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CHAPTER 4

THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AS THE PRINCIPAL REVOLUTIONARY AND STABILIZING FORCE



The Birth of a New Class

THE traditional Middle Eastern elite of kings, landowners, and bourgeoisie is declining in power or has already yielded its place. Workers and peasants are only beginning to enter the realm of politics. As for a middle class, the consensus of observers is that it barely exists. "Nationalism" and "social change" are nothing more than abstractions. Who shapes politics and makes the fundamental decisions in the Middle East and North Africa?

Two different answers are usually given. Individual personalities and small cliques, reply many Western policymakers. A "new indigenous intelligentsia . . . rootless [and] possessing no real economic base in an independent native middle class,"¹ is the explanation increasingly being accepted by social scientists. Here we shall argue that both these views overlook the emergence of a new social class in the Middle East as the principal revolutionary—and potentially stabilizing—force.

In our unproductive search for middle classes in underdeveloped areas, the fault has been in our expectations. We have taken too parochial a view of the structure of the middle class. A study of both Western and non-Western historical experience suggests that the British and American middle classes, which have commonly been considered prototypes, were actually special cases. Moreover, with the growing scope and scale of

¹ Morris Wainick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas," in *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, edited by Bert F. Hoselitz, Chicago, 1952, pp. 158-159.

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modern enterprises and institutions, the majority of the middle class even in the United States and Great Britain is no longer composed of men whose independence is rooted in their possession of productive private property. Bureaucratic organization has become the characteristic structure of business (or charity or trade unions) no less than of government, and the majority of the middle class is now salaried. They may be managers, administrators, teachers, engineers, journalists, scientists, lawyers, or army officers. A similar salaried middle class constitutes the most active political, social, and economic sector from Morocco to Pakistan.

Leadership in all areas of Middle Eastern life is increasingly being seized by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge, and it is being clustered around a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and experts.² In its style of life, however, this new middle class differs from its counterpart in the industrialized states. The Middle East moved into the modern administrative age before it reached the machine age. Its salaried middle class attained power before it attained assurance of status, order, security, or prosperity. In the Middle East, the salaried new middle class therefore uses its power not to defend order and property but to create them—a revolutionary task that is being undertaken so far without any final commitment to any particular system of institutions.

This new salaried class is impelled by a driving interest in ideas, action, and careers. It is not merely interested in ideas: its members are not exclusively intellectuals, and, being new to the realm of modern ideas and eager for action and careers, they may not be intellectuals at all. Neither are they interested only in action that enhances their power: they also share a common commitment to the fashioning of opportunities and institutions that

² For example, when Tunisia became independent in 1956 under the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party, a party controlled almost entirely by the new middle class, the election for a Constituent Assembly rewarded this class in the following way: To fill 98 seats, the country voted for 18 teachers and professors, 15 lawyers, 11 civil servants, 3 doctors, 4 pharmacists, 2 journalists, 2 commercial employees, 1 engineer, 1 appraiser, 5 workers, 17 farmers, and 17 businessmen and contractors. By contrast, every Middle Eastern parliament prior to 1950, except that of Turkey, contained a majority of landowners and a minority of professional men and industrialists.

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will provide careers open to all who have skills. This involves them in actions quite novel to their society, and hence also distinguishes them from previous politicians. They are not concerned merely with safe careers. They know that, without new ideas and new actions dealing with the backwardness and conditions of their society, careers will not open or remain secure. The men of this new class are therefore committed ideologically to nationalism and social reform.

Obviously, there is also a part of the new middle class that has neither deep convictions nor understanding. In contrast to the dominant strata of its class, this segment excludes itself from the process of making political choices, and hence does not alter the present analysis. It is also true that some members of the new middle class are interested only in ideas (hence inspire and clarify, or merely stand by), only in action (hence rise spectacularly and fall), or only in safe careers (hence merely serve). Among the last, clerks especially compose the largest yet relatively most passive segment of the new middle class. Our analysis focuses on men interested in ideas, action, and careers because such a description fits the most influential core of this group.

There are also opportunists among them but, by now, of two different kinds which are often confused by those who are taken advantage of. There is the politician who, largely for the sake of satisfying the aspirations of his new middle class constituency and so also staying in power, takes advantage of whatever opportunities may offer, east or west, at home or abroad. There is also the free-floating opportunist—Stendhal's novels describe him very well for a period in French history when values and institutions were similarly in doubt—who represents no one but himself, but represents himself exceedingly well, being loyal only to the art of survival. Some sell their skills as political brokers; some come close to selling their country. In the twentieth century it has become essential, however, to be able to distinguish between those, however perverse they may appear, who are out to gain greater elbow-room for the new middle class they represent and those, however smooth, who also make deals because they can fashion no connections unless they continually sell themselves.

In the Middle East, this salaried new middle class assumes a

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far more important role than the local property-owning middle class. Although the latter is about as numerous as that portion of the new middle class which is actually employed,⁸ it has far less power than the salaried group. Neither in capital, organization, nor skills do the merchants and middlemen control anything comparable to that power which can be mustered by the machinery of the state and hence utilized by the new salaried class. In this part of the world, no other institutions can mobilize as much power and capital as those of the state. By controlling the state in such a strategic historical period, this new salaried class has the capabilities to lead the quest for the status, power, and prosperity of middle-class existence by ushering in the machine age.⁹

⁸ In this analysis, the term "new middle class" excludes the property owning middle class. However, it includes both those who are now drawing salaries and a far larger group—a "would-be new middle class" which resembles this class in every respect except that it is unemployed. The "would-be" salariat is discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

From a different perspective, Professor Morroe Berger defines the middle class as including (1) "merchants and small manufacturers, self-employed, whose income and influence are not great enough to place them among the really powerful men in political or economic life" and (2) "independent professionals such as doctors and lawyers; employed managers, technicians, and administrative workers such as clerks and bureau chiefs; and the civil service." He concluded that, in 1947, these amounted altogether to about half a million persons in Egypt, 51 percent of them merchants; that is, mostly small retailers. ("The Middle Class in the Arab World," in *The Middle East in Transition*, edited by Walter Laqueur, New York, 1958, p. 63.) Thus defined, the salaried middle class and the property-owning middle class together amount to about six percent of the gainfully employed population or about three percent of the total population in Egypt. If one also includes the agricultural middle class, as does Professor Hassan el-Saady ("The Middle Class in Egypt," *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, April 1957, pp. 47-53), the total figure for Egypt in 1947 increases to 16 percent. The middle class is probably as large, or else smaller, in other Middle Eastern countries. By contrast, a new middle class composed of the salariat—whether employed or unemployed—must be estimated to number (no one has yet counted them) a far higher percentage. Aspiration is politically as relevant a criterion for such a census as education and position.

