The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate

Yahya Sadowski



Maath Alousi from *The Visual Diary of an Arab Architect*

The "collapse of communism" in 1989 and the victory over Iraq in 1991 sparked a wave of triumphal declarations by Western pundits and analysts who believed that all "viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism" had now been exhausted and discredited. Some then tried to sketch a foreign policy appropriate to the "new world order."[1] A consistent theme of this "new thinking" was that the peoples of the developing countries must now acknowledge that liberal democracy is the only plausible form of governance in the modern world. Accordingly, support for democratization should henceforth be a central objective of US diplomacy and foreign assistance.[2]

This trend was not welcomed by all. Autocrats in the Arab world, particularly the rulers of the Gulf states, were appalled at the thought that Washington might soon be fanning the flames of republican sentiment. "The prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples' composition and traits are different from the traits of that world," declared King Fahd of Saudi Arabia in March 1992.[3] The king's stance suits many US policy makers just fine. Former secretary of defense and CIA chief James Schlesinger spoke for more than himself recently when he asked

> whether we seriously desire to prescribe democracy as the proper form of government for other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posed in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the institutions in Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no: over the years we have sought to preserve those institutions, sometimes in preference to more democratic forces coursing throughout the region.

Schlesinger goes on to cite the king's views as endorsement of his own.[4] For their part, some partisans of Israel feared that US endorsement of democratic trends in the Arab world might abet the rise to power of "Islamic fundamentalist" regimes. (They may also privately worry that Arab democratization might erode Israel's claim to US support as "the only democracy in the Middle East.")

Those who oppose democratization initiatives in the Middle East could, moreover, turn for support to Western academic "experts." "[A]mong Islamic countries, particularly those in the Middle East," wrote Samuel Huntington in a typical dismissal, "the prospects for democratic development seem low."[5] The thesis that Middle Eastern societies are resistant to democratization had been a standard tenet of Orientalist thought for decades, but in the 1980s a new generation of Orientalists inverted some of the old assumptions and employed a new vocabulary which allowed them to link their work to a wider, international debate about the relationship between "civil society" and democratization. These updated arguments sought to prove not only—as neo-Orientalist Daniel Pipes put it—that "Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the world," but that they always would.[6]

Strong State, Weak Society

There are dozens of theories about what factors promote democracy. A country may be more likely to become democratic if it becomes richer, or redistributes its wealth

in an egalitarian manner, or specializes in manufacturing consumer durables, or rapidly converts its peasantry into proletarians, or switches to a nuclear family structure, or gets colonized by England, or converts *en masse* to Protestantism.[7] Scholars quibble endlessly about which recipes are most effective, but generally concur that democracy thrives in those countries that possess a "civil society."

The term civil society has been bandied about recently with an enthusiasm that has not made its meaning any clearer.[8] For most scholars, civil society refers to the collection of autonomous social organizations that resist arbitrary exercises of state power. This conception goes back to the 18th century, when thinkers like Montesquieu and Thomas Paine argued that the despotic tendencies of Europe's absolute monarchs could be checked if "intermediate powers" such as the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the churches, and the press united to assert their independence.[9] Today corporations, labor unions, chambers of commerce, professional syndicates, public action groups, local governments, lay religious fraternities, voluntary associations and assorted collectivities would all be considered elements of civil society inasmuch as they help to curb the powers of the state.

Groups are common enough in all human societies, but those with a level of internal organization and assertiveness that enables them to challenge state power are rare. For several centuries the consensus of Western scholars was that such groups were missing in the Orient. This lack of civil society, they contended, was the primary reason why governments in the region were so prone to despotism.[10]

Until recently, Western experts argued that in Islamic societies groups were

> strikingly different from their supposed counterparts in Western history. Their leaders were spokesmen, not directors. Entry into such groups was seldom marked by any formal observance, or datable from any specific moment. Men belonged to such groups because they identified themselves and others as belonging to certain accepted categories such as "merchant" or "scholar"; and, in general, they rallied to such groups only when the categories with which they identified were threatened.[11]

Weakly organized and lacking strong corporate identities, social associations in the Middle East tended to be "informal, personalistic, and relatively inefficient as a means of winning support and extracting resources from the populace."[12] They were too feeble to challenge the power of the state and constitute a civil society.[13]

Rather than challenging the ruler's authority, the argument went, groups in Islamic societies tended to be vehi-

An Amsterdam mosque.

Friso Spoelstra

Yahya Sadowski, *an editor of this magazine, is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, and author of* Political Vegtables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture *(Brookings, 1991).*

cles of supplication and collaboration. The most common form of political organization was the clientage network, whose members traded their loyalty for the patronage and protection of some notable.[14] In this setting, apparently modern organizations such as unions, peasant associations and professional syndicates only provide a patina that disguises the continuing struggle of atomized clients to secure the sponsorship of elite patrons.[15]

Why were groups in the Middle East so weak? Western experts offered several distinct answers, but the prevailing one was that proffered by the Orientalists: Islam accounted for this weakness in Middle Eastern society, just as it explained the region's other peculiarities.[16] Despotism was implicit in the very core of Islam. After all, the very name Islam came from the Arabic word for "submission." The image that Islamic doctrine presented of the pious believer—fatalistic, prostrate before God, obeying His every whim—served as a trope for discussing not only religious but also political behavior in societies where rulers acted as "the shadow of God upon earth."[17] In the words of the definitive Orientalist cliche, Islam was not just a religion but a total way of life. The totalistic character of the faith seemed to imply that only a totalitarian state could put its dogmas into practice.[18] Islam, moreover, discouraged the formation of groups that might have resisted despotism, since

> Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elective or representative assembly. It is interesting that the jurists never accepted the principle of majority decision—there was no point, since the need for a procedure of corporate collective decision never arose.[19]

Thus, groups such as the ulama (Islamic jurists), the military and the provincial notables, who might have shared an interest in restraining the authority of the sultan, lacked any practical foundation for organizing to do so. As a result, "the political experience of the Middle East under the caliphs and sultans was one of almost unrelieved autocracy, in which obedience to the sovereign was a religious as well as a political obligation, and disobedience a sin as well as a crime."[20]

The classical Orientalists argued that orthodox Islam promoted political quietism. Supposedly the great medieval Islamic thinkers, horrified by the periodic rebellions and civil wars that wracked their community, decreed that obedience to any ruler—even an unworthy or despotic one—was a religious duty. "As the great divine Ghazali (d. 1111) declared: 'The tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year's tyranny exerted by the subjects against each other.'"[21] As a result of this blanket prohibition of all dissent,

> there could be no question of representative bodies being set up to carry on a dialogue between ruler and subject; neither could there be institutions of local self-government in town or countryside; nor could craft or professional associations flourish unhindered, since they would always be suspected of limiting the sway of the government over its subjects.[22]

The upshot of the suppression of such groups was a despotic regime in which "the state is stronger than society."[23]

Among Western experts, the idea that in the Middle East the weakness of society assured the dominion of the state persisted until quite recently, although there had always been a handful of unorthodox scholars who argued that the prevailing consensus underestimated the real strength of society. They insisted that groups, solidarities and classes had been historically influential and that their collective action remained a critical force.[24] The size of this minority grew as political scientists found studies of clientage networks increasingly unsatisfying and began to identify authentic interest groups in Islamic societies.[25] Historians began to question the idea that the state had always been dominant. Ervand Abrahamian noted, for example, that although a late 18th-century Qajar Shah could execute anyone who attended his court, he probably enjoyed less real control over the countryside surrounding his capital than did a contemporary French monarch.[26]

The popularity of these dissident ideas exploded after the Iranian revolution of 1979. Until then, most students of Iran shared the Orientalist assumption that Islam had the effect of promoting despotic authority and claimed that Twelver Shi'ism was, if anything, an even more quietistic faith than Sunni Islam.[27] After the revolution Western experts quickly reversed their views, and now portrayed Iran as a country where society had traditionally been strong and the state weak. The Iranian clergy and its supporters among the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar and the new urban middle classes formed a genuine civil society capable not only of challenging the state but of toppling it. Shi'ism, with its cult of martyrs and delegitimation of secular authority, was now an ideal revolutionary ideology that had a long history of encouraging insurrections.[28]

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This revisionism was not confined to Iranian studies. During the 1980s, three new trends were discernible in Middle Eastern studies. First, as Islamic or Islamist movements grew more potent and challenged the ruling authorities, a host of studies of "radical Islam" appeared to reveal how Islamic doctrine disposed believers to form militant groups and contest the authority of the state. Second, as oil prices declined and government revenues dried up, scholars came to appreciate that states in the region were less powerful than they had once appeared.[29] Finally, as the intellectual foundations for the idea of "weak" Middle Eastern societies collapsed, there was a slow growth of interest in studies of mafias, mobs, interest groups, solidarities, and classes that *might* act as the equivalents of "civil society" in the region.[30]



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tial of the region, and found intellectual comfort in a new trend, which began even before the Iranian revolution, to reform and update Orientalism. This new generation of Orientalists were uncomfortable with their predecessors' claim that Islam promoted political submission—while sharing the conviction that Islam was incompatible with democracy.

Patricia Crone is probably the most persuasive and rigorous of these younger Orientalists.[34] One of her central themes is that Islamic civilization is unique in the way that it forcefully refuses to legitimize political authority. She traces this characteristic back to the eighth century when the Abbasid dynasty seized power from the Umayyads and the *shari'a* (Islamic law) was first codified. The ulama of this period were men of tribal origin, she argues, and the law they drafted reflected their "profound hostility to settled states."[35]

> the ulama defined God's law as *haqq al-'arab*, the law of the Arabs, just as they identified his language as the *lisan al-'arab*, the normative language of the bedouins, the consensus being that where God had not explicitly modified tribal law, he had endorsed it. The result was a tribal vision of sacred politics....Kings were rejected as Pharaohs and priests as golden calfs, while God's community was envisaged as an egalitarian one unencumbered by profane or religious structures of power below the caliph, who was himself assigned the duty of minimal government.[36]

The ulama portrayed all secular rulers as prone to corruption and despotism and volunteered to act as guardians against these excesses. They won enough support for these ideals from the mass of Muslims, urban and tribal alike, to prevent any dynasty from legitimating its empire.[37]

Conforming to this critique of political power, ordinary Muslims offered only tepid and intermittent support for their rulers. Unable to raise sufficient troops from among their subjects, Muslim rulers were forced to import military slaves, mamluks, to staff their armies. These slaves edged aside civilian dynasties before being replaced themselves by other warrior factions. "[B]etween foreign slaves and alienated secretaries," Crone writes, "politics degenerated into mere intrigues and bickerings for the proceeds of a state apparatus which neither party could permanently control, both parties squandering resources on an impressive scale while few indeed were reinvested in the state."[38]



Taekwando match between women at Cairo University and American University. Kristie Burns

Crone writes mainly about early Islamic history, but another of the young Orientalists—Daniel Pipes—has boldly spelled out the contemporary implications of this research in medieval politics. When Pipes was writing his own doctoral dissertation, also about the mamluks, he read Crone's thesis and concurred with her general argument.[39] He claimed that the mamluk institution was a phenomenon unique to Muslim societies and reflected the pernicious influence of the ulama and of Islamic doctrine. "While all religions postulate ideals that human beings cannot consistently maintain," he writes, "Islam alone of the

universalist religions makes *detailed political* ideals part of its basic code, the Shari'a."[40] By establishing ideals that are impossible to fulfill, Islam ensures that Muslims will view any form of government, sooner or later, as illegitimate.[41] Sincere Muslims consequently tend to withdraw support from their rulers. Since Muslims declined to serve in armies, slave soldiers had to be recruited. This bred both political instability and weakness. This political infirmity of Islamic civilization would eventually allow European civilization to outstrip it.

Pipes' analysis of the contemporary Islamic resurgence argues that the medieval failure to develop stable politics continues to be one of the "difficulties Muslims face in modernizing."[42] This view has proved congenial to the framers of elite opinion in the US, and Pipes has been able to purvey his ideas about "Muslim anomie" to an ever-widening audience—as a consultant to the State Department, as a director of the rightwing Foreign Policy Institute in Philadelphia (and editor of its journal, *Orbis*) and as a contributor to the *Wall Street Journal*, *The New Republic*, *Foreign Affairs* and other outlets.[43]



Muslims demonstrating in New Jersey.

Said Elatab/Middle East Photo

While Pipes has had the highest public profile among propagators of neo-Orientalist ideas, others have labored to spread them within the academic community. Patricia Crone is closely associated with a group of neo-Weberian scholars that includes some of the hottest young talents in several disciplines—J.G. Meriquor (political philosophy), Michael Mann (political sociology), and John Hall (political science).[44] These colleagues propagated Crone's ideas among the wider scholarly community and enriched them by weaving them into a broader argument about the evolution of societies.

John Hall in particular deserves credit for drawing out the implications of Crone's work for contemporary Islamic societies. In Hall's apt phrase, Crone has shown that, as a religion, Islam was essentially "monotheism with a tribal face."[45] Islamic history was the story of a strong society that consistently withheld its support from political authority. "Government thus has very slim roots in society," he wrote, "and stability came to depend upon such solidarity as the rulers of society could themselves achieve, as is true of most conquest societies."[46] Hall argues that the strength of society in Islamic civilizations not only made the state unstable; it also obstructed the development of true "civil society" and democracy. Precisely because society remained aloof from the state, and because dynasties tended to be very unstable, no "organic state" could emerge in the Middle East. Europe alone possessed an

> organic state, a *stronger* state, in place over long periods of time, and forced to provide infrastructural services for society, both because of the pre-existence of a civil society and because of the need to raise revenue to compete in war with other similarly stable states. In Islam such stable states did not exist. The fear of tribesmen meant that urban strata could not rule themselves, and a premium was accordingly placed upon military power. The states that resulted were transient and predatory.[47]

"Transient and predatory" states, lacking the cooperation of society, cannot be good candidates for democratization. The development of capitalism and democracy ultimately depends upon a pattern of *collaboration* between state and society.

Hall derived this vision of the origins of democracy from the work of his mentor, Ernest Gellner. The impact of Gellner's vision of history is evident in many aspects of neo-Orientalism and particularly in the idea that the cooperation of the state and society is crucial to development.[48] Gellner has argued that in most agrarian societies the commercial elite was doomed as soon as it began to grow wealthy and powerful enough to tinker with the social order.[49] Either the ruling military elite reacted to the danger of the rising commercial class by exterminating it, or the commercial elite triumphed and turned itself into a landed aristocracy. Either way, the tendency toward capitalism found among merchants usually snuffed itself out. The Protestant ethic, however, made the rising capitalist elite of Europe in the 16th to the 18th centuries different.

> For peculiar ideological reasons, this set of producers continued to be such even when grown rich enough to become powerful and to enjoy the fruits of their previous accumulation. They turned profits neither into swords nor into pleasure nor into ritual display. They had an inner compulsion to carry on, and the modern world was the byproduct of their obsessional drive.[50]

European capitalists were not inclined to abandon commerce and demand entry to the aristocracy. And, equally important, this class "did not oblige the encompassing state to control and dominate it in sheer self-defence. It did not create a political dilemma in which the new commercial class either had to eat or be eaten by the old powerholders."[51] This permitted the state and the emerging economic powers not merely to tolerate one another but increasingly to collaborate.

Gellner's argument mobilizes Weber's old (and somewhat discredited) Protestant ethic thesis for a new purpose: to explain the origins of the modern state rather than the rise of the modern economy.[52] This subtle shift has dramatic implications. It suggests that the success of development in the West was a result not of aggressive-assertive societies, but of passive-quiescent ones. It implies that capitalist development was most likely not where society constrained the state but where society avoided antagonizing authority. Gellner's argument stands the old ideas about civil society on their head. He portrays "civil" society not as a raucous band of solidarities that check the state's tendency toward despotism, but as a "civilized" assemblage of groups that expand production without threatening state power.[53]

It is long past time for scholars to abandon the quest for the mysterious "essences" that prevent democratization in the Middle East and turn to the matter-of-fact itemization of the forces that promote or retard this process.

Gellner's revisionist ideas about Protestantism in the Baroque Era had been prompted by his observations of England in his own time: an epoch of high inflation, stagnant economic growth, and growing political uncertainty. Gellner, like many other scholars, blamed these ills on the excessive growth of demands by special interests: farmers seeking crop subsidies, businessmen seeking tariff protections, and—above all—labor unions demanding wage and benefit increases. These demands triggered stagflation and arrested economic growth, and their increasingly desperate competition for a larger share of a diminishing social surplus was leading to a crisis of "governability."[54]

This anxiety about economic and political paralysis triggered a reassessment of the virtues of democracy. Some scholars claimed that it was precisely because authoritarian regimes (such as Japan and Germany) had suppressed the autonomy of social groups that they seemed especially likely to enjoy economic growth.[55] While few argued that the West would be better off abandoning democracy, many sought to dampen demands and help the state to resist such pressures.[56] Students of Germany, Switzerland and other economically successful states wrote warmly of their "corporatist" pattern of organization in which a handful of large industrial cartels and labor federations represented business and labor. By focusing and amalgamating the demands of their constituents, these corporatist bodies could negotiate industrial compromises that neutralized the peril of inflation.[57] Students of Austria and the Low Countries admired their model of "consociational" democracy, in which strong regional or religious loyalties limited the degree to which parties could compete for broad public support. Under consociation, no single party could hope for an outright majority in elections, so most parties are forced to enter into broad coalitions that dilute special interests and promote corporatist negotiating patterns.[58]

This broad intellectual shift, which emphasized the virtues—even the necessity—of curbing the autonomy of social groups and the growth of their demands on the state, created a receptive audience for the neo-Orientalists. Their argument, that tribes, mullahs and mamluks had demanded too much autonomy and created a crisis of governability in Islam, sounded plausible because Westerners could discern a trend toward the same ills in their own society.

The irony of this conjuncture needs to be savored. When the consensus of social scientists held that democracy and development depended upon the actions of strong, assertive social groups, Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When the consensus evolved and social scientists thought a quiescent, undemanding society was essential to progress, the neo-Orientalists portrayed Islam as beaming with pushy, anarchic solidarities. Middle Eastern Muslims, it seems, were doomed to be eternally out of step with intellectual fashion.

Strong Society or Strong State?

Today there is a broad empirical consensus among Western and Middle Eastern scholars about political conditions in the Middle East. They agree that states are weak and, as their economic crises grow worse, getting weaker. They concur that the weakness of the state partly reflects and partly encourages greater assertiveness by social groups: while the states are paralyzed, movements like the Islamists appear to have seized the initiative. Some think the growing energy of social groups can be harnessed to help forge democracies in the region. The neo-Orientalists, in contrast, assert that the proliferation of social movements will discourage any trend toward power-sharing and greater tolerance in the region, if it does not breed civil war and anarchy.

It is clear that the neo-Orientalist argument is seriously flawed. Crone, Pipes, and Gellner have retained exactly those ideas that vitiated classical Orientalism. They too portray Islam as a social entity whose "essential" core is immune to change by historical influences. Crone describes how the ulama wrote their tribal biases into the structure of Islamic doctrine—and claims that this bias continued long after the Arabs settled down, the ulama grew

sedentary, and Muslim society became largely detribalized. Like the classical Orientalists before them, the neo-Orientalists portray Islam (the religion) as a kind of family curse that lives on, crippling the lives of innocents generations after the original sin that created it. They claim that Muslim efforts to build durable states—from Ibn Khaldun's radical insights in the 14th century to Ottoman tax reformers in the 17th century or Islamist revolutionaries today—have not, and never can, bring about a change in the essential anti-state and therefore anti-modern core of Islamic dogma.[59]

As a corollary of this essentialism, the neo-Orientalists also (like the classical Orientalists) downplay the importance of imperialism. A fairly consistent refrain in Orientalist analyses is that "in the Middle East the impact of European imperialism was late, brief, and for the most part indirect."[60] For Orientalists of all varieties, there is no point in dwelling on the fact that half the populations of Libya and Algeria died during the course of their colonial occupation. The fact that the Ottoman and Qajar Empires were effectively deindustrialized when European imports wiped out their proto-industrial manufactures during the 19th-century era of "free trade" is irrelevant to issues of economic development.[61] According any weight to these events would tend to undermine the claim that the obstacles to development are overwhelmingly internal and have not changed during the 1400 years of Islamic history. Essentialism and the dismissal of Western colonialism and imperialism are commonly paired together, since each makes the other more plausible.[62]



Algeria's race to power; starting line ... arrival post.

Nadjib Berber

Neo-Orientalist analyses do not prove that states in the Middle East must be weak, any more than classical Orientalism proved that states had to be strong. But does this mean that the alternative proposition—that the strong societies of the Middle East provide a groundwork for democratization—is correct? The fact is that both traditional and neo-Orientalist analyses of civil society are deeply flawed. Both claim that the key to building effective states and successful democracies lies in the proper balance of power between state and society. They disagree only over what the proper balance is, over how strong society should be. The traditionalists claim that society must not be too weak; the neo-Orientalists claim it must not be too strong. Perhaps there is a narrow range where society is neither too strong nor too weak but "just right."

How could we determine if the strength of civil society was "just right?" Studies of state-society relations almost invariably issue sweeping judgments: "In the Arab homeland, the State means everything and it monopolizes almost all facilities, while the society means very little."[63] Some critics suggest that there is no way to determine the optimum strength of civil society because there is no fixed balance of power between state and society. Albert Hirschman has argued there is a cyclical pattern in which the public and private sectors alternate in strength.[64] Periods of expanding state authority are followed by correcting periods of liberalization. (The evolution of the concept of civil society may even reflect these cycles: successive generations tend to emphasize either the independence or the civility of society.)[65]

The relationship between state and society may be more complex than the classic models allow. Not only may the relationship evolve over time but the state and society may be antagonistic and collaborative in distinct areas simultaneously. "The British fiscal-military state," noted John Brewer in a brilliant study of the role of taxation in British state formation,

> as it emerged from the political and military battles that marked the struggle with Louis XIV, lacked many of the features we normally associate with a "strong state," yet therein lay its effectiveness. The constraints on power meant that when it was exercised, it was exercised fully. As long as the fiscal-military state did not cross the bulwarks erected to protect civil society from militarization it was given its due. Yet it was watched with perpetual vigilance by those who, no matter how much they lauded its effectiveness against foreign foes, were deeply afraid of its intrusion into civil society.[66]

Perhaps the key to combining state building with democratization is not the Goldilocks solution of finding the "just right" balance, but a more subtle question of finding an optimal "division of labor" between state and society.[67]

Students of the Middle East can be forgiven for not having easy answers to these questions. After all, they study a region where practical experience with democracy is rare. But they should not be excused from attending to these questions. The fact that democracy has not flourished in the Middle East does not mean its development is impossible. If Middle East experts look for models of how to study democratization in the region, they will find some admirable ones without much trouble. It is long past time for serious scholars to abandon the quest for the mysterious "essences" that prevent democratization in the Middle East and turn to the matter-of-fact itemization of the forces that promote or retard this process.[68] ■

Footnotes

1 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), p. 3.

2 See Larry Diamond, *An American Foreign Policy for Democracy* (Washington: Progressive Policy Institute, 1990); and Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1992).

3 *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, March 30, 1992. Also see A.H. Fahad, "The Arabs and the Just Despot," *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 1990.

4 "The Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 72, 1, p. 20.

5 Samuel P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" *Political Science Quarterly* 99 (Summer 1984), p. 216. A survey of the prospects for democracy published volumes on Asia, Africa and Latin America but did not include any studies of the Middle East because "with the exception perhaps of Egypt, Lebanon, and certainly Turkey (which appears in our Asia volume), the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition even to semidemocracy." (Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries*, vol. 2, *Africa* [Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988], pp. xix-xx.)

6 "The Muslims are Coming! The Muslims are Coming!" *National Review*, 42 (November 19, 1990), p. 29.

7 For a tongue-in-cheek list, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 37-38.

8 The growing popularity of the concept of civil society is analyzed in John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1988). Adam B. Seligman describes its use as a kind of shibboleth in Eastern Europe in *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). The increasing reliance on this concept in analyses of developing countries is described in Atul Kohli, *India's Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). Its spread among Arab intellectuals is also evident; see the special issue on civil society of *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, No. 158 (April 1992); *Al-Mujtama' al- Madani fil-Watan al-'Arabi wa-Dawruhu fi Tahqiq al-Dimuqratiyya* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1993); and Markaz Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Mujtama' al-Madani wal-Tahauwal al-Dimuqrati fil-Watan al-'Arabi* (Cairo: Dar Su'ad al-Sabah, 1992).

9 John Keane provides an excellent history of the evolution of the concept in "Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State," in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988), though Keane slights Montesquieu, who contributed both to the conceptualization of civil society and to the foundation of Orientalism. De Tocqueville did not employ the term "civil society," but his *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), especially pp. 198-206, may have influenced thinking about how civic associations affect political power more than any other study.

10 The early development of this idea, that civil society does not exist in the Orient, is brilliantly analyzed in Patricia Springborg, *Western Republicanism and the Oriental Prince* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992). Also see Bryan Turner, "Orientalism and the Problem of Civil Society," in Assaf Hussein, ed., *Orientalism, Islam and Islamists* (Brattelboro: Amana Press, 1984), pp. 23-42.

11 Roy Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 4.

12 Robert Springborg, "Patterns of Association in the Egyptian Political Elite," in George Lenczowski, ed., *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), p. 87.

13 An unusually intelligent summary of this thesis is Sherif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (June 1969), pp. 258-281.

14 Clement Henry Moore, "Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser's Egypt," *Comparative Politics* 6 (1974), p. 207.

15 Two of the classic studies in this tradition are Clement Henry Moore, *Tunisia Since Independence: The Dynamics of One-Party Government* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); and John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite. A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). Both Moore and Waterbury later grew disenchanted with the classical Orientalist vision of civil society and undertook studies that gave greater emphasis to the independence of social forces; see Clement Henry Moore, "Clientelist Ideology and Political Change: Fictitious Networks in Egypt and Tunisia," in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 255-273; and John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

16 Another popular explanation was the theory of hydraulic despotism, which attributed the state's power over society to its organization of essential irrigation works. The *locus classicus* of this concept is Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). For a history of this concept, see "The 'Asiatic Mode of Production' " in Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London: Verso, 1974), pp. 462-550.

17 This became, literally, the textbook description of Islamic political culture; see James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, 3rd ed., (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), pp. 156-7.

18 The idea that Islam requires a totalitarian state is accepted by some modern Muslims, particularly those associated with Mawdoodi, but even some Orientalists recognized that this is an historical novelty, appealing only to a minority, rather than something inherent in Islam. See W.M. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp. 120-123.

19 Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 48.

20 Ibid.

21 For a concise statement of the traditional Orientalist position, see Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).

22 Ibid., p. 8.

23 Ibid. See also P.J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), and Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

24 To mention only two of the most prominent, see the essays collected in Claude Cahen, *Les peuples musulmans dan l'histoire médiéval* (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1977) (which, unfortunately, does not include his pioneering "Mouvements populaires et autonisme urbain dans l'Asie Musulmane du Moyen Age," *Arabica*, 4-5 [1958-9]); and S.D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966).

25 Clement Henry Moore, "Islamic Banks: Financial and Political Intermediation in Arab Countries," *Orient* 29 (1988), pp. 45-57.

26 "Oriental Despotism: the Case of Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5 (1974), pp. 3-31; and idem, "European Feudalism and Middle Eastern Despotisms," *Science and Society* 39 (Summer 1975), pp. 129-156. An unusually large number of students of Iran were early supporters of the dissident tradition that emphasized the potency of social forces in the Middle East. See, for example, Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution," *Iranian Studies* 2 (Autumn 1969), pp. 128-150; Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Religion, Politics and Society* (London: Frank Cass, 1980).

27 For example, Leonard Binder, while acknowledging the participation of Shi'i religious leaders in insurrections such as the Tobacco Revolt and the Iranian revolution of 1905, dismissed such activism: "while some ulama were prominent in these actions against the Qajar dynasty, they never acted alone nor did they press for unfettered political power on the basis of a religious theory of political legitimacy." See his *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 74.

28 See Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, eds., *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Martin Kramer, ed., *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

29 For example, John Waterbury, "The 'Soft State' and the Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974-1984," *Comparative Politics* 18 (October 1985), pp. 65-83; and Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). For related studies on other developing countries, see Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Thomas M. Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); and Vivien Shue *The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

30 A growing number of works tried to apply the American tradition of "interest group analysis." See Robert Bianchi, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Samia Sa'id, *Man Yamluk Misr?!* (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1986). Although Arab authors developed a growing interest in the influence of social groups, they tended to concur with the classical Orientalists that these groups lacked the necessary power to press for democratization of the Arab World; see Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim, *Al-Mujtama' wal-Dawla fil-Watan al-'Arabi* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1988); and Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, "Slow Thaw in the Arab World," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1991, pp. 711-738. For an exception to this generalization, see Rachad Antonius and Qussai Samak, "A Civil Society at the Pan-Arab Level? The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations," in Hani Faris, ed., *Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World* (1986), pp. 81-93.

31 See the think-piece written for the project: Peter von Sivers, "Retreating States and Expanding Societies: The State Autonomy/Informal Civil Society Dialectic in the Middle East and North Africa," (unpublished mimeograph, 1987). Similar conclusions are evident in another paper written for the SSRC project: Emanual Sivan, "The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25 (1990), pp. 353-364.

32 The NYU project publishes a regular *Bulletin*, which can be obtained by writing to the Civil Society in the Middle East Project, Department of Politics, 715 Broadway, Room 414, NY 10003.

33 Asád AbuKhalil, "A Viable Partnership: Islam, Democracy and the Arab World," *Harvard International Review* 15 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 22-23, 65; Muhammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton, "The Need for Arab Democracy," *Foreign Policy*, #83 (Summer 1991), pp. 3-19; and Michael C. Hudson, "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World," *Middle East Journal* 45 (Summer 1991), pp. 407-426.

34 Crone's first book, *Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), argues that originally Islam was a Judaic heresy dedicated to reclaiming Palestine for the Arabs and that Muhammad was not its major prophet but just a messenger who announced the appearance of the Messiah (Umar ibn al-Khattab). This controversial thesis did not win wide acceptance, but it did gain respect for her erudition and lucid analysis. Crone's more recent writings have won much wider support, see R. Steven Humphreys, *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 84-5.

35 *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 62.

36 Ibid., pp. 62-3.

37 For a chronology of these events, see Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, *God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the first centuries of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

38 *Slaves on Horses*, p. 84.

39 For criticism of "mamlukism," the idea that the medieval mamluk institution can be hypostatized to serve as a model for contemporary Arab politics, see Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp. 149-161; and Jean-Claude Garcin, "The Mamluk Military System and the Blocking of Medieval Muslim Society," in Jean Baechler, John A. Hall, and Michael Mann, eds., *Europe and the Rise of Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 113-130.

40 *Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 62.

41 Ibid., p. 70. The notion that the gap between ideals and realities was particularly acute in Islam was already a well established theme in Orientalist literature, although Pipes deduced new implications from it; see Gustave E. von Grunebaum, "The Body Politic: Law and the State," in *Medieval Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 142-169.

42 *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 187-8. For a critical response see Edward W. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in Francis Barker, et al., *Literature, Politics and Theory* (London: Methuen, 1986), pp. 210-229.

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ORIENTALISM, ISLAM, and ISLAMISTS

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ORIENTALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ISLAM

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While the problems of understanding, comparison and translation are critical issues in philosophy, language and social conscience, they arise in a particularly acute fashion in sociology. In addition to the technical difficulties of bias, distortion and misrepresentation in the methodology of the social sciences, there are the more profound questions of relativism, ethnocentrism and ideology which call into question the whole basis of comparative analysis. It is difficult to imagine what would count as valid sociology without the comparative method and yet there are numerous methodological and philosophical difficulties which often appear to invalidate comparative sociology. There is major disagreement over the issue of whether, following the position adopted by Max Weber, a 'value-free sociology' is either possible or desirable.[1]

In more recent years, social scientists have become increasingly sensitive to the fact that, in addition to these technical and philosophical issues, the structure of power politics is profoundly influential in shaping the content and direction of social science research. In short, the existence of exploitative colonial relationships between societies has been of major significance for the theoretical development of anthropology and sociology. The role of imperial politics has been especially decisive in the constitution of Western images of Islam and the analysis of 'oriental societies'.[2]

In the conventional, liberal perspective, there is the assumption not only that power and knowledge are antithetical, but that valid knowledge requires the suppression of power. Within the liberal history of ideas, the emergence of science out of ideology and common sense beliefs is thus conjoined with the growth of individual freedom and with the decline of arbitrary political terror. This view of the contradiction of reason and power has been recently challenged by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, who argues that the growth of bureaucratic control over populations after the eighteenth century required more systematic forms of knowledge in the form of criminology, penology, psychiatry and medicine. The exercise of power in society thus presup-

poses new forms of scientific discourse through which deviant groups are defined and controlled. Against the liberal tradition, we are, through an analysis of the Western rationalist tradition, forced to admit

> that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, not any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.[3]

The growth of scientific discourse does not, therefore, inaugurate a period of individual freedoms, but rather forms the basis of more extensive forms of institutionalized power through an alliance of the prison and penology, the asylum and psychiatry, the hospital and clinical medicine, the school and pedagogy. Discourse creates difference through classification, tabulation and comparison. The categories of 'criminal', 'insane', and 'deviant' are the manifestations of a scientific discourse by which the normal and sane exercise power along a systematic dividing of sameness and difference. The exercise of power over subordinates cannot consequently be reduced simply to a question of attitudes and motives on the part of individuals, since power is embedded in the very language by which we describe and understand the world. Valid comparisons between deviants and normal individuals, between the sane and insane, between the sick and healthy cannot be achieved by simply reforming attitudes and motives, since these distinctions themselves presuppose a discourse in which conceptual differences are expressions of power relations.

The analysis of knowledge/power in the work of Michel Foucault provides the basis for Edward Said's massive study of Orientalism as a discourse of difference in which the apparently neutral Occident/Orient contrast is an expression of power relationships.[4] Orientalism is a discourse which represents the exotic, erotic, strange Orient as a comprehensible, intelligible phenomenon within a network of categories, tables and concepts by which the Orient is simultaneously defined and controlled. To know is to subordinate.

The Orientalist discourse was thus a remarkably persistent framework of analysis which, expressed through theology, literature, philology and sociology, not only expressed an imperial relationship but actually constituted a field of political power. Orientalism created a typology of characters, organized around the contrast between the rational Westerner and the lazy Oriental. The task of Orientalism was

to reduce the endless complexity of the East into a definite order of types, characters and constitutions. The chrestomathy, representing the exotic Orient in a systematic table of accessible information, was thus a typical cultural product of Occidental dominance.

In Said's analysis of Orientalism, the crucial 'fact' about the Orientalist discourse was that we know and talk about Orientals, while they neither comprehend themselves nor talk about us. In this language of difference, there were no equivalent discourses of Occidentalism. The society from which comparisons are to be made has a privileged possession of a set of essential features — rationality, progress, democratic institutions, economic development — in terms of which other societies are deficient. These features account for the particular character of Western society and explain the defects of alternative social formations. As an accounting system, Orientalism set out to explain the progressive features of the Occident and the social stationariness of the Orient.[5] One of the formative questions of classical sociology — why did industrial capitalism first emerge in the West? — is consequently an essential feature of an accounting system which hinges upon a basic East/West contrast. Within the broad sweep of this Occidental/Oriental contrast, Islam has always represented a political and cultural problem for Western accounting systems.

Unlike Hinduism or Confucianism, Islam has major religious and historical ties with Judaism and Christianity; categorizing Islam as an 'Oriental religion' raises major difficulties for an Orientalist discourse. While the issue of prophetic uniqueness is a contentious one, there are strong arguments to suggest that Islam can, along with Judaism and Christianity, be regarded as a variant of the Abrahamic faith.[6]

Furthermore, Islam has been a major cultural force inside Europe and provided the dominant culture of many Mediterranean societies. While Islam is not ambiguously Oriental, Christianity is not in any simple fashion an Occidental religion. Christianity as a Semitic, Abrahamic faith by origin could be regarded as an 'Oriental religion' and Islam, as an essential dimension of the culture of Spain, Sicily and Eastern Europe, could be counted as Occidental. The problem of defining Islam has always possessed a certain urgency for the discourse of Orientalism; thus in Christian circles it was necessary to categorize Islam as either parasitic upon Christian culture or a sectarian offshoot of the Christian faith.

The point of Foucault's analysis of discourse is to suggest that the same rules governing the distribution of statements within a discourse may be common to a wide variety of apparently separate disciplines.[7]

Thus, the Orientalist problematic is not peculiar to Christian theology, but is a discourse which underlines economics, politics and sociology. If the basic issue behind Christian theology was the uniqueness of the Christian revelation with respect to Islam, the central question behind comparative sociology was the uniqueness of the West in relation to the alleged stagnation of the East. In an earlier publication I have suggested that sociology attempted to account for the apparent absence of capitalism in Islamic societies by conceptualizing Islam as a series of gaps.[8] Western sociology characteristically argued that Islamic society lacked those autonomous institutions of bourgeois society which ultimately broke the tenacious hold of feudalism over the Occident. According to this view, Islamic society lacked independent cities, an autonomous bourgeois class, rational bureaucracy, legal reliability, personal property and that cluster of rights which embody bourgeois culture. Without these institutional and cultural elements, there was nothing in Islamic civilization to challenge the dead hand of pre-capitalist tradition. The Orientalist view of Asiatic society can be encapsulated in the notion that the social structure of the Oriental world was characterized by the absence of a civil society, that is, by the absence of a network of institutions mediating between the individual and the state. It was this social absence which created the conditions for Oriental Despotism in which the individual was permanently exposed to the arbitrary rule of the despot. The absence of civil society simultaneously explained the failure of capitalist development outside Europe and the absence of democracy.

The Concept of Civil Society

There is in Western political philosophy a set of basic categories, which can be traced back to Aristotle, for distinguishing between government in terms of monarchy, democracy or despotism. While it is possible to approach these categories numerically, that is, by the one, few or many, one central element to the problem of government is the relationship between the state and the individual. Typically, for example, the notion of 'despotism' involves a spatial metaphor of the social system in which there is an institutional gap between the private indi-

individual and the public state. In despotism, the individual is fully exposed to the gaze of the despotic ruler because there are no intervening social institutions lying between the ruler and the ruled. The individual is completely displayed before the passion, caprice and will of the despot and there are, as it were, no social groups or institutions behind which the ruled may hide. The distance between the despot and the subject may be considerable, but that social space is not filled up with a rich growth of social groupings which could encapsulate the individual and within which separate interests could develop in opposition to the unified will of the despot. By way of a preliminary definition, we may argue that despotism presupposes a society in which 'civil society' is either absent or underdeveloped. A 'civil society' is that prolific network of institutions — church, family, tribe, guild, association and community — which lies between the state and the individual and which simultaneously connects the individual to authority and protects the individual from total political control. The notion of 'civil society' is not only fundamental to the definition of political life in European societies, but also a point of contrast between Occident and Orient.

In the Scottish Enlightenment tradition, the emergence of civil society was regarded as a major indication of social progress from the state of nature to civilization. The theory of civil society was part of the master dichotomy of nature/civilization, since it was within civil society that the individual was eventually clothed in juridical rights of property, possessions and security. In Hegel's social philosophy, civil society mediates between the family and the state; it is constituted by the economic intercourse between individuals. The Hegelian conceptualization of 'civil society' in terms of economic relationships was the germ of much confusion in subsequent Marxist analysis in that it became difficult to locate civil society unambiguously in metaphor of economic base and superstructures. For Marx,

> Civil Society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, in so far, transcends the State and nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organise itself as a State.[9]

Since Marx was primarily interested in the theoretical analysis of the

capitalist mode of production, it has subsequently been difficult for Marxists to determine the precise relationship between civil society/ state, on the one hand, and to analyze such sociological concepts as 'family', 'church', 'community', or 'tribe', on the other. One solution, of course, is to treat this area of social life as explicable in purely economic terms; the primary divisions within society are those between classes, which in turn are explained by the mode of production.[10]

The difficulties of locating civil society in relation to the economy and the state are exemplified by some recent debates over Antonio Gramsci's analysis of the concept.[11]

In a famous passage, Gramsci commented that,

> Between the economic structure and the state with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society.[12]

In Gramsci's writing, civil society is the area within which ideological hegemony and political consent are engineered, and it therefore contrasts with the state, which is the site of political force and coercion. Such a conception complicates the more conventional Marxist dichotomy of base/superstructure, but there is much dissensus over exactly where Gramsci places his theoretical emphasis.[13] While there is much disagreement over the extent of hegemonic consent in modern capitalism, it is interesting to note that Gramsci's conceptualization of 'civil society' was important for his view that political strategies were relevant in relation to the extent of coercion and consent in society.[14] Gramsci made a basic distinction between the West, in which there is widespread consensus based on civil society, and the East, where the state dominates society and where coercion is more important than consensus. Speaking specifically of Russia, Gramsci argued that

> the state was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks . . .[15]

Where civil society is relatively underdeveloped in relationship to the state, political coercion of individuals is the basis of class rule rather than ideological consent which characterizes the bourgeois institutions of Western capitalism.

Liberal political theory, while clearly fundamentally different in outlook and conclusions, has often approached the East/West, coercion/consent contrasts in somewhat similar terms, especially in terms of the notion of constitutional checks and balances. In *The Spirit of the Laws* written in 1748, Montesquieu distinguished between republics, monarchies and despotisms in terms of their guiding principles which were respectively virtue, honor and fear.[16] The main differences between monarchy and despotism were that (1) while monarchy is based on the inequality of social strata, in despotism there is an equality of slavery where the mass of the population is subject to the ruler's arbitrary will; (2) in monarchy, the ruler follows customs and laws, whereas a despot dominates according to his own inclination (3) in despotism there are no intermediary social institutions linking the individual to the state. In an earlier work, *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline*, Montesquieu had been particularly concerned with the problems of centralization in the Roman empire and with the transformation of republics into monarchies.[17] Montesquieu, who was profoundly influenced by Locke and British constitutional history, came to see the divisions of powers and constitutional checks on centralized authority as the principal guarantee of political rights. His *Persian Letters*[18] permitted him to write a critical review of French society through the eyes of Oriental observers; it has subsequently not been clear whether Montesquieu's definition of and objections to the despotism of the East were, in fact, directed against the French polity, especially against the absolute monarchy.[19]

Emile Durkheim, whose Latin dissertation on Montesquieu and Rousseau was published in 1892, came to see the problem of modern political life not in the effects of the division of labor on common sentiments but in the absence of regulating institutions between the individual and the state. The decline of the church, the weakness of the family, the loss of communal ties and the underdevelopment of occupational and professional associations had dissolved those important social relations which shielded the individual from the state. Unlike Herbert Spencer, however, Durkheim did not believe that the extension of state functions in contemporary society necessarily resulted in political absolutism. Durkheim, in 'Two laws of penal evolution', defined absolutism in the following terms:

> what makes the central power more or less absolute is the more or less radical absence of any countervailing forces, regularly organized with a view toward moderating it. We can, therefore, forsee that what gives birth to a power of this sort is the more or less complete concentration of all society's controlling functions in one and the same hand.[20]

While Durkheim does not specifically employ the term, in the light of his reference to the importance of 'countervailing forces', it is not illegitimate or inappropriate to suggest that Durkheim's argument is that the weakness of civil society lying between the individual and the state is a condition for political absolutism.

This French tradition in the political sociology of absolutism from Montesquieu to Durkheim cannot be properly understood without some consideration of the debate which arose in France over the nature of enlightened government. What we now refer to as 'enlightened despotism' or 'enlightened absolutism' first arose as an intellectual and political issue in France in the 1760's partly as the result of the doctrines of the Physiocrats.[21] The terms favored by the Physiocrats were 'Despotisme eclaire' and 'Despotisme legal,' so, for example, T. G. Raynal provided a definition of good government as *'Le gouvernement le plus heureux serait celui d'un despote juste et eclaire'* in his history of trade with the West and East Indies. In their economic doctrines, the Physiocrats adhered to *laissez-faire* policies to free the economy and the individual from the unnatural fetters which constrained efficiency and economic output. However, society was not free from such artificial constraints and it was necessary for radical changes to be brought about by 'Despotisme eclaire.' The Physiocrats took for granted that such a despotism would be in the hands of an hereditary monarchy which would rationally sweep aside the artificial clutter of the past to restore the natural order of individual freedom. The despot had the duty to force people to be free by a rational policy of education and social reform.

The debate about the virtues of forms of government was generated not only by absolutism in the late eighteenth century but also by the rise of colonialism in the nineteenth. Colonial administrators were forced to decide upon schemes of imperial control for the new dependencies. Raynal's use of the notion of legal despotism is interesting in the context of a discussion of colonies. Utilitarian discussions of political organization in Britain were similarly set in the context of criticisms of British

government by an hereditary aristocracy and in terms of colonial administration in India. The utilitarians were concerned both with the problem of the working class and parliamentarian government in Britain and with the government of Indian natives.[22] Thus, James Mill's *The History of British India* was particularly concerned with the question of native despotism and government reform. He observed that,

> Among the Hindus, according to the Asiatic model, the government was monarchical, and, with the usual exception of religion and its ministers, absolute. No idea of any system of rule, different from the will of a single person, appears to have entered the minds of them, or their legislators.[23]

For Mill, there was a social hiatus between the traditional, all-embracing life of the Indian village and the outer, public world of kingdoms. The constant break-up of the latter contrasted with the social isolation and stagnation of the former. The principal political solution to this static despotism was a dose of 'Despotisme eclaire,' that is, strong central government, benevolent laws, modernized administration and a redistribution of land rights. In many respects, John Stuart Mill followed his father's line of argument both about political reform in Britain and colonial government. J.S. Mill's basic fear was focused on the effects of majority rule in popular democracies on the life and conscience of the educated and sensitive individual. This fear had been greatly confirmed by the more pessimistic aspects of Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis of American political institutions in *Democracy in America*, which Mill read in 1835.[24] According to de Tocqueville, majority rule on the basis of universal franchise could result in a sterile consensus which was inimicable to individuality and individual rights. The only check to the despotism of the majority would be the existence of strong voluntary associations (that is, civil society) protecting the individual from majority control and protecting diversity of interests and culture. Without safeguards, democracy would produce in Britain the same sterility which tradition had brought about in Asia, namely social stagnation. Mill's fears were consequently:

> not of great liberty, but too ready submission; not of anarchy, but of servility; not of too rapid change, but of Chinese stationariness.[25]

In the case of colonial rule, however, the choice was between two types of despotism, native or imperial. Native despotism was always arbitrary and ineffectual, while the enlightened despotism of 'more civilized

people' over their dominions was firm, regular and effective in promoting social reform and political advancement.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Karl Marx (1818-1883) were contemporaries. In formulating their views on Asiatic society, they were influenced by similar contemporary events and by a similar range of documentary evidence. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, to find that they also shared some common assumptions about Asiatic society, despite very different evaluations and expectations of British rule in India. While Marx's concept of the Asiatic mode of production was primarily formulated in terms of economic structures and processes (or the absence of them), the Asiatic mode is also a version of the conventional political notion of 'Oriental despotism.' In Marx's journalistic writing, Oriental society was characterized by ceaseless political changes in ruling dynasties and by total economic immobility. Dynastic circulation brought about no structural change because the ownership of the land remained in the hands of the overlord. Like James Mill, Marx also emphasized the stationary nature of village life, based on self-sufficiency. No civil society existed between the individual and the despot, between the village and the state, because autonomous cities and social classes were absent from the social system.

While Weber acknowledged a debt to Marx's analysis of Indian village life in his *The Religion of India*,[26] Weber's various elaborations of political forms — patriarchalism, patrimonialism — concentrate more on the problem of military organization than on the economic bases of political life. In fact, it is possible to see Weber's sociology as the analysis of the interconnections between the ownership of the means of production and the ownership of the means of violence. He thus established an abstract continuum between a situation where independent knights own their own weapons and provide military services for a lord, and another context in which the means of violence are centralized under the control of a patrimonial lord. Empirically, Weber recognized that these 'pure types' rarely occurred in such simplified forms, but the contrast was important in Weber's analysis of the tensions between centralizing and de-centralizing processes in political empires.

In feudalism, where knights have hereditary rights to lands and provide their own weapons, there are strong political pressures towards localism and the emergence of autonomous petty-kingdoms. The crucial political struggles in feudalism are thus *within* the dominant class,

not between lords and serfs, because the crucial question is the preservation of the feudal king's political control over other landlords who seek extensive feudal immunities from their lord. In patrimonialism, one method of controlling aristocratic cavalries based on feudal or prebendal rights to land is to recruit slave or mercenary armies. Such armies have little or no attachment to civil society — they are typically foreigners, bachelors or eunuchs and detribalized. Hence, slave armies have no local interests in civil society and are, formally at least, totally dependent on the patrimonial lord. As Weber points out, patrimonialism can only survive if the patrimonial lord enjoys a stable fiscal liquidity or access to other resources by which to pay off his armies. Patrimonial empires suffer from two perennial crises: (1) revolts by slave armies and (2) instability of political succession. While Weber does not use the feudal/prebendal distinction as a necessary criterion for distinguishing the West from the East, he does regard patrimonial instability — or 'sultanism' — as a major problem of Oriental society, especially of Turkey.

The debate about Oriental empires in European social thought found its classic expression in the twentieth century in Karl Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism*.[27] Characteristically subtitled 'a comparative study of total power,' Wittfogel presented an essentially technological account of Oriental empires. The climatic aridity of Oriental regions gave rise to the need for extensive hydraulic systems which, in turn, could be organized only on the basis of centralized political power. The difficulties of hydraulic management could be solved only on the basis of bureaucratization, general slavery and centralized authority. The hydraulic state was forced to obliterate all countervailing social groups within society which could threaten its total power. These 'nongovernmental forces' included kin groups, independent religious organizations, autonomous military groups and owners of alternative forms of property.[28] Oriental despotism thus represented the triumph of the state over society and Wittfogel saw the absence of 'civil society' in hydraulic empires as a necessary basis for total power. In Europe, absolutism was always faced by countervailing forces in civil society:

> the absence of formal constitutional checks does not necessarily imply the absence of societal forces whose interests and intentions the government must respect. In most countries of post-feudal Europe the absolutist regimes were restricted not so much by official constitutions as by the

> actual strength of the landed nobility, the Church and the towns. In absolutist Europe all these nongovernmental forces were politically organized and articulated. They thus differed profoundly from the representatives of landed property, religion or urban professions in hydraulic society.[29]

To summarize, the political problem of Oriental society is the absence of a civil society which will counterbalance the power of the state over the isolated individual.

Although the notion of the absence of civil society in Oriental Despotism was formulated by reference to Asia as a whole, it has played a particularly prominent role in the analysis of Islamic societies; it is an essential feature of the Orientalist discourse. Furthermore, the theme of the missing civil society cut across political and intellectual divisions in the West, providing a common framework for Marxists and sociologists. Marx and Engels in their articles for the *New York Daily Tribune* observed that the absence of private property in land and the centralization of state power precluded the emergence of a strong bourgeois class. The dominance of the bureaucracy and the instability of urban society meant that

> the first basic condition of bourgeois acquisition is lacking, the security of the person and the property of the trader.[30]

A similar position was adopted by Max Weber in *The Sociology of Religion* where he suggested that the effect of Islamic expansion had been to convert Islam into a "national Arabic warrior religion;" the result was that the dominant ethos of Islam

> is inherently contemptuous of bourgeois-commercial utilitarianism and considers it as sordid greediness and as the life force specifically hostile to it.[31]

In Western sociological accounts of Islamic societies, it has been argued that, because of the absence of a 'spirit of capitalism' in the middle class, trade in most Islamic societies was dominated historically by minorities (Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Slavs.) Recent sociological studies of Islam have continued this tradition by suggesting that the absence of the entrepreneural spirit and achievement motivation is linked to the underdeveloped nature of the middle class in Islam.[32]

The absence of a civil society in Islam and the weakness of bourgeois culture in relation to the state apparatus have been associated, in the

Orientalist problematic, not only with the backwardness of economic development, but also with political despotism. There is a common viewpoint among political scientists that there is no established tradition of legitimate opposition to arbitrary governments in Islam because the notions of political rights and social contract had no institutional support in an independent middle class.[33] However, the Orientalist theme of the absence of a civil society extends well beyond the area of economics and politics. The scientific and artistic culture of Islam is treated as the monopoly of the imperial court which, within the 'city camp,' patronized the emergency of a rational culture in opposition to the religion of the masses. The union of science and industry which was characteristic of the English Protestant middle classes in the nineteenth century was noticeably absent in Islamic culture. Thus, Ernest Renan, in a forthright commentary on Islam and science, suggested that, "the Mussulman has the most profound disdain for instruction, for science, for everything that constitutes the European spirit."[34]

For Renan, science could only flourish in Islam in association with heresy. While Renan's highly prejudicial attitudes are rarely articulated in an overt fashion in contemporary Oriental scholarship, the same arguments concerning elitist patronage of arts and sciences in the absence of a middle class are constantly repeated. This perspective is normally conjoined with the notion that science in Islam was merely parasitic on Greek culture and that Islam was simply a vehicle transmitting Greek philosophy to the Renaissance in Europe.[35] The deficiences of Islamic society, politics, economics and culture are, in Orientalism, located in the problem of an absent civil society.

Alternatives to Orientalism

In the period following the second World War, Orientalism has shown many symptoms of internal crisis and collapse,[36] but the alternatives to Orientalism have been difficult to secure, since Orientalism retains substantial intellectual and institutional supports. Orientalism is a self-validating and closed discourse which is highly resistant to internal and external criticism. Various attempts at reconstruction have been presented in, for example, *Review of Middle East Studies* and by the *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP). One problem in the transformation of existing paradigms is that Marxist alternatives have

themselves found it difficult to break with the Orientalist perspective which was present in the analyses of Marx and Engels.[37]

Although there have been major changes in Marxist conceptualization of such basic notions as 'the mode of production,' much of the theoretical apparatus of contemporary Marxism is irrelevant in the analysis of Islamic societies. Those Marxists who have adopted the epistemological position of writers like Louis Althusser are, in any case, committed to the view that empirical studies of the Orient will not be sufficient to dislodge the Orientalist perspective without a radical shift in epistemology and theoretical frameworks. An entirely new paradigm is required, but in the present theoretical climate there is little to suggest the presence of radical alternatives. While Edward Said has presented a major critique of the Oriental discourse, the conceptual basis on which that critique is founded, namely the work of Michel Foucault, does not lend itself unambiguously to the task of reformulating perspectives. A pessimistic reading of Foucault would suggest that the alternative to an Oriental discourse would simply be another discourse which would incorporate yet another expression of power. In Foucault's analysis there is no discourse-free alternative since extensions of knowledge coincide with a field of power. We are thus constrained to

> the patient construction of discourses about discourses, and to the task of hearing what has already been said.[38]

At one level, therefore, Said is forced to offer the hope that "spiritual detachment and generosity"[39] which will be sufficient to generate a new vision of the Middle East which has jettisoned the ideological premises of Orientalism.

There may, however, exist one line of development which would be compatible with Said's employment of Foucault's perspective on discourse and which would present a route out of Orientalism. By its very nature, language is organized around the basic dichotomy of sameness and difference; the principal feature of the Orientalist discourse has been to emphasize difference in order to account for the 'uniqueness of the West.' In the case of Islam and Christianity, however, there is a strong warrant to focus on those features which unite rather than divide them, or at least to examine those ambiguous areas of cultural overlap between them. Historically, both religions emerged, however antagonistically, out of a common Semitic-Abrahamic religious stock. They have been involved in mutual processes of diffusion, exchange and colonization.

In this sense, as I have already suggested, it is permissible to refer to Islam as an Occidental religion in Spain, Malta, Yugoslavia and the Balkans and to Christianity as an Oriental religion of North Africa, the Fertile Crescent and Asia. This obvious point has the merit of exposing the fundamental ambiguity of the notion of 'the Orient' within the Orientalist discourse. In addition to these mutual contacts in history and geography, Islam and Christianity have, for historically contingent reasons, come to share common frameworks in science, philosophy and culture. Despite these areas of mutual contact, the general drift of Orientalism has been to articulate difference, division and separation. One important illustration of these discursive separations can be found in conventional histories of Western philosophy.

Islam and Christianity are both grounded in prophetic revelation and were not initially concerned with the philosophical articulation of orthodox theology. Both religions were confronted by the existence of a highly developed system of secular logic and rhetoric which was the legacy of Greek culture. Aristotelianism became the philosophical framework into which the theologies of Islam and Christianity were poured. Eventually the formulation of Christian beliefs came to depend heavily on the work of Islamic scholars, especially Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Avicenna (Iba Sina), Al-Kinda and Ar-Razi. Here, consequently, is an area of mutual development in which medieval Christianity was parasitic on the philosophical developments which had been achieved in Islam. However, the Orientalist response to this situation has been to claim that Islam simply mediated Hellenism, which subsequently found its 'true home' in the universities of medieval Europe. Thus, we find writers like Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy* following the tradition of Renan and O'Leary in simply denying that Islam made any significant contribution to European philosophy.[40] The attraction of connecting Western philosophy with Hellenism is obvious; it provides the link between Western culture and the democratic traditions of Greek society. Greek rhetoric grew out of public debate in the political sphere where systematic forms of argument were at a premium. On this basis, it is possible to contrast the closed world of Oriental Despotism with the open world of Greek democracy and

rhetorical speech. One difficulty with this equation of Hellenism and political democracy is that it remains largely silent with respect to the slave economy of classical Greece. The majority of the Greek population was excluded from the world of logic and rhetoric by virtue of their slave status.

The philosophical and scientific legacy of Greek civilization passed to Europe through the prism of Islamic Spain, but here again Orientalism treats the impact of Islam on Spanish society as merely regression or, at best, repetition. In Wittfogel's view, the particular combination of population pressure and climatic conditions created the context within which Muslim colonialists in Spain created the despotic polity of hydraulic society. Under Islam, Spain

> became a genuinely hydraulic society, ruled despotically by appointed officials and taxed by agromanagerial methods of acquisition. The Moorish army, which soon changed from a tribal to a 'mercenary' body, was definitely the tool of the state as were its counterparts in the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates.[41]

Prior to Islamic influence, Spain had, according to Wittfogel, been a de-centralized feudal society, but, with the introduction of the hydraulic economy, was rapidly transformed into a centralized, despotic state. In other words, within an Occidental setting, Islam still carried the essential features of an Oriental despotic culture. Similarly with the *reconquista*, Spain reverted to a feudal rather than despotic polity. The reestablishment of Christianity 'transformed a great hydraulic civilization into a late feudal society.'[42] Contemporary scholarship on Islamic Spain presents a very different picture, emphasizing the continuity of agricultural and irrigation techniques between Christianity and Islam. A complex and regulated irrigation system requires considerable economic investment over a long period. While the Spanish irrigation system was considerably improved under Muslim management, this was on the basis of a system which was already in operation from classical times. It is the continuity of technology and polity in Spain rather than the difference between Islamic and Christian management which is the important issue.[43]

The conservation of civil society and economy in Spain under Islam and Christianity thus pinpoints the Orientalist fascination with difference, a difference constituted by discourse rather than by history.

Conclusion: The Individual and Civil Society

The concept of 'civil society' forms the basis of Western political economy from the Scottish Enlightenment to the prison notebooks of Gramsci; while the concept has been frequently discussed in contemporary social science, the fact that it has also been a major part of the Orientalist contrast of East and West has been seriously neglected. In simple terms, the concept has been used as the basis of the notion that the Orient is, so to speak, all state and no society. The notion of 'civil society' cannot be divorced from an equally potent theme in Western philosophy, namely the centrality of autonomous individuals within the network of social institutions. Western political philosophy has hinged on the importance of civil society in preserving the freedom of the individual from arbitrary control by the state. The doctrines of individualism have been regarded as constitutive, if not of Western culture as such, then at least of contemporary industrial culture. It is difficult to conceive of the nexus of Western concepts of conscience, liberty, freedom or property without some basic principle of individualism and therefore individualism appears to lie at the foundations of Western society. The additional importance of individualism is that it serves to distinguish Occidental from Oriental culture, since the latter is treated as devoid of individual rights and of individuality. Individualism is the golden thread which weaves together the economic institutions of property, the religious institution of confession of conscience and the moral notion of personal autonomy; it serves to separate 'us' from 'them.' In Orientalism, the absence of civil society in Islam entailed the absence of the autonomous individual exercising conscience and rejecting arbitrary interventions by the state.

Underlying this liberal theory of the individual was, however, a profound anxiety about the problem of social order in the West. The individual conscience represented a threat to political stability, despite attempts to argue that the moral conscience would always conform with the legitimate political authority. In particular, bourgeois individualism — in the theories of Locke and Mill — was challenged by the mob, the mass and the working class which was excluded from citizenship by a franchise based on property. The debate about Oriental Despotism took place in the context of uncertainty about Enlightened Despotism and monarchy in Europe. The Orientalist discourse of the

absence of civil society in Islam was thus a reflection of basic political anxieties about the state of political freedom in the West. In this sense, the problem of Orientalism was not the Orient but the Occident. These problems and anxieties were consequently transformed onto the Orient which became, not a representation of the East, but a caricature of the West. Oriental Despotism was simply Western monarchy writ large. The crises and contradictions of contemporary Orientalism are, therefore, to be seen as part of a continuing crisis of Western capitalism transferred to a global context. The end of Orientalism requires a radical reformulation of perspectives and paradigms, but this reconstitution of knowledge can only take place in the context of major shifts in political relations between Orient and Occident; the transformation of discourse also requires a transformation of power.

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Islam, the State & Democracy

Contrasting Conceptions of Society in Egypt

Sami Zubaida

Cairo portrait artist selling his wares.

The quest for democratization and human rights in the Middle East has prominently featured the term "civil society." Oppression and corruption, it is argued, have followed from an over-intrusive state and its bureaucracies. Democratization must include a withdrawal of the state to allow free spheres of social autonomies and initiative, whether economic or associational. These are the spheres of civil society. "The State," though, is not a

Joan Mandell

unified entity. It has many functions and facets. The conditions for the development of spheres of social autonomy are not only the "withdrawal" of the state, but also an active state intervention of another kind: clear legislation and institutional mechanisms which provide the framework of rights and obligations for these spheres. In the economic arena, for instance, the state must provide a clear and comprehensive framework of legislation on contract, labor, market standards, banking and finance, and so on. Similarly, trade unions and syndicates need enabling legislation as well as clear protection of individual members' rights.

Fragmentary and ambiguous legislation in these spheres, resulting from ad hoc liberalization measures such as those of Egypt's *infitah* (economic opening), result in situations in which the new spheres of activity are burdened with ambiguous regulation, or operate on the margin of the law. As the case of Egypt's Islamic investment companies in the 1980s illustrates, individuals and enterprises are at the mercy of administrative interpretations and applications, and can only succeed through the informal facilitation and evasions of bureaucratic functionaries. They are not autonomous from the state, but depend on another of its facets: the corrupt bureaucracies.

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Cairo fruit vendor.

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Two Conceptions

Egyptian intellectuals currently engaged in debates on liberalization and democratization have utilized two contrasting concepts of civil society. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the well-known sociologist and writer, argues that reinforcement of civil society is the condition for building up democratic sentiments and institutions in the Arab world.[1] He opts for a definition in terms of voluntary associations. This is in contradistinction to the spheres of the state on the one hand, and of "primordial organizations" of kinship, tribe, village or religious community on the other.

Both the state and "primordial associations" are spheres of authority and coercion which can oppress the individual and trample over human rights. Voluntary associations, by contrast, are areas which foster individual autonomy and provide experience in the exercise of social and political rights and responsibilities. The main examples of such associations are trade unions, professional syndicates, voluntary societies and clubs, pressure groups and political parties. These can act as conduits for the expression and organization of members' rights and demands vis-à-vis the state and the wider society. They also protect their members from arbitrary administrative and political measures of state agencies. Interestingly, Ibrahim does not mention the spheres of private property and business enterprise as elements of civil society, although these are central to conceptions of civil society in classical social and political theory.

Ibrahim's ideas are widely shared by liberal and leftist Egyptian intellectuals, and inform much of the human rights campaigning in that country. One such campaign is directed against Law 32 of 1964, which seriously impedes the formation and functioning of voluntary associations. This underlines my argument that civil society in the form of voluntary associations is essentially dependent on the "law-state."

To what extent is the Egyptian state a "law-state"? In theory, it is a constitutional state, and the agencies of the state are governed and regulated by the provisions of the constitution. In practice, though, the president has sweeping powers of rule by decree. Over the years, these decrees and emergency regulations, notably Anwar al-Sadat's emergency laws of 1981, which are still in operation, have abolished or suspended many of the guarantees of rights proclaimed in the constitution. State ministries and bureaucracies have, in effect, wide administrative regulatory powers which do not derive from the constitution.

The strategy of human rights campaigns is to challenge some of these provisions as incompatible with the constitution. The Constitutional Court has made a number of crucial judgments in recent years against government decisions, especially regarding licenses for the formation of political parties, and on electoral procedures. On a few occasions lower courts have also ruled in favor of challenges to government regulations, such as that forbidding strikes, on the grounds that they are incompatible with international conventions to which Egypt is a signatory. Lawyers defending striking railway workers in 1986 used this argument successfully, but the court's judgment did not end the interdiction on strikes.

To sum up, the Egyptian government has wide administrative and legal powers which give its organs almost unlimited sway. The exercise of these powers is limited to a small extent by a few independent legal judgments, but to a much greater extent by sensitivity to local and international public opinion, especially in the US and Europe. President Husni Mubarak's government is trying to project a moderate liberal-democratic image to its own intellectuals and to the Western world. This project is constrained by two factors: the inertia of its own entrenched bureaucracy, and pressures against liberalism from the increasingly strident Islamic current.

A different conception of civil society comes from Tariq al-Bishri, a prominent historian and intellectual, previously Marxist but now sympathetic to the Islamic current, who views civil society as an informal network of relationships. The context of his argument is a qualified defense of the Islamic investment companies, which were threatened in the late 1980s with government regulation and control. Bishri argues in terms of authenticity, as well as Islamic legitimacy.[2] The companies deal directly with investors, bypassing the financial network of official banks. Largely unregulated by government, the companies are, according to Bishri, an extension of traditional practices in the Egyptian countryside and provinces, where a man with savings to invest would never entrust them to a bank. He would resort to a local merchant or landowner to whom he is connected by personal networks, who would invest his savings in his enterprises and give the lender a portion of the yield. This is precisely what the Islamic companies were doing, albeit on a much larger and more impersonal scale. To impose government and central bank regulation on these companies would be to make them part of the official financial establishment, and therefore ruin this authentic traditional relationship. It would alienate the small savers from investing their wealth in the development of Egypt through native enterprise.

Liberal commentators, such as the Wafd newspaper, also defended the Islamic companies against regulation in the name of the *sahwa* (renaissance) of civil society, which must not be stifled by the dead hand of bureaucracy. Civil society, in this conception, lies essentially outside the government, whose regulation would contaminate its authenticity. Informal networks and social relations of reciprocity or dependence are the essence of civil society. The focus of its activity is property and business (in contrast to Ibrahim, who leaves these elements out of his definition of civil society).

Behind Ibrahim's and al-Bishri's concepts lie two contrasting world views—one secular-liberal, the other Islamic-communal.[3] One of the important political articulations of the first view is the campaign for human rights and democratic institutions, directed primarily at the government and the law, but increasingly also against the illiberal demands of the second, Islamist, world view. This is not to say that all Islamist world views (and there are many) are necessarily or essentially illiberal. We are discussing here the specific case of the dominant "Islamic current" in Egypt.

Associations and the Law

In 1984, a group of Egyptian intellectuals, including lawyers, applied to the government to license two human rights associations: one Arab and the other, a branch of the first, Egyptian. Licenses were refused on security grounds. The two associations were nevertheless formed and function without licenses but with a high public profile. This illustrates the contradictions for the regime: an authoritarian bureaucratic rigidity, but also a sensitivity to international public opinion, before which Egypt must appear liberal and moderate. The law under which licenses are granted to associations is Law 32 of 1964, itself the object of a human rights campaign.[4]

Law 32 regulates only voluntary associations, not trade unions, professional syndicates or political parties, to which other laws apply. Examples of voluntary associations include community development associations, village associations, educational and medical charities, women's societies, sporting clubs, art and music societies, and political pressure groups, such as the human rights associations.

