The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective

Eva Bellin

Why have the Middle East and North Africa remained so singularly resistant to democratization? While the number of electoral democracies has nearly doubled since 1972, the number in this region has registered an absolute decline.1 Today, only two out of twenty-one countries qualify as electoral democracies, down from three observed in 1972.2 Stagnation is also evident in the guarantee of political rights and civil liberties. While the number of countries designated free by Freedom House has doubled in the Americas and in the Asia-Pacific region, increased tenfold in Africa, and risen exponentially in Central and East Europe over the past thirty years, there has been no overall improvement in the Middle East and North Africa.3 Aggregate scores in 2002 differ little from 1972. Fifteen countries are designated not free, five partly free, and only one free (see Table 1). While a few countries, notably Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Yemen, have registered noteworthy progress toward political liberalization in the past decade, overall the vast majority of countries has failed to catch the wave of democratization that has swept nearly every other part of the world.

Explanations suggest a litany of regional failures. First, civil society is weak and thus is an ineffective champion of democracy. Labor unions are empty shells; businessmen’s associations lack credible autonomy; nongovernmental organizations lack indigenous grounding. The weakness of associational life undermines the development of countervailing power in society that can force the state to be accountable to popular preferences. It also contracts the opportunities for citizens to participate in collective deliberation, stunting the development of a civic culture, that essential underpinning of vibrant democracy.4

Second, the commanding heights of the economy remain largely in state hands. Despite nearly two decades of experimentation with structural adjustment, the public sector continues to account for a major share of employment and GNP generation in most countries.5 This legacy of statist ideologies and rent-fueled opportunities undermines the capacity to build autonomous, countervailing power to the state in society.

Third, people are poor; literacy rates are low; and inequality is significant. It is
Table 1 Freedom House Rankings for Middle Eastern and North African Countries, 1972 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights/Civil Liberties (Composite Score)</th>
<th>Freedom Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972/2</td>
<td>2001/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Nat’l Author.</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (South)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6 (N &amp; S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (North)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An average rating of 1-2.5 are generally considered “Free”, 3-5.5 “Partly Free”, and 5.5-7 “Not Free.” For Freedom House’s methodology see www.freedomhouse.org
*The PNA was created in 1993-94
**North and South Yemen united in 1990

not unusual for a fifth of the population in a given country to fall below the poverty line; 32 percent of adults are illiterate; and the region ranks in the bottom half of the United Nations’ human development index despite the enormous wealth of several countries. These conditions compromise both elite and mass commitment to democratic reform. The masses do not prioritize it, and the elite has reason to be frightened by it. The champions of democracy are few and far between.

Fourth, countries in the region are geographically remote from the epicenter of democratization. Few, except Turkey, border directly on successful models of democratic rule. The demonstration effect that has proven so important in fueling democratization in other regions is diluted in the Middle East and North Africa.

Fifth, culture, specifically Islam, distinguishes the region. Surely culture must explain some of the region’s exceptionalism, especially since Islam is presumed to be inhospitable to democracy.

In short, the Middle East and North Africa lack the prerequisites of democratization. The lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture explains the region’s failure to democratize.

None of these explanations is satisfying. The Middle East and North Africa are in no way unique in their poor endowment with the prerequisites of democracy. Other regions similarly deprived have nonetheless managed to make the transition. Civil society is notoriously weak in sub-Saharan Africa, yet twenty-three out of forty-two countries carried out some measure of democratic transition between 1988 and 1994. The commanding heights of the economy were entirely under state control in eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, yet the vast majority of countries in this region successfully carried through a transition during the 1990s. Poverty and inequality, not to mention geographic remoteness from the democratic epicenter, have characterized India, Mauritius, and Botswana, yet these countries have successfully embraced democracy. And other world cultures, notably Catholicism and Confucianism, have at different times been accused of incompatibility with democracy, yet these cultural endowments have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and East Asia from democratizing.

Prerequisites: A Useful Approach?

Cross-regional and cross-temporal comparison indicates that democratization is so complex an outcome that no single variable will ever prove to be universally necessary or sufficient for it. Any notion of a single prerequisite of democracy should be jettisoned. But must the notion of prerequisites be abandoned altogether? It might be tempting to hold on to the idea. Cumulative failure to realize many of the conditions that have historically been associated with successful democratization is bound to
hinder democratic transition today. In the Middle East and North Africa the failure to realize so many of these conditions simultaneously may explain the region’s resistance to transition.