⁹ The present work is not the first to notice the emergence of this new class in underdeveloped areas. Professor T. Cuyler Young, drawing in part on his experiences as Political Attaché at the American Embassy in Tehran during 1951-1952, was the first to publish an analysis of the role of the new middle class in the Middle East in "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1952, pp. 125-143. Professor John J. Johnson was the first to suggest that in Latin America "the urban middle groups are vitally, if not decisively, important in an area where one still commonly hears and reads that there is no middle class to speak of [and] where, in the view of traditional scholarship, individuals hold the center of the stage." (*Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors*, Stanford, 1958, pp. vii-ix.)

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In the West, a variety of organizational structures and devices—both governmental and private—have gradually made individual entrepreneurship a rare commodity. Stock companies, subsidies, insurance, tariffs, as well as large governmental, business, and union bureaucracies have served, among other things, to reduce individual risk and enlarge institutional predictability. The pressures that make for organization and organization men are much more desperate in the Middle East. In most of the countries of this region, there are few important jobs in the modern sector of the economy available outside the large organizations and institutions that constitute, or are guided by, government. Those who cannot get into them or cannot hold on to them usually count for little, and often cannot make a living. For most there is little hope for safety or prosperity in separate personal endeavors. Indeed, more organization is urgently needed for aggregating separate interests, bargaining among them, and executing a common will.

Among these two and the present essay, there are common intellectual links. In his preface, Johnson states that he "first became fully aware of the importance of the urban middle sectors in Latin American politics during the fifteen months in 1952-53 that [he] was with the State Department as Acting Chief of the South American Branch of the Division of Research for American Republics." At that time, a number of us in the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa had contributed to an analysis in January 1952 of the causes of *Political Instability in the Middle East* which was to become a prototype for a series of such studies of other underdeveloped regions. An evaluation of the role of the "urban middle sector" was one of the principal themes of that study.

If at least one of the collaborators of that 1952 study has changed his mind, and substituted "middle class" for "middle sector," it is because the latter term is finally too broad: Johnson includes within it the "poorly paid white-collar employee in government" as well as the "wealthy proprietors of commercial and industrial enterprises." Class is a term with peculiar advantages. The anthropological term "acculturated" includes those who have forsaken pottery for aluminum no less than those who have left Islam for communism. The principally historical term "Westernized" defines only one portion of those who now make modern political choices. The sociological terms "traditional," "transitional," and "modern" designate way-stations in social communication and psychic mobility insufficiently related to conflicts over political ideology and power. The political term "elite" is often used to designate any dominating power group without concern for the social classes from which it may be drawn. Once the term "class" is freed from its ideological strait jackets and defined dynamically in terms of the evolving interests, opportunities, and behavior of a class in the midst of the transformation of a society, and not merely of its economy, "class" may well continue to serve us as the most useful category for relating changes in social structure to changes in political power.

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The *intelligentsia*, that is, those with knowledge or awareness to see that a social and political revolution is in progress, form the largest and politically most active component of the new middle class. But they are not the only component of this class. Some members of this new class are already middle class in their pattern of consumption but still searching for ideas (hence new in a society once sure of its truths). Others are interested only in ideas about means and not, like the *intelligentsia*, also about ends, and the concern for truth of the intellectuals does not interest them. The *intelligentsia*, however, is the predominant force of this class, in part because its knowledge inescapably exposes the weakness or irrelevance of tradition. Just as in Russia in the nineteenth century, however, the *intelligentsia* is more rebellious than self-confident. Its thought is "by its very nature unspecific, unformulated, unfixed . . . sensitive to every intellectual wind from Europe, alert to the changing history of both Russia and the West. For all their dogmatism at every stage, some of the most energetic minds of the *intelligentsia* passed from one ideological stage often to its extreme opposite in their insistent search for a total system which should somehow resolve all the largest questions of national destiny."¹⁴

They are new men. They are often the very first in the history of their family to be literate. They often discover their best friends at school or in a political movement, not among kin or established brotherhood or faction. They are the first to trust who strangers on grounds of competence or shared ideology.¹⁵ They are ready to trade new dogmas for old. They are also the first publicly to confess their uncertainties. Until Gamal abd al-Nasser no Egyptian politician had begun a statement of his philosophy with the confession: ". . . I feel that I stand before a boundless world, a bottomless sea—and a trepidation restrains me from plunging into it since, from my point of vantage, I see no other shore to head for."¹⁶

¹⁴ Herbert B. Bowman, "Intelligentsia in Nineteenth Century Russia," *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Spring 1957, p. 15.

¹⁵ Some of the men appointed to the cabinet by the Iraqi army conspirators of 1958 had until their appointment neither heard of the revolution nor met their new chiefs.

¹⁶ Gamal abd al-Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Washington, 1955, p. 17.

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In Russia the *intelligentsia* was often known as the *raznochintsy*, the "men of varied ranks," on the justifiable recognition that they sprang from all classes, but also on the unwarranted conclusion that they therefore belonged to none. To make this assumption about the Middle East is to suppose that the classes from which they come, in contrast to the one in which they are now gathering, are solid and neatly distinguishable in their relationship to each other and their role in society. That is not the case, and one of the principal reasons in the Middle East as it was in Russia for the departure from their previous classes of men eager for ideas, actions, and careers is that these classes can no longer maintain their customary relationships to each other, or play their traditional role in what is becoming a modern society. It is their new role that defines their class membership, not the accident of their birth in a particular traditional social class. "The French expression '*sortil du peuple*,' like the English 'sprung from the working class' does in fact indicate both origin and breach with them."¹⁷

In the Middle East (as in other rapidly changing, underdeveloped societies) the new *intelligentsia* acts in behalf of the older ruling classes only until it is strong enough to win control of the government. When this occurs, however, the *intelligentsia* no longer remains socially unattached but acts in the interests of the new middle class of which it is an integral part. It cannot preserve the privileges of the older ruling classes if it hopes to propel any Middle Eastern country into the modern age. Similarly, it cannot offer the immediate rewards sought by workers and peasants, because its plans for the modernization of the country call for mobilization of the underlying population for new roles and productive sacrifices.

