



## Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective

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## IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND\*

THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoretical significance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusing on the political dynamics of the radical change in Iran's societal structure of domination and the moral dynamics of reintegration and collective action that accompany it. The political dynamics of revolution primarily explain the collapse of the structure of domination, while the moral dynamics of revolution underlie its teleology—i.e., its direction and consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution, revolutionary ideology assumes primary importance.

Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutions occur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structure of domination" to refer to the prevalent system of authority. It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern revolutions, but it also includes other institutions and corporate entities that have some measure of autonomous authority in the religious, judiciary, or economic spheres. The most important of these other institutions is usually the hierocracy—i.e., the church or its equivalent.

Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance. The dislocated groups and individuals need to be reintegrated into societal community and may also demand inclusion in political society. The integrative social and political movements that arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributing factor to the occurrence of revolutions.

The collapse of the societal structure of domination in revolutions is caused by two sets of factors: the structure's internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and the concerted action of the social groups and individuals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the context of the power struggle set in motion by the centralization of the state. They

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may also have moral motives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocation and normative disturbance. In addition, there may be other motives, such as class interest. The degree of cohesion and solidarity within each social group is a primary determinant of its capacity for collective action; the possibility of successful revolutionary action usually depends on the formation of coalitions among opposing social groups. All of the above factors provide important points of reference for comparisons regarding the *causes and preconditions* of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Revolutions can and should be compared in terms not only of their causes and preconditions, but also of their consequences. Those integrative social movements which successfully build on the preconditions of social dislocation and moral disorder to create revolutionary movements do so by using ideology as an instrument. The ideologies that set the revolutionary struggle in motion and are shaped in its course bridge the gap between the causes and the consequences of revolutions. They cannot account for the collapse of the societal structure of domination to any significant degree. On the other hand, the value-ideas that form their normative foundation, and are often progressively defined and formulated during the revolutionary process, *do* shape the political order installed by the revolution to a significant extent.

A comparative analysis of the *teleology* of the Islamic Revolution thus requires a serious and systematic analysis of revolutionary *ideologies*. The modern political myth of revolution and the various ideologies onto which it has been grafted in the past two centuries have constituted a causal factor in motivating revolutionary opposition to the status quo, but it would be a serious mistake to stop the analysis there. Ideologies are of primary theoretical interest in that their constitutive value-ideas determine the teleologies of the respective revolutions.<sup>1</sup> The nature and specific content of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologies therefore supply the basic points of reference for comparison with the teleology of the Islamic Revolution. These latter comparisons enable us to assess the distinct significance of Iran's Islamic Revolution in world history.

## I. THE CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

### A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY

The emphasis of recent scholarship on the role of the state, its repressive capacity, and its ability to weather serious crises has brought

<sup>1</sup> The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintended consequences of rev-

out the fact that revolutions often owe their success more to the internal breakdown and paralysis of the state than to the power of revolutionary groups.<sup>2</sup> It has been argued that the decisive factor in the occurrence of a revolution is the fragility of the existing political system.<sup>3</sup> Centralization of monarchical states reduces the degree of pluralism in society and increases its political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person. De Tocqueville, who considered that hatred of the Old Regime dominated all other passions throughout the French Revolution, also showed how that hatred became fatally focused on a single person, the king: "To see in him the common enemy was the passionate agreement that grew."<sup>4</sup> The same can be said about the Shah, whose ouster was the one common demand that brought together almost all of the disparate sections of Iranian society. Furthermore, the same property of the monarchical system in Iran goes a long way toward explaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarch and the Shah's counter-image.

The type of political regime we might call "neopatrimonial" is also characterized by its fragility. In contrast to the ideal-type of the absolutist state in which the king is the first servant of the state, government is extremely personal in patrimonial states. The chief executive encourages divisions within the army and the political elite in order to rule. Such neopatrimonial states are particularly subject to collapse and ensuing revolution once the ruler breaks down.<sup>5</sup> The Mexican Revolution that was set in motion by the death of Porfirio Díaz in 1911, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions, can be cited in support of this proposition. In his regime, the Shah combined the weaknesses of the neopatrimonial states with the old vulnerabilities of monarchy.<sup>6</sup> He had painstakingly constructed the machinery of the state around his person; there can be no doubt that the collapse of the man preceded the collapse of the machine. This collapse was evident in the Shah's pervasive wa-

olutions and confine the points of comparison to those consequences that are prefigured in the goals of the historical actors who eventually appropriate the revolution.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, 1983), 309-14.

<sup>3</sup> Jean Baechler, *Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

<sup>4</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineau*, ed. and trans. by John Lukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 82, 109.

<sup>5</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978); Jack A. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 8 (1982), 196-97.

<sup>6</sup> The Shah was aware of these vulnerabilities, and, in 1978, knowing he had cancer, began trying to make the regime more "democratic" for the succession of his son. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein & Day, 1980).

vering and indecision (for example, he could not make up his mind to appoint a prime minister for the liberal, nationalist opposition until it was far too late), in his inconsistent combination of rewards and threats, and in his highly inhibited use of force.<sup>7</sup>

The neopatrimonial character of his state notwithstanding, the Shah did have a disciplined and well-equipped army and police force. He simply refused to use them effectively to repress the revolutionary movement. The Shah pretended to be using the army. He declared martial law in some cities in late summer of 1978 and installed a military government in November. But after the Black Friday massacre of September 8, 1978, he had muffled the army, to the outrage of his generals. This is reflected in low casualties, about 250 in the September 8 massacre, about 750 in Tehran in the following five months, and probably three times this figure for the whole of Iran. On December 21, 1978, the Prime Minister, General Azhari—after a mild heart attack and from his bed—complained to the American ambassador of the demoralization of the army which he attributed to the Shah's orders forbidding the troops to fire except in the air, no matter how badly abused or pressed. "You must know this and you must tell it to your government. This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind."<sup>8</sup>

Unlike the Czar's troops in 1917, the Shah's army remained largely intact and loyal until he departed on January 16, 1979. Khomeini's leaflets were distributed among the soldiers. There were instances of fraternization with the demonstrators and of desertion; twelve officers were killed by three rebellious soldiers of the Imperial Guard; a mutiny occurred in Tabriz in December; and there were a number of other minor incidents. There was also persistent trouble with paramilitary technicians of the Air Force, known as the Homafaran. But overall, the strain of confrontation with the people did not seriously affect the morale and discipline of the armed forces. It was only *after* the Shah's departure that the process of disintegration of the army under political pressure set in seriously. I do not wish to assert that the use of the army for massive repression would have prevented the revolution. We will never know what would have happened if the Shah had ordered his forces to be brutally repressive in October and November 1978, when they were not yet affected by the revolutionary turmoil. The army might or might

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 168-71; William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 190; Jerrold J. Green, *Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 92-124.

<sup>8</sup> Sullivan (fn. 7), 212. The figures for Tehran are taken from a Master's thesis for Tehran University supervised by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf. I am grateful to Dr. Ashraf for this information.

not have disintegrated or split; the fact remains that it had not disintegrated by January 16, 1979. And the opposition knew it.<sup>9</sup>

The army's officers had a strong sense of professional identity, but no attachment to any particular solidary social group or any organized interests. Furthermore, the Shah had carefully chosen his top generals to assure they could not act in concert against him, and he had succeeded in that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not let them. They could not act against him, but neither could they act for themselves or any other group. In desperation, some of them finally made a deal with the clerical opposition. Tilly has correctly emphasized the importance of coalitions linking revolutionary challengers to the military.<sup>10</sup> Although the term coalition would be too strong, the agreement worked out by Bazargan and Beheshti through the mediation of the American ambassador with a number of the generals was of crucial importance in bringing about a split in the army and its consequent neutralization in February 1979.<sup>11</sup>

If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army was intact, despite the fact that there was no defeat in war, and despite the fact that the state faced no financial crisis and no peasant insurrections, where does all this leave the usual generalizations about revolutions? Mostly in the pits. War has been called the midwife of revolution, and peasant insurrections are considered indispensable in many currently fashionable theories of revolution.<sup>12</sup> The inferences we can draw from the case of Iran are as follows: financial and fiscal crises—or, for that matter, the extractive capacity of the state and heavy taxation—are not necessary for the occurrence of revolution. It is possible for the societal structure of domination to collapse without the participation of the peasantry; and a major war or defeat of the army are not necessary preconditions of revolution. I will show how a political order may collapse without any of these conditions. For now, let us merely note that the Cuban Revolution was an instance of a revolution without a rebellion of the peasantry and without a major defeat in war. Skocpol, whose theory of revolution puts a great deal of emphasis on both these allegedly necessary conditions, cavalierly dismisses Cuba in half a footnote. Furthermore, she does not face the theoretical consequences of the

<sup>9</sup> Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), 142-43.

