Henri Lauzière

POST-ISLAMISM AND THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE OF 'ABD AL-SALAM YASIN

For more than a decade, post-Islamism has been at the center of a major debate in French academia regarding the historical evolution of Islamism. The concept was put forth in the early 1990s as an attempt to apprehend the apparent crisis within many Islamic movements of the Middle East. In Iran, the increasingly authoritarian character of the Islamic republic, as well as the predominance of the mullahs’ discretionary powers, seemed to undermine the credibility of the Islamist alternative. Elsewhere, as in Egypt and Algeria, the advent of an Islamic order never came to pass and appeared illusory. Islamists were unable to cope with the repression and the containment policies of secular states. Therefore, a number of French scholars argued that Islamism—that is, the holistic, populist, and often revolutionary ideology whose goal is the establishment of an Islamic state and the governance of all aspects of society according to Islamic principles—had reached a dead end. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi were passé. An era of post-Islamism was dawning.¹

Initial articulations of this argument posited that Islamism was shifting toward practical and ideological compromises vis-à-vis politics. This idea remains the cornerstone of recent theoretical developments, which isolated a series of independent features for defining post-Islamism and its manifestations.² First, post-Islamists may remain politically active but have more modest agendas than their predecessors: “Today, Islamists everywhere evolve into Islamo-nationalist movements (Turkish Refah, Palestinian Hamas, Algerian FIS) for which the umma becomes a slogan for internal use.”³ Second, post-Islamists are creating a de facto secular space by re-routing religious activism away from the state and, sometimes, from political issues altogether. The reemergence of Sufi brotherhoods and Salafi neofundamentalist movements is thus considered symptomatic of post-Islamism. While the former promote quietist mysticism, the latter focus on individual orthopraxy and often tend to eschew the political sphere. Groups calling for the implementation of the shari’a are increasingly unwilling to take political responsibilities and prefer to leave the task to current regimes. Third, post-Islamism implies theological and philosophical reformulations. Coping with the intellectual failure of political Islam, some thinkers articulated secular or apolitical positions. Examples of post-Islamist thought range from the hermeneutics of Abdolkarim Soroush, who disputes...
the doctrinal rigidity of the Shi’i establishment in Iran, so the Syrian-based ‘ālien Sa’īd Ramadan al-Buti, who emphasizes Islamic spirituality and ethics.4

For the student of contemporary Morocco, post-Islamist theory is simultaneously intriguing and perplexing. Prima facie, it could explain multiple recent phenomena, including the advent of the moderate Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and the unprecedented visibility of the Buthshishiyaa Sufi order. Yet the theory is still lacking in evidence. The notion of post-Islamist thought is particularly embryonic. According to Olivier Roy’s own avowal, it is the least substantiated aspect of post-Islamist theory.5

This paper proposes to examine the concept’s validity by using the religious discourse of the Moroccan Islamist ‘Abd al-Salam Yasin as a case study. Indeed, several markers of post-Islamist thought—such as the significance of spirituality and ethics—are highly suggestive of Yasin’s ideas.

For the past thirty years, ‘Abd al-Salam Yasin has been one of the major Islamic activists and intellectuals of his country. In addition to being Supreme Guide of al-‘Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Beneficence)—an illegal yet tolerated movement that aims at the re-Islamization of society—he is also a prolific writer. Since 1972, he has published nearly thirty books in addition to several articles. Although political, social, and economic issues are prominent in his corpus, they should not distract analysis from the equally abundant spiritual content. Post-Islamist theory provides an opportunity to delve into the specifically religious and nonpolitical aspects of Yasin’s thought, which historians and social scientists have often neglected.6 The theoreticians of post-Islamism themselves have overlooked the apparent congruence between Yasin’s discourse and the concept of post-Islamist thought.

Superficial congruence, however, requires verification. What exactly does Yasin’s religious discourse consist of, and how is it novel? Is the action of post-Islamist thought capable of conveying its specificity? This paper will show that a detailed analysis of Yasin’s discourse fails to validate post-Islamism; instead, it unsets some of the theory’s weaknesses and provides clues to solve them. Since the term “post-Islamist” cannot adequately make sense of Yasin’s nonpolitical ideas, this paper will argue that “post-Salafism” is a more appropriate and meaningful category. From a strictly religious viewpoint, Yasin’s discourse is distinctive by transcending the broad Salafi epistemology that exalts exegetical scripturalism and formal instruction (ta’līm) at the expense of mysticism and spiritual guidance (tarbiya). Unlike the notion of post-Islamist thought, post-Salamism does not depend on the prior failure of political Islam; nor does it focus on political attitudes and ideas. Instead, it indicates changes in the dominant Salafi-oriented approach to Islam that characterizes most Sunni Islamists and many alleged post-Islamists.

**Rehabilitating Mysticism**

Post-Islamist theory hinges on a historical narrative. It assumes a chronological sequence in which Islamism rose, failed, and critically needed to reconsider its political, social, and intellectual nature. According to this scenario, the 1970s were the prime of Islamism. During that decade, the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical offshoots gained ground in Egypt following the defeat of Nasserism. In Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq toppled the socialist regime of ‘Ali Bhutto in 1977 and allowed the political ascent of al-Mawdudi, his disciples, and his ideas. The decade culminated in Iran with the resounding victory of the Islamic Revolution over the Shah’s regime in 1979. The gradual passage to post-Islamism occurred only later, after political disillusionment began in Iran in the mid-1980s and intensified with the global debacle of Islamism throughout the 1990s.7 Consequently, the failure of political Islam would have triggered the formulation of substitute discourses revolving around spirituality.

This narrative not only distinguishes Islamism from post-Islamism in time; it also reveals what factual information has been used to characterize both categories. Based primarily on data from Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan during the 1970s, the first part of the narrative is somewhat selective. It disregards the historical conditions that forged Islamism in countries such as Morocco, for which less scholarly research is available. As a result, it assumes that Islamism boomed systematically in reaction to the bankruptcy of secular nationalist regimes that had weak religious legitimacy. Those who filled the void in the name of religion were Islamists influenced by Qutb, Khomeini, and al-Mawdudi: they boldly called for an Islamic state, privileged a political reading of the Qur’an, and had little or no spiritual objectives per se. Such a narrative is acceptable insofar as it conveniently summarizes the upsurge of Islamism in core Middle Eastern countries and in Pakistan. The proponents of post-Islamism, however, use this portrayal of the 1970s as a historical and intellectual archetype, which then becomes a yardstick for identifying later signs of post-Islamism everywhere, from Istanbul to the suburbs of Paris. Such a methodology is too inductive to be taken at face value. Different historical conditions shaped different approaches to Islamism. Indeed, post-Islamist theory is unable to account for the fact that spirituality has been central to ‘Abd al-Salam Yasin’s discourse since 1972—that is, well before the alleged failure of political Islam.