In the Middle East, as in Russia, the new middle class springs largely, though not exclusively, from groups that had not hitherto been important, and hence had more reason and less dead-weight to take advantage of new knowledge and skills. Le Tourneau's description of North Africa could readily be applied

¹⁷ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, London, 1954, p. 159.

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to the rest of the Middle East. One can still find among the middle class, he points out, "a good number of members of the old leading families, the ruling aristocracy, the trading bourgeoisie, or even, but in lesser proportion, intellectuals of a traditional kind." Since the turn of the century, however, "things have changed, and young men from the hinterland now form the essential backbone of the middle class." The political parties reflect this change: "The Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto has as leader a pharmacist from Scif, M. Ferhat Abbas [until recently Premier of Algeria's Provisional Government]; his principal lieutenants are doctors, lawyers, and teachers among whom almost no one is a descendant of a 'grande famille' of earlier days. The same holds true for the Tunisian Neo-Destour, whose leader, M. Habib Bourguiba, is a lawyer born to a humble family of the Sahel, and for the Moroccan Istiqlal, whose governing committee is, in large part, composed of former students of the Moslem College of Fez." In Egypt, Nasser illustrates the type perfectly: the son of a postmaster, he graduated in 1938 from the first class of the Egyptian Military Academy that had admitted students from other than the upper classes. He was among the first to take advantage of a new avenue to knowledge and status. Such men are not merely strays or a stratum of spokesmen for other classes but the creators of a new class system more appropriate to the new tasks and relationships of the emerging modern age in the Middle East.

The new middle class itself does not define or crystallize its character from the very outset, but only as its various strata come to intervene in the process of modernization and assume additional roles in it. It originates in the intellectual and social transformation of Middle Eastern society, not as a homo-

⁹ Roger LaTourneau, "Le Développement d'une Classe Moyenne en Afrique du Nord," in *Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries, Record of the XXIX Session Held in London from 13-16 September 1955*, Brussels, International Institute of Differing Civilizations, 1956, pp. 106-110. The group that split off from the Moroccan Istiqlal party under Mehdi Ben Barka's leadership in 1959, the National Union of Popular Forces, is even more clearly the product of a class shaped by modern secular education and the values of the new middle class.

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gencous socio-economic class but as a secularized action group oriented toward governmental power. After capturing political power, it also attains hold of its own economic base. By controlling government in the Middle East, it also comes to own or control the countries' largest and most significant means of production. It becomes a salaried middle class with the power to decide its own salaries and responsibilities. The attainment of salaried status by this stratum of the middle class in turn also legitimizes the drive for the same status by the remaining would-be salaried middle class and usually gives that demand priority among political problems.

Unlike the traditional elite of landowners and trading bourgeoisie or the tradition-bound artisans or peasants, it is thus the first class in the Middle East that is wholly the product of the transition to the modern age. Unlike the emergent new generation of peasants and urban workers, it is already powerful and self-conscious enough to undertake the task of remolding society.

The new middle class has been able to act as a separate and independent force because: (1) prior to its seizure of power, it is freer than any other class from traditional bonds and preceptions, and better equipped to manipulate armies and voluntary organizations as revolutionary political instruments; (2) once it controls the machinery of a modernizing state, it possesses a power base superior to that which any other class in the Middle East can muster on the basis of prestige, property, or physical force; (3) it is numerically one of the largest groups within the modern sector of society; (4) it is, so far, more obviously cohesive, more self-conscious, and better trained than any other class; (5) its political, economic, and social actions, in so far as they come to grips with social change, are decisive in determining the role other classes will play in the future; and (6) it has shown itself capable of marshalling mass support. Wherever the salaried new middle class has become dominant in the Middle East, it has become the chief locus of political and economic power and of social prestige. There are few classes anywhere in the world of which this much can be said.¹⁰

¹⁰ Hence we cannot accept the Marxist idea that the intelligentsia, since it does not start from an economic base of its own, is unable to act in its own interest but must ally itself with one class or another. In areas like the Middle

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Thus there can rise to power a Nasser as "Saladin in a Grey Flannel Suit,"¹¹ greeted as hero or devil, but conceivable in these dimensions largely because he symbolizes and represents a whole class—a class which is the principal actor of the age. Those who disagree with his policies or methods may continue to think of him as devil, but they at least must recognize that this kind of devil cannot be exorcised. As the representative of a particular policy, Nasser can be foiled. As the representative of a class, and his class is the product of the Middle East's movement into the modern age, his kind cannot be made to disappear by military intervention. To acknowledge the growing presence of such a class is also to deny the long-held Western myth that the passing of the remaining older ruling elites in such countries as Iran or Jordan would leave an internal social and political vacuum.

Conflicts within the New Middle Class

To seek to create a modern prosperous economy, a modern society, and a modern nation is a noble objective. However, the task itself involves painful decisions about who shall receive rewards, or shall no longer receive them, and who shall change position, and when and how. There are obviously different ways of eliciting sacrifices, sharing sacrifices, and establishing goals for which such sacrifices are to be made. There are, correspondingly, different ways of minimizing the antagonism

East. Soviet analysts have talked about a "national bourgeoisie," composed of local industrialists, merchants, and bankers, a "lower middle class" which employs little or no outside labor, an "intelligentsia" of students and clerks, even a "military intelligentsia." (See Walter Z. Laqueur, "The National Bourgeoisie, A Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, July 1959, pp. 324-331.) They have failed to perceive, however, the central role of the class which contains such men as Ataturk, Nasser, Kasim, and Bourguiba and which not only leads the nationalist revolution, but is the harbinger and architect of a decisive change in the social structure of the Middle East.