However, the Middle East and North Africa are not unique in this cumulative failure. The inability to fulfill these conditions is the reason why democracy is on such shaky ground in so many parts of the world, why analysts must resort to “democracy with adjectives” (another term for imperfect democracy) when categorizing so many products of the third wave in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Cumulative failure to achieve the prerequisites of democracy clearly undermines the consolidation of democracy. But alone it cannot explain the failure to carry out democratic transition because many countries burdened with failure have nonetheless made that leap successfully. The transition to democracy accomplished by sub-Saharan African states that typically rank as poorly as if not worse than many Middle Eastern and North African states on standard socioeconomic indicators, proximity to successful democracy, and the vigor of civil society makes this point clear. The puzzle posed by the Middle East and North Africa is not why democracy has failed to consolidate in this region (failure would be expected) but rather why the vast majority of Middle Eastern and North African states have failed to initiate transition at all. Herein lies the exceptionalism of the region. To explain it, it is necessary to look beyond failure to achieve the prerequisites of democracy, since failure is not exceptional to the region.

Insights from Studies of Revolution

Why has democratic transition largely eluded Middle Eastern and North African countries? It is not as though the region has been deprived of all democratic impulses. It has indeed experienced the emergence of civil society (human rights groups, professional associations, self-help groups), only to see most of them either repressed or corporatized by the state. Statist regimes have increasingly liberalized their economies (often under pressure from international forces), but autonomous political initiative by their new private sectors is typically punished. Progressive interpretations of Islam that endorse democratic norms and ideals have been parsed by Islamic theorists, only to be buried by hostile state elites. In each case a coercive state deeply opposed to democratic reform has quashed initiatives favorable to democracy.

To understand the rarity of democratic transition in the region, it is necessary to return to a classic work on revolution written by Theda Skocpol more than twenty years ago. The puzzling thing about revolution, Skocpol pointed out, is that, although the intuitive prerequisite for revolution—mass disaffection from the regime in power—is a relatively common phenomenon in human experience, successful revolution is a relatively rare event. What explains this divergence between cause and outcome? The answer, Skocpol argued, lies in the strength of the state and, most important, the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion. If the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, “value incoherence,” and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects.

In short, the strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus distinguish among cases of successful revolution, revolutionary failure, and nonoccurrence. The same might be said of democratic transition. Democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coercive apparatus remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic transition will not occur. Thus, the solution to the puzzle of Middle Eastern and North African exceptionalism lies less in absent prerequisites of democratization and more in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a robust coercive apparatus in these states. The will and capacity of the state’s coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative have extinguished the possibility of transition. Herein lies the region’s true exceptionalism.

Some conceptual clarifications are in order. First, will and capacity are two independent qualities that do not covary and ought not be collapsed into one. A regime may have the capacity to repress democratic forces but not the will, as in South Korea under Roh Tae Woo in 1987. Or the reverse may be true, as in Benin under Kerekou in 1989. Second, this argument admittedly veers toward conflation of the coercive apparatus and the authoritarian regime it undergirds. The distinction between the two is often difficult to draw, even in regimes (for example, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria) where the official head of state is a civilian, because the head of state is often closely allied with the coercive apparatus and highly dependent on coercion to survive. The mutual controls exercised by the security apparatus and the civilian leader endow each with a measure of veto power over the other and make it difficult to determine who exercises superior agency in the dyad.

Classic indicators used to gauge relative power (control over appointments, political succession, budgets, and policy) often do not yield a clear-cut picture. Patrimonial linkages between the regime and coercive apparatus further muddle the two. In Algeria, for example, conflation of the regime and the coercive apparatus is so pronounced that one analyst, paraphrasing Mirabeau’s description of Prussia, declared that “every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state.” The problem of conflation between authoritarian civilian regimes and the military is in no way peculiar to this region. Nevertheless, the prevalence of patrimonial logic in many regimes makes this problem particularly pervasive in the Middle East and North Africa.
Thus, authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and North Africa because the coercive apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below. Comparative analysis is helpful in explaining why. The experience of other regions reveals what is exceptional about the Middle East and North Africa.

Robustness of the Coercive Apparatus

What shapes the robustness of a regime's coercive apparatus? Under what conditions will it lose its capacity and will to hold on to power and permit society to experiment with democratization? Comparative analysis of cases of such renunciation suggests at least four variables that are crucial to this outcome.