Before 1952, the Egyptian civil code featured carefully drafted items on the licensing and operation of voluntary associations. The law, generally liberal, distinguished between three types of associations: politico-military societies, which were forbidden; non-profit civil associations directed to any other purpose, which were constituted as legal persons and as such enjoyed full rights under the law; and charities, to which different and specific regulations applied. Infringements of the law by any of these societies could only be established and restituted by the courts. Judgments against societies entailed financial penalties, but not the dissolution of the society or punishment of its officers. In the first half of the century, civil associations, alongside newspapers and universities, played a vital part in the renaissance of intellectual, cultural, political and sporting life in Egyptian society. Cairo University (then Fuad University) was established by precisely such an association. Some associations, along with newspapers, trade unions and political parties, suffered occasional police interference and oppression, but most survived.

In 1956, a Republican decree annulled items 54 through 80 of the civil law dealing with associations. All such associations, as well as political parties and charities, were dissolved and forced to reapply for licensing. Without the empowering legal codes, relicensing was at the whim of administrative regulation and discretion. In 1964, Law 32, rather than remedying this situation, explicitly gave sweeping powers to the Ministry of Social Affairs and local government and their officials to license, regulate, monitor and dissolve associations.

Under Law 32, prospective societies apply to the Ministry of Social Affairs for a license. This ministry must

then send copies of the application to the directorate of security, the National Union (the sole and official political organization), and the sections of ministries in whose areas of competence the proposed society operates. Each of these has to approve the application or express an opinion on its suitability. One clause of the law states that "if a society is constituted which proves to be contrary to public order or morality or if its objectives are illegal or contrary to the safety of the Republic or its social system, then that society is annulled."

Another clause forbids members of trade unions and professional syndicates to form any association to pursue activities appropriate to that union or profession. This is aimed at interest groups, mutual funds and cooperatives formed among workers and colleagues. That is to say, the government-controlled unions are given complete monopoly over their members. Other arbitrary powers include the right to refuse the formation of a society because there is no need for it or because an existing society fulfills the same functions.

The Minister of Social Affairs can dissolve the board of management of a society and appoint his own nominees for a maximum period of three years. His appointee (usually an official of the ministry) has control over the society's funds. The minister also has the power to dissolve a society or amalgamate it with another which he judges to have similar objectives. In these cases, the board of the society must hand over to the ministry all the records and documents as well as the funds of the society. The minister can annul any resolution passed by the association if he judges it contrary to public order. The minister can also appoint officials or representatives of his ministry to the management board of any society, up to a half of its membership, for an unlimited period.

State Discretion

All these powers are administrative. The ministry need never resort to a court or a judge. Members of a dissolved association may take the matter to court, but they have to do so while all their records, documents and funds are held in the ministry.

A 1972 directive from the Ministry of Social Affairs (No. 754) adds that members of the management boards of private societies and institutions have to obtain permission from the minister at least one month before travelling abroad to meetings or conferences where they represent their societies. Their requests have to be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and any other relevant authority. They also have to report on the conference to the General Directorate of Societies at the ministry. Local governments at the provincial level have similar sweeping powers over private societies.

Covers of books by Farag Fuda. *The Joke: The Tale of the Islamic Investment Companies; Terrorism; Warning;* and *To Be or Not to Be* (caricature of Fuda).

A notable victim of this law is the Arab Women's Solidarity Association (AWSA), incorporated in Egypt and led by the well-known feminist writer and activist, Nawal El-Saadawi.[5] The AWSA was dissolved in June 1991 by the deputy governor of Cairo because of alleged financial irregularities, and its funds transferred to an Islamic women's organization. Informal favoritism towards Islamic associations by ministry functionaries is a regular occurrence. The dissolution of the AWSA was unsuccessfully challenged by human rights campaigners in the Administrative Court in May 1992 and is now on appeal.

The powers of the Ministry of Social Affairs are not only regulative and disciplinary; they include the means of dispensing patronage and favor. Certain associations can be placed into a privileged category of "general" or "public" interest. Organizations in this category cannot have their funds confiscated. A recent study found a disproportionate number in this category are societies with Islamic reference.[6]

Societies may receive donations from private or public sources, including foreign agencies, but at the discretion of the ministry. They can also collect funds from the public (with authorization from the ministry). They can generate income by selling goods and services. Foreign donors have been closely involved in the finance of various associations, mainly of a charitable and self-help nature, such as those operating dispensaries and nurseries, and providing professional training. Whether a society can

Leaving the mosque in Khan al-Khalili, Cairo. Jim Saah

receive foreign funding or not is determined by a clause written into its constitution at the discretion of ministry officials. This authorization can be withdrawn at will. (The recent involvement of foreign aid agencies in human rights campaigns and explicitly in the efforts to reinforce "civil society" is an interesting development, not confined to Egypt.)

Many religious voluntary associations and activities operate under the aegis of *awqaf* (pious foundations) or particular mosques, and as such are not subject to the provisions of Law 32. Some 27 percent of registered associations have an Islamic reference.[7] Their functions include pilgrimage, teaching the Quran, and social and medical services.

Islamic societies apparently enjoy special favors and privileges with ministry officials. Reportedly, ministry officials are included on the boards of management of many of these societies and paid a salary. This arrangement is apparently legal under Law 32, and in some cases required. Islamic associations are reportedly the most likely to obtain authorization to collect money from the public. These arrangements are consistent with rising Islamist sympathies among government functionaries. It is notable that Islamist political groups and their organs, vociferous in their demands on other constitutional matters, have been remarkably silent on Law 32.[8]

These apparently cozy relations between Islamic associations and government officials are pertinent to the contrast drawn above between the two images of civil society. Islamic associations here seem to have greater freedom of operation—not by virtue of empowering legislation but thanks to informal or semi-formal arrangements with ministry officials. Law 32 is highly inimical to civil society in the formal legal sense, which requires the state to facilitate and enable its operation. It constitutes a perfect illustration of the authoritarian bureaucratic state directly impeding the free associations of civil society. The Islamic associations get around these impediments through informal arrangements and networks which incorporate state officials.

Unions and Syndicates

Trade unions and syndicates are a central pillar in Saad Eddin Ibrahim's conception of civil society. After 1952, trade unions were integrated into the Nasirist state. Until recent years, the post of Minister of Labor was reserved for the general secretary of the Trade Union Federation. These unions were, and remain, unions of workers in the vast public sector. They are conduits of formal representation on boards of companies and enterprises, and for communications between workers, management and government. They do not negotiate on pay and conditions, though they do bargain on bonuses and incentives at particular plants. Unions are also the conduits of social welfare benefits to their members, and avenues for education, training and promotion. As such, they have

developed patronage networks which ensure the election of "responsible" officials.

Recent liberalization measures have attempted to separate unions from government and, in the process, make them more credible and less alienating to their members. They remain, however, tied to the public sector. Only the existing single union for each industry remains licensed; the formation of independent unions is forbidden. Strikes remain outlawed under emergency regulations. Important unofficial strikes in the 1980s and 1990s in steel, textiles and railways, were forcefully repressed by the police.

Elections for union officers and delegates in 1991 were reported to have been free. The Islamists and the left were both disappointed; successful candidates were mostly apolitical.

The unions constitute a glimmer of hope for the fortification of civil society in Egypt. They remain at present firmly tied to government and the public sector, in spite of liberalization measures, but the leadership behind the unofficial strikes may have a chance to flourish legitimately if pressure for change in the strike laws and on the monopolies of the official unions is successful. Privatization of parts of the public sector, if it proceeds, may further union autonomy.

The professional syndicates are the most advanced sectors of public life in Egypt, enjoying high status and speaking with an autonomous and respected voice. The lawyers' syndicate has been at the forefront of the campaigns for human rights and the rule of law.*

In the 1980s, the medical and engineering syndicates became largely dominated by the Islamist current. They are, however, quite different from one another in their internal politics and alignments. The engineer's syndicate raises many complex issues, so let us take the simpler example of the medical syndicate.

An estimated 70 percent of Egyptian doctors are under 35 years of age.[9] Only 25 percent are in private practice; the majority of the rest are employees of the Ministry of Health. Large numbers of recent graduates have brought with them to the profession and the syndicate the Islamist ideologies and commitments prevailing in the universities, and especially the faculties of medicine. The Islamist influence arose in response to corruption in the faculties—the high prices of photocopies of lectures and manuals, the need to buy private lessons from professors at high fees in order to pass exams, and the special privileges accorded the children of faculty members and senior doctors.

Another factor is the increasing importance of medical services provided by hospitals and clinics attached to mosques and Islamic charities. These provide an important avenue of employment for young doctors, superior to that offered by the ministry, as well as a reinforcement of their religio-political commitments.

*In September 1992, the candidates backed by the Muslim Brothers won a majority of board seats in the Bar Association election. —*Eds.*

What does the Islamist dominance in the medical syndicate imply for our argument? The syndicates are important pillars of civil society in Ibrahim's sense. They are democratic and voluntary associations of public interest and commitment. At the same time, and in that capacity, the medical syndicate is becoming involved in the networks of the Islamic sector, the informal civil society that Bishri advocates. To survive as an autonomous and democratic body, the medical syndicate requires enforceable legal guarantees provided by a law-state.

The Economic Sphere

The secure right to private property, freedom of contract and a free market are essential elements of the classic conceptions of civil society, whether liberal, Hegelian or Marxist. Security of private property and of contract were seen in this context as bases for multiple centers of social power which defy attempts at the monopoly of power characteristic of authoritarian and despotic rulers.

Sadat's *infitah* was meant to end state control of economic activity. State bureaucracies, however, in the form of the "public sector," remained firmly in control of the commanding heights of the economy. Private enterprise was at its most successful in partnership (official or unofficial) with or under the patronage of these bureaucracies and their personnel. Osman Ahmad Osman was the perfect example of *infitah* achievement in the Sadat era: a contractor-businessman with firm official and personal connections to the state bureaucracies and with family-marriage connections to the president.

The Mubarak regime remains committed to economic liberalization, including the privatization of public sector enterprises. How much of this will be accomplished remains to be seen. An important element in the program of *infitah* and privatization is adequate legislation to enable the operation of enterprises: contracts, licenses, consumer protection, labor laws, and so on. Here again the law-state is an essential condition for civil society.

The Egyptian case is admirably summed up by Robert Springborg:

> Instead of undertaking basic structural reforms which would create an environment truly conducive to private investment, the government of Egypt has been preoccupied with tinkering with the legal superstructure. The tinkering has produced some more liberal conditions governing investment, but the gain is partially offset by uncertainty resulting from the tinkering itself. Moreover, even while seeking to entice private investment through special incentives, the Egyptian authorities have presided simultaneously over the further expansion of the state's role in the economy. Public revenue as a percentage of GDP climbed steadily during the *infitah*, rising from 34.4 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 1984. The state, far from withdrawing from this arena in favor of private enterprise, has occupied a greater share of it.[10]

The resulting uncertainty, together with the corruption of large sectors of the bureaucracy, constitute constraints and incentives for entrepreneurs to acquiesce in easy,

bureaucracy-dependent money making. This situation does not facilitate the formation of independent and organized business classes, one of the pillars of "civil society" in classical social theory. It does, though, overwhelmingly favor the informal civil society of Bishri as against the social autonomies of Ibrahim. Civil society in this sense is not outside the state, but dependent—indeed parasitic—upon it.

The Islamic investment companies illustrate this point very well.[11] Bishri and others defended them in the name of social autonomy from the state: private enterprise outside the regulative dead hand of bureaucracy; Egyptians investing directly in their own economy. This is a myth. These companies only functioned freely because they recruited influential high-ranking officials, both retired and in post, to their boards of directors and consultancies at high fees. When the ruling politicians realized that they were losing control over the loyalties of their own bureaucracies, as well as risking public scandals, they clamped down firmly. And when the government acted, their control was arbitrary: there was no law or constitutional provision to qualify or temper the absolute power of the state to promulgate decrees. True, these companies were involved in all kinds of irregularities and doubtful practices. The ultimate government response to them, however, is an example of arbitrary power which could have been employed against any target perceived as a threat.

The Islamic Sector

There is no organized, unitary Islamic sector. The investment companies do not seem to have strong links to political organizations. The *jama'at islamiyya* (Islamic associations) may be loosely connected among themselves. What they have in common, however, is a mode of operation through private social networks, communal powers, communal welfare provisions, and so on.[12] For instance, the *jama'at* are trying to establish their control over villages and in urban quarters in Cairo and elsewhere. Alain Roussillon puts forward the hypothesis that these groups are attempting to replace the traditional notables who controlled these units, establishing clientalistic networks, mediating with authorities, enforcing rules of morality and order at the local level, and settling disputes. The violence in the 'Ayn Shams quarter in the late 1980s can then be seen as a battle for control against local resistance, and possibly against rival groups.[13]

The "Islamic economy" is not a distinct or unitary sector. There is no evidence of much connection between Islamic banks and Islamic investment societies; the latter prefer Western banks. Medium and small Islamic enterprises have diverse financial sources which may include Islamic banks. The Islamic welfare institutions also operate at different levels, from small clinics attached to private mosques, to the grand, modern hospital in Muhandesin. What they have in common is that they provide a wide range of employment opportunities and welfare benefits (not free but affordable). The criteria for enjoying these opportunities and benefits are personal and particularistic: adherence to Islam (including the codes of social and family morality), but also networks of patronage and clientship, communal membership and loyalty, and possibly political allegiance.

What kind of civil society is this? It is outside the state, but not necessarily against the state: it fulfills an important function of social control. It could, under certain conditions, be mobilized against the state. But if the quest for civil society is one which seeks a framework for the exercise of human rights and social autonomies, then the model presented by the Islamic sector falls short. It reproduces under modern conditions the authoritarian and patriarchal framework of the associations of kinship, village and religious community at a time when such communities have been effectively loosened and dispersed by the socioeconomic processes of modernity.

"Social Islam" as an Obstacle

Egyptian human rights activists are concerned by the anti-democratic thrust of these kinds of arrangements. It is clear that the authoritarian impulse in Egypt, as elsewhere in the region, does not emanate solely from the state and its organs, but also from various Islamist quarters of authority and communal organization. Islamist sympathies in ministries and among functionaries often combine the two sources. Authoritative voices from al-Azhar, the voice of "official" Islam in Egypt, are raised increasingly against secularist and liberal expressions. They and their Islamist allies seem to have great influence over the media, from which they are able to exclude their opponents. Their call for the banning of books has been successful in many cases, notably that of 'Ala' Hamid's *A Distance in a Man's Mind*, condemned for blasphemy by an emergency court in 1991, and its author sentenced to eight years in jail. The demand to ban Judge Ashmawi's critical books on law and government has so far failed. The recent assassination of prominent secularist writer and activist, Farag Fuda, by a Jihad militant is a tragic example of the campaign of intimidation of opposing voices. The "extremist" Jihad shares the objectives of the "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood and its state-backed Azhar allies.

Authoritarian inputs into Egyptian society also come from communal organizations, the "informal" model of civil society. The control of Islamist groups over some villages and urban quarters has replaced the traditional authority and control of local notables and bosses. Against the romantic view that this is some sort of grass-roots, "authentic" popular expression, Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa'id has pointed out the authoritarian nature of the relationship of Islamist leadership to the masses at the local levels.[14] The religious networks make no effort to recruit local leaders onto their councils of administration, which consist exclusively of their own members. Far

Egyptian Muslim Brothers leader. Said Elatab/Middle East Photo

from being popular organizations, the Islamic associations constitute the instrument by which the Islamist current controls and directs the masses. They do not encourage or foster autonomous popular organization or action, but treat the masses as objects of religious reform and control. The religious discourse does not give voice to the masses, but is directed at ethical pedagogy at the individual level and political organization at the national level. The levels between the individual and the state are covered by an unalterable *shari'a*.

One of the most disturbing elements of this kind of authoritarian communalism is the attacks on Coptic targets in the towns and villages of Upper Egypt, but also in Cairo, with loss of life as well as property. This is now one of the central problems for Egyptian human rights organizations and activists. Baha' al-Din Hassan, of the Egyptian Human Rights Organization, has recently campaigned in defense of the Christian inhabitants of Manshiet Nasir in the south. They have been subjected to violent attacks by the *jama'at* attempting to control the village by fanning communal tensions and intimidating Muslim inhabitants into taking sides. The police and the Ministry of the Interior have concentrated on protecting their own personnel and installations in the area, ignoring the plight of the inhabitants.[15]

The campaigns for human rights, freedom of expression and association, women's rights, and equality of religious minorities come up not only against the authoritarian state but also against religious authority and forms of authoritarian communal organization which borrow legitimacy from the prevailing religious ambience. These illiberal forces are increasingly represented in government apparatuses, both formally, in the constitutional commitment to the *shari'a* enshrined by Sadat, and informally, in terms of networks and sympathies. Elements of the Islamic sector, such as *jama'at* violence in Upper Egypt, pose a threat to public order. On the other hand, much of the Islamic sector represents a force for social control by providing authoritative social and economic organization and control in sectors of society which could otherwise be disorderly.

In current discourses, there is a ready identification of democracy with the ballot box. Free elections are, of course, an important element in democracy. For democracy to be an ongoing system rather than episodic elections, however, it must be instituted as a constitutional framework. Legal reforms, constitutional guarantees of rights, independence of the judiciary—in short, progress towards a law-state—are necessary preconditions for free elections. The constituencies in Egyptian society in favor of progress in these directions are important: the liberal intelligentsia occupy prominent positions in the state, education, the press and some of the syndicates. They are aided by the desire of the top political leadership to project a favorable image of Egypt as a liberal and moderate country. Western governments may be cynical in their attitudes toward democracy and human rights, but public opinion and the media in the West can exert pressures for democratization. Some of the non-governmental organizations have been active on this front. The obstacles faced by the liberal forces are enormous, but there are a few bright spots where progress is possible. ■

Footnotes

1 *Al-mujtama' al madani wal tahawwel al-dimoqraty fil-watan al-arabi* [Civil society and the transition to democracy in the Arab world] (Cairo: Ibn Khaldun Research Center, 1991).

2 *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, No. 1018, July 18, 1988, pp. 20-25.

3 It should be noted that Tariq al-Bishri is explicitly in favor of democratic institutions and respect for human rights. What follows relates not to these explicit views but to the implications for these issues of his conception of social and economic "authenticity."

4 For a history of law pertaining to associations, see Amir Salim, *Difa'an 'an takwin al-jam'iyyat* [In defense of the formation of associations] (Cairo: Center for Legal Research and Information on Human Rights, 1991).

5 See Joel Beinin, "Egyptian Women and the Politics of Protest," *Middle East Report*, #176 (May-June 1992), pp. 41-42.

6 Sarah Ben Nefissa-Paris, "Le mouvement associatif égyptien et l'islam," *Monde Arabe: Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 135 (January-March 1992), pp. 19-36.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 32.

9 Alain Roussillon, "Entre al-Jihad et al-Rayyan: phénomonologie de l'islamisme égyptien," in *Modernisation et nouvelles formes de mobilisation sociale* (Cairo: Dossiers du CEDEJ, 1991), pp. 39-69.

10 Robert Springborg, "Egypt," in Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy, eds., *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, forthcoming 1992).

11 For accounts of these companies, see Alain Roussillon, *Sociétés islamiques de placement de fonds et "ouverture économique"* (Cairo: Dossiers du CEDEJ, 1988); and Sami Zubaida, "The politics of the Islamic Investment Companies in Egypt," *Bulletin of the British Society for Middle East Studies* 17,2 (1990).

12 This is not to say that all Islamist politics must necessarily take this form. In Egypt today there are many prominent Muslims, such as Hussain Ahmad Amin, Hassan Hanafi and Muhammad 'Imara, who favor liberal democracy and are highly critical of the dominant Islamic current which is the subject of discussion here.

13 Roussillon, p. 45.

14 "Métamorphose du champ sociétal à partir du renforcement des mouvements à référence religieuse," in *Modernisation et nouvelles formes de mobilisation sociale*, p. 79.

15 See the report in the *Guardian* (London), May 27, 1992, p. 10.

tions, he considers it necessary to criticize and reconstruct much of the well-known anthropological literature.

The Cultural Component of Economic Change. The articles in this rubric deal with broad subjects of culture and economic development that are known to be connected, but those connections are commonly described in ways that make them seem to flow primarily in a single direction (cultural patterns shaping, restricting, or expanding economic opportunities; economic possibilities using, challenging, or transforming culture) and accordingly to run at different rhythms (time tends to move slowly where culture forms economic life, to be marked by rapid bursts where the economy alters culture). Each of these essays finds a distinctive way to disaggregate these processes and allow for relationships between culture and economy that are continuous and reciprocal and in which the pace of change is both rapid and glacial.

Arguments about private property in Russia, as relevant to 1991 as the Islamic radicalism analyzed by Goldberg, illustrate a long history of selective and ambivalent attitudes toward the West (see Greenfeld, 32:3; Bailes, 23:3; Rogger, 23:3; Nahirny, 4:4). In Esther Kingston-Mann's lively study, the troubling ease with which liberal ideology and the lessons of industrialization could justify serfdom and coercion says something more general about the nature of those ideas and the structure of Russian society. Korea's market economy benefited from institutions and ideas freshly adopted from the West and seemed at first to encourage classic individualism in a rapidly modernizing economy. Instead, Chang Yun-Shik shows, prosperous maturity brought a different sort of system in which personal connections (Yang, 32:1), patronage (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 22:1; Kaufman, 16:3) and corruption (Smith, 6:2; Marsh, 4:4) flourished along with capital and technology, a triumph of village culture as well as market forces. Suzette Heald meets the challenge of disentangling the decisive intersections of economy and culture by focusing on the response of Kuria and Teso households (see Collins, 28:4; Sanjek, 24:1) to tobacco farming and curing. With so controlled a comparison, she can assess the importance of the environment, company policy, the division of labor and gender roles (in an analysis very comparable to Guyer's, 22:3), and cultural attitudes that encompass different dimensions of time (also a concern of Dixon's and a topic that offers an increasingly fruitful perspective in the social sciences and humanities, note Wylie, 24:3; Farriss, 29:3).

CSSH Discussion. Ethnicity is one of those issues prominent in newspaper headlines that also raises fundamental questions of methodology and theory, requiring—as the debate between Kevin Yelvington and Carter Bentley shows—arguments meticulously framed. A coherent problem when considered in the abstract, ethnicity remains infinitely fissiparous when reduced to specific cases, which is one of the conclusions that emerges from James Bratt's stimulating review essay, itself a contribution to a continuing discussion (see especially Bromley and Koslov, 31:3, and Shanin in the same issue).

Smashing Idols and the State: The Protestant Ethic and Egyptian Sunni Radicalism

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Recent scholars of the Middle East have implicitly and suggestively noted similarities between contemporary Muslim activists and sixteenth-century Protestant reformers.[1] A more explicit and rigorous argument comparing Protestantism and contemporary Sunni movements in Egypt can yield insights into both movements.

Both Calvinism and the contemporary Islamist Sunni movements in Egypt are discourses on the nature of authority in society. Historically both movements arose as central state authorities made absolutist claims to political power and in the process sought to dominate transformed agrarian societies in new ways. Ideologically, both movements asserted that the claims of sweeping power by nominally religious secular central authorities were blasphemous egotism when contrasted with the claims of God on the consciences of believers. Socially, both movements transferred religious authority away from officially sanctioned individuals who interpret texts to ordinary citizens. Institutionally both movements create communities of voluntary, highly moti-

The author would like to acknowledge the encouragement and help received from Kenneth Jowitt, Kevin Reinhart, Farhat Ziadeh, and Ahmad Sadiq Sa'd.

[1] For an extremely early and suggestive insight to this problem, see Clement Henry Moore, "On Theory and Practice Among Arabs," in *World Politics*, 24:1 (1971), 106–26. Moore's concern is primarily with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. Looking at contemporary Sunni activists, Fouad Ajami refers to them as having "[t]he perseverance of reformers and 'saints' we can admire" in *Islam in the Political Process*, James Piscatori, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 34. The reference is, of course, to Michael Walzer's *Revolution of the Saints* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), a study of Protestantism, of which more below. Nazih Ayubi argues that "[a]s in Protestantism, the importance of discarding the church's teachings and "going back to the sources" is the egalitarian and participatory ethos that makes everybody capable of understanding and interpreting the word of God without barriers based on clerical ranks or theological education." See "The Politics of Militant Islamic Movements in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs*, 36:2 (1982), 272. Said Amir Arjomand has also tried to relate the Shi'i-led revolution in Iran to this paradigm. See "Iran's Islamic Revolution," *World Politics*, 38:3 (1986), 384–414, especially the argument that the Shi'i 'ulama are the equivalent of Calvinist preachers (p. 390). The most sustained arguments are by Ernest Gellner. See especially "Flux and Reflux in the Faith of Men" in the collection of his essays, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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vated and self-policing believers that yield greater degrees of internal cohesion and compliance than the absolutist authority can achieve and they therefore can become the basis for postabsolutist political authority in an authoritarian and antidemocratic fashion.

Although the use of the word fundamentalist is awkward and raises questions relevant primarily to Christian doctrine, it does convey something important about Protestant Christian and Sunni radical movements. Both early Protestantism and the Islamist movement seek to force believers to confront directly the authority of the basic texts of revelation and to read them directly, rather than through the intervening medium of received authority. Both believe that Scripture is a transparent medium for anyone who cares to confront it.

If both movements contain arguments about who can read and interpret Scripture, it behooves us to listen carefully to those arguments. The agenda they set forth is not economic but profoundly political: How do human beings cooperate and what role does coercion have when free consent is not forthcoming? It seems to me therefore that the fundamental or basic question in the post-Lutheran Protestant movements and in contemporary Sunni Muslim movements is an argument about public authority and the state rather than—as Max Weber would have had it—an argument about capitalism.

WEBER AND A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR RELIGIOUS CHANGE

In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber argued that shifts in religious doctrine have sociological as well as theological implications. In Weber's original formulation, Calvinism helped to forge the "spirit of capitalism," and thus the economic structure of modern capitalist Europe, because of the doctrinal features of one specific form of Protestantism (Calvinism) in regard to transcendence and human predestination.[2] It was a new and powerful form of Christianity that "placed a premium on the individual's disposition to organise coherently and control consciously his own conduct."[3]

[2] Weber was vague regarding the possibility of non-Christian religions undergoing a shift toward Protestant ethics. On the one hand, see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic*, Talcott Parsons, trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), especially 227: "Because the Mohammadan [sic] idea was that of predetermination, not predestination, the most important thing, the proof of the believer in predestination, played no part in Islam. Thus only the fearlessness of the warrior (as in the case of moira) could result, but there were no consequences for rationalization of life; there was no religious sanction for them." On the other hand, the logic of some Weberian formulations reinforces a possible comparison of Calvinism and Islam on several dimensions including that of predestination. See *Economy and Society*, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 522. Weber's knowledge of Islam was weak in comparison to his knowledge of other religions. See Bryan Turner, *Weber and Islam* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 140–1. A good selection on various approaches to the problems raised by Weber is S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View* (New York: Basic Books, 1968). Also worth looking at is Ernest Gellner's "Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order," in *Trust*, Diego Gambetta, ed. (London: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 152.

[3] Gianfranco Poggi, *Calvinism and the Capitalist Spirit: Max Weber's Protestant Ethic* (London: Macmillan, 1983), 78.

Modern scholars of Islam pursue the Weberian research agenda but focus on the *'ulama* (authoritative interpreters whose role and socialization will be defined below), who are dismissed as likely Protestants. Most of these attempts to expand the Weberian thesis, or even test it in non-European contexts, keep largely to the theological dimensions of the argument.[4] Weber had also argued that Protestants were institutional innovators. He recognized that there was an institutional "Protestant ethic," insofar as the organization to which Protestants were typically partial was the small group or sect through which they associated.

Pursuit of institutional and ideological arguments were not long in coming and have largely transcended arguments about Protestantism based on doctrine.[5] All share an understanding of Protestantism as a cohesive community of equal and cooperating individuals. Sheldon Wolin has argued that organization through sects carried the "potentially explosive idea that a community rests on an active membership" and included the anarchist principle that human society could be "at once well-organized, disciplined, and cohesive and yet be without a head."[6]

Michael Walzer's study of Puritan saints has found echoes in the contemporary literature on the Middle East.[7] Walzer defines Protestantism not as a doctrine but as a voluntary grouping of equals with a zealous commitment to engage in methodical and systematic struggle (including violence if need be) in order to attack customary social structures. Members who have a zealous commitment to ideologically oriented action are called "saints" by Walzer. These saints need not be religious, but are any individuals forming voluntary associations that engage in ideologically directed collective action. Walzer thus transforms Weber's arguments regarding sect organization to argue that Calvinism was historically important not only by means of sectarian organization but because of it. For Walzer, sect organization and radical political doctrine emerge in periods when social order breaks down and state structures become weak. Predictable ideological and organizational responses to disorder will, however, generate distinctive social outcomes depending on the real historical situation:

> The Calvinist saints were the first of these bands of revolutionary magistrates who sought above all control and self-control. In different cultural contexts, at different

[4] The major contribution to this extension is Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1973), which explicitly confronts the issue at several points (notably pp. 7–9). Other contributions in the area of Islam include Ernest Gellner, "Sanctity, Puritanism, Secularization, and Nationalism," in Eisenstadt, *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization*, 289–308.

[5] For the most recent summation of this argument, see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 465, regarding the tensions in Christianity as a system of meanings faced with emergent capitalism. For an older but still useful summary of the problems regarding the causal mechanisms involved, see Sidney A. Burrell, "Calvinism, Capitalism, and the Middle Classes: Some Afterthoughts on an Old Problem" in Eisenstadt, *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization*, 135–154.

[6] See Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1960), 191.

[7] *Revolution of the Saints*.

moments in time, sainthood will take on different forms and the saints will act out different revolutions.[8]

It makes sense to Walzer to compare Puritan saints, French Jacobins, and Russian Leninists because of their ideological and organizational similarities despite historical differences. His focus on institutions allows him to see a "Protestant" ethic in many more movements than does a strictly Weberian formulation.

I propose to look at contemporary Sunni activism to see if there are significant institutional and ideological similarities providing a useful comparison to Protestantism. Despite the many contextual and historical differences, such a comparison has at least two advantages. First, we are at least comparing Puritan saints with Muslim activists who both believe in a personal, all-powerful and all-knowing God—something not true of Jacobins or Bolsheviks. Second, we are comparing movements confronting not (as did Jacobins or Bolsheviks) weakened states but, on the contrary, strengthened states in which heads of state claimed unrestricted authority for themselves (which is somewhat more true of the Calvinists).

Why is authority important? Arguments about Protestantism hold it helped to destroy personal monarchies and absolutist regimes in Western Europe that emerged coeval with Protestant movements. In absolute regimes, the monarch rules as the sole source of law by means of a permanent, professional, and dependent bureaucracy and army.[9] Absolutism was a state in transition between two historical periods: one in which landed magnates possessed preponderant political and another in which urban industrial capitalists possessed such power. Protestantism destroyed the absolutist monarch's claim to power because it destroyed the mystical base for civil authority, insisting that the interpretation of scripture was the responsibility of all believers, not just officials bound by the classical corpus, and sanctioned methodical and ascetic behavior.

Given a tendency of some writers to make facile distinctions between Christianity and Islam on the basis of a supposed categorical separation of church and state in the former, a word of caution is in order.[10] Radical Protestantism worked not because it furthered the separation of church and state, but precisely because it did not. In Wolin's reading, scripture and scriptural dispute provided believers with a standard by which the action of political authority could be judged. The merger of church and state became necessary in Calvinist thought because "political and religious thought form a

[8] *Ibid.*, 310–1.

[9] See Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 476.

[10] See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 2: "Throughout the history of Christendom there have been two powers: God and Caesar . . . always there are two, with its own laws and jurisdictions, its own structure and hierarchy."

continuous realm of discourse."[11] Calvinism created new ideological communities of activists endowed with a theory that allowed them to withdraw their allegiance from an institutional order which was only nominally Christian:

> But in the obedience which we have shown to be due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception, and that is entitled to our first attention—that it do not seduce us from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to whose decrees all their commands ought to yield, to whose majesty all their sceptres ought to submit. . . . If they command any thing against him, it ought not to have the least attention; nor, in this case, ought we to pay any regard to all that dignity attached to magistrates.[12]

Calvin's words resonate with earlier Christian thought, and we can find a similar note in the classical Islamic *hadith* literature, although it formed a minor note. Ibn 'Umar reported that "to hear and obey [the authorities] is binding so long as one is not commanded to disobey (God); when one is commanded to disobey (God), he shall not hear or obey."[13]

What we wish then to look at is twofold. First, have contemporary "fundamentalist" groups made the same kind of break with customary and received religious authority that the Puritans did? Second, if so, what are the implications of this break? I propose to look first at how some Protestant believers looked at authority and community in the context of earlier Christian thought and then to do the same for contemporary Egyptian Muslims. As a form of religious authority, Calvinism will be defined as a refusal to accept received interpretations of the texts of revelation and a refusal to accept the authority of the old interpreters as well.

THE PROTESTANT PROBLEMATIC

For Christian and Muslim believers there is a fundamental dilemma regarding the institutional stability of a visible community of believers. This dilemma arises because humanity once had direct contact with an omnipotent and omniscient divinity who continues to hold fallible men and women responsible for their actions despite the partial, imperfect, and limited nature of their understanding. Believers are the legatees of an institutional framework that claims historical continuity with revelation but which seems to lack the emotional basis to make its claims binding.

Between the institutional and intellectual task of maintaining historical

[11] Wolin, *Politics and Vision*, 179.

[12] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, John Allen, trans. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Christian Education, 1936), IV,20,xxxii, 804–5. [The numbers for Calvin's *Institutes* in this and subsequent citations represent, in order, the particular book, chapter, and paragraph.]

[13] See Maulana Muhammad Ali, *A Manual of Hadith* (London: Curzon Press, 1944), 396; The *hadith* is from Bukhari, 56:108. In Arabic the word for "disobeying" (*ma'siyyah*) has overtones of revolt, sin, and seduction somewhat similar to Calvin's wording. [Imam Bukhari's *Sahih* is widely considered to be an important classical edition of *hadith*, and Maulana's numbers refer to a book and chapter in which a particular hadith can be found.]

continuity and the emotional task of creating anew the reception of revelation lies a significant religious space. To paraphrase Abdul Hamid el-Zein, the late anthropologist and student of Islam, the analyst cannot privilege the intellectual activity of systematic interpretation over that of "direct insight" into the order of the world.[14] We can only investigate how believers carry out these tasks. For my purposes, Protestantism involves the development of earlier Christian thought around four dimensions (which I shall later elaborate in terms of Islam). Protestantism brought new answers to four old questions inherent in Christianity (and perhaps any monotheism) and Protestants found themselves in a state of tension—if not war—with human society. Mastering themselves and society required thinking about four issues:

(1) the claims due a single and all-powerful God by believers;
(2) the recognition of the danger that there exist loyalties antagonistic to God;
(3) the nature of education, socialization, and authority required to interpret the Scripture and determine what actions validly fulfill divine claims; and (consequently)
(4) the relation of revealed Scripture to received interpretations of it.

The emergent themes in Protestantism and contemporary Sunni radicalism recapitulate and transform earlier conflicts in their respective thought. Calvin's position on God's claims over man was simple enough in outline: "The purpose of creation is for man to know God and to glorify him by worship and obedience."[15] In Calvin's own words, "the worship of God is therefore the only thing which renders men superior to brutes, and makes them aspire to immortality."[16] What is worship? It is not merely a practice but the direct confrontation of God and His Word as the apostles or prophets or saints had done. When this occurs, the meaning of Scripture becomes apparent without institutional mediation:

> How shall we be persuaded of its divine original, unless we have recourse to the decree of the Church? This is just as if any one should inquire, How shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things of taste.[17]

For the Reformers, the Reformation was not a social movement with mundane goals, but the reemergence of the spirit which men felt who had lived when God's presence was manifest:

> [T]he Reformation is not to be confused with any earlier worthy attempts which men undertook to put right the faults in the church or in Christendom. It is rather the work of Christ himself . . . the reformation message is identical with the preaching of Jesus and his disciples, and actually transports us into the situation faced by the early church.[18]

[14] See "Beyond Ideology and Theology: the Search for the Anthropology of Islam," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 6 (1977), 227–54, especially at 248–52.
[15] Carlos M. N. Eire, *War Against the Idols* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 197.
[16] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, I,3,iii [hereafter indicated by *Institutes*].
[17] *Ibid.*, I,7,ii.

The Reformation and Calvinism recapitulated some doctrinal and institutional forms of earlier Christian movements. The sixteenth century was not the first time Christians had turned to the Apostles for models. In the twelfth century, devout European Christians viewed the *vita apostolica* as a framework for "the return to the primitive life of the church, to the life of the Apostles . . . [which] by inspiring new states of life, inspired as well a new awareness of the ways that grace could take root in nature."[19] In the Middle Ages, an

> evangelical awakening took place not by a revision of existing institutions but by a return to the gospel that by-passed those institutions . . . [whose] dynamics had to be: witness to the faith, fraternal love, poverty, the beatitudes—all these were to operate more spontaneously and sooner among laymen than among clerics, who were bound within an institutional framework. The risk could be great—and in this case it was great—that laymen would grossly abuse their evangelical liberty, for once on the way to imitating the apostles, they would claim the right to teach derived from that liberty.[20]

In the twelfth century the Church could avoid this risk; in the sixteenth it could not.

In the Reformation the Apostles ceased to be men whose lives were to be emulated; collectively they became models for a new form of governance which allowed the evangelical movement to re-create a community receiving a Scripture rather than one without it. The systematic emulation of the Apostles was coupled with congregational activity which allowed constant collective scrutiny to create high levels of individual compliance with religious norms.

Why was it so necessary to link congregationalism to the systematic following of the call of Jesus? Because, although salvation was granted to individuals, human social activity created the possibility of error and damnation.[21] The Protestants were not concerned that the visible church might fail to lead men to salvation; they were more concerned that it might systematically lead them away.[22] Obedience to the letter and form of revelation could easily become submission to idolatrous and nondivine claims. Men and women

[18] Gottfried W. Locher, *Huldrych Zwingli's Concept of History* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 102.
[19] See M. D. Chenu, "Monks, Canons, and Laymen in Search of the Apostolic Life" in *Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century*, Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 203.
[20] Chenu, *Nature, Man and Society*, 219.
[21] *Institutes*, I,iv.
[22] *Institutes*, IV,i,iv–v, and IV,ii,ii–iii, and especially: "The communion of the Church was not instituted as a bond to confine us in idolatry, impiety, ignorance of God, and other evils; but rather as a means to preserve us in the fear of God, and obedience of the truths."

tended almost invariably, it seemed, not to worship God's truth and authority but human law and human power.

Norms arising from human law and power are idolatrous, because idolatry is the interposition of human and humanist values between the believer and the divine. The struggle against idolatry was not limited to iconoclasm; images were only one form of idolatry. Another form was manifest in the government of the Catholic Church itself, in which Calvin saw "chaplains, canons, deans, provosts, and other idlers . . . [who] falsely usurp the honour, and thus violate the sacred institution of Jesus Christ."[23] If idolatry could be found within the church itself, it was possible that people who appeared to be good Christians actually were not and that figures of religious or civil authority were not entitled to respect.

For early Protestants like Ulrich Zwingli, *the* critical question of the age was whether or not customary religiously sanctioned practices were in accord with the revealed word of God. "The question for Zwingli was no longer one of rejecting the misuse of 'good and honorable customs' . . . but rather of separating human customs from divine ordinances."[24] The church and its received doctrines derived from interpretation of the Bible were not merely inefficient or ineffective customs to be cast off; rather they were themselves symbols of idolatry. Calvin certainly developed this aspect of Protestant thought to an extreme degree in the *Institutes* and asserted that "Scripture settles all questions and describes the truth [in] . . . detail [sic]."[25] At stake was not nominal controversy but the very essence of monotheist religion: "As often as the Scripture asserts that there is one God, it is not contending over the bare name, but also prescribing that nothing belonging to his divinity be transferred to another."[26]

Once the Scripture itself becomes the basis for decisions about ethics, morality, and what is required of Christians rather than a received body of interpretations, a significant decentralization of authority occurs. The logic of argument then discards not only that received interpretation of Scripture (that is, canon law and the entire range of church discourse built up in the medieval period) but also implies that interpreters no longer need socialization in the old educational institutions.

Socialization and education into the priesthood is a threat to the Protestant community and a derogation of the principles upon which it is built. The very preparation for entry into the priesthood for Calvin marks the deformation of the intended function of the pastorate; the role of canons marks the deformation of the presbytery; and the dictatorship of the bishops and the Pope marks the extinction of the active participation of the Christian in the Church. Calvin's critique of church government is far more scathing that his critique of civil government. Priests, Calvin tells us, do not know Scripture; they know only canon law.[27]

[23] *Institutes*, IV,5,x.
[24] Eire, *War Against the Idols*, 54.
[25] *Ibid.*, 202.
[26] *Institutes*, I,12,1.

Protestantism was a directly powerful and compelling doctrine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Congregationalism and the possibility of a direct reading of the Scriptures gave legitimacy to lay theology and the pamphlet explosion that began as early as the first decades of the sixteenth century. City dwellers demanded religious reforms in order to preserve social community and sought an apostolic vocation, which implied that believers entered society and engaged in "admonishing one's brother against sin and warning him to repent."[28] Along with his fellow communicants, the believer henceforth was engaged in a constant struggle against idolatry and to obey the word of God in ways that required ever-increasing levels of knowledge of Scripture and a willingness to renounce received interpretations of it. To paraphrase Ulrich Zwingli, the believer was henceforth in a company of soldiers whose Captain was Christ.

THE MUSLIM OFFICIAL CONSENSUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Although there is no Islamic church, we can nevertheless identify a potential tension between the "visible community of believers" and the "invisible" or eternal community of believers. It is possible to identify a set of religious concepts in contemporary Sunni Islam that at least make it possible to examine a correspondence with Puritanism. I would like to suggest that these concepts are (1) *jihad* (the nature of the activity to which believers are called), (2) *taghut* (the existence of competing claims over the behavior of believers), (3) *ijma'* (a relationship between Scripture and received interpretations of it), and (4) the role of the 'ulama (the nature of the socialization and education required for interpreting the Scripture). The role of the 'ulama differs from that of the priesthood in many ways, not least of which is the absence of an established orthodoxy which they were to uphold.[29]

Although Sunni Islam lacks a charismatically endowed hierarchy, Sunni Muslims have developed a sophisticated methodology for understanding Scripture, for evaluating it, and for extending the logic of its arguments. The science of Scripture is called *'ilm*. Those who practice 'ilm are known as 'ulama, that is, those who know. In general the methodology mastered by these men (and they are all men) is jurisprudential knowledge.

[27] *Institutes* IV,v,ii.
[28] Paul Russell, *Lay Theology in the Reformation: Popular Pamphleteers in Southwest Germany 1521–1525* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 222. Russell himself quotes Hans Sachs, an early sixteenth-century pamphleteer.
[29] William Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 20.

Without a single well-defined hierarchy with clear disciplinary capacities (such as found in the Catholic Church), 'ulama could all arrive at different interpretations of Scripture. Only cooperation can avert the absolute fragmentation of the legal corpus whose mastery defines the 'ulama. Thus the doctrine developed that "where . . . conclusions were the subject of general agreement by the scholars, they then become incontrovertible and infallible expressions of God's law."[30] This general agreement is called ijma'. Over time the mastery of the methodology and content of ijma' itself outweighs by far the effort required to master the Scripture.[31]

Historically Sunni Muslims were enjoined as individual Muslims to the performance of five acts: the witness to the faith or *shahadah* (recognition of one God and Muhammad's prophecy), prayer, a ritual fast, the payment of alms, and pilgrimage. These essentially formal requirements establish the bounds for membership in a visible community of believers. Those who perform these rituals are members of both a visible community and possibly members of the "invisible" community of Muslims who achieve Paradise. Historically jihad was not considered to be a duty incumbent on all believers; it usually referred to relations between the Muslim community and other communities rather than within the Muslim community itself.[32]

Jihad has become a critical concept for contemporary Sunni Egyptian activists and may well be *the* critical concept for them. To the degree that these activists are like the Protestant reformers, their concepts of jihad should be markedly different from earlier understandings. Constant recognition of the supremacy of God and methodical service to Him should merge with a growing sense of antagonism to a purely nominal adherence to Islam. In succeeding sections I shall present some arguments that this is indeed the case.

Jihad is no longer thought of as a particular act or event, but it is the positive pole in a continuum in which believers orient themselves to action. Such a definition of jihad entails another concept: that of a negative pole in the continuum. There must be a competing and antagonistic claim regarding the behavior of believers.[33] Evil, the danger of a competing claim, should be understood in terms of a theology of human egoism rather than in naturalist terms. Idolatry is the principle of moral orientation that competes with God rather than the physical presence of Satan. One of the few studies of jihad as a concept in development affirms precisely such a differentiation over time—namely that for contemporary fundamentalists, "The important objects of jihad are . . . : an end to the domination of man over man and of man-made laws, the recognition of Allah's sovereignty alone, and the acceptance of the *shari'ah* as the only law."[34] Human egoism expressed in ordinary politics is designated by the Sunni activists as *taghut*—idolatry. Succeeding sections will show that the growing reliance on the concept of taghut is a "quasi-Protestant" shift in Muslim thought. The choice of the word taghut to refer to idolatry, rather *sanam* or *iblis* (which would refer to Satan), will be adduced to support this view.

Before doing so, let me briefly pursue the logic of the argument. Concern with jihad and taghut is not only a concern with the nature of the relationship of the egotistical individual to God, but it also challenges the received meaning of these concepts and implies a radical redefinition of the present Muslim community to its past and to the guardians of received knowledge from that past. Redefining what is required of the community of believers necessitates redefining the requirements for interpreting Scripture. It suggests that the monopoly over received interpretations must be broken.

Contemporary Sunni radicals attack the well-developed and sophisticated consensus of the 'ulama on two levels: First, they deny that the prior meanings are correct; and second, they deny the very right of such scholars to determine the meanings. This double attack on the 'ulamas' interpretations and their right to define them makes contemporary Sunni activism comparable to the Protestant impulse in Europe. A refusal to accept received interpretations means a return to the origins: Scripture. Denying the institutional integrity of the established religious elite challenges the kind of education, socialization, and authority required to interpret the Scripture.

To argue that the contemporary Islamic movement mounts a radical attack on received Islam requires the establishment of two prior arguments: We must first show that the ideas being discussed have an earlier provenance. Without prior dialogue, we might be looking at an imported idea rather than a conceptual break. Second, we must demonstrate that this break had not already occurred, even though contemporary activists were intellectually nourished by earlier debates. What follows is an attempt to trace the origins of the "Protestant" break with the immediate past and to provide a context for understanding the nature of the contemporary Egyptian Islamist discourse.

NEARING THE EDGE

In his sermons and written work, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Society of Muslim Brothers (*Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) discussed many of the questions that concerned Sunni radicals in the 1930s and 1940s. Al-Banna's Broth-

[30] Noel Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964), 78.

[31] See *The Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam* [hereafter, *EI*], H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), *s.v.* "Idjma'" (pp. 157–8).

[32] *Ibid.*, *s.v.* "djihad" (p. 89).

[33] Gustave von Grunebaum argued that an inherent complementarity of good and evil could be found in classical Islamic theology that "conceived of evil as the *muqabal* of good, that is, its correlative opposite, and hence possessed of equal ontological reality." Today's militants take the existential implications of such a position quite seriously. See Gustave von Grunebaum, "Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil," *Studia Islamica*, 31 (1970), 117–34 [reprinted in *Islam and Medieval Hellenism: Social and Cultural Perspectives*, Dunning S. Wilson, ed. (London: Variorum Reprints, 1976), article XIV, p. 124.

[34] Rud Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), 130. Peters uses the terms "modernist" and "fundamentalist" to distinguish those who might also be differentiated as "humanist" and "fundamentalist."

erhood was the historic cradle of contemporary Islamic activism, and the personal connections between him and the present activists obscure the critical difference between them. Al-Banna was not a "Protestant," although this has been suggested.[35]

Al-Banna was concerned that Quranic inspiration enter the daily life of Muslims. He perceived a widespread flagging of emotional commitment to Islam but expected a solution from the existing political elite. He specifically addressed this problem in the sermon "*Nazrat fi islah al-nafs*" (Remarks on Self-reform), with its striking central image of electricity:

> Why did the Noble Qur'an have such an impact on our worthy ancestors and why was it so beneficial to them but not to us? Why did the verses [of the Qur'an] affect our minds in so weak a fashion? Let me direct your attention to someone who creates electricity and must feel the electric current. This effect will vary with the force of the current, and if it is strong enough will put someone who comes into contact with it into the hospital and if it is stronger yet will put him in the grave [he then discusses similar physical effects on early converts to Islam] . . . if the effect of Qur'an is not the same in us as it was in our ancestors then we are like an electrician who has put insulation between himself and the current so that he is not affected by it, and our task is to break down this insulation so that we can feel the Noble Qur'an so that our hearts will be in communication with it and we will taste its sweetness.[36]

For al-Banna, modern Muslims were emotionally insulated from the Qur'an, but he did not connect this insulation with an institutional foundation. Commitment could increase primarily through practical activity rather than through a sweeping act of faith. Even those who were only nominal Muslims could, by integration into the works of an Islamic organization, play a role in creating an Islamic society. This was so because, for al-Banna, the community of Muslims was (in Wilfred Cantwell Smith's expression) orthoprax rather than orthodox.[37]

Without naively believing in the likelihood that all would become better, al-Banna nevertheless seems to have believed that men could affect not only their mundane but their eternal destinies:

> Regarding the Islamic spirit and the Islamic personality, 90 out of 100 never fully develop it. Thus it occurred to me to give this talk on the role of self-reform and clearly explicate what it means to say if the character is changed everything will be changed "for God only changes [events] for those who change themselves." Now it is said that this is a characteristic aim of the Sufis and we are a Brotherhood of activists not masters of mysticism [*shuyukh al-turuq*]. I say we must fear lest Satan put a veil over our spirits so that we will not reach our goal.[38]

Clearly for al-Banna it was quite possible for character to be changed through action, but action was not all. Human frailty was understood to be man's

[35] See the articles by Moore and others cited above.
[36] *Al-'Itisam*, June 1944 (Cairo).
[37] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 19.
[38] Hasan al-Banna,"Nazrat fi islah al-Nafs."

choice to listen to "the power that opposes God in the hearts of men . . . [and] whispers his insidious suggestions in their ears and makes his proposals seductive to them."[39] Nevertheless, the most dangerous enemies were the colonial political power: foreign, non-Muslim rulers who controlled Muslim societies and ruled without reference to Islamic law. For al-Banna, the most dangerous characters remain foreign; they are not to be found lurking within the community of nominal believers to confound the virtuous.

Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949. For the next fifteen years, the elaboration of his ideas about the nature of human community and governance fell to Sayyid Qutb. A literary critic by training and a moderately secular liberal, Qutb returned to Egypt from a year-long stay in the United States a committed Islamic activist. From 1949 until his execution in 1966, Qutb elucidated an Islamic vision of society, governance, and community. If al-Banna was the product of the *ancien regime* and the colonial era, Qutb focused far more sharply on the nationalist state in the postcolonial era. Qutb's understanding of community and agency was profoundly conditioned by the experience of watching a powerful but nationalist state intrude into society as the colonial regime had never been capable of doing.

Qutb evokes evil as an active and insidious force identified as taghut: "deception that cannot endure the mere existence of truth . . . for even if truth wished to live in isolation from deception—leaving victory to the decision of God—deception cannot accept this situation."[40] To describe human political power, Qutb conflates two words, taghut and *tughyan*. Although given as separate forms in classical dictionaries, the two words are easy to relate in meaning. Tughyan has to do with overstepping boundaries (including "going beyond in disbelief"), whereas taghut seems to be associated with "that which is worshipped other than God."[41] The arbitrary power of the state symbolized by the Pharaoh is evoked in this conflation.

Pharaoh is, of course, as familiar a figure to Muslims as he is to Jews and Christians. In the Qur'an he usually appears in direct contrast to the prophet Moses. Pharaoh tries constantly to overstep established normative boundaries, whether by the infliction of cruelty, the use of illusive magic, or the direct appropriation of divine status.[42] For Qutb, the moment in which Moses challenges Pharaoh exemplifies the situation of real persons torn between allegiance to God and the seductions of idolatry. The essence of Islam is in this conflict:

> The confrontation between Moses and Pharoah and his retinue reveals the reality of the struggle between the entirety of the religion of God and the entirety of ignorance

[39] *EI*, s.v. "shaitan," 523.
[40] Sayyid Qutb, *Fi zilal al-qur'an* (Beirut: Dar al-shuruq, 1974), vol. 3, 1306.
[41] See *Taj al-arus* (Cairo ed., 1306 A.H.), *s.v. taghut*, 224–5 and *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane*, A. J. Wensinck and J. P. Mensing *et al.*, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), vol. 4, pp. 4–5, especially the reference to Abu Da'ud.
[42] See especially XX, 43–72 and XXVIII, 32–40 in the Qur'an.

[jahiliyyah]. It shows how taghut regards this religion and how it feels the threat to its existence even as it reveals how the faithful understand the conflict between themselves and taghut. . . . If God is the lord of the world then no servant of his—even haughty and tyrannical Pharaoh—can make them subject to him for they are subject to no one except the lord of the world, and return of divinity to God means the return of all government to him . . . [thus Moses's] call to the lord of the world can only have one meaning, namely withdrawal of power from the servants—*tawaghit* [plural form of taghut]—and return of it to its Master and this means (in the eyes of such people) wickedness! Or as is said today in the *jahili* ordinances in response to this same call: this is an attempt to overturn the established order! And indeed from the point of view of ignorant idols [*al-tawaghit al-jahiliyyah*] that have usurped the power of God—that is that have usurped His divinity even if they do not say it directly—this [i.e., this same call] is an overthrow of the established order.[43]

Here state power and the established order (*nizam al-hukm*) are assimilated to a set of loyalties in opposition to God. Qutb's argument is not that politics as a vocation implies choices at odds with the ultimate ethic of Islam, nor does he argue that the political is necessary but corrupting. His argument is more radical.

Qutb is arguing that the state and its leadership constitutes a glorification of human needs and desires which is idolatrous, and that the leaders of the state demand the kind of uncritical loyalty due only to God. For the state to demand such loyalty and to insist on such authority strikes a blow at the foundation of revealed monotheism and restores premonotheistic idolatry. In premonotheistic Egypt, religion and politics were one and the same; and their unity was cemented in the divine or quasidivine character of the human ruler who had a theoretical right to rule unhindered. Such a ruler places himself outside law and is an absolute ruler because he rules only "from himself."[44]

Qutb's vision of the law-governed community of Moses, in contradistinction to the unconstrained coercive power of Pharaoh, analyzes in religious terms the state structure erected by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s, which still stands. After 1952, Egypt was a powerfully concentrated administrative regime, with Nasser himself wielding extraordinary powers unconstrained either by law or by any normal political process. Even local decentralization aided the concentration of power in Nasser's hands.[45] It was also during Nasser's lifetime that Egypt moved from being a society in which the landed elite controlled the state to one in which the urban professionals and capitalists gained significant political power.[46]

[43] Qutb, *Fi zilal al-qur'an*, 1330–1.

[44] For a discussion of Calvin's own approach to the problem of *princeps legibus solus* and insight into developing Protestant thinking on the subject, see Harro Hopfl, *The Christian Polity of John Calvin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 13–18.

[45] See Tariq al-Bishri, *Al-Dimuqratiyyah wa al-nasiriyyah* (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafah al-Jadidah, 1975), 22–24, especially the description of Nasser's use of the power to appoint and remove high officials.

[46] See Leonard Binder, *In a Moment of Enthusiasm* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 376–7.

Qutb represents the point of departure for the present generation of Islamic militants, whom we have yet to discuss. The state ruled by Anwar Sadat was still a Nasserist state, even if the policies sometimes differed. No matter how Sadat appeared to the West, in Egypt he often seemed to be at least as dictatorial as Nasser. He was frequently more arbitrary, even if he relied less on coercion. His speech to the Israeli Knesset, which broke the war deadlock, only occurred because Sadat could disregard any normal political or constitutional restraints. Sadat also used his power to ban the sale of meat in Egypt for a month in 1980, to enforce rigid and unrealistic laws regarding business hours, and even to suggest allowing Israel access to Nile water.

Qutb's originality lies in his uncompromising vision of the Prophet's mission in Mecca rather than Medina. Qutb's Prophet does not make a new order until he has broken with the old. In this view, Islam

is neither an Arab national program nor social, military, legal or even ethical movement. The Meccan Qur'an is nothing other than a revolution (*thawra*) of consciousness and beliefs necessary for all that followed: ethics, State, law, and social order. But this revolution of the heart was aimed at the very heart of the powers already in place: priests, tribal shaykhs, princes and local political powers, and not only at distant Persian and Byzantine despots.[47]

The Prophet and his Companions destroyed the foundations of political power in Mecca, just as Moses destroyed Pharaoh's pretensions *from within* ancient Egyptian society and only then turned to building a new one. The message is clearly that contemporary monotheists must be willing to oppose shaykhs, princes, and pharaohs within their own societies before a new order can be built.

Qutb's focus on Pharaoh gave him a vocabulary, moreover, with which to reach a much wider audience for a politics of religious criticism than any earlier thinkers did. Moses and Pharaoh have an extremely deep resonance in Egyptian folk proverbs. Almost any contemporary collection of Egyptian proverbs offers *illi ma yirda bi-hukm Musa yirda bi-hukm Fir'awn* (who will not accept the rule of Moses must accept that of Pharaoh).[48] This particular bit of folk wisdom, distinguishing a coercive from a normative order, is by no means recent. We have it in almost exactly the same words in a collection almost 175 years old.[49] It also appears in Ahmad Taymur's compendium recording usage in the early part of the twentieth century, with an explication identical to Burckhardt's and followed by another proverb with similar gram-

[47] Olivier Carré, *Mystique et politique: Lecture revolutionnaire du Coran* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1944), 47.

[48] See, for example, Wafa' al-Khanajri, *Al-Amthal al-Sha-'biyyah fi hayyatina al-yawmiyyah* (Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Qawmiyyah Al-Hadithah, 1982), 10 (entry 26).

[49] John Lewis Burckhardt, *Arabic Proverbs: or the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, 3d ed. (1817, rpt. London: Curzon Press, 1972), 237 (entry 671). See also p. 275 (entry 761) for indications of other proverbs regarding Pharaoh as an embodiment of the state.

matical structure and similar meaning.[50] Historically the proverb has been taken to mean that one should accept that which is; to the extent that Qutb has enriched the meaning of the popular contrast between Pharoah and Moses (both of whom after all are products of Egypt), followers of Moses were now to see themselves on the offensive.[51]

For Qutb the partisans of Moses would still be aided in their struggle against Pharaoh by the breadth and depth of the classical Islamic heritage. Some 'ulama might be wrong in their interpretation of classical discourse, but their discourse would remain necessary for a new polity to be built. Qutb had claimed that a new approach to the sources of Islam and its interpretation were needed. His great life's work *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* was written in part with the desire to reclaim for intellectuals like himself a greater familiarity with the Islamic sciences and intellectual resources of the 'ulama. Qutb may have created a new approach to the relationship of man to God and a new approach to the governance of the community of the Muslims. What he did not develop was a theory of the kind of socialization necessary to pursue the new kind of governance or the relationship between past and present interpretations of the Law.

I now turn my attention to those who radically reject the old socialization required for interpretation and the entire canon of received interpretation. This radical rejection creates the possibility of imagining a new form of governance for the community and for bringing that new form into being: the creation of the sect. Before doing so, however, I wish to dispose briefly of the idea that we can explain the emergence of this break with classical Islamic doctrine merely by reference to the social background of those who join such groups.

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES

The arguments about the effect of social and economic changes creating the Islamist trend seem compelling in regard to the very recent past. Egypt has

[50] See Ahmad Taymur Basha, *Al-Amthal al-'ammiyyah*, 4th ed. (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publication, 1986). See numbers 371 and 372 (pp. 61–2). See also number 3080 (p. 512) with the explication again that the word pharaoh implies oppression and coercion, and counterposes Moses to Pharaoh, asserting the need for active opposition to those who assert that they are "the highest lord." The text of the proverb is the well-known "Ya, fir'awn, min far'anak qal ma laqitsh hadd yiraddini" (Oh, Pharaoh, how did you become Pharaoh? No one opposed me).

[51] Although there is no doubt that Qutb's vision of secular authority as idolatrous grew during the Nasser years, it is quite possible that something of the populism of Nasserism has actually encouraged the opposition to the state by privileging popular and nonofficial feelings of resistance to that oppression, even if the state did not allow people to act on such feelings. Compare the treatment of the proverb "Oh Pharoah, how did you get to be Pharoah? No one opposed me" in Al-Khanajri, *Al-Amthal al-sha'biyyah* (p. 191, entry 1591) above (and in Taymur, *Al-Amthal al-'ammiyyah*, as cited above) and in Muhammad Ibrahim Abu Sina, *Falsafat al-mithl al-sha'bi* (Cairo: Dar al-katib al-arabi, 1968), in which it is closely joined with a discussion on the need to resist tyranny (*al-tughyan*) and the proverb "Silence in the right is like eloquence in the wrong" (p. 61).

experienced inflation, stagnation, low productivity, crowding, and increased income inequity in the very recent period. Gilles Kepel and Eric Davis argue that the Islamist program arises from the declining economic situation of group members or (in Davis's words) "pressurization."[52] Such arguments link up neatly with Walzer's approach to Puritanism as a response to social and economic disorder, although they unfortunately do not explain the development of this ideology in the 1950s and 1960s, when the economic situation was improving for all Egyptians. It also cannot explain the militants' manifest and self-conscious understanding that their movement is the result of Nasserism's political victory rather than its economic failure.

We do have a fairly good idea of the Islamist groups' membership. What stands out for all the groups is the degree to which members and leaders alike were middle-class, well-educated in science and technology, upwardly mobile, and possessed of strong personalities. Salih Siriyya, founder of an Islamist group that attacked the Military Academy in 1972, had a Ph.D. in science education. Shukri Mustafa, leader of a group that kidnapped a leading 'alim, had a Bachelor's degree in agricultural science.

The followers resembled the leaders. Although research on membership has been based on those arrested rather than random sampling, most scholars consider the results to be impressionistically representative of active members. Saad Eddin Ibrahim found twenty-nine of thirty-four members "were university graduates or university students who were enrolled at the time of their arrest." Seventeen of the eighteen students were in scientific programs, rather than programs in humanities or social studies; and most of those members who were employed seem to have also been heavily oriented to the hard sciences. The members were also decidedly middle-class in origin and prospects. As graduates of technical or professional schools, they either had or could look forward to professional employment. Only one member of the group was a worker. Only two of thirty-four had working-class fathers, and only another three had fathers who were small peasants. "With regard to fathers' occupation, about two-thirds (twenty-one out of thirty-four) were government employees, mostly in middle grades of the civil service." Even people who know very little about Egypt will realize how restricted this social group is in a country in which half the population is still rural.

Although many members appear to have been immigrants from small towns, they seem not to have carried much of the culture of deference from the small towns with them. They were not awed by political authority, nor do they seem to have had intense personal grievances traceable to their rural backgrounds for which the state was a convenient target. They mostly came from stable families and, as Ibrahim notes, are quite the opposite of the "alienated,

[52] See Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); and Eric Davis, "Islamic Radicalism in Egypt," in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, (S. Arjomand, ed. New York: Macmillan, 1984), 147.

marginal, anomic" individuals often presumed to be the basis for social movements such as theirs. It may be that the social groups from which these members were drawn were "pressurised" by the development of the Egyptian economy in the last decade as Davis and Kepel suggest, but there is little reason to believe that these individuals directly experienced such pressures.[53]

The economic picture that Davis and Kepel draw does not apply well to the late 1960s, when the Islamist groups first formed. The 1950s and 1960s saw significant economic progress and redistribution. Between 1951–52 and 1969–70, we know wages as a proportion of agricultural gross domestic product increased from 17 percent to 30 percent, although after 1970 they did drop back down to 25 percent.[54] The relative shares of the lowest 60 percent of households in overall consumption increased between 1958–59 and 1974–75. The relative income share of the top 10 percent, rather than the middle class, declined between the 1950s and 1976.[55]

Davis and Kepel have also misunderstood some aspects of internal migration. Immigrants to Cairo and Alexandria were more likely to see their share in the national income increase simply by moving because urban governorates had a disproportionately high share of income, wages, and consumption relative to population.[56] It is unlikely that many of the young people in these groups were adversely affected during the Nasser years; and to the extent that some were, it is more remarkable that their families bounced back under Sadat.[57] These young people were affected far more by the increasingly centralized authority of the state. Far from acceding to authority, these young people challenged it, although we cannot say whether they enjoyed challenging it. They were not raw bumpkins disoriented by the relatively greater freedom of the cities, for that freedom had drawn them to the cities—namely the "desire by the younger members of the rural community to break away from the rigid socio-cultural traditions prevailing in the village."[58] The young militants in the Islamist groups were more likely to have disliked both the authority structures of their rural homes and the prevailing norms of the urban

[53] There is certainly reason to believe that Davis is correct in his general proposition. Some survey research data indicates that children of clerical and sales workers were more likely to experience downward than upward mobility. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Social Mobility and Income Distribution," in *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt*, Gouda Abdel-Khalek and Robert Tignor, eds. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 403. Those drawn into the movements do not seem to have been directly downwardly mobile. Davis, "Islamic Radicalism in Egypt," 147. Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 217.

[54] See Ibrahim Hassan al-Issawy, "Income Distribution and Economic Growth," in Tignor and Abdel-Khalek, *The Political Economy*, 90.

[55] *Ibid.*, 100–1.

[56] *Ibid.*, 119.

[57] See, for example, John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 274, for an account of the Zumr family, two members being arrested for participation in the assassination of Sadat.

[58] See Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, *Development, Income Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt (1952–1970)* [University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics Occasional Paper 45] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 114.

elites. They became hostile to two distinct strands of contemporary Egyptian life: the enhanced power of the state and the monopoly of the 'ulama over assessing the moral dimensions of the state in terms of Islamic norms.

These young militants sought the freedom to engage in open religious discussion and in action. Middle-class youth are attracted to activism in self-denying groups. They have been drawn to what are essentially groups of equals in which discussion over questions of ethics and morals are fairly wide-ranging. The organizational structure and the membership of such groups are of a piece with an equal association of "saints." The self-abnegation, rectitude, and discipline of these groups, coupled with their moral certainty and self-assurance, seem favorably related to the demands on middle-class youth if they are to succeed. It therefore seems to me to make less sense to argue that these groups respond to social or economic "pressure" than that they responded—as did the early Protestant groups—to the process of political centralization that enhanced the arbitrary power of the political elite and especially the head of state. To make this argument, however, we must examine the actual concerns of the Sunni radicals as they themselves expressed them and pay attention to the institutional innovations they introduced into everyday life for members.

THE NEW PURITANS

The Puritans broke not only with a prevailing understanding of the relationship between man and God; they also broke with a previously accepted theory of the governance of the Christian community—the Church. In so doing the Puritans created not only a theory of calling but a theory of the socialization necessary to interpret Scripture. Protestants substituted ministers for priests not merely for ceremony: They presumed that "the most important knowledge of all, that which God imparts to his people, is . . . supremely and exclusively practical . . . [because] 'it affects the whole man with a hundred times more efficacy than the frigid exhortations of philosophers.' "[59] Contemporary Islamist groups have made a similar and equally significant break: They have received and developed a theory of jihad and taghut to address the relation of the human community to Revealed Law. They have also developed a theory of socialization and education that substitutes the practical experience of voluntary associations of lay intellectuals for the abstract 'ilm of religious professionals.

The groups with which I am primarily concerned are the so-called Jihad group, the Flight and Repentance group, and the Military Academy group.[60]

[59] William J. Bouwsma, *John Calvin, A Sixteenth-Century Portrait* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 150.

