam, which is found in the general principles contained in the Meccan part. On Taha and his movement see Paul Magnarella, “The Republican Brothers: A Reformist Movement in the Sudan,” Muslim World, 72, 1 (January 1982), 14–24, and Richard P. Stevens, “Sudan’s Republican Brothers and Islamic Reform,” Journal of Arab Affairs, 1, 1 (1981), 135–46.

In Arabic, ta’wil. Whether interpretation or reinterpretation is a debatable issue which I do not wish to prejudge here.

See Qur’an 4:3 on polygyny, 5:38 on cutting off the hand of the thief, 24:2–5 on whipping for fornication (the provision for stoning for adultery is in the Hadith). On jihad and the treatment of unbelievers, the difficult passages for modernists are the so-called “verses of the sword,” such as 9:5 on the Arab pagans and 9:29 on the people of the Book. In these and other Qur’anic references I follow Pickthall’s numbering (The Meaning of the Glorious Koran [New York: New American Library, Mentor, n.d.]).
Qur’an 24:4.

For an example of this argument, see Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed., p. 38.


Qur’an 4:129.

For an example of this argument, see Rahman, Islam, 2nd ed., p. 38.


Marxism and Islam, M. M. Enan, trans. (Cairo, n.d.), p. 21; cf. Shalaby: “But modern civilization . . . could not fully copy Islam’s attitudes. The United Nations Organization has been content to derive from the Pilgrimage its material part, that is, the annual meeting. It has forgotten that Islamic legislation furnished the Pilgrimage spirituality” (Islam, p. 225).

Mysticism, Equality, and Freedom” in Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, R. Campbell, trans. (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1980), pp. 97–111, esp. pp. 118–19. It is not that Shariati identifies Islam with either Marxism or existentialism, but he presents Islam as a solution to a Western dilemma presented in essentially Western terms.

See, e.g., Smith’s criticism of Farid Wajdi in Islam in Modern History, pp. 139–59, and Gibb’s complaint about “the intellectual confusions and the paralyzing romanticism which cloud the minds of the modernists of today” (Modern Trends in Islam [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947], pp. 105, 106).

That Shariati is to be seen as modernist and not “fundamentalist” may be illustrated by his virtual identification of God and “the people” (al-nas) on social matters; wherever in the Qur’an social matters are mentioned, Allah and al-nas are virtually synonymous . . . ‘Rule belongs to God’ [means] rule belongs to the people” (Sociology of Islam, Hamid Algar, trans. [Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979], p. 116). One could hardly imagine people like Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, or Khomeini (contrast Islam and Revolution, Hamid Algar, trans. [Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981], p. 55) saying anything like that.

A comparison of earlier and later editions of al-‘Adala al-ijtima‘iyya—the third edition (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1952) and a much later edition (Dar al-Shuruq: Cairo and Beirut, in 1394/1974) have been available to me and illustrate how Sayyid Qutb shifted to the right along the spectrum in his later years. In these he shows the influence of Mawdudi at several points. The Muslim Brothers are generally thought of as “fundamentalist,” or radical Islamist in my terms, but in fact they undoubtedly contain a spectrum of views, some of which may be closer to modernist than radical Islamist (see fn. 53, below).


Ma‘alim, pp. 94–95; cf. Milestones, pp. 157–58.

Mawdudi states that the Shari’ah was in effect in India until the British took over (The Islamic Law, p. 118). The later edition of Sayyid Qutb’s ‘Adala puts much less emphasis on the failings of post-Rashidun community than the earlier edition (cf. fn. 47, above). In the earlier edition, for
example, the coming to power of the Umayyads is described as a virtual disaster for Islam (1953 ed., p. 198, Hardie translation, pp. 197–98), while in the later edition it is said only to lead to a decline (1974 ed., pp. 216–17).

52 _The Islamic Law_, p. 118.

53 _Island and Revolution_, pp. 337–38.


57 _The Islamic Law_, pp. 265–68.

58 In _Islam and Revolution_, pp. 27–165.


60 _Jihad in Islam_, p. 5.

61 _Ma‘alim_, p. 9; _Milestones_, pp. 16–17.

62 _Ma‘alim_, p. 59; _Milestones_, p. 103.

63 On Mawdudi and the Muslim Brothers, see, e.g., Mintjes, “Maulana Maududi’s Last Days,” p. 73, fn. 85. Sayyid Qutb became less “socialist” as he became more radical Islamist (compare, e.g., _‘Adala_, 3rd ed., pp. 108, 144; and _Social Justice_, Hardie, trans., pp. 106–7 with _‘Adala_, 1974, pp. 115–16, 160–61). Comments on Iran are based on Western press reports and indications in the _Tehran Times_.

64 _Islam and Revolution_, p. 30.