**The Moroccan Context**

The logical explanation for this theoretical anomaly is that the political and religious landscape of Morocco in the early 1970s did not fully correspond to the Egyptian, Iranian, or Pakistani paradigms. Although Yasin responded to the successes and tribulations of Islamism abroad, he developed his ideas in a unique local context. At the time, Moroccan Islamists faced religious competition. On the one hand, the monarchy had deep Islamic foundations. King Hassan II asserted his sharifian origins and his pre-eminence as Commander of the Faithful (amīr al-mu’minīn). On the other hand, one of the regime’s major political challengers—the nationalist Istiqāli party—already used an Islamic idiom to articulate some of its grievances. From its inception in the 1930s, Moroccan nationalism had been tied to the Salafīyya. ‘Alīl al-Fasi (d. 1974), who headed the Istiqāli from 1956 until his death, was an Islamic modernist à la Muhammad ‘Abduh 8

This situation contributed to making the rise of Islamism much less exuberant in Morocco than it was in Egypt, Iran, or Pakistan. During the 1970s, Moroccan Islamists were generally fragmented and restrained.9 The advocates of the nationalist Salafīyya within the Istiqāli faced similar difficulties. Their old message of Islamic reform hardly answered the problems of independent Morocco, especially its socio-economic and political inequalities. By 1959, the Istiqāli had split, spawning an important new oppositional current based on secular socialism. Such ideological divisions benefited the
monarch, who elevated himself above rivalries and consolidated his power. Nationalist Salafis and Islamists shared religion as a vehicle for oppositional politics, yet none of them appeared capable of fostering any real change within Moroccan society. In this context, Yasín's interest for mysticism had a tactical value.

Indeed, nationalist Salafis and Islamists were restricted by a common epistemological stance: they both neglected spiritual devotion and mystical fulfillment, which were still central to the Moroccan masses' religious life. The nationalistic Salafiyya was a scriptural and elitist reform movement that tended to belittle the popular mystical dimension of Islam. While older Moroccan Salafis such as Abu Shu'ayb al-Dukkakí (d. 1937) had been open to consensus, their younger disciples were not. The anti-colonial struggle required a Fasi to assert that Islam was inherently rational, progressive, and conducive to modernity. Therefore, he repeatedly claimed that Sufism had obscured the true nature of Islam, which was found in the Qur'an, the hadith, and the practice of the pious ancestors (salaq). He also condemned Sufi brotherhoods for their collaboration with French imperialism. Upon independence, Sufism was a marginal form of religiosity among the nationalist Moroccan elites.

Similarly, the most prominent Islamist organization of the early 1970s, al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Youth), ignored mysticism. In keeping with the dominant intellectual Islamist current of the period, al-Shabiba abided by a Salafi epistemology. The organization followed the doctrines and the exegesis of Sayyid Qutb, which had wide political implications but provided no real spiritual solace. By connecting mystical elements to Islamism, 'Abd al-Salam Yasín could aspire to transcend this hegemonic Salafi epistemology and reach out for the Sufi sensibilities of Moroccan masses. This is not to say that Yasín's approach was strictly a tool of self-promotion. While the re-appropriation of mystical elements certainly corresponded to his personal religious beliefs, it also allowed him to lay the foundations for a more comprehensive, uniting, and mobilizing approach to Islamism in Morocco.

Yasin was fully aware of the potency of mysticism because it had been a determining experience in his life. Born in 1928, Yasín is the son of a Berber fellah and allegedly comes from a poor family. He started to recite the Qur'an at an early age and studied in a private elementary school in Marrakech. At fifteen, Yasín entered the Bin Yusuf Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, where he studied for four years. In 1947, he moved to Rabat to attend a pedagogical school for teachers, and he began a long career in education, mainly as an Arabic teacher, the following year. In 1955, Yasín successfully passed a national examination to become an education inspector and took up this new line of work in a primary school in Casablanca. During the following years, he moved frequently between Beni Mellal, Marrakech, and Casablanca to occupy higher managerial positions in the primary and secondary school system. Around 1967, however, illness prevented him from pursuing his career. This hitch coincided with a mid-life crisis that manifested itself through spiritual anguish. Approaching the age of forty, Yasín suddenly became preoccupied with existential questions regarding Islam and the meaning of human life.

Searching for answers, he was drawn to a Sufi master—al-Hajj al-'Abbas ibn al-Mukhtar al-Qdtí—who headed the Butshiyya order. Yasín found in him and in Sufism the guidance and spiritual fulfillment he had been looking for. He affirms that al-Hajj al-'Abbas liberated him from his ignorant, inherited understanding of Islam (al-Islām al-mawritah al-maqḥid). Yasín remained closely associated with the leader of the Butshiyya until al-Hajj al-'Abbas died in 1972. At that point, Yasín disagreed with Hamza—the son and successor of al-Hajj al-'Abbas—with respect to the orientation that the Sufi order should adopt. While Hamza was faithful to the quietist tradition of the Butshiyya, Yasín wanted the order to move toward greater activism in the public arena.

Therefore, Yasín left the Butshiyya in 1972 and began a life of social involvement as an Islamist intellectual. He founded no organization until the following decade and so devoted all his energies to writing. With respect to politics and economics, Yasín's discourse is often commonplace and recapitulates ideas that Qutb and al-Mawdūdī previously addressed. What truly distinguishes him is his religious discourse, which remained permeated with mystical elements, despite his conversion to Islamism. By the 1970s, the ideas of Qutb and al-Mawdūdī enjoyed unprecedented popularity and authority among Islamists but were almost exclusively concerned with temporal issues. Yasín disputed this limitation and believed that the religious dimension of Islam should address spiritual matters, as well. Yasín's mystical inclination, however, did not result from disillusionment vis-à-vis politics, as post-Islamist theory suggests, nor did it chronologically follow the alleged failure of political Islam. On the contrary, from the early 1970s onward, Yasín viewed mysticism as essential for the success of Islamism in Morocco and throughout the Muslim world.