<sup>10</sup> Tilly (fn. 2), 20.

<sup>11</sup> Sullivan (fn. 7), 199-247.

<sup>12</sup> Skocpol (fn. 2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico," *Theory and Society* 7 (No. 3, 1979), 153; Zimmermann (fn. 2), 315, 322, 336-42, 352-57.

absence of these factors in her subsequent article about the Iranian Revolution. She is rightly determined to bring the state into the picture, but does so in an unsatisfactory way, largely by deploying a new pet phrase, "the rentier state." The basic idea is misleading in that the "rentier state" was actually created by Reza Shah from the early 1920s to 1941, when the revenue received by the state from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in fact small—some 10 to 15 percent of government revenue, and minuscule compared to the oil revenue in the 1970s. She musters a modicum of other plausible but *ad hoc* subsidiary themes to account for the Iranian Revolution. However, Skocpol never faces up to the problem of reconciling the Iranian Revolution with her theoretical schema of 1979.<sup>13</sup>

One generalization is borne out by the revolution in Iran:<sup>14</sup> the Shah was seriously compromised by his close and subservient association with the United States, and the American military and economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization. The antforeign motive in challenging the legitimacy of the societal structure of domination finds parallels in the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban revolutions, and in East European fascism.

#### B. THE STATE, THE HIEROCRACY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHI'ITE IRAN

It would be a mistake to equate the societal structure of domination with the state alone. For Max Weber, its major components were the state *and* the church. He defined the two institutions of legitimate authority analogously, and took care to analyze the relationship between the church and civil society when appropriate.<sup>15</sup> This point is significant because the unique feature of Iran's Islamic Revolution is that it is a crucial stage in the conflict between hierocracy and state, while at the same time being a modern political revolution. It is a composite of two phenomena whose counterparts in Western history are separated by centuries. The absolutist states of Europe had already won the protracted contest with the Roman Church before the coming of the early modern European revolutions.<sup>16</sup> In the history of Iran, the analogous contest

<sup>13</sup> Skocpol (fn. 2), 318, n. 2; Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11 (No. 3, 1982), 265-304. On the Cuban Revolution, see John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), chap. 8.

<sup>14</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 304-06.

<sup>15</sup> Weber, *Economy and Society* (2 vols.), ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), I, pp. 54-56 and II, chap. 15.

<sup>16</sup> Otto Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective," in Reinhard Bendix and others,



between the state and the hierocracy occurred much later. Shi'ism was declared the state religion of Iran in 1501, but the hierocracy remained heteronomous and subordinate to the state for a long time, consolidating its power and autonomy only at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The curtailment of the power of the hierocracy and the appropriation of many of its prerogatives and functions by the state took place in the 20th century. The Shi'ite religious authorities were and remained doctrinally and institutionally independent of the state, however: they retained their autonomous religious authority as well as their control over appreciable resources independent of the state bureaucracy.<sup>17</sup>

The Western revolutions were directed against state *and* church. The church had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and disestablished by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, it was an integral part of the monarchical regime. In the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the entire beleaguered Shi'ite hierocracy rose against the state. (This was partly due to the Shah's fateful ineptitude in not splitting the Shi'ite hierocracy in time; there is now evidence that some of the grand ayatollahs were ready for a compromise by the summer of 1978, and a split did in fact occur after the revolution.)

For analytical reasons, too, it is important to conceive of the societal structure of domination in more inclusive terms. Revolutionary situations occur because of the disintegration of central authority. With the disintegration of the authority of the state, other elements of the societal structure of domination assume greater importance. Corporations and individuals with authority in other spheres of life can extend their authority to the political sphere and assume positions of leadership. In such situations, they emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. The hierocracy and men of religion can use their traditional authority in this fashion, and have often done so—for instance, in Spanish history.<sup>18</sup> In

eds., *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 63, 110-11.

<sup>17</sup> Said A. Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

<sup>18</sup> We encounter this kind of situation in rebellions in Castile in 1520, where Franciscan and Dominican monks figured prominently among the leaders of the *Comuneros*. Similarly, as the president of the Catalan *Diputacio*, the priest Pau Claris assumed the leading position in the rebellion of the summer of 1640. When the Spanish people rose against Napoleon in 1808 without any king or government, they were led by the church—priests and monks. See Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 42; Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), I, pp. 266-67.

Iran, many of the high-ranking members of the Shi'ite hierarchy led the popular opposition to the monarch during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906. In 1978, many groups and individuals who wanted the Shah out but had no interest whatsoever in a theocracy accepted Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership.

The centralization of the state necessitates the concentration of economic, coercive, and symbolic resources. It entails encroachments upon local and provincial privileges as well as fiscal and constitutional immunities; and it entails the dispossession of certain privileged social groups. It thus sets in motion an intense and continuous political struggle. The reaction of privileged groups and of autonomous centers of power against the expansion and centralization of the state is a major source of most if not all of the early modern European revolutions:<sup>19</sup> the revolt of the Comuneros of the cities of Castile against Charles V in 1520; the revolt of the Netherlands in reaction to the centralizing policies of Philip II in the 1560s; the French Civil War of the 16th century; the revolt of the Catalans once Olivares had consigned their "constitutions" to the devil, and of Portugal in 1640; the early phase of the English Revolution;<sup>20</sup> and the Fronde and the aristocratic pre-revolution of 1787-1788 in France.<sup>21</sup> In all these cases, estates and corporations reacted when their autonomy and inherited privileges were threatened by the state; and they usually found men of religion as their allies. The dispossessed or debt-ridden nobility of the Netherlands, for instance, found allies in Calvinist preachers and iconoclasts.<sup>22</sup> In the Iran of the 1970s, the preachers and the chief dispossessed solidary group capable of reaction were the same group.

Three major privileged social groups were victims of the centralization of the state under the Pahlavis. The first consisted of the tribal chiefs. The pacification campaigns of Reza Khan (later to become Reza Shah) in 1921-1925 broke the power of the tribal chiefs and eliminated many of them physically,<sup>23</sup> even though resistance in the most peripheral areas such as Luristan continued until the early 1930s. The land and property registry law of 1922 converted the surviving tribal chiefs into big land-

<sup>19</sup> Eisenstadt (fn. 5); Baechler (fn. 3), 139; Goldstone (fn. 5), 194-95.

<sup>20</sup> By 1640, the English Crown had alienated a large segment of the elite which included, notably, the proponents of aristocratic constitutionalism and the rising local landed gentry who resisted its increasingly statist policies. See Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 30, 57, 92, 124.

<sup>21</sup> De Tocqueville (fn. 4); Alfred Cobban, *Aspects of the French Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1968); Zagorin (fn. 18).

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 94.

<sup>23</sup> Richard Tapper, Introduction to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 26-28.

lords.<sup>24</sup> As such, they became members of the city-dwelling, landowning upper class, and, as individuals, many of them entered the Pahlavi political elite.

The Shi'ite hierocracy was next to come under fierce attack by the centralizing Pahlavi state. Under Reza Shah, the state deprived it of all its judiciary functions, eliminated its prebendal, fiscal, and social privileges, and greatly reduced its control over education and over religious endowments. In the face of Reza Shah's determination and severity, it did not react in any significant fashion.

Reza Shah had reached an accommodation with the class of big landlords, "the thousand families," who predominated in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) until 1960. It was during the first—and only genuine—stage of Mohammad Reza Shah's land reform in 1962 and 1963 that the landowning "thousand families," including the tribal chiefs, were liquidated as a class. Once the Majlis was dissolved, the "feudal" landowning class had no autonomous institutional basis and could not react against its complete political and partial economic dispossession by the state. Though many of its members retained large holdings of land and became mechanized commercial farmers, thus joining the petro-bourgeoisie, and though many of them remained in the Pahlavi political elite, the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was the power basis of the landowning class and accounted for its prominence in the Majlis, had undoubtedly been destroyed.<sup>25</sup>

Relations between the hierocracy and the monarchy had improved after the resignation of Reza Shah—especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the monarchy was weak and the hierocracy was alarmed by the threat of communism. The state resumed its aggressive posture in the 1960s and 1970s, this time encroaching upon the religious sphere in the strict sense.<sup>26</sup> In contrast to the landowning class, the partially dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate did have an autonomous institutional basis. It could react to the expansion of the state, and eventually did.

In the political struggle set in motion by the centralization and mod-

<sup>24</sup> Ann K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), chap. 15.