First, the robustness of the coercive apparatus is directly linked to maintenance of fiscal health. The security establishment is most likely to give up when its financial foundation is seriously compromised. When the military can no longer pay the salaries of its recruits and the security forces can not guarantee supplies of arms and ammunition, the coercive apparatus disintegrates from within. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa democratic transition was less the work of strong societies and more the consequence of weak states. Prolonged fiscal crisis “hollowed out” the coercive apparatus of many African countries. Soldiers went unpaid, and matériel deteriorated. Democratic transition was possible because decomposition of the military and security establishments opened up the political space in which demands for democracy could be pressed. According to Bratton and van de Walle, the strength and disposition of the military were among the most significant determinants of the fate of transition on the African continent.

Second, the robustness of the coercive apparatus is also shaped by successful maintenance of international support networks. The security establishment is most likely to lose its will and capacity to hold on to power when it loses crucial international support. Coercive regimes especially face this problem if they have been the recipients of massive foreign support (and few authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century escaped the benevolence of one great power or another during the cold war). Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on. This scenario proved key in eastern Europe, where the Soviet Union's withdrawal of support for the Brezhnev doctrine spelled the end of the coercive backbone of eastern European regimes and their will to hold on. It also proved important in Latin America, where the United States' abrupt shift away from supporting authoritarianism after the cold war dealt many regimes an important existential blow.

Finally, it was important in sub-Saharan Africa where, as the cold war waned, foreign patrons, both eastern and western, withdrew massive supplies of military aid and where western donors increasingly made foreign aid conditional on democratic reform. Third, the robustness of the coercive apparatus, or of its will to repress reform initiatives, is inversely related to its level of institutionalization. The more institutionalized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed. The less institutionalized it is, the less amenable it will be to reform.

Institutionalization of the coercive apparatus should not be confused with professionalization in Huntington's sense. Institutionalization does not refer to the depoliticization of the security establishment and its subordination to civilian control. Rather, institutionalization involves the establishment of qualities that Weber used to distinguish bureaucracies from patrimonially driven organizations. An institutionalized coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between the public and private that forbids predatory behavior vis-à-vis society; and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy. In contrast, in a coercive apparatus organized along patrimonial lines staffing decisions are ruled by cronysim; the distinction between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavages, often relying on balanced rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups.

Patrimonialism confers a number of distinct advantages on authoritarian regimes that can contribute to their longevity. They include demobilizing the opposition and building a loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary patronage. Patrimonialism can also make authoritarian regimes particularly resistant to democratic reform. In the coercive apparatus, patrimonial organization will be less receptive to political opening. By contrast, institutionalization will have more tolerance for reform. First, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized, the security elite has a sense of corporate identity separate from the state. It has a distinct mission, identity, and career path. Officers can imagine separation from the state. They believe they will live to see another day, even if they relinquish power. They do not perceive that they will be “ruined by reform.” To the contrary, they are more likely to be ruined by holding on to office too long because the inevitable political failures are bound to trigger and develop political divisions within the elite. These divisions, in turn, may threaten the institutional integrity of the security apparatus. One of the main factors that drove the military elite to transfer power to civilians in Brazil and Argentina was its concern to save the institutional integrity of the military establishments. Similar incentives are present whenever the coercive apparatus is strongly institutionalized. Second, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized rather than patrimonial, it is distinguished by a commitment to some broader national mis-
sion that serves the public good, such as national defense and economic development, rather than to personal aggrandizement and enrichment alone. Where the elite has successfully delivered on this mission, it again has good reason to be persuaded that it will not be ruined by reform. To the contrary, where it has successfully delivered on public goals like national defense and economic development, it might be confident of its ability to ride democratic transition successfully and maintain a hold on power, this time by popular election. Both Pinochet in Chile and Roh Tae-Woo in South Korea reasoned this way. While Pinochet was overly optimistic (he failed to win the plebiscite that would have elected him Chile's president in 1988), Roh Tae Woo's political confidence was well-placed. The South Korean general rode his record of achievement to win the highest office of the land.35 Again, the institutionalized character of the security apparatus fostered tolerance of democratic reform.

Finally, the coercive apparatus' capacity and will to hold on to power is shaped by the degree to which it faces a high level of popular mobilization. Violently repressing thousands of people, even if it is within the physical capacity of the security forces, is costly. It may jeopardize the institutional integrity of the security apparatus, international support, and domestic legitimacy. Clearly, the high costs of massive repression will not deter an elite that believes it will be ruined by reform.36 The slaughter of thousands at Hama by Assad's regime in Syria and the massacre of hundreds at Tiananmen Square by the Communist regime in China are only two salient examples of the human tragedy wreaked by coercive elites bent on repression and undeterred by the very high costs associated with it.37 However, where the elite does not perceive reform to be so devastating, the higher cost of repression posed by high levels of popular mobilization may serve as a tipping mechanism, pitching the elite onto the side of reform. In Korea mass demonstrations on behalf of democratic reform, manned by a broad, cross-class coalition with sizable middle class participation, persuaded Roh Tae Woo to forgo brutal repression of the democracy movement and instead opt for reform.38 Similarly, in Latin America the presence of an organized labor movement and an active civil society, both mobilized on the side of democratization, made coercive regimes in Argentina and Peru reconsider repression when other options seemed possible and safe.39