[60] None of these groups call themselves by the names commonly used for them. The use of these common names is necessary, however, if this paper is to establish a dialogue with other scholars in the field. The so-called Flight and Repentance group referred to themselves as the *juma'at al-muslimin* (Community of Muslims); the so-called Military Academy group called themselves as the *munazzamat al-tahrir al-islami* (Islamic Liberation Organization).

The most important single source for my purposes is the text of *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah* (The Neglected Duty), an internal document of the Jihad group, whose members assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981.[61] Western scholars widely agree that it is the most important single document presenting Egyptian Islamist positions and Egyptian intellectuals alike.[62] There are numerous commentaries on this work, including a fatwa or jurisprudential judgment issued by the highest institutional Islamic authority in Egypt, Shaykh al-Azhar, Jad al-Haqq Ali Jad al-Haqq.[63]

The "neglected duty" to which the pamphlet refers is jihad. The pamphlet was written to define jihad, an issue that consumed the internal discussions of the group. Of special interest was the relation of group members to nominal Muslims in political authority, such as Sadat, who called himself the "believing President." The pamphlet, written by 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, paints a picture of Muslims in a world of idolatry and ignorance. Idolatry and ignorance are not spatially and temporally apart from modern Egypt but found even within nominally Muslim society. For Faraj, true Muslims cannot view Islam as orthopraxis: the performance of acts. Islam requires the believer to take a stand; and this stand, jihad, is the struggle for that enjoined by God. Not to struggle for that which is enjoined by God is to give allegiance to idols (taghut). To establish the validity of this nonreceived concept of jihad, Faraj must negate received interpretations of it and deny a privileged interpretive role to the 'ulama.

For Faraj, believers live in a situation of extreme tension. A distant and all-powerful God sends them down paths of salvation or error, acts alone, and cannot guarantee them salvation.[64] At the same time, the world constantly forces believers to accept the idols of state power as the source of law. Such "idols of this world can only be made to disappear through the power of the sword."[65] Contemporary idolatry is revealed primarily by the intrusive structure of the state, which enforces the law of unbelief.[66] Rulers of the state are members of the nominal community of Muslims. They have Muslim names, pray, fast, and claim to be Muslims, but they are actually apostates.[67]

[61] This particular work is so important that it has been translated into English.

[62] See the translation and commentary by Johannes J. G. Jansen, in *The Neglected Duty* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), xvii–xviii, and Jamal al-Banna, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah: jihad al-sayf am jihad al-aql?* (Cairo: Dar Thabit, 1983), 5.

[63] See *Al-Fatawa al-Islamiyyah* [hereafter *FI*] (Cairo: Dar al-Ifta' al-misriyyah, 1983), vol. 10, no. 29, 3726–92, for the fatwa and an Arabic text of the booklet itself. See also Muhammad 'Amarah, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah: 'ard wa-hiwar wa-taqyim* (Cairo: Dar thabit, 1982).

[64] See Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 160, 162: "If God sends someone on the right path, no one can send him astray. If God sends someone astray, no one can guide him." See also p. 223 (§130, 131). In *FI*, see pp. 3762 and 3789–90. This is, of course, the "double decree" whose absence Weber found in conflict with a developed Protestant ethic. All translations are from Jansen. Citations will be to both Jansen and *FI* to allow general readers, as well as those who read Arabic, to pursue the argument.

[65] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 161 (§4); *FI*, p. 3762. The word for idols here is taghut.

[66] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 167 (§21); *FI*, p. 38.5.

[67] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 169 (§25); *FI*, p. 38.5. Compare Calvin's *Institutes*, II,xv,i:

The God evoked here is quite similar to the God in whom Weber argued the Protestants believed. The logic of Faraj's argument is that believers must ceaselessly strive in the path of God to be considered true Muslims. In this regard, Faraj has made a critical break with all the received understandings of Islam. Jad al-Haqq (representing the 'ulama), and social critics, such as Jamal al-Banna and Muhammad 'Amara, all agree that Muslims are those who recite the shahadah or statement of belief in the unity of God and the prophecy of Muhammad. All three critics of Faraj agree that the recitation of the shahadah is sufficient to place one within the community of Muslims, regardless of other sins of omission or commission. The only acceptable way to place someone who has recited the shahadah outside the visible community of Muslims would be if that same person expressly recanted. Insofar as Islam is a religion of orthopraxy, as suggested in the earlier discussion of Al-Banna, it is impermissible to distinguish between segments of the visible community.[68]

The core of the pamphlet is an argument about jihad in the so-called *ayat al-sayf* (Verse of the Sword) in the Qur'an: Is it historically specific to the situation of the Prophet at a particular moment of his mission, or does it have wider implications?[69] The Islamists argue for a broader interpretation—a need to continue to struggle until God is recognized as supreme throughout human history. The argument becomes somewhat technical, but the intent of the author is plain. Faraj wants to use the Verse of the Sword to argue that those who nominally accept Islam but become renegades commit a greater sin than those who never accept Islam at all. When linked to the rejection of Islam as orthopraxy, any nominal members of the community of Muslims are liable to be renegades in the eyes of the Islamists. The details in which the argument is couched thus do not detract from its basic nature: Those nominal Muslims who manifestly betray the community by the standards of the religious virtuosi commit the most heinous ethical and moral delinquency imaginable.[70]

The political rulers of Egypt are apostates because they do not rule in accord with revelation. They impose some, but not all, of the Islamic laws. More remarkable is the way the argument is made: It contrasts politics as an inherently arbitrary activity with the divine rules that should be used to administer a well-ordered society. Contemporary rulers are like the Mongols, whose

"Thus the Papists in the Present age, although the name of the Son of God, the Redeemer of the world, be frequently in their mouths, yet since they are contented with the mere name, and despoil him of his power and dignity [Christ] is not their foundation" (p. 540).

[68] For support for such a position from the Qur'an, see III,87 and LXIV,2. The sticky issue of intentionality intrudes here and what led the 'ulama to orthopraxis is an important and subtle argument. I hope to deal with issues of community and intentionality in the classical Islamic tradition in other works.

[69] For a lucid presentation of the arguments here, see Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 128–9, especially whether the question of the verse to "slay the unbelievers" should be interpreted in the context of earlier verses regarding treaty-breaking. *Ayat al-sayf* is IX,5 in the Qur'an.

[70] That apostasy is the only unforgiveable sin is agreed by everyone writing in this controversy. The question is over what constitutes apostasy: Does it need to be an express and intended repudiation of Islam, or not.

king, Genghis Khan, ruled by means of an arbitrary and self-interested decrees (*siyasat*—the word which in contemporary Arabic means policies or politics): "It contains many legal rulings which he simply made up himself because he liked them."[71] Evil resides in the arbitrariness as much as in the substance of the state, and the state in Faraj's sights is the nationalist, postcolonial state, not Western liberalism.

Jad al-Haqq presents the 'ulama's criticism of Faraj, but there is another current critical of his work sustained primarily by intellectuals long associated with the older Islamic movements. Jamal al-Banna, brother of Hasan al-Banna, has been a Muslim activist in the trade union movement for almost forty years. He has written extensively on an Islamic approach to trade union and labor problems. Muhammad 'Amara has fought strenuously to renew a lay tradition of Islamic political argument for over two decades and in the process has contributed significantly to Egyptian political and intellectual dialogue. Writers such as al-Banna and 'Amara abhor the idea that the entire postcolonial process of state building must be rejected as idolatrous and error-ridden. Such a blanket condemnation is presented as impermissibly naive by those who attack the Jihad group from within the Islamist movement. For them politics remains the art of the possible within an anticolonial framework:

> In any case, we must distinguish between rulers who furthered colonialism in our country and between those who headed toward national independence *in a secular framework or did not apply the shar' of God totally* [bold face in original]; struggle against the former is immediate and direct . . . but with the latter insofar as they move toward independence they bring closer the day when Islam and its state return to the countries of the Muslims.[72]

Such critics hold to an incrementalist Islamist strategy and view the Nasser period as positive. Human frailty for these authors enhances the attractiveness of gradual and incremental politics.

The knowledge of human frailty and a sense of predestination need not inspire withdrawal; it can inspire absolute certainty in the effort to master the world. Such a vision can be profoundly antihumanist. Just how much it opposes contemporary Islamic humanism can be seen in the response by Jamal al-Banna to the doctrines of *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah*. Al-Banna asserts that justice is the distinguishing feature of Islam as a monotheist religion, even as love (*mahabbah*) and the singleness of God (*tawhid*) are the distinguishing features of Christianity and Judaism respectively.[73]

At this point there appears to be an obvious and important distinction between Calvinism and Sunni fundamentalism. Islamists can identify the

[71] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 168 (§22); *FI*, p. 3865. See, Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 195–6. Compare Zwingli's "A Christian Town is the Same as a Christian Congregation," in Lochner, *Huldrych Zwingli's Concept of History*, 228–9.

[72] 'Amarah, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah*, 47.

[73] See Jamal al-Banna, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibha*, 122, regarding justice (*'adl*) and an exposition of the need for free discussion of religion.

source of idolatry occurring in human activity. The West is that source, and colonial history gives weight to their claims.[74] Unfortunately, this may be a distinction without much of a difference. Calvin himself believed the Turkish conquests of Europe in his day had brought "filthiness and defilement."[75] Early Protestantism and Sunni radicalism have significant affinities not only in conceptualizing sin in terms of tyranny but in exemplifying arbitrary tyranny in the ruling institutions of other cultures. It would be a mistake to assume that the denunciations of the West rest on any great familiarity with Western society and culture.[76] As analysts, we might do better to conceptualize Sunni antagonism to the West as a metaphor for antagonism to the "world," the human condition in which believers are tempted and tested every day, and duped by error and idolatry. The West is not only a source but a symbol for the place in which idolatry has reached its logical extreme and established its kingdom.

We should recall that early Protestants often projected what they thought to be most evil to the little-known countries of the East. Protestant poets could even conflate the symbols of Catholicism and Islam to draw a generalized picture of tyranny. In Protestant imagery it was Spenser's very "Oriental" Pope (and Milton's Satan) who appears as beguiling tyranny:

> A goodly lady clad in scarlet red,
> Purfled with gold and pearle of rich assay,
> And like a Persian mitre on her hed
> She wore, with crowns and owches garnished,
> The which her lauish louers to her gave;
> Her wanton palfrey all was ouerspred.[77]

The conflation of tyranny and idolatry in the work of Sayyid Qutb and in *Al-Faridah al-gha'ibah* reminds us of John Calvin's own understanding of tyranny: the ruler who has no self-restraint.[78]

Such arguments make little sense to Jad al-Haqq or a humanist layman such as 'Amara. In 'Amara's words, to say that the ruler of Egypt is an apostate

[74] This is a staple of writing on Islamist movements. One of the most eloquent examples would be the chapter, "The Question of Authenticity and Collaboration," in Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), but also see R. H. Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival," in *Middle East Journal*, 34:1 (Winter 1980), 1–12. An early and still useful approach is Wilfred Cantwell Smith's chapter "Islam in Recent History" in *Islam in Modern History*.

[75] Bouwsma, *John Calvin*, 64.

[76] This is fairly well recognized among Arab researchers of the phenomenon and Muslim official figures. See *Nadwat al-sahwah al-islamiyyah wa humum al-watan al-'arabi*, in *Al-Watan* (April 15, 1987).

[77] Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*, I,ii,13. See also John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, I, 330–350, in which Satan is perceived by the fallen angels as "thir great Sultan" and II,1–10, for the description of the Satanic "Throne of Royal State, which far/Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind. . . ."

[78] As Hopfl puts it in *The Christian Polity*, for Calvin "the absence of restraint seems to have been of the essence of tyrannical rule for him" (p. 16).

"contradicts reality: for prayers are being said, and mosques are open and being built, and there are alms that Muslims give, and they go on pilgrimmages, and the verdicts of Islam are effective in the state except in certain areas such as the *hudud* punishments and *riba* and other concerns that are the object of positive legislation."[79]

Beside the authority of the state lies the authority of interpretation. Both 'Amara and Jad al-Haqq point out the ludicrous and acontextual readings the pamphlet makes of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Qur'an respectively. Jad al-Haqq parses the syntax of the Qur'an verses regarding "those who refuse to rule by what God has sent down" to show it does not conform with Faraj's reading. 'Amara draws on fourteenth-century history to show that Islamist militants not only take words out of context but willfully misread them.

By insisting on their interpretations of the Qur'an in direct contradiction to received meanings, however, the Sunni militants openly defy the control of a small elite over these texts. As long as discussions about what the Qur'an means remain technical, rulers have little need to worry about Islamic critiques of political actors finding wide audiences. To the degree that the Islamist militants have found a language that is evocative in such everyday terms as proverbs and that remains rooted in a sophisticated ethical critique of state power, they become a danger. Only from the perspective of a fundamental critique of state power and coercion does it make sense to say that Egypt is today governed worse than the East under the Mongols. As 'Amara points out, it otherwise makes no sense at all.

From this perspective Mongol law means improvised decisions by human beings, and that implies, for Faraj, rulers who cannot restrain themselves and must therefore be restrained. From this rationale the young fundamentalists draw revolutionary and almost Maoist implications: There is no need to fight the distant enemy (such as Israel) until the near one is vanquished. For older Islamic activists, such as 'Amara, this reasoning resembles that of the Communists who argue that class struggle supersedes national struggle.[80] For 'Amara the danger of such reasoning lies in its implicit approval of the politics of the putsch: It was precisely such thinking, he points out, that impelled the Free Officers to take power after the 1948 Palestine War.

Faraj and the ideas he presented to the Jihad group must be seen in the context of a much broader movement. The Jihad group not only had to develop its own ideas but also to defend them in competition with other groups for a larger audience of interested listeners and potential adherents. Faraj therefore differentiates his approach for establishing the *hukm allah* (rule of God) from other strategies: mysticism, partisan politics, "burrowing from within," or withdrawal into closed communities. The pamphlet clarifies to

[79] *FI*, p. 3743; 'Amarah, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah*, 48–50, and especially the comparison of the Mamluks governing Egypt, as described by Ibn Taymiyyah to whose juridical rulings the members of the Jihad group referred in comparison to contemporary Egypt.

[80] 'Amarah, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah*, 46.

some degree the existence of a growing movement in which these ideas are routinely debated.[81]

The final section of the pamphlet concerns intragroup relations. Almost the entire conclusion deals with issues of intention, motivation, and compliance. Jihad is not presented merely as another form of works but as a higher instance of faith, for the actions of jihad will yield a nullity without "complete devotion . . . forgetting the outward appearance of things created by looking uninterruptedly towards the Creator."[82] How would one know what is in people's hearts, however? How can one be sure that people—even in groups like Jihad—are not saying one thing but thinking another? The only way to come close is through unrelenting examination of motives and behavior accomplished in small groups in which everything can be scrutinized. It is not surprising that the pamphlet ends by calling on those who are *not* up to the task of *jihad fi sabil allah* (struggle in the path of God) to "declare outright their true motive."[83] Blind obedience is not enough. Such obedience in this instance would be less than total and would reveal unreliable human emotions: friendship or familial ties that would be more harmful than outright enmity.[84] Members of the group must cut themselves off from their pasts and refuse to tolerate the regrowth of other loyalties within the group.

In this regard the Jihad group recapitulates internally what it has already proclaimed externally: the existence of a constant danger that human emotions and the condition of man lead to a loss of commitment to God. The only way to guard against this likelihood is to limit radically membership in the sect and guard at every moment against leakage from the world at large. Coupled with the incipient definition of the need for members to express, or one might say confess, constantly, the small group creates a new atmosphere of heightened individual dedication that is not mystical at all. Here we can see the creation of a new cultural norm at odds with received Islamic thought, although well-known within Christianity: the use of confession to bind followers to an institution. We shall return to this later.

The Jihad group is not the only fundamentalist group. We also have some sense of the ideas of at least one of the others, the so-called *Al-Takfir wa al-hijrah* group, which generally prefers to call itself the Association of Muslims (*Jama'at al-Muslimin*). This group was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of the former minister of Religious Endowments, Shaykh Dhahabi, in 1977. Although different in nuance, much of what the Flight and Repentance group believed was similar to Jihad. The five main points around which Flight and Repentance formed were:

[81] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 8–15.

[82] *Ibid.*, 222 (§130); *FI*, p. 3789.

[83] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 225 (§134); *FI*, p. 3791: "*wa yad'uhum ila al-ifsah 'amma saturuhu*."

[84] Jansen, *The Neglected Duty*, 228 (§138); *FI*, 3792.

(1) all existing societies are in a state of ignorance and apostasy;
(2) all decisions by ijma' must be rejected, including the "idols" of "*qiyas*" or analogical reasoning;
(3) only members of the jama' at *al-muslimin* are good Muslims because all others submit [*aslamu*] to taghut, governance by other than what God sent down, and they consider as Muslims all those who recite the shahadah;
(4) Islam is not merely a recitation of the shahadah but determination [*iqrar*] and action ['*amal*];
(5) only the Prophet and his companions are to be accepted as a true group or congregation, and all other congregations established so far must be rejected.[85]

The radical rejection of all previous interpretations in Islam and of the socialization required to enter into the interpretative discussion with the 'ulama is pronounced. We can see another form of this rejection of the authority of the 'ulama in the precis of Shukri's declarations before a Military Court of State Security November 6–8:

> The interpretive works of the four imams, Shukri argued, were unnecessary. The Koran was delivered in Arabic; it is therefore clear, and the only tool that may be needed for explaining the meaning of some of its terms is a good dictionary. In what way do the glosses of the imams make its meanings more accessible? And why do the glosses of the imams themselves not need to be glossed? . . . After thus appealing to the common sense of his interlocutors, Shukri told them why the imams have closed the door of ijtihad: so that they had indeed become idols (*asnam*) worshipped like the deities of a pagan pantheon.[86]

As a technical legal issue, ijtihad has to do with whether the 'ulama are seen as giving independent and original decisions of principle or following existing ones. In terms of power the issue of ijtihad has to do, as Shukri realized, with the kind of education needed to make valid judgments on Islamic law: Does one need an elite socialization or does one simply need to be able to take out a dictionary?

The truly radical nature of Shukri's rejection of the visible community of Muslims since the fourth century *hijri* led him to a position regarding the goals of the Islamist movement somewhat different from that of the Jihad group. The distinction between the Jihad group and Shukri's group may not be obvious and might even seem minor.

Jihad members tend, as do the Muslim Brothers and other activists, to identify the goal of the Islamic movement as the institution of real Islamic law, *al-hukm bi-ma anzala allah*. The Jihad group rejected the notion that the president of Egypt was really a Muslim, despite his nominal membership in the visible community, and seems to have implicitly assumed that other nominal Muslims could be brought (if not to salvation) at least to compliance with

[85] See 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, *Dhikrayati ma'-a "Jama'-at al-Muslimin" (Al-Takfir wa al-hijrah)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-'ilmiyyah, 1980), 9–10. This is essentially a statement of Shukri's at a court proceeding published in the press on October 21, 1977. The word for idols in paragraph 2 is asnam.
[86] Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 79.

appropriate norms of behavior by a state led by a member of the invisible community. Shukri's group distinguished themselves from the Brotherhood (and presumably other Islamist groups) by their insistence that their program envisaged a prior stage: getting nominal Muslims to accept Islam as their real religion (*idkhal al-nas fi din allah*). Islamist groups, like Protestants, disagree with each other as much as they disagree with the tradition from which they come.

Shukri's group was far more intensely directed toward its leader and closed than any other group. In prison the group members refused any contact with members of other groups or with former members of their own group; even the Communists were more acceptable to them than other Islamists.[87] The nature of attachment to the group was varied. Shukri, of course, was an extraordinarily powerful, perhaps even charismatic, personality. The focus of loyalty for group members nevertheless appears to have remained the group rather than Shukri and remained so even as members disagreed with Shukri. Abu al-Khayr, in his memoirs of the group, affirms a rejection of ijma' and passive membership in the Muslim community, freely admits his dislike for the kidnapping and subsequent murder of the former Minister of Religious Endowments, and does not seem completely at ease with the idea that all Islamic history from the death of the Prophet to Shukri is one of apostasy.

SUMMARY

Islamist groups appear to share a common core of beliefs despite their disputes. This common core of beliefs allows militants to move within the framework of a larger dialogue that clearly is more than the mere search for the latest and most fashionable guru.[88] When one looks especially at the Jihad group and the Jama'at al-Muslimin, several aspects of their beliefs appear to be shared in common among themselves and with early Protestantism:

(1) Belief in a single and implacable being who chooses our destiny after life (the "double decree,") and belief that as a consequence men and women must persevere actively in the way of God intellectually because we can have no knowledge or assurance of salvation.
(2) Belief in a principle of order that, by the nature of human existence, subverts our faith in God and converts our faith into idolatry.
(3) Rejection of the socialization and education that form into an elite those who would interpret Scripture.
(4) Rejection of all or almost all received commentary on Scripture and a preference for reading Scripture directly.

From this common ground with Puritanism flow two important features of the lives of the members of these groups: First, they exist in a state of war with society; and second, they adopt congregational innovations that strengthen the

[87] 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, *Dhikrayati*, pp. 137–9.
[88] Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 204.

cohesion of their small group, even if such innovations fall outside the realm of normal Islamic practice.

Members of these groups conceive of themselves as the only real Muslims living in what is essentially an apostate society. War becomes a duty for every one of them, not just a duty for some against an external enemy. Abu al-Khayr twice alludes to his own belief that groups like "TH" and others were at war with society, although he would have preferred a long period of struggle within society (*idkhal al-nas fi din allah*) to a sharp confrontation with the state, because he "saw that the group [TH] was in need of long years of peace during which it could manage its struggle [jihad, in the original] of a type that I like to think of as 'struggle with social appearances.' "[89] When Salih Siriyya was executed, Abu al-Khayr's feelings of social and ideological warfare intensified:

> Silence overtook me with the inner secret feeling in the depths of my being, that of incessant war against Islam. For Salih Siriyya and his group met the same fate as the Muslim Brotherhood which had been beaten down because they dared to make the victory of Islam on the earth their aim. . . ."[90]

Shukri's testimony during his trial certainly attests also to his sense of being at war with state and society. He even refused to allow his followers to pray in state-supported mosques.[91]

The belief that Muslims inside the Muslim community are at war with their own society is a significant break with the received Muslim thinking on jihad. The conclusions the Islamists draw for constructing the institutions of their own congregational and communal life are equally at odds with the received doctrine about how Muslims ought to deal with each other. The perception of social war provides the context for the major institutional innovation of these sectarian congregations: They spy on and constrain the behavior of each other. The militants are engaged in constant oversight of each other and constant reporting on each other; they are also engaged in constant discussion of their own behavior and that of others. This is a striking feature of their normal activity and one which clearly makes an impact on more popular circles.

The Friday religion page in the daily newspaper *Al-Ahram* provides some insight into how innovative this sectarian behavior is. Islam has traditionally opposed the idea of "spying out" or *tajassus*. What then, one reader writes, is the verdict of religion on overseeing one's comrades at work? Although it is acceptable to oversee one's comrades in the sense of supervision, "snitching" is frowned on. Even worse would be the routine and public discussion of one's own shortcomings and those of others; yet this is precisely the activity so highly regarded by saints and virtuosi. Whether the name is public confession or criticism and self-criticism, the activity is quite familiar.

[89] 'Abd al-Rahman Abu al-Khayr, *Dhikrayat*, 78.
[90] *Ibid.*, 98.
[91] Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 80–82.

The young people in both the Jihad group and in the TH group were especially concerned with the problems of what it meant to "bare one's heart." Yet this concern was something the 'ulama found contradictory to received Islam because it would turn the religion into one of "spying out." Most of the young people in these groups found society to be wholly corrupt and thus were inclined to flee from it, whether by retreating to living in the circle of the group within urban society or by leaving urban society altogether for the oases. Muhammad 'Abd al-Nur, dean of the Women's College at Al-Azhar University, ridiculed the idea of revolt against state authority. Relying on classical compilations and consensus, 'Abd al-Nur said that "the original sources such as Al-Bukhari and Muslim make clear what the relationship [between ruler and ruled] is and in these sources we find agreement that it is not permissible to combat the ruler nor to attack him when that would lead to widespread anarchy [*ihdath al-fitan*] or bloodshed [*safk al-dima'*] or splitting the community [*tamziq shaml al-umma*]." Even if the members of the Islamic community do not like a ruler's policies, he must be patiently borne as long as he does not commit an act of outright apostasy. "Rebellion," he said "against the ruler and strife with him are forbidden [*haram*] by the received consensus [*ijma'*] of Muslims."[92]

'Abd al-Nur also suggests that ordinary Muslims cannot clearly evaluate state policies in the light of religious injunctions. Judgments about the character of a ruler as a good Muslim are also to be avoided. Thus, 'Abd al-Nur suggests we must be careful about judging anyone, because judgment is reserved to God. Perhaps someone ought to look at the relation of policies to religion and hold officials accountable, but it is not a task to be left to the uninitiated and certainly not one to be decided by civil strife.

CONCLUSION

The sixteenth century is not the twentieth century, and Islam is not Christianity. That much is obvious. If mere statements that times or doctrines differed were sufficient to have any real meaning, then most of the literature surveyed at the beginning of this essay would not have been written, nor would there be a discipline of comparative politics. What is most striking about many post-Lutheran Protestant views of the state and those of the contemporary Egyptian Islamists studied here, is how similar they are in their distrust of a state in which policies directly reflect the personal preferences of rulers. The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat was not dynastic nor wholly absolute, but state policies grew out of their personal preferences to a greater degree than is true in the states of the advanced industrial economies. *L'état*, to paraphrase Louis XIV, *était presqu'eux*.

We look at polities today as if the categories of corporatism, pluralism, and

[92] "Uslub al-ta'amul bayna al-hakim wa al-mahkum" (Modes of Interaction between Ruler and Ruled), *Al-Ahram*, November 5, 1982.

authoritarianism exhausted the conceptual framework available for analysis. These categories suggest less variety in politics than citizens experience. Absolutism was not a lasting form of the European state, but it may be helpful in understanding contemporary state building in the third world. It certainly allows us to escape from the pluralist-corporatist dichotomy.

Absolutism and Puritanism were competing strategies for building powerful postagrarian states. The dominant theme in absolutist state building was the monarch's enhanced persona at the administrative center, but the dominant theme in Puritanism was society's enhanced compliance through service to a just political order. Puritan communities and absolutist rulers form a stable antagonism. If Puritan communities remain indigestible during the period of absolutist state building, then some form of liberal and plural regime may emerge, as in England. If Puritan communities become integrated into the machinery of government, then an effective and pervasive authoritarian state is built. Fundamentalism (whether Calvinist or Islamist) represents a challenge to absolutist regimes. Puritanism can be the basis for resistance to one kind of state and for dogged acquiescence in another.

The doctrinal and ideological arguments about Calvinism and capitalism emerge in comparative perspective as less important than Calvinism and the ideology of governance—whether governance of the individual, the society, or of any particular institution. Walzer and Wolin seem on firmer ground than other analysts of the Puritan experience when they argue that it was primarily an argument about politics and the state. The state in my argument, unlike theirs however, appears to be getting stronger not weaker. The question that then logically arises is why should either Calvinism or Sunni fundamentalism emerge as an ideology of governance? What is the reason for talking about power and governance in terms of predestination, calling the socialization required for interpretation, jihad, taghut, or ijma'?

The central question of fundamentalism is how men and women live together: whether they can cooperate freely or whether they must be coerced into cooperation. In Calvin's words, civil polity is required for human existence and "to entertain a thought of its extermination is inhuman barbarism; it is as necessary to mankind as bread and water, light and air, and far more excellent."[93] The need for a civil polity that provides secure property, guards against fraud, and ensures modesty and religion, arises in Calvin's analysis because men are wicked and egoistic and because fallen men (and women) cannot triumph on their own over their own instincts. Civil society's excellence, however, arises not from wickedness and egoism but as an act of divine grace: "The authority possessed by kings and other governors over all things upon earth is not a consequence of the perverseness of men, but of the providence and holy ordinance of God, who has been pleased to regulate

[93] *Institutes*, 772 (iv,xx).

human affairs in this manner; forasmuch as he is present, and also presides among them, in making laws and in executing equitable judgments."[94]

Calvin was aware that kings might act cruelly and indeed considered the likelihood of monarchy degenerating into tyranny to be great. His argument is, however, that the Christian community (however sinful its members might be in a theological sense) can thus only form a viable society by submitting to the rule of God. If everyone acted in accord with the manifest rules of God, then presumably coercion—and especially the likelihood of arbitrary self-interested coercion—would decline.

The arguments about divinely established norms are not only about salvation but also about the formation of cooperative human societies in which members police themselves and each other. Creating such a society was not an aim of Protestant thinkers, but they did consider the existence of such societies a valuable background condition for the pilgrimmage of the soul on earth. For contemporary Muslims (and indeed perhaps for the Islamic tradition as a whole), it may be that the creation of such a rule-governed society in accord with the laws of God is a more desirable end than in sixteenth-century Europe.

Calvin himself, like most sixteenth-century divines, was unwilling to recognize a right of generalized rebellion. Calvinist theory, which did develop with Pierre Viret and Theodore Beza, promptly moved in the direction of opposing not only churchly authority but civil authority as well.[95] Its development did not include any squeamishness with regard to the use of violence of the kind we would call terrorism. As Walzer notes, Calvinists such as John Knox rapidly developed a theory of civil office in which "[m]agistrates and noblemen had no rights beyond the performance of their godly duty and no rights at all short of that."[96] Mary, Queen of Scots, "that Jesabel" to John Knox, ought to have been punished with death; and Walzer is probably correct that Knox would have been quite content had an individual accomplished the punishment.[97] That Islamist movements resort to violence against individual rulers does not necessarily differentiate them from early Protestants.

Is it possible to employ an argument about Sunni radicalism similar to that just developed for Protestantism? For example, is Sunni radicalism an argument about the state, rather than merely a response to a particular set of social conditions? Most attempts to explain Sunni radicalism begin with the particular nature of contemporary Egypt: its confusion, poverty, crowding, and the failure of Nasserism.[98] Many of Egypt's current problems no doubt stem from

[94] *Institutes*, 774 (iv,xx).

[95] Eire, *War Against the Idols*, 294–8.

[96] Walzer, *Revolution of the Saints*, 105.

[97] *Ibid.*, 108–9.

[98] Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, 234–5; Michael M. J. Fischer, "Islam and the Revolt of the Petty Bourgeoisie," *Daedalus*, 111:1 (1982), 112–3; Abd al-Moneim Said Aly and Man-

the failures of Nasserism. It still seems plausible to suggest that not a few also arise from Nasser's successes in transforming the state and society. The recruits to Islamist movements not only confront the vastly enhanced power of the colonial state, but they are themselves result of the social change and educational opportunities Nasser created.

Attraction to Puritanical doctrines, however, seems to occur not among those who are downwardly mobile but the reverse—it occurs among those who will find the concerted and methodical use of their talents rewarded. It may well be that immersion in the Islamist movement in general helps people to succeed rather than excuse their failures to themselves.

One of the very few "micro-studies" of nonarrested members of Islamist movements involves women. There are certainly economic benefits to joining groups, but these may be side effects rather than causes of their existence. Young women have been attracted to Islamist movements and veiling for a variety of reasons, including the economic habits of dress they inspire. The willingness to forego being fashionable by keeping up with imported designs may stem from strengthened identities in a variety of areas.[99]

Certainly Egypt and most of the Islamic countries today are in situations reminiscent of the period of change to territorial state building and economic consolidation from an older order that was ideologically universalist but institutionally localist and cosmopolitan. Puritanism everywhere aided in the transition to state-defined societies, and it is easy to see in contemporary Islamic activism the same kind of commitment to activities that would strengthen the state, should a leader actually allied to or at least sympathetic to Islamist currents appear.[100] The contemporary Islamist movement will grow in part due to the way it inculcates methodical discipline in its adherents and any consequent prosperity they experience, but such prosperity remains an effect, not a cause. Religion continues to exist; and Islam, like Christianity, will not go away but will remain the preeminent factor in "ethics and ritual . . . [n]either capitalism, nationalism, nor later forces such as socialism have effective means of linking the family, its life cycle, and death to the macrosocial forces they embody."[101] Perhaps today, as well, we appreciate the role that the family and its life cycle play, for life and death are among the few experiences universally shared: We are all born, and we all die.

An explanation of Puritanism as merely a response to the interests of particular groups tends rapidly to functionalism. Those whose "interests" are met by being Puritans become Puritans because otherwise those interests

Fred Wenner, "Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt," *Middle East Journal*, 36:3 (Summer 1982), 347–8.

[99] Valerie Hoffman-Ladd, "Polemics on the Modesty and Segregation of Women," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19:1, 23–50, 44.

[100] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 470–1.

[101] *Ibid.*, 472.

would never be met.[102] A historical explanation of the success of those who happen to accept such doctrines, as given by Walzer for Puritanism and Davis for Islamism, makes more sense; but, as I hope I have shown, we need to bring the state rather than the capitalist market into the explanatory picture. A fully historical analogical explanation is, however, not completely sufficient, though it might be satisfying to separate "us" from "them." Such an explanation makes Puritanism only an atavistic ideology of transition through whose doors all cultures and civilizations pass, once and in only one direction.

The most compelling conclusions from comparing Sunni fundamentalists has to do with the rescue of the term fundamentalist and a deeper understanding of its meaning. If the argument presented here is valid and if Sunni radicalism and Protestantism are two variants of a single transformation of a prior classical religious tradition, then that transformation has more to do with state building than with capitalism. Protestantism has been presented either as the midwife of capitalism or of modern politics. It might be more fruitfully conceptualized as the unintended progenitor of the modern state. Thus there may still be room to re-think the Protestant ethic in terms of its role in the process of building states that have pushed the competing powers of religion and community to the side.

The importance of thinking about fundamentalism as a movement that presents a powerful critique of arbitrary absolutist power and one which presents a model for church and lay government that draws more than any predecessors on the voluntary compliance of members should not blind us to the negative nature of fundamentalism. If a single ruler can be arbitrary as he presides over the transition of a pluralistic (and to use Weber's word, polytheist) society from an agricultural to an industrial base, then contemporary democracy may also appear arbitrary, pluralistic, and polytheist.

[102] For a good critique of functionalist explanations, from which this section is drawn, see Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 27–29.

3

The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing It Back In, Carefully

Michael C. Hudson

The abuse and misuse of the political culture concept to "explain" Arab politics has been so egregious that it is hard to resist the temptation to consign it without further ado to the dustbin of political science. So many sins have been committed: gross overgeneralization (Patai), crude Orientalism (Pryce-Jones), Eurocentric chauvinism (Kedourie), anthropologic reductionism (Gellner), not to mention media sound-bites ("Shi'is are suicidal but Sunnis are homicidal"). In academic political science the "political culture approach," much admired as part of the dominant modernization–political development paradigm in the 1960s, retreated with the decline of that paradigm under the onslaught of political economy, "statism" and corporatism, rational choice, and the new institutionalism. In Middle East political science, even though there is a certain time-lag in intellectual fashions, one can observe a similar shift in attention: Today, socioeconomic rather than sociocultural approaches seem to be enjoying the greatest favor, while institutional approaches have yet to receive the attention they perhaps deserve.

Until fairly recently the main dependent variable for students of Middle East and Arab politics was authoritarianism. Each explanatory approach to this condition had its own conventional wisdom. There were easy political culture explanations: fatalism, individualism, primordial chauvinism, a herd instinct, and more. Political economy explanations focused on the dependency of the "peripheral" societies on the developed "center," the historic hegemony of wealthy elites, and the peculiar properties of oil-driven economies. Those who advocated "bringing the state back in" had no problem ascribing the authoritarian condition to the overdeveloped *mukhabarat* [national security] state. Economistic and institutional approaches were even combined with the application of

the model of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian state," drawn from Latin America. Culture in general, and political culture in particular, seemed superfluous.

The crisis of authoritarianism sweeping across the Middle East since the 1970s, however, has forced political scientists to rethink their enterprise. The situation to be explained is now more complex than the seemingly permanent authoritarianism of the past. Experiments in liberalization, even democratization, are occurring in several countries. The conventional wisdom, in its several variations, did not predict these experiments; instead, it showed us why liberalization would be highly unlikely. Indeed, if we continue to adhere to such conventional wisdom, we would have to conclude that these liberalization cases are "exceptional" and likely to fail. It is, of course, quite possible that the liberalizing trends we have observed in countries such as Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Morocco are only ephemeral; our conventional wisdom that explains the permanence and ubiquity of authoritarianism may be correct. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that liberalization is a more durable phenomenon. How, then, are we to explain it?

It is not my purpose to propose a general theory of liberalism for the Arab world. My more modest task is to ask whether the new liberalism can be adequately explained *without* invoking political culture. My answer is a somewhat reluctant "no": Despite its conceptual untidiness and empirical difficulties, political culture is an important variable; it cannot be reduced to other factors such as economics, institutions, or externalities; it is necessary for helping explain how authoritarianism is losing its legitimacy. The political culture concept, then, must be "brought back in"—but carefully. Obviously, the egregious abuses of the term must be avoided. Recently among political scientists there has been a "return" to the approach in general and an effort to address earlier weaknesses. Among Middle East political scientists too there are new efforts to rethink political culture in terms of an emerging "civil society." The attack on "Orientalism" led by Edward Said was unquestionably salutary, but a side effect was the discrediting of political culture analysis in general. Notwithstanding all the problems it poses for empirical analysis, it seems too important to be ignored. Without factoring in the complexities of culture, values, beliefs, ideology, and legitimacy, we risk being left with arid economistic reductionism. This is not a claim for the uniqueness or exceptionality of Arab politics, nor is it a denial of the significance of other factors. I would merely suggest that we need—and can develop—more sophisticated, less biased formulations of political culture(s) in Arab politics that will help us understand the possibilities and limits of alternatives to authoritarianism.

Political Culture Revisited

Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* (1963) was a major step forward in American political science, as Inglehart and others have noted, notwithstanding its flaws.[1] It marked an obvious advance over the old impressionistic "national character" analyses. Philosophically, in a tradition going back to Plato and Tocqueville, it sought to provide empirical grounding for the idea of "community" as a determinant of political performance. Their study offered new support for the proposition that a constellation of habits and attitudes marked by mutual trust was an essential condition for the development of associational life, political participation, and a loyal opposition. A torrent of debate and criticism raised serious methodological questions about *The Civic Culture*. The use of individual survey data to depict a society's political culture was faulted. The study was heavily criticized for proposing a direct causal linkage between political culture and democratic stability. Critics also raised the problem of ahistoricity inherent in a "snapshot" of attitudes at a single point in time. The authors themselves later accepted the validity of some of these criticisms.

Partly as a result of these criticisms the "political culture approach" faded during the 1970s and 1980s. Its retreat was also due to the decline of the larger political development and modernization paradigm in which it had been embedded. Ambiguities in the political culture concept were exposed. On the one hand, if political culture constellations were essentially permanent, how could they account for change in the dependent variables of stability and democratization? On the other hand, some political culturalists assumed or implied that attitudes and habits would in fact be easily modified by the forces of modernization; and yet empirical observation failed to show that more participant, inclusive political cultures were actually emerging. In the ensuing paradigmatic struggles, political economy, dependency, and the state pushed aside political culture approaches.

But the basic proposition of *The Civic Culture* is, if anything, even more central in comparative politics today—as we witness a certain "wave" of democratization around the world—than it was three decades ago. And, as we shall see, it rests at the heart of the contemporary debate about civil society and political liberalization in the Arab world. Some of the newly ascendant approaches do not seem to account satisfactorily for these outbreaks of liberalism. Dependency and statism, for example, would appear to predict the opposite. Rational choice and political economy approaches do better, but rational choice can offer only arbitrary utilitarian explanations for the values to be maximized, and economistic independent variables don't appear to discriminate between contradictory political outcomes: Economic crises can give rise to democratic experiments and also

kill them. And the causal connection between economic and political liberalization is hardly less problematic than that between the "civic" culture and democratic stability.

Perhaps these conundrums help account for what Inglehart calls "the renaissance of political culture" in mainstream comparative politics. "Renaissance" may be too expansive a term, but there does appear to have been a modest movement toward rehabilitating the political culture approach. Elkins and Simeon conceive of political culture as common assumptions (about order, causality, goals, communal identity, the political sphere, and the trustworthiness of others) pertaining to collectivities, not individuals, and they distinguish between the term as a descriptive category and as explanation.[2] Used in conjunction with structural factors, political culture has a residual explanatory function. Political culture—especially as a single factor—is not likely to "explain" dependent variables as general as stability, democracy, or authoritarianism. But it may help explain why certain institutions (such as legislatures) function as they do. Noting the distinction made by Brian Barry between sociological (or cultural) and economic approaches, they suggest that economistic categories like self-interest and utility are shaped by cultural configurations.

The same point is developed by Wildavsky, who argues that the political preference configurations essential for rational-choice analysis are rooted in political culture and not simply exogenous "givens."[3] Conflict may arise as different subcultures in a given political system clash over issues. In the same vein, Berntzen and Selle argue that "qualitative knowledge of the content of politics," by which they mean the historical cultural or ethnographic context, along with external structural factors, are essential to knowing "what is really going on."[4] Similarly, Lane stresses the importance of disaggregating "culture" into subcultures and locating them precisely in the social structure.[5] For students of Middle East politics, concerned as we must be with multiple cultures within or across state boundaries, and within or between elites (as well as masses), the point would seem to be obvious. The problem, rather, is to avoid the excessive generalizations that marked political culture studies in their heyday: artificial dichotomization between "traditional" and "modern," the oversimplification of "subject-parochial-participant" classifications, and the application of a single "culture" to a whole nation. Laitin's rejoinder to Wildavsky, while stressing the complexity of culture(s), notes that people with strongly opposed views can share a culture, while people from different cultures can have similar views. Taking the view (held by Geertz and Gramsci, among others) of political culture as a control mechanism, Laitin urges that we see it as a set of symbols that "constitute a political resource that can be effectively exploited by political entrepreneurs."[6]

Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the political culture approach in its heyday a generation ago, many political scientists today feel that the concept

cannot be abandoned altogether. They also have made some specific proposals for remedying these earlier deficiencies. It is possible, therefore, that political culture may also deserve to be brought back in to the analysis of Arab politics. But before we jump to that particular conclusion let us look briefly at the uses and misuses of political culture in the literature on Arab politics. Then let us examine the current interest in "civil society" and "democratization" in the Arab world from an enlightened political culture perspective.

Applications to Arab Politics

In the problematic epistemological relationship between political science and "area studies" one would have thought that "political culture" would be the indispensable linking concept. The gap between global generalizations and regional particularities would be bridged through careful empirical analyses of the given regional context in such a way as to enhance the explanatory power of general propositions while avoiding the blind alley of regional "exceptionalism." It is unfortunate, therefore, that the treatment of political culture in the Arab world has lagged behind general work on this subject as well as applications to other regions, notably Europe. While we shall mention below a number of notable exceptions, we have not moved as far as we should have beyond the level of long-discredited "national character" approaches. Political science on the Arab world has yet to produce a watershed study equivalent in theoretical importance to what Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* did to advance the study of political culture in general. A new generation of Arab-world political scientists is indeed rightly guided in its rejection of reductionist biased and ethnocentric readings of what Said called Orientalist political culture, but we should be careful not to throw out the political culture baby with the Orientalist bathwater.

Writers on political culture in the Arab world fall, it seems to me, into two categories: the reductionists and the empiricists. The reductionist "school," of which "Orientalism" is a big part, is the oldest and—notwithstanding the attack of Said and a new generation of scholars—the most influential, having seeped into the popular, and policy, discourse. The empiricists, to my mind a more interesting and diverse group, represent a salutary advance over the reductionists, but their work still suffers to some extent from the weaknesses of the 1960s.

"Reductionist" Approaches

The reductionist approach, whose practitioners have mainly been philologists, historians, anthropologists, and essayists, is given to grand generalizations.

It begins but does not end with Islam. The Islam presented by major scholars like von Grunebaum, Lewis, and Gellner is a disembodied essence, oddly disconnected from history, seemingly unadaptable to changing circumstances. To be sure, their Islam is (unto itself) complex, but its political implications are fairly simple: Both textually and historically it supports authoritarianism by rulers and submission by followers. Islamic political culture (in the reductionist presentation) permits no autonomous public sphere, no separation of the spiritual and temporal.

Then there are the Arabs. Jacques Berque is one of the few non-Arab scholars with the erudition and immersion to produce a profound presentation of Arab culture: He reveals the complexities of "the unitary and the plural."[7] Eschewing the too-broad generalization, the historian Albert Hourani describes multiple and changing Arab cultures over time.[8] Hourani is remembered as well for an oft-quoted characterization of "Levantine" culture: "To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once without belonging to either. . . . "[9] The implied political consequence is instability.

Lesser analysts, however, have slipped into reductionist stereotyping, sometimes unwittingly. In his well-known book, *The Arab Mind*, Patai evokes Ibn Khaldun: "The Arabs are least willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leader."[10] From there he examines (among other things) child-rearing practices, "the spell" of the Arabic language, "the Bedouin substructure of the Arab personality," shame, honor, the "fahlawi" personality, the "Islamic component of the Arab personality," "extremes and emotions, fantasy and reality," "conflict proneness," and hatred of the West. If national character approaches have long since been discredited in political science they linger on in some of the other disciplines. Fouad Ajami, starting from Orientalist assumptions, goes beyond simply elaborating the image of a closed Arab-Islamic culture immune to Westernization and asserts that Arab culture has become hopelessly pulverized by the West. The result? A collective desire "to escape from politics, to entrust it all to grand schemes."[11] Communalism and sectarianism, he declares, prevail over integration and progress; Arab Muslims are yearning for a Mahdi rather than democracy (but Islamism probably won't bring cultural coherence); the Arab citizenry lacks the institutions and "habits of mind" to become more than "sheer spectators" in the political drama.[12]

Such notions are then vulgarized for general consumption, often for political purposes. Elie Kedourie, in a book written for a pro-Israel think tank, asserts that " . . . there is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world—which are the political traditions of Islam—which might make familiar, or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional and representative government."[13] David Pryce-Jones caricatures the received wisdom in a 400-page "interpretation" of the Arabs that blames

Islam, tribalism, a shame-and-honor culture, and a total inability to be Western for the lamentable condition of Arab politics: "At present, an Arab democrat is not even an idealization, but a contradiction in terms."[14] One could cite other examples but to no useful purpose.

"Empirical" Approaches

The "reductionist" treatment of Arab political culture offers some wheat and a great deal of chaff. The insights of a Berque or Hourani resonate with independent empirical observation and other informed analysis, and the sense of contemporary *political* culture incoherence that most of these writers depict is hard to gainsay. Valid conclusions, however, can sometimes be reached for the wrong reasons. Two factors stimulated the attempts by social scientists to specify the contours of Arab political culture more precisely and empirically. One was a healthy skepticism about traditional epistemological premises and methods. The other was the pathbreaking work on political culture in comparative politics, discussed above. But how successful these attempts have been is another matter.

Reviewing political culture approaches to Middle East politics, Ben-Dor is somewhat dissatisfied with the state of affairs, but perhaps not dissatisfied enough.[15] He rightly observes that the political culture "movement" in comparative politics was unfocused: Themes exposed in *The Civic Culture* were not consistently developed in subsequent work, notably Almond and Verba's collection, *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965). Not surprisingly, therefore, the scope of Middle East political culture scholarship (as Ben-Dor sees it) is capacious, including textual studies of Islam; anthropological "findings" about personality traits, socialization, and language; and structural studies focusing on families and elites. The generalizations on Islam and politics he finds (correctly) to be somewhat impressionistic.[16] He notes (without comment on their validity) Morroe Berger's (1964) generalizations about the primacy of family and other primordial units, the hostility, lack of trust, formality, and political quietism of the Arabs. Waterbury's study of Morocco[17] is cited as a contribution to our knowledge about factionalism and clientelism. But there are more questions than answers: How do alleged negative attitudes toward government vary from place to place, class to class, and sect to sect? What precisely are the bases of solidarity groupings? What exactly are the political implications (if any) of the so-called honor and shame culture? In what way does culture affect political participation? And in what way does it support (or retard) democratic legitimacy? In the Arab world we are a very long way indeed from being able to specify and empirically test a formal model, with correlation coefficients, as Inglehart does for the European and Anglo-Saxon countries.[18]

Far away as they may be from quantifying the impact of Arab political culture(s) on a range of political outcomes (such as legitimacy, stability, or democratization), the empirical social scientists have improved upon the more reductionist and Orientalist formulations (even if they are better at questions than answers) in several ways. One is their consideration of social and cultural change. Leonard Binder, for example, in one of his earlier essays (during his "political development" period) looks beyond the texts to ask (following Karl Deutsch) whether social mobilization will increase the pressures for traditionalism or radicalism. What will be its effects upon minorities, irredentism, and "sleeping nationalities"?[19] Dankwart Rustow, more historically knowledgeable than many Middle East political scientists, was able to portray the cultural milieus of specialized elites in Turkey, thus moving the analysis beyond global country-level generalizations.[20] He also made a conceptual contribution by proposing that the investigation of political culture be focused on issues of identity, authority, and equality. Clement Henry Moore's old but still valuable study of North Africa, while not quantitatively rigorous, offers insightful contrasts between the "rationality" of the Tunisian "political formula" compared with the emerging institutionalized tradition of Morocco and the artificial "order" of Algeria disconnected from an incoherent political culture.[21]

The latest edition of Bill and Springborg's textbook on Middle East politics for the most part eschews sweeping cultural generalizations and wisely focuses on structures.[22] Despite certain misleading phrases (such as "the genes of politics") and some tenuous historical propositions (such as the Prophet Muhammad as the model for today's "patrimonial" leaders), political culture is not explicitly advanced as an explanatory factor for contemporary tensions—indeed, the term does not even appear in the index or chapter headings. Social structure and political economy receive greater attention. Cultural *content* is less important than the *configuration* of social units like family, clan, sect, and client grouping. The balancing behavior and competition for "collective goods" among such groupings is what politics is all about, and the overarching, multifaceted dynamics of economic change ("modernization") intensify the uncertainty and the competition. In a loose sense, of course, this book—emblematic of the "political development" school of the 1960s—is "cultural" in its basic proposition: "the dialectical clash between the challenging forces of modernity and the persistent strength of tradition."[23] While the singular noun "tradition" might appear as the ultimate cultural reductionism, a closer reading of these "neomodernization" authors—who are not oblivious to two decades of often-valid criticisms of that paradigm—reveals a more discriminating and sophisticated depiction of enduring Middle Eastern political "realities." Certainly their work represents a significant advance over

the Islamic essentialism and national character stereotyping that unfortunately still dominate the public discourse.

In any inventory of political culture work by social scientists mention should be made of attitude surveys and micro-level, often anthropological case studies of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian communities. Both in their different ways aspire to a degree of specificity and empiricism absent in the nation-level studies. Attitudes and opinions, as measured by questionnaires and systematic interview data, may not be the best way of tapping into deep collective value orientations, but they are not perhaps inherently less valid than textual extrapolations or armchair speculation. Compared to other regions, empirical survey work on the Arab world is meager, but there is some and it is increasing.[24] Validity and reliability, not to mention interpretation, are often problematic, however; particularly when polling designs are polluted by "the authorities" or when the survey methods and even the identities of the poll-takers cannot be specified.[25] Lerner's groundbreaking work in the 1950s used attitude surveys to support an imaginative if flawed proposition about modernization and cultural transformation in which the mediating variable was the psychological property of empathy.[26] Marvin Zonis discovered on the basis of systematic interviews with a sample from the Iranian political elite a culture of cynicism that (rightly) suggested a certain hollowness in the legitimacy of the Shah's regime.[27] Farah brought together a number of studies from social psychology and survey research that empirically demonstrated an authoritarian socialization process and challenged conventional views about hierarchies of group identification in several Arab countries.[28] Saad Eddin Ibrahim directed a large-scale, cross-national survey of Arab public opinion that confirmed that Arabs remained deeply concerned about "all-Arab" national problems, but also discovered significant subregional variations.[29]

Among more recent work is Suleiman's survey of young Tunisians' political attitudes. He finds not one but three distinct subcultures: Arab-Islamic, secular (French), and a "mixed" stratum that is (in Hourani's term) acutely "Levantinized."[30] A U.S. government information specialist, writing under the auspices of a pro-Israel think tank, takes to task both scholars who "underrate" and those who "exaggerate" the power or consistency of Arab popular opinion, and expresses moderate optimism (based on a private Jordanian poll) that there is an attitudinal change in Arab opinion toward acceptance of a compromise with Israel.[31] In contrast, on the basis of a survey of professionals and academics in the Gulf during and after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, Ismael and Ismael discern an antagonism between (regime) politics and popular political culture and conclude that the Arab state system "cannot be sustained any longer."[32]

The "ethnographic" approach to political culture typically involves the application of anthropological or historical methods to particular social

groupings. A fruitful recent example is the collection edited by Khoury and Kostiner, in which scholars examine the complex relationship between tribes and the development of the modern state in the Middle East.[33] An underlying concern of these writers is compatibility of identification between these deeply rooted structures and the newer, overarching state, with all of its demands. The legitimacy of the political order depends to an important degree on this congruence—or, in the Middle East, the lack of it. "Because the nominal nation-state has not met the challenge [of development]," writes one of the contributors, "society has resorted to its prenational ties as a solution. . . . The 'ethnicization of conflict' suggests that tribalism has been revived under a new cover and that it obstructs the process of state formation."[34] In the same vein but more categorically, the editors of a volume on ethnicity in the Middle East make the following cultural assertion: "The Middle East is a congeries of ethnic communities, most of which are fated to coexist with others under the same political authority within the boundaries of the same territorial state."[35] One of the editors states that the Middle East is generally similar to other Third World regions, except that "the salience of the religious definition of communal solidarity" is more acute. He concludes that modernization has exacerbated ethnic solidarities and conflict rather than erasing them, and that consequently ethnic solidarities are too strong to permit the management of conflict by assimilation, that is, developing allegiance to nonethnic symbols.[36] Coercive domination by the strongest ethnic group tends to be the prevalent pattern. Such observations rest on a certain image of Arab or Middle Eastern political culture, which in turn rests on an interpretation of a certain historical "reality."

To try and derive such images and interpretations from empirical observation is an improvement over *ex cathedra* Orientalism or armchair psychology; yet there is still room for disagreement. Subjectivity, unwitting bias, conceptual reification, factual selectivity, and even hidden agendas may also play their part. Serious scholars can and do have honest disagreements. For example, contrast Barakat's interpretation of roughly the same empirical materials with some of the writers discussed above. Arguing from what the dust jacket explains is "an Arab perspective," he skillfully dispatches the national character reductionists.[37] Like several of the "ethnographers" just mentioned, he is sensitive to the pull of parochial subcultures and "primordial" loyalties; but he sees much more development in the "secular" sector than they do, and he ascribes much of the stagnation not to cultural factors but to structural political conditions—authoritarian regimes and their powerful external supporters. Reversing the explanation of the cultural reductionists who ascribe the lack of democracy to cultural factors, Barakat and many other Arab intellectuals blame the current sociocultural malaise—including stifled creativity, a "traditional

mentality," the absence of "scientific and future-oriented rationalism," the "subjugation of women," and what Sharabi calls "neopatriarchy" (a deformed, authoritarian, dependent, imitative condition neither truly traditional nor modern)[38]—on "a devastating condition of alienation" engendered by the Arab citizen's exclusion from the political process.[39] Which comes first: the democratic chicken or the cultural egg?

Civil Society and Democratization

With the collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War came a wave of experiments in democratization around the world.[40] There has been as well a renewed interest on the part of comparative politics theorists in democracy.[41] Although the Arab-Islamic world seems to some to be the major exception to this trend, even here there has been some cautious movement toward liberalization, if not democratization.[42] In the search for explanations, some political scientists have returned to old concepts, among them political culture. A recent volume on political culture and democracy in developing countries celebrates "the return of political culture" after two decades of banishment at the hands of neo-Marxism and dependency theory.[43] Indeed, the larger paradigm of liberal political development and modernization may also be making a return, although with slightly different labeling. The concept of "civil society" has emerged as a key condition for democratization, and now a number of the most able political scientists of the Middle East are investigating whether the reality is emerging as well, and why.[44]

Most of these analysts would agree that civil society is an autonomous space between the domain of the state and society at large and that it has links with both. It is a structural concept whose hallmark is a plethora of voluntary associations. But it is a cultural concept too: As al-Sayyid puts it, there must be an "ethic of tolerance."[45] When Norton speaks of "the vibrancy of civil society" in some Middle East countries, he is not just saying that they have many voluntary associations, but also that there are habits of cooperation and an acceptance of pluralism. Economic explanations alone will not do the trick; nor will reliance on exogenous political factors. From this Tocquevillian perspective the appropriate habits of the mind are deeply rooted—cultural—and they take time to grow. They do not vary with short-term changes in per capita income. In their empirical study of civic traditions in Italy, Putnam and his collaborators trace the origin of civic traditions (and democratic behavior) in northern Italy to the twelfth century and chart the growth of civic involvement from the mid-nineteenth century.[46]

If one is interested in understanding conditions such as legitimacy, liberalism, or democracy it is hard to ignore culture (and Tocqueville) even if

it is a residual variable after structural, economic, and exogenous factors. But if we decide to exhume the political culture concept in application to the Arab world (some would prefer to leave it buried), we must confront again old arguments. Some Orientalists would claim that the requisite "civic" associational structures and habits of mind certainly have not existed over time, nor do they now; on the contrary, there is an unbroken and unchanging cultural predisposition toward authoritarianism, submission, and fatalism.

But a respectable number of social scientists read "reality" very differently. Hermassi, for example, rejects the prerequisite of unbroken historical continuity, observing that the colonial experience created a kind of cultural *tabula rasa* in which civic culture can indeed take quick root.[47] He criticizes what he calls the Orientalist depiction of Arab-Islamic political culture as basically responsible for the lack of liberalism and democracy in the Arab world. Objecting to the "cultural essentialism" of Lewis, he observes that equally reputable scholars "have shown that in the Arab and Islamic world, the historic experience of freedom is much larger than a textual analysis would lead one to believe." He also challenges the Orientalist assumption of historical and cultural continuity in the Middle East state: What they miss, he contends, "is the obvious and profound discontinuity in the social formation of the Middle Eastern state introduced by colonialism."[48] He goes on to argue that neither Islam nor Arab cultural patterns are inherently hostile to liberalism and democracy and, indeed, that democratic norms may be gaining importance as a source of political legitimacy. Similarly, Saad Eddin Ibrahim, on the basis of empirical investigations, is convinced that associational life is growing significantly throughout the Arab world and that a new civic space is emerging to curb the authoritarian *mukhabarat* (national security) state. Barakat (unlike some of the ethnographers) argues that a "progressive secular" future is possible, despite formidable obstacles. He cites Gramsci's observation on the double-edged character of civil society: " . . . at once the political terrain on which the dominant class organizes its hegemony and the terrain on which opposition parties and movements organize, win allies and build their social power."[49]

The key question (except perhaps for radical and postmodern analysts) is how to deal empirically with civil society and political culture in general. Our survey of past and present applications suggests that there are no simple answers. Definitions are imprecise and elastic. Methods and evidence include everything from cerebral intuition and texts to historical narratives and quantitative survey data. It may be, as Diamond argues, that "the return of political culture" is welcome, and that it cannot be ignored in any attempt to explain the enlargement of democracy.[50] But in a book designed to fill part of the void on applications to the developing world there are only three Middle Eastern studies—Turkey, Egypt, and Israel—

of which only two are thoroughly indigenous political cultures and only one is Arab. The analysis of Egypt proposes that Egypt's current malaise is rooted in a deep antagonism between "modern instrumental rationality and indigenous value rationality,"[51] the latter represented by the Islamist movement. While political Islam challenges the authoritarian modalities of "modern instrumental rationality," it refuses to accept the ethic of tolerance required for civil society, leaving Egypt with both an opening for and an obstacle to democracy. If the conclusion sounds familiar, so is the methodology: a qualitative interpretation of historical events and Islamist texts, with some emphasis on "Islamic praxis in the field of political economy."[52] But the effects of Islamism on democratization or liberalization in Egypt or elsewhere need more careful examination than they receive here, and one wonders whether we have advanced much beyond the kind of work that was being done 30 years ago.[53]

The uneven evolution of political culture studies provides us with a few epistemological lessons: (1) Avoid reductionist concepts and essentialist assumptions. (2) Disaggregate political culture: Look at subcultures (vertical and horizontal); look at elite cultures and mass cultures. (3) Political culture is a multilayered phenomenon, amenable therefore to "geological" study: Look at formal ideologies (on the "surface"), then at opinions (easily changeable), then at attitudes (less so), and finally try to plumb the deep structure of enduring collective values and orientations. (4) Focus on group identities, orientations toward authority, and principles of equity and justice. (5) Be methodologically multifaceted: Texts (from scripture and philosophy to newspapers, cassettes, and graffiti), despite their occasional misuse in our field, remain a fundamental (and fundamentalist) primary source; traditional historical narratives are indispensable, as are comparative case studies; interview and survey data should be more widely utilized.

The return of political culture to the study of Arab politics is, as W. S. Gilbert might have put it, a cause for "modified rapture." No Middle East area specialist (if only out of professional self-interest) would quarrel with the notion that culture is a good thing to know about: On a purely descriptive level, cultural knowledge no doubt improves political analysis in some intangible way. It is on the explanatory level that the concept seems at once indispensable yet problematic. It is important to specify what political condition or behavior one wants to explain. If asked to explain the decline of the U.S. automobile industry, economists might invoke models of supply and demand, factor costs, comparative advantage, and aggregate growth. If asked to explain General Motors' loss of market share, however, they might hire an anthropologist to analyze the "culture" of General Motors' management. Austere rational-choice models or macro-level economic variables may be sufficient to explain certain kinds of domestic and even

foreign policy decisionmaking. Structures and institutions (formal and informal) will help explain the powers of and constraints on politicians. But can economics or structures alone carry us far enough toward understanding those enduringly interesting dependent variables: legitimacy and stability, trust and effectiveness, authoritarianism and despotism, liberalism and democracy? Dogan remarks that "[p]ower, legitimacy, trust and effectiveness do not have identical meanings in London and Jakarta, or in Washington and Cairo."[54] Some comparative understanding of political culture surely is necessary to save us from egregious ethnocentrism. The discourse of Arab politics is, if anything, increasingly moral in tone and value-laden: There has been no "end of ideology." Today's debate over political Islam conceivably is no more than coded language for "pure" economic and political behavior. Is it old-fashioned to sometimes take things at face value—or is it prudent?

Notes

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4

Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach

Lisa Anderson

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the apparent worldwide embrace o the values and institutions of the victors, the virtually complete absenc of liberal democracy in the Arab world seems quite remarkable. Politica scientists do not ordinarily concern themselves with accounting for nega tives—that is, with explaining what did not happen or is not there—for i is difficult enough to interpret what did happen without also trying to ex plain what might have been. Democracy is an exception to this genera rule, however, because it is what might be called a "sentimental favorite" of Western social scientists. Most European and North American student of social and political life (almost all of whom, it should be noted, live and work in democracies) more or less secretly believe that the democratic states were victorious because they deserved to be. In other words, they believe that what was always self-evident to its beneficiaries—that democracy is the most desirable form of government—has now become apparent to the rest of the world as well.

Social theorists have failed to distinguish their normative biases from their analytical frameworks since social theory began; indeed, ethical values animate much truly important social science. Unfortunately, however, many of today's partisans of democracy have assumed not only that the superiority of democracy is self-evident, but that the converse is also true: A country's failure to embrace it is evidence of political perversity or moral obtuseness on the part of its citizenry. From this perspective, the inability or unwillingness of people elsewhere in the world to install and maintain democratic governments is to be explained by assigning some kind of handicap or immaturity to the people themselves.

In fairness, much of the literature examining the prospects for democracy in various parts of the world often does address what might be called

The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East

Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective

Eva Bellin

Why have the Middle East and North Africa remained so singularly resistant to democratization? While the number of electoral democracies has nearly doubled since 1972, the number in this region has registered an absolute decline.[1] Today, only two out of twenty-one countries qualify as electoral democracies, down from three observed in 1972.[2] Stagnation is also evident in the guarantee of political rights and civil liberties. While the number of countries designated free by Freedom House has doubled in the Americas and in the Asia-Pacific region, increased tenfold in Africa, and risen exponentially in Central and East Europe over the past thirty years, there has been no overall improvement in the Middle East and North Africa.[3] Aggregate scores in 2002 differ little from 1972. Fifteen countries are designated not free, five partly free, and only one free (see Table 1). While a few countries, notably Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, and Yemen, have registered noteworthy progress toward political liberalization in the past decade, overall the vast majority of countries has failed to catch the wave of democratization that has swept nearly every other part of the world.

Explanations suggest a litany of regional failures. First, civil society is weak and thus is an ineffective champion of democracy. Labor unions are empty shells; businessmen's associations lack credible autonomy; nongovernmental organizations lack indigenous grounding. The weakness of associational life undermines the development of countervailing power in society that can force the state to be accountable to popular preferences. It also contracts the opportunities for citizens to participate in collective deliberation, stunting the development of a civic culture, that essential underpinning of vibrant democracy.[4]

Second, the commanding heights of the economy remain largely in state hands. Despite nearly two decades of experimentation with structural adjustment, the public sector continues to account for a major share of employment and GNP generation in most countries.[5] This legacy of statist ideologies and rent-fueled opportunities undermines the capacity to build autonomous, countervailing power to the state in society.

Third, people are poor; literacy rates are low; and inequality is significant. It is

Table 1 Freedom House Rankings for Middle Eastern and North African Countries, 1972 and 2002

Country	Political Rights/Civil Liberties (Composite Score)		Freedom Rating	
	1972/3	2001/2	1972/3	2002/3
Algeria	6	5.5	Not Free	Not Free
Egypt	6	6	Not Free	Not Free
Iran	5.5	6	Not Free	Not Free
Iraq	7	7	Not Free	Not Free
Libya	6.5	7	Not Free	Not Free
Oman	6.5	5.5	Not Free	Not Free
Palestine Nat'l Author.	*	5.5	*	Not Free
Qatar	5.5	6	Not Free	Not Free
Saudi Arabia	6	7	Not Free	Not Free
Sudan	6	7	Not Free	Not Free
Syria	7	7	Not Free	Not Free
Tunisia	5.5	5.5	Not Free	Not Free
United Arab Emirates	6	5.5	Not Free	Not Free
Yemen (South)	7	6 (N & S)	Not Free	Not Free
Lebanon	2	5.5	Free	Not Free
Bahrain	5.5	5.5	Partly Free	Partly Free
Jordan	6	5	Not Free	Partly Free
Kuwait	4	4.5	Partly Free	Partly Free
Morocco	4.5	5	Partly Free	Partly Free
Turkey	3.5	4.5	Partly Free	Partly Free
Yemen(North)	4.4	**	Partly Free	**
Israel	2.5	2	Free	Free

An average rating of 1-2.5 are generally considered "Free", 3-5.5 "Partly Free", and 5.5-7 "Not Free." For Freedom House's methodology see www.freedomhouse.org

*The PNA was created in 1993-94

**North and South Yemen united in 1990

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not unusual for a fifth of the population in a given country to fall below the poverty line; 32 percent of adults are illiterate; and the region ranks in the bottom half of the United Nations' human development index despite the enormous wealth of several countries.[6] These conditions compromise both elite and mass commitment to democratic reform. The masses do not prioritize it, and the elite has reason to be frightened by it. The champions of democracy are few and far between.

Fourth, countries in the region are geographically remote from the epicenter of democratization. Few, except Turkey, border directly on successful models of democratic rule. The demonstration effect that has proven so important in fueling democratization in other regions is diluted in the Middle East and North Africa.[7]

Fifth, culture, specifically Islam, distinguishes the region. Surely culture must explain some of the region's exceptionalism, especially since Islam is presumed to be inhospitable to democracy.[8]

In short, the Middle East and North Africa lack the prerequisites of democratization. The lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture explains the region's failure to democratize.

