Questions – Week #13

1. Please review Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts, with the concluding chapter 9.  And then be ready to discuss whether neo-liberal economic reforms really do require a tougher state to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of the reforms against publics that may feel victimized by the reforms.  What did you think of Timothy Mitchell's discussion of Egyptian neoliberal reform in the countryside. Did it require shedding the state's "soft" image for a tougher one to protect the interests of the landowners?  What are the possible alternatives?
2. Whether emanating from civil society or controlled by the state, interests are assumed to become ever more demanding and complex as societies evolve in the contemporary world. Political scientists have transferred Italian, Portuguese, and/or East European "corporatism" to Nasser's Egypt, Turkey on occasion, and other Middle Eastern states. But how far can these conceptual transplants legitimately travel? Note the earlier discussion of “corporatism” in your Ayubi readings (Ayubi pp. 216ff and 240 ff). 
3. What are the implications of Cammett’s analysis of the Moroccan textile industry for the articulation of economic interests and more generally for political change in Morocco?   
4. How, more generally, are the political and economic forces associated with “globalization” affecting prospects for democracy in the region?  What about the evident "deliberalization" of Egypt in the 1990s?  Was it due to international pressures for economic adjustment (breaking that implicit contract to meet welfare commitments), as Kienle suggests? What other reasons might explain deliberalization? Why, in particular, did the Egyptian authorities change its strategy in 1992, noted by El-Ghobashy (IJMES 37:3 (August 2005), for handling the Islamist opposition?
5. Can institutional arrangements, as suggested by Ellen Lust-Okar, keep oppositions divided and the mainstream oppositions more amenable to continued authoritarian rule? How, in particular, does Egypt fit her framework? And what about Turkey, which she does not mention?
6. Is it possible that Al Qaeda and kindred jihadist movements are acquiring the greatest audiences among Muslim minorities, especially in Europe? What connections, if any, remain between these jihadist variants of Islamism and nationalist contestation against colonial occupation? Can Qaeda in the new contexts, whether in Europe or in postcolonial states, even define, much less develop a practical strategy to implement the shared goal?
7. Does the surge in oil revenues significantly reduce pressures on the oil-rich regimes to engage in economic reform? Can regimes with sufficient resources to meet their implicit welfare commitments continue to minimize political reform and investments in political infrastructure? How would you advise the GCC regimes to proceed?