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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND*

The object of this paper is to bring out the theoretical significance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusing on the political dynamics of the radical change in Iran's societal structure of domination and the moral dynamics of reintegration and collective action that accompany it. The political dynamics of revolution primarily explain the collapse of the structure of domination, while the moral dynamics of revolution underlie its teleology—i.e., its direction and consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution, revolutionary ideology assumes primary importance.

Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutions occur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structure of domination" to refer to the prevalent system of authority. It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern revolutions, but it also includes other institutions and corporate entities that have some measure of autonomous authority in the religious, judiciary, or economic spheres. The most important of these other institutions is usually the hierocracy—i.e., the church or its equivalent.

Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance. The dislocated groups and individuals need to be reintegrated into societal community and may also demand inclusion in political society. The integrative social and political movements that arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributing factor to the occurrence of revolutions.

The collapse of the societal structure of domination in revolutions is caused by two sets of factors: the structure's internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and the concerted action of the social groups and individuals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the context of the power struggle set in motion by the centralization of the state. They

*This paper was completed at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and has benefited from the comments of the fellow members of the Social Sciences Seminar for 1984-85. Of the colleagues and friends who have commented on earlier drafts of this paper, I especially wish to thank Lewis Coser, Jack Goldstone, Juan Linz, and James Rule.
may also have moral motives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocation and normative disturbance. In addition, there may be other motives, such as class interest. The degree of cohesion and solidarity within each social group is a primary determinant of its capacity for collective action; the possibility of successful revolutionary action usually depends on the formation of coalitions among opposing social groups. All of the above factors provide important points of reference for comparisons regarding the causes and preconditions of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Revolutions can and should be compared in terms not only of their causes and preconditions, but also of their consequences. Those integrative social movements which successfully build on the preconditions of social dislocation and moral disorder to create revolutionary movements do so by using ideology as an instrument. The ideologies that set the revolutionary struggle in motion and are shaped in its course bridge the gap between the causes and the consequences of revolutions. They cannot account for the collapse of the societal structure of domination to any significant degree. On the other hand, the value-ideas that form their normative foundation, and are often progressively defined and formulated during the revolutionary process, do shape the political order installed by the revolution to a significant extent.

A comparative analysis of the teleology of the Islamic Revolution thus requires a serious and systematic analysis of revolutionary ideologies. The modern political myth of revolution and the various ideologies onto which it has been grafted in the past two centuries have constituted a causal factor in motivating revolutionary opposition to the status quo, but it would be a serious mistake to stop the analysis there. Ideologies are of primary theoretical interest in that their constitutive value-ideas determine the teleologies of the respective revolutions. The nature and specific content of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologies therefore supply the basic points of reference for comparison with the teleology of the Islamic Revolution. These latter comparisons enable us to assess the distinct significance of Iran's Islamic Revolution in world history.

I. THE CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY

The emphasis of recent scholarship on the role of the state, its repressive capacity, and its ability to weather serious crises has brought

"The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintended consequences of rev-
out the fact that revolutions often owe their success more to the internal breakdown and paralysis of the state than to the power of revolutionary groups. It has been argued that the decisive factor in the occurrence of a revolution is the fragility of the existing political system. Centralization of monarchical states reduces the degree of pluralism in society and increases its political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person. De Tocqueville, who considered that hatred of the Old Regime dominated all other passions throughout the French Revolution, also showed how that hatred became fatally focused on a single person, the king: "To see in him the common enemy was the passionate agreement that grew." The same can be said about the Shah, whose ouster was the one common demand that brought together almost all of the disparate sections of Iranian society. Furthermore, the same property of the monarchical system in Iran goes a long way toward explaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarch and the Shah's counter-image.

The type of political regime we might call "neopatrimonial" is also characterized by its fragility. In contrast to the ideal-type of the absolutist state in which the king is the first servant of the state, government is extremely personal in patrimonial states. The chief executive encourages divisions within the army and the political elite in order to rule. Such neopatrimonial states are particularly subject to collapse and ensuing revolution once the ruler breaks down. The Mexican Revolution that was set in motion by the death of Porfirio Díaz in 1911, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions, can be cited in support of this proposition. In his regime, the Shah combined the weaknesses of the neopatrimonial states with the old vulnerabilities of monarchy. He had painstakingly constructed the machinery of the state around his person; there can be no doubt that the collapse of the man preceded the collapse of the machine. This collapse was evident in the Shah's pervasive wa-

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vering and indecision (for example, he could not make up his mind to appoint a prime minister for the liberal, nationalist opposition until it was far too late), in his inconsistent combination of rewards and threats, and in his highly inhibited use of force."

The neopatrimonial character of his state notwithstanding, the Shah did have a disciplined and well-equipped army and police force. He simply refused to use them effectively to repress the revolutionary movement. The Shah pretended to be using the army. He declared martial law in some cities in late summer of 1978 and installed a military government in November. But after the Black Friday massacre of September 8, 1978, he had muffled the army, to the outrage of his generals. This is reflected in low casualties, about 250 in the September 8 massacre, about 750 in Tehran in the following five months, and probably three times this figure for the whole of Iran. On December 21, 1978, the Prime Minister, General Azhari—after a mild heart attack and from his bed—complained to the American ambassador of the demoralization of the army which he attributed to the Shah's orders forbidding the troops to fire except in the air, no matter how badly abused or pressed. "You must know this and you must tell it to your government. This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind."

Unlike the Czar's troops in 1917, the Shah's army remained largely intact and loyal until he departed on January 16, 1979. Khomeini's leaflets were distributed among the soldiers. There were instances of fraternization with the demonstrators and of desertion; twelve officers were killed by three rebellious soldiers of the Imperial Guard; a mutiny occurred in Tabriz in December; and there were a number of other minor incidents. There was also persistent trouble with paramilitary technicians of the Air Force, known as the Homafaran. But overall, the strain of confrontation with the people did not seriously affect the morale and discipline of the armed forces. It was only after the Shah's departure that the process of disintegration of the army under political pressure set in seriously. I do not wish to assert that the use of the army for massive repression would have prevented the revolution. We will never know what would have happened if the Shah had ordered his forces to be brutally repressive in October and November 1978, when they were not yet affected by the revolutionary turmoil. The army might or might


1Sullivan (fn. 7), 212. The figures for Tehran are taken from a Master's thesis for Tehran University supervised by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf. I am grateful to Dr. Ashraf for this information.
not have disintegrated or split; the fact remains that it had not dis-
integrated by January 16, 1979. And the opposition knew it.9

The army's officers had a strong sense of professional identity, but
no attachment to any particular solidary social group or any organized
interests. Furthermore, the Shah had carefully chosen his top generals
to assure they could not act in concert against him, and he had succeeded
in that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not let
them. They could not act against him, but neither could they act for
themselves or any other group. In desperation, some of them finally
made a deal with the clerical opposition. Tilly has correctly emphasized
the importance of coalitions linking revolutionary challengers to the
military.10 Although the term coalition would be too strong, the agree-
ment worked out by Bazargan and Beheshi through the mediation of
the American ambassador with a number of the generals was of crucial
importance in bringing about a split in the army and its consequent
neutralization in February 1979.11

If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army was
intact, despite the fact that there was no defeat in war, and despite the
fact that the state faced no financial crisis and no peasant insurrections,
where does all this leave the usual generalizations about revolu-
tions? Mostly in the pits. War has been called the midwife of revolution, and
peasant insurrections are considered indispensable in many currently
fashionable theories of revolution.12 The inferences we can draw from
the case of Iran are as follows: financial and fiscal crises—or, for that
matter, the extractive capacity of the state and heavy taxation—are not
necessary for the occurrence of revolution. It is possible for the societal
structure of domination to collapse without the participation of the
peasantry; and a major war or defeat of the army are not necessary
preconditions of revolution. I will show how a political order may
collapse without any of these conditions. For now, let us merely note
that the Cuban Revolution was an instance of a revolution without a
rebellion of the peasantry and without a major defeat in war. Skocpol,
whose theory of revolution puts a great deal of emphasis on both these
allegedly necessary conditions, cavalierly dismisses Cuba in half a foot-
note. Furthermore, she does not face the theoretical consequences of the