None of these explanations is satisfying. The Middle East and North Africa are in no way unique in their poor endowment with the prerequisites of democracy. Other regions similarly deprived have nonetheless managed to make the transition. Civil society is notoriously weak in sub-Saharan Africa, yet twenty-three out of forty-two countries carried out some measure of democratic transition between 1988 and 1994.[9] The commanding heights of the economy were entirely under state control in eastern Europe prior to the fall of the Berlin wall, yet the vast majority of countries in this region successfully carried through a transition during the 1990s.[10] Poverty and inequality, not to mention geographic remoteness from the democratic epicenter, have characterized India, Mauritius, and Botswana, yet these countries have successfully embraced democracy.[11] And other world cultures, notably Catholicism and Confucianism, have at different times been accused of incompatibility with democracy, yet these cultural endowments have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and East Asia from democratizing.[12]

Prerequisites: A Useful Approach?

Cross-regional and cross-temporal comparison indicates that democratization is so complex an outcome that no single variable will ever prove to be universally necessary or sufficient for it.[13] Any notion of a single prerequisite of democracy should be jettisoned. But must the notion of prerequisites be abandoned altogether? It might be tempting to hold on to the idea. Cumulative failure to realize many of the conditions that have historically been associated with successful democratization is bound to

hinder democratic transition today. In the Middle East and North Africa the failure to realize so many of these conditions simultaneously may explain the region's resistance to transition.

However, the Middle East and North Africa are not unique in this cumulative failure. The inability to fulfill these conditions is the reason why democracy is on such shaky ground in so many parts of the world, why analysts must resort to "democracy with adjectives" (another term for imperfect democracy) when categorizing so many products of the third wave in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[14] Cumulative failure to achieve the prerequisites of democracy clearly undermines the consolidation of democracy. But alone it can not explain the failure to carry out democratic transition because many countries burdened with failure have nonetheless made that leap successfully. The transition to democracy accomplished by sub-Saharan African states that typically rank as poorly as if not worse than many Middle Eastern and North African states on standard socioeconomic indicators, proximity to successful democracy, and the vigor of civil society makes this point clear. The puzzle posed by the Middle East and North Africa is not why democracy has failed to consolidate in this region (failure would be expected) but rather why the vast majority of Middle Eastern and North African states have failed to initiate transition at all. Herein lies the exceptionalism of the region. To explain it, it is necessary to look beyond failure to achieve the prerequisites of democracy, since failure is not exceptional to the region.

Insights from Studies of Revolution

Why has democratic transition largely eluded Middle Eastern and North African countries? It is not as though the region has been deprived of all democratic impulses. It has indeed experienced the fledgling emergence of civil society (human rights groups, professional associations, self-help groups), only to see most of them either repressed or corporatized by the state.[15] Statist regimes have increasingly liberalized their economies (often under pressure from international forces), but autonomous political initiative by their new private sectors is typically punished.[16] Progressive interpretations of Islam that endorse democratic norms and ideals have been parsed by Islamic theorists, only to be buried by hostile state elites.[17] In each case a coercive state deeply opposed to democratic reform has quashed initiatives favorable to democracy.

To understand the rarity of democratic transition in the region, it is necessary to return to a classic work on revolution written by Theda Skocpol more than twenty years ago. The puzzling thing about revolution, Skocpol pointed out, is that, although the intuitive prerequisite for revolution—mass disaffection from the regime

in power—is a relatively common phenomenon in human experience, successful revolution is a relatively rare event. What explains this divergence between cause and outcome? The answer, Skocpol argued, lies in the strength of the state and, most important, the state's capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion. If the state's coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, "value incoherence," and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects.[18]

In short, the strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state's coercive apparatus distinguish among cases of successful revolution, revolutionary failure, and nonoccurrence.[19] The same might be said of democratic transition. Democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state's coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coercive apparatus remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic transition will not occur.

Thus, the solution to the puzzle of Middle Eastern and North African exceptionalism lies less in absent prerequisites of democratization and more in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a robust coercive apparatus in these states.[20] The will and capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative have extinguished the possibility of transition. Herein lies the region's true exceptionalism.

Some conceptual clarifications are in order. First, will and capacity are two independent qualities that do not covary and ought not be collapsed into one. A regime may have the capacity to repress democratic forces but not the will, as in South Korea under Roh Tae Woo in 1987. Or the reverse may be true, as in Benin under Kerekou in 1989. Second, this argument admittedly veers toward conflation of the coercive apparatus and the authoritarian regime it undergirds. The distinction between the two is often difficult to draw, even in regimes (for example, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria) where the official head of state is a civilian, because the head of state is often closely allied with the coercive apparatus and highly dependent on coercion to survive. The mutual controls exercised by the security apparatus and the civilian leader endow each with a measure of veto power over the other and make it difficult to determine who exercises superior agency in the dyad.

Classic indicators used to gauge relative power (control over appointments, political succession, budgets, and policy) often do not yield a clear-cut picture.[21] Patrimonial linkages between the regime and coercive apparatus further enmesh the two. In Algeria, for example, conflation of the regime and the coercive apparatus is so pronounced that one analyst, paraphrasing Mirabeau's description of Prussia, declared that "every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state."[22] The problem of conflation between authoritarian civilian regimes and the military is in no way peculiar to this region.[23] Nevertheless, the prevalence of patrimonial logic in many regimes makes this problem particularly pervasive in the Middle East and North Africa.

Thus, authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and North Africa because the coercive apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below. Comparative analysis is helpful in explaining why. The experience of other regions reveals what is exceptional about the Middle East and North Africa.

Robustness of the Coercive Apparatus

What shapes the robustness of a regime's coercive apparatus? Under what conditions will it lose its capacity and will to hold on to power and permit society to experiment with democratization? Comparative analysis of cases of such renunciation suggests at least four variables that are crucial to this outcome.

First, the robustness of the coercive apparatus is directly linked to maintenance of fiscal health. The security establishment is most likely to give up when its financial foundation is seriously compromised. When the military can no longer pay the salaries of its recruits and the security forces can not guarantee supplies of arms and ammunition, the coercive apparatus disintegrates from within. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa democratic transition was less the work of strong societies and more the consequence of weak states.[24] Prolonged fiscal crisis "hollowed out" the coercive apparatus of many African countries. Soldiers went unpaid, and matériel deteriorated. Democratic transition was possible because decomposition of the military and security establishments opened up the political space in which demands for democracy could be pressed.[25] According to Bratton and van de Walle, the strength and disposition of the military were among the most significant determinants of the fate of transition on the African continent.[26]

Second, the robustness of the coercive apparatus is also shaped by successful maintenance of international support networks. The security establishment is most likely to lose its will and capacity to hold on to power when it loses crucial international support. Coercive regimes especially face this problem if they have been the recipients of massive foreign support (and few authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century escaped the benevolence of one great power or another during the cold war). Withdrawal of international backing triggers both an existential and financial crisis for the regime that often devastates both its will and capacity to carry on. This scenario proved key in eastern Europe, where the Soviet Union's withdrawal of support for the Brezhnev doctrine spelled the end of the coercive backbone of eastern European regimes and their will to hold on.[27] It also proved important in Latin America, where the United States' abrupt shift away from supporting authoritarianism after the cold war dealt many regimes an important existential blow.[28] Finally, it was important in sub-Saharan Africa where, as the cold war waned, foreign patrons,

both eastern and western, withdrew massive supplies of military aid and where western donors increasingly made foreign aid conditional on democratic reform.[29]

Third, the robustness of the coercive apparatus, or of its will to repress reform initiatives, is inversely related to its level of institutionalization. The more institutionalized the security establishment is, the more willing it will be to disengage from power and allow political reform to proceed. The less institutionalized it is, the less amenable it will be to reform.

Institutionalization of the coercive apparatus should not be confused with professionalization in Huntington's sense. Institutionalization does not refer to the depoliticization of the security establishment and its subordination to civilian control.[30] Rather, institutionalization invokes the constellation of qualities that Weber used to distinguish bureaucracies from patrimonially driven organizations. An institutionalized coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between the public and private that forbids predatory behavior vis-à-vis society; and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy. In contrast, in a coercive apparatus organized along patrimonial lines staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism; the distinction between public and private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; and discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, often relying on balanced rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups.

Patrimonialism confers a number of distinct advantages on authoritarian regimes that can contribute to their longevity.[31] They include demobilizing the opposition and building a loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary patronage. Patrimonialism can also make authoritarian regimes particularly resistant to democratic reform.[32] In the coercive apparatus, patrimonial organization will be less receptive to political opening. By contrast, institutionalization will have more tolerance for reform. First, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized, the security elite has a sense of corporate identity separate from the state. It has a distinct mission, identity, and career path. Officers can imagine separation from the state. They believe they will live to see another day, even if they relinquish power. They do not perceive that they will be "ruined by reform."[33] To the contrary, they are more likely to be ruined by holding on to office too long because the inevitable political failures are bound to trigger and develop political divisions within the elite. These divisions, in turn, may threaten the institutional integrity of the security apparatus. One of the main factors that drove the military elite to transfer power to civilians in Brazil and Argentina was its concern to save the institutional integrity of the military establishments.[34] Similar incentives are present whenever the coercive apparatus is strongly institutionalized. Second, where the coercive apparatus is institutionalized rather than patrimonial, it is distinguished by a commitment to some broader national mis-

sion that serves the public good, such as national defense and economic development, rather than to personal aggrandizement and enrichment alone. Where the elite has successfully delivered on this mission, it again has good reason to be persuaded that it will not be ruined by reform. To the contrary, where it has successfully delivered on public goals like national defense and economic development, it might be confident of its ability to ride democratic transition successfully and maintain a hold on power, this time by popular election. Both Pinochet in Chile and Roh Tae-Woo in South Korea reasoned this way. While Pinochet was overly optimistic (he failed to win the plebiscite that would have elected him Chile's president in 1988), Roh Tae Woo's political confidence was well-placed. The South Korean general rode his record of achievement to win the highest office of the land.[35] Again, the institutionalized character of the security apparatus fostered tolerance of democratic reform.

Finally, the coercive apparatus' capacity and will to hold on to power is shaped by the degree to which it faces a high level of popular mobilization. Violently repressing thousands of people, even if it is within the physical capacity of the security forces, is costly. It may jeopardize the institutional integrity of the security apparatus, international support, and domestic legitimacy. Clearly, the high costs of massive repression will not deter an elite that believes it will be ruined by reform.[36] The slaughter of thousands at Hama by Assad's regime in Syria and the massacre of hundreds at Tiananmen Square by the Communist regime in China are only two salient examples of the human tragedy wreaked by coercive elites bent on repression and undeterred by the very high costs associated with it.[37] However, where the elite does not perceive reform to be so devastating, the higher cost of repression posed by high levels of popular mobilization may serve as a tipping mechanism, pitching the elite onto the side of reform. In Korea mass demonstrations on behalf of democratic reform, manned by a broad, cross-class coalition with sizable middle class participation, persuaded Roh Tae Woo to forgo brutal repression of the democracy movement and instead opt for reform.[38] Similarly, in Latin America the presence of an organized labor movement and an active civil society, both mobilized on the side of democratization, made coercive regimes in Argentina and Peru reconsider repression when other options seemed possible and safe.[39]

Two objections might be raised to this fourth variable. First, it introduces an element of circularity to the argument, since the level of popular mobilization in society is, to some degree, shaped by the coercive capacity and will of the state. For example, in Egypt the state's coercive capacity and will has led to harsh repression of civil society; consequently, many popular forces have been reluctant to mobilize politically. The reluctance has lowered the cost of repression for the state and refortified its will to use coercion. However, there is no simple correlation between a state's coercive capacity and will and its demobilization of society. Some coercive states nurture the development of civil society through corporatist measures. Others repress inconsistently, demobilizing some groups (for example, leftist unions) but not others (for

example, the church). Tolerated pockets of mobilization can come back to challenge the state. The elite is forced to ask if the cost of repression is worth the benefit. For example, in South Korea in 1987 the mobilization of tolerated groups such as church and student movements created significant pressure to reform. Consequently, popular mobilization must be measured on its own, independent of the state's coercive capacity and will.

A second objection to popular mobilization as a variable is that it reintroduces some of the logic of the social prerequisites approach rejected earlier. The level of popular mobilization is clearly shaped by such variables as literacy, urbanization, and socioeconomic inequality. However, one variable can not be reduced to the other. Popular mobilization is also shaped by ideological factors (like Communism or Islamism), leadership variables (like charismatic leadership), and sudden moments of crisis that spur a spontaneous popular response. Measurement of socioeconomic variables will not account for such spurts of mobilization; popular mobilization must be measured on its own.[40]

Conditions in the Middle East and North Africa

No single variable, whether poor fiscal health, declining international support, strong institutionalization, or high levels of popular mobilization, is either a necessary or sufficient condition of retreat from power by the coercive apparatus. But these four variables have been important cross-regionally in cases of retreat. How do the countries of the Middle East and North Africa rate on them? Their performance suggests reasons why authoritarian regimes are exceptionally robust there.

First, with regard to fiscal health, although many states in the Middle East and North Africa have economic difficulties of one sort or another, few, save perhaps the Sudan, face economic collapse of sub-Saharan proportions.[41] Most, moreover, enjoy sufficient revenue to sustain exceedingly robust expenditure on their security apparatuses. In fact, these expenditures are among the highest in the world. The region's states are world leaders in the proportion of GNP spent on security. On average, they spent 6.7 percent of their GNP on defense expenditures in the year 2000, compared to a global average of 3.8 percent, 2.2 percent in NATO countries, 2.8 percent in non-NATO European countries, 3.3 percent in East Asia and Australasia, 4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 1.6 percent in the Carribean and in Central and Latin America.[42] They are also among the biggest spenders in terms of arms purchased. Seven—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Algeria—alone accounted for 40 percent of all global arms sales in the year 2000.[43] Finally, the percentage of population engaged in various branches of the security apparatus is high by world standards. The average country counts 16.2 men per thousand under arms, compared to 6.31 in France, 3.92 in Brazil, and .33 in Ghana. In

Iraq, for example, the number is 20.94; in Syria, 26; in Bahrain, 33.8; in Saudi Arabia, 9.86; and in Egypt, 10.87.[44]

How do these countries sustain such elaborate coercive apparatuses? Here is where access to rent comes into play. This access has long distinguished the region.[45] Many, though not all, of these states are major recipients of rentier income. Their rent derives from different endowments—petroleum resources, gas resources, geostrategic utility, and control of critical transit facilities. From the more than $30 billion that the Saudi state earns each year in oil revenue to the $2 billion that Egypt receives annually from the United States in foreign aid, many Middle Eastern and North African states are richly supplied with rental income.[46] It gives them access to substantial discretionary resources so that, even if the country is overall in poor economic health, the state is still able to hew to conventional economic wisdom and pay itself first, that is, give first priority to paying the military and security forces. Thus, while government spending on education and welfare may remain flat and economic crisis may cut into infrastructural investment, expenditure on the security apparatus remains very high.[47] In Egypt, for example, economic crisis forced the regime to sign an IMF accord that required a reduction in the subsidy of basic goods by 14 percent. This reduction did not prevent the regime from increasing the military budget by 22 percent that same year.[48] Similarly, in Algeria, although civil war has ravaged the country's economy, the army is always paid. The military apparatus remains intact thanks to Algeria's reliable dole of oil and gas rents. In short, exceptional access to rents has nurtured a robust coercive apparatus in many states across the region.

With regard to international support, the region is exceptional for the unique position it enjoys in the international arena. As in other regions, authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa profited from the cold war, reaping patronage from eastern and western great powers (sometimes simultaneously) in return for the promise of reliable alliance in the fight for or against Communism. But in contrast to other regions the authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa did not see their sources of international patronage evaporate with the end of the cold war or with America's subsequent reanimation with democracy, because western interest in the region has been driven by multiple security concerns that survived the cold war. Two key concerns are a reliable oil supply, a strategically crucial resource to increasingly dependent OECD countries, and the Islamist threat, which has proved ever more alarming as Islamist radicals turned their fury toward American targets in the U.S. and abroad.[49]

Both of these concerns have provided a compelling rationale to western policymakers to persist in providing patronage to many authoritarian states in the region. As Roosevelt said about Somoza, "they may be sons of bitches but at least they are our sons of bitches."[50] Authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Algeria have received western support, at times in very generous proportions,

because of the belief (perhaps mistaken) among western policymakers that these regimes would be most likely to deliver on western security concerns by assuring regular oil and gas supplies to the West and containing the Islamist threat. In short, the region is exceptional in that the cold war's end has not signaled great power retreat from patronage of authoritarianism, as in Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere.[51] Playing on the West's multiple security concerns has allowed authoritarian regimes in the region to retain international support. The West's generous provision of this support has bolstered the capacity and will of these regimes to hold on.

With regard to the third variable, patrimonialism, in most Middle Eastern and North African countries the coercive apparatus, like the regimes themselves, is governed by patrimonial logic. Although not universal (the military in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia are highly institutionalized) many of the regional powerhouses, such as Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, as well as lesser forces such as Jordan and Morocco, have coercive establishments shot through with patrimonialism. Personalism pervades staffing decisions. In Jordan and Morocco the king regularly appoints his male relatives to key military posts to guarantee against military rebellion.[52] In Saudi Arabia and Syria entire branches of the military and security forces are family affairs.[53] Political reliability supercedes merit in promotions. In Jordan Palestinians can not rise above the rank of major or lieutenant colonel in combat units.[54] In Syria an Air Force commander was appointed though he was not even a pilot (but he was a trusted friend of Hafez al-Asad).[55] Ethnic ties are used to guarantee loyalty. In Iraq the elite units were overwhelmingly Sunni. In Syria they are Alawi.[56] Intercorp and intracorp discipline is maintained by relying on balanced rivalry between primordial groups. The Syrian regime carefully balances Alawi, Sunni, and Christian leadership to maintain control. The Jordanian and Saudi regimes rely on tribal and bedouin loyalties to balance power between different corps.[57] The distinction between public and private is not always scrupulously observed. In Iraq and Syria the military has served as a key route to personal enrichment. It has not been unusual for generals to turn their units into personal economic fiefdoms.[58]

Of course, not all security establishments are equally corrupted. The Jordanian military is much more rule-governed than its Syrian or Iraqi counterparts. Moreover, patrimonialism should not be confused with professional incompetence; many of these apparatuses are professionally well-trained and equipped to handle the most modern military matériel. But patrimonialism spells a strong personal linkage between the coercive apparatus and the regime it serves; it makes for the coercive apparatus' personal identification with the regime and the regime's longevity and thus fosters resistance to political reform.

Under patrimonial conditions, political reform represents the prospect of ruin for the elite of the coercive apparatus. Political opening and popular accountability would deprive the Alawi officer in Syria of his special perquisites, if not his life. Regime change would jeopardize the predominance of favored tribal elites in the

Jordanian and Saudi military. Furthermore, few of these officers could expect to ride electoral politics to power, Roh Tae Woo-style, because of the failure of these patrimonially driven apparatuses to deliver on national goals as successfully as did Roh Tae Woo. To the contrary, these officers have every incentive to close ranks behind the old authoritarian system, shoring it up even when natural calamity provides an opportunity for opening. For example, in Syria the ruling dictator's old age, illness, and death might have created an opportunity for political opening if the leaders of the coercive apparatus had not closed ranks behind the old system and persuaded the dictator's son that the country's best interests lay in continuing the regime.

The prevalence of patrimonialism is by no means exceptional to this region. Similar logic governs regimes in Africa, Asia, and beyond. But the low level of institutionalization in the region's coercive apparatuses constitutes one more factor explaining the robust will of so many to thwart political reform.

As for the fourth variable, popular mobilization on behalf of political reform remains weak. Nowhere in the region do mammoth, cross-class coalitions mobilize on the streets to push for reform, as in South Korea. Consequently, in most Middle Eastern and North African countries the costs of repression are relatively low. Even where mobilization has been higher, as when Islamists mobilized impressive numbers for political reform in Syria in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s, the state lessened the costs of repression, that is, the potential loss of domestic legitimacy or international support, by playing on the special threat posed by Islamist forces. The mobilization was cast as a threat to order and security for both domestic and international constituencies. This approach succeeded. The Algerian state was able to count on continued French patronage for many years by emphasizing the danger of the Islamist menace. Even Asad's brutal massacre at Hama won him some popular support on the grounds: "Better one month of Hama than fourteen years of civil war as in Lebanon."[59]

The low level of popular mobilization for political reform is not limited to the region, and to some extent it is a consequence of some of the absent prerequisites of democracy like poverty and low levels of literacy. However, there are additional factors that reduce popular enthusiasm for democratic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. First, experiments in political liberalization are historically identified with colonial domination rather than self-determination (in contrast to India). Earlier half-hearted attempts carried out under British and French mandates were more window-dressing for foreign domination than substantive experiments in self-rule. Second, there is no prolonged prior experience with democracy that might have created the institutional foundations for popular mobilization, such as mass-based parties and labor unions (in contrast to many Latin American countries). Third, a counterparadigm offers an ideologically rich and inspiring alternative to liberal democracy (in contrast to eastern Europe after the fall of Communism). Although Islamist

ideologies need not be posed as an alternative to liberal democratic world-views, they often develop in this way out of political expedience. Fourth, the presence of this nondemocratic Islamist threat demobilizes much of the traditional constituency for democratic activism, the secular and educated elements of the middle class. No matter what the explanation is, low levels of popular mobilization for democratic reform are a reality in the region. They lower the costs of repression for the coercive apparatus and increase the likelihood that the security establishment will resort to force to thwart reform initiatives.

Of course, there is one dramatic example in the region where popular mobilization for political reform succeeded in bringing on regime change: Iran. Millions of Iranians participated in mass protests to bring down the shah, and popular mobilization played a key role in the revolution's success, not least for the profound impact it exercised on the military. Although the military retained the physical capacity to repress the protestors, its will was sapped by the potentially enormous cost of repression, not least to the institutional integrity of the military itself. Faced with masses of civilians bearing flowers and chanting religious slogans, many soldiers refused to shoot; desertions mounted; and outright mutinies against the upper ranks multiplied. Fearing for the institutional integrity of the armed forces, the chief of staff declared the military's neutrality toward the revolution and sealed the fate of the old regime.[60] In short, high levels of popular mobilization in Iran raised the cost of repression sufficiently to undermine the coercive apparatus's will to repress.[61]

A fifth variable, the existence of a credible threat, has been suggested to explain the robustness of the coercive apparatus in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. Given the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the politics of the region, some analysts link the robustness of the region's authoritarianism to the existential threat posed by Israel to its Arab neighbors and to the subsequent construction of large militaries by many Arab states. No doubt the prevalence of interstate conflict in the region (including but not limited to the Arab-Israeli conflict) has played an important role in reinforcing authoritarianism in the region.[62] But analysts who champion this explanation must account for the fact that the robustness of coercive apparatuses in Arab states correlates neither geographically nor temporally with the threat posed by Israel. Geographically, the arc of authoritarianism in the region far exceeds the fly-zone of the Israeli air force; that is, countries far removed from the epicenter of the conflict (for example, Saudi Arabia, Morocco) still share the region's propensity for robust coercive apparatuses. Temporally, reduction in the existential threat posed by Israel has not led to commensurate decline in the size of the coercive apparatus. For example, the cold peace between Egypt and Israel over the past twenty-five years has not been matched by a comparable reduction in Egypt's military budget.[63]

Conclusion

The exceptionalism of the Middle East and North Africa lies not so much in absent prerequisites of democracy as in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism and especially a robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus. Some conditions responsible for the robustness of this authoritarianism are exceptional to the Middle East and North Africa; others are not. Access to abundant rent distinguishes the region and subsidizes much of the cost of these overdeveloped coercive apparatuses. Multiple western security concerns in the region guarantee continuous international support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa even after the cold war. But the prevalence of patrimonialism in state structures and the low level of popular mobilization are not unique to the region. Together, these factors reinforce the coercive apparatus' capacity and prevent democratic reform.

For other regions, the experience of the Middle East and North Africa draws attention to the persistent importance of structural factors, most importantly, the character of state institutions, in charting a country's susceptibility to democratic transition. The sudden and pervasive turn toward democracy in Latin America during the 1980s played a key role in discrediting socioeconomic determinism in theories of democratic transition, highlighting instead the centrality of elite choice and voluntarism in establishing democracy.[64] The dramatic transition to democracy that swept sub-Saharan Africa and eastern Europe in the 1990s drew attention to the important role popular mobilization can play in bringing down authoritarian regimes.[65] But the stubborn persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa highlights an equally powerful lesson. Where patrimonial institutions are wedded to coercive capacity, authoritarianism is likely to endure. In this context, regime elites possess both the will and the capacity to suppress democratic initiative. And where international support and financing is forthcoming to the authoritarian regime, rapid regime change is unlikely.[66]

It would be tempting to argue that removal of the coercive apparatus, perhaps by decisive external intervention, could end authoritarianism and open the way to democracy in such regions. Unfortunately, the analysis presented here does not support this view. The four variables identified above explain the robustness of the coercive apparatuses in many Middle Eastern and North African countries and their will to suppress democratic initiative. This analysis says little about the conditions necessary to implant democracy itself. For, while the removal of democracy-suppressing coercive apparatuses is a necessary condition for democratic transition and consolidation, it is not sufficient. A host of conditions, including a minimal level of elite commitment, a minimal level of national solidarity, a minimal level of per capita GNP, and, perhaps most important of all, the creation of impartial and effective state institutions must be present. Effective bureaucracies, police, and judiciaries that can deliver predictable rule of law and order are essential for democracy to flourish. To a large degree, order comes prior to democracy. Democracy can not thrive in chaos.[67]

Sadly, countries with a history of patrimonial rule are greatly disadvantaged in this institutional endowment. Personalistic regimes, by definition, privilege government by the ruler's discretion, not rule of law. Generally, patrimonial regimes do not have the effective and impartial bureaucracies, police, and other state institutions that are essential for a robust democracy. Thus, consolidation of democracy in post-patrimonial regimes is especially challenging.[68]

In the absence of effective state institutions, removing an oppressive coercive apparatus will lead, not to democracy, but rather to authoritarianism of a different stripe or, worse, chaos. To anchor democracy in the region, political reformers must focus on building effective, impartial state institutions, nurturing associations that reach across ethnic lines and unite people around common economic and cultural interests, and fostering economic growth that will increase per capita GNP into the zone of democratic possibility.[69] This challenge is gargantuan but is little different from the one facing many other countries. In facing this challenge, as in so many ways, the Middle East and North Africa are hardly exceptional at all.

NOTES

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1. The Middle East and North Africa include twenty-one countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. I have excluded four countries that are members of the Arab League but are geographically too remote: Somalia, Mauritania, Djibouti, and the Comoros Islands.

2. Israel and Turkey today meet the standards of electoral democracy, defined as a regime that chooses its government through regular, free, competitive elections. In 1972 Lebanon did as well. Freedom House, "Freedom in the World: 2002," www.freedomhouse.org, p. 7. On electoral versus liberal democracy, see Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?," *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (July 1996), 20–37.

3. Ibid., pp. 5–7. Freedom House's division of the world places Turkey in Europe and the Palestinian Authority in a separate category called disputed territories. Thus, neither country appears in its statistics for the Middle East and North Africa. I include both.

4. Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995–96). For a superb overview of the debate on the sources of Middle Eastern authoritarianism, see Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds., *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

5. UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report* (2002), reports that government expenditures as a percentage of GDP average 30 percent in the Arab world, though this figure is likely an underestimate since many oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were not included.

6. For poverty levels and illiteracy rates, see *Economic Trends in the MENA Region, 2002* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2002), pp. 23, 102. The illiteracy rate cited excludes Israel, which registers 4 percent adult illiteracy. For human development data, see UNCAD, *Human Development Report* (2001). Interestingly, according to Adams and Page "the MENA region has the lowest regional incidence of extreme poverty with less than 2.5% of the population living on or below $1/day." In fact, countries in the region have, on average, one of the most equal income distributions in the world, although even its income distribution is significantly unequal. See UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report* (2002), p. 90; World Bank, *World Development Report (*2002), pp. 230–35.

7. See Giuseppe DiPalma, *To Craft Democracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 1–26.

8. Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab Political Culture* (London: Frank Cass, 1994); P. J. Vatikiotis, *Islam and the State* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Martin Karmer, "Islam vs. Democracy," *Commentary,* 95 (January 1993), 35–42.

9. Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (New York: Cambridge, 1997), pp. 1–13, 72; Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics*, 41 (1989), 407–30; Jeffrey Herbst, "Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years," *Comparative Politics*, 33 (April 2001), 357–75.

10. Ivo Banac, ed., *Eastern Europe in Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

11. Atul Kohli, ed., *The Success of India's Democracy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 69, 246.

12. For example, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew pronounced "Asian values" contrary to democracy. See also Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Howard J. Wiarda, "Social Change and Political Development in Latin America: Summary," in Howard Wiarda, ed., *Politics and Social Change In Latin America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 72–85; Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), pp. 161–217. Perhaps the most powerful critique of any deterministic association between religious tradition and authoritarianism, and specifically between Islam and authoritarianism, is made by a nonspecialist. Alfred Stepan, "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations,'" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Arguing Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), emphasizes the multivocality of all great religious traditions and their potential for reconciliation with democratic ideals. He provides empirical support for the possibility of Islam's reconciliation with democracy by pointing to both Muslim majority countries that sustain electoral democracies (Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh) and the millions of Muslims who reside in democracies in India, Europe, and the U.S. without injury to their religious identity.

13. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

14. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," *World Politics*, 49 (April 1997), 430–52; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Diamond, *Developing Democracy,* pp. 1–63.

15. See Norton, ed. Also Iliya Harik, "Rethinking Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (July 1994), 43–56; Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control," *Comparative Politics*, 33 (October 2000), 43–61.

16. Eva Bellin, *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 86–121.

17. Mumtaz Ahmad, "Parliament, Parties, Polls and Islam: Issues in the Current Debate on Religion and Politics in Pakistan," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 2 (July 1985), 15–28.

18. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 32.

19. Ibid., p. 34.

20. Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World," *World Politics*, 46 (January 1994), 262–89.

21. In Egypt, for example, the president retains control over promotions above brigadier, has a final say over the military's budget, and can dismiss popular military leaders (such as Abu Ghazala) if they become too popular. The military has independent sources of financing, seems to exercise veto power over the designation of Mubarak's successor, and has saved the regime from fatal attack on at least three occasions. See Philippe Droz-Vincent, "Le Militaire et le Politique en Egypte," *Monde Arabe: Maghreb Machrek*, 165 (July-September 1999), 16–35; Daniel Sobelman, "Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?," *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2001), 31–40; John Sfakianakis and Robert Springborg, "The President, the Son, and Military Succession in Egypt," *Arab Studies Journal* (Fall 2001), 73–88. In Syria the balance of power is similarly unclear. The late dictator Hafez el-Assad was able to dismiss powerful special forces commander Ali Haydar over a difference in policy but also had to court the favor of the military to ensure the succession of his son Bashar to the presidency. See Risa Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for ISIS, 1998).

22. Mohammad Harbi, cited in *Le Soir de Bruxelles,* Jan. 11, 2002. I thank Reda Bensmaia for alerting me to this source. Droz-Vincent, p. 16, identifies the original source as Mirabeau.

23. For example, Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization in Africa," *African Studies Review*, 37 (September 1994), esp. 42–50, explores it in Africa.

24. Herbst, p. 372.

25. Luckham, "The Military, Militarization, and Democratization," pp. 50–59; also, Robin Luckham, "Dilemmas of Military Disengagement and Democratization in Africa," *IDS Bulletin*, 26 (1995), esp. 52–55.

26. Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 83, 144–49, 211.

27. Andrew Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 342; Mark R. Thompson, "To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics*, 34 (October 2001), 63–84.

28. The impact of such a shift was evident even prior to the end of the cold war. See Richard Snyder, "Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes," in H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 73; John Booth, "The Somoza Regime in Nicaragua," in ibid., p. 148.

29. Luckham, "Dilemmas of Military Disengagement," pp. 53–56.

30. Peter Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political* Science, 2 (1999), 211–41.

31. Jason Brownlee, "And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neo-Patrimonial Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 37 (Fall 2002). See also Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after 20 Years," *Annual Review of Political Science,* 2 (1999), 115–44.

32. Bratton and van de Walle, pp. 82–97; Geddes, pp. 115–44.

33. Nancy Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997), esp. 315; also, Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

34. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

35. See Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* p. 206.

36. Bermeo, "Myths of Moderation," p. 317.

37. Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1989), pp. 76–105; Thompson, pp. 63–83.

38. Nora Hamilton and Eun Mee Kim, "Economic and Political Liberalization in South Korea and Mexico," *Third World Quarterly*, 14 (1993); Carter Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); Michael Hsiao and Hagen Koo, "The Middle Classes and

Democratization," in Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 312–34.

39. Ruth Berins Collier and James Mahoney, "Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (April 1997), 285–303.

40. Popular mobilization should also not be confused with the variable civil society. It encompasses and exceeds this variable, embracing more spontaneous and short-lived movements such as demonstrations and riots and not limiting itself to the more institutionalized components of associational life such as labor unions, businessmen's associations, and nongovernmental organizations.

41. Nemat Shafik, ed., *Prospects for Middle Eastern and North African Economies* (New York: St. Martin's, 1998); *Economic Trends in the MENA Region, 2002*; UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report* (2001).

42. International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 2001–2002 (London: Oxford, 2001), p. 304.

43. "The MENA continues to be the world's leading arms market...in absolute terms." Ibid., pp. 119, 298.

44. Compiled from ibid., p. 128. The size of the coercive apparatus alone does not indicate the relative robustness of authoritarianism. A country may boast a very large military and still be democratic, as in the U.S. Similarly, Israel sustains a democratic political system despite the very large size of its military, measured in terms of military expenditure as share of GNP or of percentage of population under arms. As long as the coercive apparatus is subject to civilian control, large size is compatible with democracy.

45. Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 20 (October 1987), esp. 9–12; Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States" in Giacomo Luciani, ed., *The Arab State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 65–84; Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier Sate in the Arab World," in ibid., pp. 85–99; Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Price of Wealth," *International Organization*, 43 (Winter 1989), 101–45; Dirk Vandewalle, *Libya since Independence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics*, 53 (April 2001), 325–61.

46. See Clement Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 30–44. Although they detect a declining trend in rents earned by Middle Eastern and North African countries in recent years, this income is still substantial. For example, oil income alone accounted for more than 50 percent of government revenues in about half of these countries in the late 1990s.

47. See ibid., p. 106. In many countries 25 percent (or more) of government expenditure is on the military, and in some, including the Sudan (55 percent), the UAE (48 percent), and Saudi Arabia (37 percent), the proportion is significantly higher.

48. Droz-Vincent, p. 17.

49. Preservation of Israel's security might be a third concern, although it seems to be more an American than a fully western preoccupation. See Amy Hawthorne, "Do We Want Democracy in the Middle East?," www.afsa.org/fsj/feb01/hawthorne01.html.

50. I would like to thank Steve Levitsky for reminding me of this quotation.

51. Henry and Springborg, p. 32.

52. Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly*, 115 (2000), 89.

53. Ayman al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (Boulder: Westview, 1985); Raymond Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria* (Boulder: Westview, 1990).

54. Alexander Bligh, "The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges," in Barry

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Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds., *Armed Forces in the Middle East* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 150.

55. Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Army on the Domestic and External Fronts," in Rubin and Keaney, eds., pp. 118–22.

56. Barry Rubin, "The Military in Contemporary Middle Eastern Politics," in Rubin and Keaney, eds., pp. 7–8.

57. Robert Satloff, *Troubles on the East Bank* (New York: Praeger, 1986), pp. 60–62; Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).

58. Zisser, pp. 119–20.

59. Friedman, p. 101.

60. Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution 1979," *American Sociological Review*, 61 (February 1996), 165.

61. Of course, high levels of popular mobilization were not the only reason the military folded. Also at work were the weak administrative structure of the military (which was left headless after the shah's departure) and the sense among the generals that the U.S. had abandoned the shah. See Said Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown* (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 121–29.

62. Besides providing rhetorical legitimation for coercive regimes, persistent conflict has rationalized the prolonged states of emergency that stifle civil liberties in many Middle Eastern and North African countries. See Gregory Gause, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World," in Brynen, Korani, and Noble, eds., pp. 283–306.

63. Droz-Vincent, p. 17.

64. Karen Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

65. Bratton and van de Walle; Banac.

66. Brownlee; Snyder.

67. No single variable is universally necessary or sufficient for an outcome as complex as democracy. But past democratic transitions suggest that the chances for democracy are favored when per capita GNP rises above $5,500, when there is popular consensus about national solidarity, and when elites are persuaded that democratic institutions are the least worst way to handle conflict. See Eva Bellin, "Iraq Post-Saddam: Prospects for Democracy," *Harvard Magazine* (July-August, 2003). See also Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theory and Facts," *World Politics*, 49 (1997), 155–83; Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2002), 5–21; Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, Amy Hawthorne, and Daniel Brumberg, "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, October 2002.

68. H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, "A Theory of Sultanism," in Chehabi and Linz, eds., p. 48.

69. Statistically, between $4,500 and $5,500.

Michael Hudson, Arab Politics (Yale 1977)

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The Legitimacy Problem in Arab Politics

Without legitimacy, argued Max Weber, a ruler, regime, or governmental system is hard-pressed to attain the conflict-management capability essential for long-run stability and good government. While the stability of an order may be maintained for a time through fear or expediency or custom, the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept the rightness of the ruler's superior power.[1] Contemporary scholars agree. As David Easton puts it:

> The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is probably the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor both of the authorities and of the regime. A member may be willing to obey the authorities and conform to the requirements of the regime for many different reasons. But the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere. The strength of support implicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of any kind, except in the very long run.[2]

Ted Gurr, after identifying a number of common synonyms or near-synonyms for legitimacy such as "political community," "political myth," "support," "authoritativeness," and "system affect," proposes that regimes are legitimate "to the extent that their citizens regard

1. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 124–26; Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 294–95.

2. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 278.

them as proper and deserving of support."[3] It is the extent to which leadership and regimes are perceived by elites and masses as congruent and compatible with the society's fundamental myths—those "value-impregnated beliefs" (as Robert MacIver puts it) that hold society together.[4] The governmental system and leadership that is genuinely national, that partakes of the nation's history, that acts in accordance with the society's values, and that protects its broadest concerns is likely to be regarded as legitimate, even though particular decisions and leaders may be unpopular or unwise. A ruler, regime, or governmental process (procedures, arrangements for collective choice) that is not widely perceived as clothed in legitimacy is not able to function authoritatively.

The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab governments. If one were called upon to describe the contemporary style of politics in the Arab world—a region that stretches from Morocco to Kuwait, organized into eighteen sovereign states (excluding Mauritania and Somalia, which recently joined the Arab League) embracing some 125 million people—the adjectives that immediately spring to mind include mercurial, hyperbolic, irrational, mysterious, uncertain, even dangerous. Arab politics today are not just unstable, although instability remains a prominent feature, they are also unpredictable to participants and observers alike. Fed by rumor, misinformation, and lack of information, the Arab political process is cloaked in obscurity and Arab politicians are beset by insecurity and fear of the unknown. If their behavior appears at times quixotic or even paranoid, the irrationality lies less within themselves than in their situation. Whether in power or in the opposition, Arab politicians must operate in a political environment in which the legitimacy of rulers, regimes, and the institutions of the states themselves is sporadic and, at best, scarce. Under these conditions seemingly irrational behavior, such as assassinations, coups d'état, and official repression, may in fact derive from rational calculations. The consequences of such behavior, which itself stems from the low legitimacy accorded to political processes and institutions, contribute further to the prevailing popular cynicism about politics. These consequences, so dysfunctional for political development by almost any definition, are all the more damaging

3. Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 183–85.
4. Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 4–5.

when juxtaposed against the revolutionary and nationalist values that are today so widely and intensely held by the Arab people. These values include liberation of the entire national homeland by regaining Palestine and throwing off indirect forms of external influence; fulfillment of Arab national identity through integration, if not fusion, of the numerous sovereignties; and the establishment of democratic political structures through which social justice and equality can be achieved. Such are the staples of virtually all political platforms in the Arab states, regardless of regime orientation; and such appeals have amply proved their political salience from one end of the Arab world to the other, as evidenced by the wave of independence and revolutionary movement throughout the region since World War I. So widespread are these appeals that every Arab politician of consequence has felt compelled to endorse and exploit them; and today, as we shall see, even the ideologically conservative monarchies have become fervent advocates of Arabism, democracy, and social justice. But such vast, if not utopian, ideals, held by so many with almost sacred fervor, contrast strikingly with the grim realities of political life. This incongruence cannot but complicate the task of building a legitimate order. Indeed, one observes from conversations with politicians and government officials across the Arab world a sense of frustration. They find themselves caught between ideology and political-administrative realities. They discover apathy, indifference, and corruption within their own bureaucracies and among the constituencies to be served. One also observes a widespread negative attitude, even fear, toward government among ordinary people. Even census taking in countries such as Sa'udi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and, of course, Lebanon is regarded with suspicion. Such attitudes cannot be satisfactorily explained simply as the superstitions of "traditional" people but rather appear to be rationally derived from unhappy prior experience with "the authorities."

Structure of the Arab Legitimacy Problem

To analyze the Arab legitimacy problem most fruitfully, we must look beyond explanations rooted in the alleged uniqueness of the area itself. While it is easy to demonstrate the uniqueness of Arab culture, it is fallacious to assume that this uniqueness decisively shapes the political behavior of Arabs. Instead, we must seek our explanation in terms of universally applicable categories of analysis. Apart from the well-known objections to an area-oriented approach on general empirical grounds, an additional reason for looking to general theory is

the dubious character of existing reductionist concepts of the Arab or Islamic mind, personality, and national character.

The legitimacy problem in the Arab world is basically the same as that in most newly independent, rapidly modernizing states. In essence, it results from the lack of what Dankwart Rustow has designated as the three prerequisites for political modernity: authority, identity, and equality.[5] The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a territory must feel a sense of political community which does not conflict with other subnational or supranational communal identifications. If distinct communal solidarity may be understood as the necessary horizontal axis for the legitimate political order, there must as well be a strong, authoritative vertical linkage between the governors and the governed. Without authoritative political structures endowed with "rightness" and efficacity, political life is certain to be violent and unpredictable.

Equality, the third prerequisite for political legitimacy, is specifically a product of the modern age, which in the Arab world may be dated from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798. Certainly the nationalist stirrings in various parts of the Arab world, which began in the late nineteenth century and came to fruition in the post–World War I period, have been increasingly infused with liberal and radical ideology. The ideas of freedom, democracy, and socialism are today inextricable criteria for legitimate political order in the Arab world, as in most of the Third World, and are, unfortunately, far from being achieved. This singular failing, however, does not vitiate the importance of equality as a functional prerequisite for legitimacy in Arab politics; indeed, I shall argue that it stands as the single greatest impediment (though not the only one) to the development of political legitimacy in the Arab world.

It is now virtually a truism that the process of modernization, or social mobilization as Karl Deutsch has called it, has profound effects on the politics of the new states, effects that are both functional and dysfunctional for building political legitimacy.[6] The social mobilization "package," which includes increasing urbanization, literacy, education, media exposure, and wealth, appears, on the one hand, to enhance the possibilities of developing a civic, liberal political order inasmuch as it broadens people's identifications and affiliations, integrates their

5. Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

6. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55:3 (September 1961), pp. 493–514, esp. pp. 498–502.

socioeconomic behavior, and standardizes to some extent their cultural norms. It also, in theory, enlarges the capabilities of government and administration. On the other hand, social mobilization is disruptive of traditional political relationships: the newly mobilized, politicized masses do not find old patterns of identity and authority relevant, and the process of developing new ones is rarely peaceful and sometimes revolutionary. Furthermore, rapid social mobilization certainly accentuates the importance of equality as a prerequisite norm for political legitimacy. The effects of social mobilization are discussed in chapter 6.

Specific Features of the Arab Legitimacy Problem

The politics of the Arab states can and should be analyzed in terms of the foregoing general framework, which is equally applicable to all modernizing polities. But there are several features of the Arab situation that require special attention for a full understanding of the Arab legitimacy problem. Indeed, to approach the legitimacy problem of any particular Arab state without reference to conditions and issues common and salient to all Arabs, or to what most Arabs refer to as the Arab nation, would result in a monochromatic, two-dimensional analysis. To put the matter in a slightly different way, Arab politicians and Arab political behavior are evaluated not solely according to internal, intrastate criteria. It is impossible to make an adequate diagnosis of the legitimacy of a particular Arab political system, regime, leader, or politician without reference to factors external to the Arab world. External sources of legitimacy, as we shall see in the comparative case studies below, are of two types: The first is the influence, defined largely in terms of the classical instruments of power, such as threat, coercion, promise, and reward, from contiguous or neighboring regimes and movements. For example, Syria or Egypt will "interfere" in the affairs of a neighboring Arab country by trying to enhance or reduce the legitimacy of a given politician or regime. The second type of external factor is more broadly identified as a set of evaluative standards that the noted Lebanese writer Clovis Maksoud has called all-Arab core concerns. The legitimacy of given leaders in a given state is determined to an important extent by their fidelity to these core concerns. At the present time, as I have indicated, Palestine is the foremost all-Arab core concern, although not the only one.

The fact that the Arab world in the late 1970s is divided into eighteen sovereign jurisdictions plus the Palestinian community enormously complicates the problem of developing two of the prerequisites of legitimacy—national identity and authority. National identity in the

Arab *umma* is at best multidimensional, at worst mired in irreconcilable contradictions. Legitimate authority is hard to develop within state structures whose boundaries are inherently incompatible with those of the nation. To make matters worse, the state interests of particular regimes are often incompatible with one another, so that conflict of varying degrees of severity often characterizes the relations between Arab states instead of the cooperation and harmony so obviously in the "national interest." One of the most perplexing features of contemporary Arab politics is the simultaneous growth of integrative cross-national behavior—as indexed by the proliferation of functional organizations and by flows of trade, finance, development projects, tourists, elites, and leaders—and the persistence of intrastate tensions, which have sometimes escalated into sabotage and armed violence, as in disputes between Syria and Jordan, Syria and Iraq, Egypt and Sa'udi Arabia, Sa'udi Arabia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, "south" Yemen), the PDRY and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, "north" Yemen), Libya and Morocco, and Algeria and Morocco—to take the most prominent examples from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. In recent years, particularly since the decline of Nasirism in the mid-1960s, some writers on Arab affairs have argued that the pan-Arab urge, never very successful, is now on the wane.[7] The failure of the highly touted unification or federation efforts by Egypt and Syria in the late 1950s and by Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, and Libya in the early 1970s would seem to support such a conclusion. But the fact that such efforts persist is surely as significant, if not more so, as the fact that they have thus far failed; and the fact that organizations with pan-Arab commitments such as the Ba'th party and the Palestinian national movement are now quite institutionalized without having forsaken their goal of all-Arab solidarity also suggests that pan-Arab perspectives have not lost their salience. Arab nationalism remains a formidable legitimizing resource for kings and presidents alike, and the considerable potential power of a revolutionary like George Habash derives in no small measure from his impeccable Arab nationalist credentials.

Given the fact that sovereign power in the Arab world today is distributed among several states, it is necessary to analyze the legitimacy problem of each within its own territorial context, but it would be a mistake not to recognize the importance of the pan-Arab environment in both its power and moral dimensions for intrastate legitimacy. I attempt to give due consideration to this factor in the comparative case studies below. In doing so I also attempt to recognize that the salience of all-Arab concerns for political legitimacy varies within the Arab world.

7. For an interesting discussion of this theory, see Richard H. Pfaff, "The Function of Arab Nationalism," *Comparative Politics*, 2:2 (January 1970), pp. 147–68.

Legitimacy and Change: Three Perspectives

I have suggested that the problem of community and conflict in the Arab world today arises from a legitimacy shortage and that this shortage in turn is the result of the profound transformation occurring throughout Arab society and culture. As indicated above, scholars are less certain than they once were about the nature of modernization, particularly its political ramifications. One can discern three theoretical approaches that help reveal the implications of social change for building legitimacy. Broadly, each suggests a different range of possibilities for a legitimate political order. The "transformationist" model envisages the possibility, indeed to some the inevitability, of the complete displacement of traditional by rational sociopolitical systems through the cataclysm of revolution that in turn is induced by contradictions in the changing social structure. The Arab world political counterparts are several new republics with ideologies dedicated to a thoroughgoing social revolution surpassing in scope simple nationalist assimilation. The "mosaic" model emphasizes the persistence of primordial and parochial loyalties even during rapid modernization, and in some conditions even predicts their strengthening. The implication of this model for building legitimacy is that reconciliation, bargaining, and conflict management procedures are the only viable course short of brutal, forced assimilation for achieving community. Finally, the social mobilization model conceives of political outcomes, including ultimately legitimacy, as the product of a constellation of not necessarily harmonious social forces interacting with a given political culture. In its liberal version, the social mobilization model holds out the possibility of modernization giving rise to an educated, tolerant "civic" polity. In another version it is seen giving rise to efficient despotism or anarchy. I will discuss each of the three models briefly.

The transformationist model conceives of a fundamental system change from tradition to rationality through the medium of revolution. The revolution is a watershed that separates the new rational order from its traditional roots. Hisham Sharabi, discussing the Arab world, draws the distinction clearly: "Revolutionary leadership is 'rational,' choosing specific means to achieve specific ends, whereas patriarchal

leadership is 'traditional,' accepting inherited values and goals and employing customary means to achieve them."[8] Sharabi, observing the coups d'état in the Arab world between 1949 and 1963, sees the transition process as relatively sudden and discontinuous through the traumatic event of revolution.[9] Power has to be seized; it is possible for men to transform a polity from the traditional to the rational by making a revolution; there is "a revolutionary wave" that is challenging both the remaining traditional states and the "intermediate" states.[10] It is noteworthy that in his recent writings Sharabi is consistent in maintaining his radical optimism, that is, his belief in the possibility of men creating a rational political order, despite the receding of the revolutionary wave in the Arab world after 1967 and the weakening of the Palestinian national movement in Jordan 1970–71 and Lebanon in 1976. Optimism is still possible because the Marxist liberationist position insists that Arab society, with its medieval disabilities, contains fundamental destabilizing contradictions which, when triggered, will generate the mass revolutionary consciousness that has been missing thus far.[11] Sharabi's analysis, which is partially correct, implies that once the revolution has been triggered a new and rational legitimacy formula will emerge, one that is deeply rooted and congruent with the new revolutionary worker and peasant class consciousness. The indisputably valid part of this analysis is the clarity with which it distinguishes traditional orientations from revolutionary ideologies and the significance it bestows on the revolutionary event in the transformation of political systems. Certainly once the revolution has occurred, there must be some change in the legitimacy formula. Less certain is whether revolutionary legitimacy formulas can sweep away traditional values and become deeply rooted themselves, that is, whether there can be a successful resolution of the revolution.

Similarly, Manfred Halpern invokes the metaphor of "the shattering of the glass" to depict the impact of secular modernism on traditional Islamic society.[12] Again, the image is one of the complete displacement of a system of balanced traditional beliefs and certainties by a disruptive force that, initially at least, offers no coherent system to replace it. One

8. Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 53.

9. Ibid., chap. 4.

10. Ibid., pp. 72–79.

11. Hisham B. Sharabi, "Liberation or Settlement: The Dialectics of Palestinian Struggle," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 3:2 (Winter 1973), pp. 33–48.

12. Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), chap. 2.

does not need to accept Halpern's assertion that a new professional middle class is building a new, pragmatic science- and technology-based legitimacy formula to appreciate his insight into the profundity of the social changes that are taking place. Nor does one have to share Sharabi's radical optimism to benefit from his emphasis on the importance of the political sector in the process of change and of the very sharp contradictions in belief systems manifest in that sector.

The mosaic model, which has received renewed scholarly attention, questions the assumption underlying the transformationist and social mobilization models, namely that major sociopolitical development is likely or necessary. It questions even the possibility of revolution. The mosaic model asserts the persistence of traditional particularist identifications even under conditions of modernization or political revolution. It stresses the permanence of parochial and corporatist orientations. Among the most prominent social scientists to stress the deep-rootedness of "primordial" identifications, ethnic, religious, racial, and linguistic, is Clifford Geertz who, in a well-known article, indicated their possibly explosive salience for political developments in the new states.[13] Milton Esman asserts that "ethnic, racial, and religious solidarities are likely to touch deeper emotional levels" than other cleavages, implying that it cannot be easy for modernizing regimes to replace them with new loyalties.[14] Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring have challenged the logic of the Weberian secularization model (as expounded by Marion Levy).[15] That model, they suggest, asserts that with specialization, division of labor, and greater interaction of subsystems a society inevitably becomes more homogeneous, so that particularist, corporate subgroups lose their cohesion and distinctiveness. But they go on to argue that the assumption that the greater the social interaction, the greater the cognitive problem of distinguishing individuals and of placing them in society is erroneous, at least for societies that tend to be corporatist rather than individualist, that is, societies in which there are substantial identifiable majorities or stigmatized groups.

The implications for developing legitimacy that flow from the mosaic image are somber. Because ethnicity is so deep-rooted, the possibilities

13. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 105–57.

14. Milton Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," *Public Policy* 21:1 (Winter 1973), pp. 49–78, 54.

15. Ronald Rogowski and Lois Wasserspring, "Legitimacy and Stability in Corporatist Societies," paper delivered at the 1969 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 1–7.

for the integration of new polities along modern lines, let alone revolutionary transformation, are remote; but insofar as assimilative, modernizing ideologies have an irreversible momentum of their own, the prospects for continuous conflict—a permanent legitimacy crisis—are far from negligible. The anthropologist M. G. Smith has developed a model of the plural society, characterized by deeply divided subcultures whose cohesion can only be maintained by a coercive elite.[16] Walker Connor, in a sharp attack on the assimilationist assumption in conventional models of nation-building, finds that only 10 percent of the world's states are ethnically homogeneous while in some 30 percent the largest ethnic group fails to account for half the total population. These are significant figures if it is also true, as he asserts, that "the prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population."[17] Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle propose a model of the essential instability of multiethnic polities, owing to a tendency toward "the politics of outbidding."[18] On the empirical level, in his cross-national study of civil strife in 119 polities, Ted Robert Gurr found that indicators of "group discrimination" and "political separatism" were "consistently and positively related to levels of civil violence."[19] Similarly, Douglas Hibbs, in his analysis of data from Charles Taylor's and my *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, discovered a "powerful interactive impact manifested by the conjunction of social mobilization and ethnolinguistic fractionalization . . . (which provides striking evidence for theories arguing that a mobilized *and* differentiated population is a particularly explosive combination)."[20] Then of course there are the numerous contemporary intrastate conflicts that strikingly illustrate

16. M. G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," in M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 75–91. See also Leo Kuper, "Sociology: Some Aspects of Urban Plural Societies," in R. A. Lystad (ed.), *The African World: A Survey of Social Research* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 107–30; and Leo Kuper, "Plural Societies: Perspectives and Problems," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), *Pluralism in Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 7–26.

17. Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?" *World Politics*, 24:3 (April 1972), pp. 319–55, 320, 353.

18. Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

19. Ted Gurr, with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Test of a Causal Model*, Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1967, p. 108. See also Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, chap. 1 and Appendix.

20. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 76–78. Data are drawn largely from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson et al., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

the salience of ethnic identifications and conflict: Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Ruanda-Urundi, and Ethiopia, to name only a few of the most prominent.

What of the applicability of the mosaic model to the Arab world? This examination of Arab political culture will make clear that it is permeated with primordial sentiments and honeycombed with stigmatized groups—religious, ethnolinguistic, racial, tribal, and class; it thus tends toward the corporatist or segmented rather than the individualist type. At least half of the Arab countries exhibit politically salient (often conflict-ridden) divisions: Morocco, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the two Yemens, Oman, and Bahrain. In Arab society, then, "particularism can survive modernization."[21] The same is true of the non-Arab Middle Eastern states of Cyprus and Iran. The problems thus posed for developing political system legitimacy are serious indeed, especially in polities that have recently undergone modernizing coups or revolutions. Even under the comparatively optimistic transformationist and social mobilization models, it is not easy for elites to compose a strong legitimacy formula, but at least they can draw some solace from theories that predict the acceptance of universal symbols and norms sooner or later. The implantation of common revered loyalties and "rules of the game" can be expected. But if the political culture remains tenaciously parochial and segmented despite modernization (and the political ferment it generates)—if, indeed, modernization may in some cases actually exacerbate such separatist tendencies—then the problem of developing a political system legitimacy formula is not likely to solve itself as modernization continues; instead the nature of the problem itself is changed. In such cases, strategies of legitimacy based on transformationist or social mobilization models should be rejected, some scholars have argued, in favor of strategies of accommodation. For example, Iliya Harik asserts that "the new states of the Middle East are in need of accommodating particularistic tendencies and by constructive policy channeling them in the service of the civic order with patience and endurance."[22]

Perhaps the most satisfactory conception of the third model of change, the social mobilization model, is found in the work of Karl Deutsch.[23] His work, like that of other major development theorists such as Marion Levy, David Apter, and Gabriel Almond, falls within

21. Rogowski and Wasserspring, op. cit., p. 4.

22. Iliya Harik, "The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 3:3 (July 1972), pp. 303–23, 312.

23. Deutsch, op. cit. See also his classic *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

the Weberian tradition. This tradition (though not Weber himself) conceives of the transition from traditional to rational-legal societies through the process of secularization. In Deutsch's well-known formulation, social mobilization is posited as an interrelated set of growth processes including economic development, mass media exposure, interpersonal communications, urbanization, and the expansion of literacy and education. The implications of social mobilization for political system legitimacy are profound, especially in the Arab world where the growth rates are so high; but they do not all pull in the same direction. There are two areas of impact: the loads-capabilities equation, which relates the political system to the society, and the integration of the political culture itself. Social mobilization expands the politically relevant population by politicizing the masses and by both enlarging and fragmenting the elite. Thus it may create new and contradictory demands on government. The aspects of social mobilization bearing on infrastructure growth (urbanization, industrialization, etc.) may also generate heavier administrative demands on the decision-making apparatus and bureaucracy. On the other hand, the government and other structures of the political system may themselves grow, and their capabilities for institutionalizing participation, initiating development, and controlling subversion—in short, for coping with modernity—may be more than adequate to meet the new demands. Unfortunately, it is not easy to discern empirically whether the net effect is positive or negative in any particular case. Similarly, while the growth of communications networks associated with social mobilization may solidify the communal identity of groups having some primordial characteristics in common, such as language, race, ethnicity, or religion, it may actually divide societies in which there are several such semidistinct groupings: instead of all enhancing their identifications to the society bounded by the state, they may develop subnational or supranational affinities that weaken the state's legitimacy formula. The effects of social mobilization upon system legitimacy, therefore, are complex and even possibly contradictory, as Deutsch has always recognized. But his conceptualization of the process illuminates the possibilities more clearly perhaps than any other. It certainly illuminates the obstacles to legitimacy in fast mobilizing, culturally heterogeneous societies.

The psychological dimension of social mobilization also has important implications for the legitimacy problem. In his pioneering study of social change in the Middle East, Daniel Lerner suggests that empathy—the quality of an individual being able to imagine himself in somebody else's role—is one consequence of exposure to modernity

(or social mobilization).[24] Empathy may ease the transition from tradition to modernity; it may promote the tolerance and ability to compromise, to associate together on instrumental and rational grounds instead of through primordial affinities. The implication is that new bases for community—a new legitimacy formula—are not only possible but predictable as a function of the rate of social mobilization.

But there is also a pessimistic side to this psychological coin. In modern society the social atomization of the individual produces apathy and alienation. These characteristics, Kornhauser argues, in turn facilitate the manipulation of the individual by the state or organized political movements.[25] His observations about mass society are based on the highly modernized societies of the West, and even the most modernized areas of the Arab world do not reach the same levels of industrialization or social differentiation. But they are relevant nonetheless. Even partial modernization generates severe pressures on the medieval mosaic of primordial affiliations that has always held Arab society together. And Arab society (perhaps because it is only partially modernized) lacks the web of secondary associations and cross-cutting group memberships of Western society so well celebrated by Tocqueville. Thus when old solidarities are broken down, Arab society probably lacks the "cushion" of secondary associations that in the West serve to some extent to counteract alienation. The implications for legitimacy are again ambivalent. On the one hand, mass alienation may be considered functional for establishing a new and rational legitimacy formula because it uproots people from old affiliations and renders them manipulatable, although this is not how Arab revolutionaries would describe the development of mass revolutionary consciousness. On the other hand, if alienation is a relatively permanent condition in a long period of social change, it may make the establishment of any permanent and active loyalties very difficult for the new regime as well as the old. An apathetic and perhaps unreliable population is an obstacle to the achievement of revolutionary objectives, and the nonachievement of objectives in turn is a new drain upon legitimacy.[26]

Granting that each of the three perspectives contains valuable insights, is it possible to ascertain which is the most valid for this

24. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), pp. 47–52.

25. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Chicago: Free Press, 1959), esp. chaps 4, 7, and 8.

26. Cf. Halim Barakat, "Al-Ightirab wal-thawra" (Alienation and Revolution), *Mawaqif* (Beirut), 5 (1969).

inquiry? The radical ideological transformation in Arab politics is a fact of undeniable importance, notwithstanding the equally obvious fact that the Arab revolutions thus far have accomplished far less than they were intended to. Customary authority has sharply declined in importance at the national level in over half the countries of the area and is beginning to give way at the local level as well. In the Arab political vocabulary modern ideological symbols of liberation, democracy, and socialism are crowding out the parochial kinship and religious symbols of an earlier era as the basis for the legitimate political order. Ever so gradually centers of power are evolving that rest upon the egalitarian concerns not of a "new middle class" but of the great mass of urban and rural laboring people, as the established revolutionary movements seek to create a mass base to justify their rule. Imperfect as they may appear when judged against classical socialist standards, the revolutionary systems in Syria and Iraq, Algeria, Tunisia, the PDRY, and even post-Nasir Egypt, to mention the most notable cases, are indeed radical by comparison with the regimes that preceded them. Nevertheless, the radical optimism of the late 1950s and early 1960s that detected or anticipated a "shattering of the glass" and the creation of a coherent new basis for legitimacy on "modern" grounds was clearly mistaken. New legitimacy norms are not to be instantly and comprehensively implanted, and old values and attachments, whose incompatibility with modernity was exaggerated by the revolutionaries, are not going to be eradicated quickly.

But to admit that the validity of the transformationist model is only partial is not to concede superior validity to the mosaic model, for it too is defective. The chief merit of the mosaic perspective is its emphasis on the persistence of traditional solidarity patterns, with its obvious negative implications for radical sociopolitical engineering. But as the basis for a workable strategy for legitimacy, the mosaic model presents difficulties. On balance, there is little evidence to suggest that the Arab states are undergoing an "ethnic revolution." It is true that important ethnoreligious minorities, such as the Kurds, Sudanese blacks, and Lebanese Catholics, have been politicized perhaps to an even greater degree by social mobilization than the majority populations and have tried, with important Western help, to assert or defend their political independence. It is also true that other primordial groupings, such as the North African Berbers and the Alawite and Shi'ite Muslims of the eastern Arab world, exhibit the potential for political autonomy. But the spread of Arab identity and the imperatives to functional coordination arising out of technological and economic development suggest that Balkanization of the present Arab sovereignties and the larger Arab community, notwithstanding their own precarious and unconsolidated legitimacy, is not a deep-running trend. Even the Lebanese civil war has been a manifestation of sociopolitical rather than primordial-parochial cleavages. The image of an Arab Middle East dominated by particularist sectarian or ethnic elites is appealing to some for various reasons, but it is probably not an accurate forecast of the Arab future. The legitimacy of any new fragment-entities certainly would be severely challenged by the radical, secularist, assimilative, nation-building elements in Arab politics, which remain the strongest shapers of Arab goals and world views. Even though much Arab nationalist ideology of the 1950s and 1960s, with its calls for unity and social transformation, must be regarded as romantic and unrealistic, the trend is likely to remain toward assimilation rather than fragmentation, toward fewer and larger states, and toward greater functional coordination.

Is the social mobilization model, then, the most valid of the three? I feel that it is, in that it takes better account of the relevant factors. But I do not therefore conclude that the road to legitimacy in Arab politics is either smooth or short. It should be apparent from what I have said about the transformationist and mosaic perspectives that the social mobilization model, at least in its "melting pot" version, is seriously oversimplified. Thus this approach, like the other two, is unable to lead directly to a solution of the Arab legitimacy problem. Although this study ultimately concludes that the principal "cure" for the legitimacy problem is a significant degree of institutionalized participation through parliaments, parties, or equivalent bodies, it is not because social mobilization is producing bodies politic that are more individualized, liberal, educated, and tolerant, and thus "ready" for democracy. I cannot optimistically accept the old liberal arguments that a certain level of economic and social attainment (which the Arabs today are capable of reaching) are prerequisites for liberal democracy, as Lipset tried to demonstrate in general and Issawi tried to apply to Middle Eastern societies in particular.[27] Rather, it is because the political realities of an expanding, more differentiated, more organized, more sophisticated, politically mobilized population will require more representative institutions if a higher degree of political legitimacy is to be achieved. This is not to say, of course, that the requirement will be met, and it is entirely possible that higher degrees of legitimacy will

27. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), chap. 2; Charles Issawi, "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, 32:1 (1956), pp. 27–42.

not be achieved. The two alternatives – chronic instability or more efficient despotism underpinned by fear and corruption – are equally foreseeable possibilities.

The particular merit of the social mobilization model lies not so much in its ability to predict a particular future as in its explication of the interplay of factors that will determine that future. Social mobilization is changing the structure of Arab politics. The possibility of assimilative nation-building remains real, though it will not occur within a short time; but, as I have indicated, the outcome is the result of the interaction between an expanding, more complex political arena, on the one hand, and the growth of government itself, on the other. These processes have profound implications for the development of government authority and political identity. Given the peculiarities of the Arab nation and the several Arab states and the sharply different levels of social mobilization in different parts of the Arab world and within particular states, it is no simple matter to sort out these implications. Consequently, it is easier to describe and analyze the struggle for legitimacy in different parts of the Arab world than it is to predict whether the Arabs are likely to develop more legitimate political systems in the future. I shall, however, hazard some opinions on this subject in the final chapter.

Strategies for Building Legitimacy

I have tried to expose the nature of the legitimacy problem in the Arab world in all its gravity and complexity. I turn now to another question: how is legitimacy developed under these difficult conditions? It might be argued that, for some regimes at least, no legitimacy whatever is developed. Indeed, John Waterbury, in an ingenious discussion of corruption in Morocco, goes even further and suggests that the system's stability depends on its pervasive illegitimacy.[28] But only the most cynical observers would contend that Arab political systems are totally devoid of legitimacy and thus completely dependent upon raw coercion for such stability as they may possess. Some systems enjoy greater legitimacy than others, and the legitimacy of particular ones fluctuates over time.

Leaders, regimes, and oppositions cope with the problem in various ways, using the instruments of legitimation at their disposal in varying combinations and trying to develop and maintain a reservoir of diffuse support as well as a specific coalition of supporters. What kind

28. John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," *World Politics*, 25:4 (July 1973), pp. 533–55.

of legitimacy resources can they rely on? Again, Weber's insights are germane. He states that the legitimacy of an order can be established by tradition, by positive affectual, emotional attitudes, by rational belief in its absolute value, or by recognition of its legality. In modern societies, he suggests, "the most usual basis of legitimacy is the belief in *legality*, the readiness to conform with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted procedure."[29] The difficulties confronting Arab politicians are obvious. First, Arab society is no longer traditional in the sense that any significant sectors can be swayed by appeals to custom, status, or superstition. Too much has happened in this century to disrupt customary authority relations and the status of old elites; too much social mobilization has occurred in the last generation for "primitive" superstition or fatalism to remain as reliable bases for rule. But if contemporary Arab society is no longer traditional, it is far from being fully modern; rather it is, in S. N. Eisenstadt's terminology, "post-traditional" – an obscure, ambivalent condition conducive neither to traditional legitimacy nor to rational-legal legitimacy.[30]

Second, the possibility of legitimacy based on rational belief in absolute values, expressed for example in the acceptance of natural law philosophy in the medieval West, is diminished in the modern Arab world because of the decline of Islamic jurisprudence as a significant factor in the formation of public policy. I am not suggesting that Islam is in decline as a popular religion; indeed, its importance as a solidarity bond and a component of Arabism remains undiminished. But the growing irrelevance of Islamic standards and criteria in the issues, conflicts, and policy processes of modern Arab politics and the diminishing influence of Islamic authorities in politics reduce the importance of an Islamic variant of Weber's "natural law" as a basis for legitimacy.