<sup>25</sup> Ahmad Ashraf "Dehqanan, Zamin va Enqelab" [The Peasantry, Land and Revolution], in *Kitab-e Agah* (1982/136), 1, 11-12; Eric Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 79, 81; Ann K.S. Lambton, "Land and Revolution in Iran" (Review Article), *Iranian Studies* 17 (No. 1, 1984), 76-77. The destruction of the peasant-landlord relationship was completed in the 1960s, during the second and third phases of the reform, with the schemes for division of land between peasants and landlords. Though the redistributive effect of these phases was negligible, their sociopolitical effect in breaking the traditional links between peasants and landlords was profound.

<sup>26</sup> Said A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," *Government and Opposition* 16 (Summer 1981), 293-316.

ernization of the state, the dispossessed social groups that retain an institutional basis for reacting against the expanding state still need to create *coalitions* with other social groups and classes if they are to succeed. In the early 1960s, elements from the hierocracy, the landlords, and the tribal chiefs made poorly coordinated attempts to forge a coalition, but the separate uprisings of Khomeini's followers and the Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad tribes of Fars in 1963 were ruthlessly suppressed.<sup>27</sup> In 1978, when an effective coalition did come into being, it carried out a revolution.

Because of their common hatred of the Shah, the revolutionary coalition of 1978 included the bulk of Iran's urban population. The peasantry did not play a role in the Islamic Revolution, and neither did the industrial working class. All other segments of the population actively opposed the Shah and accepted Khomeini's revolutionary leadership. The two most important coalition partners of the militant clerics consisted of the new middle class—government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia, and the white-collar workers in the service sector—and the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar.

The coalition between the Shi'ite clerics and the new middle class was highly unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on the part of the former and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long: having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no time in liquidating the Westernized intelligentsia.

The coalition between the revolutionary clerics and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the other hand, rested on more tangible grievances on both sides and on a more solid historical basis. It has been more enduring. It is the latest instance of the alliance of the mosque and the bazaar, and resembles the alliance of the urban bourgeoisie and the church in the 11th and 12th centuries in Western Christendom. It was forged in the late 1970s, under the immediate impact of the Shah's destruction of the seminaries in Mashad and his massive antiprofitteering campaign against the bazaar merchants and retailers.<sup>28</sup>

Why did the new middle class lose out? History could have gone the other way—as it did in the case of Nasser's temporary coalition with the Muslim Brothers who had wide popular support and were in some ways much better organized than the mullahs. In 20th-century Iran, the

<sup>27</sup> Ann K.S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 102-13; Tapper (fn. 23), 29.

<sup>28</sup> According to Bakhash, 8,000 shopkeepers were jailed and as many as 250,000 fined during this campaign in 1975 and 1976. Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 13. The last figure seems too high.

centralizing state had atomized society to a considerable degree. It had detached the tribal chiefs and dissolved the landowning class; and it had created an intelligentsia, a bureaucratic class, a body of army officers and, lately, an industrial/entrepreneurial group; all of these were unattached to any solidary social community, be it a tribe, an estate, or a corporation. In partial contradistinction to prerevolutionary France, however, three elements of the old civil society had escaped the atomization of Iranian society: the Shi'ite clerical estate; the bazaar and traditional bourgeoisie; and urban communities in certain older city quarters that were dominated by the previous group. To these, one should add the new urban communities created by chain migration from rural areas and small towns into the larger cities. It is not surprising, then, that the atomized new middle class proved to be the proverbial Marxian "sack of potatoes" while the other solidary social groups in the coalition were capable of remarkably concerted political action, and soon took over.<sup>29</sup>

The Shah had kept the new middle class under constant supervision by the secret police and had not allowed it to form associations or to gain any political experience. Moreover, its ability to act was seriously impaired because the army officers were isolated from the rest of its elements. Thus, the political representatives of the new middle class could not easily form a coalition with the army, which was too closely identified with the Shah and his regime. They therefore decided to form a coalition with the Shi'ite hierarchy.

According to Tilly, contenders who are in danger of losing their place in a polity are especially disposed to "reactive" collective action. He rightly observes that for centuries the principal form of collective action followed a "reactionary" pattern—i.e., it was "reactive" and "communal." Thanks to social evolution, however, that is no longer the case, and collective action has become predominantly "proactive" in modern times.<sup>30</sup> This conceptual distinction seems of dubious value: a whole set of revolutions analyzed in this paper are both "reactive" and "proactive."

<sup>29</sup> It is interesting to compare the heterogeneity and lack of cohesiveness of Iran's new middle class with the same features associated with its Western counterpart, which Gouldner erroneously portrays as a new class in the Marxian schema. Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury, 1979).

<sup>30</sup> Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science, III: Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 507-10. It is highly revealing that the period identified by Tilly as marking the transition from traditional to modern forms of collective action, the mid-19th century, coincided with the end of the classic age of revolutions. Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-1855," in William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

In reality, collective action that Tilly had typified as "reactive" does not lose its importance after the middle of the 19th century; and it usually continues to draw on communal traditional solidarities. Whenever these communal solidarities are class solidarities, they pertain not to rising but to *declining* or threatened social classes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran alerts us to the undeniable importance of reactive action in the revolutionary movements of the last two centuries, including those that Marx took to be revolutions of rising classes.

Fascinating evidence for the importance of reactive action and traditional communal solidarities in revolutionary movements has recently come to light; it concerns the very groups who inspired Marx with the theory of revolution that has distorted our understanding of the phenomenon for over a century. The myth of the middle class in the English and the French Revolutions has long been exploded, notably by Hexter and Cobban. Trevor-Roper's characterization of the English Revolution as the declining "mere gentry's" revolution of despair contains an element of truth, but also much exaggeration.<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, we now know that the revolutionaries of 1789 were *not* the capitalist bourgeoisie,<sup>32</sup> and that the revolutionaries of the first decades of the 19th century in England and of 1848 were *not* the industrial working class. The English revolutionary working class of that time in fact consisted of the artisans and craftsmen who were threatened by capitalist industrialization and were holding on to the memory of the golden age of a community of small producers based on mutual ties and cooperation.<sup>33</sup> A recent study of these "reactionary radicals," as one observer calls them, concludes that "commitment to traditional cultural values and immediate communal relations are crucial to many radical movements." Communal relations are seen to be important resources for mobilization as they enable traditional communities to remain mobilized for a long time and in the face of considerable privation.<sup>34</sup> Shopkeepers and artisans predominated in the French insurrections of the 1830s.<sup>35</sup> The same group of artisans reacting against industrial capitalism and proletarianization, who

<sup>31</sup> For an assessment of Trevor-Roper's idea, see J. H. Hexter, *Reappraisals in History*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 129-31.

<sup>32</sup> Alfred Cobban, *Social Interpretations of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Jack A. Goldstone, "Reinterpreting the French Revolution," *Theory and Society* 13 (September 1984).

<sup>33</sup> Krishan Kumar, "Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-Century England: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," *European Journal of Sociology* 24 (No. 1, 1983).

<sup>34</sup> Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (No. 5, 1983), 886, 897, 908.

<sup>35</sup> Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 374-75.

drew their standards and idiom of protest from the past, constituted the backbone of the 1848 revolutions in France and Germany. In France, the journeymen's brotherhoods which perpetuated the traditional corporate consciousness and solidarities of the *ancien régime* constituted the leading revolutionary element in 1848. In Germany, artisan groups were prominent in the revolutionary movement of 1848 while the proletariat was the most quiescent of all social entities.<sup>36</sup>

"Reactionary radicals," concludes Calhoun, "have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacy in revolutions. But at the same time, revolutions worthy of the name have never been made without them."<sup>37</sup> With the Islamic Revolution, a group of reactionary radicals under the leadership of the custodians of the Shi'ite tradition have at last gained supremacy in what is theoretically the most interesting of modern revolutions.

Let us move on to consider some movements that Marx did not study. First, there are the peasant rebellions. Generally speaking, the Islamic Revolution has this in common with peasant rebellions: it draws on corporate solidarities and communal and kinship ties, and consequently has many conservative and defensive features.<sup>38</sup> In Mexico, there was the massive peasant rebellion of 1810 led by Father Hidalgo and Father Morelos, both parish priests.<sup>39</sup> In Spain, the Carlists' aim in the 1830s has been described as the "restoration of 'monkish democracy'": the clergy led the prosperous Basque and Aragonese yeomanry in rising to defend their local autonomy and their *fueros* against the centralizing policy of the Bourbon government.<sup>40</sup> In the present century, there was the revolt of Zapata in defense of the local autonomy of traditional agrarian communities against the expanding *haciendas* in Mexico. Thanks to the devout Zapatistas (laws of 1915 and 1917) and to Cárdenas (1934-1940), the Mexican Revolution established the security of the *ejido*—community-owned, inalienable individual or communal holdings in the villages. It should be added that the outcome of the Mexican Revolution would have been much less secularist and more conservative if the Cristero movement, organized by priests and lay Catholics in reaction to the anticlerical policies of central government, with the motto

<sup>36</sup> William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 126, 127.