9 Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random
House, 1985), 142-43.
10 Tilly (fn. 2), 29.
11 Sullivan (fn. 7), 199-247.
12 Skocpol (fn. 2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and
Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico," Theory and Society 7 (No. 3, 1979), 153;
Zimmermann (fn. 2), 315, 312, 330-42, 351-57.
absence of these factors in her subsequent article about the Iranian Revolution. She is rightly determined to bring the state into the picture, but does so in an unsatisfactory way, largely by deploying a new pet phrase, "the rentier state." The basic idea is misleading in that the "rentier state" was actually created by Reza Shah from the early 1920s to 1941, when the revenue received by the state from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in fact small—some 10 to 15 percent of government revenue, and minuscule compared to the oil revenue in the 1970s. She musters a modicum of other plausible but ad hoc subsidiary themes to account for the Iranian Revolution. However, Skocpol never faces up to the problem of reconciling the Iranian Revolution with her theoretical schema of 1979.13

One generalization is borne out by the revolution in Iran:14 the Shah was seriously compromised by his close and subservient association with the United States, and the American military and economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization. The antiforeign motive in challenging the legitimacy of the societal structure of domination finds parallels in the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban revolutions, and in East European fascism.

B. THE STATE, THE HIEROCRACY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHI’ITE IRAN

It would be a mistake to equate the societal structure of domination with the state alone. For Max Weber, its major components were the state and church. He defined the two institutions of legitimate authority analogously, and took care to analyze the relationship between the church and civil society when appropriate.15 This point is significant because the unique feature of Iran’s Islamic Revolution is that it is a crucial stage in the conflict between hierocracy and state, while at the same time being a modern political revolution. It is a composite of two phenomena whose counterparts in Western history are separated by centuries. The absolutist states of Europe had already won the protracted contest with the Roman Church before the coming of the early modern European revolutions.16 In the history of Iran, the analogous contest

14 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 304-06.
16 Otto Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective," in Reinhard Bendix and others,
between the state and the hierocracy occurred much later. Shi'ism was
declared the state religion of Iran in 1501, but the hierocracy remained
heteronomous and subordinate to the state for a long time; consolidating
its power and autonomy only at the end of the 18th and the beginning
of the 19th century. The curtailment of the power of the hierocracy and
the appropriation of many of its prerogatives and functions by the state
took place in the 20th century. The Shi'ite religious authorities were
and remained doctrinally and institutionally independent of the state,
however: they retained their autonomous religious authority as well as
their control over appreciable resources independent of the state bu-
reaucracy. 17

The Western revolutions were directed against state and church. The
church had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and dis-
established by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, it was an
integral part of the monarchical regime. In the Islamic Revolution in
Iran, the entire beleaguered Shi'ite hierocracy rose against the state.
(This was partly due to the Shah's fateful ineptitude in not splitting the
Shi'ite hierocracy in time; there is now evidence that some of the grand
ayatollahs were ready for a compromise by the summer of 1978, and a
split did in fact occur after the revolution.)

For analytical reasons, too, it is important to conceive of the societal
structure of domination in more inclusive terms. Revolutionary situations
occur because of the disintegration of central authority. With the dis-
integration of the authority of the state, other elements of the societal
structure of domination assume greater importance. Corporations and
individuals with authority in other spheres of life can extend their
authority to the political sphere and assume positions of leadership. In
such situations, they emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. The
hierocracy and men of religion can use their traditional authority in this
fashion, and have often done so—for instance, in Spanish history. 18 In

eds., State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1968); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State

17 Said A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order,
and Social Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago

18 We encounter this kind of situation in rebellions in Castile in 1520, where Franciscan
and Dominican monks figured prominently among the leaders of the Comuneros. Similarly,
as the president of the Catalan Diputacio, the priest Pau Claris assumed the leading
position in the rebellion of the summer of 1640. When the Spanish people rose against
Napoleon in 1808 without any king or government, they were led by the church—priests
and monks. See Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political
Background of the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 44;
Perez Zagorin, Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660 (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Iran, many of the high-ranking members of the Shi'ite hierarchy led the popular opposition to the monarch during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906. In 1978, many groups and individuals who wanted the Shah out but had no interest whatsoever in a theocracy accepted Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership.

The centralization of the state necessitates the concentration of economic, coercive, and symbolic resources. It entails encroachments upon local and provincial privileges as well as fiscal and constitutional immunities; and it entails the dispossession of certain privileged social groups. It thus sets in motion an intense and continuous political struggle. The reaction of privileged groups and of autonomous centers of power against the expansion and centralization of the state is a major source of most if not all of the early modern European revolutions: the revolt of the Comuneros of the cities of Castile against Charles V in 1520; the revolt of the Netherlands in reaction to the centralizing policies of Philip II in the 1560s; the French Civil War of the 16th century; the revolt of the Catalans once Olivares had consigned their "constitutions" to the devil, and of Portugal in 1640; the early phase of the English Revolution; and the Fronde and the aristocratic pre-revolution of 1787-1788 in France. In all these cases, estates and corporations reacted when their autonomy and inherited privileges were threatened by the state; and they usually found men of religion as their allies. The dispossessed or debt-ridden nobility of the Netherlands, for instance, found allies in Calvinist preachers and iconoclasts. In the Iran of the 1970s, the preachers and the chief dispossessed solidary group capable of reaction were the same group.

Three major privileged social groups were victims of the centralization of the state under the Pahlavis. The first consisted of the tribal chiefs. The pacification campaigns of Reza Khan (later to become Reza Shah) in 1921-1925 broke the power of the tribal chiefs and eliminated many of them physically, even though resistance in the most peripheral areas such as Luristan continued until the early 1930s. The land and property registry law of 1922 converted the surviving tribal chiefs into big land-

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9 Eisenstadt (fn. 5); Baechter (fn. 3), 139; Goldstone (fn. 5), 194-95.

10 By 1640, the English Crown had alienated a large segment of the elite which included, notably, the proponents of aristocratic constitutionalism and the rising local landed gentry who resisted its increasingly statist policies. See Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 36, 57, 92, 124.

11 De Tocqueville (fn. 4); Alfred Cobban, Aspects of the French Revolution (New York: Norton, 1968); Zagarin (fn. 18).

12 Ibid., II, p. 94.

lords. As such, they became members of the city-dwelling, landowning upper class, and, as individuals, many of them entered the Pahlavi political elite.

The Shi’ite hierocracy was next to come under fierce attack by the centralizing Pahlavi state. Under Reza Shah, the state deprived it of all its judiciary functions, eliminated its prebendal, fiscal, and social privileges, and greatly reduced its control over education and over religious endowments. In the face of Reza Shah’s determination and severity, it did not react in any significant fashion.

Reza Shah had reached an accommodation with the class of big landlords, “the thousand families,” who predominated in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) until 1960. It was during the first—and only genuine—stage of Mohammad Reza Shah’s land reform in 1962 and 1963 that the landowning “thousand families,” including the tribal chiefs, were liquidated as a class. Once the Majlis was dissolved, the “feudal” landowning class had no autonomous institutional basis and could not react against its complete political and partial economic dispossession by the state. Though many of its members retained large holdings of land and became mechanized commercial farmers, thus joining the petit-bourgeoisie, and though many of them remained in the Pahlavi political elite, the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was the power basis of the landowning class and accounted for its prominence in the Majlis, had undoubtedly been destroyed.