Main Spiritual Concepts

Yasin justifies his post-Salafi discourse in terms of medical analogies. According to him, the contemporary umma suffers from a disease: its body is ailing because its spirit is sick. Muslims have lost their spiritual bond by growing too enamored with this world (dunya) and becoming averse to death. Thus, Yasín argues that Islamists like himself must put forth a religious medication that corresponds to this diagnosis. The appropriate remedy, he claims, is spiritual guidance (al-arba'īya al-rāḥîyya). For him, Islamic fervor requires a mystical knowledge ('ilm ladam) that reason alone fails to grasp. Although he acknowledges the intellectual exertions of Muhammad 'Abduh, he draws inspiration from the theosophy of Sufi teachers such as the Moroccan shaykh, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dabbagh (d. 1719). Indeed, Yasín's literary production is replete with concepts that have Sufi overtones. Three of them are particularly recurrent: suḥba (spiritual companionship), dihr (remembrance), and ḵisān (beneficence). From the onset, companionship and remembrance have been prominent subject matters in his corpus, especially in the first two books he published in 1972 and 1973. Both concepts imply what Annemarie Schimmel calls mysticism of personality—that is, the cultivation of love relations between God and individual believers.

The term suḥba usually refers to the interaction between the members of a Sufi order and the shaykh who guides them. For Yasín, it remains a form of spiritual tutelage between two or more individuals but is no longer confined to Sufi orders. Thus, suḥba means seeking the company and the positive influence of believing Muslims who may serve as guides or role models. Yasín argues that sound companionship is the necessary condition for creating an environment that is conducive to spiritual progress. In some cases, suḥba may entail sacrifices, such as the departure (ḥijra) from a familiar but
in this world (dunya) and to prepare souls for salvation in the hereafter (akhira). Thus, ishaan is a way of being, thinking, and acting that translates a love for God and his creation. Examples include fighting one's ego, providing money for the poor, and even protecting the ecosystem.

The notion of ishaan implies a framework of mystical gradation that is typical of Sufism. Yasin does not deny the succession of stages and the relevance of guided imitation.

Islam is ascension. Islam is not a stationary state. The first step is that of the practicing Muslim who makes sure to fulfill the duties that the law prescribes to him and to all Muslims. The second step is that of imam (faith); a high step where adoration and moral rectitude are on a par. The third degree is ishaan, which is the starting point and the infinite space of the great spiritual journey. In the latter's utmost stage, a spiritual guide is necessary because the trip is long and full of difficulties.

Undoubtedly, the concepts that Yasin borrowed from Sufism proved useful when he decided to found his first Islamic association in 1981, Jama'a al-Usra, which transformed into al-'Adi wa-l-Ihsan in 1987. Indeed, companionship, remembrance, and beneficence provided him with a basic structural, ritual, and disciplinary framework. It should be noted that references to Sufism also endowed Yasin with a certain political authority (wilayat). In Morocco, the model of the Sunni Muslim saint as an active religious-cum-political figure dates from the mid-15th century. There is a long history of pre-modern Moroccon Sufis partaking in socio-political life and reminding the sultans of their duty on behalf of the population.

In a way, Yasin can be viewed as a continuation of this tradition. In a famous open letter he sent to King Hassan II in 1974, which was titled "Isham or the Deluge," Yasin claimed a moral and spiritual ascendance. He admonished the king to repent, to return to God, and to follow a straight path for his own sake and for the good of his community.

Seeking Acknowledgment and Consensus

Yasin's rehabilitation of mystical elements clashed with the fundamentals of Salafi epistemology. In Morocco, his theosophical ideas have been subjected to sharp criticism by Wahhab-inspired Salafis and by fellow Islamists whose religious philosophy derives from Salafi principles. In 1983, the movement al-Islah wa-l-Taqfird (Reform and Renewal), a splinter group of al-Shibaa al-Islamiyya, published a short document attacking the Sufi inclination of Yasin's thought. According to this group, Yasin unscrupulously relied on weak (da'ila) hadiths and Sufi lore, which led him to overemphasize dhikr and to distort Muslims from the Qur'an. In a typical Salafi fashion, the document invokes the intellectual authority of Ibn Taymiyya to condemn the mystical dimension of Yasin's religious discourse.

It is true that Yasin's initial publications naively referred to controversial Sufis and their vocabulary. In his first book, for instance, Yasin devoted an entire section to the praiseworthy science of Muslim "saints" (awliya) and even mentioned Ibn 'Arabi (d. 1240)—among the proponents of Salafi epistemology despise and typically accuse of existential moralism—as a source of wisdom. Such references were too marginal within Islamist circles to escape criticism. In his subsequent books, Yasin tried to remove such obvious sources of discredit. He virtually abandoned the notion of saint and no longer
referred to Ibn 'Arabi. By 1980, he had considerably reduced his allusions to the most esoteric or supernumeral issues. In *L’Islam à l’heure de la révolution*, for instance, one finds only a lone reference to dream interpretation as a means of spiritual guidance. Dreams, Yasin argued, may serve to indicate spiritual maturity; at a higher stage of *iḥān*, a Muslim is likely to have explicit visions of the Prophet. Trying to avoid controversy, however, was insufficient to secure the religious legitimacy of an eclectic combination between mysticism and Islamism. In the 1980s, Yasin faced a dilemma: to defend the validity of his unusual approach or to cave in to his detractors and abandon the mystical elements of his discourse. He chose the former option and attempted to prove his critics wrong. To transcend the dominant Salafi epistemology, he had no choice but to demonstrate that certain spiritual matters, though often rejected out of hand as being “Sufi,” were indeed compliant with scriptural orthodoxy. Through this plea, Yasin endeavored to gain recognition from other Islamic activists and, ultimately, to foster a truly consensual discourse. In a book originally written around 1989, he seeks the indirect approval of reputable Muslim scholars, but they dead or alive. One of his main points is to show that mysticism was inherent to the religious worldview of great medieval Muslims.