Third, as I have hinted, the struggle to develop legitimacy based on legality, which is the core of the Arab legitimacy problem, is only beginning. The norm that there should be "right rules of the game" is almost universally accepted by Arab elites, but the rules themselves in general have not been spelled out, have not remained permanent, and have been only sporadically effective. Given the newness of all the present Arab political systems (including the so-called traditional monarchies), it could hardly be otherwise. In short, Weber's "accepted

29. Weber, op. cit., pp. 130–32, 131.
30. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition," *Daedalus*, 102:1 (Winter 1973), pp. 1–28.

procedures" are still largely absent. Little wonder, then, that what passes for regime support or popularity – transitory legitimacy—is so strongly infused with affect, emotion, and charisma. Little wonder too that it is so sporadic, mercurial, and insubstantial; it lacks solid institutional underpinnings.

I must now examine the instruments and strategies of legitimacy-building that politicians operating under the austere conditions of Arab politics can employ. What structural and cultural resources can they draw upon to generate citizen attitudes that the regime is "proper and deserving of support"?[31] David Easton has provided a useful threefold classification of legitimacy resources: personal, ideological, and structural. A strong personal leader may generate legitimacy for a regime or an entire system. The regime or opposition movement that succeeds in identifying itself with a highly salient ideological program may win positive support. Certainly in the Arab world those leaders who successfully associate themselves with the fullfillment of abstract but highly valued goals pertaining to sacred obligations, corporate identity, or deeply valued principles are likely to last longer and perform better than those who can induce compliance only on the basis of fear or expediency. Such leaders may even succeed in generating the scarcest but most enduring kind of legitimacy of all—structural or legal legitimacy, that is, a generalized respect for the rightness of the decision making and adjudicative roles and procedures of the political system itself. I will discuss briefly each of Easton's three types as they constitute the framework of analysis employed in the case studies in chapters 7, 8, and 9.

Personal

In systems "where the behavior and personalities of the occupants of authority role are of dominating importance," suggests Easton, the personal basis of legitimacy may be an important component of the overall legitimacy formula.[32] He goes on to suggest that the leader enjoying high personal legitimacy "may violate the norms and prescribed procedures of the regime and . . . ignore its regular structural arrangements." Moreover, "all political leadership, and not the charismatic type alone, if it is effective in winning support at all, carries with it this legitimizing potential; hence the concept of personal legitimacy covers a broader range of leadership phenomena than

31. Gurr, op. cit., p. 185.
32. Easton, op. cit., pp. 302–03.

charisma, in Weber's original sense, and includes the latter."[33] The political systems of the Arab world, as we shall see, have certainly assigned a strong role to personal leadership, historically and culturally. Furthermore, Arab leaders in the modern age, operating in systems that are poorly institutionalized and in the throes of ideological change, have had to carry more of the legitimacy burden than they can easily bear. Some, like Nasir and Bourguiba have exerted charisma (valid or spurious) over their followers and have single-handedly bestowed substantial coherence to their systems. Most of the region's numerous other strongmen have lacked comparable magnetism and failed to impart similar coherence, yet they have still accounted for much of whatever system legitimacy exists. One thinks of leaders like Ja'far al-Numayri of the Sudan, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi of Libya, Hafiz al-Asad of Syria, Abd al-Karim Qassim of Iraq, and Houari Boumedienne of Algeria. That even those leaders incapable of casting magical spells over their followers can still perform a legitimizing function is due partly to the vacuum in legitimacy from other sources and partly to the historical-cultural importance assigned to personal leadership. Once again, strong leadership proves to be an unusually important common legitimizing factor in both the traditional and nontraditional regimes.

Personal leadership plays a major legitimizing role, of course, in the Arab monarchies; in fact, in all of them the king, amir, shaykh, or sultan does not merely reign but rules. It should be made clear that I am now speaking of personal, not structural, legitimacy. In traditional Arabian tribal politics we cannot say that "the office makes the man." On the contrary, the leader must demonstrate his personal competence if he is to earn the traditional oath of allegiance. What is perhaps more surprising is the persistence of monolithic personal authority structures in most of the revolutionary republican polities of the region. There is a curious continuity of personalist rule in the most traditional and the most rational systems – from Ibn Khaldun's concept of royal authority to the absolutistic presidential authority of a Nasir or Qadhafi. Since the Arab cases suggest that personal legitimacy is at least as salient in the nontraditional systems as it is in the traditional, it is difficult to accept Moore's opinion that "'personal legitimacy' is meaningless outside a traditional framework," even though he concedes that a charismatic leader can contribute

33. Ibid., pp. 303–4.

to rational legitimacy by articulating a rational formula.[34] Surely the leader's contributions to system legitimacy in Tunisia (and certainly in Egypt) are far more extensive and intensive in themselves than the rational ideologies that they propagate.

Notwithstanding the process through which new and dissonant values are taking root, the deferential orientations that support personalist rule seem to be little diminished. Yet theory would indicate that personalist legitimacy is increasingly vulnerable to erosion as societies modernize and become exposed to norms hostile to absolutism and dictatorship. If this proposition is sound, then—other things being equal—we would expect continued ferment in the monarchical and republican systems prevalent in the region. Such indeed is probably the long-term trend. But at present, personalist leadership is still a formidable legitimacy resource partly because of the absence of countervailing structures and partly because the leaders have been able to embody in themselves some of the diffuse legitimizing values arising out of political culture, most notably nationalism.

Ideological

Ideologies, Easton tells us, are "articulated sets of ideals, ends, and purposes, which help the members of the system to interpret the past, explain the present, and offer a vision for the future. . . . From a manipulative or instrumental point of view they may be interpreted as categories of thought to corral the energies of men; from an expressive point of view we may see them as ideals capable of rousing and inspiring men to action thought to be related to their achievement."[35] Ideology bulks large as a legitimacy resource in Arab politics. Indeed, political discourse in the Arab world over the past quarter century has been awash in ideology. If one were to measure frequency of symbols of nationalism, such as Islam, Palestine, democracy, liberation, and social justice, in the public speeches of Arab leaders, it would in all probability dwarf the discussion of policy alternatives, projects, and day-to-day politics; it would almost certainly exceed the attention given to comparably profound issues of identity, authority, and the ultimate good society in the political vocabulary of more settled political systems.[36]

The psychologically disruptive effects of social mobilization have

34. Clement H. Moore, *Politics in North Africa* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 91, n.5.

35. Easton, op. cit., p. 290.

36. For a succinct essay on the language of Arab politics, see Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1966), chap. 7.

generated not just an interest but a need for the masses newly interested in politics to identify with valued, meaningful collective goals and politicians who credibly associate themselves with these goals. The socially disruptive effects of social mobilization have created at the same time objective conditions of poverty and inequality among the rural and urban lower classes which render ideologies of socialism, redistribution, and social welfare more salient than they might have been fifty years ago. Furthermore, in the absence of structural legitimacy, ideological legitimacy assumes paramount importance almost by default. Ideology becomes a substitute for institutionalization. Perhaps, however, it serves to buy the necessary time for structural legitimacy to develop.

All the Arab regimes, whether "conservative" or "progressive," exploit ideology assiduously in their pursuit of legitimacy. But in the revolutionary republics it has been magnified into what David Apter calls political religion. To understand political religion it is necessary to extract from Apter's complex treatment of modernization his conceptualization of the consummatory and the instrumental aspects of legitimacy.[37] The consummatory aspects of legitimacy are solidarity and identity and the instrumental aspects are concerned with the effectiveness of policy making or political performance evaluated in terms of specified goals. Consummatory legitimizing values flow from Apter's "sacred-collectivity" model of the political system; instrumental ones pertain to his "secular-libertarian" model. Drawing his inspiration from Tolstoy, Apter suggests that through the mechanism of political religion, the political sector can communicate throughout society the symbols which may help satisfy the transcendental needs of individuals. These needs, which he identifies as the necessity of accepting death, establishing an individual personality, and identifying objectives, are doubtless acutely felt by people living through a period of rapid social change. The dilemma of successfully implanting new community values in societies undergoing political upheaval is obvious, and nowhere more so than in the Arab world where the religious character of society is so evident. One strategy for building a viable new mythology is to propagate a mythology that taps the need for the sacred without sacrificing the new requirements of modernity and rationality. Apter suggests that "the sacred may now be employed to develop a system of political legitimacy and to aid in mobilizing the community for secular ends."[38] The Arab, revolutionary

37. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 266, and chap. 8.

38. Ibid., pp. 39, 268, and 292.

regimes conform in theory to Apter's "mobilization system" type in which values of the sacred collectivity model are predominant to the exclusion of the secular-libertarian. Those that have come close include Iraq, Syria, Libya, the PDRY, and Algeria. Certainly "political religion" performs a central legitimizing function in these systems. It also performs a lesser role in those that have fallen short, which Apter might classify as the "neomercantilist" system—Egypt, Tunisia, the Sudan, and the Yemen Arab Republic. In all these cases the primary values invoked are secular nationalism and modernity, and their effectiveness has been enhanced by historical-cultural orientations and the powerful irritant of Western imperialism. In each system the ruling elite attempts to harmonize (in varying degrees, to be sure) religion and nationalism, kinship group and political movement, the legacy of the past and the promise of the future, the sacred and the secular, and the consummatory and the instrumental.

Political religion, however, is a problem as well as a solution from the point of view of those who favor the development of secular liberal democracies legitimized by law. As Apter puts it, "Can mobilization systems with political religions transform themselves into reconciliation systems, whose commitment is to a liberal framework of law? This is a question of great concern to the West." While such a complete transformation seems unlikely, the possibility exists for the emergence of a mixed neomercantilist system through the ritualization of political religion. Ritualization "would limit the functional consequences of religion without destroying its relation to authority." And, "If a mobilization system should begin to ritualize its leadership and traditionalize its consummatory values, by making them into a new and effective link between novelty and the past, this important alternative system becomes possible."[39] This process has been evident in the revolutionary regimes and may account in part for the superficial stability which several of them have displayed in recent years. But whether it can lay groundwork for structural legitimacy in the long run is a more doubtful proposition.

Structural

Political structures in themselves are also an important source of legitimacy. To the extent that they are seen to constitute the framework within which "accepted procedures" are carried out, they bestow legal legitimacy upon the system. In the traditional Arab politics, the offices of caliph, sultan, and shaykh generate respect

39. Ibid., pp. 305, 406–09.

based upon religion or custom, although such legitimacy is even more strongly affected by the personal reputation of the officeholder. The highly developed bureaucracies of some of the premodern dynastic Arab empires contributed to legitimacy by virtue of their pervasive presence and their control and extractive capabilities.

In trying to assess the impact of structural conditions on legitimacy in the contemporary Arab states, the concept of institutionalization as explicated by Samuel Huntington in his important study of political modernization serves as a guide. "Institutionalization," says Huntington, "is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."[40] The more a governmental system or major structures within it are institutionalized, that is, exhibit adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence, the more positively they will contribute to system legitimacy, that is, generate what Easton calls "independent belief in validity of the structure and norms."[41] Legitimacy is also enhanced by the scope of support accorded to structures; Clement Moore makes a strong case for the importance of this characteristic in his analysis of political development in North Africa.[42] The legitimizing constituency becomes larger and more widespread as society modernizes. The enlargement occurs on both the elite and mass levels. It is not easy for a political system to develop a legitimacy formula that will have wide appeal in both the enlarged mass and elite constituencies and also be capable of managing the new conflict cleavages within and between them that accompany the expansion of what Deutsch would call the population available for political participation. The extent to which the present-day Arab regimes can develop structural legitimacy is primarily a function of their ability to develop bureaucratic and party structural capabilities that extend government and politics from the settled area (the *bilad al-makhzan*) to the hinterland (the *bilad al-siba*) to perform service as well as extractive functions. Theory suggests that structurally based legitimacy may be the most durable, but of the three categories Easton proposes, this one has been the most difficult for contemporary Arab politics, whether patrimonial or republican, to develop.

Although the structural legitimacy of most of the modern Arab regimes is weak, it is also important to consider the possibility that it is getting stronger. It is easy for observers preoccupied by the feverish, conflict-ridden nature of Arab politics to forget that there has been a

40. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12–24.

41. Easton, op. cit., p. 287.

42. Moore, op. cit., pp. 91–93.

steady, unspectacular but very important development of a modern judiciary and public administration throughout the region. Unlike the early 1960s, there are today very few places in the Arab world where law and order and a governmental presence do not exist. Political scientists have not explored sufficiently the growth of modern civil and criminal codes alongside or in place of Islamic legal institutions. The considerable growth in the size of civil service and military bureaucracies in nearly all the Arab countries has added new weight to governmental authority. Furthermore, above and beyond the growing control capabilities of government there is also a growing service capability. If it is true that the growing, socially mobilized populations of the Arab world tend increasingly to judge politicians and evaluate the legitimacy of regimes by how well they perform, then it is important to consider policy formation and implementation in assessing overall legitimacy. Unfortunately, too little attention has been paid to policy outcomes, and so it is difficult to make comprehensive assessments of this complex subject.

For all the growth of bureaucratic structures, however, there has been little development of structures of political participation that are integrated within the formal political system. Parties and movements have appeared in most countries of the region, to be sure, but those that are not bureaucratized extensions of the leader or regime have usually played a dysfunctional, revolutionary, sometimes subversive role, challenging rather than consolidating such system legitimacy as may exist. Inasmuch as the liberal tradition in Arab politics was recent and of short duration, this situation is not surprising; the idea of "desert democracy" is too limited to a particular social situation to provide much historical precedent for participation in a modern setting. Nevertheless, this failing, while understandable, is of more than academic importance today because virtually all Arab politicians, conservative and progressive, whether in power or in the opposition, proclaim democracy as a central political goal. And the idea of popular participation has become widely circulated, and presumably widely accepted, by the socially mobilized masses during the last half-century. Today "government by the people, for the people, and of the people" is a criterion of political legitimacy in the Arab world, and the fact that none of the present Arab regimes meets this standard stands as a formidable obstacle to developing genuine structural legitimacy, as opposed merely to the extension of governmental control and patronage.

Pathways to Legitimacy

Burdened with many loads — identity problems, social change, radical ideologies, and incompletely integrated political cultures — the

Arab political systems function fitfully with their meager legitimacy resources. These systems cope with the pressures in two basic ways. One formula, in which traditional autocratic authority combined with diffuse nationalism and the ethos of development, is followed by the modernizing monarchies. The other, in which autocracy clothed in modern democratic norms and buttressed with more militant nationalism and a commitment to social equality as well as development, is practiced in the Arab republics. Most of these republics have been established recently through revolutions or struggles for independence.

The Modernizing Monarchies

With the exception of Morocco, the monarchies form a continuous group embracing most of the Arabian peninsula: Jordan, Sa'udi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. Their authority is patrimonial both in theory and in fact, notwithstanding the accommodations that some of them have made toward democratic values and structures. The monarchies are legitimated primarily by the monarch's personal reputation and secondarily by the tradition of kingship (which in most cases is not firmly rooted) and an ideology emphasizing religious rectitude and kinship obligation. Ruling monarchs are nearly extinct outside the Arab world, but within this region their remarkable persistence suggests that the legitimacy formula that they embody exhibits greater congruence with sociocultural values than observers have thought. The monarchical legitimacy strategy may be designated as patriarchal in order to convey the character of the king's authority; in a fatherly way he governs each tribe and sect. King Hussein frequently speaks of Jordan as a "family." The metaphor has more than passing relevance for a culture in which the family is so central and revered and in which the father traditionally enjoys a high degree of deference from other members. Like many another father, however, Arab kings have frequently had to deal with rebellious children whose own growth and outside education incite them to challenge the established order. Historically, leadership in the tribal societies of the Arab world has fallen to chieftains whose authority has derived in part from their real or mythical kinship status, and in the Islamic polities of the past kinship has been an important legitimizing tradition.

The modern monarchies of the Arab world, not surprisingly, have exploited kinship and religion as legitimizing values: patriarchal authority is presented as normal, and the ruler's piety and dynastic proximity to the line of the Prophet Muhammad is often emphasized. But most of the present monarchs in the region have not been reticent about appropriating more modern values, presenting themselves as

champions of economic development and pillars of secularized nationalism. In certain cases attempts have been made to align the monarchy with a form of parliamentary system although there has been little parliamentary independence.

Personal legitimacy, of course, bulks large among the sources of systemic legitimacy in the monarchies. Strong individual leadership as well as family or religious status are important determinants of the authority to be bestowed upon a king and, by extension, of the legitimacy of his regime. The office of monarch generates a certain structural legitimacy, but the performance of the incumbent is more important. Apart from the structural legitimacy of kingship itself, the contemporary monarchies have also succeeded in varying degree in institutionalizing their regimes more broadly. They have devoted considerable resources toward developing elaborate and capable administrative structures, particularly in the field of internal security. A different kind of structural embellishment was exemplified best until recently by Kuwait, which had developed a semiautonomous parliament and electoral system. I shall suggest that the surviving monarchies in general have been quite resourceful in exploiting the available systemic and symbolic building blocks of legitimacy.

In terms of their orientation to change, the patriarchal systems may best be described as conservative. They accept existing traditional group identities and accommodate them. They exploit traditional rivalries and play one group against another rather than trying to build a new order. The monarchs build their constituency on the traditional power holders: the upper-middle-class commercial and business elite, the large landowners, the clerical establishment, and the local notables of good families. As such they are pursuing a legitimacy strategy of accommodation rather than trying to assimilate traditional groupings into a new national identity; in this orientation they differ from the revolutionary leaders. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that the monarchs are insensitive to the legitimacy potential of certain nontraditional values. Several of the kings have sought to associate themselves with selected modern norms, particularly nationalism and development. But instead of building a new nationalism unfettered by tradition, the monarchs have simply superimposed nationalism onto existing political culture patterns without trying to eliminate them. Similarly, every monarchy in the region has set out energetically to show that it can deliver prosperity and growth just as effectively as progressive regimes. But they are wary of the more directly liberal, democratic, participatory values associated with modernity. Although they seek economic growth, they are reluctant to see the masses politicized and unwilling to permit significant mass participation or autonomous opposition groups. The Arab kings of the 1970s vary considerably in their benevolence, but they are fairly uniform in their refusal to open up their political processes in conformity with the ideals of democracy and egalitarianism, which are increasingly prevalent in their modernizing countries. Therein lies one of the principal weaknesses in the monarchical legitimacy formula.

The Revolutionary Republics

The Arab republics (with the qualified exception of Lebanon) share in varying degrees a revolutionary legitimacy. They share the traumatic experience of the revolutionary or independence event. This event serves as a watershed separating these new regimes from the web of traditional patterns of authority and influence one finds in the monarchies, and the patriarchal, deferential, sacred, and quasi-feudal values underlying them. The new regime confronts both an opportunity and a host of problems as it attempts to fill the legitimacy vacuum with modern, reformist symbols and myths. Several of the postrevolutionary regimes and leaders I shall analyze have derived considerable legitimacy simply through having participated in the independence struggle or revolutionary coup.

But beyond this exploitation of what might be called a fixed and diminishing legitimacy resource, the revolutionary republics have also sought to develop new and positive bases for government. In contrast to the conservative accommodation of existing identity and authority patterns, they have tried to break them down and integrate people into new ones. The authority problem is addressed with populist ideology and "popular organizations," bureaucratic parties and functional organizations subservient to the authorities. They have tried to build a new community committed to secular nationalism, strong central government, progress, and modernization. They seek their legitimacy through secular, rational, and universal norms. Yet, this nation-building is seriously impeded by the persistence of traditional primordial and parochial orientations. They emphasize Arabism and the importance of fulfilling hitherto frustrated national aspirations because they are well aware of the salience of these issues in Arab public opinion. But at the same time the quixotic, sporadic, uncoordinated, and usually unsuccessful efforts to achieve these ends also complicate the search for legitimacy. Indeed, the single most important delegitimizing factor for the regimes in what I shall call the pan-Arab

core, has been their consistent failure to match words with effective deeds on the Palestine issue. Yet legitimacy requires at least that the words be uttered.

Under such circumstances it should be obvious why the building of structural legitimacy has been so slow, painful and as yet incomplete a process. In the absence of solid structural legitimacy, therefore, there has been an inordinate reliance on affective ideological symbols for legitimation, which accounts for the comparatively frenetic and hyperbolic style of revolutionary politics. This absence also helps explain the prominence of personalist leadership in the legitimacy formulas of the revolutionary republics.

It is useful to divide the revolutionary republics into two groups, those of the pan-Arab core and the republics of the periphery. The first group includes the older republics of the area in which Arab nationalism was born and the development of independent political structures and processes has been most complete. The politics of legitimacy in this area continues today to be shaped (and frustrated) by all-Arab concerns and by the Palestine question in particular. This group includes Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian community; in comparing their political behavior I attempt to evaluate the Nasirist, Ba'thist, Palestinian nationalist, and Lebanese pluralist approaches to the Arab legitimacy problem. The second group is more disparate, comprising Libya, Sudan, the two Yemens, Algeria, and Tunisia. Generally speaking, these political systems are newer than those of the pan-Arab core, having assumed their present forms from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Geographically far removed from the pan-Arab core, their socioeconomic linkages with it until recently have been relatively tenuous. They share significantly in the Arab historical experience, but they also have their distinct local characteristics. Even though all-Arab concerns are becoming increasingly salient in all of the peripheral republics, and unmistakably so in Libya and Algeria, these values are not as overwhelmingly central as they are in the pan-Arab core.

As the Arab world advances toward the year 2000 is the legitimacy problem becoming more serious or less so? Scholars are divided on this question. Some are optimistic insofar as they predict the emergence of a new Arab man, or a new middle class, or new personalities embodying empathy and tolerance, or a new generation presumably more enlightened than its predecessors. Other scholars are pessimistic, seeing instead a vicious circle of praetorian instability, the monopoly of power by opportunistic military men, or even the persistence of inherent defects in the Arab mind that render modern civilized government difficult to achieve. But such visions, whether optimistic or pessimistic, must be treated with some skepticism since they suffer from a common analytical weakness: the reification of single-factor causes that lack convincing empirical support. In fact, to summarize and anticipate at the same time, the prospects for legitimacy depend on a more complicated set of conditions. On the one hand, the modernization process has sharply disrupted a political culture that even in its "traditional" state was parochial, fragmented, and dissonant. The social mobilization of the Arab masses, which is the most important fact for any political analysis of the region, has multiplied the often incompatible or contradictory policy demands made on the political system, and it has presented an array of new opportunities for opposition movements which regard existing regimes as illegitimate. Democracy, for example, is newly salient but conspicuously absent throughout the region. It has also placed additional administrative loads on governments insofar as social welfare and development responsibilities have become conventionally accepted, in conservative and progressive regimes alike. The new awareness of politics, moreover, has exacerbated the social and communal tensions latent in traditional Arab society, a development which, other things equal, suggests that ethnic and working class (urban and rural) upheavals will continue or be intensified in the coming years.

On the other hand, other things are not likely to remain equal, for the same modernization process will also generate conditions favorable for the development of legitimacy. The growth of a transportation, communications, and economic infrastructure has woven societies more closely together, thus enhancing the solidarity within specific countries and the Arab region as a whole. The new availability of the masses for politics has enhanced the integrative and legitimizing functions of Islam and even more so of Arabism. What was until only three decades ago primarily an intellectual movement, capable of mobilizing the masses only sporadically, has now developed into a significant wellspring of diffuse support for leaders and regimes skillful enough to identify themselves effectively with Arab-Islamic political goals. No less important is sheer growth in potential capabilities. The new power of governments facilitates legitimacy formation in two ways. One is through enhanced security. Although the legitimacy of a government is hardly proportional to the fright which it can inspire in its citizens, it is clear that a government with weak internal security is unlikely to generate either the support or the longevity necessary to convince people of its claims to legitimacy. Even more important is the dramatically expanded ability of Arab governments over the

last two decades to make their administrative presence felt throughout their territories and to deliver new social services. Bigger governments and more secure regimes also may be able to satisfy some of the intangible value demands concerning national dignity, Palestine, and the Arab nation and in so doing yield perhaps the most important (though hardest to measure) legitimacy dividends.

I foresee neither a revolutionary leap forward into a new rational-legal consensus nor the resurrection of the Islamic polity with its ethnoreligious mosaics and stable class system. Despite the breathtaking socioeconomic development taking place in the Arab world, with all its implications for the growth of political system capabilities, the Arab political future seems cloudy. The fragmentation of the Arab nation into separate sovereignties appears largely irreversible, and only limited progress has been made toward inter-Arab coordination. So the chances for the advancement of all-Arab causes, notably Palestine, do not appear good, even as the salience of these causes in Arab public opinion intensifies. Thus, an important source of the Arab legitimacy problem, common to the monarchies as well as the republics, is not likely to diminish. Internally, the future of systems which rely mainly on traditional legitimacy is not bright, notwithstanding their unexpected durability; and the legitimacy potential of the revolutionary systems, while brighter than the analysts of praetorianism foresee, is still seriously marred by the intractability of the participation problem.

Manfred Halpern,
Politics of Social Change
(Princeton 1965)

CHAPTER 4

THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AS THE PRINCIPAL REVOLUTIONARY AND STABILIZING FORCE

The Birth of a New Class

THE traditional Middle Eastern elite of kings, landowners, and bourgeoisie is declining in power or has already yielded its place. Workers and peasants are only beginning to enter the realm of politics. As for a middle class, the consensus of observers is that it barely exists. "Nationalism" and "social change" are nothing more than abstractions. Who shapes politics and makes the fundamental decisions in the Middle East and North Africa?

Two different answers are usually given. Individual personalities and small cliques, reply many Western policymakers. A "new indigenous intelligentsia . . . rootless [and] possessing no real economic base in an independent native middle class,"[1] is the explanation increasingly being accepted by social scientists. Here we shall argue that both these views overlook the emergence of a new social class in the Middle East as the principal revolutionary —and potentially stabilizing—force.

In our unproductive search for middle classes in underdeveloped areas, the fault has been in our expectations. We have taken too parochial a view of the structure of the middle class. A study of both Western and non-Western historical experience suggests that the British and American middle classes, which have commonly been considered prototypes, were actually special cases. Moreover, with the growing scope and scale of

[1] Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas," in *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, edited by Bert F. Hoselitz, Chicago, 1952, pp. 158-159.

modern enterprises and institutions, the majority of the middle class even in the United States and Great Britain is no longer composed of men whose independence is rooted in their possession of productive private property. Bureaucratic organization has become the characteristic structure of business (or charity or trade unions) no less than of government, and the majority of the middle class is now salaried. They may be managers, administrators, teachers, engineers, journalists, scientists, lawyers, or army officers. A similar salaried middle class constitutes the most active political, social, and economic sector from Morocco to Pakistan.

Leadership in all areas of Middle Eastern life is increasingly being seized by a class of men inspired by non-traditional knowledge, and it is being clustered around a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and experts.[3] In its style of life, however, this new middle class differs from its counterpart in the industrialized states. The Middle East moved into the modern administrative age before it reached the machine age. Its salaried middle class attained power before it attained assurance of status, order, security, or prosperity. In the Middle East, the salaried new middle class therefore uses its power not to defend order and property but to create them—a revolutionary task that is being undertaken so far without any final commitment to any particular system of institutions.

This new salaried class is impelled by a driving interest in ideas, action, and careers. It is not merely interested in ideas: its members are not exclusively intellectuals, and, being new to the realm of modern ideas and eager for action and careers, they may not be intellectuals at all. Neither are they interested only in action that enhances their power: they also share a common commitment to the fashioning of opportunities and institutions that

[3] For example, when Tunisia became independent in 1956 under the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party, a party controlled almost entirely by the new middle class, the election for a Constituent Assembly rewarded this class in the following way: To fill 98 seats, the country voted for 18 teachers and professors, 15 lawyers, 11 civil servants, 5 doctors, 4 pharmacists, 2 journalists, 2 commercial employees, 1 engineer, 1 appraiser, 5 workers, 17 farmers, and 17 businessmen and contractors. By contrast, every Middle Eastern parliament prior to 1950, except that of Turkey, contained a majority of landowners and a minority of professional men and industrialists.

will provide careers open to all who have skills. This involves them in actions quite novel to their society, and hence also distinguishes them from previous politicians. They are not concerned merely with safe careers. They know that, without new ideas and new actions dealing with the backwardness and conflicts of their society, careers will not open or remain secure. The men of this new class are therefore committed ideologically to nationalism and social reform.

Obviously, there is also a part of the new middle class that has neither deep convictions nor understanding. In contrast to the dominant strata of its class, this segment excludes itself from the process of making political choices, and hence does not alter the present analysis. It is also true that some members of the new middle class are interested only in ideas (hence inspire and clarify, or merely stand by), only in action (hence rise spectacularly and fall), or only in safe careers (hence merely serve). Among the last, clerks especially compose the largest yet relatively most passive segment of the new middle class. Our analysis focuses on men interested in ideas, action, and careers because such a description fits the most influential core of this group.

There are also opportunists among them but, by now, of two different kinds which are often confused by those who are taken advantage of. There is the politician who, largely for the sake of satisfying the aspirations of his new middle class constituency and so also staying in power, takes advantage of whatever opportunities may offer, east or west, at home or abroad. There is also the free-floating opportunist—Stendhal's novels describe him very well for a period in French history when values and institutions were similarly in doubt—who represents no one but himself, but represents himself exceedingly well, being loyal only to the art of survival. Some sell their skills as political brokers; some come close to selling their country. In the twentieth century it has become essential, however, to be able to distinguish between those, however perverse they may appear, who are out to gain greater elbow-room for the new middle class they represent and those, however smooth, who also make deals because they can fashion no connections unless they continually sell themselves.

In the Middle East, this salaried new middle class assumes a

far more important role than the local property-owning middle class. Although the latter is about as numerous as that portion of the new middle class which is actually employed,[3] it has far less power than the salaried group. Neither in capital, organization, nor skills do the merchants and middlemen control anything comparable to that power which can be mustered by the machinery of the state and hence utilized by the new salaried class. In this part of the world, no other institutions can mobilize as much power and capital as those of the state. By controlling the state in such a strategic historical period, this new salaried class has the capabilities to lead the quest for the status, power, and prosperity of middle-class existence by ushering in the machine age.[4]

[3] In this analysis, the term "new middle class" excludes the property owning middle class. However, it includes both those who are now drawing salaries and a far larger group—a "would-be new middle class" which resembles this class in every respect except that it is unemployed. The "would-be" salariat is discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

From a different perspective, Professor Morroe Berger defines the middle class as including (1) "merchants and small manufacturers, self-employed, whose income and influence are not great enough to place them among the really powerful men in political or economic life" and (2) "independent professionals such as doctors and lawyers; employed managers, technicians, and administrative workers such as clerks and bureau chiefs; and the civil service." He concluded that, in 1947, these amounted altogether to about half a million persons in Egypt, 51 percent of them merchants; that is, mostly small retailers. ("The Middle Class in the Arab World," in *The Middle East in Transition*, edited by Walter Laqueur, New York, 1958, p. 63.) Thus defined, the salaried middle class and the property-owning middle class together amount to about six percent of the gainfully employed population or about three percent of the total population in Egypt. If one also includes the agricultural middle class, as does Professor Hassan el-Saaty ("The Middle Class in Egypt," *L'Egypte Contemporaine*, April 1957, pp. 47-53), the total figure for Egypt in 1947 increases to 16 percent. The middle class is probably as large, or else smaller, in other Middle Eastern countries. By contrast, a new middle class composed of the salariat—whether employed or unemployed—must be estimated to number (no one has yet counted them) a far higher percentage. Aspiration is politically as relevant a criterion for such a census as education and position.

[4] The present work is not the first to notice the emergence of this new class in underdeveloped areas. Professor T. Cuyler Young, drawing in part on his experiences as Political Attaché at the American Embassy in Tehran during 1951-1952, was the first to publish an analysis of the role of the new middle class in the Middle East in "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1952, pp. 125-143. Professor John J. Johnson was the first to suggest that in Latin America "the urban middle groups are vitally, if not decisively, important in an area where one still commonly hears and reads that there is no middle class to speak of [and] where, in the view of traditional scholarship, individuals hold the center of the stage." (*Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors*, Stanford, 1958, pp. vii-ix.)

In the West, a variety of organizational structures and devices —both governmental and private—have gradually made individual entrepreneurship a rare commodity. Stock companies, subsidies, insurance, tariffs, as well as large governmental, business, and union bureaucracies have served, among other things, to reduce individual risk and enlarge institutional predictability. The pressures that make for organization and organization men are much more desperate in the Middle East. In most of the countries of this region, there are few important jobs in the modern sector of the economy available outside the large organizations and institutions that constitute, or are guided by, government. Those who cannot get into them or cannot hold on to them usually count for little, and often cannot make a living. For most there is little hope for safety or prosperity in separate personal endeavors. Indeed, more organization is urgently needed for aggregating separate interests, bargaining among them, and executing a common will.

Among these two and the present essay, there are common intellectual links. In his preface, Johnson states that he "first became fully aware of the importance of the urban middle sectors in Latin American politics during the fifteen months in 1952-53 that [he] was with the State Department as Acting Chief of the South American Branch of the Division of Research for American Republics." At that time, a number of us in the Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa had contributed to an analysis in January 1952 of the causes of *Political Instability in the Middle East* which was to become a prototype for a series of such studies of other underdeveloped regions. An evaluation of the role of the "urban middle sector" was one of the principal themes of that study.

If at least one of the collaborators of that 1952 study has changed his mind, and substituted "middle class" for "middle sector," it is because the latter term is finally too broad: Johnson includes within it the "poorly paid white-collar employee in government" as well as the "wealthy proprietors of commercial and industrial enterprises." Class is a term with peculiar advantages. The anthropological term "acculturated" includes those who have forsaken pottery for aluminum no less than those who have left Islam for communism. The parochially historical term "Westernized" defines only one portion of those who now make modern political choices. The sociological terms "traditional," "transitional," and "modern" designate way-stations in social communication and psychic mobility insufficiently related to conflicts over political ideology and power. The political term "elite" is often used to designate any dominating power group without concern for the social classes from which it may be drawn. Once the term "class" is freed from its ideological strait jackets and defined dynamically in terms of the evolving interests, opportunities, and behavior of a class in the midst of the transformation of a *society*, and not merely of its *economy*, "class" may well continue to serve us as the most useful category for relating changes in social structure to changes in political power.

The intelligentsia, that is, those with knowledge or awareness to see that a social and political revolution is in progress, form the largest and politically most active component of the new middle class. But they are not the only component of this class. Some members of this new class are already middle class in their pattern of consumption but still searching for ideas (hence new in a society once sure of its truths). Others are interested only in ideas about means and not, like the intelligentsia, also about ends, and the concern for truth of the intellectuals does not interest them. The intelligentsia, however, is the predominant force of this class, in part because its knowledge inescapably exposes the weakness or irrelevance of tradition. Just as in Russia in the nineteenth century, however, the intelligentsia is more rebellious than self-confident. Its thought is "by its very nature unspecific, unformulated, unfixed . . . sensitive to every intellectual wind from Europe, alert to the changing history of both Russia and the West. For all their dogmatism at every stage, some of the most energetic minds of the intelligentsia passed from one ideological stage often to its extreme opposite in their insistent search for a total system which should somehow resolve all the largest questions of national destiny."[5]

They are new men. They are often the very first in the history of their family to be literate. They often discover their best friends at school or in a political movement, not among kin or established brotherhood or faction. They are the first to trust strangers on grounds of competence or shared ideology.[6] They are ready to trade new dogmas for old. They are also the first publicly to confess their uncertainties. Until Gamal abd al-Nasser no Egyptian politician had begun a statement of his philosophy with the confession: ". . . I feel that I stand before a boundless world, a bottomless sea—and a trepidation restrains me from plunging into it since, from my point of vantage, I see no other shore to head for."[7]

[5] Herbert E. Bowman, "Intelligentsia in Nineteenth Century Russia," *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Spring 1957, p. 15.

[6] Some of the men appointed to the cabinet by the Iraqi army conspirators of 1958 had until their appointment neither heard of the revolution nor met their new chiefs.

[7] Gamal abd al-Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution*, Washington, 1955, p. 17.

In Russia the intelligentsia was often known as the *raznochintsy*, the "men of varied ranks," on the justifiable recognition that they sprang from all classes, but also on the unwarranted conclusion that they therefore belonged to none. To make this assumption about the Middle East is to suppose that the classes from which they come, in contrast to the one in which they are now gathering, are solid and neatly distinguishable in their relationship to each other and their role in society. That is not the case, and one of the principal reasons in the Middle East as it was in Russia for the departure from their previous classes of men eager for ideas, actions, and careers is that these classes can no longer maintain their customary relationships to each other, or play their traditional role in what is becoming a modern society. It is their new role that defines their class membership, not the accident of their birth in a particular traditional social class. "The French expression '*sorti du peuple*,' like the English 'sprung from the working class' does in fact indicate both origin and breach with them."[8]

In the Middle East (as in other rapidly changing, underdeveloped societies) the new intelligentsia acts in behalf of the older ruling classes only until it is strong enough to win control of the government. When this occurs, however, the intelligentsia no longer remains socially unattached but acts in the interests of the new middle class of which it is an integral part. It cannot preserve the privileges of the older ruling classes if it hopes to propel any Middle Eastern country into the modern age. Similarly, it cannot offer the immediate rewards sought by workers and peasants, because its plans for the modernization of the country call for mobilization of the underlying population for new roles and productive sacrifices.

In the Middle East, as in Russia, the new middle class springs largely, though not exclusively, from groups that had not hitherto been important, and hence had more reason and less deadweight to take advantage of new knowledge and skills. Le Tourneau's description of North Africa could readily be applied

[8] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, London, 1954, p. 159.

to the rest of the Middle East. One can still find among the middle class, he points out, "a good number of members of the old leading families, the ruling aristocracy, the trading bourgeoisie, or even, but in lesser proportion, intellectuals of a traditional kind." Since the turn of the century, however, "things have changed, and young men from the hinterland now form the essential backbone of the middle class." The political parties reflect this change: "The Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto has as leader a pharmacist from Setif, M. Ferhat Abbas [until recently Premier of Algeria's Provisional Government]; his principal lieutenants are doctors, lawyers, and teachers among whom almost no one is a descendant of a 'grande famille' of earlier days. The same holds true for the Tunisian Neo-Destour, whose leader, M. Habib Bourguiba, is a lawyer born to a humble family of the Sahel, and for the Moroccan Istiqlal, whose governing committee is, in large part, composed of former students of the Moslem College of Fez."[9] In Egypt, Nasser illustrates the type perfectly: the son of a postmaster, he graduated in 1938 from the first class of the Egyptian Military Academy that had admitted students from other than the upper classes. He was among the first to take advantage of a new avenue to knowledge and status. Such men are not merely strays or a stratum of spokesmen for other classes but the creators of a new class system more appropriate to the new tasks and relationships of the emerging modern age in the Middle East.

The new middle class itself does not define or crystallize its character from the very outset, but only as its various strata come to intervene in the process of modernization and assume additional roles in it. It originates in the intellectual and social transformation of Middle Eastern society, not as a homo-

[9] Roger LeTourneau, "Le Développement d'une Classe Moyenne en Afrique du Nord," in *Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries, Record of the XXIX Session Held in London from 13-16 September 1955*, Brussels, International Institute of Differing Civilizations, 1956, pp. 106-110. The group that split off from the Moroccan Istiqlal party under Mehdi Ben Barka's leadership in 1959, the National Union of Popular Forces, is even more clearly the product of a class shaped by modern secular education and the values of the new middle class.

geneous socio-economic class but as a secularized action group oriented toward governmental power. After capturing political power, it also attains hold of its own economic base. By controlling government in the Middle East, it also comes to own or control the countries' largest and most significant means of production. It becomes a salaried middle class with the power to decide its own salaries and responsibilities. The attainment of salaried status by this stratum of the middle class in turn also legitimizes the drive for the same status by the remaining would-be salaried middle class and usually gives that demand priority among political problems.

Unlike the traditional elite of landowners and trading bourgeoisie or the tradition-bound artisans or peasants, it is thus the first class in the Middle East that is wholly the product of the transition to the modern age. Unlike the emergent new generation of peasants and urban workers, it is already powerful and self-conscious enough to undertake the task of remolding society.

The new middle class has been able to act as a separate and independent force because: (1) prior to its seizure of power, it is freer than any other class from traditional bonds and preconceptions, and better equipped to manipulate armies and voluntary organizations as revolutionary political instruments; (2) once it controls the machinery of a modernizing state, it possesses a power base superior to that which any other class in the Middle East can muster on the basis of prestige, property, or physical force; (3) it is numerically one of the largest groups within the modern sector of society; (4) it is, so far, more obviously cohesive, more self-conscious, and better trained than any other class; (5) its political, economic, and social actions, in so far as they come to grips with social change, are decisive in determining the role other classes will play in the future; and (6) it has shown itself capable of marshalling mass support. Wherever the salaried new middle class has become dominant in the Middle East, it has become the chief locus of political and economic power and of social prestige. There are few classes anywhere in the world of which this much can be said.[10]

[10] Hence we cannot accept the Marxist idea that the intelligentsia, since it does not start from an economic base of its own, is unable to act in its own interest but must ally itself with one class or another. In areas like the Middle

Thus there can rise to power a Nasser as "Saladin in a Grey Flannel Suit,"[11] greeted as hero or devil, but conceivable in these dimensions largely because he symbolizes and represents a whole class—a class which is the principal actor of the age. Those who disagree with his policies or methods may continue to think of him as devil, but they at least must recognize that this kind of devil cannot be exorcised. As the representative of a particular policy, Nasser can be foiled. As the representative of a class, and his class is the product of the Middle East's movement into the modern age, his kind cannot be made to disappear by military intervention. To acknowledge the growing presence of such a class is also to deny the long-held Western myth that the passing of the remaining older ruling elites in such countries as Iran or Jordan would leave an internal social and political vacuum.

Conflicts within the New Middle Class

To seek to create a modern prosperous economy, a modern society, and a modern nation is a noble objective. However, the task itself involves painful decisions about who shall receive rewards, or shall no longer receive them, and who shall change position, and when and how. There are obviously different ways of eliciting sacrifices, sharing sacrifices, and establishing goals for which such sacrifices are to be made. There are, correspondingly, different ways of minimizing the antagonism

East, Soviet analysts have talked about a "national bourgeoisie," composed of local industrialists, merchants, and bankers, a "lower middle class" which employs little or no outside labor, an "intelligentsia" of students and clerks, even a "military intelligentsia." (See Walter Z. Laqueur, "The 'National Bourgeoisie,' A Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, July 1959, pp. 324-331.) They have failed to perceive, however, the central role of the class which contains such men as Ataturk, Nasser, Kassim, and Bourguiba and which not only leads the nationalist revolution, but is the harbinger and architect of a decisive change in the social structure of the Middle East.

There are fundamental reasons for this failure of recognition. Perceptively, the Marxist philosopher Georg Lukacs has noted: "In such periods of transition, society is not dominated by any system of production. . . . In these circumstances it is, of course, impossible to speak of the operation of any economic laws which would govern the entire society. . . . There is a condition of acute struggle for power or of a latent balance of power . . . : the old law is no longer valid and the new law is not yet generally valid." He adds, "As far as I know, the theory of historical materialism has not yet confronted this problem

of conflicting interests and values as the new middle class translates its objectives into the mission of the entire nation. It is also possible for nationalists representing the new middle class to hold different conceptions of the national interest in relation to foreign nations. What, then, determines these choices on the part of the new middle class?

The factors that readily come to mind—the burden of the past, available skills and resources and the awareness and opportunities to utilize them, differences in individual character and temperament, the force of ideas and the exigencies of particular local power constellations—are all relevant and important.[12] An elite in power, whatever the social class from which it springs, faces problems and temptations in the very business of maintaining itself in power which will often distinguish it from those who have the same hopes and interests but not the same responsibilities. Membership in a particular social class is by no means the sole determinant of policy decisions. Differences in political choices among members of the new middle class, however, also reflect differences among the strata of that class and the variant character of its class consciousness.

Such differences are real enough, but they usually become politically important only after the new middle class has achieved power. Earlier, all its members normally concentrate on the battle for power, mobility, and status in order to open up the

from an economic perspective." (*Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, Berlin, 1923, pp. 243 and 249.) As far as the present author is aware, this vacuum remains.

[11] C. L. Sulzberger's phrase in *The New York Times*, March 26, 1958.

[12] Not that we know by any means enough about how these factors operate. It would be most instructive to make a number of case studies, to examine, for example, the dynamics involved in the change by different age-groups in the control over large parts of the same political movement (e.g., from al-Fassi to ben Barka in Morocco's Istiqlal party); the change of outlook within the same family (e.g., the change from Abbas, father, recipient of the French Legion of Honor to Abbas, son, recent Premier of the Provisional Algerian Government in Exile); and the change within a single spirit (e.g., Edward Atiyah, *An Arab Tells His Story: A Study in Loyalties*, London, 1946) and contrast these with the fate of a party which remains under the control of a single age-group for several decades (e.g., the Wafd in Egypt), of a family which maintains its role as a mediator above political factions for several generations (e.g., the Shehabs of Lebanon), and of a man who never changed his mind (e.g., Nuri of Iraq).

controlling positions in society and administration. Soon after the triumph of the new middle class, however, it becomes apparent that there is simply not room for all of them—that some will be "in" and most will be "out." It also becomes clear that, although they are agreed on the need for the transformation of their society, they are not of the same mind as to what to do with their historical opportunity.[13]

Such differences, however, are never merely political, or merely social, or merely economic. All three realms are entwined as, for example, in one of the most profound of all tensions within the new middle class—between those who are salaried and those who would be like them but are not. Only a minority of the Middle East's new middle class actually holds jobs and draws salaries. The rest either can find no jobs consonant with their skills and values, or else work for status quo regimes which deny this group status and power. It would be quite misleading to exclude the "would-be" new middle class from this middle class. Both components of the middle class possess modern rather than traditional knowledge, and both are eager for a forced march into the modern age. Both are striving for the status, power, order, and prosperity that ought to go with middle-class existence. They resemble each other in every respect except success. This would-be middle class will therefore enlist itself in any movement that promises the kind of education that creates modern skills, the kind of job that opens a career, and the kind of action that gives a mere career individual rewards and social importance.

The inclusion of this group among the new middle class may be unexpected to those who restrict themselves to the classical economic definition of classes. In areas like the Middle East, however, where a modern economy is still to be created, and where control over the state and the forces of social change is more potent than ownership of property, property relations alone cannot serve to define class relations. In the midst of a profound transformation of society, it would also be quite wrong to define

[13] At such a point, the intelligentsia may well split again and speak for different competing factions within the new middle class—another reason why it is not possible to use "intelligentsia" and "new middle class" interchangeably.

a social class statically, in terms of occupation, or employment at a particular moment in time. Each class must be defined in terms of its political, social, and economic role in the process of social change. In the present instance, that means taking account of all who either already perform the role of a member of the salaried middle class or who are bent by revolutionary action, if necessary, to gain a chance to perform this role and no other.

How searing the difference can be between the new salaried class and the would-be middle class, whose basic orientation must be defined by middle class deprivations instead of middle class achievements, is illustrated by the situation in Iran. The Iranian example also demonstrates on how many levels that difference can recur, and how quickly the pressure of frustration can mount in the Middle East. In the 1920's and 1930's there were jobs in Iran for all who were educated, and there was only one cause of frustration. Status was still largely the fruit of traditional rank rather than individual accomplishment. "Those who had been educated abroad [and] had good family background and professed unquestionable loyalty to the political system . . . were given top administrative posts. . . . The graduates of the University of Tehran and other colleges (plus some high school graduates during the 1930's) were assigned less important government positions and formed the majority of the lower echelon of the civil service. They tended to come from families where the fathers had been merchants, guildsmen, and clergymen."[14]

Within a decade, the causes of discontent had multiplied enormously. Those members of the new middle class who had ideas and careers found their opportunities for status and action circumscribed. By the early 1940's, the "surplus of government employees was glaringly evident at all levels, [hence] the prestige of civil service jobs also dropped. . . . The duties proved to be routine and the job gave . . . no responsibility or sense of social participation." Inflation, the result both of

[14] Reza Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," an unpublished manuscript presented to the Faculty Seminar of the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, May 1959, pp. 38-40. Arasteh has now enlarged upon this subject in *Education and Social Awakening in Iran, 1850-1960*, Leiden, 1962.

planned and unplanned scarcities in the economy, took its toll. "The civil servant was no longer able to maintain his accustomed standard of living, and since then it has become necessary for him to take on a second job, equally uninspiring." He had also become socially isolated, "that is, he feels alienated from his family and he also senses the abyss that lies between him and the under-privileged, illiterate masses." He had also become more conscious of "the divergency of [his] interests with the upper-class elite whose mode of life is even more Western than [his] own."[15]

But that is not all. Just at a time when the status of those members of the new middle class having careers is becoming increasingly insecure, they are also being exposed to the growing challenge of a would-be middle class demanding careers, status, and power. Approximately 18,000 students graduated from Iranian colleges between 1851 and 1958. A smaller number studied abroad. Yet in 1958 alone, 9,321 students were enrolled at the University of Tehran and more than 10,000 additional Iranians were studying in universities abroad.[16] There are few jobs open for them in the government, and even fewer in private business.

Yet a still larger number are waiting—waiting to get into schools in which there are no vacancies in order to wait for a job that does not exist. "Because the University of Tehran and the universities in the provinces can accept only a third of those who apply, competition is very keen, and family influence often plays a part in acceptance." But the number of those who actually apply is only a partial measure of frustration. "Looking at it one way, the present 20,000 (approximately) Iranian college students constitute only 10 percent of secondary school enrollment, and two percent of the graduates of elementary schools." However, if we compare the number of college students with the potential college age group in the total population (some 1,760,000), or merely in the major urban areas (some 440,000), then the

[15] Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," pp. 39-43.
[16] By contrast, only 16,229 students were enrolled at various levels of the Koranic schools, once the only educational institutions. (Ernst A. Messerschmidt, *Iran*, Cologne, 1953, p. 48.) The figures for the religious schools apply to 1952/53.

number of students who actually reach college is far below one percent.[17] "There is sufficient evidence to indicate that this large college age group . . . constitutes for a non-technical society like Iran an unrestful group and a potential source of change."[18]

In Egypt there has occurred the same closing of opportunities during the past decade. In 1947, about a third of all Egyptians with primary education or above held government jobs. The entire educational system was designed largely to prepare students for the civil service and, until recently, salary and promotions depended on the type of school certificate, rather than on the nature of the work or the skill of performance. In 1953, about 41 percent "or 46 percent, depending on how closely one calculated," of total expenditures went for government salaries and wages.[19] Meanwhile, although a third of all Egyptian children of school age had no opportunity even for primary education, there were almost twice as many university students in proportion to the population as in industrialized Great Britain, and all would be clamoring for appropriate jobs. In Iraq between 1950 and 1955, about 10,000 Iraqis graduated from the Colleges of Law, Commerce, Arts, and Sciences, but only 1,250 of them found jobs in government and business.[20]

Partially overlapping the distinction between the working and jobless sections of the new middle class is the difference between the younger and older members of this class. "Youth" is not a passing phase in this region where half of all the people are under 20 years old, and where population grows so quickly and opportunities so slowly. In this situation men in their forties may still have almost all the naïveté of youth—being untouched by careers, status, and power—yet have none of youth's innocence, for they know what they have missed.

The plight of youth is obvious when the elite is recruited only from traditional classes. This plight is not resolved when the new

[17] In the United States, 22 percent of this age group goes to college.
[18] Arasteh, "Education for Bureaucracy and Civil Service in Iran," pp. 17-28, *passim*.
[19] Morroe Berger, "Civil Service and Society," an unpublished paper prepared for a Panel on Comparative Public Administration, Fiftieth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1954.
[20] *Al-Hawadith* (a Baghdad daily), September 17, 1955.

middle class comes into its own. Initially, it grows worse. Those who have arrived often come to the top in their thirties (Ataturk, Nasser) or their forties (Kassim, Ayub). What they do can have more far-reaching results in the lives of their people than the actions of any preceding government. Yet almost all of them become authoritarians who do not intend to relinquish the reins of power until they die. Nor do members of the leading echelon of administrators and directors in government, business, journalism, schools, etc. mean to depart before the particular head of state to whom they owe their position. The older group of nationalists often learned patience and perseverance in the long struggle for power when a foreign state could always be made to bear the blame for the postponement of success. The younger men now find no target for their frustration except their own ruling elite.

When youth wins out early and retires late, all the young men who mature for action thereafter are unlikely to be able to acquire a stake in the status quo and hence in moderation. When the age group that made the revolution lingers, yet does not increase the range of employment for those with talent, energy, and ideas, then the young are likely to remain radical (i.e., insist on going to the roots of the problem) or else extremist (i.e., using violence to substitute a dogmatic answer of their own). The characteristic extremism or radicalism of contemporary Middle Eastern student groups must therefore be taken more seriously than it might be in countries where one might smile comfortably at Clemenceau's jest that men who are not socialists at twenty have no heart, and men who remain socialists at forty have no head.

The sharp and often bitter competition among members of the new middle class, however, does not inhibit the acquisition of a common historical awareness that each of them suffers from the same burden of the past and the same frustrations of the present. In the very fact of their separate individuality lies the essence of their common fate.[31] Coming into being by influx from all social

[31] Some may concentrate on preserving their status, some on enlarging it, others on attaining it. Such competition, however, does not touch their class membership. Separate individuals, to amend only slightly a formulation by Karl Marx (*The German Ideology*, New York, 1938, p. 49), form a class only in so far as they play a common role in relation to social change, and

classes—uniting the Western-educated son of a landlord with the army-trained son of a postmaster—the new middle class is the first in Middle Eastern history for whom family connections can no longer help automatically to establish class membership. Also, being itself composed of new men, it is the first which cannot hope to rest on inherited status or existing opportunities. It is the first class for whom communication depends on successful persuasion of other individuals; it cannot base itself on the implicit consensus of the past. The new middle class is distinguishable from all other classes in the Middle East by being the first to be composed of separate individuals. It is therefore also the first class for which the choice between democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism is a real and open choice.

The Relationship of the New Middle Class to Other Classes

The fact that the goals of the new middle class demand the mobilization of the entire society in no way implies that the role it assigns to others in its national design will correspond to the interests felt by other classes. Even the communists, whose ideology declares their dictatorship to be in the interests of the proletariat, cannot escape this clash of class interests. "It took some time until the lesson had . . . been learned; communism must cease to be 'proletarian.' . . . 'Revolution' no longer signifies 'liberation of the toilers' but 'all power to the planners.' "[32] No

have to carry on a common battle against another class or seek collaboration with it. Otherwise, they may be on hostile terms with each other as competitors.

[32] G. L. Arnold, "Collectivism Reconsidered," *British Journal of Sociology*, March 1955, p. 12. The issue of antagonism between the planners and the workers had actually been raised decades before the Russian Revolution. As early as 1899, a Polish revolutionist named Waclaw Machajski had raised this point in *The Evolution of Social Democracy*, and in 1904, in *The Intellectual Worker*, he restated his thesis that the theory of socialism had not been worked out in the interests of the proletariat but of a new force, "the growing army of intellectual workers and the new middle class." Their revolution would produce a state capitalism in which the technicians, organizers, administrators, educators, and journalists would constitute the "great joint stock company known as the State, and become, collectively, a new privileged stratum over the manual workers." (Daniel Bell, "One Road from Marx: On the Vision of Socialism, and the Fate of Workers' Control, in Socialist Thought," *World Politics*, July 1959, pp. 491-512.)

other rulers, at least in underdeveloped areas, can escape this conflict. If most Middle Eastern peasants and workers want more worldly goods, they want them for the sake of living well here and now; for the sake of gaining the prestige of offering larger dowries, of having more leisure. The contrast between postponing rewards and reaping them now is great enough, especially in a part of the world where scarcity and uncertainty have always loomed so threateningly, to create valid and deeply felt distinctions between political parties; indeed, between styles of life. Hence there is no reason to assume that the contradiction—even between those who demand immediate satisfactions for workers and peasants and those who claim to represent their "true" interests in the long run—can be "non-antagonistic."[23]

Such contradictions need not, however, become overtly antagonistic. This is not because nationalist ideologists deny that such conflicts are genuine, but because the sense of class interests is still blurred. The new middle class has only recently been emerging as a class and tribal and family loyalties remain predominant among many of the peasants and workers. Although the disciplined organization of a majority of urban workers into trade unions in Morocco and Tunisia within a decade or less demonstrates how quickly the Middle East is changing, the mobilization of peasantry and workers by the new middle class has scarcely begun in most countries of this region. Charismatic and nationalist identification between leaders and followers frequently creates much overlapping enthusiasm even when there are few overlapping interests. And peasants and workers are often content to yield much for concrete rewards, regardless of the political system that grants them—especially greater justice from the courts, more honesty from the administrators, more wells, more schools, more food. The Middle East is only beginning to enter the age of choice, and hence of experiencing the price of making friends and enemies among one's own people. Middle Eastern political and social stability, therefore, has scarcely yet been tested.

The new middle class is not the first class that has sought to

[23] Cf. editorial in *Peiping People's Daily* on "non-antagonistic contradictions," reprinted in *Pravda*, April 15, 1957.

take the leading role in modernizing the Middle East. There were individual rulers in the nineteenth century who recognized that the survival of their power, the prestige of their dynasty, and the security of their domain depended on the modernization at least of their army, bureaucracy, and trade. Mohammed Ali (in power 1805-1848) in Cairo, and Sultan Mahmud II (in power 1808-1839) in Constantinople were among the earliest such rulers. Later, when Middle Eastern empires were succeeded by independent states, the bourgeoisie and large landowners assumed this task, but once again limited their performance largely to what was required to enhance their own status and power. Hence trade and bureaucracy remained the principal foci of modernization. To reflect the participation of a somewhat broader group in politics, party cliques and quasi-parliamentary structures were developed. Since European influence in the Middle East was usually strong enough during this period to curb the army's growth, it was modernized only sufficiently to make it an adequate repressive force. There was little or no response to pressures for modernization from below, and no general commitment to deal with social change.

This older bourgeoisie was in its structure, interests, and relationships, and hence in its political role, quite different from the emergent new middle class. The former maintained itself in urban enclaves within a "feudal" society.[24] It never attained the strength to unite city and countryside into a single economic unit, or the courage to reshape that larger society which was, nonetheless, beginning to crumble around it.

Many of the small businessmen—the principal pillars of the propertied middle class—have tended here as elsewhere "to develop a generalized hostility toward a complex of symbols and processes bound up with industrial capitalism, the steady growth and concentration of government, labor organizations, and business enterprises, and the correlative trend toward greater rationalization of production and distribution."[25] Their interests

[24] This distinction between the role of the bourgeoisie and the middle class is also employed by G. D. H. Cole, "The Conception of the Middle Classes," *The British Journal of Sociology*, December 1950, pp. 275-290.

[25] Martin Trow, "Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and McCarthy," *American Journal of Sociology*, November 1958, p. 274.

therefore differ from those of a salaried new middle class accustomed to life in an organization, and their range of interests and their links with the new class are too limited in the Middle East to give them a leading role in shaping the direction of a society in upheaval.

In part, of course, even the salaried middle class is aware of itself only as an interest group with pragmatic, specific, and relatively short-run demands. It may concentrate on conspicuous consumption—acquiring Cadillacs, building steel mills regardless of their relative economic utility, or improving armies that are already strong enough to maintain internal security and protect the frontiers against all but the large industrialized powers. To allocate savings and scarce foreign exchange to the satisfaction of the immediate desires of the new middle class in this manner is no different from allowing them to be used by peasants for larger dowries—the conflict is then between interest groups, not between different orientations toward social change. The interest of one group is satisfied at the direct expense of another's.

It is quite apparent, however, that the pace and pain of social change had become too great by the second half of this century for the new middle class to avoid acquiring a larger historical consciousness of its role.[26] The new middle class has become the first bearer of civic spirit on a national scale in the Middle East because it cannot translate its ideas into action or achieve careers or status unless it creates a nation of individuals linked by consciousness and material fact—a nation that economically, socially, and politically can survive social change. For almost every individual in the Middle East is now in motion, even those who are still standing still. Things are not the same for those who toil or die in traditional fashion if their neighbors now have modern implements to plant modern cash crops and can keep themselves healthy with modern medicines. When people come to be called traditionalists by their neighbors, the old spell has been broken.

The new middle class not only possesses the kind of empathy

[26] In Lebanon, however, there appears to be a peculiar obstacle to such a change: various religious and ethnic groups have become political interest groups, each entitled to a proportionate share of jobs in parliament, bureaucracy, and education.

that allows its members to see themselves "in the other fellow's situation."[27] Even in traditional Islam, it was not infrequent for an artisan to become the leader of a religio-political rebellion, or for a soldier or tribal chief to become Sultan. Some could envisage playing such roles; others could not. What characterizes the new middle class in the Middle East is that it is the first that has the capacity to envisage new types of roles to be played in a new kind of world.

In the midst of a profound social transformation which it helps to shape and sharpen, this new middle class will, of course, not remain a stable or static element. In part it will give birth to new strata from within itself; in part it will be midwife to other classes kindred to it—namely those which are usually termed upper and lower middle classes. Indeed, these are already beginning to appear in their modern version.

Given the predominant role of the new middle class in the government, and hence in the social and economic development of the country, the modern upper middle class is very likely to develop to a considerable extent from among the ranks of the former. Even the members of modern professions, almost exclusively sons of landlords and the traditional bourgeoisie earlier in this century, are being increasingly drawn from the same broader ranks as the salaried middle class. If such social and economic development grows apace, the modern upper middle class of politicians, professional men, and administrators may well come to dominate society and give it a moderate orientation.

This upper middle class which starts, as it were, from scratch, may be joined by private entrepreneurs taking advantage of the new political stability and the economic foundations built by the government. It seems, however, rather rare for members of traditional bourgeois families to take advantage of their capital and connections to acquire new skills relevant to an industrial economy.[28] To have become rich in traditional fashion often shrouds incentives to the learning of modern skills. As for self-

[27] The key concept defining transitional and modern man in Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Glencoe, 1958, pp. 49-54, 69-75.

[28] See Bert F. Hoselitz, "Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, October 1952.

made modern capitalists in the Middle East, much will depend on the ideology of the salaried middle class. In Egypt, even the most efficient large private enterprises have been nationalized for the sake of centralizing control over investments and distribution of benefits. In Syria, capitalists threatened by the same policies during 1961 allied themselves with opposition movements drawn from the would-be middle class and succeeded in installing a tenuous new regime pledged to a mixed economy.

Members of the traditional elite who are not landlords or traders have sometimes gained access more readily to the modern upper middle class. Sons of the traditional bourgeoisie in a number of Middle Eastern countries have transformed themselves into one of the most influential elements of the modern upper middle class by virtue of their training as officers in the army. Trained in modern technology and administration, and assigned a national mission, this group had the opportunity and incentive for a successful transition. Similar to them in origin and second to them only in power are many of the Western-trained members of the upper levels of the bureaucracy. And there are, it must be added, a number of kings who seem anxious to make the same transition—among them those of Afghanistan, Iran, Jordan, and Morocco. But be they general, bureaucrat, or king, they are likely to fail politically unless they can relate themselves to the aspirations of the rest of the new middle class. For they themselves number in no country of this region more than a few hundred. Even if some of them have independent incomes, nevertheless all are dependent upon civil and military bureaucracies without whose loyalty or cohesion they can no longer function at all.

The modern lower middle class is, in the Middle East, composed of two distinct groups. There are those whose "western education is limited, and more probably has been cut off at an early stage. Self-education seems to be a recurrent feature among them."[39] But there are also those in the lower middle class who, instead of being able to capitalize on a modicum of modern

[39] Leonard Binder's description of the Pakistani lower middle class is probably applicable to the rest of this region [drawn from an unpublished manuscript delivered at the Dobbs Ferry Conference of the Social Science Research Council, 1957].

knowledge, suffer from a peculiarly modern disability. They are well trained, but in classic subjects (e.g., *Shari'a* law) or in the wrong language (e.g., Urdu, when English is essential to government and business), In any but the modern age, they would have been able to rise to a status equivalent at least to that of the modern middle class. Now they can only hope to eke out a lower middle class existence. In short, both components of the modern lower middle class in the Middle East consist of men who are frustrated in their social mobility. They are not like the traditional lower middle class, composed predominantly of small artisans and shopkeepers and minor clerks, most of whom implicitly accept their station in life.[40] They are not, like the middle and upper strata of the new middle class, capable of translating their ambition into reality. Hence, organizing their discontent is likely to offer a major potential for political action.

Prospects for the New Middle Class

Thus the character and terms of the struggle for power in the Middle East become clearer. The changes now under way in the social and political system appear to have three successive, though often overlapping, phases: first, the battle between the new middle class and the traditional ruling class; second, the drive by the successful new middle class to supply cadre for all five groups that compose the elite in modern society (political leaders, government administrators, economic directors, leaders of masses, and military chiefs);[41] and third, the struggles among

[40] In Turkey, where the modern age began earlier than in most of the Middle East, the mid-nineteenth century saw the appearance of the Young Ottomans, many of them minor bureaucrats, whose level of expectations had risen since they had become the Empire's new experts in communication and administration. Yet they lacked the lubricants of money and family status to advance themselves. At that point in history they allied themselves almost entirely with the ulema who were beginning to lose prestige with the growth of secularization. (See Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton, 1962.) In twentieth century Egypt, such men often allied themselves with the Moslem Brotherhood (see Chapter 8).

[41] These five categories are drawn from Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *The British Journal of Sociology*, March and June 1950, p. 9. Aron points out that "The fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet type and one of the Western type is that the former has a unified

strata within the new middle class for predominance, increasingly involving other new classes, especially uprooted peasants and workers.

In terms of these phases, it is apparent that the most important political struggle in the Middle East is no longer between the new middle class and the traditional ruling class. The new middle class has already come to power in almost all but the least developed and regionally least influential countries.[33] At this extraordinary moment when the traditional ruling class has been defeated and the peasants and workers have not yet organized themselves to make their own demands, politics has become a game played almost entirely within the new middle class. Thus, it is a political era resembling none that preceded it and probably none that will follow it, and one that is likely to prove particularly volatile and productive.

It will be volatile, in part, because politics within the new middle class will involve competition for a very limited number of powerful positions by persons who, even in behalf of issues, must often substitute the force of personality (itself still evolving) for the strength of established political parties. Compromises will be hard to arrange. Because the majority of the people are unrepresented, one of the most persuasive arguments for compromise among executive policy-makers in other countries—the anticipated reaction of a free legislature—will continue to be irrelevant. Disagreements among policy-makers in authoritarian regimes will usually mean ouster for one or the other.

Although repression of one faction of the new middle class by

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elite and the latter a divided elite" (p. 10). From that perspective, the Middle Eastern situation fits somewhere in between, since the elite is drawn from a single, small, and embattled class which strives for the unification of the elite but seldom succeeds for long in preventing clashes. The pressure for a unified elite in the Midde East, moreover, is based on historical exigencies (the availability of a large number of members of the new middle class for a small number of careers in the new institutions of society) and political expediency (the need for loyal supporters in an environment in which the majority does not yet share the outlook of the new middle class). Conformity to an ideological dogma which justifies the unification of the elite (for example under the guise of the "dictatorship of the proletariat") characterizes only the communists in the Middle East.