Relations between the hierocracy and the monarchy had improved after the resignation of Reza Shah—especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the monarchy was weak and the hierocracy was alarmed by the threat of communism. The state resumed its aggressive posture in the 1960s and 1970s, this time encroaching upon the religious sphere in the strict sense. In contrast to the landowning class, the partially dispossessed Shi’ite clerical estate did have an autonomous institutional basis. It could react to the expansion of the state, and eventually did.

In the political struggle set in motion by the centralization and mod-

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"Ahmad Afshar “Dehcanan, Zamin va Enqelab” [The Peasantry, Land and Revolution], in Khat-e Agah (1982/136), 1, 11-12; Eric Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 79, 81; Ann K.S. Lambton, “Land and Revolution in Iran” (Review Article), Iranian Studies 17 (No. 1, 1984), 76-77. The destruction of the peasant-landlord relationship was completed in the 1960s, during the second and third phases of the reform, with the schemes for division of land between peasants and landlords. Though the redistributive effect of these phases was negligible, their sociopolitical effect in breaking the traditional links between peasants and landlords was profound.
ernization of the state, the dispossessed social groups that retain an institutional basis for reacting against the expanding state still need to create coalitions with other social groups and classes if they are to succeed. In the early 1960s, elements from the hierocracy, the landlords, and the tribal chiefs made poorly coordinated attempts to forge a coalition, but the separate uprisings of Khomeini's followers and the Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad tribes of Fars in 1963 were ruthlessly suppressed. In 1978, when an effective coalition did come into being, it carried out a revolution.

Because of their common hatred of the Shah, the revolutionary coalition of 1978 included the bulk of Iran's urban population. The peasantry did not play a role in the Islamic Revolution, and neither did the industrial working class. All other segments of the population actively opposed the Shah and accepted Khomeini's revolutionary leadership. The two most important coalition partners of the militant clergies consisted of the new middle class—government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia, and the white-collar workers in the service sector—and the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar.

The coalition between the Shi'ite clerics and the new middle class was highly unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on the part of the former and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long: having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no time in liquidating the Westernized intelligentsia.

The coalition between the revolutionary clergies and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the other hand, rested on more tangible grievances on both sides and on a more solid historical basis. It has been more enduring. It is the latest instance of the alliance of the mosque and the bazaar, and resembles the alliance of the urban bourgeoisie and the church in the 11th and 12th centuries in Western Christendom. It was forged in the late 1970s, under the immediate impact of the Shah's destruction of the seminaries in Mashhad and his massive antiprofiteering campaign against the bazaar merchants and retailers.

Why did the new middle class lose out? History could have gone the other way—as it did in the case of Nasser's temporary coalition with the Muslim Brothers who had wide popular support and were in some ways much better organized than the mullahs. In 20th-century Iran, the

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3 According to Bahkash, 8,000 shopkeepers were jailed and as many as 250,000 fined during this campaign in 1975 and 1976. Shaul Bakshash, The Struggle of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 13. The last figure seems too high.
centralizing state had atomized society to a considerable degree. It had detached the tribal chiefs and dissolved the landowning class; and it had created an intelligentsia, a bureaucratic class, a body of army officers and, lately, an industrial/entrepreneurial group; all of these were unattached to any solidary social community, be it a tribe, an estate, or a corporation. In partial contradistinction to prerevolutionary France, however, three elements of the old civil society had escaped the atomization of Iranian society: the Shi’ite clerical estate; the bazaar and traditional bourgeoisie; and urban communities in certain older city quarters that were dominated by the previous group. To these, one should add the new urban communities created by chain migration from rural areas and small towns into the larger cities. It is not surprising, then, that the atomized new middle class proved to be the proverbial Marxian “sack of potatoes” while the other solidary social groups in the coalition were capable of remarkably concerted political action, and soon took over.9

The Shah had kept the new middle class under constant supervision by the secret police and had not allowed it to form associations or to gain any political experience. Moreover, its ability to act was seriously impaired because the army officers were isolated from the rest of its elements. Thus, the political representatives of the new middle class could not easily form a coalition with the army, which was too closely identified with the Shah and his regime. They therefore decided to form a coalition with the Shi’ite hierocracy.

According to Tilly, contenders who are in danger of losing their place in a polity are especially disposed to “reactive” collective action. He rightly observes that for centuries the principal form of collective action followed a “reactionary” pattern—i.e., it was “reactive” and “communal.” Thanks to social evolution, however, that is no longer the case, and collective action has become predominantly “proactive” in modern times.9 This conceptual distinction seems of dubious value: a whole set of revolutions analyzed in this paper are both “reactive” and “proactive.”

9 It is interesting to compare the heterogeneity and lack of cohesiveness of Iran’s new middle class with the same features associated with its Western counterpart, which Gouldner erroneously portrays as a new class in the Marxian schema. Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (New York: Seabury, 1970).

In reality, collective action that Tilly had typified as "reactive" does not lose its importance after the middle of the 19th century; and it usually continues to draw on communal traditional solidarities. Whenever these communal solidarities are class solidarities, they pertain not to rising but to declining or threatened social classes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran alerts us to the undeniable importance of reactive action in the revolutionary movements of the last two centuries, including those that Marx took to be revolutions of rising classes.

Fascinating evidence for the importance of reactive action and traditional communal solidarities in revolutionary movements has recently come to light; it concerns the very groups who inspired Marx with the theory of revolution that has distorted our understanding of the phenomenon for over a century. The myth of the middle class in the English and the French Revolutions has long been exploded, notably by Hexter and Cobban. Trevor-Roper’s characterization of the English Revolution as the declining "mere gentry’s" revolution of despair contains an element of truth, but also much exaggeration. On the other hand, we now know that the revolutionaries of 1789 were not the capitalist bourgeoisie, and that the revolutionaries of the first decades of the 19th century in England and of 1848 were not the industrial working class. The English revolutionary working class of that time in fact consisted of the artisans and craftsmen who were threatened by capitalist industrialization and were holding on to the memory of the golden age of a community of small producers based on mutual ties and cooperation.

A recent study of these "reactionary radicals," as one observer calls them, concludes that "commitment to traditional cultural values and immediate communal relations are crucial to many radical movements." Communal relations are seen to be important resources for mobilization as they enable traditional communities to remain mobilized for a long time and in the face of considerable privation. Shopkeepers and artisans predominated in the French insurrections of the 1830s. The same group of artisans reacting against industrial capitalism and proletarization, who

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Krishan Kumar, “Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-Century England: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives,” 
European Journal of Sociology 24 (No. 1, 1983).
Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 374-75.
drew their standards and idiom of protest from the past, constituted the backbone of the 1848 revolutions in France and Germany. In France, the journeymen’s brotherhoods which perpetuated the traditional corporate consciousness and solidarities of the ancien régime constituted the leading revolutionary element in 1848. In Germany, artisan groups were prominent in the revolutionary movement of 1848 while the proletariat was the most quiescent of all social entities.  

“Reactionary radicals,” concludes Calhoun, “have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacy in revolutions. But at the same time, revolutions worthy of the name have never been made without them.” With the Islamic Revolution, a group of reactionary radicals under the leadership of the custodians of the Shi’ite tradition have at last gained supremacy in what is theoretically the most interesting of modern revolutions.  