For this purpose, he distinguishes between orthodox “Salafi” Sufism (al-taṣawwuf al-salafi) and “philosophical” Sufism (al-taṣawwuf al-falsafī). Salafi Sufism is presented as a shari’a-abiding type of mysticism that is also concerned with the welfare of hearts and souls. Some prominent representatives were ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya order, and Ahmad al-Rifa‘i (d. 1182). Philosophical Sufism, in turn, designates a gnosis whose origins, according to Yasin, are found in neo-Platonism. He accuses this type of mysticism of being antinomian, tainted by foreign ideas, and suffused by spiritual ecstasies of divine infusion and union (al-ḥulūli wa-l-ittihād). These charges tacitly refer to the mysticist of al-Hallaj (d. 922) and Ibn ’Arabi. Without further elaboration, Yasin dismisses philosophical Sufism as non-Islamic. Rather, he wants to emphasize Salafi Sufism and its significance.

Yasin affirms that some of the most eminent Muslim scholars of the medieval period were not mere ulamas, but also jurists of guidance (ṣajda al-tariqya) and spiritual doctors who could cure hearts (ṭabib al-qalb). Judging by his extensive, though selective, quoting, the “doctors of the hearts” are numerous and come from all Sunni legal schools (madhābīn). Yasin wishes to underline that such scholars’ spiritual growth was as significant as scripturalism and legal sciences. The Malikī jurist al-Shābī (d. 1388), for example, wrote passages in which he admitted the validity and ethical benefits of orthodox Sufism. Sūrūd Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1200), the Hanbali author of *Talbis iblis* (*The Devil’s Delusion*) — a book that the proponents of the Salafi epistemology often hail as the utmost denunciation of Sufism. While al-Jawzi condemned certain practices such as dancing (raqs) and liturgical concerts (*samā‘*), he considered that dry asceticism was insufficient to fulfill inner longings and that only a sober form of mysticism could appease one’s heart. As for the Shafi‘i scholar Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505), he sought spiritual guidance from the masters of the Shadhiliyya order after completing his formal religious studies.

To be sure, Yasin’s favorite model is al-Ghazali (d. 1111), whom he recognizes as the archetypal anizer of Sufism and traditional Islamic knowledge (*iḥān*). Yasin is prone to identify himself with his intellectual muse, especially since they have in common a mid-life spiritual crisis that led them to embrace mysticism. Al-Ghazali, however, is not the most authoritative or inspirational figure among contemporary Islamists. Therefore, Yasin endeavors to unveil evidence of mystical affinities in the writings of the most zealous Hanbali scholars — such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) — to whom his Salafi-oriented detractors are indebted. Using specific quotations, Yasin argues that both scholars respected the ethos of orthodox mysticism, even though they disliked the word “sufism.” Ibn Taymiyya did not believe that Sufis were blameworthy; instead, he wrote that Sufis were liable to error, just like any other Muslim seeking truth. As for Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, he declared that orthodox Sufism was among the noblest of Islamic sciences, second only to the theology of God’s unity (ʿilm al-tawḥīd).

Yasin contends that today’s advocates of the Salafi epistemology, which include Islamists and Wahhabi-inspired Salafis, are misreading their sources. As a result, they cast undue discredit on Sufism and deprive the anna of much needed spiritual guidance. To buttress this delicate argument, Yasin invokes a contemporary *ʿālim* who shares his point of view. This scholar is Su‘ad Ramadan al-Buti, who, according to Olivier Roy, exemplifies the concept of post-Islamist thought. Like Yasin, al-Buti challenges the standard Salafi reading of Ibn Taymiyya, whom he refuses to portray as an enemy of Sufism. Al-Buti is different, however, in that he enjoys widespread popularity as a television preacher and benefits from a solid reputation as a graduate of al-Azhar and as a professor in the faculty of Islamic law at the University of Damascus. By referring to al-Buti, Yasin is able to compensate for his own lack of formal academic credentials while lending credibility to his religious discourse.

This rhetoric, however, is a double-edged sword. Since Yasin aims to transcend the Salafi distrut vis-à-vis Sufism, he ipso facto confronts a new problem. Indeed, he cannot accept one of the logical conclusions of his own argument, which would be to invite contemporary Muslims to join orthodox Sufi orders or to seek the guidance of an orthodox Sufi shaykh. Yasin does not wish to rehabilitate Sufis as religious competitors but does not want to acknowledge Sufism as an alternative to political Islam. His intention remains to foster a credible, uniting, and eclectic Islamist ideology that can appeal to as many Muslims as possible. Therefore, Yasin finds himself in an awkward position. While attempting to rehabilitate a certain form of Sufism, he must simultaneously struggle to dissociate himself from it. He readily proclaims that orthodox Sufism is not a proper Islamic meditation: “I do not propagate Sufism. I like neither the noun nor the form [its practice takes] because I cannot find them in the book of God or the sunna of the Prophet.” Instead, Yasin contends that orthodox Sufis are relevant only inssofar as they hold the key to *iḥān* and preserve the means of spiritual guidance. However, nothing good can be expected from them because they are disengaged from socio-political life and cannot escape their solitary contemplation even when injustice is omnipresent. Although Yasin admits he owes everything to his Sufi masters, he argues that criticizing them for their quietism is an essential part of the contemporary Islamic renewal. Thus, he uses the adjective “Sufi” only to describe his past convictions (ṣawābiq).

Despite such ambiguities — or perhaps because of them — it appears that Yasin’s partial rehabilitation of mysticism was rewarding. It provided him with a distinct yet inclusive religious ideology that eventually contributed to turning al-ʿAṣl wa-l-Ihsan into one of the most popular Islamist organizations in Morocco. Though unusual, Yasin’s religious
should observe in their daily life. To be sure, these two types of re-Islamization occur outside the political arena, yet they entail two very different articulations of Islam and imply different modes of religious education and intellectual work. The label “post-Islamist” is incapable of conveying such distinctions.