<sup>37</sup> Calhoun (fn. 34), 911.

<sup>38</sup> Georges Lefebvre, "La Révolution française et les paysans [The French Revolution and the peasants], in *Études sur la Révolution française* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1954 [1933]), 250, 254; Tilly (fn. 30, 1975), 498; Zimmermann (fn. 2).

<sup>39</sup> Dunn (fn. 13), 52-53.

<sup>40</sup> Brennan (fn. 18), 206-11, 213, note A. In the Second Carlist War (1870-1876), monks and priests again led the guerrilla bands.

*Viva Cristo Rey* (Long live Christ the King), had succeeded in 1927-1928.<sup>41</sup>

The pernicious idea that fascism was a movement of the petty bourgeois class has finally been laid to rest.<sup>42</sup> The petty bourgeoisie was somewhat overrepresented in most fascist movements, and it is undoubtedly overrepresented in the Islamic movement in Iran. But it is overrepresented in all sorts of radical movements. We find the "little people," the "*menus peuple*," in the religious riots in 16th-century France on both sides.<sup>43</sup> We find them among the stormers of the Bastille<sup>44</sup> and, as we have just seen, we find them among the 19th-century radicals who, for E. P. Thompson, *made* the English working class. Recent studies clearly show that fascist parties were supported by elements from *all* social groups, but especially the dislocated, the dispossessed, and the declassed. What is more to the point (and not disputed) is that the *leadership* of the fascist movements came disproportionately from the *declassé* and the dispossessed, from demobilized army officers, from displaced or unemployed bureaucrats (especially those dislocated by the redrawing of national boundaries), and from the occasional dispossessed aristocrat. The Nazis also did not fail to tap the traditional communal solidarities of the Protestant countryside.<sup>45</sup>

European fascism and the Islamic movement in Iran are similar in that they were led by dispossessed elements. But there are two important differences. First, the fascist leaders were a heterogeneous group, whereas Khomeini's militant clerics form a homogeneous solidary group. Second, the fascist leaders did not have exclusive control over any cultural assets, and had to get their ideas where they could find them. The Shi'ite hierarchy consisted of the custodians of a rich religious tradition. The consequences of these differences will become apparent presently.

<sup>41</sup> Dunn (fn. 13), 49, 64-69; François Chevalier, "The *Ejido* and Political Stability in Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 161-69; Guenter Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 16; Alistair Hennessy, "Fascism and Populism in Latin America," in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 280.

<sup>42</sup> Stein U. Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust, *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980); Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

<sup>43</sup> Natalie Z. Davis, "Religious Riots in Sixteenth-Century France," *Past and Present* 59 (1973), 85-86.

<sup>44</sup> George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 387.

<sup>45</sup> Francis L. Carsten, "Interpretations of Fascism," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 416-19; Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," *ibid.*, 38-39; Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing the Fascist Movements," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 764, 789; Miklós Lackó, "The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: The Arrow Cross," *ibid.*, 395-96; Hamilton (fn. 42), esp. 444-55.



C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL  
DISLOCATION

We can now turn to the preconditions of revolution—the social dislocation and moral disturbance that follow rapid social change. Let us begin with normative disturbance at the most superficial level.

The conspicuous consumption on the part of Iranian high society and the abundance of *nouveaux riches* produced an acute sense of relative deprivation among the new middle-class government employees, white-collar workers in the private sector, and schoolteachers. At times, there was the added discomfort of absolute deprivation, which resulted from an acute housing shortage that was aggravated by the influx of a sizable foreign work force and American advisers.

In this context, it would be valid to speak of the widespread discontent of 1977-1978 as a confirmation of Davies's J-curve of continuous rising expectations and sudden frustrations.<sup>46</sup> Iran's GNP grew by 30.3 percent in 1973-1974 and by a further 42 percent in 1974-1975. Then came the economic debacle—despite, or rather because of, the massive unregulated inflow of oil revenue. Severe bottlenecks in skilled manpower and infrastructure halted economic growth in 1976.<sup>47</sup> The problem was more deep-rooted, however. What underlay the widespread desire for revolutionary change was a fundamental disorientation and *anomie* more than a superficial and short-run frustration of material expectation. As Durkheim has pointed out, "crises of prosperity" generate disorientation by disturbing the collective normative order.<sup>48</sup> There can be no doubt about the tremendous confusion and disorder created by the massive inflow of petrodollars, just as there can be little doubt about similar confusions in Nigeria and Mexico today. The consequent sense of moral disorder and desire for the reaffirmation of absolute standards should not be minimized. There was a widespread cultural malaise throughout Iranian society, ranging from general confusion and disorientation on the part of the *nouveaux riches* to sharply focused and intense rejection of foreign and antireligious cultural influences on the part of the mullahs and the merchants of the bazaar.

In Europe, the socialist and fascist mass movements were part of the extraordinary wave of mass political mobilization and national integration that swept the continent in the early decades of the 20th century.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (No. 1, 1962).

<sup>47</sup> Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

<sup>48</sup> Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951 [1897]).

<sup>49</sup> Merkl (fn. 45), 760-62.

It is easy to recognize that these movements acted as vehicles for the integration of the recently mobilized masses into societal community. But one should not forget that religious movements have often performed the same function in the past.

Political mobilization comes about as a result of basic social change which also entails considerable social dislocation. Social change displaces a large number of persons from the strata into which they were born. These persons yearn for and demand inclusion in new forms of societal community. Religious movements and sects are age-old channels for the reintegration of such dislocated individuals. Political movements and parties are the new channels for societal reintegration. The Islamic Revolution demonstrates that the old and the new can combine.

Urbanization and the expansion of higher education in the two decades preceding the revolution are the two dimensions of rapid social change most relevant to the problem. Between 1956 and 1976, the urban population of Iran increased from 31 percent to 47 percent (from 6 to 16 million). Rural-urban migration accounts for a substantial proportion of this shift—over one-third for the decade 1966-1976, the rate being even higher for Tehran. This decade also witnessed an unprecedented expansion of higher education. The number of persons with higher education quadrupled (to about 300,000) and the enrollment in universities and professional schools in Iran trebled (to about 150,000). These factors contributed significantly to the rise of the Islamic movement. Thousands of religious associations spontaneously came into being in cities and in universities, and acted as the mechanism for the social integration of a significant proportion of the migrants into the cities and of the first-generation university students.<sup>50</sup> By contrast, the Shah's parallel attempt to integrate these same groups into his one-party political system proved to be a fiasco.

There is nothing new about dislocated, uprooted men and women finding new moorings in religious associations, sects, and revivalist movements. In England, for instance, many "masterless" men became sectaries in the 16th and 17th centuries.<sup>51</sup> As early as the 1570s, Presbyterian classes were attended by laymen, but it is in the 1620s and 1630s that Puritan lectureships took root in towns to an astonishing degree, to the dismay of the Anglican Church. Laymen became patrons and paymasters of the Puritan lecturers, and the congregations clustering around the latter became "models for ideological party organization."<sup>52</sup> The situation

<sup>50</sup> Arjomand (fn. 26).

<sup>51</sup> Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975), 45-48.

<sup>52</sup> Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21.

strongly resembles the growth of lay religious associations in Iran in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, where the mullahs preached—at first in person but later, when demand outstripped supply, through cassette players—to avid audiences of urbanites. We find an even closer parallel in the rise of Methodism. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, migrants into the new industrial towns of England flocked to the assemblies of the Methodist preachers. Here, the perspective of integration into societal community brings out the sociological cogency of Halévy's famous thesis: the Methodist Revival integrated the recently urbanized masses into societal community and thus prevented a political revolution in England.<sup>53</sup>

Fascism, too, acted as the vehicle of integration of rural-urban migrants into societal community. In Germany, for instance, "many of the new urbanites failed to complete their cultural adjustment to city life and instead remained curiously vulnerable to the agrarian romanticism of *völkisch* ideologues."<sup>54</sup> One-half of the top Nazi party leaders were born in large villages.<sup>55</sup>

Literacy and Puritanism went hand-in-hand. The same is true of the growth of Islamic scripturalism. Islamic fundamentalism spread in Iranian universities just as Puritanism had spread at Oxford and Cambridge.<sup>56</sup> Many of the Islamic activists of the 1970s, who currently form the lay second stratum of the Islamic regime, discovered "the true Islam" in university associations, just as Cromwell was reborn at Cambridge. Fascism spread at European universities in a parallel fashion. In Eastern Europe in particular, university students and young activists constituted the core of the fascist parties and their leadership. Rumanian fascism is of particular interest in this respect. In the early 1920s, its leaders, Codreanu and Mota, were founders of university associations for Christian reform and national revival in the universities of Iasi and Cluj, respectively.<sup>57</sup>

The *combination* of higher education and social dislocation is of particular importance for explaining the politicization of integrative movements. The key to the social composition of Islamic and university

<sup>53</sup> Elie Halévy, *The Birth of Methodism in England*, trans. and with an introduction by Bernard Semmel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

<sup>54</sup> Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

<sup>55</sup> Linz (fn. 45), 50.