There are fundamental reasons for this failure of recognition. Perceptively, the Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs has noted: "In such periods of transition, society is not dominated by any system of production. . . . In these circumstances it is, of course, impossible to speak of the operation of any economic laws which would govern the entire society. . . . There is a condition of acute struggle for power or of a latent balance of power. . . . the old law is no longer valid and the new law is not yet generally valid." He adds, "As far as I know, the theory of historical materialism has not yet confronted this problem

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of conflicting interests and values as the new middle class translates its objectives into the mission of the entire nation. It is also possible for nationalists representing the new middle class to hold different conceptions of the national interest in relation to foreign nations. What, then, determines these choices on the part of the new middle class?

The factors that readily come to mind—the burden of the past, available skills and resources and the awareness and opportunities to utilize them, differences in individual character and temperament, the force of ideas and the exigencies of particular local power constellations—are all relevant and important.¹² An elite in power, whatever the social class from which it springs, faces problems and temptations in the very business of maintaining itself in power which will often distinguish it from those who have the same hopes and interests but not the same responsibilities. Membership in a particular social class is by no means the sole determinant of policy decisions. Differences in political choices among members of the new middle class, however, also reflect differences among the strata of that class and the variant character of its class consciousness.

Such differences are real enough, but they usually become politically important only after the new middle class has achieved power. Earlier, all its members normally concentrate on the battle for power, mobility, and status in order to open up the

from an economic perspective." (*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Berlin, 1923, pp. 243 and 249.) As far as the present author is aware, this vacuum remains.

¹¹ C. L. Sulzberger's phrase in *The New York Times*, March 26, 1958.

¹² Not that we know by any means enough about how these factors operate. It would be most instructive to make a number of case studies, to examine, for example, the dynamics involved in the change by different age-groups in the control over large parts of the same political movement (e.g., from al-Faied to Ben Barka in Morocco's Istiqlal party); the change of outlook within the same family (e.g., the change from Abbas, father, recipient of the French Legion of Honor to Abbas, son, recent Premier of the Provisional Algerian Government in El-Alia); and the change within a single spirit (e.g., Edward Atiyah, *An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties*, London, 1946) and contrast these with the fate of a party which remains under the control of a single age-group for several decades (e.g., the Wafd in Egypt), of a family which maintains its role as a mediator above political factions for several generations (e.g., the Shehabs of Lebanon), and of a man who never changed his mind (e.g., Nuri of Iraq).

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controlling positions in society and administration. Soon after the triumph of the new middle class, however, it becomes apparent that there is simply not room for all of them—that some will be "in" and most will be "out." It also becomes clear that, although they are agreed on the need for the transformation of their society, they are not of the same mind as to what to do with their historical opportunity.¹¹

Such differences, however, are never merely political, or merely social, or merely economic. All three realms are entwined as, for example, in one of the most profound of all tensions within the new middle class—between those who are salaried and those who would be like them but are not. Only a minority of the Middle East's new middle class actually holds jobs and draws salaries. The rest either can find no jobs consonant with their skills and values, or else work for status quo regimes which deny this group status and power. It would be quite misleading to exclude the "would-be" new middle class from this middle class. Both components of the middle class possess modern rather than traditional knowledge, and both are eager for a forced march into the modern age. Both are striving for the status, power, order, and prosperity that ought to go with middle-class existence. They resemble each other in every respect except success. This would-be middle class will therefore enlist itself in any movement that promises the kind of education that creates modern skills, the kind of job that opens a career, and the kind of action that gives a mere career individual rewards and social importance.

The inclusion of this group among the new middle class may be unexpected to those who restrict themselves to the classical economic definition of classes. In areas like the Middle East, however, where a modern economy is still to be created, and where control over the state and the forces of social change is more potent than ownership of property, property relations alone cannot serve to define class relations. In the midst of a profound transformation of society, it would also be quite wrong to define

¹¹ At such a point, the intelligentsia may well split again and speak for different competing factions within the new middle class—another reason why it is not possible to use "intelligentsia" and "new middle class" interchangeably.

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a social class statically, in terms of occupation, or employment at a particular moment in time. Each class must be defined in terms of its political, social, and economic role in the process of social change. In the present instance, that means taking account of all who either already perform the role of a member of the salaried middle class or who are bent by revolutionary action, if necessary, to gain a chance to perform this role and no other.

How scarring the difference can be between the new salaried class and the would-be middle class, whose basic orientation must be defined by middle class deprivations instead of middle class achievements, is illustrated by the situation in Iran. The Iranian example also demonstrates on how many levels that difference can recur, and how quickly the pressure of frustration can mount in the Middle East. In the 1920's and 1930's there were jobs in Iran for all who were educated, and there was only one cause of frustration. Status was still largely the fruit of traditional rank rather than individual accomplishment. "Those who had been educated abroad [and] had good family background and professed unquestionable loyalty to the political system . . . were given top administrative posts. . . . The graduates of the University of Tehran and other colleges (plus some high school graduates during the 1930's) were assigned less important government positions and formed the majority of the lower echelon of the civil service. They tended to come from families where the fathers had been merchants, guildsmen, and clergymen."¹²

Within a decade, the causes of discontent had multiplied enormously. Those members of the new middle class who had ideas and careers found their opportunities for status and action circumscribed. By the early 1940's, the "surplus of government employees was glaringly evident at all levels. [hence] the prestige of civil service jobs also dropped. . . . The duties proved to be routine and the job gave . . . no responsibility or sense of social participation." Inflation, the result both of

¹² Reza Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," an unpublished manuscript presented to the Faculty Seminar of the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, May 1959, pp. 38-40. Arasteh has now enlarged upon this subject in *Education and Social Awakening in Iran, 1850-1960*, Leiden, 1962.

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planned and unplanned scarcities in the economy, took its toll. "The civil servant was no longer able to maintain his accustomed standard of living, and since then it has become necessary for him to take on a second job, equally uninspiring." He had also become socially isolated, "that is, he feels alienated from his family and he also senses the abyss that lies between him and the under-privileged, illiterate masses." He had also become more conscious of "the divergency of [his] interests with the upper-class elite whose mode of life is even more Western than [his] own."¹⁵

But that is not all. Just at a time when the status of those members of the new middle class, having careers is becoming increasingly insecure, they are also being exposed to the growing challenge of a would-be middle class demanding careers, status, and power. Approximately 18,000 students graduated from Iranian colleges between 1851 and 1958. A smaller number studied abroad. Yet in 1958 alone, 9,321 students were enrolled at the University of Tehran and more than 10,000 additional Iranians were studying in universities abroad.¹⁶ There are few jobs open for them in the government, and even fewer in private business.