The Prophetic Method

Yasin’s intellectual strategy of re-Islamization is complex and multi-layered. To understand its particularities, it is necessary to specify Yasin’s religious standpoint. Because of his eclectic convictions and ambitions, he is difficult to categorize. Technically, he is not merely a Sufi, as one historian has contended. Nor is he a typical Salafi, as another author recently suggested. Rather, he is an Islamist who strives to merge two religious styles in an attempt to walk the surest path between the mystical and the legal dimensions of Islam—that is, between the tarîqa and the shari‘a. This third way is what Yasin calls the prophetic method (al-minhâj al-nabawi). It proceeds from the assumption that one must combine Sufi spirituality and Salafi legalism to revive Islam and to respond to the problems of the contemporary umma. According to Yasin, Muslims must return to the comprehensive religious epistemology of the Prophet. While Muhammad interpreted and applied God’s laws, he simultaneously cultivated his people’s spirituality. Today, however, Yasin laments, the two aspects no longer intersect: Salafi legalism focuses only on the external aspect of human existence (zîhur), while Sufi spirituality emphasizes only the Muslims’ inner soul (batîn).

The prophetic method is a religious stance but also an Islamist blueprint for action. Yasin mentions that the word “minhâj” refers simultaneously to a path and the way one should walk it. To illustrate his thought, he singles out a passage from the Sura al-Balad (The Land): “Have we not appointed to him (man) two eyes, and a tongue, and two lips, and guided him on the two highways? Yet he has not assaulted the steep.” While the two highways represent good and evil, the steep represents the challenge of human life. For Yasin, it implies a constant struggle against gravity or, metaphorically, against the various temptations of hedonism and egoism. The minhâj is an ascending path that requires effort and dedication. Assisting the steep means that Muslims must act to improve their vertical relationship with God as well as their horizontal relationships with fellow human beings.

Yasin’s own religious discourse is one means of implementing the prophetic method. His writings often serve as a tool of re-Islamization insofar as they provide guidance for readers who wish to improve their vertical relationship with God. Indeed, like a majority of Islamist intellectuals, Yasin considers that religious renewal (tajdîd) and proselytism (da‘wa) are essential for addressing the problems of Muslim society. Yet his eclectic convictions confront him with the burden of renewing both the inner and the outer aspects of Islamic life. As might be expected, Yasin chooses to concentrate on what he deems more important or urgent. Here he differs from most proponents of the Salafi epistemology in that he emphasizes faith (imân) rather than doctrine or jurisprudence:

It is said in the tradition that faith is maintained by the tongue, belief by the soul (which is the heart), and practice by the pillars of Islam. Yet faith originates from the heart and resides there. So if the impulses of the faith are staggering in one’s heart, practice becomes invalid and the
tongue speaks hypocrisy. In turn, whenever faith becomes stronger in one’s heart, the impulses of practice are reinforced. Therefore, the renewal that the sunna requires is the renewal of its faith’s impulses.56

This reference to the primacy of faith summarizes Yasin’s strategy of re-Islamization. In theory, his prophetic method implies that legalism and spirituality are equally significant for ensuring the revitalization of the sunna. In practice, however, Yasin readily admits that his priority is to renew faith, as though to compensate for the lacunas of the Salafi-inspired agenda that most Sunni Islamists and many alleged post-Islamists share. As a tool of re-Islamization, Yasin’s nonpolitical discourse tends to privilege spiritual guidance for the heart (tariqah) over formal religious instruction (a’dah). Therefore, he transcends—and sometimes outflanks—the Salafi-oriented methods of re-Islamization that revolve around pragmatic exegesis, legal methodology, and legal prescriptions.

An Epistemological and Spiritual da’wa

Islamist intellectuals, be they politically moderate or radical, insist that the Qur’an and the sunna can yield superior alternatives to the ideas and institutions of modernity. This scripturalist assumption, which is a legacy of the modernist Salafiyah, has led them to scrutinize the formative texts of Islam to find pragmatic solutions to the social, political, and economic problems of their community.57 Perhaps the most representative example of this Salafi-inspired type of intellectual activism is Sayyid Qutb’s seminal exegesis (tafsir) titled Fi silt al-Qur’an. In it, Qutb set the scene for a very pragmatic and this-worldly analysis of the scriptures. His goal was not to renew faith per se, but to demonstrate the immediate applicability of the Qur’an in the fields of politics, social justice, and religious praxis.58 To be sure, Islamist intellectuals acknowledge that action requires firm belief. However, most of them—including Kharshid Ahmad, Hasan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannushi, and many others—prefer to teach their readers what to believe and what concrete reforms to implement. Few embark on the abstract task of teaching their readers how to cultivate a deep and sincere faith. This option is indeed less congruent with the Salafi epistemology that tends to disregard mysticism. Therefore, most Islamists have been prone to limit their intellectual exertions to outer rather than inner reforms and to initiate the concrete re-Islamization of institutions, policies, creed, and behaviors.

Yasin applauds and, to a certain extent, emulates such pragmatic exegesis. Yet, as a post-Salafi intellectual, he refuses to treat faith as a residual question. Indeed, he has always been prompt to defend spirituality against materialist and atheist worldviews—especially Marxism—Leninism—because he embraced Islamism during a period of unprecedented leftist effervescence among the elite and the educated youth of Morocco.59 However, his most elaborate strategy of spiritual proselytism dates from the 1990s, when he encountered postmodern literature and the critiques of the scientific method. In such works, Yasin found new intellectual ammunition to attack all Western philosophies based on secular rationalism. In his 1998 book Islamiser la modernité, he undertakes what can be called an epistemological and spiritual da’wa, in which he attempts to debunk the rational assumptions that have characterized philosophical modernity since the Enlightenment. His intention is not merely to assert the superiority of Islam or to criticize its detractors, as other Islamists have done. Instead, he wishes to liberate the advocates of modernity from their epistemological limitations while opening their hearts to spirituality and Islam.60

Yasin begins his epistemological da’wa by denying modernity any quintessential value. In the wake of postmodern thinkers, he claims that its underpinning system of thought is a constructed reality—that is, a “Western-engineered building.”61 According to him, the philosophical foundations of modernity, including its rational–scientific axioms, are frail man-made myths; they may enjoy an aura of truth, but they are illusory assumptions of knowledge. Therefore, Yasin engages some of modernity’s engineers, such as Descartes, Comte, Marx, and Freud. Questioning the epistemological foundations of their thought is critical, Yasin claims, because the normative power of ideas is the most dangerous and insidious weapon in the arsenal of modernity.62