[33] The displacement of the landowners and traditional bourgeoisie as the political elite does not necessarily imply their demise as a social class. Where

another faction is common, membership in the same class seems to make a difference. Rival movements are outlawed, but individual members—men with whom, after all, one went to school, worked in common clandestineness, and with whose ideas one may once have toyed oneself—are often allowed to write editorials or remain in the bureaucracy. And the more important opposition leaders are, with startling frequency, appointed to Embassies abroad, being jailed only if they insist on returning. The centuries of repression which the new middle class fought to end more clearly and courageously than anyone else are, at present, in disrepute. For the first time since the Middle Ages, and in contrast to recent status quo oligarchies such as the late Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha's in Iraq, the elite and the main opposition, both drawn from the new middle class, speak a mutually comprehensible language derived from a common experience. Thus a genuine political dialogue is at last in progress in the Middle East.

The vital question now—vital because the outcome affects all aspects of society—is which segment of the new middle class shall predominate, what ideological orientation it will prefer, and what factors help or hinder the progress of competing factions.

The thrust toward revolutionary action on the part of the new middle class is overwhelming. It is itself the product of an unfinished and uncontrolled revolutionary transformation of society. It intends therefore to organize social change rather than become its victim. Even those who do not possess this broader vision, but who nevertheless would like to live in the same style as the average man in the more conservative industrialized nations, will have to upset the status quo much further before they can hope to enjoy the benefits of a stable new status quo. Unlike the great majority of the Western salaried middle class, this new class cannot afford to perpetuate the traditional norms and laws of society, even though it is already being threatened by the confusion of standards and the growth of extremism in its own ranks. The

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such a demise of what was always a small group is in fact in progress, as in Tunisia, and where a strong egalitarian strain makes it difficult for any member of the new middle class to raise himself socially or economically high above his fellows, it may, strictly speaking, be wrong to speak of a *middle* class. Even here, however, "middle" still serves to define its aspirations and style of consumption, whatever its final destiny.

largest component of the new middle class in most countries, and the most rapidly growing, will be the young with few links to tradition or to the previous generation, with inadequate knowledge and skills, and with little chance of status or of any useful job. Both the burden of the past and the threat of the future impel the salaried middle class to become the principal revolutionary force, creating new standards and institutions relevant to a modernizing society.

There is no inescapable doom that revolutionary change must come through violence, however. One of the most remarkable, and remarkably neglected, phenomena of modern history is the near absence of violence that has marked rapid, structural changes in all those countries where, since 1950, the new middle class has come to power. In Egypt, for example, a landed ruling class was economically dispossessed, socially displaced, and politically overthrown. A new social class took its place, the greater part of the economy was nationalized or at least placed under effective state control, the legal basis of authority and the structure and functions of political institutions were fundamentally altered, and a religion-bound culture was secularized, all at the cost of less than twenty lives.[illegible] This is a remarkable performance in contrast to the French Revolution of the eighteenth century, or the Chinese and Russian Revolutions of our time.

The absence of violence alone, however, is not sufficient evidence of stability, or a clear sign that the fundamental revolution of Middle Eastern society has come to an end. The new middle class will be able to signal its conversion from a revolutionary into a stabilizing force only when it has succeeded in limiting the realm of politics to the domain of public authority, thus allowing the social, economic, and private business of men once again to become autonomous realms. That cannot happen until there is

[illegible] Two soldiers were killed during the brief fighting that accompanied Nasser's coup in 1952, eleven strikers were shot during riots or subsequently court-martialed and hanged in 1952, and six members of the Moslem Brotherhood, as they might under the laws of any country, were sentenced to death in 1954 for having conspired to assassinate Nasser.

Where the toll of violence was greater, the causes so far lay largely either in the resistance of the entrenched rulers to the emergence of the new middle class (as in Algeria), or in a deep division within the new middle class (as in Iraq).

sufficient capacity and consensus for dealing with social change, and until political leaders need no longer convert all aspects of existence into issues of power.

In most countries of this region it is improbable, certainly within the next decade, that the new middle class will have succeeded in establishing firm economic, political, and psychological foundations for the growth of individuals and groups that can be autonomous in action yet share in a broad consensus of values. Instead, most of the governments will still be struggling to establish their own authority, and assure physical survival for their citizens. The status and prosperity that ought to accompany middle class existence is likely still to elude most of its members, and even the term "middle class" will retain ironic overtones. They will still be caught in the middle of time, between an age not yet quite dead and one not yet quite born. They will still be suspended between a traditional folk that is being uprooted but not yet sure what leadership to follow over the longer run, and a political elite, drawn at last from their own class but unable as yet to satisfy their aspirations. The new middle class will not be able to escape soon from the harsh struggle for the sheer biological and psychological necessities of life. Hence it will not soon escape from an age of revolution into an age in which both freedom and authority are assured.

The salaried new middle class possesses one advantage over all previous ruling groups. The tasks it must perform in order to create status, power, and prosperity for itself no less than the nation require the establishment of modern, integrating institutions which can mobilize the spirit and resources of the entire nation. At the same time these institutions, by their very nature, are also peculiarly adapted to control by the new middle class.

While it is almost inevitable in the present historical situation that the new middle class will acquire power, there is nothing inevitable about its orientation or its permanent success. Under the inspiration of particular personalities, ideologies, or environmental changes, this new ruling group may fractionalize more often than act in unison. Overwhelmed by pressure of sheer population, inadequate organizational skill, or lack of courage, it may not be able to cement a working relationship with the

majority of the population—the peasants and workers. Yet unlike any of its predecessors, the new middle class has goals which depend for their success on popular support and participation, whether achieved by consent, authority, or terror.

Thus, the new middle class is faced with most extraordinary opportunities. If it fails to consolidate its authority by achieving sufficient internal cohesion and general social progress, and its factions are instead engaged in ruthless competition for the support of the rural and urban masses, the approaching future is bound to be one of fearful unrest.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF SYRIA'S RULING, MILITARY GROUP AND THE CAUSES FOR ITS DOMINANCE

Hanna Batatu

At the heart of Syria's regime stands a cluster of military officers. They hold in their hands the crucial threads of power. This much is obvious. Their common military profession, however, does not explain why they cling together and act in concert. Far more significant in this connection is the fact that the ruling element consists at its core of a close kinship group which draws strength simultaneously, but in decreasing intensity, from a tribe, a sect-class, and an ecologic-cultural division of the people.

Thus, figuring among the officers who are decisive for the holding together of the entire power structure, in order of importance are: Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, the President of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; Rif'at al-Asad, the Commander of *Sarāyā al-Difā'*, or Defense Units; Jamīl al-Asad, the Commander of a special unit of *Sarāyā al-Difā'* concerned with the security of the 'Alawī community; and 'Adnān al-Asad, commander of *Sarāyā al-Ṣira'* or Struggle Companies. The task of *Sarāyā al-Difā'* which comprise at least 12,000 and possibly as many as 25,000 men, is to protect the regime. They surround Damascus and control all the access routes to the capital. The *Sarāyā al-Ṣira'*, which embrace some 5,000 men, play a similar protective role. 'Adnān is a cousin and Rif'at and Jamīl are brothers of Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad. Two nephews of the President also occupy sensitive posts in the Defense Units. Moreover, a brother-in-law of Asad, 'Adnān Makhlūf, was for several years the Deputy Commander of the Defense Units but it would appear that he was relieved of his post in May 1979.

Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and his blood relations belong to the Numailatiyyah section of al-Matāwirah, one of the four tribes into which most of Syria's 'Alawīs are divided, the others being al-Ḥaddādīn, al-Khayyāṭīn and al-Kalbiyyah. To

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Asad's tribe, al-Matāwirah, belong a number of other major figures in the regime, including Brigadier Muḥammad al-Khawlī, Adviser to the President, Chief of Air Intelligence, and Chairman of the Presidential Intelligence Committee; Brigadier 'Alī Dūbah, the head of Military Intelligence; Brigadier 'Alī Aṣlān, the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Bureau of Military Operations and Training; and Major General 'Alī Ṣāliḥ, Commander of the Air Defense Forces and the Missile Corps. Incidentally, 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Khaddām, the Deputy Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is Sunni, married in 1954 a woman from al-Hawwāsh, a family that provided the chiefs of al-Matāwirah in Ottoman times.[1] To the same tribe belongs, in all probability, a considerable number of the noncommissioned officers and rank-and-file of *Sarāyā al-Difā'* and *Sarāyā al-Ṣirā'*. The members of these units, which were formed in 1971 and 1973 respectively, were chosen with extreme care and it seems unlikely that preference in selection would not have been given to men with close tribal links to Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad. Many of them are even said to be from his birth place, the village of Qardāḥah.

But of course, Asad does not rely exclusively on his own tribe, which constitutes only about one-fifth of the million or so 'Alawīs of Syria, or 2.3 per cent of its total population, and can provide only a thin basis for his power. His reliance on the 'Alawīs generally is clear from other significant military appointments. Thus Yūnis Yūnis, commander of the Ninth Armored Division, is from the tribe of al-Ḥaddādīn. Again, Tawfīq al-Jahanī, who headed the First Armored Division from 1971 to 1978, is from the Raslān section of al-Kalbiyyah. Moreover, 'Alī Umrān, who commanded until recently one unit of the Special Forces, is from al-Khayyāṭīn. A reserve regime-shielding unit, the Special Forces, comprises from 5,000 to 8,000 commandos and parachutists and is led by 'Alī Ḥaydar, who, according to an 'Alawī source, belongs to the 'Alawī tribe of al-Ḥaddādīn but, according to a Shi'i source, descends from a landed Shi'i family of Salamiyyah that in the past employed members of the Asad family on its farms in Qardāḥah.

There are other military 'Alawīs of consequence, such as Ibrahim Ḥasan, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or 'Alī Ja'ja', the Commander of the Third Armored Division, but their tribal affiliation could not be determined.

A note of caution is in order here. To assert that Asad depends for his power upon his tribe or his co-religionists is not to assert that Asad is necessarily tribal or sectarian in his outlook or motives or in his economic or political line of conduct. While some of Asad's policies—for example, his

1. People from Ṣafītah, where the woman taught school, still recall that the *muqaddam* or initial portion of her bride-price paid by 'Abd -al-Ḥalīm Khaddām in 1954 was only one piastre but that her *mu'akhkhar* or the amount held in reserve for her in case of divorce reached as high as 100,000 Syrian pounds. Later Khaddām apparently took for second wife a woman from the Sunni family of al-Ṭayyārah.

grants of land in the plain of al-Ghāb to peasants from the 'Alawī Mountain—have been at least partly affected by his 'Alawī background, broader considerations have been at the basis of other actions taken by his regime. In illustration one could cite Asad's limited economic "open door" policy (consult p. 340) or his decision to cooperate with Egypt in preparing for, and eventually waging, the war of October 1973.

To this another word must be appended in clarification. As far as political decision making is concerned, only two men are crucial in Syria's regime: Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and his brother Rif'at. In this sense whatever control other men have over the lives and behavior of Syrians is not fundamental but derivative; it springs from their relationship or loyalty to one or the other or both of the Asad brothers. This is true of the Sunnis who occupy conspicuous posts in the regime, such as Premier 'Abd al-Ra'ūf al-Kasam or Minister of Defense Muṣṭafa Ṭlās, They clearly draw their authority from Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and have no power base of their own.

II

In order to throw more light on the nature of the social support of Syria's military rulers, it is appropriate at this point to say a word or two about the 'Alawīs.

Until recently the 'Alawī community was in an objective sense a sect-class. In its province of origin, the province of Latakia, which is in the north-west of Syria, there was at least until the late 1950s, a close although not complete correspondence between the sectarian and ecologic-class divisions. To a preponderant degree the urban population was Sunni, the rural population 'Alawī. In the plains to the west, south and east of the 'Alawī mountains the most numerous and poorest peasants were invariably 'Alawī. They cultivated the soil for the relatively middling Christian and Sunni landowners from the towns of Latakia, Jablah, and Banyās, as well as for the big Sunni proprietors of Ḥamāh and al-Akkār.

The 'Alawīs were the food-producers of many of these parts for centuries. As long ago as 1317, in the days of the Mamlūks (as can be read in the pages of Ibn Baṭṭūṭah), the Sultan at Cairo, having learned of a violent uprising by 'Alawīs in the district of Jablah, ordered that they be put to the sword. "But these people," urged the Chief of the Amirs of Tripoli in protest, "work the land for the Muslims and if they are killed, the Muslims will be enfeebled."[2] The rebels were thus spared on account of their vital economic function.

2. Ibn Baṭṭūtah, *Tuḥfat al-Nuẓẓār fī Gharā'ib al-Amṣār wa 'Ajā'ib al-Asfār (The Gem of the Observers of the Marvels of Cities and Journeys)*, Arabic text edited by C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti under the title *Voyages d'Ibn Baṭṭūṭa* and annotated by Vincent Monteil (Paris, 1968), p. 179; and René Dussaud, *Histoire et religion des Noṣairis* (Paris, 1900), pp. 23–24.

The lot of the 'Alawīs was never enviable. Under the Ottomans they were abused, reviled and ground down by exactions and, on occasions, their women and children led into captivity and disposed of by sale.[3] In the plains, even in villages, that had once belonged to them, the 'Alawī peasants worked as mere *murābi's*, that is, they were allowed only one-fourth of the proceeds of their labor.[4] A large number of their originally *mushā'* or collectively held villages, with appertaining lands and livestock, passed in the course of the nineteenth century into the hands of Christian or Sunni merchants or notables through legal manipulations and other unfair practices.[5] Their income became so meager—their yearly share in the closing decade of Ottoman rule in the district of Jablah was, according to a contemporary estimate, as low as five and no higher than ten Turkish liras[6]—that frequently in desperation they seized part of the crop or refused to pay the assessed state tax, thus inviting the wrath of the law. We have here but another confirmation of the old truth to which Rousseau gave expression: "the law is always useful to those who possess and harmful to those who have nothing." The conditions, even of the more independent and less downtrodden 'Alawī peasants in the inaccessible mountainous regions became so deplorable that they developed after World War I the practice of selling or hiring out their daughters to affluent townspeople. Some were sold in their childhood for life as servants but most were, for an agreed price, merely indentured, so to say, for a given period of time.[7]

It is such conditions, which scarcely improved under the French mandate or in the post-independence period—the average daily income of the peasants in 1938 was only about 22 Syrian piastres while the daily cost of living per capita was approximately 50 piastres[8]—that drove the 'Alawīs to enroll in great numbers in the state's armed forces.

Despite their vulnerability and sunken status, the 'Alawīs for long did not present a common front. There were several reasons for this. For one thing, they were split into tribes, as already noted. For another, they were religiously divided into Shamsīs, Qamarīs and Murshidiyyīn. The Shamsīs (a derivative of *shams* or sun, the astral symbol of Muḥammad), a section of detribalized 'Alawīs, form a minority in Syria and are said to pay more

3. For the last-mentioned point, see, for example, Shaykh 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Bīṭār, *Ḥilyat al-Bashar fī Tārīkh al-Qarn al-Thālith 'Ashar (The Ornament of Mankind or the History of the Thirteenth Century of the Hijrah)*, Part III (Damascus, 1963), pp. 1600–1601.

4. Jacques Weulersse, *Le Pays des Alaouites*, Tome I (Tours, 1940), pp. 224–225.

5. Muḥammad Amīn Ghālib al-Ṭawīl, *Tārīkh al-'Alawiyyīn (The History of the 'Alawīs)*, (Beirut, 1966), p. 406.

6. 'Abdallah Ḥannā, *Al-Qaḍiyyat al-Zirā'iyyah wa al-Ḥarakāt al-Fallāḥiyyah fī Sūriyyā wa Lubnān, 1820–1920 (The Agrarian Question and the Peasant Movements in Syria and Lebanon, 1820–1920)*. Part I (Beirut, 1975), p. 141.

7. 'Abd-ul-Laṭif Yūnis, *Thawrat al-Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-'Alī* ("The Revolt of Shaykh Ṣāliḥ al-'Alī") (Damascus, 2nd edition, n.d.), p. 178.

8. 'Abdallah Ḥannā, *op. cit.*, Part II, *1920–1945* (Beirut, 1978), p. 49.

reverence to the Prophet Muḥammad than to 'Alī, his cousin and son-in-law. The majority section, the Qamarīs (after *qamar* or moon, the astral symbol of 'Alī), allegedly regard 'Alī as the *ma'na* or "meaning" of the divinity. The Murshidiyyīn split off from the Qamarīs and are followers of Sulaymān al-Murshid. A humble shepherd, al-Murshid claimed prophetic powers in 1923 at the age of 17 and on that account and for seditious proclivities suffered death at the hand of the authorities some 20 years later. His sect attracted many adherents and spread widely among the tribe of al-Khayyāṭīn. President Asad's sect, the traditional Qamarīs, is led by Sulaymān al-Aḥmad, who is usually referred to as "the Bedouin of the Mountain" (*Badawī al-Jabal*) and carries the official title of "Servant of the Prophet's Household" (*Khādim Ahl-il-Bayt*). He has his center at Qardāḥah, Asad's village, and belongs to Asad's section, the Numailātiyyah, of al-Matāwirah tribe.

It should be mentioned parenthetically that the leaders of the 'Alawīs deny any connection or affinity with astral gnosticism or other deviations from conventional Shi'ism. In a formal proclamation issued in 1973, 80 religious personages, representing the various parts of the 'Alawī country, unqualifiedly affirmed that their book is the Qur'an, that they are Muslim and Shi'i, and, like the majority of Shi'is, Ithnā 'Ashariyyah or Twelvers, that is, partisans of the 12 imams, and that whatever else is attributed to them has no basis in truth and is a mere invention by their enemies and the enemies of Islam.[9] In this connection, it is significant that when General Ṣalāḥ Jadīd, Syria's 'Alawī strongman in the second half of the 1960s, voiced apprehensions at the rise of sectarian feelings in the country and his Ismā'īlī Minister of Information, Sāmī-j-Jundī, suggested, as an answer to the problem and a check to the suspicion nursed by the other communities, the publication of the secret books of the 'Alawī sect, Jadīd sharply rejoined: "If we did this, our shaykhs would crush us."[10]

The 'Alawīs were divided not only from the religious or tribal standpoints but also in a geographical sense. There was, first, the division between the 'Alawīs of the Mountain and the 'Alawīs of the plains. The latter, although originally from the Mountain, had in time become less spirited, less hardened, and more submissive than the montane 'Alawīs. But more conducive to the weakness of the 'Alawī peasants generally was the fact that they tended to be thinly scattered. None of their villages was very large. For example, in the 1930s in the plains the average 'Alawī village counted between 100 and 250 inhabitants.[11]

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9. The *'ulamā'* of the Islamic 'Alawī Sect in the Syrian Arab Republic and in Lebanon, *Al-'Alawiyyūn. Man Hum wa Mā 'Aqidatuhum (The 'Alawīs. Who are They and What are their Beliefs?)*, undated and unplaced, pp. 6–7, 16–20, and 27.

10. Sāmī al-Jundī, *Al-Ba'th* (Beirut, 1969), pp. 144–145.

11. Jacques Weulersse, *Le Pays des Alaouites*, I, p. 239.

Recently the 'Alawīs have also become economically more sharply stratified. In the Ottoman period the economic distance between their peasants and religious and administrative chiefs—the *shaykhs* and *muqaddams*—was not wide or pronounced. Their conditions did not become more markedly unequal in the first half of this century. However, since their rise to power, an upper class has been differentiating itself from the rest of the community and, within the ranks of this class, even a group of millionaires, waxing rich from fat commissions on state contracts, has reared its head. This may under certain circumstances weaken the attachment to the regime of the least favored segments of the sect. Significantly enough, in 1969 when 'Alawī peasants launched a rising in the Ghāb district over debts owed to the Agricultural Bank, the 'Alawī rulers did not sympathize with them but put them down by force.

All these divisive factors—tribal, religious, geographical and economic—explain in part (there are also personal elements and new ideological influences at play) the factionalism that 'Alawī politics has exhibited since 1963. But working for cohesion at the present juncture is the strong fear among 'Alawīs of every rank that dire consequences for all 'Alawīs could ensue from an overthrow or collapse of the existing regime.

III

Syria's ruling group does not or did not draw strength merely from the Matāwirah tribe or the 'Alawī community but also, as stated at the outset, from an ecologic-cultural division of the Syrian people.

The divisions between town and country or between the main cities and the country towns are very old social and cultural divisions and, historically, their interests have tended to be intrinsically at variance. For long the peasants lived at the mercy of the cities. From their standpoint, the cities obtained benefits and brought only injury. The cities, especially the capital, symbolized for them the foreign ruler, the *kapi kulus*—the imperial janissaries—the gendarmes and the tax-collector. Moreover, men from the cities owned their villages or, if they did not own them, controlled the markets in which they had to sell their produce. Over and above this, in recent times the main cities have increasingly been attracting to themselves much of the energy and wealth of the population and have been growing rapidly at the expense of the rest of the country.

How people of rural origins or from country towns feel towards the capital city is reflected in their common descriptions of its inhabitants. They regard the Damascenes as grasping, inhospitable, imperious and disdainfully proud. "The Damascene merchant," they maintain, "will extract profit even from his father." They also gloat over the old saying: "Every Damascene has distinction but is also ignoble" *(kullu shāmī fīhi 'alāmah wa fīhi la'āmah).*

The peasants recurrently sought to liberate themselves from the influence of the cities. There were, for example, risings by 'Alawīs under indigenous chiefs in 1806, 1811, 1815, 1844, 1852, 1855, 1858, 1918–1921 and 1935. But these risings were isolated and localized and, therefore, historically ineffective. Of deeper structural consequence were the struggles that took place *within the cities* between the chief representatives of urban power on the one hand and former peasants or former country people on the other. Connected with these struggles is a phenomenon that repeats itself: rural people, driven by economic distress or lack of security, move into the main cities, settle in the outlying districts, enter before long into relations or forge common links with elements of the urban poor, who are themselves often earlier migrants from the countryside, and together they challenge the old established classes.

Thus, the struggles, that broke out from time to time in the eighteenth and the first third of the nineteenth century between the troops of the governors and the *zarbāwāt* (the disadvantaged and refractory mass of the *yerliyya* or local janissaries) in Damascus, or between the *ashrāf* (the claimants of descent from the Prophet) and the counterpart of the *zarbāwāt* in Aleppo, were, in their more serious aspects, struggles between, on the one hand, the dominant families, who lived in the inner parts of Damascus or Aleppo and held most of the surrounding villages and, on the other hand, the men of the people from the outer part of these cities, who were largely former peasants or former bedouins and constituted the cities' menial workers or artisans of inferior standing.[12] For a time the *zarbāwāt* and their leaders gained the ascendancy, at least in their own districts, if not over the entire city, as at Aleppo. In Damascus, in the words of a contemporary chronicler, "they all spoke with one tongue as if they were a soul in one body" and their chiefs gathered such strength that they defiantly boasted: "If ten pashas came to us, accompanied by the Sultan, we would take no account of them and would tear their tails with our *ṭabanjas*."[13] The ascendancy of these forces was short-lived by reason of the intervention of the Ottoman

12. The *yerliyya* had their strongholds in the districts of al-Maydān and Sūq Sārūjā in Damascus and Bānqūsa and Bāb an-Nayrāb and their extensions in Aleppo. These districts were largely inhabited by people of rural or nomadic origins. For this and the points in the text, consult Aḥmad al-Budayrī al-Ḥallāq, *Ḥawādith Dimashq al-Yawmiyyah. 1154–1176 A.H. (The Daily Events of Damascus. 1741–1762)*, as revised by Muḥammad Sa'īd al-Qāsimī and edited by Aḥmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karīm (Cairo, 1959), pp. 18, 63, 66–70, 77–78, 97–98, 127–129, 197, 200, 202, and 213–217; Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar fī A'yān al-Qarn al-Thānī 'Ashar (The String of Pearls or the Biography of the Notables of the Twelfth Century of the Hijrah)*. III (Cairo, 1883), pp. 90 and 286–287; Būlus Qara'lī, ed., *Ahammu Ḥawādith Ḥalab fī al-Nisf al-Awwal min al-Tāsi' 'Ashar (The Most Important Events of Aleppo in the First Half of the 19th Century)*, based on a manuscript by Būlus Arūtin, Maronite Bishop of Aleppo, 1788–1850 (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 56 and 58; and Herbert L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo. 1760–1826* (Chapel Hill, 1963), pp. 57–64 and 100–102.

13. Al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar*, III, p. 286; and al-Budayrī al-Ḥallāq, *Ḥawādith Dimashq*, p. 69. A *ṭabanja* is a type of pistol.

government but the underlying tensions they represented have remained a factor in Syrian politics.

In recent times the most serious urban-rural clashes also occurred within the cities—in the 1960s within Aleppo, Damascus and Ḥamāh, and in 1979–1981 within Ḥamāh, Aleppo and Latakia. At the bottom of much of the anger of the Ḥamawīs, who put up the fiercest opposition against the existing regime, is the fact that since 1966 Syria's rulers have been bringing down peasants from the 'Alawī Mountain and giving them title to lands in the very rich and recently developed plain of al-Ghāb which had formerly been in the possession of wealthy or influential people from Ḥamāh. In the clashes in this as in the other cities, in sharp contrast to the outcome of the urban-rural conflicts of past centuries, the country people clinched a more enduring, if unstable, victory by virtue of their deep penetration of the Syrian army.

If, therefore, in the long-drawn conflict between city and country, the city has been more and more overshadowing the countryside and growing in size, power and significance, the original city people themselves have been falling under. Even so the city is having the final say, inasmuch as the country people, who are on the top of the heap now, are themselves being urbanized and transformed into citizens.

IV

Can one adduce more concrete evidence in support of the generalization that Syria's regime depends heavily on people of rural origins?

In 1968, in an internal publication,[14] the Ba'th command provided the following figures on the social composition of the Ba'th Party:

Social Category	Full Members (Per cent)	Candidates (Per cent)
Workers	12	14
Peasants	16	28
Students	20	32
Employees	32	7
Teachers	16	4
Others	4	15
	100	100

14. The National Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party (Syria), *Al-Taqrīr al-Tanẓīmī li al-Mu'tamar al-Qawmī al-Istithnā'ī al-'Āshar (The Organizational Report of the Extraordinary Tenth National Congress)*, Damascus, 1968.

Of course, these statistics are not conclusive as to the nature of the support of the regime in the year in question. They are silent about the proportion of workers, students, employees and teachers who are from a rural background.

There are, however, other indications. In the first place, there is the frank admission by Ba'thīs or ex-Ba'thīs that Damascus has never been a Ba'thī stronghold and that the party's support there was drawn essentially from rural-based students and teachers.[15] Secondly, in the last comparatively free elections held in Damascus, those of 1961, the Ba'thī candidate received from the city's inner districts of 'Amārah and Qaymariyyah only 17.4 per cent and 17.7 per cent of the votes respectively, but 31.5 per cent, 31.7 per cent, and as high as 49.1 per cent of the votes from, severally, the capital's neighboring villages of al-Qadam, Kfar Sūsah and Dummar-Kīwān.[16] Moreover, there is the telling fact that in the 1960s and in the last twelve months or so the government had on occasion to bring in peasants from the countryside to counter the demonstrations and strikes that broke out in Ḥamāh, Aleppo and Damascus. It is also significant that, out of the 600 or so members of the Ba'th's Nationalist Guard in Syria's capital in 1964, only 12 were Damascenes.[17]

Over and above this, it is clear that since 1963 the Ba'th regime derived support at one point or another not only from the rural-inclined 'Alawī military element but also from one or the other, or from all, of three other major army groups of rural background, the Druze group of Jabal al-'Arab, the Sunni group of Ḥawrān, and the Sunni group of Dayr al-Zūr.

In fact, almost all the Sunni officers who rose to conspicuous military positions during the Ba'thī period hailed from country towns or rural areas or from city districts inhabited by former peasants. Thus, Mūsa al-Zu'bī, Chief of the Missile Corps in 1965–1966, and Aḥmad Suwaydānī, the Chief of Staff in 1966–1967, are from the Ḥawrān. Nājī Jamīl, the Commander of the Air Force from 1971 to 1978, is from Dayr al-Zūr. Ḥikmat Shahābī, the present Chief of Staff, is from al-Bāb and the Minister of Defense, Muṣṭafa Ṭlās, is from Rastan. Again, Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ, who played a leading role in the Ba'th regime from 1963 to 1966, hails from Bāb al-Nayrāb, an outlying quarter of Aleppo inhabited by people of rural origin (and in the first third of the nineteenth century, interestingly enough, by members of the *yerliyya* corps).

In view of the fact that the city people, and in particular the members of the professions and the commercial and industrial middle and lower middle

15. See, for example, Sāmī-j-Jundī, *Al-Ba'th*, p. 38.

16. The percentages are based on the detailed results of the elections provided in *Mudhakirrāt Khālid al-'Aẓm (The Memoirs of Khālid al-'Aẓm)*, Volume III (Beirut, 1973), p. 222.

17. Conversation, December 1964, with a knowledgeable member of the Ba'th Party who did not wish to be identified.

classes in Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia, Ḥamāh and Ḥimṣ, form a very significant element in terms not only of numbers but also of skills, education, administrative competence and economic *savoir faire,* the neglect of their interests by the Ba'th leaders in the 1960s, through the application of insufficiently considered socialist measures, and the fierce hostility that this aroused, exposed the Ba'th regime to great perils. It is the realization by Asad of the necessity of moderating the urban-rural conflict that formed a principal point of strength of his government in the 1970s. By propitiating the urban middle classes, through the adoption of a limited "open door" economic policy, Asad added to the durability of his regime. This policy explains to no little degree why the Damascenes, its main beneficiaries, did not join, in any serious manner, in the violent urban risings of 1979–1981 against Asad's government. But also at play in their relative quiescence is the fact that the Damascenes have become a minority in their own city, largely by virtue of the great migratory waves from the countryside: the population of Damascus grew from 345,237 in 1961[18] to about 1.2 million in 1981. Moreover, the state, while paying insufficient attention to the economy of Aleppo or Ḥamāh, has heavily invested in the infrastructure of the capital. Over and above this, the commercially-minded Damascenes, who essentially desire greater freedom of profit-making under conditions of comparative stability, do not see in Syria's political horizon any acceptable alternative to the present pragmatic partly statist partly capitalist system.

V

What made possible the political dominance in Syria of the 'Alawī military element when the members of their community add up to less than one-eighth of the population of the country? Leaving aside two general explanatory factors—the fragmentation of the social structure and the political ineffectiveness of the mass of Syrians—the question resolves itself into one of determining what made possible the decisive control by the 'Alawī military of the Syrian armed forces.

First, it must be made clear that on the level of the officer corps the 'Alawīs, contrary to a widespread impression, were not as important numerically as the Sunnis prior to 1963. They derived much of their real strength from the lower ranks of the army. In an arithmetical sense, they had

18. Great Britain, the Board of Trade, *Syria, Review of Commercial Conditions 1951–1952* (London, 1952), p. 4.

a plurality among the common soldiers and a clear preponderance among the non-commissioned officers. As early as 1955, after the assassination of the Deputy Chief of Staff 'Adnān al-Mālikī by Sergeant Yūsuf 'Abd al-Karīm, an 'Alawī member of the Parti Populaire Syrien, Colonel 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Sarrāj, Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, discovered to his surprise that no fewer than 65 per cent or so of the non-commissioned officers belonged to the 'Alawī sect.[19] How can one account for this state of affairs?

One factor, that is frequently brought up in this connection, is the minority-oriented policy pursued by the French from 1921 to 1945. It is indeed true that out of the eight infantry battalions in the Troupes Spéciales serving in Syria under the French mandate, three consisted entirely or substantively of 'Alawīs and none were Sunni Arab in composition. It is also true that out of the 12 cavalry squadrons on which data are available, only one, the 24th, consisted of rural Sunni Arabs from Dayar al-Zūr and al-Raqqah and two others, the 21st and the 25th, comprised some Sunni Arab elements from the tribe of Shammar or from the towns of Idlib and Ḥimṣ. All the other units were drawn from the Druzes, Circassians, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians or Isma'īlīs.[20]

However, the pre-independence character of the army, that is, its character prior to 1946, cannot account for its 1963 or its present composition, at least in any decisive sense. The reason must be obvious. In 1963 Syria had standing armed forces of about 65,000,[21] and now has nearly a quarter of a million men under arms, whereas the Syrian contingent of the Troupes Spéciales that it inherited from the French in 1946 counted only 7,000, and was by 1948 reduced to 2,500 men,[22] because the ruling landed and mercantile families of the day regarded the contingent as too large and too financially burdensome. (Incidentally, the fact just cited does not support the notion so often heard that Syria at that time harbored aggressive intentions against the Jewish community in Palestine. When one harbors aggression, one prepares for it and the decrease of one's armed forces from 7,000 to 2,500, in a period when the Palestine question was approaching its highest point of crisis, is scarcely a sign of hostile preparation.) At any rate, it is clear that the strong foothold of the 'Alawīs in the Troupes Spéciales cannot explain their present dominant influence in the army.

A more significant causal factor that was at work as relentlessly in the post-independence period as under the French was the depressed economic condition of the 'Alawīs. Enough has been said about this subject in the

19. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Sarrāj, conversation, April 1980.

20. I am indebted for the details relating to the composition of the Troupes Spéciales to Professor R. Bayly Winder, who kindly provided me with a copy of an unpublished paper on the subject prepared by him in March 1959. Pages 14–15, of the paper have reference.

21. *The New York Times*, April 26, 1963.

22. *Jaysh al-Sha'b (The Army of the People)*, Damascus, No. 995–996 of August 3, 1971, p. 10.

foregoing pages. Also relevant as an explanation for the superior numerical weight of the 'Alawīs, at least among the rank-and-file draftees, is the matter of the *badal* ("financial substitute"). Prior to 1964 Syrians were permitted to buy exemption from military service for the sum of 500 Syrian pounds.[23] In 1964 the practice was severely restricted and the *badal* raised to 2,000 pounds for holders of college degrees, 1,000 pounds for secondary school graduates, and 600 pounds for other Syrians.[24] In 1968 the maximum *badal* was increased to $3,000 and more recently to as high as $5,000, and must now be discharged in hard currency.[25] In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the Sunni of the cities, no matter how humble in condition, could as a rule afford to part with 500 or 600 Syrian pounds to avoid one and a half or two years of compulsory service. But for the peasants, especially the 'Alawīs, 500 or 600 pounds represented the value of several seasons of arduous labor. Moreover, peasants were seldom free from debt.

Ultimately, however, it was the rise of the 'Alawīs to dominance in the officer corps that assured their decisive control of the armed forces. In this regard what above all worked to their advantage was the fact that, whereas the 'Alawī officers were overwhelmingly of rural origins, peasant extraction, common regional provenance, and, after 1955, Ba'thī in persuasion, the Sunni officers were hopelessly divided in political, regional and class terms. Thus, the Sunni officers were clearly differentiated into urban and rural officers. Among the urbanites the most active and the most politically distinguishable were the Damascenes and the Ḥamawīs, among the country officers the groups of Dayr al-Zūr and the Ḥawrān. The Damascenes were in part Nāṣirites but identified themselves mostly with the Secessionists, who represented a maze of discordant elements, ranging from groups with roots in the affluent landed, commercial and industrialist parts of society, to Muslim Brethren, socialists and independent leftists from the middle and lower middle classes. The Ḥamawīs largely sympathized with socialist-minded Akram Ḥūrānī and partly with the old elite. Some of the officers from Dayr al-Zūr and the Ḥawrān were Nāṣirites, but most threw in their lot with the Ba'th Party.

By virtue of these divisions in the ranks of the Sunni officers—and I am here simplifying somewhat a very complicated situation—Sunnis of one persuasion ended up purging Sunnis of another persuasion, or low or middle class Sunnis joined with 'Alawīs or Druzes in purging upper class Sunnis, or

23. Article 1 of Decree No. 746 issued on October 24, 1953, by Syria's Ministry of National Defense, *Al-Jarīdat al-Rasmiyyah li al-Jumhūriyyat al-Sūriyyah (The Official Gazette of the Syrian Republic)*, No. 69 of November 12, 1953, p. 5326.

24. Article 7 of Decree No. 35 of March 4, 1964, issued by the chairman of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command, *Al-Jarīdat al-Rasmiyyah* . . . , No. 10 of 1964, p. 2493.

25. Article 2 of Decree No. 7 of January 10, 1978, *Al-Jarīdat al-Rasmiyyah* . . . , No. 49 of November 21, 1978, p. 117.

rural-oriented Sunnis joined with 'Alawīs and Druzes in purging city-based Sunnis . In political terms, the Secessionists, the Ḥūrānists, the Nāṣirites, the group of the independent Ziyād Ḥarīrī, and the supporters of the Ba'thī Amīn al-Ḥāfiẓ were successively purged between March 1963 and February 1966 and, with every purge, the Sunnis in the officer corps decreased in number and significance. A blow in September 1966 against the Druzes—the group of Salīm Ḥāṭūm—and a blow in February 1968 against the remaining bloc of rural Sunnis—the Ḥawrān group of Aḥmad Suwaydānī—left the 'Alawī officers in clear command of the field.

In this struggle the 'Alawī officers were greatly aided by their control of the Military Section of the Ba'th Party. This came about largely as a result of the fact that officers from their sect constituted the core of the Ba'th Secret Military Committee which took shape in Cairo in 1959, served soon after as a center of attraction for disaffected Syrian officers, and eventually played a leading role in pulling off the military coup of March 1963.

The control by the 'Alawīs of the Ba'th Military Section enabled them, in the first place, to act as Ba'thīs rather than as 'Alawīs. But this observation must be qualified. The 'Alawī officers were not all the time acting consciously as 'Alawīs. They were, it must be remembered, also people of rural and humble origins and acting as such, that is, acting according to the instincts and tendencies that their structural situation engendered. At any rate, by dint of their control of the Ba'th Military Section, they were able to regulate the admission into the military academies and to shuffle and reshuffle the commands of military units in manners answering to their purposes. They did this at first—in the second quarter of 1963—with caution but determinedly after July 1963 and more so from February 1966 onwards. Moreover, by virtue of a tactic devised during the secessionist period—the period from 1961 to 1963—the tactic of planting Ba'thīs in clandestine military organizations of every coloring, they were kept posted on the intentions and plans of all their rivals.

Also greatly contributing to their eventual triumph was the fact that they concentrated upon, and succeeded in gaining control of, powerful striking units that were of direct relevance to the making and unmaking of military coups, that is, such units as air squadrons, missile detachments, and armored brigades in or around the capital, not to mention intelligence and counter-intelligence forces.

Of course, many Sunnis are still in the officer corps but, if they are important, they are important not as a group but as individuals and more in the professional than in the political sense.

VI

It remains to point out how remarkably similar, in their basic outlines, are the characteristics of Syria's rulers to those of Iraq's governing element,

despite the different balance of ethnic and sectarian forces in the two countries (53 per cent of Iraq's population are Shi'i Arabs, 20 per cent Sunni Arabs, and 18 per cent Sunni Kurds, whereas in Syria 63 per cent are Sunni Arabs and 12 per cent 'Alawī Arabs, to mention only the most numerous groups).

Thus, the core of the ruling element of Iraq also consists of a kinship group (closely related members of the Begāt section of the Albū Nāṣir tribe); rests essentially on members of a minority sect (Sunni Arabs) and on country rather than city people (on middle and lower middle class families from the country towns of the Arab north-western part of Iraq); and reflects the balance of forces in the army rather than in the country at large (the relative strength of the bloc of military officers originating from the country town of Takrīt).

How can one explain these similarities of the ruling groups in Syria and Iraq? They are obviously a natural reflection of the similar level of social development in both countries and of similar past struggles between the countryside and the main towns or capital city or, more concretely, between disadvantaged rural or partially urbanized forces and privileged city-based groups.

To this a final observation should be added, which is perhaps a tautology: when in Syria or Iraq disadvantaged or previously disadvantaged rural or partially urbanized people—representing a level in social evolution different than that of relatively long established urban groups—tend in their political actions to adhere to or cooperate more markedly with kinsmen or members of their own clan or people from their own sect or region, this is not so much a manifestation of narrow cliquishness, although their behavior bears this aspect, as it is they are really acting in a natural manner, merely obeying, so to say, the logic of their fundamental structural situation.

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1

Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World

Volker Perthes

Regime change and the quality of governance in various Arab countries have come to the fore as major topics in the international policy debate, particularly so in the United States under the administration of George W. Bush. There is little doubt that leadership personnel and the manner in which Arab leaders rule their states and societies also have an impact on how these countries fare in an increasingly globalized world. Why, however, should one study elites or the changes in and among elites in Arab states? Do "elite" and "elite change" denote a particular normative or political background? Why should the focus be on the particular group of countries that constitute the Arab world? Is it relevant to study the change of elites in that region in the first place? If so, which theoretical assumptions should guide such research?

A comparative study of the Arab world focusing on its elites—or more precisely in this case, on its politically relevant elites—and on change among them necessarily proceeds from general underlying assumptions. First, one must assume that there are enough similarities and interdependencies among the Arab states that will lend themselves to useful insights from a comparative perspective. Second, one must assume that change among elites is actually taking place or will occur at some point at roughly concurrent times. It is obvious that in the Arab world a generation of leaders—not just a couple of septuagenarian prime decisionmakers—is gradually disappearing, and a new political elite is emerging.

It is also assumed that this "changing of the guard" will affect political dynamics in the region. This assumption implies that national politics are important. Political outcomes, in other words, are to a large extent shaped by the agendas and strategies of political actors in addition to being influenced by global and regional structures and developments, and by constraints that limit the capabilities of individual states. This study thus takes an actor-oriented approach, assuming that political elites indeed matter. The

state remains the primary framework for social and political action, but, as Charles Tripp notes, it must not be divorced "from the individuals and groups which in fact hold the power of decision."[1]

Elites are a sociopolitical reality. They are the people, as Harold Lasswell has put it, "who get most of what there is to get."[2] That goes for politics as much as for the economy and other areas of social life; in many cases, they take the most in every instance. There is nothing normative in this statement or in the critical analytic approach taken here: the elite are not necessarily the best or the brightest nor are they always those who should rule or should have certain privileges. Such elitist notions, with theoretical foundations in Plato's *Republic* and Pareto's sociology, too easily lend themselves to authoritarian or even totalitarian systems and rulers. Our approach is also not normative in the sense of proposing what elites should do in their respective states: One may wish, for example, that Arab leaders would move their countries toward democracy, pluralism, or social equality. This research, however, is about the agendas and political projects of these leaders, as well as other members of the elite, in regard to the socioeconomic and political challenges their countries face. Finally, studies of elites should not be normative or even ideological in the sense of claiming that the ruling or politically relevant elites have gained their positions as a result of some equitable and pluralist form of competition. For most of the Arab world, this is certainly not the case.

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Elite studies experienced something of a renaissance in the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, to a great extent because of the transformation processes of authoritarian systems in Latin America and, even more so, in the former socialist countries. The crucial role of political elites in democratic transitions is commonly acknowledged by those researchers interested in transition processes as such,[3] and it has became a focal point of elite studies.[4] There has been more than one attempt to find common ground between studies that focus on elites and those that focus on the masses or class actors in order to better understand the interaction of leaders and the masses that shaped the democratization processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Mass action has often been a driving force in elite policies.[5] Michael Burton, John Higley, and others have explored the relationship between certain types of elites—consensual, fragmented, or divided—and regime types, as well as the chances of transition from one regime type to another. They conclude that the emergence of consolidated democracies requires "unity in diversity"—that is, a situation in which the groups comprising the elite agree on the rules of the game.[6] In regard to some of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, it has recently been noted that some of the elite who ruled these countries under socialism have survived the breakdown of those regimes and managed to retain their political elite status.[7]

Political failure evidently does not directly or necessarily lead to a loss of status.

Contrary to the claim that in this renaissance of elite studies "hardly any country . . . has not been the site of at least one recent elite study,"[8] the fact is that the Arab world has largely been ignored. Most studies of elites and emerging elites in the Arab states were done in the 1960s and 1970s, some even in the early 1980s. Little wonder that most of this work is heavily influenced by the modernization paradigm, which was dominant at that time. These studies—focusing mostly on the formation of a broad range of young elites, their social and professional backgrounds, socialization, political alignments, and worldviews—reflect the more or less revolutionary political and socioeconomic transformations that the region underwent beginning in the mid-1950s.[9] Frequently they are analytical, but tend to be more apologetic than critical, particularly in regard to the military. They generally stress the role of the new salaried middle classes as a social stratum promoting technological change and social modernization, and some even hail the civil and military functionaries who constituted this stratum as "the principal revolutionary and stabilizing force."[10] The optimism surrounding the role of the man on horseback receded considerably, practically as well as theoretically, with the unfolding of the long and often agonizing experiences with Arab rulers of military origin and army-backed regimes.

Because of the longevity of Arab regimes, academic interest in the political elites of the Arab world began to decline at the end of the 1970s. Thereafter students of political sociology occasionally took a look at new or reemerging elite segments, particularly the entrepreneurial elite and professional groups, or at emerging social alliances between these strata and state bureaucracies or state bourgeoisies.[11] Such interest in the role of Arab political elites usually surfaced in the context of studies concerning economic and political adjustment or liberalization processes, for which transition and "third-wave" (of democratization) literature often provided the conceptual framework. In a sense, however, everyone took for granted the continuity of the existing regimes and the ruling strata. Studies from the 1970s, or with respect to that period, remained largely valid in their characterization of the ruling elite up to the late 1990s. At present, these studies offer a basis for comparison of this older elite with the younger elite who have emerged or are positioning themselves for substantive political roles.

Despite the recent interest in elite studies, no general theory of elites and political change exists on which this book could rely, and it is not going to fill that gap. At best, the essays here furnish elements of a theory of limited reach that helps in explaining the relationship between elite change and political and socioeconomic changes in Arab countries. They may, nonetheless, be useful to students of other regions.

The Focus on Elite Change in the Arab World

It took the deaths in 1999 and 2000 of four Arab heads of state—King Hussein of Jordan, King Hassan II of Morocco, Amir Isa of Bahrain, and President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria—to make outside observers alert to the prospect of a wide-ranging change of leadership in the Arab world. By 2009 the leadership map of the region will differ substantially from the one a decade prior, and the difference will be considerably greater than that between the maps of 1999 and 1989 and even of 1979. Arab regimes have been extremely stable over the past three last decades or so: In 1999, the average term in office of prime decisionmakers was more than twenty years. Change at the leadership level will hence be regionwide, and the effects of such parallel change on domestic developments and on the regional and international relations of individual Arab states are well worth studying.

Academic and media observers have tended to focus on who will follow the top decisionmakers in individual states; in some cases, due to the longevity of some leaders, such questions have been studied for more than a decade.[12] Other studies have dealt with the problems of succession,[13] or with successful succession processes, and, consequently, with the personalities of new leaders.[14] The upcoming changes of the guard will go much deeper, however. Mainly because of the autocratic and personalized nature of many Arab regimes, there has been little change in the second and third circles of decisionmaking elites. Long-standing leaders have retained trusted advisors and ministers or commanded a pool of trusted aides whom they rotate in and out of government positions. Also, from the 1970s (and sometimes 1960s) to the late 1990s in Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), there was about as much change at the top of tolerated opposition parties and factions as at the top of the respective regimes.[15] Accordingly, a real generation gap has emerged between the political elite and the majority of the population in most Arab countries. Consider that up to three-fourths of the population in Arab states is less than twenty-five years of age. In 2003 the majority of Libyans, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Saudis, among others, had no active memory of a regime other than the one in power. Also, the historical events and symbols frequently invoked in public discourse by many of these regimes mean little to younger generations. Future changes at the top and within the wider elite are likely to reduce that gap and be reflected in new (or renewed) discourses and symbols closer to the experiences of the younger generations.

In some country studies, scholars have addressed such issues as the social and professional backgrounds of future leadership elites.[16] The effects of multiple parallel successions in the region, however, and questions pertaining to the development of a broader political elite have not yet been systematically examined.

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The Politically Relevant Elite

The subject of the research presented here is the politically relevant elite (PRE). This stratum comprises those people in a given country who wield political influence and power in that they make strategic decisions or participate in decisionmaking on a national level, contribute to defining political norms and values (including the definition of "national interests"), and directly influence political discourse on strategic issues. The PRE thus encompasses the political elite, defined as those top government, administrative, and political leaders "who actually exercise political power"[17] or "persons whose strategic position in large and powerful organizations and movements enable them to influence political decisionmaking directly, substantially, and regularly."[18] The PRE reaches, however, beyond the political elite to include groups and segments that contribute to political processes or influence them from various sidelines. "Temporary elites"[19]—people who gain a position of political relevance but do not maintain elite status once their job is done—should not be conceptually excluded from this group. The same applies to ad hoc leaders of mass movements—the arouch in Algeria, for example—who, as John Peeler has argued in the case of Latin America, become elites the moment they lead.[20]

The concept of politically relevant elites also extends beyond today's common understanding of "political class"—those, in Tom Bottomore's words, who "exercise political power or influence, and are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership."[21] The PRE encompasses such functional segments as government, administration, and the military and may include individuals or groups who are not competing for political leadership, but rather use their influence to set or influence political agendas and define the themes of national discourse. These latter are opinionmakers rather than decisionmakers, advisors and *éminences grises* or lobbyists. Top businessmen, members of the media, and religious leaders, among others, are not per se considered part of the PRE; they are only included if their contribution to political processes is considered relevant. Generalizations are difficult, as relevance depends on the political structures as well as on the political culture of the different Arab states. Although religious leaders are certainly part of the PRE in Saudi Arabia or, for completely different reasons, in Lebanon—defining the legal framework in the former and, often enough, community interests in the latter—they cannot be considered politically relevant in Tunisia. Prominent journalists may have real influence on political agenda setting in Lebanon and, perhaps, in Kuwait and

Egypt, but for the time being they do not in Iraq and Syria. Similarly, the political relevance of deputies and members of shura councils, party functionaries, military officers, and government ministries is not the same from country to country. Which groups are considered part of the PRE must be established through a structural analysis of the political systems in each state.

The PRE concept includes opposition or dissenting voices once they are relevant to political processes. It is not necessary to theoretically juxtapose a "ruling elite" and a "counterelite," which would create a sometimes problematic and rather artificial distinction between those who are "in" and those who are "out." The criterion is relevance, as defined above, not membership in a ruling coalition or appointment to a formal office. Position alone does not guarantee a person political relevance; sometimes even position coupled with wealth do not translate into political power or influence. On the other hand, a full-fledged parliamentary democracy is not required for political forces that oppose a given government or differ with its agenda to gain a voice or some measure of influence on political processes. These forces might be competitors who play by the rules of the game or challengers who do not accept these rules or are not allowed to play the game in the first place. Take for example Lebanon, where members of the political oligarchy, even if they strongly oppose the president or the prime minister, still compete for political and material resources and are never actually "out." Even in some of the Arab monarchies rulers or parts of the ruling elite try to accommodate or integrate dissenters in one way or another. In these and other cases, even opposition leaders based outside the country may have real influence on decisions and discourses within the country. Algeria's Hocine Ait-Ahmed is an example of an influential challenger; it would be difficult to defend the claim that this veteran party leader has lost relevance in Algerian politics by being in exile. He is certainly not, however, among the core decisionmakers.

A model of three concentric circles highlights the different degrees of influence within the PRE (see Figures 2.1, 5.1, and 7.1 as exemplary illustrations).[22] The first (or inner) circle comprises the core elite—those who make decisions on strategic issues. In the second circle one finds an intermediate elite—groups and individuals who exert considerable influence on or make decisions of lesser political importance, but do not have the power to make decisions on strategic issues unless these are delegated to them. The third circle comprises what may be referred to as the subelite—less influential elites capable of indirectly influencing strategic decisions or contributing to national agenda setting and national discourses through their position in the government and administration, interest organizations and lobbies, the media, or other means. The boundaries between the circles are not hard and fast or hermetically sealed: Political elites have always

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been "somewhat elastic formations with unclear boundaries."[23] Movement into and out of the PRE, and between its circles, is indeed a major feature of social mobility and political change, and it is as such the center of interest here.

Issues and Approaches

This comparative look at politically relevant elites in the Arab countries focuses, where possible, on emerging or new elites. The dominant theme of change concerns change within elites and of elite settings as well as changes in the domestic and external environments that affect or are affected in some way by change on the elite level. Change includes everything from minor modifications of existing constellations to major, systemic transformations.

The case studies in this book deal with three related clusters of questions or issues that also denote three different levels of analysis: the human actor, the regional or international environments, and the nation-state. The first cluster pertains to the structure and composition of Arab PRE per se, which concerns identifying the politically relevant individuals and groups and those who have emerged or are about to emerge as part of this elite. The focus here is on the circulation of elites—the exchange of personnel—and on their attitudes and behavior. Given the longevity of regime elites in the Arab world, the question of what characterizes "new" or "emerging" is of particular importance: What is the scope of the changes taking place?[24] Can one speak of broad change in the sense that large numbers of positions in the first, second, and third circles change hands, or are these changes rather narrowly restricted to the most prominent or some of the more prominent elite members? How deep is such change? Is change within an elite purely generational, that is, is the new or emerging elite a mere reproduction or a younger version of the incumbent elite? Is that change structural—involving new political forces or new social strata or segments, and shifts in class or ethnic composition—or a new political or social balance of power? Further, can one detect changes in the dominant attitudes and values of a country's PRE, and what kind of effects do such changes have on that elite's behavior?

The second cluster of issues considers the interrelation between elite change and developments in the regional and international environment of the states in question. Elite change does not take place in a void. The political elites of the Arab world must deal with new regional and international structures—such as the World Trade Organization and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership—that tend to penalize noncooperation more than the international system did when the outgoing generation of leaders

came to power. In some cases, external players have explicitly demanded that incumbent political elites change or be exchanged.

Evolving regional and global circumstances do not act as absolute constraints on what the PRE of a given country can do in terms of regional and international relations, but they have to be taken into consideration. Analytical caution should prevail, however. There is no reason to assume that new elites will necessarily promote more peaceful solutions to interstate conflicts, take regional cooperation more seriously, or allow a higher degree of direct foreign interference in personnel and policy decisions simply because, when compared to their predecessors, they have a more civilian background, more exposure to the West, greater appreciation of the means and effects of globalization, and can count the Madrid and Oslo processes as part of their formative experience.

The third cluster of questions focuses on the relationships between the formation of new elites and socioeconomic as well as structural political changes. One should not presume that the emerging elites of the Arab world will necessarily follow a liberal economic agenda, let alone a liberal political one. Generation change on the elite level could, however, speed reforms: There is little doubt that the longevity of some regimes, such as that of Hafiz al-Asad in Syria or of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the ossification of the Syrian and Egyptian elites explain to some extent the resistance to reform seen in both countries in the 1990s.[25] To the extent that reforms are enacted by a core elite, and structural changes occur, there arises a need for new qualifications within the broader elite. That is, reform and structural change will create pressures that may expedite further generation change and most certainly have an impact on recruitment patterns and elite composition, particularly in the second and third elite circles.

Identifying the PRE

A comparative project of this kind must allow for academic pluralism in the various contributions that form its whole. Consequently, for example, some authors stress the sociological aspects of elite change more than others, while some approach it from a political economy perspective or pay special attention to the relevance of external factors. Putting such foci aside, however, the study of each country involves identifying its politically relevant elite.

For a critical analytic perspective, one cannot be content with a purely institutional or positional approach that defines the political elite as the group of people whose members occupy the ten, twenty, or fifty or so top executive or representative positions in the official or constitutional structure of a given polity in a certain period. In a study of the Palestinians, one author included within the "political elite" the president of Palestine, anybody who held at some point a position in the council of ministers, the president of the Palestinian Legislative Council, the heads of committees in the parliament, the heads of parties, and the leaders of major public institutions.[26] Obviously, a major portion of those called the politically relevant elite here will be found in such official positions. One must consider, however, that many ministers in Arab (and other) countries do not participate in strategic decisions and have only limited influence on dominant discourses. Thus, to avoid being deceived by rank and formal position, it is necessary to examine the structure and workings of the political system, including where and how strategic decisions are made, in order to pinpoint possible positions and persons of influence outside the official framework. Key decisions may be made in formal or informal bodies that do not actually have constitutional or even legal bases.

To overcome the shortcomings of approaches that concentrate on formal position alone, structural analysis of political systems and decisionmaking processes is essential. Generalizations should be avoided: While most of the governments of the Arab states can be characterized as autocratic, decisionmaking structures, even at the highest (or core-elite) level, are not all the same. A few countries—among them Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria under the rule of Hafiz al-Asad—look like "presidential monarchies," where strategic questions rest firmly in the hands of the prime decisionmaker. Even in such authoritarian countries, however, presidents do not make their decisions alone. Corporatist institutions often play a role; ruling parties or security apparatuses might have a say in decisions.

In some countries, decisionmaking structures are more consultative and consensus oriented, sometimes explicitly so: Consider the Lebanese constitution, which sets out three presidencies designed to share and balance decisionmaking powers between the three main confessional groups, or the family councils in the Gulf monarchies. In still other cases there exist more or less informal bodies that are consulted on strategic decisions, hold veto power over such decisions, or actually make them collectively. Examples include the Saudi Royal Council, or Algeria's self-recruiting military junta, which forms a collective leadership with more power than the president or the government.[27] Similarly, the so-called *qiyada filastiniyya* (Palestinian leadership), a group of ministers, political and military cadres, and advisors surrounding the Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat, is consulted on strategic issues, but it does not, as a body, have veto power.[28]

Even more variance exists with respect to structures comprising the second and third circles of the PRE. In Egypt or Syria, to give but two examples, the ruling party has a role to play in decisionmaking. In Jordan opposition party leaders, including Islamists, are also part of the PRE, and they have a voice even if parliament is suspended. In Lebanon, and to some extent in Egypt and Morocco, the media (and individual journalists) have

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some influence on agenda setting and public discourse. Religious leaders have a say in policy debates in countries as different as Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, but virtually no input in Algeria or Tunisia. Business associations have gained weight in several countries; trade unions have lost clout in most.

While a body of reliable literature exists on the political structures of Arab states, actual decisionmaking processes often remain opaque. Theoretically, a researcher would have to trace the processes that lead to decisions on relevant issues; identify the groups and institutions that try to influence and succeed in influencing debates on particular issues; and establish at what level disputes are solved, compromises are sought, or conflictual outcomes are determined. Practically, such research will only be possible to a limited extent. At times one will only be able to note that powerful networks have an influence on key decisions, but it will be too difficult to ascertain their structures or members.

Beyond political systems analysis, identifying the PRE requires relying on expert opinion, or the so-called reputational approach, which is an indispensable tool.[29] This may mean asking a group of knowledgeable observers from inside and outside the country who, according to their judgment, plays a relevant role with regard to strategic decisions. Method clearly meets content here, as people, even in systems with little transparency, tend to "know" who is in charge, who is influential, or who or which institutions and bodies can largely be disregarded. Such knowledge is of practical importance to citizens trying to solve individual or collective problems vis-à-vis the state but which cannot for whatever reason be solved through official, institutional channels; this knowledge is generally built on experience. A reputation of being influential, powerful, close to a top decisionmaker, an éminence grise, and so on is more than having a whiff of fame; it can be a real asset that facilitates access to material and symbolic resources and, thereby, increases political weight, or "capital." It is one feature among others that distinguish the elite from the masses.

Identifying emerging elites requires examining career and recruitment patterns. Elites are never, even in revolutionary situations, totally exchanged. In most of the Arab states, incumbent elites significantly influence the formation of the new elite that will replace them. Although recruitment patterns change over time, such as to meet new economic, foreign policy, or other challenges, it is usually possible to identify the incubators, as it were, where emerging elites are trained or prepare themselves for political careers. Parliament, as Rola el-Husseini and Gamal Abdelnasser point out, is a place to hone one's political skills in Lebanon and in Egypt. The Moroccan parliament, the shura council in Saudi Arabia, and some other legislative bodies may attain such a role in the future, or at least become places in which to vet ideas and thus influence political discourse.[30] In Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Syria, administration, particularly being in the position of a *wali* or a *muhafiz* (regional governor), is an important training and recruitment site for ministerial careers. The military remains a pool for future leaders in most countries, with the notable exception of the Gulf monarchies. Some leading families in Jordan, Lebanon, or Saudi Arabia have provided PRE members over two, three, or more generations.

Modernizing young leaders are likely to look for elite incubators outside the established structures of state, party, and leading families. Consider the role of the Economic Consultative Council in Jordan or the Syrian Computer Society in Syria in the modernization efforts of Abdallah II or Bashar al-Asad, respectively.[31] Also, in countries that undergo economic reform and adjustment processes, nationals who have made a career in international organizations stand a good chance of parachuting into key government positions. In general, the contributors to this book follow qualitative rather than quantitative analysis. All contributions are based on extensive fieldwork, particularly on semistructured or informal interviews with members of the PRE and other resource persons. The object of analysis defines the researcher's method to quite some extent. Members of political elites are less easily accessible than members of broader societal elites; and one can hardly expect the political leadership of a country to fill in the questionnaire of some curious researcher. While the ability to grasp changing realities through quantitative analyses must not be overestimated in the first place, sociobiographical data, even of a sample of incumbent PRE members and young recruits to the second and third circles, can help discern patterns of elite formation and their modification over time. Saloua Zerhouni's examination of Morocco provides a particularly useful example.[32]

Some of the chapters also present portraits of individuals, biographies of incumbents and emergent elites, or sketches of proto- or ideal-type PRE members. Such analysis helped the authors organize their ideas, and it may help others understand the politicocultural environment of the polities in question. Future developments will determine whether a researcher was able to skillfully sift through the available information to plausibly judge whose lives make representative biographies, who is a promising young leader, or where the line should be drawn between the first, second, and third circles of the PRE.

Identifying Agendas and Strategic Themes

A study on elite change must be concerned with the agendas of new and emerging PRE. Agendas, or political projects, should be understood as the concretized and prioritized interests of actors within a given temporal and

spatial framework. Although incumbent elites can be judged by their track record, such evaluation of emerging or young elites will necessarily be limited. One therefore must rely, to a large extent, on discourse analysis—critical examination of "speech acts" that reflect the opinions and attitudes of emergent as well as incumbent members of the elite. Discourse is not merely a reflection of attitudes, however. It is also practice—it is an essential part of agenda setting; it helps one recognize friend and foe; and it can redefine norms and institutions, challenge existing political configurations, or shield those in power against the claims of contenders.[33] To discern elite discourses, the contributors to this book have relied on personal interviews and discussions, published and unpublished statements, speeches, publications, and other materials.

Political culture had to be taken into account in identifying and selecting relevant materials. For example, in a country such as Lebanon, with a media-oriented culture, members of incumbent and emerging elites generally make efforts to publish books or articles. In Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, oral communication remains essential; for example, Crown Prince Abdallah and other Saudi leaders set agendas by publishing their addresses to select gatherings. Emerging elite members in the Gulf are more likely to rely on their word being spread through formal meetings or informal gatherings, such as the *diwaniyya*s of Kuwait. Here, even researchers may have to rely more on what they can hear than on what they can read.

In order to focus their analysis, the authors generally identified a limited number of relevant, strategic themes concerning their country of study. The assumption here is that impending elite change will be reflected in the political debates and discussions about these strategic themes and thus in elite discourse. The strategic themes are those of national importance, so they vary from country to country. European Union (EU) association, for example, and the liberalization measures that are to go along with association would certainly be considered strategic themes in countries that are about to negotiate agreements with the Europeans. They are contested within the PRE in Egypt and Syria, but not in Lebanon or Tunisia. In Lebanon, relevant themes include relations with Syria and the future of the confessionalist system. In Jordan, the questions of "normalization" of relations with Israel and of domestic relations between Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians are disputed and highly relevant. In the major oil-producing countries, questions of rent distribution, subsidies and taxes, and adjustment because of decreasing oil income may have similar relevance.

One should keep in mind that political science and other social sciences are not exact sciences. This book does not, therefore, offer irrefutable prophecies, statistics, or comprehensive quantitative data. A researcher may easily determine statistically that the emerging elites in a given country are

better educated, more urban, or more civilian than their predecessors, or that more of them are women. The value of such findings is, however, rather limited unless it can be translated into judgments and hypotheses about future political developments. In more than a few cases, such hypotheses can be based on anecdotal evidence rather than statistical or sociobiographical material.

Comparative Observations and Prospective Hypotheses

Political systems of Arab states vary, and comparative studies help to identify their differences. What these systems share, however—and this, again, underscores the relevance of studying elites and elite change in the region—is the elitist nature of political participation: Royal councils, shura councils, the Lebanese parliament with its confessionalist representation (indeed, the assemblies of most Arab countries), the Economic Consultative Council in Jordan, and other bodies are explicit means for integrating a wider, politically relevant elite into decisionmaking processes. In the past, republican regimes, like those in Syria, Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere, have tried to hide their elitism behind a populist facade. Practically, however, by treating their population as "the masses," rather than as citizens, they never left any doubt that decisionmaking powers were concentrated and should remain in the hands of a narrow, self-recruiting elite.

Elite Structure and Composition

The social and professional profile, as well as the historical experiences, of the new and emerging Arab leaders as of 2003 was considerably different from those of the political elites that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s (or even earlier in some of the monarchies). According to Manfred Halpern, these earlier elites were "a core of salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and experts,"[34] that is, technocrats from either the military or the bureaucracy. The old commercial and land-owning bourgeoisie were no longer considered part of the political elite, and an entrepreneurial class had yet to emerge.

The breadth and depth of elite change in the Arab world has and will continue to vary by country. In Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, where prime decisionmakers have relatively recently been replaced by their sons, a large percentage of people within the first, second, and third circles of the PRE have been exchanged. Except in Morocco, where some Islamists have moved into the third elite circle, these changes were not necessarily structural or deep in the sense that new political forces or new social segments entered the scene. In Jordan King Abdallah II's recruitment of members of

the business elite into leading political functions has brought more depth to postsuccession elite change, at least in the first and second circles, than that witnessed in Syria.

Algeria has experienced wide-ranging change, particularly in the third circle, and Isabelle Werenfels notes that its core elite has seen the replacement of "one generation of the revolution by a younger generation of the revolution."[35] These changes were partially structural, as the elite became more civilian. In Lebanon, many of the prewar and war elites have left the scene, and there has also been structural change: there are now fewer notables in the PRE, more businesspeople, and, at least in the third circle, more civil society actors than before. Also, most of the war elite militia leaders have been removed in one way or another, and some of the politicos who owe their positions solely to Syria may well experience the same fate if Syria's dominance in Lebanon fades. In Tunisia, the pre–Ben Ali elite has been totally replaced, but the new elite is basically a reproduction of the old in terms of socioprofessional composition and basic political philosophy. In Egypt, wide-ranging change can be expected once a successor to President Husni Mubarak comes to office, and it is likely to be at least partly structural—more civilian and probably with a strong business component. In Iraq, the war launched in 2003 by the United States and Britain was the driving force engineering wide-ranging elite change, from abroad. In the Palestinian territories, change is likely to be more constrained, even after the death or removal of Yasser Arafat, not least so because not everybody in the political elite derives his (or, in some cases, her) power directly from the president. Structural change will largely depend on Israeli-Palestinian developments. In Saudi Arabia, changes in the third circle have been relatively broad, including the co-optation of members of hitherto unrepresented social segments. Change in the first and second circles may come in doses. The death of a leader will lead to changes of position, but not necessarily to wide-ranging replacements of members of the PRE.

In general, as Arab societies have become more complex and diversified, the socioprofessional profile of new and emerging PRE has broadened, and PRE members have increased in number. Military officers are likely to be less dominant than they were in the final decades of the twentieth century. Even in Algeria, where the military firmly holds on to power, the president is now a civilian, and the institution of the presidency has been strengthened.[36] Overall, there will still be a military element in most PRE. Today's military officers, however, differ in many respects from the officer generation of largely rural origin that graduated from the military academies in the 1950s and 1960s and had a social revolutionary agenda.[37] Arab military officers in the early twenty-first century can generally be seen as a stability-oriented element. At the same time, their interactions with the political leadership and with the public have changed: With respect

to Egypt, for instance, it has been noted that younger officers tend to be less antidemocratic, less suspicious of the outside world, and more open to participating in public policy debates than the elder generation, which was used to the military being secluded from civil society.[38]

Managers and politicians. Relatively speaking, the country studies in this volume indicate that there are fewer military personnel, medical doctors, and teachers among the new elites than was the case in earlier times. Engineers, who formed an important element of the incumbent Arab political elites, are still to be found in large numbers among the newcomers, but their professional experience is increasingly in the private rather than the public sector. There is also a growing number of representatives of the liberal professions, and more people with management and business backgrounds. Overall, the new PRE of most Arab countries are or will be largely of urban middle-class origin.