Two objections might be raised to this fourth variable. First, it introduces an element of circularity to the argument, since the level of popular mobilization in society is, to some degree, shaped by the coercive capacity and will of the state. For example, in Egypt the state's coercive capacity and will has led to harsh repression of civil society; consequently, many popular forces have been reluctant to mobilize politically. The reluctance has lowered the cost of repression for the state and reconstituted its will to use coercion. However, there is no simple correlation between a state's coercive capacity and will and its demobilization of society. Some coercive states nurture the development of civil society through corporatist measures. Others repress inconsistently, demobilizing some groups (for example, leftist unions) but not others (for example, the church). Tolerated pockets of mobilization can come back to challenge the state. The elite is forced to ask if the cost of repression is worth the benefit. For example, in South Korea in 1987 the mobilization of tolerant groups such as church and student movements created significant pressure to reform. Consequently, popular mobilization must be measured on its own, independent of the state's coercive capacity and will.

A second objection to popular mobilization as a variable is that it reintroduces some of the logic of the social prerequisites approach rejected earlier. The level of popular mobilization is clearly shaped by such variables as literacy, urbanization, and socioeconomic inequality. However, one variable can not be reduced to the other. Popular mobilization is also shaped by ideological factors (like Communism or Islamism), leadership variables (like charismatic leadership), and sudden moments of crisis that spur a spontaneous popular response. Measurement of socioeconomic variables will not account for such spurs of mobilization; popular mobilization must be measured on its own.40

Conditions in the Middle East and North Africa

No single variable, whether poor fiscal health, declining international support, strong institutionalization, or high levels of popular mobilization, is either a necessary or sufficient condition of retreat from power by the coercive apparatus. But these four variables have been important cross-regionally in cases of retreat. How do the countries of the Middle East and North Africa rate on them? Their performance suggests reasons why authoritarian regimes are exceptionally robust there.

First, with regard to fiscal health, although many states in the Middle East and North Africa have economic difficulties of one sort or another, few, save perhaps the Sudan, face economic collapse of sub-Saharan proportions.41 Most, moreover, enjoy sufficient revenue to sustain exceedingly robust expenditure on their security apparatus. In fact, these expenditures are among the highest in the world. The region's states are world leaders in the proportion of GNP spent on security. On average, they spent 6.7 percent of their GNP on defense expenditures in the year 2000, compared to a global average of 3.8 percent. 2.2 percent in NATO countries, 2.8 percent in non-NATO European countries, 3.3 percent in East Asia and Australasia, 4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.6 percent in the Caribbean and in Central and Latin America.42 They are also among the biggest spenders in terms of arms purchased. Seven—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Algeria—alone accounted for 40 percent of all global arms sales in the year 2000.43 Finally, the percentage of population engaged in various branches of the security apparatus is high by world standards. The average country counts 16.2 men per thousand under arms, compared to 6.31 in France, 3.92 in Brazil, and .33 in Ghana. In
Iraq, for example, the number is 20.94; in Syria, 26; in Bahrain, 33.8; in Saudi Arabia, 9.86; and in Egypt, 10.87. How do these countries sustain such elaborate coercive apparatuses? Here is where access to rents comes into play. This access has long distinguished the region.44 Many, though not all, of these states are major recipients of rentier income. Their rent derives from different endowments—petroleum resources, gas resources, geostrategic utility, and control of critical transit facilities. From the more than $30 billion that the Saudi state earns each year in oil revenue to the $2 billion that Egypt receives annually from the United States in foreign aid, many Middle Eastern and North African states are richly supplied with rentable income.45 It gives them access to substantial discretionary resources so that, even if the country is overall in poor economic health, the state is still able to hew to conventional economic wisdom and pay itself first, that is, give first priority to paying the military and security forces. Thus, while government spending on education and welfare may remain flat and economic crisis may cut into infrastructural investment, expenditure on the security apparatus remains very high.47 In Egypt, for example, economic crisis forced the regime to sign an IMF accord that required a reduction in the subsidy of basic goods by 14 percent. This reduction did not prevent the regime from increasing the military budget by 22 percent that same year.48 Similarly, in Algeria, although civil war has ravaged the country’s economy, the army is always paid. The military apparatus remains intact thanks to Algeria’s reliable dole of oil and gas rents. In short, exceptional access to rents has nurtured a robust coercive apparatus in many states across the region.49