Yet a still larger number are waiting—waiting to get into schools in which there are no vacancies in order to wait for a job that does not exist. "Because the University of Tehran and the universities in the provinces can accept only a third of those who apply, competition is very keen, and family influence often plays a part in acceptance." But the number of those who actually apply is only a partial measure of frustration. "Looking at it one way, the present 20,000 (approximately) Iranian college students constitute only 10 percent of secondary school enrollment, and two percent of the graduates of elementary schools." However, if we compare the number of college students with the potential college age group in the total population (some 1,760,000), or merely in the major urban areas (some 440,000), then the

¹⁵ Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," pp. 39-43.
¹⁶ By contrast, only 16,229 students were enrolled at various levels of the Koranic schools, once the only educational institutions. (Ernst A. Meiser-schmidt, *Iran*, Cologne, 1953, p. 48.) The figures for the religious schools apply to 1952/53.

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number of students who actually reach college is far below one percent.¹⁷ "There is sufficient evidence to indicate that this large college age group . . . constitutes for a non-technical society like Iran an unrestful group and a potential source of change."¹⁸

In Egypt there has occurred the same closing of opportunities during the past decade. In 1947, about a third of all Egyptians with primary education or above held government jobs. The entire educational system was designed largely to prepare students for the civil service and, until recently, salary and promotions depended on the type of school certificate, rather than on the nature of the work or the skill of performance. In 1953, about 41 percent "or 46 percent, depending on how closely one calculated," of total expenditures went for government salaries and wages.¹⁹ Meanwhile, although a third of all Egyptian children of school age had no opportunity even for primary education, there were almost twice as many university students in proportion to the population as in industrialized Great Britain, and all would be clamoring for appropriate jobs. In Iraq between 1950 and 1955, about 10,000 Iraqis graduated from the Colleges of Law, Commerce, Arts, and Sciences, but only 1,250 of them found jobs in government and business.²⁰

Partially overlapping the distinction between the working and jobless sections of the new middle class is the difference between the younger and older members of this class. "Youth" is not a passing phase in this region where half of all the people are under 20 years old, and where population grows so quickly and opportunities so slowly. In this situation men in their forties may still have almost all the naïveté of youth—being untouched by careers, status, and power—yet have none of youth's innocence, for they know what they have missed.

The plight of youth is obvious when the elite is recruited only from traditional classes. This plight is not resolved when the new

¹⁷ In the United States, 22 percent of this age group goes to college.

¹⁸ Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," pp. 17-28, *passim*.

¹⁹ Morroe Berger, "Civil Service and Society," an unpublished paper prepared for a Panel on Comparative Public Administration, Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1954.

²⁰ *Al-Nawadir* (a Baghdad daily), September 17, 1955.

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middle class comes into its own. Initially, it grows worse. Those who have arrived often come to the top in their thirties (Ataturk, Nasser) or their forties (Kassim, Ayub). What they do can have more far-reaching results in the lives of their people than the actions of any preceding government. Yet almost all of them become authoritarians who do not intend to relinquish the reins of power until they die. Nor do members of the leading echelon of administrators and directors in government, business, journalism, schools, etc. mean to depart before the particular head of state to whom they owe their position. The older group of nationalists often learned patience and perseverance in the long struggle for power when a foreign state could always be made to bear the blame for the postponement of success. The younger men now find no target for their frustration except their own ruling elite.

When youth wins out early and retires late, all the young men acquire a stake in the status quo and hence in moderation. When the age group that made the revolution lingers, yet does not increase the range of employment for those with talent, energy, and ideas, then the young are likely to remain radical (i.e., insist on going to the roots of the problem) or else extremist (i.e., using violence to substitute a dogmatic answer of their own). The characteristic extremism or radicalism of contemporary Middle Eastern student groups must therefore be taken more seriously than it might be in countries where one might smile comfortably at Clemenceau's jest that men who are not socialists at twenty have no heart, and men who remain socialists at forty have no head.

The sharp and often bitter competition among members of the new middle class, however, does not inhibit the acquisition of a common historical awareness that each of them suffers from the same burden of the past and the same frustrations of the present. In the very fact of their separate individuality lies the essence of their common fate.²¹ Coming into being by influx from all social

²¹ Some may concentrate on preserving their status, some on enlarging it, others on attaining it. Such competition, however, does not touch their class membership. Separate individuals, to amend only slightly a formulation by Karl Marx (*The German Ideology*, New York, 1918, p. 49), form a class only in so far as they play a common role in relation to social change, and

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classes—uniting the Western-educated son of a landlord with the army-trained son of a postmaster—the new middle class is the first in Middle Eastern history for whom family connections can no longer help automatically to establish class membership. Also, being itself composed of new men, it is the first which cannot hope to rest on inherited status or existing opportunities. It is the first class for whom communication depends on successful persuasion of other individuals; it cannot base itself on the implicit consensus of the past. The new middle class is distinguishable from all other classes in the Middle East by being the first to be composed of separate individuals. It is therefore also the first class for which the choice between democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism is a real and open choice.

The Relationship of the New Middle Class to Other Classes

The fact that the goals of the new middle class demand the mobilization of the entire society in no way implies that the role it assigns to others in its national design will correspond to the interests felt by other classes. Even the communists, whose ideology declares their dictatorship to be in the interests of the proletariat, cannot escape this clash of class interests. "It took some time until the lesson had . . . been learned; communism must cease to be 'proletarian' . . . 'Revolution' no longer signifies 'liberation of the toilers' but 'all power to the planners.'"²² No

have to carry on a common battle against another class or seek collaboration with it. Otherwise, they may be on hostile terms with each other as competitors. as G. L. Arnold, "Collectivism Reconsidered," *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1955, p. 12. The issue of antagonism between the planners and the workers had actually been raised decades before the Russian Revolution. As early as 1899, a Polish revolutionist named Wacław Machajski had raised this point in *The Evolution of Social Democracy*, and in 1904, in *The Intellectual Worker*, he restated his thesis that the theory of socialism had not been worked out in the interests of the proletariat but of a new force, "the growing army of intellectual workers and the new middle class." Their revolution would produce a state capitalism in which the technicians, organizers, administrators, educators, and journalists would constitute the "great joint stock company known as the State, and become, collectively, a new privileged stratum over the manual workers." (Daniel Bell, "One Road from Marx: On the Vision of Socialism, and the Fate of Workers' Control, in Socialist Thought," *World Politics*, July 1959, pp. 491-512.)