66 On the absence of the idea of progress from traditional thinking, see fn. 80, below.

67 I prefer the expression “Islamic symbol system” or “basic Islamic symbol system” to “Islam” here. What I mean by the “basic Islamic symbol system” is those central beliefs and practices, such as the unity of God (tawhid), the final prophethood of Muhammad, and the five “pillars,” found in the Qur‘an and the Sunna and viewed as an organized system. This is not simply the same as the Qur‘an and the Sunna; for example, the doctrine that Muhammad is the last prophet is a central and essential part of the “symbol system” but is mentioned only once in the Qur‘an. For the idea of religion as a “symbol system” see especially Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System” in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds., _Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach_, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 205–16; also Robert N. Bellah, “Religious Evolution,” in ibid., pp. 73–87. Modernists insist that Islam is an essentially simple religion and one way they “simplify” the symbol system is by reducing the obligatory content of the Hadith and rejecting much of traditional fiqh. Radical Islamists such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb do these things too to some extent, but they also simplify the symbol system with their stress on tawhid in the sense of obedience exclusively given to God as the central linchpin of their system.

68 Smith has remarked on this in relation to Mawdudi ( _Islam in Modern History_, p. 236), as has Charles Adams (“The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi” in D. E. Smith, ed., _South Asian Politics and Religion_ [Princeton University Press, 1966], pp. 394–95). Sayyid Qutb also sees Islam as a system, or perhaps as a program or a method (manhaj) which gives rise to a system (see fn. 62, above). The idea of Islam as a system is closely related to the idea of Islam as an ideology (Adams, ibid.).


71 Mawdudi, Qutb, and Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers, were all “laymen” and this point is commonly made concerning Sunni “fundamentalists” (e.g., Mintjes, “Mawlama Mawdudi’s Last Years,” p. 54; Ibrahim, “Anatomy,” p. 434). Nevertheless, there certainly are
“fundamentalist” ulama in Egypt today, and I presume elsewhere too. Khomeini is, of course, one of the ulama, as were also the earlier figures, Abu al-Qasim Kashani and Mujtaba Nawwab Safawi (see Voll, Islam, Continuity and Change, p. 204).

Though in some cases radical Islamism uses modernist interpretations in its own ways. Examples would be the idea of tawhid as meaning rejection of the worship of any but God, which modernists present as the charter of political freedom (see note 42, above) and radical Islamists use to stress the necessity of relating every area of life to Islam, and also the idea of jihad as necessary so that Islam may be freely preached, which modernists use to restrict the need for jihad where a non-Muslim government allows Muslims religious freedom but radical Islamists use to insist that government must be in the hands of Muslims (for examples see Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 125–31).

I suspect that Khomeini could accept “republic” but not “democracy” because the former in Persian (jumhuri) comes from an Arabic root, though so far as I know its use in the sense of “republic” is new.


See, for example, the attitude of Ahmad Amin’s father toward the British occupation of Egypt (Shepard, Faith of a Modern Muslim, p. 15).

The following reaction of the scholar Ahmad ibn Sa‘d to the fall of the Sokoto caliphate to the British in 1903 seems to me a good example of traditionalism: “We have a precedent in what the unbelievers did with . . . Baghdad. They burnt it, destroyed it, desecrated the graves of the saints, tore the community apart, and killed the Caliph such that the world was without a Caliph for a while. We have a precedent and a consolation in the Qarmatian unbeliever whom God granted the power over Mecca on the Day of Sacrifice. . . . Even the Black Stone he took and went away with it. As God restored normalcy for the Muslim by the return of the Stone and the Caliphate to them, so also do we hope God will resolve this matter for us and grant us amelioration by His power and His grace.” (Quoted in Inquiry, 1, 7, December 1984, 54.) Secularists, modernists and radical Islamists all realize that “normalcy” is gone forever. Cf. Fazlur Rahman, “For the traditionalist there is no new age in the real sense of the word” (“Roots,” p. 32).


These may be seen as continuations of the “adaptionist” and “fundamentalist” styles of traditional Islam described by Voll (see note 2, above).

Traditional Islam, like other traditional religions, did not hold the Western myth of progress, a point argued forcefully by Martin Lings writing under his Muslim name, Abu Bakr Siraj ed-Din, in “The Islamic and Christian Conceptions of the March of Time,” Islamic Quarterly, 1, 4 (December, 1954), 229–35.


Zaki Yamani’s article, “Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues,” in Charles Malik, ed., God and Man in Contemporary Islamic Thought (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1972), pp. 49–82, strikes me as modernist. Dekmejian reports that in 1983 the King Fahd “called upon Islamic scholars to hold an international conference to modernize Islamic law through rigorous ijtihad” (Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World [Syracuse University Press, 1985], p. 148 and fn. 26). This has a modernist ring to me.

The attitude is illustrated by the following from Sayyed Hossein Nasr: “Of course we do not propose that Muslims should remain oblivious of the world around them. This is neither desirable nor possible. No Islamic state can avoid owning trains and planes” (Islamic Life and Thought [Albany: SUNY Press, 1981], p. 28). This seems to suggest that modern technology is more something that cannot be avoided than something to be positively valued.