Let us move on to consider some movements that Marx did not study. First, there are the peasant rebellions. Generally speaking, the Islamic Revolution has this in common with peasant rebellions: it draws on corporate solidarities and communal and kinship ties, and consequently has many conservative and defensive features. In Mexico, there was the massive peasant rebellion of 1810 led by Father Hidalgo and Father Morelos, both parish priests. In Spain, the Carlists’ aim in the 1830s has been described as the “restoration of ‘monkish democracy’”: the clergy led the prosperous Basque and Aragonese yeomanry in rising to defend their local autonomy and their fueros against the centralizing policy of the Bourbon government. In the present century, there was the revolt of Zapata in defense of the local autonomy of traditional agrarian communities against the expanding haciendas in Mexico. Thanks to the devout Zapatistas (laws of 1915 and 1917) and to Cárdenas (1934-1940), the Mexican Revolution established the security of the ejido—community-owned, inalienable individual or communal holdings in the villages. It should be added that the outcome of the Mexican Revolution would have been much less secularist and more conservative if the Cristero movement, organized by priests and lay Catholics in reaction to the anticlerical policies of central government, with the motto...

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10 Calhoun (fn. 34), 91-1.


12 Dunn (fn. 11), 52-53.

13 Brenan (fn. 10), 26-61, 213, note A. In the Second Carlist War (1870-1876), monks and priests again led the guerrilla bands.
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Viva Cristo Rey (Long live Christ the King), had succeeded in 1927-1928.

The pernicious idea that fascism was a movement of the petty bourgeois class has finally been laid to rest. The petty bourgeoisie was somewhat overrepresented in most fascist movements, and it is undoubtedly overrepresented in the Islamic movement in Iran. But it is overrepresented in all sorts of radical movements. We find the “little people,” the “menus peuple,” in the religious riots in 16th-century France on both sides. We find them among the stormers of the Bastille and, as we have just seen, we find them among the 19th-century radicals who, for E. P. Thompson, made the English working class. Recent studies clearly show that fascist parties were supported by elements from all social groups, but especially the dislocated, the dispossessed, and the declassed. What is more to the point (and not disputed) is that the leadership of the fascist movements came disproportionately from the déclassé and the dispossessed, from mobilized army officers, from displaced or unemployed bureaucrats (especially those dislocated by the redrawing of national boundaries), and from the occasional dispossessed aristocrat. The Nazis also did not fail to tap the traditional communal solidarities of the Protestant countryside.

European fascism and the Islamic movement in Iran are similar in that they were led by dispossessed elements. But there are two important differences. First, the fascist leaders were a heterogeneous group, whereas Khomeini’s militant clerics form a homogeneous solidary group. Second, the fascist leaders did not have exclusive control over any cultural assets, and had to get their ideas where they could find them. The Shi’ite hierocracy consisted of the custodians of a rich religious tradition. The consequences of these differences will become apparent presently.


C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL DISLOCATION

We can now turn to the preconditions of revolution—the social dislocation and moral disturbance that follow rapid social change. Let us begin with normative disturbance at the most superficial level.

The conspicuous consumption on the part of Iranian high society and the abundance of nouveaux riches produced an acute sense of relative deprivation among the new middle-class government employees, white-collar workers in the private sector, and schoolteachers. At times, there was the added discomfort of absolute deprivation, which resulted from an acute housing shortage that was aggravated by the influx of a sizable foreign work force and American advisers.

In this context, it would be valid to speak of the widespread discontent of 1977-1978 as a confirmation of Davies’s J-curve of continuous rising expectations and sudden frustrations. Iran’s GNP grew by 30.3 percent in 1973-1974 and by a further 42 percent in 1974-1975. Then came the economic debacle—despite, or rather because of, the massive unregulated inflow of oil revenue. Severe bottlenecks in skilled manpower and infrastructure halted economic growth in 1976. The problem was more deep-rooted, however. What underlay the widespread desire for revolutionary change was a fundamental disorientation and anomic more than a superficial and short-run frustration of material expectation. As Durkheim has pointed out, “crises of prosperity” generate disorientation by disturbing the collective normative order. There can be no doubt about the tremendous confusion and disorder created by the massive inflow of petrodollars, just as there can be little doubt about similar confusions in Nigeria and Mexico today. The consequent sense of moral disorder and desire for the reaffirmation of absolute standards should not be minimized. There was a widespread cultural malaise throughout Iranian society, ranging from general confusion and disorientation on the part of the nouveaux riches to sharply focused and intense rejection of foreign and antireligious cultural influences on the part of the mullahs and the merchants of the bazaar.

In Europe, the socialist and fascist mass movements were part of the extraordinary wave of mass political mobilization and national integration that swept the continent in the early decades of the 20th century.

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48 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951 [1897]).
49 Merkl (fn. 45). 760-61.
It is easy to recognize that these movements acted as vehicles for the integration of the recently mobilized masses into societal community. But one should not forget that religious movements have often performed the same function in the past.

Political mobilization comes about as a result of basic social change which also entails considerable social dislocation. Social change displaces a large number of persons from the strata into which they were born. These persons yearn for and demand inclusion in new forms of societal community. Religious movements and sects are age-old channels for the reintegration of such dislocated individuals. Political movements and parties are the new channels for societal reintegration. The Islamic Revolution demonstrates that the old and the new can combine.

Urbanization and the expansion of higher education in the two decades preceding the revolution are the two dimensions of rapid social change most relevant to the problem. Between 1956 and 1976, the urban population of Iran increased from 31 percent to 47 percent (from 6 to 16 million). Rural-urban migration accounts for a substantial proportion of this shift—over one-third for the decade 1966-1976, the rate being even higher for Tehran. This decade also witnessed an unprecedented expansion of higher education. The number of persons with higher education quadrupled (to about 300,000) and the enrollment in universities and professional schools in Iran trebled (to about 150,000). These factors contributed significantly to the rise of the Islamic movement. Thousands of religious associations spontaneously came into being in cities and in universities, and acted as the mechanism for the social integration of a significant proportion of the migrants into the cities and of the first-generation university students. By contrast, the Shah’s parallel attempt to integrate these same groups into his one-party political system proved to be a fiasco.

There is nothing new about dislocated, uprooted men and women finding new moorings in religious associations, sects, and revivalist movements. In England, for instance, many “masterless” men became sectaries in the 16th and 17th centuries. As early as the 1570s, Presbyterian classes were attended by laymen, but it is in the 1620s and 1630s that Puritan lectureships took root in towns to an astonishing degree, to the dismay of the Anglican Church. Laymen became patrons and paymasters of the Puritan lecturers, and the congregations clustering around the latter became “models for ideological party organization.”

99 Arjomand (fn. 26).
101 Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21.
strongly resembles the growth of lay religious associations in Iran in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, where the mullahs preached—at first in person but later, when demand outstripped supply, through cassette players—to avid audiences of urbanites. We find an even closer parallel in the rise of Methodism. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, migrants into the new industrial towns of England flocked to the assemblies of the Methodist preachers. Here, the perspective of integration into societal community brings out the sociological cogency of Halevy’s famous thesis: the Methodist Revival integrated the recently urbanized masses into societal community and thus prevented a political revolution in England.53

Fascism, too, acted as the vehicle of integration of rural-urban migrants into societal community. In Germany, for instance, “many of the new urbanites failed to complete their cultural adjustment to city life and instead remained curiously vulnerable to the agrarian romanticism of völkisch ideologues.” One-half of the top Nazi party leaders were born in large villages.55

Literacy and Puritanism went hand-in-hand. The same is true of the growth of Islamic scripturalism. Islamic fundamentalism spread in Iranian universities just as Puritanism had spread at Oxford and Cambridge.56 Many of the Islamic activists of the 1970s, who currently form the second stratum of the Islamic regime, discovered “the true Islam” in university associations, just as Cromwell was reborn at Cambridge. Fascism spread at European universities in a parallel fashion. In Eastern Europe in particular, university students and young activists constituted the core of the fascist parties and their leadership. Rumanian fascism is of particular interest in this respect. In the early 1920s, its leaders, Codreanu and Mota, were founders of university associations for Christian reform and national revival in the universities of Iasi and Cluj, respectively.57