One can no longer speak of emerging political elites in Arab states without a reference to private business and its more traditional and new entrepreneurial sectors. In some countries, expatriates who are prepared to invest their skills and their capital in their homeland have entered or may enter the fold. Observers have noted that since the late 1980s, the offspring of the bureaucratic and military classes, or state bourgeoisie, of Arab states with more or less etatist development courses have turned into new entrepreneurs or joined the business class.[39] Egyptian Gamal Mubarak is representative of this trend, which is also evident among the sons of Algerian, Libyan, Saudi, and Syrian policymakers and generals. As possible contenders for political influence and power, these young men must be taken as seriously as members of the reinvigorated and more self-confident "traditional" business classes that have reestablished themselves in the course of economic liberalization.

During the last three decades or so, the pattern in the Arab republics and monarchies has been to attain political influence, which could then be used to acquire wealth or establish a business, not the reverse. Cases such as Lebanon's Rafiq al-Hariri, a businessman who gained political power, remain impressive exceptions to the rule. More of these may lie in the future, but such a pattern would presuppose the emergence of more competitive political systems.

One can therefore assume that the number of true politicians—who in the Weberian sense live for politics, rather than from politics[40]—and their relevance in the political lives of Arab countries, will increase, if only slowly. In contrast to the rather apolitical type of technocratic functionary simply occupying a government position, such a politician would act as a power broker, stand for a political program, and even act as and be perceived as the representative of a particular constituency or of social or eco-

nomic interests. This latter type has always existed in Lebanon. As Husseini illustrates in her contribution, since the end of the civil war there has been an increase in politicians who do not come from the traditional bourgeoisie and who are attempting to push themselves into the foreground of the political stage via entrepreneurial success or civil society activities. In Morocco, former prime minister Abd al-Rahman Youssoufi represents an ideal-type politician. Most of his life, he opposed the monarchical regime that eventually co-opted him to form a government of alternation. Zerhouni explains how his appointment, which preceded the death of Hassan II and the accession of Mohammed VI, represented a partial political opening of the system. While the number of politicians in the PRE increased, bureaucratic and technocratic cadres remained dominant. It is noteworthy that Youssoufi's successor, Driss Jettou, is a technocrat, though one with a private sector background.

Politicians—in the "true" sense—are also to be found in the political elites of Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan. Even with agendas out of step with their government's, they can occasionally influence or determine public discourse. So far, however, they have not entered the inner circle of the PRE. In Saudi Arabia, as Iris Glosemeyer explains, the Consultative Council has become a forum for the emergence of a group of politically relevant "bourgeois"—that is, nonprincely—politicians. In Syria, a group of independent politicians and civil society actors stepped forward after the accession of Bashar al-Asad. Once they threatened to become a politically relevant factor, their movement was quickly cut down to size. Steffen Erdle argues that in Tunisia under Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, politicians have disappeared from the politically relevant elite. In these cases and others, it is safe to infer that an increase in the number or weight of "politicians" within a country's PRE usually attests to the movement of the political system toward plurality and competitiveness.

The knowledge factor. In general, the percentage of PRE members with undergraduate degrees or doctorates, many of them from universities in Europe or the United States, is on the rise. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of universities were established in Arab countries. These schools provide opportunities for upward social mobility, and their graduates are now competing for jobs and positions with graduates who studied abroad. Upward mobility through national universities, however, may have its limits. In all likelihood, persons with "foreign" degrees will continue to have better chances of being recruited into the technocratic segments of the PRE, and incumbent elites will continue to send their sons and daughters to universities abroad or to universities with Western curriculums within their countries as a means of reproducing themselves—that is, passing on their elite status to their offspring.[41]

In the republican systems, membership in the regime party may still be indispensable for recruitment into the first or even the second circle of influence. Party membership—or membership in the royal family in a country like Saudi Arabia—is no longer sufficient in and of itself for gaining a position of political relevance. What counts beyond loyalty or membership are qualifications and knowledge—a degree that certifies technocratic competence, training, or professional experience abroad, or, generally, skills that correspond (functionally or at least symbolically) to the challenges of the globalized flow of information and goods. Thus, among the newer recruits into the PRE of Arab countries, one finds increasing numbers of jurists (such as Algerian prime minister Ali Benflis), economists with experience in international financial institutions (such as Palestinian finance minister Salam Fayad, Lebanese economy minister Bassel Fuleihan, or Syria's minister of economy and trade Ghassan al-Rifa'i), or managers (such as Moroccan prime minister Driss Jettou and Jordanian prime minister Ali Abu Raghib). In contrast to some expectations that the new elites of Arab states would, among other things, also be more female,[42] the proportion of women within positions of political relevance has not substantially increased.

Generation matters. When speaking of new or emerging elites, one should keep in mind that the concept of "youth" varies in the different Arab countries. Incumbent elites have begun to or are about to give way to a younger generation in most Arab states, but this does not mean that the new PRE represent the same generation throughout the entire Arab world. In Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, the death of the long-standing head of state precipitated a far-reaching exchange of leaders in their sixties and seventies with persons in their thirties and forties. In Saudi Arabia one can expect that positions currently held by septuagenarians and octogenarians will be taken over by "younger" princes in their fifties and sixties once the incapacitated monarch passes away.

At any rate, the historical experience of emerging PRE differs from that of the incumbent generation, and the fact that it is closer to that of the majority of the population may be of considerable importance given the relative youth of Arab societies. More often than not, generations can be defined clearly in relation to historical moments; the members of the generation may also perceive themselves as being marked by shared historical experience: they would then, to borrow a concept from Marxist class theory, constitute a generation "for itself" rather than only "in itself."[43]

This may have been the case for the generation that ruled Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt in the years following their independence, and it certainly holds for the so-called generation of the revolution in Algeria, defined by participation in the struggle against French colonialism. This

generation, which includes, to date, the president of the republic and most leading military officers, has long managed to successfully exclude members of postrevolutionary generations from positions of real power. At the same time, they have worked to transfer their revolutionary legitimacy to their offspring, sometimes literally, as by establishing the Organisation Nationale des Enfants des Chouhada (National Organization of the Children of Martyrs).[44]

In Egypt and Syria, politicians of largely the same age group have tried to define themselves by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Egyptian president Mubarak and other military officers and former military officers who had a leading role in that war are generally referred to as *jil uktubir* (the October generation).[45] For many of their age group and of their somewhat younger cohorts, however, in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine this generation has remained what Palestinian author Saïd Aburish (himself born in 1935) has called the "generation of despair"[46]—a generation that never recovered from the psychological wounds of the 1967 war. In many respects, this is a pan-Arab generation that generally—to the extent that generalizations are possible—has sought and hoped for a strong Arab leadership that would create "parity" with Israel. Many of its members, from the Gulf to North Africa, perceived the Arab world as part of the anti-imperialist camp, believed (for some time at least) in socialist development models, and did not view democracy or civil rights as political priorities. Iraqi political scientist Isam al-Khafaji has aptly characterized the basic attitudes of political activists from that generation: "The belief that imperialism would try to forestall any attempt to overcome underdevelopment, whether through direct intervention or through local agents . . . reinforced the perception that a strong state with a strong army was an essential prerequisite for genuine development. Hence the easiness with which liberal and even reformist ideas were dismissed or discredited among the populace."[47]

In the 1970s increasing direct or indirect oil rents allowed for an enormous expansion of the state and public sectors throughout the region and for rapid social mobility for great numbers. Many who had entered professional life by that time, among them a substantial number of left-leaning *soixante-huitards* (adherents to the ideals of the worldwide 1968 student protests), remember the era as their golden years. In Egypt, pupils and university students at the time of the 1973 October War and those who served as conscripts have alternatively been dubbed *jil al-wasat* (the generation of the middle) and *jil al-sahwa al-islamiyya* (the generation of the Islamic awakening). The older members of this age group benefited from the oil boom. For the somewhat younger members, who graduated and entered professional life in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the bust of oil prices and the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s were decisive in determining

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their future and their outlook. Although benefiting from the expansion of secondary and university education, many of them found career opportunities blocked by members of the preceding generation clinging to power and positions of influence. By the late 1990s, few of this generation had made it into the first or second circle of political relevance. A substantial part of those politically active sought Islamic alternatives to the regimes in power.

In most Arab countries, political developments in the next two or three decades will likely not be determined by the generation of the middle, which in many respects is a generation between two dominant others. It is no coincidence that Egypt's al-Wasat party—whose name references not only a centrist course between moderate Islamist and liberal approaches, but also the generation of its founders—has not been licensed to participate in politics. One should rather expect the generation of Bashar al-Asad, Abdallah of Jordan, Mohammed VI, and Marwan Barghouthi to take the lead. The historical experience of this elite generation differs considerably from that of the outgoing PRE. It is, generally speaking, not the experience of the East-West conflict, of the great Arab-Israeli wars, of experimentations with socialism, or of the oil boom. It is instead one of the end of bipolarity, U.S. hegemony, protracted recession, debate about globalization, the post–1991 Arab-Israeli peace process, and civil war in Algeria. In many Arab countries, this generation could be called the generation of sons—the offspring of those who shaped the history of the Arab world during the last quarter or more of the twentieth century. In the case of the Palestinians, these emerging leaders represent the intifada generation, certainly a generation in and for itself, whose members generally share the experience of violent conflict with the Israeli army and struggles for power and influence with the incumbent Palestinian leadership around Arafat—*al-khityar* (the old man), as he is so often referred to in the Palestinian territories.[48]

Regional and International Factors

Much of the historical experience that defines Arab elite generations is related to external factors. The relationship between elite change on the one hand and the regional and international relations of Arab states on the other has crosscutting effects: Elite change affects these relations, and external factors affect the composition and behavior of local elites.

For starters, change at the top can trigger shifts in bilateral relations; often a change of the guard helps to improve such relations. This has definitely been the case for Bahrain and Qatar, where new leaders found a way to settle a long-standing territorial dispute by simply accepting the decision of the International Court of Justice. In the case of Jordan and Syria, the accession of two young leaders at roughly the same time also helped improve bilateral relations. These cases primarily reflect the personal

nature of Arab regimes and, consequently, of inter-Arab relations. Jordan's case is telling: The death of King Hussein allowed his successor, Abdallah, to turn a new page with Syria, where he found a like-minded young leader in Bashar al-Asad, who was then still in training to succeed his father. Abdallah's ascension also cleared the way for better relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, whose leaders decided to bury their animosity toward Jordan with the death of Hussein, the man responsible for Jordan's pro-Iraqi neutrality during the Gulf War.

What these situations illustrate is a change in personnel, not a change in pattern. There is, in other words, no guarantee that a personal falling out or a conflict over issues of regional policy between, say, the Jordanian and the Syrian leaders, would not seriously disrupt bilateral contacts and relations. To institute structural change in inter-Arab relations, the new leaders and their teams would have to depersonalize their countries' bilateral relations, insulating state institutions that deal with day-to-day foreign relations from the power games at the leadership level. Such a move would allow functional cooperation to stand on its own administrative and economic feet. Authoritarian and highly centralized regimes may not necessarily be less peaceful or more aggressive than democracies or pluralistic systems, as is sometimes claimed in a vulgarized form of the "democratic-peace" theorem,[49] but they are definitely less able to cooperate. Sustainable regional and international cooperation, particularly in multilateral frameworks, needs the broader participation of societal actors and necessitates the delegation of decisionmaking powers to lower-level officials. It cannot be guaranteed through a mere change at the top of the hierarchy.[50]

In speaking of the regional relations of Arab states, one should not forget that the leadership generation that dominated Arab and Middle Eastern policies throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century did manage to introduce some continuity into regional politics. Although these elites failed to foster stable cooperative relations, settle the dominant regional conflict, or implement a system of cooperative security, they did prove capable of containing the civil wars of Algeria, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen, preventing these crises from turning into regional wars. Also, Arab-Israeli wars have been shorter and less destructive than might have been expected considering the depth of enmity and the longevity of the conflict.

The new generation of leaders obviously lacks similar experience in conflict administration. Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, there is little reason to expect that the replacement of one leadership generation by another will by itself make it easier to civilize the conflict, or help resolve issues of contention. In Israel, the change from the generation of Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres to Benjamin Netanyahu's postindependence generation did not at all make Israel more peaceful or cooperative. In a similar vein, some Israelis are likely deceiving themselves (and others) when they

claim that all that is needed to settle the conflict with the Palestinians is the exit of Arafat and the accession of a younger generation.[51]

The new leaders of Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Bahrain have all enjoyed something of a honeymoon in terms of the regional environment, and in most cases future new leaders are likely to experience a similar beginning. National interests usually dictate greeting a new team in a neighboring country with high hopes of good relations. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that significant changes within the PRE of a country might negatively affect regional relations. This is most likely to happen in the case of nonconstitutional or revolutionary change or in the case of weak and inexperienced leaders coming to power. To build and broaden their domestic base, they might engage in hypernationalistic discourses or in activities that their neighbors or relevant international players find provocative, or that challenge the regional balance. The same might occur when regional players try to take advantage of the assumed or de facto weaknesses of a newcomer.[52]

Perhaps a more daunting prospect for the new and emerging Arab elites will be dealing with the changing external challenges summed up under the heading "globalization": speedier flows of information and finance, increased competition based on global standards, and a premium on openness and the ability to cooperate regionally and internationally. Those who miss the globalization train will pay the high costs ensuing from the lack of economic efficiency. Although all Arab political elites will have to face these challenges, they have the option of responding to them in different ways. The Syrian leadership, to give but one example, could decide to go slow in negotiating an association agreement with the European Union, or even do without such an association. This would probably be done at a loss, however, passing up access to European resources and risking a further relative decline of competitiveness in comparison to regional neighbors.

In general, the new and emerging elites of the Arab world are more prepared to deal with the challenges of globalization and economic openness than their predecessors were. Many of them see cooperation with Europe as a strategic choice. At the same time, these young elites do not want to relinquish what they perceive as national or regime interests. The Maghreb states in particular, because of their dependence on the EU, have tried to strengthen cooperative relations with the United States in an attempt to limit the influence of Europe over and within them.

In the regional geopolitical context, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process continue to be of great relevance for the young elites in Palestine—where Israeli occupation and the struggle over how to deal with it dominate all other political issues—and also for those young elites in the countries neighboring Israel and in the Gulf. In Algeria, by contrast,

"Palestine" is a nonissue for most political groups, with the exception of the Islamists. Rather, domestic policy and relations with Europe and the West in general carry much more weight. In Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, however, the intifada and the Arab-Israeli conflict are consistently topics of domestic debate and conflict. Abdelnasser even argues that the course of Arab-Israeli events will be the main determinant for the type and political outlook of Egypt's post-Mubarak PRE. In Jordan contesting elements of the PRE have garnered substantial public support under the banner of fighting normalization with Israel. In Lebanon, the military tension that Hizballah tries to sustain along the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli border area is a major point of contention between the supporters of the liberal economic course set out by Hariri and Syria's men within the country's political elite.

In Syria, the leadership elite around Bashar al-Asad are more aware than their predecessors of the economic necessity of settling the conflict with Israel; at the same time, they use conflict to bolster the popularity of the young president. Bashar al-Asad, without discarding his father's realpolitik approach, has developed a more provocative, hard-line discourse when speaking of Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This has disturbed foreign observers, but it appeals to many of the younger generation, not only in Syria but also in other Arab countries. With respect to Israel and the future of the peace process, the general attitude of the emerging PRE across the Middle East seems to be to legitimize radical methods while remaining pragmatic about the substance of an acceptable settlement.

Changing regional relations and new forms of integration into the regional and international environments are factors in elite change that should not be overlooked. Thus, in the countries that share a front or a border with Israel, recent heightened tensions with Israel have affected the balance of forces within the core elite, generally to the advantage of less reform-oriented elements. At the same time, any decision to launch a cooperative scheme—Euro-Mediterranean, Arab, or other—is a strategic choice that will influence the recruitment of leadership personnel, at least on the technocratic level, and thus the composition of emerging PRE. In Egypt, for instance, the decision to enter into negotiations over an association agreement with the EU led to the installation of a revamped foreign and economic policy team, much as occurred in an earlier era concerning the decision to wage peace with Israel.

Peace between Israel and the Palestinians and Palestinian statehood would no doubt precipitate major changes within the Palestinian PRE. Confrontations with Israel, the first agreements between the PLO and Israel, and the establishment of proto-state structures had a decisive impact on elite formation. By the end of the first intifada (1987–1993), a relatively young local elite had emerged that could not be ignored once the Oslo

process was on track. With the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this largely secretive, underground elite stepped forward, and diaspora leaders returned. A new national (not just local) political and economic elite emerged with the creation of ministries and other public bodies and the election of representatives to the legislative council. The elites associated with these institutions had interests in trade and investment policies and relations with Israel.[53]

Arafat, as Hans-Joachim Rabe points out in this volume, was able to dominate elite structures thanks to the agreements with Israel and financial aid from abroad. By the fall of 2000, the failure of Arafat and his team to bring about a withdrawal of the Israeli army from at least most of the occupied territories encouraged a young guard of newly emerging local leaders and leaders of the first intifada to launch the al-Aqsa intifada. This second uprising was not only an attempt at ending the Israeli occupation, it also aimed to "weaken and eventually displace" the Palestinian old guard, the historic leadership around Arafat.[54]

Since George W. Bush became president of the United States, and particularly since the events of 11 September 2001, the question of forced regime change or elite change from abroad has become a major topic in regard to Palestine and, of course, in regard to Iraq. In the Palestinian case, major external forces agreed to press for reforms that implicitly or explicitly included the demand for the prime decisionmaker, Yasser Arafat, to leave the scene or agree to being relegated to a position of much less importance. Parts of the emerging Palestinian elite obviously desire a change at the top, but they have no interest in becoming or being perceived as an instrument of a U.S. or an Israeli agenda. Repeated Israeli sieges of Arafat's headquarters have served to strengthen his legitimacy and abort attempts to initiate reforms from within Palestinian institutions. The U.S. mission to Iraq has not only removed Saddam Hussein and his clique from power. The ensuing "de-Baathization" was in fact an attempt to enforce a wide-ranging exchange of the political elite. By the time this book was finalized, a postwar PRE was emerging in still undecided struggles for power and positions, and for the soul of Iraq.

Leaders and commentators in other Arab countries began to ask which country's leadership would "be next on the list," after the Bush administration succeeded in replacing the regime in Baghdad. Maybe they need not fear too much. Among other things, the Palestinian and Iraqi cases demonstrate the limits of direct external pressure. Policy shifts are often externally induced, which may speed or otherwise affect elite change. Short of an inappropriate degree of force or outright war, however, such pressure will likely not succeed in bringing about a change in the political leadership of any country in the region. Western policymakers should realize that even a

forced removal of local elites would not necessarily yield more open or more efficient political and economic systems.

Modernity First: The New Elites and Their Domestic Agendas

Decisions concerning economic reform that are in one way or other induced by external factors can indeed have wide-ranging effects on elite settings. Even half-hearted starts in that direction can lead to significant changes among top political personnel. In Egypt's case, the reform efforts of the early 2000s brought a new prime minister to power who symbolized that new departure: someone with a managerial background rather than a loyal party functionary. Within the last decade or so, the governments of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Tunisia have all placed emphasis on securing the skills and knowledge of technocrats with economic expertise or have at least tried to incorporate businesspeople and private sector representatives into formal decisionmaking or consultative structures. In most Arab countries, however, business elites have gained influence mainly or only in the realm of economic policy decisionmaking. With the notable exceptions of Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and Moroccan prime minister Driss Jettou, few businesspeople have acquired leading government positions. If and when economic liberalization proceeds, Arab governments will need the expertise of increasing numbers of people qualified in business management, banking, and international trade law.

New business elites have benefited from changing economic policies or have been able to take advantage of such opportunities as, for example, the sanctions against Iraq, the emergence of new technologies, particularly in the information sector, or the space that has gradually been opened for private institutes of higher education in most of the countries studied here. Thus far, business elites have not asked for any real share in political power nor have they been encouraged to do so. The Arab regimes have allowed these groups wealth and a certain economic power, but they have also seen to it that they remain in the outer circles of political relevance.

Overall, the emerging leadership generation in the Arab world is clearly more business friendly than the outgoing generation. Not all of this generation will make the emergence and success of private business as much a priority as Jordan's young king and his team apparently seek to do, but on the other hand few of them share the enthusiasm for etatism and public sector dominance that the outgoing elites possess. In a sense, the pressures of globalization and the orientations of the newcomers reinforce each other. At the same time, a larger presence of business-oriented technocrats within the PRE may increase the confidence of local, expatriate, and foreign investors

and thus propel them forward through initially slow and gradual moves toward economic liberalization.

The emerging elites' historical backgrounds and the era in which they were socialized make many of them less apprehensive of political pluralism than the dominant elites of the last thirty years have been. To many of them, single-party states and streamlined media are somewhat outmoded. The denial of competing groups' interests can no longer be pursued once economic liberalization and privatization become issues of public debate. Expectations about the depth of reforms and the structural political changes associated with the emergence of new regime elites should, however, remain guarded. Bahrain, on which there is no chapter in this book, may serve as an example of a new ruler's attempt to renegotiate a political pact with the people. The cases of Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, however, demonstrate that generational change at the top will not automatically lead to far-reaching political reform. Also, as the Tunisian case, among others, underlines, modern discourses and the willingness of a Western-oriented regime elite to embrace technical modernization and economic opening need not be accompanied by political liberalization.

Some of the young leaders have reminded Western audiences and domestic critics that they are not willing to "apply the democracy of others upon ourselves," as Syria's Bashar al-Asad put it. "We have to have our [own] democratic experience," he continued, "which is special to us, which stems from our history, culture, civilization and which is a response to the needs of our society and the requirements of our reality."[55] Morocco's young king Mohammed had a similar message for those who expected him to rapidly democratize his country. "My rhythm is the one of Morocco. . . . It is not necessarily the same rhythm certain observers, with arrogance and ignorance, wish to impose upon us."[56]

Most of the new leadership elites are likely to use the authoritarian instruments of the states they inherit or take over in order to firmly establish themselves. Their priority is clearly economic reform and technical modernization. Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, with largely new PRE, and Algeria with its "nationalist reformers," are indicative in this respect. At least in the first and second circles, their discourses with regard to democracy or political reform are similar. Some argue that democracy, or democratization, cannot be a priority as long as they must fend off resistance—from bureaucracies or from interest groups—to any reform they seek to implement. Others make use of classical modernization theory propositions concerning what degree of prosperity or literacy must be achieved before one actually could, or should, speak of democratization.[57] Still others argue that their respective societies are simply not ripe for democracy: Wouldn't the Islamists be the winners under the circumstances?

Given these outlooks, when new elite teams take charge in other coun-

tries of the region, rapid democratic transformations should not be expected. More probable is a gradual and cautious process of pluralization. This would likely include more liberal and open debates, fewer restrictions on the media and the use of information systems, a greater variance of political views and agendas within legislatures and assemblies, and more elections involving representative bodies. Pluralization would stop, however, at elections for the highest decisionmaking positions or measures with the potential of bringing about a change of regime or a substantial recomposition of the PRE through the ballot box.

In most Arab countries, regime elites have shown a remarkable ability to control the pace and scope of political change. Steps toward economic and political reform have been taken from above, basically system maintenance operations, rather than by societal forces applying pressure on the regime.[58] Little seems to have changed in this respect with changes at the top in some countries. The relatively wide-ranging reforms introduced to the political system in Bahrain have been as much a regime affair—or, more concretely, a process designed by the new amir and the crown prince—as have the more gradualist paths embarked on by Bashar al-Asad in Syria or Mohammed VI in Morocco.[59]

Given that change within the Arab PRE continues to be fostered mainly through recruitment and co-optation from above, rather than through elections, it is not surprising that many second-circle PRE see things largely the same as their countries' prime decisionmakers and core elites see them. Zerhouni, observing Morocco's "neo-makhzanian" officials, notes that many of them have little to say about political reform. In Algeria, to give another example, only "radical democrats" and "Islamist reformers"—according to Werenfels's characterization—put political reform high on their agenda; none of them has made it into the first circle of influence. In a number of countries, explicit prodemocracy activists have had no chance thus far to enter even the third circle.

As a matter of fact, democracy is not high on the agenda of any group of actors that otherwise are forces pushing for change. Businesspeople in most Arab countries have become vocal in demanding economic reform and liberalization. As mentioned, however, they have in most cases abstained from openly calling for political liberalization, let alone democratization. A study of Egyptian businessmen found that they have been "either unconcerned with, or not particularly averse to, the kind of moderate political authoritarianism" that the regime of Husni Mubarak represents.[60] Similar judgments have been elicited from Palestinian and North African business elites.[61]

Even the new generation of businesspeople in the Arab world does not seem to count democracy among their primary interests. A small survey conducted in 2001 at a regional meeting of young entrepreneurs and managers from eight Arab countries clearly revealed the political priorities of this stratum: economic liberalization first, followed by reform of the training and education systems of their countries. Democracy and political liberalization would be appreciated, but they only came in third or even fourth place among participants from countries neighboring Israel, where higher priority was given to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[62] In some countries, individual representatives of the business class who have a more far-reaching agenda have been warned to keep their political ambitions within limits. The arrest and subsequent trial in the summer of 2001 of two Syrian deputies, both with business backgrounds, was a case in point. Both had clearly transgressed the mandate that they, according to the view of the regime leadership, were supposed to fulfill as deputies and representatives of the entrepreneurial stratum.

Most of the countries examined here have societal forces that have been calling or campaigning for such political reforms as more transparency, respect for human rights, and a transformation to democracy. With few exceptions (the Palestinian territories being one) such voices are either to be found within the third circle of the PRE or outside it entirely. Foreign observers who (legitimately) pay much attention to those who seek more substantive changes than the incumbent elites do should be cautious not to overrate the influence of these groups and individuals.

It is striking, in a sense, that neither the clamp-downs on prodemocracy or human rights activists in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and other states nor the repeated postponement of elections in Jordan have led to protests of any consequence or threat to the regimes in power. Certainly, none of them led to popular reactions as strong as those triggered in most of these countries by the continued Israeli occupation and policies in the Palestinian territories. Algeria and Lebanon digress from this picture somewhat. Both are countries with highly differentiated, partly fragmented political elites; in both cases, there is no single, patrimonial leader; and radical prodemocracy movements have been able to influence strategic discourses and thereby contribute to national agenda setting to an extent. The overall state of affairs in the Arab countries may be partly explained by repression, but one must not overlook the fact that the constituency for substantial political reform within and around the PRE is still quite limited.

There is as yet also little external pressure on Arab states to embark on thoroughgoing political reforms. While the "elites appear to be modern but not democratic," writes Lisa Anderson, "the masses are angry." There is no guarantee that democratizing Arab countries would remain friendly. Rather, democratization processes could unleash new nationalisms, ethnic conflicts, or anti-American and anti-Western political ideologies.[63] Most probably, therefore, the United States as well as the European Union will be content if new, friendly Arab regimes and regime

elites do exactly what they have placed at the top of their agenda—modernize their economies and their administrations while refraining from risking domestic and regime stability and well-established international relations by putting themselves and the systems as such to a sudden democratic test of popularity. In fact, many governments, while often deploring the lack of democracy in Arab countries, have appreciated the continuity inspired by authoritarianism in the Arab world.[64] This appreciation of what one might call a "lid-on stability" may actually contribute to the ills that the same Western governments are deploring in the Arab world and the Middle East: the lack of accountability and good governance; the lack of regional cooperation; and, of course, the anger of much of the young generation.

This book, in the chapters that follow, presents case studies of nine Arab countries.[65] Following the comparative approach that was outlined above, the authors identify the respective politically relevant elite, scan changes within the structure and composition of that elite, examine the elite's agenda, and analyze the interrelation between elite change, policies, and, where applicable, external influences. The first three chapters deal with Arab states where changes at the top have recently taken place, and relatively young leaderships are now in power. Bank and Schlumberger in their article on Jordan demonstrate how the renewal of the PRE has supported a new ruler's changing policy priorities: Jordan has become more business oriented, and new, hand-picked elite members represent the king's technocratic and business-minded orientation. Zerhouni shows that the succession from Hassan II to Mohammed VI has not led to broader power sharing. The new leadership has been able to adapt to new discourses on, among other things, democracy and human rights, but neither the mode of recruitment into the PRE nor the attitudes of most of the first-circle PRE have undergone significant change. In the Syrian case, the renewal of the wider political elite, which the new president and his team have brought about, seems to have been of major importance for the gradual strengthening of the power of an heir. The fact that the reproduction of Syria's elite was largely conducted from the center, however, may well account for the limits of political change.

The two chapters that follow deal with countries where a succession at the top will occur in a not too distant future and where the succession question occupies much of the interest of the domestic public and international partners. In his contribution on Egypt, Abdelnasser makes a case to revise the prevalent picture of a stagnant elite that does not allow for change. He also shows that the outcome of the succession process will largely depend on the regional situation, not the least of which is the state of the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process. Analyzing the case of Saudi Arabia, Glosemeyer also rejects the image of stagnancy, demonstrating that the

combination of actors that form the PRE is up for changes and that no segment of the incumbent or emerging elite is able to escape the impact of globalization.

Algeria and Tunisia provide two cases of countries where elite change, economic transformation, and political systems continuity seem to reinforce each other. Werenfels, in her contribution on Algeria, demonstrates the attempt of the incumbent PRE to extend the revolutionary legitimacy it claims to its offspring. She also argues that a substantial increase in the number of relevant political players has actually fragmented the elite, made alliances of new elite segments improbable and, hence, political change less likely. In the Tunisian case, as Erdle makes clear, the authoritarian system is relying on, and has quite successfully co-opted, social actors who usually would be seen as agents of change, namely the educated middle classes, reform-minded technocrats, and young business elites. Thus, by presenting itself as a facilitator of development and modernization, and as a protector against both globalization and Islamism, the regime elite has been able to reassert its control over society.

The last two case studies deal with elite change under foreign domination. Husseini, dealing with Lebanon, demonstrates how a new, partly recycled political elite has consolidated itself since the end of the civil war, and how it has managed, so far, to block the way for emerging elite aspirants. To the observer, elite politics in today's Lebanon seem very much like a replay of patterns that marked the development of that country after independence and before the first breakdown of the system in 1958. The main difference seems to be Syria's dominance, and the emergence of an elite segment that owes its political capital solely to its ties with the Syrian leadership. Rabe, in his chapter on Palestine, shows how a national elite has tried to informally expand the limited field of action opened to it with the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. He also demonstrates how the breakdown of the peace process has contributed to multipolarization of the elite, and how Arafat's attempt to establish and maintain a centralized system has largely failed.

The book closes with a short conclusion that highlights some of the comparative evidence from the country studies, particularly the remarkable correspondence in most of these cases of elite change and reproduction on the one hand, and systems maintenance on the other.

Notes

1. Tripp, "States, Elites and the 'Management of Change.'"
2. Lasswell, *Politics*, p. 13.
3. See, among others, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule;* Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market;* Bos, "Die Rolle

von Eliten"; Gill, *Dynamics of Democratization;* McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship."

4. See Higley and Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions"; Higley and Moore, "Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000"; Peeler, "Elites, Structures, and Political Action."

5. See, for example, Etzioni-Halevy, "Elites and the Working Class"; Peeler, "Elites, Structures, and Political Action," p. 242.

6. Fields, Higley, and Burton, "A New Elite Framework"; Burton and Higley, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations"; Higley and Lengyel, "Elite Configuration After State Socialism."

7. See, among others, Adam and Tomšič, "Elite (Re)configuration"; Higley and Lengyel, "Elite Configuration After State Socialism." Both titles deal with Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. On political transition processes and the elites in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, see Tismaneanu, *Political Culture and Civil Society.*

8. Higley and Moore, "Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000," p. 176.

9. See, among others, Lenczowski, *Political Elites in the Middle East;* Tachau, *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East;* Heradstveit, *Arab and Israeli Elite Perceptions;* Zartman, *Political Elites in Arab North Africa.*

10. Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change;* Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics.*

11. See Bahout, *Les entrepreneurs syriens;* Blin, "Les entrepreneurs palestiniens"; Gotowicki, "The Military in Egyptian Society"; Longuenesse, "Ingenieurs et médecins dans le changement social"; Perthes, "Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th"; Picard, "Arab Military in Politics"; Springborg, "The Arab Bourgeoisie"; Zaki, *Egyptian Business Elites.*

12. See, among others, Drysdale, "The Succession Question in Syria"; Henderson, *After King Fahd;* Legrain, "Les 1001 successions de Yasser Arafat"; Peterson, "Succession in the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council"; Abdul Aziz and Youssef Hussein, "The President, the Son, and the Military."

13. See Faath, *Konfliktpotential politischer Nachfolge;* Cantori, "Political Succession in the Middle East."

14. See, for example, Taheri, "Les átouts d'Abdallah"; Willis, "After Hassan"; Ghadbian, "The New Asad"; Khalaf, "The New Amir of Bahrain."

15. This, of course, is also largely a reflection of the authoritarian nature of the regimes, or the dominant political culture, in the entire political scene. As a rule, when conflicts have erupted within these parties and organizations, the groups have split rather than change leaderships.

16. See Waterbury, "Whence Will Come Egypt's Future Leadership?"

17. Bottomore, *Elites and Society,* p. 7.

18. Higley and Moore, "Political Elite Studies at the Year 2000," p. 176.

19. See Obeidi, "Elitenstruktur in Libyen."

20. Peeler, "Elites, Structures, and Political Action," p. 242.

21. Ibid.

22. This is not the first and will not be the last time this model is used for such purposes. For an earlier (1975) use, see Bill, "The Patterns of Elite Politics in Iran."

23. Burton and Higley, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations," p. 182.

24. On the scope, width, and depth of elite change, see Higley and Lengyel, "Elite Configuration After State Socialism."

25. On Egypt, see Kienle, *A Grand Delusion;* on Syria, see Perthes, *The Political Economy of Syria.*

26. See Hilal, *Takuin al-nukhba al-filastiniyya.*

27. See Isabelle Werenfels's chapter on Algeria in this volume.

28. See Hans-Joachim Rabe's chapter on Palestine in this volume.

29. See in general Moyser and Wagstaffe, *Research Methods for Elite Studies.*

30. See Saloua Zerhouni's chapter on Morocco and Iris Glosemeyer's chapter on Saudi Arabia in this volume. On the changing function of parliaments in the Arab world, see Baaklini, Denoeux, and Springborg, *Legislative Politics in the Arab World.*

31. See André Bank and Oliver Schlumberger's chapter on Jordan and Volker Perthes's chapter on Syria in this volume.

32. See Saloua Zerhouni's chapter on Morocco in this volume.

33. Asbach, "Von der Geschichte politischer Ideen."

34. Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change,* p. 52.

35. See Isabelle Werenfels's chapter on Algeria in this volume.

36. Ibid.

37. See, among others, Batatu, "The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Revolutions."

38. See Soltan, "The Military and Foreign Policy."

39. See, among others, Perthes, "Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th"; Waterbury, "Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?"

40. Weber, "Politics as a Vocation."

41. It is noteworthy that the number of foreign (European, Euro-Arab, U.S.) private universities in the Arab world has substantially increased since the mid-1990s. Traditionally, there have been the American University in Cairo and the American University of Beirut. Additional "American universities" of various origins and quality are to be found in Dubai, Jordan, Lebanon, and at least two places in the United Arab Emirates. In Syria, a Euro-Arab private university is about to be established.

42. In a report on the Middle East Institute's 1999 annual conference, "Leadership for a New Century," Elizabeth Fernea was quoted as stating, "Future leaders will be those who focus on poverty, unemployment, corruption, and health care, and will be drawn from both sexes since the perception of women's place in society has changed." *Middle East Institute Newsletter,* November 1999.

43. According to Mannheim, there is indeed an analogy between the phenomena of class and generation. Belonging to the same class or to the same "generation unit" means sharing a common location in social and historical processes, and it limits the members of that group "to a specific range of political experience." Mannheim, "The Problem of Generation," p. 291.

44. See Isabelle Werenfels's chapter on Algeria in this volume.

45. See Gamal Abdelnasser's chapter on Egypt in this volume.

46. Aburish, *Saddam Hussein,* p. 139.

47. Khafaji, "War as a Vehicle."

48. See Hans-Joachim Rabe's chapter on Palestine in this volume; see also Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided."

49. The still debated democratic peace theorem holds that democracies do not fight each other, not that they are per se more peaceful than others. See Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace.*

50. For a more detailed argument, see Perthes, *Vom Krieg zur Konkurrenz.*

51. Ehud Barak, after being voted out of office, became an early proponent of this after-Arafat view. See his editorial, "It Seems Israel Has to Wait for a New Palestinian Leadership," *International Herald Tribune,* 31 July 2001.

52. The accession of Hamad bin Khalifa in Qatar is a case in point. First, Hamad accelerated the constitutional process of succession by overthrowing his

father—an act certainly not appreciated by the aging rulers of other Gulf monarchies. Second, along with Hamad came a new ruling elite that nurtured ambitious foreign policy and media projects, such as simultaneously cultivating good relations with Iraq and Israel, and establishing an uncensored satellite news channel that aggressively covered other Gulf countries. Hamad and his new team also made it clear that they would not be patronized by Saudi Arabia. In the judgment of many of their neighbors, they tried to grab more regional and international weight than Qatar deserved. Their actions upset the ruling elites of the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, with relations bottoming when Qatar accused Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates of having lent support to a counter coup attempt by Hamad's deposed father. The accusation, it seems, was not totally baseless.

53. See Hilal, *Takuin al-nukhba al-filastiniyya*, pp. 59–63.

54. See Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided."

55. Inaugural speech, as quoted in *Syria Times*, 18 July 2000.

56. Interview, *Le Figaro*, 4 September 2001.

57. See Saloua Zerhouni's chapter on Morocco, André Bank and Oliver Schlumberger's chapter on Jordan, and Volker Perthes's chapter on Syria in this volume.

58. See, among others, Krämer, "Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World"; Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization and the Prospects of Democratization"; al-Najjar, "Waqi' wa-mustaqbal al-awda' al-siyasiyya."

59. See Khalaf, "The New Amir of Bahrain."

60. Zaki, *Egyptian Business Elites*, p. 226. The picture does not seem to differ much for the businesspeople of other Arab countries.

61. See Hilal, *Takuin al-nukhba al-filastiniyya;* Dillman, "Facing the Market in North Africa."

62. See Perthes and Spapperi, "The Young Entrepreneurs of the Arab World."

63. Anderson, "Friendly Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects," *World Policy Journal* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2001) (Internet edition).

64. See also Dunn, "The Coming Era of Leadership Change."

65. This is not a "handbook" on the Arab world or its leadership personnel, and it was therefore never supposed to give a comprehensive picture of all Arab countries. Comparative evidence can be drawn even from a limited sample. Regrettably, however, there is no article on Iraq, which doubtless forms an important case: Fieldwork in Iraq on such a highly political issue as the elite was seen as too difficult, or even dangerous; and we did not want to depart from our common approach—studies based on extensive fieldwork, that is—and make do with a contribution that would solely rely on secondary sources.

Figure 2.1 Mapping Power: Jordanian Politically Relevant Elites, 2002



Notes: The idea of mapping elites in concentric circles was first suggested by James A. Bill, "The Patterns of Elite Politics," p. 23, and was further developed by Peter Pawelka, *Herrschaft und Entwicklung*. Political relevance in Jordan depends on the personal standing of an incumbent elite rather than on the formal institutional post he or she occupies. Thus in mapping the Jordanian PRE, the model has been modified to include individual incumbent elites rather than formal institutions only.

Incumbents and their positions are as follows: *Bassem Awadallah*, planning minister; *Rim Badran*, director general, Jordan Investment Board; *Sima Bahouth*, director, Queen Noor Foundation; *Salah al-Bashir*, trade and industry minister; *Toujan Faisal*, former deputy, House of Representatives, prominent opposition figure; *Fahd al-Fanek*, journalist for the *Jordan Times* and the *Daily Star; Fadi Ghandour*, ECC member and CEO of Aramex; *Mustafa Hamarnah*, director of the Center of Strategic Studies and board member, media privatization council; *Sa'd Khair*, head of the General Intelligence Department; *Qaftan al-Majali*, interior minister; *Michel Marto*, finance minister; *Sabih al-Masri*, ECC member with diverse business interests domestically and internationally; *Marwan Mu'asher*, foreign affairs minister; *Ghassan Nuqul*, ECC member and vice-chairman of the Nuqul Group; *Laith al-Qasim*, head of the Young Entrepreneurs Association of Jordan; *Zaid al-Rifa'i*, Speaker of the Senate; *Samir Tawil*, national economy minister; and *Fawaz Zu'bi*, information and communications technology minister.

Figure 5.1 Egypt's Politically Relevant Elite, 2002



Although military and security officers and diplomats do not have the active or passive right to vote, and therefore do not participate in formal politics, they highly influence strategic decisionmaking. Some observers argue that the role of the military in Egyptian politics is diminishing, but it does not mean that its members are being excluded from the first PRE circle.[7] The possibility of terrorist attacks has strengthened the political weight of the security apparatus.[8] But demilitarization is still the underlying matrix for politics today: "Whereas the military supplied one-third of the ministerial elite and filled 40 percent of ministerial positions under Nasser, in Sadat's post-1973 'infitah government,' military representation dropped to about 10 percent, and it remained limited under Mubarak."[9]

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7

Algeria: System Continuity Through Elite Change

Isabelle Werenfels

In contrast to many Arab countries, Algeria has not been ruled by the same leader for two or more decades. Nevertheless, it has been governed by the same forces since its independence from France in 1962. A small number of military leaders and party functionaries who emerged during the War of Independence erected a bureaucratic authoritarian system with the army as its backbone. For decades they monopolized the key positions in state institutions. New recruits came primarily from the pool of "old comrades." Loyalties and networks established during the war prevailed after independence, and different "clans" of revolutionaries as well as clans based on regional and other allegiances within the elite competed over rents, power, and posts. At times these elites reached uneasy informal arrangements (as during the era of Houari Boumedienne, 1965 to 1978), at other times they engaged in fierce struggles over distribution of these "spoils" (as during Chadli Bendjedid's reign in the 1980s).[1] This relative continuity in elites seemed to end with the political opening in 1989 that promised radical system and elite change.[2] The military's coup d'état in 1992—following the triumph of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in the first round of Algeria's first pluralistic and free parliamentary elections—put an end to this process and reestablished the power of incumbent elites.

Ten years after the abrupt end of that democratic experiment, two developments within the Algerian elite were apparent: first, there had been a sharp increase in the number of individual and collective actors constituting the politically relevant elite, that is, those who exert influence on decisions concerning strategic issues of national relevance, such as market and education sector reforms and democratization; and second, old guard "revolutionaries" were being replaced by two younger generations in many elite segments. Domestic and international factors had driven these changes: the civil war, which broke out after the 1992 coup and led not only to the bloody repression, but also to the co-optation and fragmentation of the

Islamist opposition;[3] the army's attempt to give its authoritarian rule a constitutional and democratic façade through presidential elections (in 1995 and 1999) and parliamentary elections (in 1997 and 2002); and an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment program and debt rescheduling, both of which not only brought new actors onto the political stage but also opened for incumbent and emerging elites rent-seeking avenues beyond hydrocarbon-related revenues. Although political and economic liberalization affected only marginally the rules of domination, they were enough to allow for new and, in many cases, young actors with a wide spectrum of agendas to enter the political stage.

Algeria in the early 2000s, according to the criteria used in much of the transition literature, was not an unlikely candidate for a shift from an authoritarian to a (somewhat) democratic regime.[4] Cracks had been increasing in the regime, including splits among the elite. Softliners (reformers) had contested hardliners throughout the 1990s, and in the early 2000s freedom of expression was remarkable, and popular sentiment appeared to be in favor of democracy.[5] The constitution gave the president substantial power, but not enough to principally preclude democracy. Moreover, the regime had experienced economic shocks and external pressure for extensive economic liberalization. Yet, the military prevailed over the political, and democratic tendencies remained confined to small nuclei of activists throughout the 1990s.

This analysis shares the assumption of Michael Burton and John Higley that "political elite transformations are the fulcrums for fundamental political change"[6] and argues that any attempt to understand the stickiness of Algerian authoritarianism needs to focus on the dynamics and recruitment patterns within the Algerian PRE as well as on the ways in which the politically relevant elite were shaped and constrained by domestic, international, social, and economic forces. Earlier studies of Algerian elites,[7] while excellent in many respects, were strongly conditioned by the modernization paradigm. They tended to neglect the embeddedness of elites in specific "traditional" and "modern" social structures and in the Algerian rentier economy and, hence, largely ignored the resulting interests, constraints, and conflicts.

The approach here combines an actor-oriented microsociological analysis with a more structure- and macro-oriented analysis in order to shed light on three issues: the nature of the changes within the Algerian politically relevant elite in the decade after the coup d'état, the implications of these changes for the prospects of system change, and the factors external to the elites that played into the relationship between elite change and system change.[8] The main argument is the following: The changes and dynamics in the outer circles of the Algerian elite in the second half of the 1990s narrowed the core elite's margin of action. Also, in the early 2000s the core

elite was less unified than it had been immediately following the 1992 coup. These phenomena, however, were system stabilizing rather than destabilizing for reasons linked to core elite strategies and structural factors:

- The divides and vertical networks within the PRE prevented broad coalition building by contesting elites. This fragmentation was not just a result of the linguistic, ethnic, and regional cleavages within Algerian society, but also of the core elite's successful management of these cleavages using a threefold strategy of repression, co-optation, and encouragement of excessive (and often fake) competition by creating parallel structures.
- Recruitment into the PRE was, with few exceptions, limited to social segments that had been represented in the PRE for decades. This largely resulted from two mechanisms of exclusion: the Arabization policy and the claim to historical legitimacy, not only by incumbent elites and their clients but also by their offspring.
- A generational change in the elite reinforced an elite type, the nationalist reformer, who advocated substantial economic and administrative reforms but not system change.[9] Representatives of this type, thus, were paralyzed by a dilemma: the reforms they proposed would undo the social, political, and economic structures that had produced their elite status.[10]
- Given the above factors, changes in the elite could translate into system change if they coincide with a number of external and internal factors that in the past have affected the Algerian system: economic shock, widespread popular uprisings, and the types of external pressures that accompany acceptance of international agreements. When change comes to Algeria, it is unlikely to be Western-style democracy: The rentier nature of the Algerian economy and the country's existing social structures (shaped as they are, partly by the current elites) might simply produce similar political elites and structures.

The Algerian Elite

Between 1962 and 1989, Algeria was ruled by elites from three state institutions: the party, the army, and the bureaucracy (or public administration). Elites with a revolutionary past *and* an army career were found in the party and the bureaucracy and tended to constitute the decisionmaking center.[11] With the army-instigated demise of Chadli in January 1992, the military component in the core elite became more obvious. Throughout the 1990s little more than a handful of generals (in office or retired) made all strategic decisions. They either chose the president from their ranks (Liamine Zeroual in 1994), designated someone belonging to the old revolutionary

guard (Mohamed Boudiaf in 1992, Ali Kafi in 1992), or in elections put all their weight behind a candidate from within the army (Zeroual in 1995) or without (Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999). To conclude from this that the core elite, with the exception of changes in presidents, remained static in composition, distribution of individual power, or strategies since 1992 would, however, be wrong. There were three developments in these areas after the late 1990s: (1) the emergence of the president, respectively the presidency as a (somewhat) separate power center,[12] causing conflict among the core elite and gridlock in decisionmaking; (2) the complete replacement of one generation of the revolution by a younger generation of the revolution; and (3) the efforts by the army to convey the notion of a new strategy vis-à-vis politics.

The First Circle: The Core Elite, Last Bastion of the Revolutionary Generation

In 1999, at the time of Bouteflika's election, Algeria's prime decisionmakers, or core elite—*les décideurs*, or *le pouvoir (réel)*[13]—were without exception generals: the head of the army's general command since 1993, Mohamed Lamari; the head of army intelligence since 1990, Mohamed "Tewfik" Mediene; the president's advisor for defense issues and unofficial spokesman of the generals, Mohamed Touati; and two retired generals, Larbi Belkheir and Khaled Nezzar, a former minister of defense. Belkheir was the strongman during Chadli's rule and in 2000 returned to the presidency as the powerful director of the presidential cabinet, an appointment putting him at the interface between the army and the presidency and one imposed on Bouteflika by the military. Finally, a number of other generals could also be considered to belong to the décideurs, notably Smail Lamari, the number two man in army intelligence since 1992, and commanders of the six military regions. With no clearly discernible *primus inter pares* (first among equals), decisions were taken in opaque, informal, and consensus-oriented processes, which were often lengthy because of diverging interests and struggles between factions.[14]

Virtually all of these generals belonged to the same generation. They were born in the late 1930s, received their secondary education in French, and in the mid-1950s embarked on careers in the French military but later deserted to the national liberation army.[15] After independence they received military training at prestigious institutions, such as the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre in Paris and the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow, and they continued to communicate primarily in French.[16] As of 1988 these revolutionaries began to push aside their "older brothers," those who had fought the revolution from the start, who had not received professional military training, and who had kept their "younger brothers" from moving into key positions for years. The younger brothers continued this practice by blocking *their* successors, here referred to as the second generation. Only in the late 1990s did the first officers who lacked "revolutionary legitimacy" receive promotions to the rank of general,[17] and only in 2002 did the first generals from the second generation become *général-major*.[18] While an overwhelming majority of the revolutionary generation had come from the east—Batna, Tebessa, Souk Ahras—and had promoted young officers according to regional affiliations, the second generation, though still the product of a slight regional bias, represented a wider regional spectrum.

With the ascendance of Bouteflika, a civilian with a long diplomatic career and excellent ties to the West and the Gulf states, the presidency began to emerge as a power center within the core elite. According to Mohamed Lamari, Bouteflika was "le choix le moins mauvais" (the least bad choice),[19] but was, nonetheless, the army's choice; the other six presidential candidates dropped out of the race because of unfair campaigning conditions. Though Bouteflika had been the army's candidate, he soon found himself in a tug-of-war with the general command, which, along with part of the Algerian political establishment, was wary of his own authoritarian ambitions. Conflicts erupted over strategic appointments, such as Bouteflika's nominee for defense minister, a row that after several months ended with the president conceding and instead keeping the portfolio himself (as his predecessors had done). In another conflict, over the nomination for secretary general of the Defense Ministry, Bouteflika prevailed.[20] Another major point of contention was the president's reconciliatory policy toward radical Islamists that was formalized in the Concorde Civile[21] and included a controversial amnesty for demobilized combatants. The principal reason for Bouteflika's emergence as a powerful and (somewhat) independent actor and a décideur was his foreign policy success, which relieved Algeria of the international isolation that developed during its civil war. Bouteflika concluded an association agreement with the European Union in 2001, and in the wake of September 11 he established close ties with the United States, based on the "war against terrorism," and managed to obtain weapons that the United States had withheld. The army thus found it difficult to dispose of him. Bouteflika's domestic record was, however, meager: vast economic and administrative reforms he had promised did not pass the stage of proposals. His power struggles with the generals and others with vested interests in these decisions were responsible in part for gridlock on the decisionmaking level.[22]

Rumors of conflicts between the top echelon of the army and Bouteflika (and much of his entourage) became so widespread that in summer 2002 Mohamed Lamari publicly denied the allegations and reiterated the president's decisionmaking power. A few weeks after Lamari's statement, however, General Nezzar belied the alleged harmony and accused

Bouteflika of having orchestrated a campaign (notably in the foreign media) against the generals. Such contradictory messages from décideurs pointed to conflicts not only between the president and the generals but also between factions within the army.

The points of contention were political—dealing with the uprisings in Kabylia and with the (legal and outlawed) Islamist parties—as well as economic: the ability to control the hydrocarbon sector, the generator of 97 percent of exports and 77 percent of state revenues in 2000.[23] To determine the destination of hydrocarbon rents had been a main, if not the main source of core elite power since Boumedienne. Economic reform thus threatened the vital interests of core elite members, who commanded patronage networks built on the allocation of privileges such as import and distribution licenses.[24] The involvement of current and retired military officers in the private and the informal sectors of the economy had been increasing since the 1980s and was indirectly encouraged by an early retirement regulation for civil servants. Not surprisingly, many members of the core elite, for example Belkheir and Mohamed Lamari, placed family members in privileged positions in the private sector and were reputed to have made fortunes. Conflicts with Bouteflika could also be seen in the light of economic struggles, with the president trying to privilege his clients, as seemed to have been the case with the allocation of the first private mobile phone license.[25]

After a decade of controlling the state, the army in 2002 went to great lengths to publicly distance itself from politics and to create a new, "clean" image for itself. In July 2002, for the first time in the history of independent Algeria the head of the general command, Mohamed Lamari, faced uncensored questions in a press conference that lasted several hours. While journalists covered wide-ranging issues—from Lamari's salary to the release of FIS leaders and alleged army involvement in massacres of civilians—the not-so-hidden agenda of the army was to play down its role in politics and to counter allegations that it had been involved in mass killings. The army admitted that it had called the shots on matters of national importance from 1992 to 1999—in its eyes, to "save the republic" from what it called "Islamist theocracy"—but insisted that its political involvement had stopped with the election of Bouteflika.[26]

An optimistic interpretation of these statements would suggest the development of a more transparent relationship and a stronger demarcation between the army and the executive, as is the case in Turkey. More likely, however, they were merely produced for the international community as part of an effort to better sell the politics of repression. In other words, the generals were not "going Turkish," but simply "pretending to go Turkish." A real retreat from politics, after all, would involve relinquishing influence over the hydrocarbon rent, an unlikely scenario. An increasingly virulent

anti-Bouteflika campaign in the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections in privately owned Algerian newspapers, reputedly under the influence of certain generals and accusing the president of being in collusion with Islamists,[27] seemed an indication that the army was gearing up for the presidential race and, contrary to its claim, was not yet ready to retire from kingmaking. Either way, the army was reacting to the changing international climate: Human rights campaigns and Algeria's growing ties with the EU and NATO—Algeria joined the Mediterranean Dialog in 2000—contributed to these developments.

The Second Circle: Clients of the Core Elite

It would be incorrect to think that the décideurs were able to or wanted to (completely) monopolize decisionmaking. In economic issues the commerce minister, who headed the negotiations for World Trade Organization membership, and the energy and mines minister, who also oversaw the state's hydrocarbon empire, Sonatrach, had a say. Depending on the issue in question, a number of other people were being consulted—these included Ali Benflis who became prime minister in 2000, and in 2001 general secretary of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN, the party that ruled Algeria as a single party for twenty-seven years), and who was a main reason for the FLN being the top vote getter in the 2002 elections.[28] Others with advisory power were the presidents of the two parliamentary chambers,[29] certain presidential advisors (most of whom come from the president's region),[30] party leaders, or high functionaries. However, in most cases these individuals were, at best, the clients of core elite patrons. Along with the core elite, they constituted the ruling elite. Since they had strong advisory power but limited or sectoral decisionmaking capacities, they belonged to the second, or middle, circle of elites rather than to the inner, or first, circle. The latter in 2002 consisted of less than a dozen people, among them no clearly discernible prime decisionmaker (see Figure 7.1).

The second circle of elites was primarily a pool of important core elite clients from various state institutions and the cabinet (the cabinet being the most important collective actor in the second circle), drawn as well from the public economic sector, the private sector, and from among regime-supporting civil society groups. In rare instances one also found contesting elites, such as opposition figures, leaders of the Kabyle protest movement, and so on in this circle; but their presence was usually only temporary, resulting from a passing political constellation during which they were able to mobilize public opinion to an extent that made them as influential as a minister, albeit in a different way. Some second-circle elites had high profiles and exercised official functions. Others, such as Bouteflika's closest advisors, a number of retired generals, and the country's most important

Figure 7.1 Segments of the Algerian Politically Relevant Elite



Notes: This figure shows dynamics within the PRE, indicating the range of movement of elite segments into and out of certain circles of influence, depending on political conjunctures. Members of the PRE are divided into three circles of influence. Actors in the first, or inner, circle have decisionmaking power on strategic issues; those in the second, or middle, circle have primarily advisory power on these issues; and those in the third, or outer circle, have either weak advisory power or, in most cases, veto or nuisance power. The triangles indicate the range of mobility. The influence of state institutions remains more constant than that of nonstate institutions and organizations. Leaders of the Kabyle protest movement, for instance, are at times outside the PRE, but at other times their activities allow them access to the third or even the second circles. This figure does not reflect the fact that members of one segment of the PRE (e.g., parliament) may also be members of other segments of the PRE (e.g., the private sector).

Table 7.1 Third Generation Ideal Types in Algeria

	Political Socialization	Common Formative Experiences	Role Models	Family Background	Primary Language	Perception of Urgent Problems	Sector or Field
Neodinosaur	FLN and its satellites, regime-supporting NGOs	Death of Boumedienne, Islamist terrorism	Houari Boumedienne, Gamal Abdel Nasser	Revolutionary, *ulama*, nomenclature, tribal elites, local notables	French or Arabic	Unemployment, terrorism/security situation, national unity	Army, cabinet, parliament, public administration, FLN and its satellites
Nationalist Reformer	Regime-supporting NGOs, FLN and its satellites	1988 uprisings, return of Boudiaf, Islamist terrorism	Charles de Gaulle, Mohamed Boudiaf, Houari Boumedienne, Gandhi	Revolutionary, *ulama*, nomenclature, tribal, private sector elites, local notables	Mainly French but some Arabic	Economic reforms, terrorism/security situation	Army, cabinet, parliament, public administration, FLN and its satellites, private sector, NGOs
Islamist Reformer	Mosque, clandestine student movements, Islamic NGOs	1988 uprisings, democratic opening, 1992 coup, violence of the 1990s	Hassan al-Banna, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Nelson Mandela, Gandhi	Revolutionary, *ulama*, tribal, private sector elites, local, religious notables, and lesser privileged rural and urban	Arabic or French	Economic reforms, fight against corruption, national reconciliation, rule of law, democratization	Cabinet, parliament, public administration, private sector, religious charities, print media
Radical Democrat	(Clandestine) student movements; for Kabyles: family, high school, regime-critical NGOs	1980 Berber spring, 1988 uprisings, democratic opening, 1990 coup, civil war	Nelson Mandela, Olof Palme, Gandhi, Hocine Ait-Ahmed, Martin Luther King Jr., Che Guevara	Revolutionary, local notables, *marabout* families, and lesser privileged urban	French or Kabyle but some Arabic	Democratization, national reconciliation, rule of law, human rights, education sector reforms	Parliament, independent unions, print media, independent NGOs, Kabyle citizens' movement

Notes: This table shows the main elite types, or ideal types, born after 1960 and found among the Algerian PRE as of the second half of the 1990s. The balance of power among these types favors the nationalist reformer, with the neodinosaur a strong second. A fifth elite type, the rejectionist, is not included in this table because he is found in the PRE only temporarily. "Islamist terrorism," "violence of the 1990s," and "civil war" refer to the same events but reflect different perspectives on these events. While different ideal types may share perceptions of urgent problems, they differ regarding the means for solving these problems.

businesspeople, kept a low profile, acting behind the scenes. Virtually all of them had direct access to one or more décideurs and were able to influence decisions or give advice on matters of strategic interest, such as economic and education sector reforms and democratization. It was possible to discern at least five dynamics interacting in this circle:

- Its members had suffered a high degree of turnover. Algeria had eighteen governments between 1988 and 2002 (including major reshufflings), seven of them between 1998 and 2002 alone, a period that also produced four prime ministers.
- The older and younger brothers of the generation of the revolution were being replaced by the second generation (for example, Benflis) in virtually all elite segments, partly because of biological factors—the youngest members of the revolutionary generation were around sixty and approaching retirement in the late 1990s—but also as a result of a deliberate core elite strategy of rejuvenation.
- Private sector elites as well as elites with backgrounds in economics had gained influence, not least as a result of IMF-induced market reforms.
- Civil society elites were being co-opted into this circle.
- An increasing number of elites in the second circle could be described as nationalist reformers in the sense that they advocated substantial structural reforms in the economy and the administration with goals of efficiency, accountability, and the rule of law, but not a system change.

The second Benflis government, formed after the 2002 parliamentary elections, was a good example of these tendencies. It consisted of three parties: the FLN, the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND, an FLN spin-off founded by core and second-circle elites in 1997), and the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP, formerly Hamas, a moderate Islamist party co-opted into the government in 1994).[31] Roughly half of the government's thirty-nine ministers did not belong to a party, and the overwhelming majority could be described as technocrats; politicians in the Weberian sense remained rare. Most cabinet members came from the state bureaucracy, the public economic sector, the universities, or international organizations and institutions. One also found a civil society activist (for women's rights) and several members of the private sector. Entry into the circle for these people was paved by the Conseil Consultatif National and later by the Conseil National de Transition, the quasi-parliamentary bodies installed between 1992 and 1997 after the interruption of the elections and which included as wide a spectrum of regime-supporting groups as possible.

The Benflis government looked significantly different from governments of the early and mid-1990s: 50 percent of the ministers had never sat

in a cabinet before; there were five women; only seven of the thirty-nine ministers belonged to the revolutionary generation (while in the early 1990s almost two-thirds had such a past); only one cabinet member came from an army background; and there had been an increasing tendency to recruit members from parliament. The recycling of political figures through cabinet posts, a decades-old practice, appeared to be in decline.

As to clientelist affiliations, ministers from the 2002 cabinet fell into four (partially overlapping) categories:[32] the president's men, the military's men, the prime minister's men and women, and people co-opted for the sake of social stability. The president's men tended to be the oldest ministers,[33] came from the west (in four cases from Nedroma),[34] were reform-oriented technocrats, sat in the more important ministries, and usually had (international) experience and high competence in their respective fields. In addition to "regional capital" and "capital of competence," several of these ministers also had "historical capital," that is, they had participated in the revolution and belonged to a network, such as the Ministère de l'Armement et des Liaisons Générales (MALG).[35] The prime minister's people tended to occupy less important ministries, came from the FLN, and reflected that party's new desirable profile: young, with university degrees (and, ideally, academic careers), and speaking the language of reform. Despite their relatively young age—most were in their forties—several of these ministers had historical capital qua inheritance, as children or relatives of prominent revolutionaries, martyrs, or *ulama* leaders.[36] Although a number of these ministers were elected to parliament in 2002, few had experience in party, local, or national politics. Many only joined the FLN or became active in it for the 2002 campaign; a lack of politicization appeared to have been an asset for upward mobility in this case. The military's men, roughly half a dozen ministers, had little in common except that they were reputed or confirmed to have *un parrain*, a godfather, in the first circle, in the army. Most of them occupied strategically important ministries, such as justice. Finally, there were the three ministers of the co-opted Islamist MSP. Without a godfather in the first circle, their influence was limited and, similar to some of the prime minister's men and women, they belonged to the third, or outer, circle of influence rather than the second circle.

Apart from the more powerful ministers, top cadres of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA), the powerful union under the single-party system, and top business elites also had clout in decisions on economic reforms. The UGTA was powerful both because it had access to the first circle, and because it had strong veto and nuisance power.[37] By rallying public opinion and political elites, it forced Bouteflika to shelve a new hydrocarbon bill that he had proposed.[38] Abdelmajid Sidi Said, the secretary general of the UGTA, and Omar Ramdane, president of the Forum des Chefs d'Entreprise (FCE), a lobby of more than sixty of the

largest entrepreneurs, could not be ignored when it came to economic decisions. Both were invited to accompany the commerce minister to the fourth round of WTO membership negotiations in November 2002. The FCE also somewhat successfully advocated for regulations to weaken the Algerian import lobby and favor producers over traders. The import lobby, reputed to be close to certain army clans but not formally organized, for its part, fought to keep its privileges.[39] Finally, the wealthiest businessmen, usually with blood or familial ties to the army or politics, informally and individually tried to influence economic decisionmaking; a prominent example was Issad Rebrab, one of the country's biggest industrialists. Algeria's most prominent businessman, Rafik al-Khalifa, whose empire was on the verge of collapse in early 2003,[40] was unlikely to have wielded much political influence, as he was reputed to be a figurehead financed by generals or by Gulf countries (depending on the source of the allegation).

A further category of actors that could be part of the second circle was top cadres of state-sponsored but formally independent organizations, namely those that fell under the umbrella of the *famille révolutionnaire*[41] and could mobilize hundreds of thousands of Algerians in elections. This was true primarily of the Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine (ONM), a veterans group whose secretary general in 2002 became minister of moudjahidine and who defended the material benefits and interests of veterans,[42] as well as the Organisation Nationale des Enfants de Chouhada (Children of Martyrs). The fact that these organizations were political instruments and had political weight was reflected in the state's allocation of funds to them: in the 2003 budget proposal the moudjahidine item was the fourth largest, receiving only one-third less than defense and more than higher education and the entire health sector. This situation also helped explain the apparently large number of *faux moudjahidine*—the number of officially acknowledged veterans rose from 24,000 in 1962 to 420,000 in 1999[43]—and the intense efforts to make hereditary the historical capital of veterans through organizations such as the Organisation Nationale des Enfants de Moudjahidine (Children of Veterans), founded in 1993. Being a cadre in one of these organizations or in an association of "victims of terrorism" was an excellent stepping stone for entering the politically relevant elite. The fictional and mythical famille révolutionnaire thus constituted what Olivier Roy calls a "modern *asabiyya*" (kinship-based solidarity).[44]

The Third Circle: The Subelites—Clients and Contesters

The third circle of the politically relevant elite was the most dynamic circle. The early 1990s, before the aborted elections, witnessed the mushrooming of the number of collective actors with indirect but substantial

political influence through advising, lobbying, or possessing the power to effectively veto decisions or be a nuisance. Many of these actors managed to retain some of their influence beyond the coup. Furthermore, in the late 1990s new politically relevant actors emerged, for example, the Kabyle protest movement. This not only led to a sharp increase in the number of actors that were able to temporarily, as opposed to permanently, move into the third circle, but also led to a fragmentation of third-circle elites. Another tendency in this circle was the increasing dominance of young actors born after the revolution. These developments in the third circle, in conjunction with the recruitment and co-optation mechanisms used to sustain the second circle, were a primary reason for system continuity and relative stability in Algeria.

Two categories of actors informed this circle: clients and contesting elites. The clients had been "lifted" into the PRE by patrons from above, had good chances of moving into the second circle, and were found primarily in the RND and the FLN and its satellites (for example, in the Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne [UNJA], and the UGTA), in regime-friendly NGOs,[45] and in the two chambers of parliament. The Senate, or upper house, one-third of whose members were nominated by the president, could be seen as a parking lot for aging former top functionaries with historical capital or, for its younger members, a waiting room for entry into the executive or diplomatic corps. The lower chamber of parliament, the Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN)—as of 1997 a multiparty chamber—while not a powerful institution in the constitutional sense, developed into a platform for controversial debates and agenda setting with the first-time appearance of two opposition parties[46] and three "semi-opposition" parties.

The APN, dominated by the RND in 1997, and by an absolute majority of the FLN in 2002, became a sphere of frequent elite turnover (more than 80 percent of 1997 MPs were not reelected in 2002) and of elite rejuvenation. In 1997, 11 percent belonged to the generation born after independence; in 2002 this number more than doubled, to 25 percent, and, conversely, the number of the revolutionary generation declined, from 16 percent to 5 percent. Both developments were engineered by party leaders. In 2002, moreover, a phenomenon previously witnessed in most Arab countries reached Algeria: the entry into politics of private sector elites. At the end of the single-party era in 1989, only 1 to 2 percent of MPs had a private sector background; in 2002 this figure had climbed to 10 percent. Finally, many of the regime-supporting MPs formed a clientelist link between local and national levels, between mass organizations (for example, the ONM, the victims of terrorism, the scouts) and between the first and second-circle elites who used these organizations and numerous smaller NGOs to broad-

en the power base of the regime. Hachemaoui pertinently termed such MPs *entrepreneurs de la médiation clientélaire* (entrepreneurs of clientelist mediation).[47]

The contesting elites, who wanted to alter or completely change the political system, comprised two large groups: Islamists and leftists. Although most contesting elites had imposed themselves or had been pushed into the PRE from below by such social forces as the Kabyle protest movement, their co-optation and movement into the second circle was not uncommon, as evidenced by the fortunes of some MSP and UGTA cadres and some media elites. As a result of their elevation, their positions softened, and they lost popular appeal because of their cooperation with the regime, as happened to the MSP. Though the MSP only received minor ministries, it could still be said to have obtained a certain veto power, because the government needed an Islamist party fig leaf to claim legitimacy through pluralism.