Yasin views Darwinism as the main obstacle to faith and spirituality because it elevated a “bestial postulate” to the status of dogmatic truth. As a result, philosophical modernity assumes that human beings are merely a higher form of animal life resulting from a slow evolutionary process. According to Yasin, this bestial postulate implies a series of blind rejections: there exists no creator, no God, and no hereafter. The Darwinist mythology, as he calls it, strips life of its essential meaning and is tantamount to spiritual murder.63 Yasin affirms that such rationalist secular ideas keep human beings away from the message of Islam and from Ihsan. In other words, modernity turns men and women into hostages of nihilism and leads them to spiritual chaos, sadness, and anomic. Clearly, Yasin’s epistemological da’wa stems from his conviction that the advocates of philosophical modernity will reject a standard call to Islam as long as they maintain their current epistemological assumptions; rather, they will continue to seek truth in the material world and to discard anything that is not scientifically measurable. Yasin admits that the bestial postulate is difficult to counter because it is rooted in a powerful dogmatic positivism that rejects metaphysical discussions.64

Consequently, he tries to oppose Darwinism—and, by the same token, all of philosophical modernity—by challenging the sanctification of positivism and rational secularism. For that purpose, he resorts to critical figures in the Western sociology of knowledge, such as the Austrian-born philosopher and scientist Karl Popper, the Belgian Nobel Prize–winner Ilya Prigogine, and the French sociologist and philosopher Edgard Morin. Yasin invokes these scholars because they themselves expose, to a certain extent, the social construction of modern epistemology and some of its limitations. Popper, for instance, is known as the main proponent of the theory of falsification, which he articulated in response to the dominant logical positivism of the 1930s. His basic argument is that empirical evidence cannot verify a scientific theory; it can only falsify or disprove it. Thus, Popper questioned the validity of scientific knowledge and the methods used to reach it. His argument implies that all scientific theories are speculations whose veracity is logically impossible to establish.65

By questioning modernity’s dogmatic assumptions through Popper and others, Yasin wants to instill some sense of uncertainty in his readers. If the scientific method is not truly reliable, or if human rationality proves unable to provide definitive truths, then the entire edifice of modern knowledge may appear unstable. As a corollary, Yasin wants to legitimize irrationality and faith: “[t]he incoherence and limitations of those [modern thinkers] who reflect upon complex matters come from their confinement to rationality.
Yet questioning the epistemological value of modern knowledge is, in itself, a promising opening. Yasin uses this epistemological breach to reintroduce existential questions concerning the raison d'être of the universe and the meaning of life.

At this point, however, Yasin abandons the Western thinkers who have helped him to shake the foundations of the Western-engineered building. He argues that such scholars lead to a dead end; they can expose the epistemological myths of modernity, but the anti-spiritual atmosphere of Western academia prevents them from providing real answers.

Thus, Yasin uses the critical sociology of knowledge, but only as a springboard for the reaffirmation of spirituality. The ultimate aim of his epistemological darwa is to rehabilitate the firman Qur’anic concept often associated with matters of conversion and repentance (taubah). The firman is the essential and innate repository of faith and spirituality that lies in every human soul. Yasin argues that if modern men and women reconnect with their firman, the true meaning and purpose of life, which is to serve and love God, will become obvious to them. Yet this process can occur only if the hegemony of positivism and nihilism is undermined. Unless these individuals’ hearts and minds are ready to welcome spiritual matters, the re-Islamization of society is doomed to fail. A rehabilitated firman, however, would allow the hostages of modern worldviews to become receptive to the message of Islam.

In Islamiser la modernite, Yasin calls this message the “science of the Qur’an.” It is not so much a body of specific regulations or commands as a series of prophetic paradigms. The science of the Qur’an includes the stories of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other exemplary figures worth imitating. Because of their virtue, these paradigms provide an essential source of spiritual guidance. Yasin has a particular predilection for the story of Noah and the deluge. It provides him with the necessary metaphorical vocabulary for defining his views and activism. The deluge is a constant theme in his work. It was already a key symbol in the open letter he sent to King Hassan II in 1974. In Islamiser la modernite, Yasin writes: “[this book’s] other ambition is to invite an unfaithful modernity to settle down so that it can avoid the kind of shipwreck that was experienced by the unfaithful people of Noah during the deluge.” The same story fosters additional naval metaphors. Yasin warns that human existence is a challenging adventure at sea; that the Qur’an is a beacon; and that those who ignore God will get lost.

Fiqh as a Residual Issue

Within the larger framework of the prophetic method, the specific determination of righteous actions belongs to the domain of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Yasin reminds his readers that anyone who reaches the stage of ithmar must continue to follow Islamic law and the sound prescriptions of the jurists. Indeed, his insistence on faith and spirituality is not tantamount to a rejection of scripturalism. Yasin is often as fundamentalist as the proponents of the Salafi epistemology. However, he does not read formative texts for the sole purpose of finding legal regulations: “(those who read the history of the first community and the Islamic texts looking only for the law will never reach wisdom. Law is the container: it is extremely important, but the content is the essential part.”

Although Yasin does raise issues of Islamic jurisprudence, he more often prefers to delve into the Qur’an and the sunna to find sources of spiritual growth.

Undoubtedly, Yasin’s agenda departs from another fundamental aspect of Salafi re-Islamization—that is, the rejuvenation and application of Islamic jurisprudence—which has been a major preoccupation of the modernist Salafis, Islamists, and neo-fundamentalists throughout the 20th century. In the wake of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid ‘Rida, modernist Salafis were deeply concerned with the revitalization of fiqh and its adaptation to current conditions. In Morocco, ‘Alai al-Fasi pursued these objectives in a number of elaborate, technical, and didactic books about Islamic jurisprudence. On the one hand, he addressed the nature of fiqh, its sources, the specificities of its implementation, and the functions of its executors. On the other hand, he endeavored to renew jurisprudence on the basis of rational concepts such as ishtiaq (preference) and maslahah (utility). To some extent, Islamists have built on the legacy of Islamic modernism and continued to advocate the adaptation and the implementation of the shari’a depending on their personal qualifications, they addressed these issues in a more or less erudite manner. An ishtiaq such as the Sudanese Islamist Hasan al-Turabi, for instance, was able to propose a deeper reform of fiqh than the one outlined by Sayyid Qutb, who had not received an advanced traditional education. The typical Salafi predilection for legal issues also extended to rigorous neo-fundamentalists, whom Roy regards as post-Islamists. In Morocco, Taqi al-Din al-Hilali (d. 1987), a Wahhabi-inspired Salafi closely linked to the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, was the intellectual forefather of this current. He preached in the mosques of Casablanca, issued fatwas, and published legal compendiums on proper devotional behavior.