The combination of higher education and social dislocation is of particular importance for explaining the politicization of integrative movements. The key to the social composition of Islamic and university

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54 Merkl (fn. 45), 757.
55 Linz (fn. 45), 50.
57 Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 3ed. (New York: Praeger, 1964), 44; Carsten (fn. 45), 418; Linz (fn. 45), 48-50; Juan J. Linz, “Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer,” in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 107; Zevi Barbua, “Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspective on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania,” ibid., 385-87.
activists of the 1970s is that they either moved from small towns to big cities to go to universities, or they were the first generation from traditional lower middle-class backgrounds to attend universities, or both.\footnote{Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, “State and Social Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution,” \textit{State, Culture and Society} 1 (No. 3, 1985).} These young men contributed to the revolutionary politicization of the Islamic revival of the 1960s and 1970s in the same way in which the educated country gentlemen in England had contributed to the revolutionary politicization of Puritanism. The parallel with Rumanian fascism is even more striking. As the last Iron Guard leader, Sima, put it, “in 1926-27, our universities were flooded by a big wave of young people of peasant origin... who brought with them a robust national consciousness and were thus destroying the last strongholds of foreign spirit in our universities.”\footnote{Ismail and Mackie, \textit{The Shah’s War}, 44.} According to Eugen Weber, “legionary leadership came from the provincial, only just urbanized intelligentsia: sons or grandsons of peasants, schoolteachers, and priests.”\footnote{Eugen Weber, \textit{The Men of the Archangel}, \textit{Journal of Contemporary History} 1 (No. 1, 1966), 107.}

Max Weber once remarked that with the advent of modern mass politics, the condition of clerical domination itself changes. “Hierocracy has no choice but to establish a party organization and to use demagogic means, just like all other parties.”\footnote{Max Weber (fn. 15), II, p. 1195.} Rapid urbanization and the Shah’s failure to integrate uprooted elements—especially the socially mobile, newly educated elements—into his political system offered Khomeini and the cornered Shi’ite hierocracy an unparalleled opportunity for creating a politicized revolutionary mass movement. Using the organizational network of the lay religious associations and Islamic university students, the mullahs periodically organized the massive anti-Shah demonstrations and closures of the bazaar which amounted to a general strike of unprecedented duration. Perhaps they could even have brought down a stronger regime; we will never know. What is certain is that the clerically led general strike did bring down the fragile Pahlavi regime and its vacillating ruler.

\begin{itemize}
  \item The political and moral motives of the supporters of revolution and the minor significance of class interest
\end{itemize}

 Political motive may be defined as the motive to retain or recover political and institutional assets threatened or expropriated, and to gain political power by membership in, and maximally, control of, political society. On the negative side, the moral motive for supporting a revo-
lution may stem from the condemnation of a regime because it is unjust, because it is servile to foreign powers, or because it is instrumental in spreading an alien culture and undermining authentic traditional cultural and religious values. The moral condemnation of the regime as unjust may, in turn, be due to its being perceived as tyrannical, or it may be due to a sense of relative deprivation. On the positive side, the moral motive for supporting the revolution may result from the acceptance of the modern myth of revolution as a redemptive collective act. Finally, class interest can act as a motive for supporting the revolution if the economic interests of a class (so defined by virtue of their position in the mode or system of production) are protected or furthered thereby. With this schema, let us examine the motives that can plausibly be attributed to the social groups who supported the revolution against the Shah.

Political and moral motives are closely intertwined in the attitude of Shi’ite hierocracy. The primary material interest of the clerical leaders was to regain the prerogatives and functions they had lost as a result of the centralization and modernization of the state. This was true of the leading clerical militants who came from traditional urban backgrounds, were in their forties or fifties at the time of the revolution, and had a keen awareness of the dispossessions of the Shi’ite hierocracy by the Pahlavi state. The younger militant clerics, who were primarily drawn from humbler rural and small-town backgrounds, saw all avenues of upward social mobility for people in their profession blocked under the Pahlavis. They expected an Islamic government to guarantee them rapid social ascent and full incorporation into the political system.

Both the clerical leaders and the militant seminarians were morally indignant at the spread of immorality, libertinism, and an alien culture under the Pahlavi regime. In a significant statement, Khomeini’s son identified the conservative members of the Shi’ite hierocracy who supported the revolution against the Shah as persons whose motivation was exclusively moral.54

The political and moral motives are also entwined for the intensely politicized lay Islamic activists. These first-generation provincial and lower middle-class university students and graduates, mostly in the applied sciences and engineering, saw themselves barred from the Westernized upper echelons of society and high government positions. They,

too, were motivated by the desire to remove these barriers to their upward social mobility. It would be absurd to attribute any class interest to this young "petty bourgeois" group other than the desire to gain power and entry into the political system, to move up on the social ladder, and to put an end to a cultural climate they found alien and resented deeply.

The motives of the new middle class were both political and moral. Many of its members—including the recently mobilized middle-class women who figured prominently in the anti-Shah demonstrations—wanted inclusion in the political society. They considered the Pahlavi regime tyrannical and unjust, and accepted the myth of revolution. It should be noted, however, that the potency of the political myth of revolution caused the new middle class, especially the women, to join the Islamic revolutionary movement against their class interests—indeed suicidally.64

The traditional bourgeoisie—the merchants of the bazaar, the petty bourgeois of distributive trades, and the craftsmen of the bazaar guilds—was the one social group for which class interest was the primary motive for overthrowing the Shah. These groups felt threatened by the developmental economic policies of the state which, among other things, excluded them from easy access to credit; they also feared the encroachment of the modern sector of the economy on their territory in the form of competing machine-made goods and new distributive networks of supermarkets and chain stores. To this motivating class interest was added a sense of relative deprivation caused by the tremendous gains made by court-connected industrialists, as well as considerable moral indignation caused by the disregard of Islam and traditional values under foreign cultural influence.

II. The Teleology of the Islamic Revolution

A. MORAL RIGORISM AND THE SEARCH FOR CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY

The fact that integrative social movements are reactions to social dislocation and normative disorder explains the salience of their search for cultural authenticity and their moral rigorism.

64 It was neither the first nor the last time that a social class participated in a revolution which did not further its interests. As Barrington Moore has pointed out, peasants have often been the principal victims of modernization brought about by communist governments they helped create by their participation in revolutionary movements. See Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 428-59; also see Zimmermann (fn. 2), 339-41, 355. Similarly, the outcome of the French Revolution was not especially favorable to the petite bourgeoisie, the sans-culottes, who most vigorously participated in it. Ibid., 387, 407.
“Fascism was a revolution, but one which thought of itself in cultural, not economic terms.”

The same is true of the Islamic Revolution, which emphatically saw itself in these terms—even when not explicit—and is the “Islamic cultural revolution” against Westernism and (Eastern) atheistic communism inaugurated with the closing of the universities in April 1980. Since the revolution, Iran’s secular judiciary system has been systematically Islamicized, the Shi’ite Sacred Law has been codified for the first time in history, and Islamic morals and coverage of women are strictly enforced by an especially created official vigilante corps.

Disoriented and dislocated individuals and groups cannot be successfully integrated into a societal community without the creation or “revitalization” of a moral order. Walzer emphasizes that Puritanism was primarily a “response to the disorder of the transition period.”

Ranulf has correctly underscored the moral rigor of Nazism and compared it to Puritanism. The intense and repressive moralism of the Islamic revolutionaries in reaction to the moral laxity and disorder of Pahlevi Iran finds a strict parallel in Puritan moralism in reaction to the moral laxity and sensuality of the Renaissance culture, and in Nazi moralism in reaction to the decadence of the Weimar period. Furthermore, the parochial rejection of cosmopolitanism is a common feature of the Islamic Revolution and Nazism, and especially of Eastern European fascism.