With regard to international support, the region is exceptional for the unique position it enjoys in the international arena. As in other regions, authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa profited from the cold war, reaping patronage from eastern and western great powers (sometimes simultaneously) in return for the promise of reliable alliance in the fight for or against Communism. But in contrast to other regions the authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa did not see their sources of international patronage evaporate with the end of the cold war or with America’s subsequent reanimation with democracy, because western interest in the region has been driven by multiple security concerns that survived the cold war. Two key concerns are a reliable oil supply, a strategically crucial resource to increasingly dependent OECD countries, and the Islamist threat, which has proved ever more alarming as Islamist radicals turned their fury toward American targets in the U.S. and abroad.49

Both of these concerns have provided a compelling rationale to western policymakers to persist in providing patronage to many authoritarian states in the region. As Roosevelt said about Somoza, “they may be sons of bitches but at least they are our sons of bitches.”50 Authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria have received western support, at times in very generous proportions, because of the belief (perhaps mistaken) among western policymakers that these regimes would be most likely to deliver on western security concerns by assuring regular oil and gas supplies to the West and containing the Islamist threat. In short, the region is exceptional in that the cold war’s end has not signaled great power retreat from patronage of authoritarianism, as in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere.51 Playing on the West’s multiple security concerns has allowed authoritarian regimes in the region to retain international support. The West’s generous provision of this support has bolstered the capacity and will of these regimes to hold on.

With regard to the third variable, patronialism, in most Middle Eastern and North African countries the coercive apparatus, like the regimes themselves, is governed by patronial logic. Although not universal (the military in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia are highly institutionalized) many of the regional powerhouses, such as Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as lesser forces such as Jordan and Morocco, have coercive establishments shot through with patronialism. Personalism pervades staffing decisions. In Jordan and Morocco the king regularly appoints his male relatives to key military posts to guarantee against military rebellion.52 In Saudi Arabia and Syria entire branches of the military and security forces are family affairs.53 Political reliability supercedes merit in promotions. In Jordan Palestinians can not rise above the rank of major or lieutenant colonel in combat units.54 In Syria an Air Force commander was appointed though he was not even a pilot (but he was a trusted friend of Hafez al-Assad).55 Ethnic ties are used to guarantee loyalty. In Iraq the elite units were overwhelmingly Sunni. In Syria they are Alawi.56 Intercorp and intracorp discipline is maintained by relying on balanced rivalry between primordial groups. The Syrian regime carefully balances Alawi, Sunni, and Christian leadership to maintain control. The Jordanian and Saudi regimes rely on tribal and bedouin loyalties to balance power between different corps.57 The distinction between public and private is not always scrupulously observed. In Iraq and Syria the military has served as a key route to personal enrichment. It has not been unusual for generals to turn their units into personal economic fiefdoms.58

Of course, not all security establishments are equally corrupted. The Jordanian military is much more rule-governed than its Syrian or Iraqi counterparts. Moreover, patronialism should not be confused with professional incompetence; many of these apparatuses are professionally well-trained and equipped to handle the most modern military matériel. But patronialism spells a strong personal linkage between the coercive apparatus and the regime it serves; it makes for the coercive apparatus’ personal identification with the regime and the regime’s longevity and thus fosters resistance to political reform.

Under patronial conditions, political reform represents the prospect of ruin for the elite of the coercive apparatus. Political opening and popular accountability would deprive the Alawi officer in Syria of his special perquisites, if not his life. Regime change would jeopardize the predominance of favored tribal elites in the
Jordanian and Saudi military. Furthermore, few of these officers could expect to ride electoral politics to power, Roh Tae Woo-style, because of the failure of these patronially driven apparatchiks to deliver on national goals as successfully as did Roh Tae Woo. To the contrary, these officers have every incentive to close ranks behind the old authoritarian system, shoring it up even when natural calamity provides an opportunity for opening. For example, in Syria, the ruling dictator’s old age, illness, and death might have created an opportunity for political opening if the leaders of the coercive apparatus had not closed ranks behind the old system and persuaded the dictator’s son that the country’s best interests lay in continuing the regime.

The prevalence of patrimonialism is by no means exceptional to this region. Similar logic governs regimes in Africa, Asia, and beyond. But the low level of institutionalization in the region’s coercive apparatuses constitutes one more factor explaining the robust will of so many to thwart political reform.