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other rulers, at least in underdeveloped areas, can escape this conflict. If most Middle Eastern peasants and workers want more worldly goods, they want them for the sake of living well here and now; for the sake of gaining the prestige of offering larger dowries, of having more leisure. The contrast between postponing rewards and reaping them now is great enough, especially in a part of the world where scarcity and uncertainty have always loomed so threateningly, to create valid and deeply felt distinctions between political parties; indeed, between styles of life. Hence there is no reason to assume that the contradiction—even between those who demand immediate satisfactions for workers and peasants and those who claim to represent their "true" interests in the long run—can be "non-antagonistic."²²

Such contradictions need not, however, become overtly antagonistic. This is not because nationalist ideologists deny that such conflicts are genuine, but because the sense of class interests is still blurred. The new middle class has only recently been emerging as a class and tribal and family loyalties remain predominant among many of the peasants and workers. Although the disciplined organization of a majority of urban workers into trade unions in Morocco and Tunisia within a decade or less demonstrates how quickly the Middle East is changing, the mobilization of peasantry and workers by the new middle class has scarcely begun in most countries of this region. Charismatic and nationalist identification between leaders and followers frequently creates much overlapping enthusiasm even when there are few overlapping interests. And peasants and workers are often content to yield much for concrete rewards, regardless of the political system that grants them—especially greater justice from the courts, more honesty from the administrators, more wells, more schools, more food. The Middle East is only beginning to enter the age of choice, and hence of experiencing the price of making friends and enemies among one's own people. Middle Eastern political and social stability, therefore, has scarcely yet been tested.

The new middle class is not the first class that has sought to

²² Cf. editorial in *Peiping People's Daily* on "non-antagonistic contradictions," reprinted in *Pravda*, April 15, 1957.

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take the leading role in modernizing the Middle East. There were individual rulers in the nineteenth century who recognized that the survival of their power, the prestige of their dynasty, and the security of their domain depended on the modernization at least of their army, bureaucracy, and trade. Mohammed Ali (in power 1805-1848) in Cairo, and Sultan Mahmud II (in power 1808-1839) in Constantinople were among the earliest such rulers. Later, when Middle Eastern empires were succeeded by independent states, the bourgeois and large landowners assumed this task, but once again limited their performance largely to what was required to enhance their own status and power. Hence trade and bureaucracy remained the principal foci of modernization. To reflect the participation of a somewhat broader group in politics, party cliques and quasi-parliamentary structures were developed. Since European influence in the Middle East was usually strong enough during this period to curb the army's growth, it was modernized only sufficiently to make it an adequate repressive force. There was little or no response to pressures for modernization from below, and no general commitment to deal with social change.

This older bourgeoisie was in its structure, interests, and relationships, and hence in its political role, quite different from the emergent new middle class. The former maintained itself in urban enclaves within a "feudal" society.²³ It never attained the strength to unite city and countryside into a single economic unit, or the courage to reshape that larger society which was, nonetheless, beginning to crumble around it.

Many of the small businessmen—the principal pillars of the properited middle class—have tended here as elsewhere "to develop a generalized hostility toward a complex of symbols and processes bound up with industrial capitalism, the steady growth and concentration of government, labor organizations, and business enterprises, and the correlative trend toward greater rationalization of production and distribution."²⁴ Their interests

²³ This distinction between the role of the bourgeoisie and the middle class is also employed by G. D. H. Cole, "The Conception of the Middle Classes," *The British Journal of Sociology*, December 1950, pp. 275-290.

²⁴ Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and McCarthy," *American Journal of Sociology*, November 1958, p. 274.

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therefore differ from those of a salaried new middle class accustomed to life in an organization, and their range of interests and their links with the new class are too limited in the Middle East to give them a leading role in shaping the direction of a society in upheaval.

In part, of course, even the salaried middle class is aware of itself only as an interest group with pragmatic, specific, and relatively short-run demands. It may concentrate on conspicuous consumption—acquiring Cadillacs, building steel mills regardless of their relative economic utility, or improving armies that are already strong enough to maintain internal security and protect the frontiers against all but the large industrialized powers. To allocate savings and scarce foreign exchange to the satisfaction of the immediate desires of the new middle class in this manner is no different from allowing them to be used by peasants for larger dowries—the conflict is then between interest groups, not between different orientations toward social change. The interest of one group is satisfied at the direct expense of another's.

It is quite apparent, however, that the pace and pain of social change had become too great by the second half of this century for the new middle class to avoid acquiring a larger historical consciousness of its role.¹⁶ The new middle class has become the first bearer of civic spirit on a national scale in the Middle East because it cannot translate its ideas into action or achieve careers or status unless it creates a nation of individuals linked by consciousness and material fact—a nation that economically, socially, and politically can survive social change. For almost every individual in the Middle East is now in motion, even those who are still standing still. Things are not the same for those who toil or die in traditional fashion if their neighbors now have modern implements to plant modern cash crops and can keep themselves healthy with modern medicines. When people come to be called traditionalists by their neighbors, the old spell has been broken. The new middle class not only possesses the kind of empathy

¹⁶ In Lebanon, however, there appears to be a peculiar obstacle to such a change: various religious and ethnic groups have become political interest groups, each entitled to a proportionate share of jobs in parliament, bureaucracy, and education.

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that allows its members to see themselves "in the other fellow's situation."¹⁷ Even in traditional Islam, it was not infrequent for an artisan to become the leader of a religio-political rebellion, or for a soldier or tribal chief to become Sultan. Some could envisage playing such roles; others could not. What characterizes the new middle class in the Middle East is that it is the first that has the capacity to envisage new types of roles to be played in a new kind of world.