The vehement rejection of cultural Westernism in favor of revitalized Christianity in Rumania and Hungary finds a counterpart in Khomeini’s more systematic and successful determination to extirpate Western cultural pollution by establishing an Islamic moral order.

**B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS**

The revolutions of early modern Europe were made by men for whom restoration was the key word, and who “were obsessed by renovation—the desire to return to an old order of society.” The confused teleology of these revolutions was marked by an absence of ideology and by a corporate or national constitutionalism “which was mainly the preserve of the dominant social and vocational groups.”

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97 Walzer (fn. 96), 333, 315.
lution, "with the nature, source, and grounds of political legitimacy all up for grabs, there was almost inevitably a great effusion of claims to legitimacy on all sorts of grounds, old and new."27 Nevertheless, two elements predominate in the teleology of the English Revolution: parliamentarianism, and Puritanism and its offshoots.

If the French Revolution instituted one thing for all subsequent revolutions, it is the presence of ideology. It gave birth to Jacobinism as the classic form of modern revolutionary ideology. The ideas of constitutional representation and national sovereignty were coupled at the beginning. As the revolution progressed, however, the source of legitimacy drifted from the representation of estates to the symbolic embodiment of the will of the people. The claim to embody the will of the nation as a single homogeneous entity could only be made through the manipulation of the maximalist language of consensus. Presumed embodiments of the will of the people became the sole and sufficient basis of legitimacy. During the period of Jacobin ascendancy, revolutionary legitimacy triumphed; and with its triumph, revolutionary ideology "filled the entire sphere of power" and "became coextensive with government itself."28 The distillation of the Jacobin experiment was the modern political myth of revolution. Revolutionary legitimacy became an autonomous and self-sufficient category.

In the 19th century, revolutions became "milestones in humanity's inexorable march toward true freedom and true universality."29 Leninism combined this conception of revolution with the Jacobin myth; it has become the justification for the seizure of power by revolutionaries who proclaim themselves in charge of realizing the next stage of socio-historical development.30 With the consolidation of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, Leninist revolutionary ideology "obtained control over the interpretation of world history."31 It is this control that is challenged by the fascist and the Islamic revolutionaries even while they are upholding, like the Bolsheviks, the myth of revolution as an act of redemption and liberation of oppressed masses and nations.

Both fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movement are latecomers to the modern international political scene. As such, they share a number of essential features. The foremost of these is the appropriation of the

27 Hester (fn. 31), 178.
30 Dunn (fn. 13), 8-11.
legitimatory political myth of revolution. The Italian fascists boasted of their "revolutionary intransigence," and the Nazis contrasted their revolution, the revolution of the German Volks, to the "subhuman revolution" of 1789. Similarly, Iran's revolutionaries take great pride in the historic mission of the Islamic Revolution.

"Economics was indeed one of the least important fascist considerations." The same is true of the Islamic Revolution. (Khomeini, responding to complaints about the state of the economy, once remarked, "we did not make the Islamic Revolution so the Persian melon would be cheap.") Furthermore, like the European fascists, the Islamic militants aim at integrating all classes, including the working class, into a national community. The fascists substituted "nation" for "class" and developed the concept of "the proletarian nations." Class conflict was thus replaced by the conflict between nations, rich against poor. With the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, we have an identical transposition of the theme of exploitation of one class by another into the exploitation of the "dis-inherited" (mustaţ'af) nations by the imperialist ones.

"The fact that fascism is a latecomer," writes Linz, "helps to explain, in part, the essential anti-character of its ideology and appeal." Furthermore, "it is paradoxical that for each rejection there was also an incorporation of elements of what they rejected." Like fascism, the Islamic revolutionary movement has offered a new synthesis of the political creeds it has violently attacked. And, like the fascists, the Islamic militants are against democracy because they consider liberal democracy a foreign model that provides avenues for free expression of alien influences and ideas. (Also like the fascists, however, the Islamic militants would not necessarily accept the label of "antidemocratic.") Similarly, both groups are antibourgeois, resenting the international cosmopolitan orientation of the new middle class. Both movements are anti-Marxist—i.e., anticomunist and antisocialist—while appropriating the ideas and certainly the slogans of social justice and equality. The Islamic revolutionary movement has the considerable advantage over fascism, however, of combining this "anti-character" with strong traditionalism. Here

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* Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: New American Library, 1969), 281; Brechler (fn. 3), 10, n. 15.
* Mosse (fn. 65), 21.
* Linz (fn. 45), 15. Once the attempt to export the Islamic Revolution, temporarily checked by the setback in the Iran-Iraq war, is resumed fully, one may expect further resonances of the Italian fascist ideas of "an imperialism of the poor" and "proletarian imperialism."
* Linz (fn. 45), 5.
we can see the consequence of the fact that the dispossessed leaders of
the Islamic Revolution were not a heterogenous but a homogeneous
solidary group and, furthermore, one that guarded the Shi'ite religious
tradition. In contrast to the Nazi "Revolution of Nihilism" (and to the
striking lack of reference to Japan's own intellectual tradition in the
writings of the leaders of the fascist New Order Movement of the late
1930s),81 the Islamic Revolution combines the rejection of other alien
political ideologies with a vigorous affirmation of the Islamic religious
and cultural tradition. I have therefore characterized it as "revolutionary
traditionalism."82

In addition to their common anti-character and other incidental fea-
tures, fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movements both have a
distinct constitutive core. Racism and anti-Semitism were the most ob-
noxious features of European fascism, but, as Mosse and others have
convincingly shown, not its core component. The constitutive core of
fascism that goes beyond European fascism and continues to live in a
variety of forms as a vigorous ideological force in the third world is the
combination of nationalism and socialism. As George Valois put it in
1925, "nationalism + socialism = fascism." The marriage of nation-
alisn and socialism was in the cards after World War I.83 This fact by
far transcends the particular conditions of any dispossessed stratum, any
European country, or, for that matter, of interwar Europe. It was arrived
at by different fascist leaders in different European countries, and it has
been arrived at independently by many third-world ideologues since
1945.

An enduring feature of fascist ideology has been its insistence on the
reality of the nation and the artificiality of class. To the emotionally
unattractive idea of perpetual class struggle, the French fascist thinker
Marcel Deat contrasts the appeal of belonging to a community untainted
by divisive conflict and fragmentation: "The total man in the total
society, with no clashes, no prostration, no anarchy."84 The Arab na-
tionalist thinkers sought to utilize the appeal of belonging to a com-

81 William M. Fletcher, The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar
Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
82 Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Arjomand, From Na
83 Sternhell (fn. 78), 320-21, 326, 335-37.
84 Quoted, ibid., 335, 347.
in the cards since the fascist era. It has been in the cards irrespective of the plight of the dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate in Iran. The latter did have the advantage of institutional autonomy and of independence in the exercise of religious authority, something the Sunni Islamic ideologues like Rashid Rida could only dream of. But it was exceedingly slow in creating a consistent ideology in order to defend itself against the state. In fact, the Islamic ideology was developed elsewhere, by publicists and journalists like Mawdudi (d. 1979) in Indo-Pakistan and Qutb (d. 1966) in Egypt. Its essence consisted in presenting the secular state as an earthly idol claiming the majesty that is God's alone. When Khomeini finally rose against the Shah, he imported the Islamic ideology from Pakistan and Egypt as a free good.