<sup>56</sup> Stone (fn. 20), 96-97; Michael Walzer, *The Revolutions of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 140-43.

<sup>57</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 3d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1956), 44; Carsten (fn. 45), 418; Linz (fn. 45), 48-50; Juan J. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 167; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspective on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania," *ibid.*, 385-87.

activists of the 1970s is that they either moved from small towns to big cities to go to universities, or they were the first generation from traditional lower middle-class backgrounds to attend universities, or both.<sup>58</sup> These young men contributed to the revolutionary politicization of the Islamic revival of the 1960s and 1970s in the same way in which the educated country gentlemen in England had contributed to the revolutionary politicization of Puritanism. The parallel with Rumanian fascism is even more striking. As the last Iron Guard leader, Sima, put it, "in 1926-27, our universities were flooded by a big wave of young people of peasant origin . . . who brought with them a robust national consciousness and were thus destroying the last strongholds of foreign spirit in our universities."<sup>59</sup> According to Eugen Weber, "legionary leadership came from the provincial, only just urbanized intelligentsia: sons or grandsons of peasants, schoolteachers, and priests."<sup>60</sup>

Max Weber once remarked that with the advent of modern mass politics, the condition of clerical domination itself changes. "Hierocracy has no choice but to establish a party organization and to use demagogic means, just like all other parties."<sup>61</sup> Rapid urbanization and the Shah's failure to integrate uprooted elements—especially the socially mobile, newly educated elements—into his political system offered Khomeini and the cornered Shi'ite hierocracy an unparalleled opportunity for creating a politicized revolutionary mass movement. Using the organizational network of the lay religious associations and Islamic university students, the mullahs periodically organized the massive anti-Shah demonstrations and closures of the bazaar which amounted to a general strike of unprecedented duration. Perhaps they could even have brought down a stronger regime; we will never know. What is certain is that the clerically led general strike did bring down the fragile Pahlavi regime and its vacillating ruler.

#### D. THE POLITICAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF THE SUPPORTERS OF REVOLUTION AND THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS INTEREST

Political motive may be defined as the motive to retain or recover political and institutional assets threatened or expropriated, and to gain political power by membership in, and maximally, control of, political society. On the negative side, the moral motive for supporting a revo-

<sup>58</sup> Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "State and Social Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution," *State, Culture and Society* 1 (No. 3, 1985).

<sup>59</sup> Barbu (fn. 57), 392.

<sup>60</sup> Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 107.

<sup>61</sup> Max Weber (fn. 15), II, p. 1195.

lution may stem from the condemnation of a regime because it is unjust, because it is servile to foreign powers, or because it is instrumental in spreading an alien culture and undermining authentic traditional cultural and religious values. The moral condemnation of the regime as unjust may, in turn, be due to its being perceived as tyrannical, or it may be due to a sense of relative deprivation. On the positive side, the moral motive for supporting the revolution may result from the acceptance of the modern myth of revolution as a redemptive collective act. Finally, class interest can act as a motive for supporting the revolution if the economic interests of a class (so defined by virtue of their position in the mode or system of production) are protected or furthered thereby. With this schema, let us examine the motives that can plausibly be attributed to the social groups who supported the revolution against the Shah.

Political and moral motives are closely intertwined in the attitude of Shi'ite hierocracy. The primary material interest of the clerical leaders was to regain the prerogatives and functions they had lost as a result of the centralization and modernization of the state. This was true of the leading clerical militants who came from traditional urban backgrounds, were in their forties or fifties at the time of the revolution, and had a keen awareness of the dispossessions of the Shi'ite hierocracy by the Pahlavi state. The younger militant clerics, who were primarily drawn from humbler rural and small-town backgrounds, saw all avenues of upward social mobility for people in their profession blocked under the Pahlavis.<sup>62</sup> They expected an Islamic government to guarantee them rapid social ascent and full incorporation into the political system.

Both the clerical leaders and the militant seminarians were morally indignant at the spread of immorality, libertinism, and an alien culture under the Pahlavi regime. In a significant statement, Khomeini's son identified the conservative members of the Shi'ite hierocracy who supported the revolution against the Shah as persons whose motivation was exclusively moral.<sup>63</sup>

The political and moral motives are also entwined for the intensely politicized lay Islamic activists. These first-generation provincial and lower middle-class university students and graduates, mostly in the applied sciences and engineering, saw themselves barred from the Westernized upper echelons of society and high government positions. They,

<sup>62</sup> Michael M.J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

<sup>63</sup> Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 87 (May 1980), 26.

too, were motivated by the desire to remove these barriers to their upward social mobility. It would be absurd to attribute any class interest to this young "petty bourgeois" group other than the desire to gain power and entry into the political system, to move up on the social ladder, and to put an end to a cultural climate they found alien and resented deeply.

The motives of the new middle class were both political and moral. Many of its members—including the recently mobilized middle-class women who figured prominently in the anti-Shah demonstrations—wanted inclusion in the political society. They considered the Pahlavi regime tyrannical and unjust, and accepted the myth of revolution. It should be noted, however, that the potency of the political myth of revolution caused the new middle class, especially the women, to join the Islamic revolutionary movement against their class interests—indeed suicidally.<sup>64</sup>

The traditional bourgeoisie—the merchants of the bazaar, the petty bourgeoisie of distributive trades, and the craftsmen of the bazaar guilds—was the one social group for which class interest was the primary motive for overthrowing the Shah. These groups felt threatened by the developmental economic policies of the state which, among other things, excluded them from easy access to credit; they also feared the encroachment of the modern sector of the economy on their territory in the form of competing machine-made goods and new distributive networks of supermarkets and chain stores. To this motivating class interest was added a sense of relative deprivation caused by the tremendous gains made by court-connected industrialists, as well as considerable moral indignation caused by the disregard of Islam and traditional values under foreign cultural influence.

## II. THE TELEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

### A. MORAL RIGORISM AND THE SEARCH FOR CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY

The fact that integrative social movements are reactions to social dislocation and normative disorder explains the salience of their search for cultural authenticity and their moral rigorism.

<sup>64</sup> It was neither the first nor the last time that a social class participated in a revolution which did not further its interests. As Barrington Moore has pointed out, peasants have often been the principal victims of modernization brought about by communist governments they helped create by their participation in revolutionary movements. See Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 428-29; also see Zimmermann (fn. 2), 339-41, 356. Similarly, the outcome of the French Revolution was not especially favorable to the *petite bourgeoisie*, the *sans-culottes*, who most vigorously participated in it. *Ibid.*, 387, 407.

"Fascism was a revolution, but one which thought of itself in cultural, not economic terms."<sup>65</sup> The same is true of the Islamic Revolution, which emphatically saw itself in these terms—even when not explicitly so, as in the "Islamic cultural revolution" against Westernism and (Eastern) atheistic communism inaugurated with the closing of the universities in April 1980. Since the revolution, Iran's secular judiciary system has been systematically Islamicized, the Shi'ite Sacred Law has been codified for the first time in history, and Islamic morals and coverage of women are strictly enforced by an especially created official vigilante corps.

Disoriented and dislocated individuals and groups cannot be successfully integrated into a societal community without the creation or "revitalization" of a moral order.<sup>66</sup> Walzer emphasizes that Puritanism was primarily a "response to the *disorder* of the transition period."<sup>67</sup> Ranulf has correctly underscored the moral rigorism of Nazism and compared it to Puritanism.<sup>68</sup> The intense and repressive moralism of the Islamic revolutionaries in reaction to the moral laxity and disorder of Pahlavi Iran finds a strict parallel in Puritan moralism in reaction to the moral laxity and sensuality of the Renaissance culture, and in Nazi moralism in reaction to the decadence of the Weimar period. Furthermore, the parochial rejection of cosmopolitanism is a common feature of the Islamic Revolution and Nazism, and especially of Eastern European fascism.<sup>69</sup> The vehement rejection of cultural Westernism in favor of revitalized Christianity in Rumania and Hungary finds a counterpart in Khomeini's more systematic and successful determination to extirpate Western cultural pollution by establishing an Islamic moral order.