This seems to be the case with ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj in al-Farida al-gha‘iba (n.pl., 1402/1982, pp. 7–8, English translation, Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar, Ottawa [?], n.d.), pp. 8–10. The idea of...
Khomeini as a precursor to the return of the Twelfth Imam is evidently held by some in Iran; e.g., the author of the wall slogan I saw in Tehran in 1984, “O God, O God, protect Khomeni until the revolution of the Mahdi” and the article, “Who will be the next president of Iran?” in the *Tehran Times*, Sept. 14, 1981, 1–2.

Is There ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ in Indonesia Now?” mimeographed copy of article prepared for *The New Internationalist*. One of the best known policies of the Nahdatul Ulama, their holding to the four madhahib over against groups such as the Muhammadiyya, marks them as (neo-)traditionalist.

See note 85, above. Hassan Hanafi states that some of these groups rejected the use of radio and television and practiced traditional rather than modern medicine (*al-Haraka al-Islamiyya*, part 2, *al-Wadan*, November 20, 1982, page numbers, etc., not available to me).

Though many of the leading Ulama today might better be described as modernist. The fatwa of the sheikh of the Azhar against *al-Farida al-gha’iba* claims that Islam teaches that “the nation is the source of authority” (*al-Fatawa al-Islamiyya min Dar al-Ifsa’ al-Misriyya*, 10, 31 [Cairo, 1404/1983], p. 3750), almost a secularist position. On the other hand, the argument that a ruler should be considered a Muslim, and thus not the object of jihad, if he does no more than perform Salat, even if he does not rule by the Shari’a (ibid., pp. 3744), has an adaptationist traditionalist flavor.


*Nasr’s* discussion of “secularism” as “all that is, from the human point of view, non-sacred or non-divine” (*Islamic Life and Thought*, p. 8) seems to me a bit more in line with traditional Islamic thinking than most definitions of secularism. Note also his attack on progress as a “false idol” (ibid., p. 27), his willingness to accept the traditional limitation of the Shari’a to the area of “personal law” (pp. 27–29), his concern for the full “intellectual and spiritual riches” of Islam (p. 32), and his concern that Islam be the judge of “the times” and not vice-versa while at the same time desiring that the traditional truths of Islam be translated into contemporary language and urging that Muslims must know the West well, not just at second hand (p. 32). Cf. note 83 above. On Lings, see note 80.


They are, I think, more likely than others to appreciate the moral commitment that is a condition of modern science and technology and that underlies secular ideologies; e.g., Taha Hussein, *Future of Culture*, p. 21.

E.g., Taha Hussein’s oft-quoted statement about “literally and forthrightly doing everything” the Europeans do, quoted in note 17 above.

One finds these things in Ahmad Amin’s popular series on Islamic cultural history, *Fajr al-Islam* (Cairo, 1929 and later editions), *Duha al-Islam*, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1933–1936 and later editions), *Zuhr al-Islam*, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1944–1955, and later editions). Such writing has undoubtedly contributed to the considerable amount of secularist opinion in educated circles in Egypt.

See, e.g., Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 206–7. Other examples, at least as relevant, would be the major changes in Judaism involved in the transition from ancient to “Rabbinic” Judaism and in modern times from this to either Reform Judaism or Zionism. Whether Islam has ever undergone such a shift in its basic symbol system may be doubted.


According to Kenneth Cragg, writing in 1955, ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq’s view was a “now largely accepted reinterpretation of the Caliphate” (Richard N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West* [The Hague: Mouton, 1957], p. 158). This may be so in many circles, but I am not aware of any serious public discussion that has led to it.

One who does recognize it, at least in the area of intellectual endeavor, and who may perhaps be located somewhere between modernism and radical Islamism on the scale, is Ziauddin Sardar. See “Is There an Islamic Resurgence?” *Afkar International*, 1, 1 (June 1984), 35–39, and “Reconstructing the Muslim Civilization,” *Inquiry*, 1, 6 (November 1984), 39–44.
That the doctrine of vilayat-i faqih is new has been recognized by more than one scholar, e.g., Said Amir Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Iran," in S. A. Arjomand, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (London: Macmillan, 1984), 222–23.

Iran is of course crucial here, but its war with Iraq and international ostracism tend to keep it in an “oppositional” mode.

See, for example, the story reported by Anderson in Law Reform, p. 75; also Schacht’s comments in “Problems in Modern Islamic Legislation,” in R. H. Nolte, ed., The Modern Middle East (New York: Atherton, 1963), ch. 11, esp. pp. 190–91, 199.

Azzam, for example, equates dhimma with “modern citizenship” in The Eternal Message, p. 124, but never mentions the “verse of the sword” that relates to the people of the Book (Qur’an 9:29).