In opposition to all these proponents of the Salafi epistemology, Yasin tends to avoid re-Islamization through fiqh. He does not strive to develop a new theory of legal hermeneutics; nor does he issue legal ordinances on what is halāl, haram, or hukm. However, unlike all other Islamists, Yasin cannot avoid calling for the implementation of the shari’a and its adaptation to changing conditions. Yet he does not present legal matters as a priority, and he does not introduce himself as the person who might undertake the reforms he is calling for. Yasin does touch on some broad issues of legal rejuvenation but hardly goes beyond general statements about the necessity of informed legal reasoning (i’tihād). He remains evasive as to how these prescriptions should be implemented.

When Yasin deals more extensively with the law, as in the 1990 book Nacrat fi al-fiqh wa-l-tarikh, he tends to focus on political jurisprudence (fiqh siyāsah) as a way to criticize despotic regimes and their state jurists (fiqah al-qāyūb). Thus, the book is a manifesto rather than a treatise. One finds little technical discussion besides a few short sections devoted to the finalities of the shari’a (‘ilm al-maqāsid)—a branch of jurisprudential philosophy that was dear to ‘Alai al-Fasi. Here again, Yasin is not particularly thorough or innovative. He invokes al-Shatibi (d. 1388), the foremost authority in the field, and reenunciates the legal necessity of preserving religious life, soul, mind, family, and property, which are the five objects traditionally associated with ‘ilm al-maqāsid. Ironically, the most distinctive aspect of the exposé is its underlying spiritual concern. Yasin stresses that the finality of the shari’a is not merely social stability or the material welfare of the people. These are only intermediary objectives whose raison d’être is to relieve Muslims from the mundane preoccupations of daily life. Instead, the ultimate goal of the shari’a is to foster an environment that is conducive to ithmar so that
Muslims can concentrate on spiritual growth and hope to secure their salvation in the afterlife.80 Yasin does not abjure the law and its specific regulations, but he clearly de-emphasizes them as an object of study and guidance. Overall, legal issues are marginal subject matter in his corpus. One may object that Sayyid Qub was no different from Yasin in that *fiqh* was only one element within his grand totalizing ideology and never constituted the main focus of his intellectual work. However, Qub never went so far as to claim that spirituality is superior to jurisprudence, as Yasin did. Indeed, as a post-Safdi intellectual activist, Yasin wishes to devote more efforts to reviving spirituality that to implementing or adjusting *fiqh*. He legitimates his stance by asserting that, historically, faith and the love for God came before the Qur'an and its legal prescriptions.80

There are personal reasons behind his choice. Even though Yasin studied at the Bin Yusuf institute in Marrakech for four years, he never pursued advanced studies in a major Islamic university, such as al-Azhar in Cairo or al-Qarawiyyin in Fez. Indeed, he never portrays himself as a jurist (*qādī*). On the contrary, he constantly reminds his readers that he is not a specialist of anything and that he does not write in a sophisticated jargon.80 Since he cannot claim an expert status in legal matters, Yasin prefers to contribute to the Islamist cause through his Sufi experience—that is, by focusing on the renewal of faith and spirituality.

Historical conditions may have further discouraged Yasin from focusing on Islamic law, despite his lack of formal training. After the independence of Morocco, nationalist Salafis such as ‘Allal al-Fasi failed to re-establish the full jurisdiction of the shari’a courts. Al-Fasi complained that the Western-oriented Moroccan elites—the products of French schools—had become the new exponents of Western ideas and institutions; they had used their influential positions within the government to restrict the codification of the shari’a to matters of personal status and inheritance.80 Therefore, according to Al-Fasi, intellectual colonialism persisted in the mid-1960s even though the French had left Morocco in 1956. In this context, he viewed the renewal of Islamic jurisprudence as a critical response to the challenge posed by Western thought in post-independence Morocco. To compete with the foreign legal codes that the elite favored, the shari’a needed adjustments to modern conditions.

Yasin still acknowledges these problems but cannot share al-Fasi’s former hopes. In the 1960s—under Muhammad V and during the first years of Hassan II’s reign—al-Fasi may reasonably have thought that the implementation of a fully Islamic legal system was still possible. When Yasin became an Islamist activist, however, such hopes had already diminished. The ascendancy and resilience of Hassan II proved to be a major obstacle. The king controlled the religious field, which he used to enhance his legitimacy and silence opposition.81 A revised Islamic jurisprudence—unless ordered by the king himself—would stand little chance of being implemented. The political context in which Yasin has operated since 1972 is less flexible than that of the 1950s and early 1960s.

**Conclusion**

A priori, the religious discourse of ‘Abd al-Salam Yasin appears to corroborate some elements of the French theory of post-Islamism, whose foremost theoretician is Olivier Rey. On the one hand, Yasin departs from the archetypal Islamist discourse of the 1970s in that he emphasizes the spiritual and ethical dimension of Islam. On the other hand, he undertakes the re-Islamization of society from the bottom up and targets individuals rather than the state. Yet post-Islamism—though superficially attractive—is not applicable to Yasin’s religious discourse. Because of the vagaries of Moroccan history and Yasin’s personal background, Yasin’s approach to Islamism has promoted spirituality and spiritual guidance from the early 1970s onward—that is, before the alleged decline and failure of political Islam. Although post-Islamist theory is an attempt to systematize empirical data from the past thirty-five years into a coherent historical pattern, it relies on a narrow and selective definition of Islamism that cannot account for the particularities of the Moroccan context. Post-Islamism would probably prove more useful if its theoretical ambitions were to be reduced and its application restricted to specific contexts. It should remain a valid analytical device for understanding the political and ideological transformations that took place in Iran, for instance, where Islamists have been in power for more than twenty-five years. It also seems better suited to cases in which the rise and failure of revolutionary Islamism has been overt and pronounced, as in Egypt and Algeria.