#### B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS

The revolutions of early modern Europe were made by men for whom restoration was the key word, and who "were obsessed by *renovation*—by the desire to return to an old order of society." The confused teleology of these revolutions was marked by an *absence of ideology* and by a corporate or national constitutionalism "which was mainly the preserve of the dominant social and vocational groups."<sup>70</sup> In the English Revo-

<sup>65</sup> George L. Mosse, "The Genesis of Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 22.

<sup>66</sup> Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for their Comparative Study," *American Anthropologist* 58 (April 1956).

<sup>67</sup> Walzer (fn. 56), 313, 315.

<sup>68</sup> Svend Ranulf, *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology* (New York: Schocken, 1964 [1938]).

<sup>69</sup> Eugen Weber, "Rumania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Istvan Deak, "Hungary," *ibid.*, 394; Barbu (fn. 57).

<sup>70</sup> John Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past and Present* 42 (1969), 42-44, 48.

lution, "with the nature, source, and grounds of political legitimacy all up for grabs, there was almost inevitably a great effusion of claims to legitimacy on all sorts of grounds, old and new."<sup>71</sup> Nevertheless, two elements predominate in the teleology of the English Revolution: parliamentarianism, and Puritanism and its offshoots.

If the French Revolution instituted one thing for all subsequent revolutions, it is the presence of ideology. It gave birth to Jacobinism as the classic form of modern revolutionary ideology. The ideas of constitutional representation and national sovereignty were coupled at the beginning. As the revolution progressed, however, the source of legitimacy drifted from the representation of estates to the symbolic embodiment of the will of the people. The claim to embody the will of the nation as a single homogeneous entity could only be made through the manipulation of the maximalist language of consensus. Presumed embodiments of the will of the people became the sole and sufficient basis of legitimacy. During the period of Jacobin ascendancy, revolutionary legitimacy triumphed; and with its triumph, revolutionary ideology "filled the entire sphere of power" and "became coextensive with government itself."<sup>72</sup> The distillation of the Jacobin experiment was the modern political myth of revolution. Revolutionary legitimacy became an autonomous and self-sufficient category.

In the 19th century, revolutions became "milestones in humanity's inexorable march toward true freedom and true universality."<sup>73</sup> Leninism combined this conception of revolution with the Jacobin myth; it has become the justification for the seizure of power by revolutionaries who proclaim themselves in charge of realizing the next stage of socio-historical development.<sup>74</sup> With the consolidation of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, Leninist revolutionary ideology "obtained control over the interpretation of world history."<sup>75</sup> It is this control that is challenged by the fascist and the Islamic revolutionaries even while they are upholding, like the Bolsheviks, the myth of revolution as an act of redemption and liberation of oppressed masses and nations.

Both fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movement are latecomers to the modern international political scene. As such, they share a number of essential features. The foremost of these is the appropriation of the

<sup>71</sup> Hexter (fn. 31), 178.

<sup>72</sup> François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. 29, 48-49, 70-74.

<sup>73</sup> Eugen Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution: Nomos VIII* (New York: Atherton, 1966), 126.

<sup>74</sup> Dunn (fn. 13), 8-11.

<sup>75</sup> Jules Monnerot, *Sociology and Psychology in Communism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 [1949]), 12.



legitimatory political myth of revolution. The Italian fascists boasted of their "revolutionary intransigence," and the Nazis contrasted their revolution, the revolution of the German *Volk*, to the "subhuman revolution" of 1789.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, Iran's revolutionaries take great pride in the historic mission of the Islamic Revolution.

"Economics was indeed one of the least important fascist considerations."<sup>77</sup> The same is true of the Islamic Revolution. (Khomeini, responding to complaints about the state of the economy, once remarked, "we did not make the Islamic Revolution so the Persian melon would be cheap.") Furthermore, like the European fascists, the Islamic militants aim at integrating all classes, including the working class, into a national community. The fascists substituted "nation" for "class" and developed the concept of "the proletarian nations." Class conflict was thus replaced by the conflict *between* nations, rich against poor. With the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, we have an identical transposition of the theme of exploitation of one class by another into the exploitation of the "disinherited" (*mustaz'af*) nations by the imperialist ones.<sup>78</sup>

"The fact that fascism is a latecomer," writes Linz, "helps to explain, in part, the essential anti-character of its ideology and appeal." Furthermore, "it is paradoxical that for each rejection there was also an incorporation of elements of what they rejected."<sup>79</sup> Like fascism, the Islamic revolutionary movement has offered a new synthesis of the political creeds it has violently attacked. And, like the fascists, the Islamic militants are against democracy because they consider liberal democracy a foreign model that provides avenues for free expression of alien influences and ideas. (Also like the fascists, however, the Islamic militants would not necessarily accept the label of "antidemocratic.")<sup>80</sup> Similarly, both groups are antibourgeois, resenting the international cosmopolitan orientation of the new middle class. Both movements are anti-Marxist—i.e., anticommunist and antisocialist—while appropriating the ideas and certainly the slogans of social justice and equality. The Islamic revolutionary movement has the considerable advantage over fascism, however, of combining this "anti-character" with strong traditionalism. Here

<sup>76</sup> Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: New American Library, 1969), 281; Baechler (fn. 3), 10, n. 15.

<sup>77</sup> Mosse (fn. 65), 21.

<sup>78</sup> Linz (fn. 45), 16. Once the attempt to export the Islamic Revolution, temporarily checked by the setback in the Iran-Iraq war, is resumed fully, one may expect further resonances of the Italian fascist ideas of "an imperialism of the poor" and "proletarian imperialism." Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 334-35; Joseph Baglieri, "Italian Fascism and the Crisis of Liberal Hegemony: 1901-1922," in Larsen (fn. 42), 322-23.

<sup>79</sup> Linz (fn. 45), 5.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 20-21.

we can see the consequence of the fact that the dispossessed leaders of the Islamic Revolution were not a heterogeneous but a homogeneous solidary group and, furthermore, one that guarded the Shi'ite religious tradition. In contrast to the Nazi "Revolution of Nihilism" (and to the striking lack of reference to Japan's own intellectual tradition in the writings of the leaders of the fascist New Order Movement of the late 1930s),<sup>81</sup> the Islamic Revolution combines the rejection of other alien political ideologies with a vigorous affirmation of the Islamic religious and cultural tradition. I have therefore characterized it as "revolutionary traditionalism."<sup>82</sup>

In addition to their common anti-character and other incidental features, fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movements both have a distinct constitutive core. Racism and anti-Semitism were the most obnoxious features of European fascism, but, as Mosse and others have convincingly shown, not its core component. The constitutive core of fascism that goes beyond European fascism and continues to live in a variety of forms as a vigorous ideological force in the third world is the combination of nationalism and socialism. As George Valois put it in 1925, "nationalism + socialism = fascism." The marriage of nationalism and socialism was in the cards after World War I.<sup>83</sup> This fact by far transcends the particular conditions of any dispossessed stratum, any European country, or, for that matter, of interwar Europe. It was arrived at by different fascist leaders in different European countries, and it has been arrived at independently by many third-world ideologues since 1945.

An enduring feature of fascist ideology has been its insistence on the reality of the nation and the artificiality of class. To the emotionally unattractive idea of perpetual class struggle, the French fascist thinker Marcel Deat contrasts the appeal of belonging to a community untainted by divisive conflict and fragmentation: "The total man in the total society, with no clashes, no prostration, no anarchy."<sup>84</sup> The Arab nationalist thinkers sought to utilize the appeal of belonging to a community by similarly replacing class by nation. The advocates of Islamic ideology only needed to take one step further to replace the nation by the *umma*, the Muslim community of believers.

Thus, the emergence of an Islamic revolutionary ideology has been

<sup>81</sup> William M. Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

<sup>82</sup> Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Arjomand, *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, and Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).

<sup>83</sup> Sternhell (fn. 78), 320-21, 326, 335-37.

<sup>84</sup> Quoted, *ibid.*, 335, 347.

in the cards since the fascist era. It has been in the cards irrespective of the plight of the dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate in Iran. The latter did have the advantage of institutional autonomy and of independence in the exercise of religious authority, something the Sunni Islamic ideologists like Rashid Rida could only dream of. But it was exceedingly slow in creating a consistent ideology in order to defend itself against the state. In fact, the Islamic *ideology* was developed elsewhere, by publicists and journalists like Mawdudi (d. 1979) in Indo-Pakistan and Qutb (d. 1966) in Egypt. Its essence consisted in presenting the secular state as an earthly idol claiming the majesty that is God's alone. When Khomeini finally rose against the Shah, he imported the Islamic ideology from Pakistan and Egypt as a free good.