As for the fourth variable, popular mobilization on behalf of political reform remains weak. Nowhere in the region do mammoth, cross-class coalitions mobilize on the streets to push for reform, as in South Korea. Consequently, in most Middle Eastern and North African countries the costs of repression are relatively low. Even where mobilization has been higher, as when Islamists mobilized impressive numbers for political reform in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the state lessened the costs of repression, that is, the potential loss of domestic legitimacy or international support, by playing on the special threat posed by Islamist forces. The mobilization was cast as a threat to order and security for both domestic and international constituencies. This approach succeeded. The Algerian state was able to count on continued French patronage for many years by emphasizing the danger of the Islamist menace. Even Asad’s brutal massacre at Hama won him some popular support on the grounds: “Better one month of Hama than fourteen years of civil war as in Lebanon.”

The low level of popular mobilization for political reform is not limited to the region, and to some extent it is a consequence of some of the absent prerequisites of democracy like poverty and low levels of literacy. However, there are additional factors that reduce popular enthusiasm for democratic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. First, experiments in political liberalization are historically identified with colonial domination rather than self-determination (in contrast to India). Earlier half-hearted attempts carried out under British and French mandates were more window-dressing for foreign domination than substantive experiments in self-rule. Second, there is no prolonged prior experience with democracy that might have created the institutional foundations for popular mobilization, such as mass-based parties and labor unions (in contrast to many Latin American countries). Third, a counterparadigm offers an ideologically rich and inspiring alternative to liberal democracy (in contrast to eastern Europe after the fall of Communism). Although Islamist ideologies need not be posed as an alternative to liberal democratic world-views, they often develop in this way out of political expediency. Fourth, the presence of this nondemocratic Islamist threat demobilizes much of the traditional constituency for democratic activism, the secular and educated elements of the middle class. No matter what the explanation is, low levels of popular mobilization for democratic reform are a reality in the region. They lower the costs of repression for the coercive apparatus and increase the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to force to thwart reform initiatives.

Of course, there is one dramatic example in the region where popular mobilization for political reform succeeded in bringing on regime change: Iran. Millions of Iranians participated in mass protests to bring down the Shah, and popular mobilization played a key role in the revolution’s success, not least for the profound impact it exercised on the military. Although the military retained the physical capacity to repress the protestors, its will was sapped by the potentially enormous cost of repression, not least to the institutional integrity of the military itself. Faced with masses of civilians bearing flowers and chanting religious slogans, many soldiers refused to shoot; desertsions mounted; and outright mutinies against the upper ranks multiplied. Fearing for the institutional integrity of the armed forces, the chief of staff declared the military’s neutrality toward the revolution and sealed the fate of the old regime. In short, high levels of popular mobilization in Iran raised the cost of repression sufficiently to undermine the coercive apparatus’s will to repress.

A fifth variable, the existence of a credible threat, has been suggested to explain the robustness of the coercive apparatus in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. Given the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the politics of the region, some analysts link the robustness of the region’s authoritarianism to the existential threat posed by Israel to its Arab neighbors and to the subsequent construction of large militaries by many Arab states. No doubt the prevalence of interstate conflict in the region (including but not limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict) has played an important role in reinforcing authoritarianism in the region. But analysts who champion this explanation must account for the fact that the robustness of coercive apparatuses in Arab states correlates neither geographically nor temporally with the threat posed by Israel. Geographically, the arc of authoritarianism in the region far exceeds the fly-zone of the Israeli air force; that is, countries far removed from the epicenter of the conflict (for example, Saudi Arabia, Morocco) still share the region’s propensity for robust coercive apparatuses. Temporally, reduction in the existential threat posed by Israel has not led to commensurate decline in the size of the coercive apparatus. For example, the cold peace between Egypt and Israel over the past twenty-five years has not been matched by a comparable reduction in Egypt’s military budget.
Conclusion

The exceptionality of the Middle East and North Africa lies not so much in absent prerequisites of democracy as in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism and especially a robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus. Some conditions responsible for the robustness of this authoritarianism are exceptional to the Middle East and North Africa; others are not. Access to abundant rent distinguishes the region and subsidizes much of the cost of these overdeveloped coercive apparatuses. Multiple western security concerns in the region guarantee continuous international support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa even after the cold war. But the prevalence of paternalism in state structures and the low level of popular mobilization are not unique to the region. Together, these factors reinforce the coercive apparatus' capacity and prevent democratic reform.