One additional problem is that the label “post-Islamist” is based solely on political variables. For this reason, it fails to distinguish the various religious stances among quietist Islamic activists and cannot convey the distinctiveness of Yasin’s message and *dawwa*. The limits of such a political approach are particularly obvious with respect to the concept of post-Islamist thought, which has no inherent or precise religious meaning per se, even though it intends to shed light on spiritual and theological issues. Instead of maintaining specific keys for understanding the substance of religious discourses, it seeks to highlight the absence of explicit references to politics or, inversely, the explicit presence of non-political themes, whatever they may be. Thus, it appears that the concept’s main purpose is to validate Roy’s thesis on the failure of political Islam, and not so much to analyze the spiritual discourses that it initially targeted. In the end, political considerations alone continue to determine whether religious ideas are significant.

Therefore, a more appropriate way to qualify Yasin’s religious discourse is to underscore how it transcends the standard Salafi understanding of Islam and religious guidance. It is possible to conceive of the Salafiyya as a broad scripturalist epistemology whose proponents—regardless of their political attitudes—disregard Sufism and thesological ideas, privilege formal instruction based on scriptural positivism, and usually concentrate on the outer dimension of religious life. Yasin transcends this epistemology by attempting to rehabilitate mystical concepts and by focusing on the renewal of inner faith rather than on orthodoxy and orthopraxy. From a diachronic perspective, this is reminiscent of the approach adopted by previous Islamic activists and intellectuals who, like al-Banna (d. 1949) in Egypt, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) in colonial India, and Sa’id Nursi (d. 1960) in Turkey, were receptive to the spiritual dimension of Islam.81 From a synchronic perspective, however, Yasin’s post-Salafi discourse is peculiar. Indeed, since the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s, most prominent Sunni Islamists have been strict advocates of the Salafi epistemology. Thus, Yasin’s religious discourse is even more marginal because it endeavors to transcend an epistemology that has been relatively hegemonic within Islamist circles for the past thirty years.
Post-Islamism and Religious Discourse of al-Salam Yasin

earlier Moroccan Salafis and their relationship to Sufism are found in Henry Munson, Jr., "Religion and Power in Morocco" (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 97–102.

280


38. Durif, Jama'a al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan, 63–64.


40. As quoted in Durif, Jama'a al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan, 64.


44. Yasin al-Ihsan, 118–92.

45. Ibid., 197.

46. Yasin al-Ihsan, 475.

47. Ibid., 292.

48. Ibid., 313.

49. Abdul al-Salam Yasin, La révolution à l'heure de l'islam (o.p., 1983), 27. See also Daff, Jama'a al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan, 26–27.


51. Ibid., 197.

52. Yasin al-Ihsan, 208–18.


55. 'Abd al-Salam Yasin, Islamiat al la modernité (Rabat:Dar al-Okbat Impressions, 1999), 224.

56. Ibid., 285.


58. Torsi, Monarchie et islam politique, 72–73.


60. Yasin al-Ihsan, bayna al-da'wa wa-l-dawla, 352. The exact same references are found in his second book, which was published in 1973: see Yasin, al-Islam ghadaif, 777.
Post-Islamism and Religious Discourse of al-Salam Yasin

261

260 Henri Louchaire

42 Ibid., 370–74.
43 There is a strong possibility that Yasin built on other arguments from al-Buti’s corpus. Since the late
1970s, al-Buti has put forth strikingly similar ideas to those of Yasin’s discourse. Like Yasin, al-Buti believes
that orthodox Sunnism is intrinsic to the true meaning of Islam; he also underscores the significance of dhikr
and dhiyā. A good example of al-Buti’s position toward Sunnis is found in his critique of the Wahhabi-
inspired Salafiyah, which was originally published in 1988. See Muhammad Sa‘d Ramadhan al-Buti, al-
Salafiyah: manhaj zamanayn muhabah le madhhab Islami (Darassul: Dar al-Fitr, 1988), 189–208. In
English, see Andreas Christen, “Islamic Scholar and Religious Leader: Shukri Muhammad Sa‘d Ramadhan
al-Buti, in Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Response, ed. John Cooper et al. (London: L. B.
Tauris, 1998), 57–81. It is worth noting that two of al-Buti’s books figure in a list of readings that Yasin
recommends to his readers and to the members of al-Adl wa-l-Iслam: see Yasin, al-Minḥaj al-nabawi, 45–47.
Yasin, al-Islam, 33.
46 Ibid., 7.
49 Roy, “Le post islamisme,” 13, 20–27. Roy swiftly suggests that Islamization through Sufi brotherhoods
is a recent sociological phenomenon that follows the modernization process of the 1950s and 1960s. Today,
this observation is true of a Sufi order may be a deliberate and individual religious statement in reaction to the
disenchantment of the Islamic world. This was not necessarily the case in the past, Roy claims, when joining
a Sufi order was a traditional expression of communal religiosity that implied no Islamization per se.
53 Ibid., 39–40.
54 Qur’an 10:68–71, quoted in ibid., 50.
55 Ibid., 54.
56 The other means of implementing the prophetic method is al-Adl wa-l-Iслam. Yasin intended his move-
ment to provide various forms of communal support, from medical services to financial help for marriages.
The function of this organization is also to provide a structure for performing dhikr in groups and for finding
57 Ibid., 31.
58 L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000), 141.
60 See his attack on Marxist philosophy as Yasin, La révolution, 38, 74–77. In the early 1970s, two Marxist–
Leninist organizations—2 Mars and 14 al-Amam—were particularly popular on university campuses: their
members and sympathizers eventually took control of the National Union of Moroccan Students; see Vermeersch,
Histoire de Marrakech, 51–54.
61 Al Islāmiyāt ta’madīrīy, the advocates of modernity include Westerners and the Westernized Arab elite.
The book was clearly intended for a widespread audience and was translated into English and Arabic two
years after its original publication in French. The English version is Abdal-Qadir Yasin, Winning the Modern
is Abd al-Salam Yasin, al-Islāmiyāt ta’madīrīyā (Cairo: Muḥāfaẓat al-Ṭifāl, 2000).
62 Yasin, Islamiser la modernité, 137.
63 Ibid., 47.
64 Ibid., 133–34.
65 Ibid., 133.
67 Yasin, Islamiser la modernité, 153.
68 Ibid., 154.
69 Ibid., 184–85.
70 Ibid., 16.