In 1926, in a work that anticipates most of the ideological developments of the past two decades, the youthful Mawdudi had declared: "Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch . . . and *jihad* (holy war) denotes the revolutionary struggle." Mawdudi conceived the modern world as the arena of the "conflict between Islam and un-Islam," the latter being equated with pre-Islamic Ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and polytheism. Modern creeds and political philosophies were equated with polytheism and Ignorance. Their predominance necessitated the revival of Islam. A few decades later, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb adopted the contrast between Islam and un-Islam—conceived as Ignorance—from Mawdudi and made it the cornerstone of his revolutionary Islamic ideology. For accepting secular states, contemporary Muslim societies are branded as societies of Ignorance. To extirpate Ignorance from these societies, an Islamic government has to be established and the Sacred Law applied. To establish an Islamic government—that is, to establish the rule of God—Islamic revolution is necessary.<sup>85</sup>

The distinctively clericalist Shi'ite idea of Islamic government, to be realized after the revolution of 1979, was *not* directly influenced by the trend in Sunni Islam. It is best understood in the context of the struggle between the Shi'ite hierarchy and the centralizing monarchy discussed earlier. Though a novelty in Shi'ite history, Khomeini's idea of Islamic government, first put forward in 1970, was stated in the traditional Shi'ite frame of reference and does not betray any influence of the

<sup>85</sup> Abu'l-A'la' Mawdudi, *Process of Islamic Revolution* (Pathankot, Punjab: Makteb-e Jamaat-e Islami, 1947); Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (October 1981), 500; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *The Middle East Journal* 37 (No. 1, 1983).

ideological innovations of Mawdudi and Qutb. It simply extended the general judiciary authority of the jurist (*faqih*), as well as some of his very specific rights of gerency, to include the right to rule.<sup>86</sup>

Nevertheless, Mawdudi and Qutb were read avidly, in Persian translation and/or in Arabic, by Khomeini's militant followers, who adopted the fundamental revolutionary idea that obedience to the impious secular state—in this case the Shah's—was tantamount to idolatry. The centrality of this idea is unmistakable in the revolutionary slogans and pamphleteering, most notably in the application of the term *taghut* (ungodly earthly power) to the Pahlavi political order. Its influence has become more pronounced since the elimination of the moderates and Islamic modernists in 1980-1981, and is easily noticeable in the speeches of the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Ayatollah Safi has no difficulty whatsoever in combining the advantages of the ideologies of Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalist ideas of Khomeini. For him, the government of the jurist on behalf of the Hidden Imam is the true government of God on Earth, vowed to the implementation of His Law. All other political regimes are ungodly orders, regimes of Ignorance and of *taghut*. The Islamic Revolution will continue until the overthrow of all these regimes.<sup>87</sup>

C. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM, AND  
THE TELEOLOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF PROGRESS

The Islamic Revolution in Iran should draw our attention to the neglected importance of reactive and reactionary elements in all revolutions. The ideology of proletarian revolution, as Mannheim has shown, incorporated many of the elements of the romantic, reactionary critique of the Enlightenment.<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, Nazism, as both its ideologues and its historians (notably Bracher) have insisted, contained revolutionary as well as reactionary elements.<sup>89</sup>

The Islamic Revolution constitutes a wry comment on the debate among historians as to whether the early modern European revolutions were conservative or liberal, reactionary or progressive. It also demonstrates that revolutionaries often act in defense of traditional values. Baechler is right when he notes, "contrary to appearances and accepted

<sup>86</sup> Said A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Arjomand, *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism* (forthcoming, 1987).

<sup>87</sup> Lotfollah Safi, *Nezam-e Emamat va Rahbari* [Regime of Imamate and Leadership] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Be'that, 1982/1361), 16-18.

<sup>88</sup> Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays on Sociology and Psychology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).

<sup>89</sup> Karl D. Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 7-13; Carsten (fn. 45), 428.

belief, conservative revolutions are supported less by the elite than by the people."<sup>90</sup> Not surprisingly, some important teleological elements in the clerically led popular uprisings such as Carlism and the Cristero movement<sup>91</sup> find resonance in the Islamic Revolution in Iran: repudiation of foreign and cosmopolitan influences and values, and vehement opposition to anticlerical policies of modernizing governments, including, of course, atheism. Marx's famous idea that the French revolutionaries parodied the Roman republicans because they had not yet developed a political language of their own should not automatically be generalized. The revolutionaries who draw on traditional imagery can vary greatly in their knowledge of and professional identification with tradition. The Ayatollahs were the official custodians of the Shi'ite tradition and knew their methodology of Shi'ite jurisprudence. In the past six years, they have proved this by their sustained efforts to Islamicize Iran's judiciary system, by institutionalizing substantial political functions for the Friday prayer leaders, and by presiding over the strict enforcement of Islamic morals.

Islamic revolutionary traditionalism does have its modern trappings. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic pays lip service to equality and especially to social justice, and it guarantees freedom of the press, of the expression of political opinion, of political gatherings and groups—provided, needless to say, that they are not contrary to the interests of Islam. Finally, there is another modern element that is more than a trapping: the Majlis, or parliament. The constitutionalism of the early-modern European revolutions was the idealization of practice, and closely linked to the aim of preserving local liberties. In Iran, even though constitutionalism entered as an imported panacea in 1905-1906, the mul-lahs used the constitutionalist ideology when opposing the Shah. Consequently, the Majlis is an enduring feature of the Islamic regime. Its legislation, however, is rigorously supervised by the clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians. In addition, both the ruling clerics and the lay Islamic second stratum of the regime have a keen interest in technology. They love broadcasting, being televised, and being interviewed by the press, and they love organizing seminars and congresses and using modern-sounding phrases such as "political-ideological bureaus."

When the notions of revolution and progress are linked, as they were in the 19th century and as they still are today, a line can clearly be drawn between revolution and counterrevolution. The evidence offered in this paper makes it impossible to draw such a line. It has been pointed

<sup>90</sup> Baechler (fn. 3), 108.

<sup>91</sup> Hennessy (fn. 41), 258.

out that all revolutions contain counterrevolutionary elements. The obverse is also true: all counterrevolutions must incorporate revolutionary innovations in order to restore what they consider to be the traditional order. This is clearly the case with Islamic revolutionary traditionalism in Iran. As I have argued elsewhere, it has in fact brought about a revolution *within* Shi'ism.<sup>92</sup> Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution has stimulated considerable growth in the size of the state and the number of persons employed by it. One can legitimately see these factors as the continuation of a trend in modernization. It is, however, best treated as a universal trend making for continuity with the past rather than as specific to the teleology of this revolution as distinct from others.

#### D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

Comparative evidence not only requires that we sever the conceptual link between revolution and progress, but also suggests that we link revolution and religion. Religion was an important factor not only in the Puritan Revolution, but in all early-modern European revolutions except the Fronde.<sup>93</sup> Walzer is right in considering the Puritan Marian exiles of the 1550s to be forerunners of modern revolutionary ideologues.<sup>94</sup> But the same is true of the clerics of the Catholic League thirty years later.<sup>95</sup> In 1640, the Puritan preachers were calling the House of Commons God's chosen instrument for rebuilding Zion.<sup>96</sup> In the same year, their Catholic counterparts in Catalonia were also engaged in revolutionary activity. Here is the commander of the Spanish king's forces in Rossello complaining of the sedition and licentiousness of the clergy:

In the confessional and the pulpit they spend their entire time rousing the people and offering the rebels encouragement and advice, inducing the ignorant to believe that rebellion will win them the kingdom of heaven.<sup>97</sup>

There are striking parallels between the Puritan Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini as Abraham and Moses in one; for the Puritan Saints, we have the militant mullahs; and for the fast sermons of 1642-1649,<sup>98</sup> we had, under the

<sup>92</sup> Arjomand (fn. 86).

<sup>93</sup> Zagorin (fn. 18), I, p. 741.

<sup>94</sup> Walzer (fn. 56), 92-113.

<sup>95</sup> Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies, 1450 to the Present*, trans. by Peter Evans (New York: Schocken, 1973), 50, 61; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, chap. 10.

<sup>96</sup> Stone (fn. 20), 90.

<sup>97</sup> John Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 487.

<sup>98</sup> Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament," in Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1972).