For other regions, the experience of the Middle East and North Africa draws attention to the persistent importance of structural factors, most importantly, the character of state institutions, in charting a country's susceptibility to democratic transition. The sudden and pervasive turn toward democracy in Latin America during the 1980s played a key role in discrediting socioeconomic determinism in theories of democratic transition, highlighting instead the centrality of elite choice and voluntarism in establishing democracy. The dramatic transition to democracy that swept sub-Saharan Africa and eastern Europe in the 1990s drew attention to the important role popular mobilization can play in bringing down authoritarian regimes. But the stubborn persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa highlights an equally powerful lesson. Where patronial institutions are wedded to coercive capacity, authoritarianism is likely to endure. In this context, regime elites possess both the will and the capacity to suppress democratic initiative. And where international support and financing is forthcoming to the authoritarian regime, rapid regime change is unlikely.

It would be tempting to argue that removal of the coercive apparatus, perhaps by decisive external intervention, could end authoritarianism and open the way to democracy in such regions. Unfortunately, the analysis presented here does not support this view. The various phenomena identified above explain the robustness of the coercive apparatuses in many Middle Eastern and North African countries and their will to suppress democratic initiative. This analysis says little about the conditions necessary to implant democracy itself. For, while the removal of democracy-suppressing coercive apparatuses is a necessary condition for democratic transition and consolidation, it is not sufficient. A host of conditions, including a minimal level of elite commitment, a minimal level of national solidarity, a minimal level of per capita GNP, and, perhaps most important of all, the creation of impartial and effective state institutions must be present. Effective bureaucracies, police, and judiciaries that can deliver predictable rule of law and order are essential for democracy to flourish. To a large degree, order comes prior to democracy. Democracy can not thrive in chaos.

Sadly, countries with a history of patrimonial rule are greatly disadvantaged in this institutional endowment. Personalistic regimes, by definition, privilege government by the ruler's discretion, not rule of law. Generally, patrimonial regimes do not have the effective and impartial bureaucracies, police, and other state institutions that are essential for a robust democracy. Thus, consolidation of democracy in post-patrimonial regimes is especially challenging.

In the absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive apparatus will lead, not to democracy, but rather to authoritarianism of a different stripe or, worse, chaos. To anchor democracy in the region, political reformers must focus on building effective, impartial state institutions, nurturing associations that reach across ethnic lines and unite people around common economic and cultural interests, and fostering economic growth that will increase per capita GNP into the zone of democratic possibility. This challenge is gargantuan but is little different from the one facing many other countries. In facing this challenge, as in so many ways, the Middle East and North Africa are hardly exceptional at all.

NOTES

The author gratefully acknowledges the critical comments of Lisa Anderson, Michele Feffer Angrist, Mia Biocm, Jason Brownlee, Jose Cheibub, Larry Diamond, Kenneth Erickson, Gregory Gause, Barbara Geddes, Daniel Gingerich, Steven Heydemann, Michael Hudson, Samuel Huntington, Alan Jacobs, Pauline Jones-Lueng, Vickie Langho, Ellen Lust-Oakar, Nelson Kastir, Augustus Richard Norton, Susan Pharr, Manha Priapiea Fossay, Bruce Rutherford, Paul Salern, Benjamin Smith, Lily Tsai, Lucas Way, Carrie Rosefsky Wickaam, the members of the Harvard University Research Workshop on Comparative Politics, and two anonymous readers and the research assistance of Theresa House.

1. The Middle East and North Africa include twenty-one countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. I have excluded four countries that are members of the Arab League but are geographically too remote: Somalia, Mauritania, Djibouti, and the Comoros Islands.


3. Ibid., pp. 5-7. Freedom House's division of the world places Turkey in Europe and the Palestinian Authority in a separate category called disputed territories. Thus, neither country appears in its statistics for the Middle East and North Africa. I include both.


5. UNDP, Arab Human Development Report (2002), reports that government expenditures as a percentage of GDP average 30 percent in the Arab world, though this figure is likely an underestimate since many oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were not included.
6. For poverty levels and illiteracy rates, see Economic Trends in the MENA Region, 2002 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 23, 102. The illiteracy rate cited excludes Israel, which registers 4 percent adult illiteracy. For human development data, see UNCAD, Human Development Report (2001). Interestingly, according to Adams and Paae the MENA region has the lowest regional incidence of extreme poverty with less than 2.5% of the population living on or below $1/day; in fact, countries in the region have, on average, one of the most equal income distributions in the world, although even its income distribution is significantly unequal. See UNDP, Arab Human Development Report (2002), p. 90. World Bank, World Development Report (2003), pp. 230-33.