In 1926, in a work that anticipates most of the ideological developments of the past two decades, the youthful Mawdudi had declared: “Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch . . . and jihad (holy war) denotes the revolutionary struggle.” Mawdudi conceived the modern world as the arena of the “conflict between Islam and un-Islam,” the latter being equated with pre-Islamic Ignorance (jahiliyya) and polytheism. Modern creeds and political philosophies were equated with polytheism and Ignorance. Their predominance necessitated the revival of Islam. A few decades later, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb adopted the contrast between Islam and un-Islam—conceived as Ignorance—from Mawdudi and made it the cornerstone of his revolutionary Islamic ideology. For accepting secular states, contemporary Muslim societies are branded as societies of Ignorance. To extirpate Ignorance from these societies, an Islamic government has to be established and the Sacred Law applied. To establish an Islamic government—that is, to establish the rule of God—Islamic revolution is necessary.58

The distinctively clericalist Shi'ite idea of Islamic government, to be realized after the revolution of 1979, was not directly influenced by the trend in Sunni Islam. It is best understood in the context of the struggle between the Shi'ite hierocracy and the centralizing monarchy discussed earlier. Though a novelty in Shi'ite history, Khomeini's idea of Islamic government, first put forward in 1970, was stated in the traditional Shi'ite frame of reference and does not betray any influence of the

ideological innovations of Mawdudi and Qutb. It simply extended the
general judiciary authority of the jurist (faqih), as well as some of his
very specific rights of gerency, to include the right to rule.\textsuperscript{86}

Nevertheless, Mawdudi and Qutb were read avidly, in Persian transla-
tion and/or in Arabic, by Khomeini’s militant followers, who adopted
the fundamental revolutionary idea that obedience to the impious secular
state—in this case the Shah’s—was tantamount to idolatry. The cen-
trality of this idea is unmistakable in the revolutionary slogans and
pamphleteering, most notably in the application of the term \textit{taghut} (ungodly earthly power) to the Pahlavi political order. Its influence has
become more pronounced since the elimination of the moderates and
Islamic modernists in 1980-1981, and is easily noticeable in the speeches
of the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Ayatol-
lah Safi has no difficulty whatsoever in combining the advantages of the ideologies of Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalist ideas of
Khomeini. For him, the government of the jurist on behalf of the Hidden
Imam is the true government of God on Earth, vowed to the imple-
mentation of His Law. All other political regimes are ungodly orders,
regimes of Ignorance and of \textit{taghut}. The Islamic Revolution will continue
until the overthrow of all these regimes.\textsuperscript{87}

\section{C. The Old and the New in Revolutionary Traditionalism, and
The Teleological Irrelevance of Progress}

The Islamic Revolution in Iran should draw our attention to the
neglected importance of reactive and reactionary elements in all revolu-
tions. The ideology of proletarian revolution, as Mannheim has shown,
incorporated many of the elements of the romantic, reactionary critique
of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{88} On the other hand, Nazism, as both its ideolo-
gues and its historians (notably Bracher) have insisted, contained revolu-
tionary as well as reactionary elements.\textsuperscript{89}

The Islamic Revolution constitutes a wry comment on the debate
among historians as to whether the early modern European revolutions
were conservative or liberal, reactionary or progressive. It also dem-
onstrates that revolutionaries often act in defense of traditional values.
Bacchler is right when he notes, “contrary to appearances and accepted

\textsuperscript{86} Said A. Arjomand, “Ideological Revolution in Shiism,” in Arjomand, \textit{Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism} (forthcoming, 1987).

\textsuperscript{87} Lotfollah Safi, \textit{Nezam-e Emanati va Rahbari} [Regime of Imamate and Leadership] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Be’that, 1982/1361), 16-18.


\textsuperscript{89} Karl D. Bracher, \textit{The German Dictatorship} (New York: Praeger, 1970), 7-13; Carsten (in 45), 448.
belief, conservative revolutions are supported less by the elite than by the people. Not surprisingly, some important teleological elements in the clerically led popular uprisings such as Carlism and the Cristero movement find resonance in the Islamic Revolution in Iran: repudiation of foreign and cosmopolitan influences and values, and vehement opposition to anticlerical policies of modernizing governments, including, of course, atheism. Marx's famous idea that the French revolutionaries parodied the Roman republicans because they had not yet developed a political language of their own should not automatically be generalized. The revolutionaries who draw on traditional imagery can vary greatly in their knowledge of and professional identification with tradition. The Ayatollahs were the official custodians of the Shi'ite tradition and knew their methodology of Shi'ite jurisprudence. In the past six years, they have proved this by their sustained efforts to Islamicize Iran's judiciary system, by institutionalizing substantial political functions for the Friday prayer leaders, and by presiding over the strict enforcement of Islamic morals.

Islamic revolutionary traditionism does have its modern trappings. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic pays lip service to equality and especially to social justice, and it guarantees freedom of the press, of the expression of political opinion, of political gatherings and groups—provided, needless to say, that they are not contrary to the interests of Islam. Finally, there is another modern element that is more than a trapping: the Majlis, or parliament. The constitutionalism of the early-modern European revolutions was the idealization of practice, and closely linked to the aim of preserving local liberties. In Iran, even though constitutionalism entered as an imported panacea in 1905-1906, the mullahs used the constitutionalist ideology when opposing the Shah. Consequently, the Majlis is an enduring feature of the Islamic regime. Its legislation, however, is rigorously supervised by the clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians. In addition, both the ruling clerics and the lay Islamic second stratum of the regime have a keen interest in technology. They love broadcasting, being televised, and being interviewed by the press, and they love organizing seminars and congresses and using modern-sounding phrases such as "political-ideological bureaus."

When the notions of revolution and progress are linked, as they were in the 19th century and as they still are today, a line can clearly be drawn between revolution and counterrevolution. The evidence offered in this paper makes it impossible to draw such a line. It has been pointed

* Baechler (fn. 3), 108.
* Hennessy (fn. 41), 258.
out that all revolutions contain counterrevolutionary elements. The ob-
verse is also true: all counterrevolutions must incorporate revolutionary
innovations in order to restore what they consider to be the traditional
order. This is clearly the case with Islamic revolutionary traditionalism
in Iran. As I have argued elsewhere, it has in fact brought about a
revolution within Shi‘ism.\textsuperscript{92} Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution has
stimulated considerable growth in the size of the state and the number
of persons employed by it. One can legitimately see these factors as the
continuation of a trend in modernization. It is, however, best treated as
a universal trend making for continuity with the past rather than as
specific to the teleology of this revolution as distinct from others.

D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

Comparative evidence not only requires that we sever the conceptual
link between revolution and progress, but also suggests that we link
revolution and religion. Religion was an important factor not only in
the Puritan Revolution, but in all early-modern European revolutions
except the Fronde.\textsuperscript{93} Walzer is right in considering the Puritan Marian
exiles of the 1550s to be forerunners of modern revolutionary ideo-
logues.\textsuperscript{94} But the same is true of the clerics of the Catholic League thirty
years later.\textsuperscript{95} In 1640, the Puritan preachers were calling the House of
Commons God’s chosen instrument for rebuilding Zion.\textsuperscript{96} In the same
year, their Catholic counterparts in Catalonia were also engaged in
revolutionary activity. Here is the commander of the Spanish king’s
forces in Rossello complaining of the sedition and licentiousness of the
clergy:

In the confessional and the pulpit they spend their entire time rousing
the people and offering the rebels encouragement and advice, inducing
the ignorant to believe that rebellion will win them the kingdom of
heaven.\textsuperscript{97}

There are striking parallels between the Puritan Revolution and the
Islamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini as
Abraham and Moses in one; for the Puritan Saints, we have the militant
mullahs; and for the fast sermons of 1642-1649,\textsuperscript{98} we had, under the