Shah, the gatherings at forty-day intervals to commemorate the "martyrs"; after the revolution, we have the Friday sermons at congregational prayers. Important differences, however, affect the teleologies of these respective revolutions. There were strong anarchic elements in Puritanism—especially Independency, which considered itself the true Church within the corrupt church. Such anarchic innerworldly millenarian precepts of the Independents militated against their acceptance of a Presbyterian national church government. These precepts could also lead in the direction of the Levellers' conception of man as a rational being in the image of God, and hence to natural rights. The corporate solidarism of the militant Shi'ite clergy contrasts as strongly with the factionalism of the Puritan Saints as methodologically grounded legalism contrasts with the Saints' millenarian idea of Christ as the Lawgiver. Finally, the revolutionary Shi'ite clericalist theory of the sovereignty of the jurist is in sharp contrast to the idea of congregational representation—especially in Presbyterianism.<sup>99</sup>

The situation *is* different with regard to the modern revolutions; but let us see how. De Tocqueville knew that the French Revolution had produced a new religion. It aimed at

nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race. . . . It developed into a species of religion, if a singularly imperfect one, since it was without a God, without a ritual or promise of a future life. Nevertheless, this strange religion has, like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants and martyrs.<sup>100</sup>

The terms "secular religion" and "political religion" have aptly been used to describe communism and fascism.<sup>101</sup> Modern revolutions *do* require political religions. The crucial issue is whether there is any necessary incompatibility between religion and political religion.

The Bolshevik Revolution was militantly atheistic. But before we draw any conclusions, let us think of its totally imported ideology and of the exceedingly narrow social base of its political elite. What about the French Revolution? De Tocqueville did not see any incompatibility between Christianity and the political religion of the revolution. Anticlericalism and the campaign against religion stemmed from the identification of the Church with the *ancien régime*, and not from any wide-

<sup>99</sup> Tai Liu, *Discord in Zion: The Puritan Divines and the Puritan Revolution 1640-1660* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 50-51, 94-97, 146-60; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, p. 166.

<sup>100</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, new trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), 13, 156.

<sup>101</sup> Monnerot (fn. 75); Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two Essays* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1968). It is interesting to note that in 1949 Monnerot described communism as "the twentieth-century Islam."

spread anti-Christian sentiment.<sup>102</sup> What about the fascist revolution? European fascism was often associated with anticlericalism, but this association is neither general nor fundamental. The Nazis glorified the mythical pre-Christian German tradition and were anti-religious. The same is true of other fascist movements in Western and Northern Europe. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Rumanian, the Hungarian, the Slovak, and the Croatian fascist movements were emphatically Christian and aimed at establishing Christian corporatist states.<sup>103</sup>

Clerical leadership and participation in the Slovak Republic established by Father Hlinka's People's Party (presided over by Father Tiso) and in the Ustasha movement in Croatia offer interesting points for comparison with Iran.<sup>104</sup> But the most illuminating parallel is between Shi'ite revolutionary traditionalism and the Rumanian Iron Guards, the Legion of Archangel Michael. Both movements are characterized by extraordinary cults of suffering, sacrifice, and martyrdom. Priests figured prominently in the legionary movement, side by side with university students. Legionary meetings were invariably preceded by church services, and their demonstrations were usually led by priests carrying icons and religious flags. The integral Christianity of the Legionaries differentiated them from the Nazis and the Italian Fascists. This they knew. As one of their leading intellectuals explained, "Fascism worships the state, Nazism the race and the nation. Our movement strives not

<sup>102</sup> It was "a spectacular but transient phenomenon . . . in no sense basic to its program." Therefore, the antireligious features faded as the true political teleology of the revolution unfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. 100), 5-7. On the vitality of religious sentiment among the insurgent masses during the French Revolution, see Albert Soboul, "Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la révolution: Saintes patriotes et martyrs de la liberté" [Religious sentiment and popular cults during the revolution: patriotic saints and martyrs of liberty], *Archives de sociologie des religions* 1 (No. 2, 1956).

<sup>103</sup> These variations become intelligible in the light of Linz's demonstration that the extent of organized preemption of the political space by Christian-democratic or Catholic-conservative parties was a decisive factor in inhibiting the growth of fascism (as in Spain and Belgium). Where such parties existed and had carved up electoral territories for themselves, fascism found a formidable rival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlerical in order to differentiate itself from the rival religious party (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-à-vis the Zentrum party). See Linz (fn. 45), 16-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), 156; Hamilton (fn. 45), 37-41.

Mexican fascism, the Sinarquism of the late 1930s and early 1940s, also fits Linz's pattern. The movement declined when its middle-class supporters defected to the Catholic Accion Nacional. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280-82. Linz's account of cases in which fascism was not anticlerical but intensely Christian is unsatisfactory, however; see Linz (fn. 45), 16, and Linz (fn. 57), 164, 184, n. 51. The reverse side of Linz's argument is well put by Merkl: "There is ample evidence that religious decline and confrontations played a role in fascist development . . . , creating a massive reservoir of confused quasi-religious fears and longings open to exploitation by fascist demagogues." Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

<sup>104</sup> Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement," in Larsen and others (fn. 42).



merely to fulfill the destiny of the Rumanian people—we want to fulfill it along the road to salvation." The ultimate goal of the nation, Codreanu and others emphasized, was "resurrection in Christ."<sup>105</sup>

Finally, we must consider Brazilian Integralism, the most important fascist movement in Latin America. Its founder, Plinio Salgado, met Mussolini in 1930. The meeting made a deep impression on him, and he certainly saw no incompatibility between the fascist political religion and Catholicism. He returned to Brazil to "Catholicize" Italian fascism. Taking advantage of an extensive network of lay religious associations, which had been brought into existence by Cardinal Leme, he founded the Brazilian Integralist Action with the aim of creating a corporatist, integralist state. Integralism appealed to Catholic intellectuals because of its promise of a "spiritual revolution" and of an Integral State "which comes from Christ, is inspired in Christ, acts for Christ, and goes toward Christ." Salgado accordingly criticized the "dangerous pagan tendency of Hitlerism" and lamented the lack of a Christian basis in Nazi ideology.<sup>106</sup>

Few would find the statement that political revolutions are a modern form of millenarianism objectionable. Russian communism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Rome, and Nazism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Reich, "the Thousand Year Reich of national freedom and social justice."<sup>107</sup> As was the case with religion and political religion, political and religious millenarianism are by no means mutually exclusive. The religious chiliastic element may predominate, as in the Taiping Rebellion which aimed at establishing the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace;<sup>108</sup> or it may play an important subsidiary role, as in the Puritan Revolution in England and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In the Puritan Revolution we encounter two forms of millenarianism: the milder, more inner-worldly millenarianism of the Independent divines, and the better known, activist one of the men of the Fifth Mon-

<sup>105</sup> E. Weber (fns. 60 and 69); Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), 247, 266-70.

<sup>106</sup> Stanley Hilton, "Acaō Integralista Brasileira: Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 9 (No. 2, 1972), 12; Margaret T. Williams, "Integralism and the Brazilian Catholic Church," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 54 (No. 3, 1974), 436-40. In this typical search for "a third way," Salgado also sought to "Brazilianize" Italian fascism. He considered the two aspects of his project fully compatible, and declared, "My nationalism is full of God." *Ibid.*, 434-36.

<sup>107</sup> Monnerot (fn. 75), chap. 3; Nicholai A. Berdiaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961); James M. Rhodes, *The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 79.

<sup>108</sup> Lewy (fn. 41), chap. 7.

archy. There can be no doubt that revolutionary political millenarianism played a crucial role in the motivation of the Iranian intelligentsia and other groups. But in addition, the Shi'ite doctrine contains an important millenarian tenet: the belief in the appearance of the Twelfth Imam as the Mahdi to redeem the world. This belief was as convenient for Khomeini's revolutionary purpose as it had been for the founder of the Safavid Empire in 1501.<sup>109</sup> Although Shi'ite millenarianism played an important role in the Islamic Revolution, it did not have any of the divisive and anarchic consequences of Puritan millenarianism because the clerics were firmly in control of its interpretation, and in fact partly derived their legal/juristic authority from it.

#### CONCLUSION

The success of the Islamic revolutionary ideology is the novel and teleologically distinct mark of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ideology is a powerful response to the contemporary politicized quest for authenticity. It has been constructed through the unacknowledged appropriation of *all* the technical advantages of the Western ideological movements and political religions, with the added—or rather, the emphatically retained—promise of other-worldly salvation. In a sense, it has a considerable ideological advantage over Nazism and communism, both of which clashed with religion. Rather than creating a new substitute for religion, as did the communists and the Nazis, the Islamic militants have fortified an already vigorous religion with the ideological armor necessary for battle in the arena of mass politics. In doing so, they have made their distinct contribution to world history.

<sup>109</sup> Arjomand (fn. 17), 269-70.