11. Atul Kohli, ed., The Success of India’s Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 69, 246.


14. Perhaps the most powerful critique of any deterministic association between religious tradition and authoritarianism, and specifically between Islam and authoritarianism, is made by a nonsectarian. Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), emphasizes the multiplicity of all great religious traditions and their potential for reconciliation with democratic ideals. He provides empirical support for the possibility of Islam’s reconciliation with democracy by pointing to both Muslim majority countries that sustain electoral democracies (Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh) and the millions of Muslims who reside in democracies in Europe, and the U.S. without injury to their religious identity.

15. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).


19. Ibid., p. 34.


21. In Egypt, for example, the president retains control over promotions above brigadier, has a final say over the military’s budget, and can dismiss popular military leaders (such as Abu Ghazala) if they become too popular. The military has independent sources of financing, seems to exercise veto power over the designation of Mubarak’s successor, and has saved the regime from fatal attacks on at least three occasions. See Philippe Droz-Vincent, “Le Militaire et le Politique en Egypte,” Monde Arabic: Maghreb Machrek, 165 (July-September 1999), 16-35; Daniel Sobelman, "Garnal Mubarak, President of Egypt?,” Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2001), 31-40; John Stavananakis and Robert Springberg. "The President, the Son, and Military Succession in Egypt," Arab Studies Journal (Fall 2001), 73-88. In Syria the balance of power is similarly unclear. The late dictator Hafez al-Assad was able to dismiss powerful special forces commander Ali Badar over a policy difference but also had to court the favor of the military to ensure the succession of his son Bashar to the presidency. See Rina Brooks, Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press for ISIS, 1998).

22. Mohammed Harbi, cited in Le Soir de Bruxelles, Jan. 11, 2002. I thank Reba Bensmaia for alerting me to this source. Droz-Vincent, p. 16, identifies the original source as Mirebeau.


32. Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 82-97; Geddes, pp. 115-44.


40. Popular mobilization should also not be confused with the variable civil society. It encompasses and exceeds this variable, embracing more spontaneous and short-lived movements such as demonstrations and riots and not limiting itself to the more institutionalized components of associational life such as labor unions, businessmen’s associations, and nongovernmental organizations.


43. “The MENA continues to be the world’s leading arms market...in absolute terms.” Ibid., pp. 119, 298.

44. Compiled from ibid., p. 128. The size of the coercive apparatus alone does not indicate the relative robustness of authoritarianism. A country may boast a very large military and still be democratic, as in the U.S. Similarly, Israel sustains a democratic political system despite the very large size of its military, measured in terms of military expenditure as share of GNP or of percentage of population under arms. As long as the coercive apparatus is subject to civilian control, large size is compatible with democracy.


46. See Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 30–44. Although they detect a declining trend in rents earned by Middle Eastern and North African countries in recent years, this income is still substantial. For example, oil income alone accounted for more than 50 percent of government revenues in about half of these countries in the late 1990s.

47. See ibid., p. 106. In many countries 25 percent (or more) of government expenditure is on the military, and in some, including the Sudan (55 percent), the UAE (48 percent), and Saudi Arabia (37 percent), the proportion is significantly higher.


49. Preservation of Israel’s security might be a third concern, although it seems to be more an American than a fully western preoccupation. See Amy Hawthorne, “Do We Want Democracy in the Middle East?” www.afs.org/65/feb01/hawthorne.html.

50. I would like to thank Steve Levitsky for reminding me of this quotation.

51. Henry and Springborg, p. 32.


61. Of course, high levels of popular mobilization were not the only reason the military folded. Also at work were the weak administrative structure of the military (which was left headless after the shah’s departure) and the sense among the generals that the U.S. had abandoned the shah. See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 121–29.

62. Besides providing rhetorical legitimation for coercive regimes, persistent conflict has rationalized the protracted states of emergency that stifle civil liberties in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. See Gregory Gause, “Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World,” in Brynen, Korany, and Noble, eds., pp. 283–306.

63. Droz-Vincent, p. 17.


65. Bratton and van de Walle, Basque.

66. Brownlee, Snyder.


69. Statistically, between $4,500 and $5,500.

156


61. Of course, high levels of popular mobilization were not the only reason the military folded. Also at work were the weak administrative structure of the military (which was left headless after the shah’s departure) and the sense among the generals that the U.S. had abandoned the shah. See Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 121–29.

62. Besides providing rhetorical legitimation for coercive regimes, persistent conflict has rationalized the protracted states of emergency that stifle civil liberties in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. See Gregory Gause, “Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World,” in Brynen, Korany, and Noble, eds., pp. 283–306.

63. Droz-Vincent, p. 17.


65. Bratton and van de Walle, Basque.

66. Brownlee, Snyder.


69. Statistically, between $4,500 and $5,500.