\textsuperscript{91} Arjomand (fn. 86).
\textsuperscript{92} Zagorin (fn. 18), I, p. 741.
\textsuperscript{93} Walzer (fn. 56), 92-113.
\textsuperscript{94} Roland Mousnier, \textit{Social Hierarchies, 1450 to the Present}, trans. by Peter Evans (New
York: Schocken, 1973), 50, 61; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, chap. 10.
\textsuperscript{95} Stone (fn. 20), 90.
\textsuperscript{96} John Elliott, \textit{The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)}
\textsuperscript{97} Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament,” in Trevor-Roper,
Shah, the gatherings at forty-day intervals to commemorate the "martyrs"; after the revolution, we have the Friday sermons at congregational prayers. Important differences, however, affect the teleologies of these respective revolutions. There were strong anarchic elements in Puritanism—especially Independency, which considered itself the true Church within the corrupt church. Such anarchic innerworldly millenarian precepts of the Independents militated against their acceptance of a Presbyterian national church government. These precepts could also lead in the direction of the Levellers' conception of man as a rational being in the image of God, and hence to natural rights. The corporate solidarity of the militant Shi'ite clergy contrasts as strongly with the factionalism of the Puritan Saints as methodologically grounded legalism contrasts with the Saints' millenarian idea of Christ as the Lawgiver. Finally, the revolutionary Shi'ite clericalist theory of the sovereignty of the jurist is in sharp contrast to the idea of congregational representation—especially in Presbyterianism.99

The situation is different with regard to the modern revolutions; but let us see how. De Tocqueville knew that the French Revolution had produced a new religion. It aimed at

nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race. ... It developed into a species of religion, if a singularly imperfect one, since it was without a God, without a ritual or promise of a future life. Nevertheless, this strange religion has, like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants and martyrs.100

The terms "secular religion" and "political religion" have aptly been used to describe communism and fascism.101 Modern revolutions do require political religions. The crucial issue is whether there is any necessary incompatibility between religion and political religion.

The Bolshevik Revolution was militantly atheistic. But before we draw any conclusions, let us think of its totally imported ideology and of the exceedingly narrow social base of its political elite. What about the French Revolution? De Tocqueville did not see any incompatibility between Christianity and the political religion of the revolution. Anti-clericalism and the campaign against religion stemmed from the identification of the Church with the ancien régime, and not from any wide-

101 Monnerot (fn. 75); Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two Essays (Chicago: Regency Gateway, 1968). It is interesting to note that in 1949 Monnerot described communism as "the twentieth-century Islam."
spread anti-Christian sentiment. What about the fascist revolution? European fascism was often associated with anticlericalism, but this association is neither general nor fundamental. The Nazis glorified the mythical pre-Christian German tradition and were anti-religious. The same is true of other fascist movements in Western and Northern Europe. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Rumanian, the Hungarian, the Slovak, and the Croatian fascist movements were emphatically Christian and aimed at establishing Christian corporatist states.

Clerical leadership and participation in the Slovak Republic established by Father Hlinka’s People’s Party (presided over by Father Tiso) and in the Ustasha movement in Croatia offer interesting points for comparison with Iran. But the most illuminating parallel is between Shi‘ite revolutionary traditionism and the Rumanian Iron Guards, the Legion of Archangel Michael. Both movements are characterized by extraordinary cults of suffering, sacrifice, and martyrdom. Priests figured prominently in the legionary movement, side by side with university students. Legionary meetings were invariably preceded by church services, and their demonstrations were usually led by priests carrying icons and religious flags. The integral Christianity of the Legionaries differentiated them from the Nazis and the Italian Fascists. This they knew. As one of their leading intellectuals explained, “Fascism worships the state, Nazism the race and the nation. Our movement strives not

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“... It was “a spectacular but transient phenomenon... in no sense basic to its program.” Therefore, the antireligious features faded as the true political theology of the revolution unfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. 100), 5-7. On the vitality of religious sentiment among the insurgent masses during the French Revolution, see Albert Soboul, “Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la révolution: Saints patriotes et martyrs de la liberté” [Religious sentiment and popular cults during the revolution: patriotic saints and martyrs of liberty], Archives de sociologie des religions 1 (No. 2, 1956).

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“... These variations become intelligible in the light of Linz’s demonstration that the extent of organized preemption of the political space by Christian-democratic or Catholic-conservative parties was a decisive factor in inhibiting the growth of fascism (as in Spain and Belgium). Where such parties existed and had carved up electoral territories for themselves, fascism found a formidable rival. Fascism would also tend to be antireligious in order to differentiate itself from the rival religious party (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-à-vis the Zentrum party). See Linz (fn. 45), 16-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), 156; Hamilton (fn. 45), 37-41.

Mexican fascism, the Sinarquismo of the late 1930s and early 1940s, also fits Linz’s pattern. The movement declined when its middle-class supporters defected to the Catholic Accion Nacional. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280-82. Linz’s account of cases in which fascism was not antireligious but intensely Christian is unsatisfactory, however; see Linz (fn. 45), 16, and Linz (fn. 57), 164, 184, n. 51. The reverse side of Linz’s argument is well put by Merkl: “There is ample evidence that religious decline and confrontations played a role in fascist development... creating a massive reservoir of confused quasi-religious fears and longings open to exploitation by fascist demagogues.” Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

merely to fulfill the destiny of the Rumanian people—we want to fulfill it along the road to salvation.” The ultimate goal of the nation, Codreanu and others emphasized, was “resurrection in Christ.”

Finally, we must consider Brazilian Integralism, the most important fascist movement in Latin America. Its founder, Plinio Salgado, met Mussolini in 1930. The meeting made a deep impression on him, and he certainly saw no incompatibility between the fascist political religion and Catholicism. He returned to Brazil to “Catholicize” Italian fascism. Taking advantage of an extensive network of lay religious associations, which had been brought into existence by Cardinal Leme, he founded the Brazilian Integralist Action with the aim of creating a corporatist, integralist state. Integralism appealed to Catholic intellectuals because of its promise of a “spiritual revolution” and of an Integral State “which comes from Christ, is inspired in Christ, acts for Christ, and goes toward Christ.” Salgado accordingly criticized the “dangerous pagan tendency of Hitlerism” and lamented the lack of a Christian basis in Nazi ideology.

Few would find the statement that political revolutions are a modern form of millenarianism objectionable. Russian communism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Rome, and Nazism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Reich, “the Thousand Year Reich of national freedom and social justice.” As was the case with religion and political religion, political and religious millenarianism are by no means mutually exclusive. The religious chiliastic element may predominate, as in the Taiping Rebellion which aimed at establishing the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace; or it may play an important subsidiary role, as in the Puritan Revolution in England and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In the Puritan Revolution we encounter two forms of millenarianism: the milder, more inner-worldly millenarianism of the Independent divines, and the better known, activist one of the men of the Fifth Mon-

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108 Lewy (fn. 41), chap. 7.
archy. There can be no doubt that revolutionary political millenarianism played a crucial role in the motivation of the Iranian intelligentsia and other groups. But in addition, the Shi’ite doctrine contains an important millenarian tenet: the belief in the appearance of the Twelfth Imam as the Mahdi to redeem the world. This belief was as convenient for Khomeini’s revolutionary purpose as it had been for the founder of the Safavid Empire in 1501. Although Shi’ite millenarianism played an important role in the Islamic Revolution, it did not have any of the divisive and anarchic consequences of Puritan millenarianism because the clerics were firmly in control of its interpretation, and in fact partly derived their legal/juristic authority from it.

CONCLUSION

The success of the Islamic revolutionary ideology is the novel and teleologically distinct mark of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ideology is a powerful response to the contemporary politicized quest for authenticity. It has been constructed through the unacknowledged appropriation of all the technical advantages of the Western ideological movements and political religions, with the added—or rather, the emphatically retained—promise of other-worldly salvation. In a sense, it has a considerable ideological advantage over Nazism and communism, both of which clashed with religion. Rather than creating a new substitute for religion, as did the communists and the Nazis, the Islamic militants have fortified an already vigorous religion with the ideological armor necessary for battle in the arena of mass politics. In doing so, they have made their distinct contribution to world history.

* Arjomand (fn. 17), 269-70.