In the midst of a profound social transformation which it helps to shape and sharpen, this new middle class will, of course, not remain a stable or static element. In part it will give birth to new strata from within itself; in part it will be midwife to other classes kindred to it—namely those which are usually termed upper and lower middle classes. Indeed, these are already beginning to appear in their modern version.

Given the predominant role of the new middle class in the government, and hence in the social and economic development of the country, the modern upper middle class is very likely to develop to a considerable extent from among the ranks of the former. Even the members of modern professions, almost exclusively sons of landlords and the traditional bourgeoisie earlier in this century, are being increasingly drawn from the same broader ranks as the salaried middle class. If such social and economic development grows apace, the modern upper middle class of politicians, professional men, and administrators may well come to dominate society and give it a moderate orientation.

This upper middle class which starts, as it were, from scratch, may be joined by private entrepreneurs taking advantage of the new political stability and the economic foundations built by the government. It seems, however, rather rare for members of traditional bourgeois families to take advantage of their capital and connections to acquire new skills relevant to an industrial economy.¹⁸ To have become rich in traditional fashion often shrouds incentives to the learning of modern skills. As for self-

¹⁷ The key concept defining transitional and modern man in Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Glencoe, 1958, pp. 49-54, 69-75.

¹⁸ See Bert F. Hoeselitz, "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October 1952.

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made modern capitalists in the Middle East, much will depend on the ideology of the salaried middle class. In Egypt, even the most efficient large private enterprises have been nationalized for the sake of centralizing control over investments and distribution of benefits. In Syria, capitalists threatened by the same policies during 1961 allied themselves with opposition movements drawn from the would-be middle class and succeeded in installing a tenuous new regime pledged to a mixed economy.

Members of the traditional elite who are not landlords or traders have sometimes gained access more readily to the modern upper middle class. Sons of the traditional bourgeoisie in a number of Middle Eastern countries have transformed themselves into one of the most influential elements of the modern upper middle class by virtue of their training as officers in the army. Trained in modern technology and administration, and assigned a national mission, this group had the opportunity and incentive for a successful transition. Similar to them in origin and second to them only in power are many of the Western-trained members of the upper levels of the bureaucracy. And there are, it must be added, a number of kings who seem anxious to make the same transition — among them those of Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and Morocco. But be they general, bureaucrat, or king, they are likely to fail politically unless they can relate themselves to the aspirations of the rest of the new middle class. For they themselves number in no country of this region more than a few hundred. Even if some of them have independent incomes, nevertheless all are dependent upon civil and military bureaucracies without whose loyalty or cohesion they can no longer function at all.

The modern lower middle class is, in the Middle East, composed of two distinct groups. There are those whose "western education is limited, and more probably has been cut off at an early stage. Self-education seems to be a recurrent feature among them."¹⁰ But there are also those in the lower middle class who, instead of being able to capitalize on a modicum of modern

¹⁰ Leonard Binder's description of the Pakistani lower middle class is probably applicable to the rest of this region (drawn from an unpublished manuscript delivered at the Dobbs Ferry Conference of the Social Science Research Council, 1937).

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knowledge, suffer from a peculiarly modern disability. They are well trained, but in classic subjects (e.g., *Shari'a* law) or in the wrong language (e.g., Urdu, when English is essential to government and business). In any but the modern age, they would have been able to rise to a status equivalent at least to that of the modern middle class. Now they can only hope to eke out a lower middle class existence. In short, both components of the modern lower middle class in the Middle East consist of men who are frustrated in their social mobility. They are not like the traditional lower middle class, composed predominantly of small artisans and shopkeepers and minor clerks, most of whom implicitly accept their station in life.¹¹ They are not, like the middle and upper strata of the new middle class, capable of translating their ambition into reality. Hence, organizing their discontent is likely to offer a major potential for political action.

Prospects for the New Middle Class

Thus the character and terms of the struggle for power in the Middle East become clearer. The changes now under way in the social and political system appear to have three successive, though often overlapping, phases: first, the battle between the new middle class and the traditional ruling class; second, the drive by the successful new middle class to supply cadre for all five groups that compose the elite in modern society (political leaders, government administrators, economic directors, leaders of masses, and military chiefs);¹² and third, the struggles among

¹¹ In Turkey, where the modern age began earlier than in most of the Middle East, the mid-nineteenth century saw the appearance of the Young Ottomans, many of them minor bureaucrats, whose level of expectations had risen since they had become the Empire's new experts in communication and administration. Yet they lacked the lubricants of money and family status to advance themselves. At that point in history they allied themselves almost entirely with the ulama who were beginning to lose prestige with the growth of secularization. (See Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton, 1962.) In nineteenth century Egypt, such men often allied themselves with the Moslem Brotherhood (see Chapter 8).

¹² These five categories are drawn from Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *The British Journal of Sociology*, March and June 1950, p. 9. Aron points out that "The fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet type and one of the Western type is that the former has a unified

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strata within the new middle class for predominance, increasingly involving other new classes, especially uprooted peasants and workers.

In terms of these phases, it is apparent that the most important political struggle in the Middle East is no longer between the new middle class and the traditional ruling class. The new middle class has already come to power in almost all but the least developed and regionally least influential countries.³³ At this extraordinary moment when the traditional ruling class has been defeated and the peasants and workers have not yet organized themselves to make their own demands, politics has become a game played almost entirely within the new middle class. Thus, it is a political era resembling none that preceded it and probably none that will follow it, and one that is likely to prove particularly volatile and productive.

It will be volatile, in part, because politics within the new middle class will involve competition for a very limited number of powerful positions by persons who, even in behalf of issues, must often substitute the force of personality (itself still evolving) for the strength of established political parties. Compromises will be hard to arrange. Because the majority of the people are unrepresented, one of the most persuasive arguments for compromise among executive policy-makers in other countries—the anticipated reaction of a free legislature—will continue to be irrelevant. Disagreements among policy-makers in authoritarian regimes will usually mean ouster for one or the other.

Although repression of one faction of the new middle class by

elite and the latter a divided elite" (p. 10). From that perspective, the Middle Eastern situation fits somewhere in between, since the elite is drawn from a single, small, and embattled class which strives for the unification of the elite but seldom succeeds for long in preventing clashes. The pressure for a unified elite in the Middle East, moreover, is based on historical exigencies (the availability of a large number of members of the new middle class for a small number of careers in the new institutions of society) and political expediency (the need for loyal supporters in an environment in which the majority does not yet share the outlook of the new middle class). Conformity to an ideological dogma which justifies the unification of the elite (for example under the guise of the "dictatorship of the proletariat") characterizes only the communists in the Middle East.

³³ The displacement of the landowners and traditional bourgeoisie as the political elite does not necessarily imply their demise as a social class. Where

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another faction is common, membership in the same class seems to make a difference. Rival movements are outlawed, but individual members—men with whom, after all, one went to school, worked in common clandestineness, and with whose ideas one may once have toyed oneself—are often allowed to write editorials or remain in the bureaucracy. And the more important opposition leaders are, with startling frequency, appointed to Embassies abroad, being jailed only if they insist on returning. The centuries of repression which the new middle class fought to end more clearly and courageously than anyone else are, at present, in disrepute. For the first time since the Middle Ages, and in contrast to recent status quo oligarchies such as the late Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha's in Iraq, the elite and the main opposition, both drawn from the new middle class, speak a mutually comprehensible language derived from a common experience. Thus a genuine political dialogue is at last in progress in the Middle East.

The vital question now—vital because the outcome affects all aspects of society—is which segment of the new middle class shall predominate, what ideological orientation it will prefer, and what factors help or hinder the progress of competing factions.

The thrust toward revolutionary action on the part of the new middle class is overwhelming. It is itself the product of an unfinished and uncontrolled revolutionary transformation of society. It intends therefore to organize social change rather than become its victim. Even those who do not possess this broader vision, but who nevertheless would like to live in the same style as the average man in the more conservative industrialized nations, will have to upset the status quo much further before they can hope to enjoy the benefits of a stable new status quo. Unlike the great majority of the Western salaried middle class, this new class cannot afford to perpetuate the traditional norms and laws of society, even though it is already being threatened by the confusion of standards and the growth of extremism in its own ranks. The

such a demise of what was always a small group is in fact in progress, as in Tunisia, and where a strong egalitarian strain makes it difficult for any member of the new middle class to raise himself socially or economically high above his fellows, it may, strictly speaking, be wrong to speak of a middle class. Even here, however, "middle" still serves to define its aspirations and style of consumption, whatever its final destiny.

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largest component of the new middle class in most countries, and the most rapidly growing, will be the young with few links to tradition or to the previous generation, with inadequate knowledge and skills, and with little chance of status or of any useful job. Both the burden of the past and the threat of the future impel the salaried middle class to become the principal revolutionary force, creating new standards and institutions relevant to a modernizing society.

There is no inescapable doom that revolutionary change must come through violence, however. One of the most remarkable, and remarkably neglected, phenomena of modern history is the near absence of violence that has marked rapid, structural changes in all those countries where, since 1950, the new middle class has come to power. In Egypt, for example, a landed ruling class was economically dispossessed, socially displaced, and politically overthrown. A new social class took its place, the greater part of the economy was nationalized or at least placed under effective state control, the legal basis of authority and the structure and functions of political institutions were fundamentally altered, and a religion-bound culture was secularized, all at the cost of less than twenty lives.¹⁴ This is a remarkable performance in contrast to the French Revolution of the eighteenth century, or the Chinese and Russian Revolutions of our time.

The absence of violence alone, however, is not sufficient evidence of stability, or a clear sign that the fundamental revolution of Middle Eastern society has come to an end. The new middle class will be able to signal its conversion from a revolutionary into a stabilizing force only when it has succeeded in limiting the realm of politics to the domain of public authority, thus allowing the social, economic, and private business of men once again to become autonomous realms. That cannot happen until there is

¹⁴ Two soldiers were killed during the brief fighting that accompanied Nasser's coup in 1952, eleven strikers were shot during riots or subsequently court-martialed and hanged in 1952, and six members of the Moslem Brotherhood, for having conspired to assassinate Nasser, were sentenced to death in 1954.

Where the toll of violence was greater, the causes so far lay largely either in the resistance of the entrenched rulers to the emergence of the new middle class (as in Algeria), or in a deep division within the new middle class (as in Iraq).

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sufficient capacity and consensus for dealing with social change, and until political leaders need no longer convert all aspects of existence into issues of power.

In most countries of this region it is improbable, certainly within the next decade, that the new middle class will have succeeded in establishing firm economic, political, and psychological foundations for the growth of individuals and groups that can be autonomous in action yet share in a broad consensus of values. Instead, most of the governments will still be struggling to establish their own authority, and assure physical survival for their citizens. The status and prosperity that ought to accompany middle class existence is likely still to elude most of its members, and even the term "middle class" will retain ironic overtones. They will still be caught in the middle of time, between an age not yet quite dead and one not yet quite born. They will still be suspended between a traditional folk that is being uprooted but not yet sure what leadership to follow over the longer run, and a political elite, drawn at last from their own class but unable as yet to satisfy their aspirations. The new middle class will not be able to escape soon from the harsh struggle for the sheer biological and psychological necessities of life. Hence it will not soon escape from an age of revolution into an age in which both freedom and authority are assured.

The salaried new middle class possesses one advantage over all previous ruling groups. The tasks it must perform in order to create status, power, and prosperity for itself no less than the nation require the establishment of modern, integrating institutions which can mobilize the spirit and resources of the entire nation. At the same time these institutions, by their very nature, are also peculiarly adapted to control by the new middle class.

While it is almost inevitable in the present historical situation that the new middle class will acquire power, there is nothing inevitable about its orientation or its permanent success. Under the inspiration of particular personalities, ideologies, or environmental changes, this new ruling group may fractionalize more often than act in unison. Overwhelmed by pressure of sheer population, inadequate organizational skill, or lack of courage, it may not be able to cement a working relationship with the

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majority of the population—the peasants and workers. Yet unlike any of its predecessors, the new middle class has goals which depend for their success on popular support and participation, whether achieved by consent, authority, or terror.

Thus, the new middle class is faced with most extraordinary opportunities. If it fails to consolidate its authority by achieving sufficient internal cohesion and general social progress, and its factions are instead engaged in ruthless competition for the support of the rural and urban masses, the approaching future is bound to be one of fearful unrest.