The most powerful Islamist actor was arguably the opposition Mouvement pour la Réforme Nationale (MRN, or al-Islah, which split from al-Nahda in 1999). It was the third most influential political force within the formal political system and had attracted former FIS activists and voters. The power of Islah laid less in its agenda of social justice than in its ability to hamper reforms in the education sector and other areas by presenting such measures as an "occidentalization" of society, thus mobilizing conservative opinion. It had informal nuisance power but limited formal veto power, because it remained a minority in parliament and on many issues had no allies. The electoral power of other contesting Islamist forces—such as the outlawed FIS and moderate Islamist, or Arabo-nationalist, Wafa, headed by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Boumedienne's long-time minister and a former revolutionary—was hard to evaluate because these groups could not operate openly. Ibrahimi, the most hopeful opposition candidate in the 1999 presidential race, had been accused of trying to create an FIS successor organization even though WAFA was by no means more radical or more Islamist than Islah. The fact that it had not been legalized spoke of its potential electoral power and the fear it aroused among the core and second-circle elites.

The FIS elite were physically eliminated, imprisoned, or deprived of their political rights throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, the party's number one and two, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, who were supposed to be released from prison in July 2003, could not be ignored by the regime. The support of the FIS leadership for holding presidential elections in 1999 and for the Concorde Civile was crucial to incumbent elites, because it offered them broad legitimacy and allowed for the integration of parts of the FIS electorate into the formal political process. With some FIS elites and part of its electorate co-opted, and with persistent quarrels between and within the leadership in Algeria and in exile, it appeared unlikely that the party (even if legalized) would regain the influence it held in the early 1990s, when its leaders were about to move from the second to the first circle. Finally, the remaining armed Islamist groups, Groupement Islamique Armés (GIA) and Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, were able to muster indirect influence on certain strategic decisions in that they provided justification for the army not lifting the state of emergency and keeping up its repression. The GIA, especially, through massacres, played into the hands of the army, which in turn led to persistent and plausible rumors of army infiltration of these groups.[48]

Elites on the political left—from members of political parties to the Kabyle protest movement and human rights activists—formed another important opposition force. Their organization, however, exemplified the problems hampering opposition forces from uniting and becoming a real force of change. The most important parties on the left, the Trotskyite Parti des Travailleurs (PT), led by Louisa Hanoune, and the social democratic and Berberophone Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), led by Hocine Ait-Ahmed, one of the nine principal leaders of the revolution, had advocated regime and system change for decades from within and without the political system. Though both of these parties shared a goal of democratization and national reconciliation that includes the FIS, they had fallen out over tactical issues, such as whether to participate in elections. Moreover, the FFS, which had strong regional roots and historical legitimacy, lost part of its constituency to the Kabyle citizens movement, or Arouch, a protest movement born in April 2001 following the killing of a young Berber in a police station.[49]

The Kabyle movement was formally organized into several committees, the largest being the Coordination des Arouch, des Dairas et des Communes (CADC).[50] Its leadership represented a new force in the third circle of elites and at the same time contributed to the fragmentation of the more established contesting elites. This movement, although not homogeneous or well structured, was able to take credit for the state finally accepting the Berber language, Tamazight, as a national language in April 2002.[51] Moreover, it succeeded largely at preventing—not least through violent means—the holding of local and national elections in Kabilya in 2002. It also substantially weakened the Berber FFS and Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD), which was forced to leave government as a result of the uprisings. These parties, as well as the government, tried to repress, split, and control the movement; and several movement leaders were arrested in late 2002. The Arouch, however, remained adamant that without the fulfillment of their political and social demands as stated in the so-called Platform of El Kseur,[52] they would neither negotiate nor cooperate with state agencies. While such maximalist demands threatened to drive

the Arouch into a political dead end, the movement was not likely to simply disappear, since it was, among other things, an expression of a generational conflict, deriving much of its strength from the increasing number of young Berbers, who were completely alienated from (national) political life.[53]

The fact that the government was not able to repress the Kabyle protest movement the way that it had repressed the FIS[54] could be attributed to the presence of two politically relevant actors with strong nuisance power: the nongovernmental Arabophone and Francophone press, which were remarkably, but not entirely, free,[55] and national and international human rights activists. The press reported not only every move against the Arouch, but continuously uncovered scandals involving core and second-circle elites. In 1998, for example, a press campaign pushed General Mohamed Betchine, a strong and utterly corrupt Zeroual man, to resign.[56] The private press's vigilance, moreover, contributed to preventing the wide-scale manipulation of elections. Human rights activists, for their part, developed a nuisance power that moved them into the second circle, that is, until the events of September 11 internationally "legitimized" the Algerian use of force against Islamists retrospectively. From the mid-1990s onward Algerian and foreign human rights activists contributed to the isolation of the Algerian core elite by raising the question "Qui tue qui?" (Who kills whom?) in the French press, insinuating that the army had committed atrocities in order to discredit the Islamists and to justify the regime's repressive policies. In 2001 complaints of torture forced General Nezzar to flee from France overnight. Moreover, in 2002 a French court after long hearings dismissed a lawsuit in which Nezzar had accused former army officer Habib Souaidia of defamation. The latter had—in the media as well as in a highly publicized book—blamed the décideurs for the systematic and willful perpetration of atrocities.[57]

In view of these pressures, the army's public relations campaign could also be seen as a response to the globalization of justice and the fear of a Milosevic-like fate for décideurs. Other regime counterstrategies included trying to split the media and human rights groups. Several editors, columnists, and caricaturists had been co-opted (sometimes into the second circle) and were being used to attack regime foes and for agenda setting, while also being given leeway to criticize the regime.[58] As for human rights activists, those from truly independent organizations continued to suffer from clampdowns, while several regime-backed organizations, defending the human rights of some people but not of others, sprung up.[59] What ultimately prevented most contesting elites in the third circle from becoming stronger was the wildly fluctuating nature of their influence, which depended on the national and international climate. After September 11, for instance, independent human rights activists for a while disappeared almost completely from the PRE.

Continuity Through Change

The above analysis has shown that dynamics within the Algerian politically relevant elite, particularly the increase in the number of actors in the second half of the 1990s, led to a substantially reduced range of action for the core elite. Members of the core elite, in an effort to broaden their power base and to institutionalize controllable valves, responded to popular pressure by liberalizing the political system, albeit selectively. This allowed for young and less powerful third-circle elites (or subelites) to emerge and to at times successfully press for certain concessions or block core elite strategies. Such actions were made possible not least by changes abroad, such as the end of the Eastern European socialist paradigm, which resulted among other things in transitions to market economies worldwide, globalization of justice, and international treaties—putting pressure on a core elite exhibiting increasing disunity in vision and strategy. The core elite fragmentation opened spaces in which contesting elites could act. The result of these developments, however, was not system reform or system instability but, on the contrary, system continuity. The increasing fragmentation of the PRE, the recruitment mechanisms into the politically relevant elite (for example, core elites co-opting nonpoliticized young elites), and the nature of the channels of social mobility (for example, clientelist networks based on regional, familial, and historical capital) preserved the existing political structures. Underlying this situation were components external to Algeria's elite: The elites' fragmentation reflected longstanding and deep divisions in Algerian society as a whole—the core elite "merely" managed these division successfully. Recruitment mechanisms and channels for upward mobility embodied the vertical, primordial (familial, tribal, regional), and modern (revolutionary, rentier) networks as well as the informal (personalized) modes of negotiation and exchange found throughout Algerian society. This explained why, despite a common "enemy," contesting elites only once—in 1995 in Rom in a mediation of the Sant'Egidio Catholic community—agreed on a common political platform of national reconciliation that included the FIS.[60]

The personalized networks and the modes of exchange resulted in part from the rentier character of the Algerian economy.[61] This aspect of the economy was a principal obstacle to elite transformation and system change, because it helped the core elite to finance a costly divide and conquer strategy, consisting of repression (for example, of the FIS), co-optation (for example, of the Islamist MSP), and encouragement of real and fake competition through the creation of parallel structures. A classic example of this last mechanism was the creation of new parties to weaken existing ones by having the newer parties espouse similar agendas and address similar electorates to those of the established parties. Cases in point were

the Berberophone RCD (to oppose the Berberophone FFS) in 1989 and the RND (to oppose the FLN, temporarily in opposition) in 1997. Also, businesspeople, former politicians, and generals founded or supported a plethora of private Francophone daily newspapers. In 2002 these numbered more than a dozen and served to weaken the effect that any individual newspaper might have, thus rendering the (Francophone) press less threatening. Finally, of the 57,000 associations in 2002,[62] only a few were truly independent. Many were regime satellites (for example, the victims of terrorism associations) or instruments for distributing benefits to regime supporters, for weakening independent and opposition NGOs, and, last but not least, for integrating emerging young elites into the fold.[63] Examination of these young elites and the mechanisms of generational change in Algerian politics offered additional clues into why, despite the dynamic nature of the third elite circle, shifts in the second circle, and changes in the balance of power in the first circle, the Algerian system remained remarkably resistant to change.

Grandchildren of the Revolution

It seems superfluous, but it is nevertheless important to stress that a different generational experience produces a different "generation entelechy."[64] Obviously, a common experience does not lead to homogeneity among an entire generation, and elite rejuvenation does not necessarily mean wholesale changes in attitudes, strategies, or policies. What an actual generational change and an approach focusing on it offer are a chance to pinpoint areas of change. Equally important, they highlight continuity, for one must remain aware that focusing on elite transformations "risks underestimating the persistence and exaggerating the change."[65] By using common historical and common formal educational experiences to delineate different generations, it was possible to discern three generations among the Algerian politically relevant elite in the early 2000s: the revolutionary generation, the second generation (coming of age after independence), and the third generation (born around or after independence). The elites of the revolutionary generation, whether opposition or regime elites, were marked by the war of independence, by the rivalries and rifts the war generated among Algerians, and by what Mohammed Harbi terms an "esprit de secret, de suspicion et de rivalité" (a spirit of secrecy, of suspicion, and of rivalry).[66]

The second generation, born between the mid-1940s and the late 1950s, had memories of the war but had also been significantly marked by an era of hope: the euphoria of independence and "the golden years of Boumedienne" involving state building, ambitious industrialization projects, and high oil prices. It had enjoyed generous state scholarships to France, Eastern Europe, the Arabic- and English-speaking worlds;[67] job

opportunities had been abundant and social mobility fairly high. The educational system—although geared toward mass education and slowly beginning to be Arabized—had still featured private schools and "showed an imbalance in favor of those whose families already [held] wealth, status and power."[68] Nevertheless, upward mobility had been widespread in this generation: The step-by-step Arabization of the official sphere turned command of Modern Standard Arabic, rarely found in the revolutionary generation, into an asset during the 1970s and opened channels for ambitious young people with non-Francophone rural or less privileged backgrounds. Among the institutions producing elites were technical and engineering schools, the École Nationale d'Administration, the Faculté de Droit in Algiers, and the army academies. Networks based on familial, regional, and revolutionary affiliations as well as mass organizations, such as the UGTA, the UNJA, and the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), were channels of upward mobility. These FLN satellites helped form an etatist, socialist, collectivist, and nationalist identity. This "ideology of the state," together with the opportunities offered to the second generation, had inspired a sentiment among this generation that they could never give back to the state what it had given to them. Hence, it was not surprising that the second generation of elites had turned out to be obedient rather than rebellious and had remained in the shadow of its heroic fathers, particularly of one strong man: Boumedienne. Hardly any representatives of this generation had ascended to key positions in the FLN or the administration until the early 1990s, none made it to the top echelons of the army until the late 1990s, and none occupied the presidency.

The main socializing experiences of the third generation of elites were, in contrast, a chain of primarily discouraging or violent developments: the economic decline during the Chadli years that accelerated socioeconomic problems; the bloodily repressed riots of 1988 that led to three short years of democratic opening, accompanied by the euphoria of a political spring but also increased social tensions linked to the ascendance of the Islamist FIS; the military coup after the FIS election victory; the assassination of President Boudiaf, who had represented a ray of hope;[69] the outbreak of the civil war; and, throughout the 1990s, rampant unemployment, low social mobility, and the emigration of more than 400,000 Algerians with higher diplomas.[70] This elite generation, moreover, suffered from a decline in the school system, which had been completely (but poorly) Arabized by the early 1980s (with the exception of the natural sciences at the university level) and produced what many Algerians refer to as "illiterates in two languages." With state scholarships to foreign countries becoming scarce, this generation of elites was educated almost exclusively in Algeria, mainly at the Sciences Po and the Faculté de Droit of Algiers University. Army elites constituted the sole exception: they continued to be sent abroad for train-

ing. At military academies, English was pushed as of the mid-1980s. In terms of elite training and international exposure, the army was, therefore, far ahead of the civilian sector.

While this third generation of elites was (not yet) found in the first circle, and while its members were only slowly moving into cabinet positions—two in 2002—they had in the army attained the rank of colonel and were increasingly found in ever-higher positions in the general command. They were also moving into top positions in the private and public economic sectors, in the state administration, and in parties. More than half of the top cadres of the FFS in 2002 were born after the revolution, and even the FLN's *bureau politique*, the eternal stronghold of the so-called dinosaurs, had one member under forty years of age. The executives of the Islamist parties from their beginnings included members of the third generation, adding a generational component to the confrontation between the regime and the Islamists. With the regime excluding the younger generations from power, the FIS in the early 1990s became the primary forum for their political voice. It appeared that the Arouch, at least for the Kabyles, took on this function in the early 2000s.

The most striking common feature of the third generation of elites was the fact that it had been recruited almost exclusively from certain privileged layers of society, in many cases from within the PRE: from well-known revolutionary families[71] or from the larger (and largely imaginary) famille révolutionnaire, from the nomenklatura (administrative and FLN cadres and military elites), locally important families (including postrevolutionary "notables," such as local party functionaries), families of religious notables (*ulama* and religious brotherhoods), prominent tribes, and the private sector. Remarkable still was that almost none of the core elite's offspring could be found in top positions in state institutions. Most of them were educated abroad (in France, the United States, or Britain) and either stayed there or returned and went into the private sector. A few were found in the army, but not (yet) in its top echelons.

A principal reason for "elite reproduction" was the Arabization of the school system, which hampered the social mobility of Algerians who did not grow up in a privileged French-speaking household, in a Francophone urban milieu, or attend schools in France. The army's general command as well as the cabinet communicated primarily in French. Ministers, generals, and directors of enterprises made it clear that French was a prerequisite for promotions into the upper spheres of the Algerian system. Even in Islamist parties, mastering French seemed, judging from the high number of top cadres that spoke it beautifully, a plus for one's career, even if party leaders refused to speak it publicly for ideological reasons. To a limited extent, the only space open to actors from backgrounds other than those above were independent unions,[72] independent NGOs, the Arabophone press, and

Islamist parties. Thus, as Pierre Bourdieu notes, the educational system contributed to reproducing the existing order.[73]

A second reason for the reproduction of the current elite and for existing social hierarchies was the monopolization of historical legitimacy by incumbent elites. A link, no matter how remote, to the fictitious famille révolutionnaire was a key asset for entering the PRE. It was no coincidence that when Leila Boutlilis, one of the female members in the second Benflis cabinet, was presented to the media, her being an offspring of a famous "martyr" was mentioned more prominently as a merit than her being a well-known professor of cardiology. Historical legitimacy as a criterion for recruitment thus experienced a renaissance. According to John Entelis, it had become less important in the late 1970s;[74] in the wake of the regime's fight against Islamism in the 1990s, however, historical legitimacy regained importance and was extended to organizations fighting terrorism. The fact that the PRE, despite its still strong egalitarian and populist rhetoric, recruited mainly from within and from the same privileged societal segments, did not, however, preclude newly recruited young elites from developing attitudes that differed from their older predecessors.

The Faces of the Young Elite

As Mannheim stresses, an "actual generation," composed of those with common historical experiences, is divided into "differentiated, antagonistic generation units" because common historical experiences are dealt with in different ways.[75] In the Algerian case, the domestic and foreign media have tended to reduce these units to binary categories, such as *éradicateurs/réconciliateurs* (eradicators/reconcilers) or Arabophone/Francophone or Arabophone/Franco-Berberophone or Islamist/democratic, and so on. Such dualities, usually relying on one variable only—for example, language or attitude toward Islamists—have overlooked complex crosscutting of political, ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages and neglected additional dimensions, such as outlooks on economic reforms. Their explanatory power for elite change as well as for system change has been limited. The inclusion of a wider spectrum of variables[76] allows for the construction of five different "ideal types" in the third generation: the neodinosaur, the nationalist reformer, the Islamist reformer, the radical democrat, and the rejectionist (see Table 7.1.).[77] The balance of power in the third generation favored the nationalist reformer, while in the second generation the dinosaur prevailed.

The neodinosaur—found in the army, cabinet, and parliament, as well as in public administration, and often an FLN, or in some cases, an RND member—was the most reform averse of the ideal types. He had been socialized in a family belonging to the nomenklatura or in organizations

such as the UNJA that have also functioned as channels for upward mobility.[78] He was a populist nationalist in the tradition of Boumediennists and saw himself as the true inheritor of the revolutionaries. His motto was *continuité* (continuity), and his political program was to slow reforms in the administrative, education, and economic sectors on the one hand while demanding state programs to alleviate socioeconomic misery on the other. Democracy was seen as having arrived with the demise of the single-party system in 1997; it now only needed some consolidation.

The rejectionist was the opposite of the neodinosaur. His principal goal was a change of what he viewed as a completely corrupt and murderous regime and elite. He was not interested in reforms, rejected negotiations, and was ready to flirt with violence to achieve his goals, arguing that (violent) uprisings, rather than negotiations, had been the motor of change in the Algerian past. In the 1990s he was found primarily among the more radical FIS cadres, whose visions of post-FLN Algeria revolved around an Islamic social order and the Islamic values of the revolution that were betrayed after independence. As of 2001, the most influential rejectionists were leaders of the Berber protest movement. They saw themselves as revolutionaries in the tradition of a Che Guevara or Algerians such as Abane Ramdane, who had been killed by revolutionaries who later took over the state. At the same time, paradoxically, the leaders of the protest movement, in accordance with dominant sociocultural practices, excluded women almost completely and included a revitalized concept of an archaic organizational structure, the Arouch, in their movement. Few rejectionists were found in the PRE, and they had no chance of advancing in the existing system because they refused co-optation.

The radical democrat—found in small numbers in parliament but mainly in independent unions, NGOs, and newspapers and in the FFS, PT, and occasionally RCD—was also rooting for regime change, but through nonviolent means and often from within the system. He tended to be Berberophone or Francophone and his goal was a secular, social democratic system that allowed space for the FIS. For him, too, the revolutionaries—with the exception of figures such as Ait-Ahmed—betrayed the main goal of the revolution: the establishment of a democracy. His main concerns were democratization, human rights, a functioning judiciary, and a fairer distribution of state resources. He was, hence, blocking some reforms (for example, privatization) while pushing other (political, educational, and administrative) reforms. In contrast to the neodinosaur, he was neither a functionary nor a bureaucrat but a true politician in the Weberian sense. His upward mobility, however, was usually limited to the third circle of elites.

The Islamist reformer—found in the MSP, to some extent in the Islah, in the cabinet and parliament, and the Arabophone press—was usually an Arabophone and could also be described as a democrat. He shared many of

the concerns of the radical democrat—rule of law, human rights, the fight against corruption—except his vision of society was shaped more by Islamic than by universalist values; yet he tolerated other political and social visions. He blamed the postrevolutionary elite for having betrayed the Arab-Islamic pillars of the revolution and for having subscribed to authoritarian, socialist, and Francophone values instead. Like the conservative neodinosaur, he opposed education sector reforms—namely, the early introduction of French—but advocated a market economy, transparency, and accountability. He, too, tended to be a politician in the Weberian sense, and his influence could reach into the second circle by agreeing to limited deals with the regime and by utilizing his nuisance power.

The nationalist reformer—found in the FLN and the RND, in government, parliament, the public administration, the public and private economic sectors, and many NGOs—exemplified why the Algerian system remained virtually unchanged, despite much talk of reforms. He had one foot in politics (parliament), one foot in business, and at the same time was a cadre in a (large) NGO. While his background was similar to that of the neodinosaur, he differed in outlook and behavior. He communicated openly and critically about the country's problems and was convinced that substantial structural reforms in the administration, the economy, the judiciary, and the educational system were the only way out of the political, social, and economic crisis that Algeria had suffered for more than a decade. Political reforms, however, were not a priority, and he had internalized the modernization paradigm in that he saw economic and social development as a prerequisite for democracy. The nationalist reformer viewed economic and administrative reforms as means to ease tensions and satisfy interest groups in order to postpone or avoid political concessions and prevent system change.[79]

With nationalist reformers from the third and the second generation moving into key positions (in most ministries and, arguably, the presidency), why were the economic, administrative, and education sector reforms advocated by them not implemented? The answer is found not only in the opposition of groups with vested interests (for example, importers in the case of privatization) or with different visions of society (for example, Islamists in the case of education reforms based on universalist values), but because the reforms were slowed by the nationalist reformer himself: The reforms he advocated, namely transparency, accountability, and the rule of law (eventually leading to strong state institutions), would have undermined the very structures (of informal networks based on primordial ties and personalized relations) that "made" him. He thus was likely to make choices that did not threaten these structures. In other words, attitudes were not primarily what guided his decisions, rather it was the personalized and clientelist relations with individual elites that shaped and constrained him.

The personal trajectory of a third generation nationalist reformer illustrates this point.

X was a private sector consultant from a family in western Algeria with links to the ulama (and thus had historical legitimacy). In high school he dated a general's daughter, was introduced to several décideurs, and began doing (vaguely defined) "favors" for them. In 2002, he advised several ministers informally, had close ties to the country's most important business leaders as well as to several generals, and was among those who advised the generals of the need to change the army's image. At the same time he mediated between international governmental, nongovernmental, and multilateral organizations and the Algerian ruling elite. His business relationships with Algerians were highly informal, and when called upon to solve a problem, he often succeeded with one phone call to a highly placed person. He openly talked about the importance of giving and taking in informal exchanges of favors that did not necessarily need to be of a material nature.[80] X's analysis of Algeria's problems and shortcomings in no way differed from those of the World Bank or foreign diplomats, and he organized workshops on corruption, transparency, accountability, and lobbying. Yet, X's activities were geared toward improving Algeria's image rather than toward real structural changes, and they were conditioned by his efforts to satisfy those who protected him rather than by advocacy for the reforms he deemed necessary. When Bouteflika was in good standing with the army, he publicly backed him; when the president fell from favor, he criticized him in the media, even though Bouteflika and his entourage were arguing for reforms that X thought important. As all nationalist reformers, X had great respect not necessarily for the décideurs, but for the army as an institution, which he perceived as functioning better and more according to merit than all other institutions.

X did not hold a formal political position and may have been unique in what he did professionally, but the way in which he operated within the system and subordinated his reformist agenda to the needs of negotiating and renegotiating his personal ties with various patrons did not differ much from the ways in which nationalist reformers in the second circle, including prime ministers, negotiated with core elites, except that the members of the second circle spoke about it less openly. X's example, moreover, showed that patron-client networks were highly dynamic and subject to constant negotiating and renegotiating.

Elite Change and System Transformation: The Impact of Sociocultural and Economic Factors

Patrick Chabal pointedly states about Africa that politics are not "functionally differentiated, or separated, from the sociocultural considerations which govern everyday life."[81] This also held true, even if to a lesser extent, for Algeria during the period examined, and is an issue completely overlooked by actor-oriented transition models that try to reach general (universal) conclusions about possible transition trajectories.[82] Even if an elite ideal type, such as the radical democrat, moved through a pact into the second or even the first circle and participated in decisionmaking, it remains questionable whether such movement would ultimately lead to democracy. For even in Algerian parties that had a Western-style democratic agenda, internal politics and personnel decisions remained guided by sociocultural and primordial considerations more than political ones. The FFS for instance was run by a charismatic patriarch, who, coming from a *marabout*[83] family, possessed religious capital and placed family members in strategic positions. No Algerian party leader allowed a strong rival to rise within his party. Dissent within parties, moreover, quickly led to schisms (for example, Islah from Nahda). If the charismatic leader disappeared or left the party, the party more or less vanished (as happened to Nahda after its leader, Djaballah, left the party and founded Islah). Even those political figures who saw themselves as the new revolutionaries or praised "modern" values of citizenship, such as the leaders of the Kabyle movement, had a discourse deeply shaped by sociocultural practices in that they spoke of the movement's *code d'honneur* (code of honor), thus resorting to a central concept of "traditional" Kabyle social organization.[84] Also, they excused the complete absence of women in the movement as in the "arouch's tradition."

What Harbi stated about the inner life of the FLN in 1954 still held for Algerian party politics five decades later: "What one finds here are relations of power and influence in which personal relations and family and regional ties fuse. It is less a matter of pure political relations than of community relations expressed in a modern language."[85] In Algerian politics, even in the early 2000s, one did not find figures such as Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri or former Polish presidential candidate Stanislaw Tyminski or former Estonian foreign minister Tom Ilves—men who had made their careers or their fortunes outside their country and could at least initially operate outside traditional social and economic networks. Ministers who earlier had an impressive career in international organizations—for example, Hamid Temmar, privatization minister, and Chakib Khalil, energy and mines minister—and a clear and radical reform vision were immediately initiated into "clans," in these cases, Bouteflika's, which made them targets of his foes and subject to his maneuvering and efforts to duck reforms.

In view of the importance of patronage networks and informal structures for the stability of formal political structures in Algeria, it can be argued that the nature of the country's economy was a prime reason for sys-

tem continuity. The Algerian economy in the early 2000s remained one of rent distribution and informal exchange rather than of production: 97 percent of export revenues came from the hydrocarbon sector, imports offered a prime opportunity for quick and big money, and the informal economy (consisting also primarily of import and distribution) constituted up to 30 percent of the country's GDP.[86] The hydrocarbon rent allowed the ruling elite to sustain distribution networks[87] and to buy allegiances and loyalty from a substantial number of Algerians.[88] The hydrocarbon rent, moreover, helped to finance military repression of insurgencies, to "penetrate civil society" (as one young RND cadre and head of a large regime-founded NGO bluntly put it), and to alleviate the most potentially explosive social misery. Oil (or gas) thus could be said to have turned control of the state into a zero-sum struggle.[89] This raised the stakes for incumbents as well as for contesting elites and was not likely to allow for "a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each others' corporate autonomies or vital interests."[90]

Perspectives for Change

Analysis of the Algerian politically relevant elite in the decade after the 1992 coup d'état leads to the conclusion that dynamics and changes within it did not translate into policy shifts indicative of a system change. Instead, change guaranteed systemic continuity; the same patterns of domination persisted despite the surfacing of a number of actors with substantial veto and nuisance power, generational change giving rise to a young reform-oriented elite type, and increasing disunity within the core elite. Core elite strategies, recruitment policies, as well as structural factors external to these elites explained this dynamic.

First, changes among the elite linked to political and economic liberalization created a release, allowing contesting elites some influence and giving potentially frustrated young elites hope for long-awaited upward mobility through co-optation. Obviously, the ruling elite was not able to fully control the dynamics arising from its liberalization policies; the Berber movement, the press, and the Islamist Islah became stronger and more independent than (presumably) expected, but core elite policies largely succeeded in preventing the formation of a broad coalition of contesting elites by successfully playing on regional and tribal divides, historic rivalries, ethnic sentiments, linguistic rifts, and religious-secular divides in the PRE. Second, though generational changes within the PRE gave rise to young elites, the ruling elite only enabled a few unrepresented or underrepresented social segments and groups to enter. Most young members of the elite were the offspring of the nomenklatura and the privileged, a phenomenon

that resulted from the Arabization policy as well as the monopolization of historical legitimacy by incumbent elites and the conversion of this legitimacy into an inheritable symbolic capital. Even though many of these young elites had a clear vision of the country's structural problems and a reform agenda, they were not willing to push such a program if it entailed jeopardizing the social and economic networks and clientelist structures of which they were a part. Finally, sociocultural practices, the hydrocarbon rent, and market reforms benefited the current ruling elites and their clients.[91] They allowed the highly personalized networks and blurred boundaries between the military, political, bureaucratic, and economic spheres as well as between formal and informal institutions to be sustained.

The situation, however, was not static. Constant struggles shifted the balance of power between factions within the PRE, and the elites were vulnerable to external influence and pressures. As discussed above, Algeria's joining NATO's Mediterranean Dialog and international human rights campaigns had an effect on elite strategies. In an era in which the United States considers outside intervention for regime change legitimate and in which the arm of international justice seems to reach into more and more areas of the world, Algerian core elites thus are likely to be forced to make more political concessions in the future. It can, moreover, be expected that pressures arising from the association agreement with the European Union and membership negotiations with the WTO will push Algeria's elites to implement the reforms nationalist reformers thought necessary but hesitated to push through because of resistance and fear of losing out—namely those involving transparency, accountability, rule of law, demonopolization of the economy, and protection of civil liberties. Most likely, substantial political and economic changes in the short and medium term will come about only if pressure coincides with further core elite disunity (leading to implosion), a fall in hydrocarbon revenues (making it difficult to maintain the distributive networks), and popular uprisings that extend beyond one region and shake the whole country.[92] In 1988, when oil prices and unrest came into play, the government decided to push ahead with reforms. A confluence of all the factors above, resulting in such a push in the future, is, however, unlikely.

Even when Algeria's system is shaken, it is questionable whether the outcome will be more democratic. The rentier structures, the fractionalized nature of Algerian society, the dominance of personalized vertical networks preventing the development of a horizontal (class) conscience, and the absence of strong state institutions that are insulated in a Weberian sense might perpetuate the current pattern of simply reproducing similar political elites and structures. Moreover, as long as most formal institutions work according to informal (personalized) rules and remain weak, and as long as civil unrest and low-level (Islamist) violence prevail, the army as the most

cohesive and well structured institution will be able to present itself as the indispensable backbone of the state and use the prospect of internal disorder to justify its presence in state affairs.[93] It is, hence, likely that what may appear to be a transition from authoritarianism will merely lead from one variant of authoritarianism to another, and possibly a more competitive one.

Notes

I would like to thank Miriam R. Lowi and Oliver Schlumberger for important comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

1. For an excellent analysis of the elite of the war and the early years of independence, see Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership;* for elites under Boumedienne, see Zartman, "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite"; under Boumedienne and Chadli, see Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power." For general postindependence developments as well as elite struggles over competing projects, see also Hidouci, *Algérie: la libération inachevée.*

2. In October 1988 Algeria witnessed uprisings in many parts of the country. The army responded with a brutal crackdown, leaving hundreds dead. These events propelled Chadli and the reformers around him to push political reforms. In 1989 a new constitution was adopted in a referendum, ending single-party rule, permitting the formation of associations of a political nature, and allowing freedom of expression and of assembly. These reforms marked the beginning of a democratization process.

3. For an excellent account of the war, see Martinez, *La guerre civile.*

4. For example, O'Donnell et al., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule;* Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market.*

5. Quandt, "Algeria's Uneasy Peace," p. 19.

6. Burton and Higley, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations," p. 182.

7. Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership;* Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power"; Zartman, "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite."

8. The sources on which this analysis is based are three: (1) in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in Algeria in 2001 and 2002 with ninety-two members of the PRE, including retired generals, Prime Minister Ali Benflis, former prime ministers and current ministers, party leaders, MPs, administrative cadres, and party, union, business, media, and NGO representatives; (2) data on the career trajectories of individual elites from questionnaires handed out to interview partners and from the print media; and (3) analysis of decisionmaking processes based on data from interviews and print media on positions and strategies of key players vis-à-vis the strategic issues of economic reform, education sector reform, and democratization.

9. The term "system change" is used here in the sense of the transition literature, that is, it refers to the transition from one type of polity (authoritarianism) to a different type of polity (democracy). System reform, as used in this chapter, means adaptations within the existing system.

10. With no existing or accessible polling data on this generation, the primary bases for analysis were fifty-two interviews with elites born after 1960 that focused on socioeconomic and educational background, political socialization, career patterns, networks, positions on strategic issues, and perceptions of the country's biggest problems as well as solutions for these problems.

11. Zartman, "The Algerian Army in Politics"; Yefsah, "L'armée et le pouvoir en Algérie."

12. The presidency is used here as a collective, including not only the president but also his closest and most powerful advisors.

13. Since *le pouvoir* is also used to describe a system of domination, *les décideurs* shall be used here for the primary decisionmakers.

14. The choice of Bouteflika, for instance, entailed drawn out, heated negotiations among the decisionmakers.

15. For short biographies of many of the elites discussed in this chapter, see Cheurfi, "La classe politique algérienne."

16. Many of them were not literate in Arabic. General Mohamed Lamari, at his first press conference in July 2002, switched to French after half a sentence even when the questions asked were in Arabic.

17. While there were statutes governing retirement (*statut de retraite*) for army officers, the regulations did not apply to generals, who could stay in office as long as they wanted. Hence, widespread rumors seemed credible that a wave of frustrated colonels in their late forties and early fifties took early retirement in 2001 and 2002 because they saw no prospects for advancement.

18. General-major ranks above a general and is the second highest rank in Algeria. The highest is general of the army corps, a rank awarded only to Mohamed Lamari.

19. *Le Matin*, 14 December 2002.

20. The army said it objected to the president trying to build a network based on regional affiliations. Both candidates for defense came from the town of Nedroma in Tlemcen, the province from which Bouteflika's family hailed.

21. The Concorde Civile is a law ratified in a 1999 referendum. It foresaw a treaty with armed groups that put down their weapons and amnesty, probation, or mild punishment for members of these groups (depending on their individual actions).

22. A case in point is the privatization of state-owned industries, where intraelite struggles presented a major obstacle to this process. See Werenfels, "Obstacles to Privatization."

23. In April 2001 the brutal killing of a young Kabyle in a gendarmerie station in Kabylia sparked uprisings and riots in the entire region. More than one hundred Kabyle youth were shot dead by security forces. These events led to the emergence of a protest movement with coherent political demands. Demonstrations, riots, and sit-ins were still taking place in Kabylia as of early 2003.

24. Karabadji, "L'économie algérienne"; Tlemcani, *Etat, bazar et globalisation.*

25. *Le Matin*, 7 September 2002, and 14 December 2002.

26. Another part of the army's public relations campaign was an October 2002 international symposium on terrorism at which several generals for the first time talked publicly about the confrontations with the Islamists, trying to justify army policies.

27. See *Le Matin*, 22 December 2002.

28. Benflis's relations with the most politically relevant generals were reputed to be better than Bouteflika's relations with them, making Benflis a possible army candidate and Bouteflika competitor in the 2004 presidential race. This was rumored to have caused friction between Bouteflika and Benflis.

29. These were the Senate, installed in 1997, and the Assemblée Populaire Nationale.

30. Bouteflika surrounded himself with close to thirty advisors, most formally appointed, several, including his two brothers, brought in informally, with a majori-

ty coming from western Algeria. With the formally nominated advisors having status equal to that of ministers, it could be argued that Bouteflika formed a shadow cabinet, based on primordial (familial, tribal, or regional) ties and consisting of some of his advisors and some members of the official cabinet.

31. For more on the co-optation of MSP, see Hamladji, "Cooptation, Repression and an Authoritarian Regime's Survival."

32. Elite profiles and recruitment dynamics in the upper echelons of the public administration did not differ much from those in the government. The transition from the revolutionary generation to the second generation was ongoing, and recruitment similarly personalized. Historic, regional, and family capital as well as competence was also important.

33. There were also women—for example, Khalida Messaoudi, information and culture minister and government spokesperson—but they represented exceptions to the rule.

34. Nedroma has been producing national elites for decades (see Gilbert Grandguillaume, *Nédroma: l'évolution d'une médina*), but after the arrival of Bouteflika it was possible to speak of a powerful "Nedroma clan."

35. The MALG was the predecessor of the Sécurité Militaire and continued to constitute an important network. Of the roughly 500 "Malgache" alive in 2002, six were generals, three ministers, a number were ambassadors, and one was the powerful governor of Algiers.

36. L'association des Ulamas d'Algérie, a force during the early days of the independence struggle, lost political importance after independence but remained an important solidarity network. See M. Haddab, "Pour une approche structurale du champ des élites en Algérie" (unpublished paper, University of Algiers, 2000).

37. Nuisance power refers to the ability to be a thorn in the side of the core elite and thus influence certain of their decisions.

38. It involved allowing foreign companies to become majority stockholders in hydrocarbon exploitation, something hitherto reserved for the state company, Sonatrach.

39. The first draft of the proposed 2003 finance law heavily favored large importers.

40. See *Le Monde*, 1 March 2003 and 21 March 2003. This son of a former minister and Malgache moved within seven years from owner of a pharmacy to head of Algeria's largest business empire, which included a private bank and an airline. See *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 18 July 2002.

41. The term *famille révolutionnaire* was coined by Zeroual in the mid-1990s in an effort to rally all non-Islamist forces under an umbrella of nationalism and homage to the revolution.

42. Among these privileges were a yearly pension of between 92,000 DA ($1,196) and 620,000 DA ($8,065), a right to a duty-free car import, and, until the 1990s, the right to a taxi license.

43. *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 20 April 2002.

44. Roy, "Patronage and Solidarity Groups."

45. Many of the large Algerian NGOs fell into what Sheila Carapico calls GO-NGOs, or government-organized NGOs. See Carapico, "NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs."

46. These parties, for instance, forced onto the agenda the sensitive issue of the missing (Islamists) of the civil war.

47. Hachemaoui, "La représentation politique en Algérie," presents an excellent analysis of what he terms "jeu social," that is, the logics of identification, solidarity ties, strategies, and modes of representation of actors.

48. See, for instance, François Gèze, "Algérie, la violence d'état reste aux commandes," *Politis*, 20 December 2001.

49. *Arouch* means "tribes" in Maghrebi Arabic and is used also to refer to specific traditional forms of social organization at the local level.

50. The CADC was an umbrella organization consisting of different local and regional committees, including revitalized (or reinvented) traditional village committees as well as newer urban neighborhood and administrative district committees.

51. Had the state refused to do so, it would have further reduced the ruling elites' legitimacy and raised (repression) costs for the state.

52. This platform, made public in June 2001, consisted of fifteen demands—some political, some economic, some cultural—which, if applied in their entirety, would have implied a change in the rules of domination.

53. Many young Berbers viewed someone like the thirty-something Belaid Abrika, one of the CADC's imprisoned leaders, as more capable at enunciating their socioeconomic and political discontent and championing their identity claims than such political players as the twice-as-old FFS leader Hocine Ait-Ahmed, who lived in Switzerland in exile and was considered to belong to the political establishment.

54. FIS's demands in some respects, such as those concerning the departure of incumbent elites and socioeconomic justice, were similar to those of the CADC.

55. Until the late 1990s journalists were killed (by whom is not always clear) and after that regularly harassed and jailed. Investigating embezzlement and links between business and terrorism, especially on the local level, was extremely dangerous (see *Liberté*, 23 July 2002). Also, there was indirect intervention in advertising by state enterprises. Moreover, many newspapers were "private" rather than "independent," because their owners had ties to décideurs, and each paper ran relentless campaigns against the foes of its patrons.

56. It is, however, highly unlikely that the press was acting entirely on its own. Rather, it was used by Betchine's foes to dispose of him.

57. Souaidia, *La sale guerre*. For a décideur's account of the violence in the 1990s and the court case, see Nezzar and Maarfia, *Un procès pour la vérite*.

58. This is obvious from long-term analysis of the media and was confirmed in interviews with journalists in this situation.

59. One example was the RND-backed Association Algérienne pour la Promotion de la Citoyenneté et les Droits de l'Homme (founded in 2002), which had no interest in defending Islamists.

60. The Algerian décideurs dismissed the mediation as outside intervention.

61. For a definition of rentier states and mechanisms of distribution, see Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States."

62. *Le Matin*, 25 and 26 January 2002.

63. The increasing involvement of such international governmental and non-governmental institutions as the National Democracy Institute (in Washington, D.C.) and German political foundations supporting regime and opposition forces tended to enforce rather than counter core elite policies and is worth being studied in depth.

64. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, p. 309.

65. Burton and Higley, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations."

66. Harbi, *Une vie debout*, p. 328. See also ibid., and Quandt, *Revolution and Political Leadership*, for political socialization, trajectories, and ideal types in the different (age) groups within what are here somewhat crudely referred to as the generation of the revolution and the older and younger brothers.

67. Because scholarships were given by various ministries as well as enter-

prises, such as Sonatrach, it was difficult to obtain absolute numbers. Entelis, "Technocratic Rule, Military Power," p. 104, speaks of 2,500 Algerian students in 1977–1978 at U.S. colleges alone, most of whom can be assumed to have had state scholarships.

68. Zartman, "Algeria: A Post-Revolutionary Elite," p. 279.

69. Boudiaf was killed by one of his security guards. An official inquiry concluded that the killer had acted alone on behalf of Islamists. Boudiaf's family claimed (and most Algerians believed) that he was killed by "the generals," among other things because of his inquiries into their corruption networks.

70. *Le Quotidien d'Oran*, 17 December 2002.

71. As Harbi, *Une vie debout*, and others have noted, many of the revolution's leaders came from privileged families, that is, social elites under colonialism.

72. Cadres of independent unions, for example, the Syndicat Autonome des Personnels de l'Administration Publique (SNAPAP), were only temporarily able to enter the politically relevant elite. Even though these unions were barred from certain sectors, including the state economic sector, and though the UGTA remained the government's prime and often sole interlocutor, their membership rolls and popular support continued to rise, and their young, dynamic cadres managed to put issues neglected by the UGTA and its organizations on the public agenda.

73. Bourdieu, *La réproduction*.

74. Entelis, "Algeria: Technocratic Rule, Military Power," p. 111.

75. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, pp. 305–312.

76. These included political socialization, perceptions of the country's problems, attitudes vis-à-vis the above-mentioned three strategic issues—market and education sector reforms as well as democratization—as well as economic, social, and cultural factors that shaped elite behavior.

77. Based on interviews with members of the PRE born after 1960.

78. By October 2002, of three members of the UNJA executive interviewed in April 2002, one was an advisor to a minister, one was president of the council for a large Algiers neighborhood, and one had managed to get reelected to parliament even though more than 80 percent of former MPs were not reelected.

79. Several nationalist reformers interviewed showed great respect for such authoritarian leaders as South Korea's Gen. Park Chung Hee and Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who managed to push through economic reforms and lead their countries to (relative) prosperity.

80. Hachemaoui, "La représentation politique en Algérie," offers an outstanding account of such giving and taking, based on a microanalysis of transactions between individual actors, party apparatuses, intermediaries, formal and informal, local and central authorities during election campaigns.

81. Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, p. 148.

82. See ibid., note 4, and Higley and Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation*.

83. A marabout is a local religious leader to whom supernatural powers are ascribed.

84. For the centrality of the sentiment of honor in Kabyle social organization, see Bourdieu, "The Sentiment of Honour."

85. "On y trouve des rapports de pouvoir et d'influence où se mêlent relations personnelles, liens familiaux et régionaux. Il s'agit moins de rapports purement politiques que de rapports communautaires exprimés dans un langage moderne." Harbi, *Une vie debout*, p. 207.

86. *North Africa Journal*, 2 December 2002.

87. When these networks were in danger of collapsing because of low oil prices, IMF intervention and debt rescheduling in 1994 rescued the system and allowed continued distribution to regime-supporting segments of society.

88. According to "Algeria's Economy: The Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence," *ICG Africa Report*, October 2001, up to 800,000 Algerians were estimated to profit from patronage systems (though not all necessarily are linked to the oil rent). Algerian scholars and elites interviewed by this author, however, estimated these figures to be much higher.

89. M. R. Lowi, "Algeria, 1992–2002: Toward a Political Economy of Violence" (manuscript on file, 2002), convincingly argues that oil has raised the stakes of fighting between incumbent elites and Islamist insurgents and has thus contributed to prolonging the civil war.

90. O' Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, pp. 37–38.

91. For ways in which market reforms have done this, see Werenfels, "Obstacles to Privatization."

92. Most members of the young elite seemed convinced that violence in the form of popular uprisings rather than negotiations would lead to system change.

93. Quandt, "Algeria's Uneasy Peace," p. 20.

11

Elite Change and Systems Maintenance

Volker Perthes

Elites matter. They certainly factor into the political and social developments that the Arab world will undergo in the coming decades. This may not be a particularly surprising conclusion—one would hardly expect a study focusing on elites to come to a different one—but it should be kept in mind theoretically and practically in regard to international cooperation with Arab countries. Although actors and their behavior cannot be examined in a meaningful way devoid of structural and institutional contexts, these "factors constitute at most constraints to that which is possible under a concrete historical situation."[1] Put somewhat differently, "institutional mechanisms do much to pattern the channels and ways in which elites compete and are recruited," but elites also "play a seminal role in shaping institutional designs."[2]

The structural and institutional contexts in most of the Arab world, as the case studies in this volume underline, are shaped by the prevalence of autocratic rule. This refers not so much to the more or less authoritarian constitutions, as to the underlying structures of dominance embodied in what is often referred to as the "security state," the political economy particular to the Arab world, regional structures (especially the prevalence of the Arab-Israeli conflict and other territorial conflicts), as well as, of course, the changing international environment (not the least of which currently involves the forces of economic globalization).

The availability of oil rents remains the most salient feature of the regional political economy; despite decreasing oil prices, oil revenues still amounted to between 48 percent and 59 percent of the cumulated budgets of *all* Arab states during 1995 to 2000.[3] Rent income enables core elites to establish clientelistic relationships with elites in the second or third circles, to buy-off contesting elites, and to maintain substantial autonomy from business and labor. Although the relation between rent income and political competitiveness is neither direct nor mechanical, it cannot be ignored: No

one should be surprised that Bahrain (on which there is no case study in this book), the Gulf monarchy the least dependent on oil income, has advanced the furthest in pluralizing its system. The political opening in Algeria at the end of the 1980s was also linked to a steep decrease in oil income, and Saudi Arabia's gradual reforms are linked to the realization that the "days of abundant oil revenues are over and will not return," as Crown Prince Abdallah has stated.[4] A relative decline in oil income provides independent elites, primarily in the third circle, with the opportunity to make their voices heard, but it does not determine the balance of power within a given country's politically relevant elite .

Within these contexts, elites undergo change in their composition as well as in how they present themselves and in what actions they take. As noted, change has spread wider or deeper in some countries than in others. Young leaders who inherited their power have tended to liberate themselves from the influence of many of those people their fathers relied on while retaining some as long as they feel that they need their experience. In all of the Arab states examined, structural change has mainly occurred and—we suggest—will continue to occur primarily in the third circle, where members of political factions or social groups previously without representation in the PRE establish footholds. This is to be expected considering the rather gradual and controlled mode of elite circulation among Arab PRE at this stage. Here, in the third circle of influence, those who are co-opted by the core and those who try to force themselves on the incumbent elite through participation in elections, civil society activities, protest, or lobbying, meet. Here also, in most of the countries, one finds contesting elites and politicians, rather than technocrats or those politicos who "live from politics."

An increasing proportion of politicians in the PRE can generally be taken as a sign that a system is becoming more competitive. While this is not the case in most of the countries studied here, recruitment from parliament has increased in many cases. Given the debates in not a few countries about the importance of parliaments or consultative councils, such assemblies appear likely to increasingly become more important as elite incubators.

In all of the Arab countries, a large number of PRE newcomers bring with them new qualifications. In general, wherever changing economic, technical, or even political parameters, such as the spread of new communications technologies or the privatization of public services, open new fields of activity, doors are also opened to emerging elites. Economic elites will gain in importance as the countries of the Middle East and North Africa prepare to join the WTO, enter into association agreements with the European Union, and otherwise simply fulfill the need to encourage export-oriented industries in order to provide jobs to youthful majorities, fill state coffers with tax income, and obtain foreign exchange for imports.

Economic necessity thus becomes a major factor in elite change. In most of these countries, business elites currently coexist with the regime elites, rather than, for the time being at least, entering into struggles for political power. Gradually, however, they will become indispensable, so it seems, and will be asked to enter the fold rather than interjecting themselves into it.

At the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, gradualism and, for the most part, peacefulness were and remain the prevalent modes of elite change in the Arab world. Certainly, the civil wars in Lebanon and Algeria contributed to sociopolitical changes in these two countries. In Lebanon, however, where the war ended more than a decade ago, most of the war elite—militia leaders recycled as politicians—have been quietly sidelined in the postwar transition period.[5] In Algeria, core and second-circle elites were rejuvenated, but not exchanged during the civil war. At any rate, although there are exceptions to the general mode of gradual and peaceful elite change in the Arab countries—the obvious case being that of regime-change-by-invasion in Iraq—this trend contrasts sharply with the historical experiences of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, when revolutionary or putschist takeovers led to wide-ranging and structural changes of the core elite and its associated circles in so many Arab countries.

Gradualism, here, indicates that change, where it occurs, is steered and largely controlled from the core. In this respect, there is little difference between the republics and the monarchies of the Arab world. Rather, one could speak of signs of convergence: While the monarchies are broadening their societal base and their PRE through the establishment of parliaments or assemblies, not a few of the republican systems have tried to develop a hereditary legitimacy rooted, partly at least, in the blood relationship between would-be successors and long-standing leaders. This phenomenon has arisen at a time when the historical achievements of these regimes, or what has been celebrated as such over years and decades—Algeria's liberation, the 1952 revolution and others, the October War, and various "corrective" movements—have faded and fail to motivate the younger generations.

In the future, even where change at the top and in the core elite is mainly a matter of rejuvenation or generation change, new patterns of behavior and style are likely to emerge. Morocco, Jordan, and Syria all provide examples of top officials displaying more openness and transparency in dealing with the media and the public. These include such occurrences as the unprecedented public presentation of the wife of the Moroccan king or, somewhat ironically perhaps, the announcement by Syria's state news agency of the arrest of opposition figures. Socialized with satellite television and the Internet, younger members of these countries' political elite seem not to share the secretiveness of their predecessors with regard to issues of public interest. One can assume that such lim-

ited and symbolic steps toward transparency will create expectations for more openness.

Also, as noted, the biological rejuvenation of leadership elites has led to policy changes, particularly in the economic realm, and to a partial exchange of elite segments with others. Similar processes are likely to take place in countries on the verge of change at the level of the top decisionmaker.

What one should not expect is that succession at the top—so much the focus of media attention concerning Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and other states—will lead to system change. In many cases, successions in Arab countries will bring about new *regimes*, but not a different regime *type*. Iraq under foreign occupation might take a different path, but the German or Japanese post–World War II model of a U.S.-led system transformation is not, in this author's judgment, the most likely scenario. A post-Arafat and independent Palestinian state may become a more democratic model than the one developed under the Oslo Accords because of the combination of external influences and changing balances within the domestic elite.

Most regime elites have so far managed to retain control of the mechanisms of domination established in the last three decades or so of the twentieth century. Through these the core maintains regime stability in part by orchestrating elite change—or, more precisely, the circulation and rejuvenation of the wider PRE. Thus co-optation prevails over competitive modes of elite recruitment. As a result, the political elites of most Arab states have become more representative; but what we are seeing emerge is a form of representation without (or with only limited and controlled) competition.

The co-optation and integration of aspirants to positions of (greater) responsibility and of some contestants may actually reduce or neutralize demands for more competition. Co-optation—in contrast to negotiated pacts, as in ideal-type democratic transitions—is of individuals, not of segments or entire networks that could establish themselves as alternatives to incumbents. Co-opted individuals are more easily integrated into the system and may thereby be neutralized as challengers.

Some regimes also resort to "fake competition,"[6] which is based around core-created or core-sponsored alternative parties or networks that give the impression of a competitive political system. This allows for a broadening of the PRE and the recruitment of new talent without threatening core elite control.

Almost all regimes will continue to seek new rent income in order to buy the allegiance or at least the consent of a silent majority (or maybe the silence of that majority). Although new and future regime elites must take into consideration somewhat heightened international sensitivities toward violence against political competitors and challengers, open repression

remains an employable last resort. The instruments of the security state have been maintained all over the region.

Based on the empirical research in this volume, it is safe to assert that thoroughgoing institutional and political changes in Arab countries should not be expected, barring some sort of change in the relative influence among the PRE—specifically a decrease in the ability of the prime decisionmaker and core elite to control elite recruitment and hinder more competitive forms of elite circulation and change.

External interference and pressure may be successful if they are applied to elite strategies. They are likely to yield only limited success (at best) if their purpose is to bring about a change in leadership or the exchange of an entire elite. In both cases, such tactics create fears among incumbent elites about the stability of their regimes. Rather than encouraging political openings, these fears are likely to strengthen a prevalent autocratic elite consensus on the necessity of maintaining stability, or the status quo.

Such a consensus already exists in many Arab countries. As the case of Morocco illustrates, it may include some of the main opposition parties and thereby effectively marginalize the rest of the opposition.[7] Consensus on the rules of the game allow for economic adjustment and modernization, for the gradual rejuvenation of the elite—whereby new elements better equipped to respond to new challenges are brought in—and for successions and generation change, which can spare a country the types of divisions that can lead to major disturbances, including civil war. It is a consensus, however, that allows for modest institutional development at best, and is therefore likely to disappoint some constituencies, domestically and abroad, that expected deeper political systems change.

To date, such expectations, particularly in Western policymaking and media circles, have not been based on realism. Why, one might ask, should anyone expect a leader who has just inherited power to share it or risk it through democratic elections, unless forced to do so through constitutional or other constraints? Why should the advisors of that heir, and second-circle elites who owe their positions to him, urge him to open the political system and hold elections that would allow others to compete for the positions that they have just obtained?[8]

Conventional Western thinking may also have overrated the importance of youth and exposure to the West. First, exposure to the West is not a new phenomenon. Quite a number of elder technocratic elites obtained their expertise abroad; some of the prime decisionmakers of the outgoing generation were trained at Sandhurst or the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris—as opposed to Harvard Business School or the École Nationale d'Administration more en vogue today. Second, time spent in the West, although an interesting and attractive subject to the media, obviously does

not necessarily transform an heir apparent into a committed democrat. A future leader trained in, for example, a London clinic may well develop ideas about the efficacy of technology and efficiency and be inspired by British hospital organization; as head of state, however, he may then take the latter such forms of organization, rather than Westminster democracy, as a model for organizing "his" state.

Perhaps what must be realized is that elite change in autocratic systems should not be confused with "transition to" a new system. This applies not only to Arab states, but also to such cases as Turkmenistan, Belarus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and others. In the Arab states, which provide an empirical basis for this book, the ruling elites have proved to be proficient at system maintenance. Although in many cases they have been less successful at providing services to citizens, their ability to preserve their regimes, which includes maintaining domestic stability, is a fact appreciated by many, including members of the business and intellectual elites and members of the wage-earning middle classes who in other respects may have second thoughts about these regimes and their policies.

Core elite strategies in most Arab countries have been increasingly influenced by inputs from and developments in their international environment. Consider, among others, the prospects of EU association or WTO membership; media globalization; international human rights campaigns; and more recently of course the geopolitical revolution brought about by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. While they could not escape the international context, these core elites have adapted to it, not least so by their management—or manipulation—of elite change. Elite circulation has thereby been used quite successfully for the modernization of policies and style, and the reproduction of power structures.

Research can be misleading if its analysis of Arab elites and change, or the potential for change in the Arab states, is gauged solely by the question of whether these elites have "succeeded" or will be able to succeed in bringing about a transition from autocratic rule to some form of democratic system. Such change may not be their goal. Arab PRE have proved themselves quite successful at developing a "type of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization,"[9] a type one might call liberalized autocracy or pluralistic authoritarianism[10] and is here to stay for some time.

The political role of elites remains crucial, nonetheless. During the 1990s hopes rose that in the Arab world democracies would emerge "without democrats."[11] There should today be little expectation of that happening if the "powerful" are not also "committed to the democratic project."[12] With limited external and societal pressures, and quite workable regime maintenance strategies, even emerging Arab elites will not automatically develop such a commitment. This is not to say that Arab countries are

immune to democracy or addicted to despotism. The modernizing young and emerging elites are certainly not principally or ideologically antidemocratic. Given an uncertain future and a rapidly changing international environment, however, they may simply find their interests better served by not rocking the boat.

Notes

1. Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of Transition," p. 48.
2. Higley and Lengyel, "Elite Configuration After State Socialism," p. 8.
3. League of Arab States, Consolidated Arab Economic Report, 2001, p. 328.
4. *Financial Times*, 1 December 1999.
5. See Rola el-Husseini's chapter on Lebanon in this volume.
6. See Isabelle Werenfels's chapter on Algeria in this volume.
7. See Saloua Zerhouni's chapter on Morocco in this volume.
8. See, similarly, Carapico, "Successions, Transitions, Coups, and Revolutions."
9. Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," p. 56; see also Schlumberger, "Transition in the Arab World."
10. For more, see Perthes, *Geheime Gärten*, pp. 347–368.
11. Salameh, *Democracy Without Democrats*.
12. McFaul, "Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship."

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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND*

THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoretical significance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusing on the political dynamics of the radical change in Iran's societal structure of domination and the moral dynamics of reintegration and collective action that accompany it. The political dynamics of revolution primarily explain the collapse of the structure of domination, while the moral dynamics of revolution underlie its teleology—i.e., its direction and consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution, revolutionary ideology assumes primary importance.

Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutions occur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structure of domination" to refer to the prevalent system of authority. It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern revolutions, but it also includes other institutions and corporate entities that have some measure of autonomous authority in the religious, judiciary, or economic spheres. The most important of these other institutions is usually the hierocracy—i.e., the church or its equivalent.

Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance. The dislocated groups and individuals need to be reintegrated into societal community and may also demand inclusion in political society. The integrative social and political movements that arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributing factor to the occurrence of revolutions.

The collapse of the societal structure of domination in revolutions is caused by two sets of factors: the structure's internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and the concerted action of the social groups and individuals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the context of the power struggle set in motion by the centralization of the state. They

* This paper was completed at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and has benefited from the comments of the fellow members of the Social Sciences Seminar for 1984-85. Of the colleagues and friends who have commented on earlier drafts of this paper, I especially wish to thank Lewis Coser, Jack Goldstone, Juan Linz, and James Rule.

may also have moral motives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocation and normative disturbance. In addition, there may be other motives, such as class interest. The degree of cohesion and solidarity within each social group is a primary determinant of its capacity for collective action; the possibility of successful revolutionary action usually depends on the formation of coalitions among opposing social groups. All of the above factors provide important points of reference for comparisons regarding the *causes and preconditions* of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Revolutions can and should be compared in terms not only of their causes and preconditions, but also of their consequences. Those integrative social movements which successfully build on the preconditions of social dislocation and moral disorder to create revolutionary movements do so by using ideology as an instrument. The ideologies that set the revolutionary struggle in motion and are shaped in its course bridge the gap between the causes and the consequences of revolutions. They cannot account for the collapse of the societal structure of domination to any significant degree. On the other hand, the value-ideas that form their normative foundation, and are often progressively defined and formulated during the revolutionary process, *do* shape the political order installed by the revolution to a significant extent.

A comparative analysis of the *teleology* of the Islamic Revolution thus requires a serious and systematic analysis of revolutionary *ideologies*. The modern political myth of revolution and the various ideologies onto which it has been grafted in the past two centuries have constituted a causal factor in motivating revolutionary opposition to the status quo, but it would be a serious mistake to stop the analysis there. Ideologies are of primary theoretical interest in that their constitutive value-ideas determine the teleologies of the respective revolutions.[1] The nature and specific content of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologies therefore supply the basic points of reference for comparison with the teleology of the Islamic Revolution. These latter comparisons enable us to assess the distinct significance of Iran's Islamic Revolution in world history.

I. The Causes and Preconditions of the Islamic Revolution

A. The Collapse of the Monarchy

The emphasis of recent scholarship on the role of the state, its repressive capacity, and its ability to weather serious crises has brought

[1] The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintended consequences of rev-

out the fact that revolutions often owe their success more to the internal breakdown and paralysis of the state than to the power of revolutionary groups.[2] It has been argued that the decisive factor in the occurrence of a revolution is the fragility of the existing political system.[3] Centralization of monarchical states reduces the degree of pluralism in society and increases its political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person. De Tocqueville, who considered that hatred of the Old Regime dominated all other passions throughout the French Revolution, also showed how that hatred became fatally focused on a single person, the king: "To see in him the common enemy was the passionate agreement that grew."[4] The same can be said about the Shah, whose ouster was the one common demand that brought together almost all of the disparate sections of Iranian society. Furthermore, the same property of the monarchical system in Iran goes a long way toward explaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarch and the Shah's counter-image.

The type of political regime we might call "neopatrimonial" is also characterized by its fragility. In contrast to the ideal-type of the absolutist state in which the king is the first servant of the state, government is extremely personal in patrimonial states. The chief executive encourages divisions within the army and the political elite in order to rule. Such neopatrimonial states are particularly subject to collapse and ensuing revolution once the ruler breaks down.[5] The Mexican Revolution that was set in motion by the death of Porfirio Díaz in 1911, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions, can be cited in support of this proposition. In his regime, the Shah combined the weaknesses of the neopatrimonial states with the old vulnerabilities of monarchy.[6] He had painstakingly constructed the machinery of the state around his person; there can be no doubt that the collapse of the man preceded the collapse of the machine. This collapse was evident in the Shah's pervasive wa-

olutions and confine the points of comparison to those consequences that are prefigured in the goals of the historical actors who eventually appropriate the revolution.

[2] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, 1983), 309-14.

[3] Jean Baechler, *Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

[4] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineanu*, ed. and trans. by John Lukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 82, 109.

[5] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978); Jack A. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 8 (1982), 196-97.

[6] The Shah was aware of these vulnerabilities, and, in 1978, knowing he had cancer, began trying to make the regime more "democratic" for the succession of his son. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein & Day, 1980).

vering and indecision (for example, he could not make up his mind to appoint a prime minister for the liberal, nationalist opposition until it was far too late), in his inconsistent combination of rewards and threats, and in his highly inhibited use of force.[7]

The neopatrimonial character of his state notwithstanding, the Shah did have a disciplined and well-equipped army and police force. He simply refused to use them effectively to repress the revolutionary movement. The Shah pretended to be using the army. He declared martial law in some cities in late summer of 1978 and installed a military government in November. But after the Black Friday massacre of September 8, 1978, he had muffled the army, to the outrage of his generals. This is reflected in low casualties, about 250 in the September 8 massacre, about 750 in Tehran in the following five months, and probably three times this figure for the whole of Iran. On December 21, 1978, the Prime Minister, General Azhari—after a mild heart attack and from his bed—complained to the American ambassador of the demoralization of the army which he attributed to the Shah's orders forbidding the troops to fire except in the air, no matter how badly abused or pressed. "You must know this and you must tell it to your government. This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind."[8]

Unlike the Czar's troops in 1917, the Shah's army remained largely intact and loyal until he departed on January 16, 1979. Khomeini's leaflets were distributed among the soldiers. There were instances of fraternization with the demonstrators and of desertion; twelve officers were killed by three rebellious soldiers of the Imperial Guard; a mutiny occurred in Tabriz in December; and there were a number of other minor incidents. There was also persistent trouble with paramilitary technicians of the Air Force, known as the Homafaran. But overall, the strain of confrontation with the people did not seriously affect the morale and discipline of the armed forces. It was only *after* the Shah's departure that the process of disintegration of the army under political pressure set in seriously. I do not wish to assert that the use of the army for massive repression would have prevented the revolution. We will never know what would have happened if the Shah had ordered his forces to be brutally repressive in October and November 1978, when they were not yet affected by the revolutionary turmoil. The army might or might

[7] *Ibid.*, 168-71; William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 190; Jerrold J. Green, *Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 92-124.

[8] Sullivan (fn. 7), 212. The figures for Tehran are taken from a Master's thesis for Tehran University supervised by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf. I am grateful to Dr. Ashraf for this information.

not have disintegrated or split; the fact remains that it had not disintegrated by January 16, 1979. And the opposition knew it.[9]

The army's officers had a strong sense of professional identity, but no attachment to any particular solidary social group or any organized interests. Furthermore, the Shah had carefully chosen his top generals to assure they could not act in concert against him, and he had succeeded in that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not let them. They could not act against him, but neither could they act for themselves or any other group. In desperation, some of them finally made a deal with the clerical opposition. Tilly has correctly emphasized the importance of coalitions linking revolutionary challengers to the military.[10] Although the term coalition would be too strong, the agreement worked out by Bazargan and Beheshti through the mediation of the American ambassador with a number of the generals was of crucial importance in bringing about a split in the army and its consequent neutralization in February 1979.[11]

If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army was intact, despite the fact that there was no defeat in war, and despite the fact that the state faced no financial crisis and no peasant insurrections, where does all this leave the usual generalizations about revolutions? Mostly in the pits. War has been called the midwife of revolution, and peasant insurrections are considered indispensable in many currently fashionable theories of revolution.[12] The inferences we can draw from the case of Iran are as follows: financial and fiscal crises—or, for that matter, the extractive capacity of the state and heavy taxation—are not necessary for the occurrence of revolution. It is possible for the societal structure of domination to collapse without the participation of the peasantry; and a major war or defeat of the army are not necessary preconditions of revolution. I will show how a political order may collapse without any of these conditions. For now, let us merely note that the Cuban Revolution was an instance of a revolution without a rebellion of the peasantry and without a major defeat in war. Skocpol, whose theory of revolution puts a great deal of emphasis on both these allegedly necessary conditions, cavalierly dismisses Cuba in half a footnote. Furthermore, she does not face the theoretical consequences of the

[9] Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), 142-43.

[10] Tilly (fn. 2), 20.

[11] Sullivan (fn. 7), 199-247.

[12] Skocpol (fn. 2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico," *Theory and Society* 7 (No. 3, 1979), 153; Zimmermann (fn. 2), 315, 322, 336-42, 352-57.

absence of these factors in her subsequent article about the Iranian Revolution. She is rightly determined to bring the state into the picture, but does so in an unsatisfactory way, largely by deploying a new pet phrase, "the rentier state." The basic idea is misleading in that the "rentier state" was actually created by Reza Shah from the early 1920s to 1941, when the revenue received by the state from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in fact small—some 10 to 15 percent of government revenue, and minuscule compared to the oil revenue in the 1970s. She musters a modicum of other plausible but *ad hoc* subsidiary themes to account for the Iranian Revolution. However, Skocpol never faces up to the problem of reconciling the Iranian Revolution with her theoretical schema of 1979.[13]

One generalization is borne out by the revolution in Iran:[14] the Shah was seriously compromised by his close and subservient association with the United States, and the American military and economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization. The antiforeign motive in challenging the legitimacy of the societal structure of domination finds parallels in the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban revolutions, and in East European fascism.

B. THE STATE, THE HIEROCRACY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHI'ITE IRAN

It would be a mistake to equate the societal structure of domination with the state alone. For Max Weber, its major components were the state *and* the church. He defined the two institutions of legitimate authority analogously, and took care to analyze the relationship between the church and civil society when appropriate.[15] This point is significant because the unique feature of Iran's Islamic Revolution is that it is a crucial stage in the conflict between hierocracy and state, while at the same time being a modern political revolution. It is a composite of two phenomena whose counterparts in Western history are separated by centuries. The absolutist states of Europe had already won the protracted contest with the Roman Church before the coming of the early modern European revolutions.[16] In the history of Iran, the analogous contest

[13] Skocpol (fn. 2), 318, n. 2; Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11 (No. 3, 1982), 265-304. On the Cuban Revolution, see John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), chap. 8.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 304-06.

[15] Weber, *Economy and Society* (2 vols.), ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), I, pp. 54-56 and II, chap. 15.

[16] Otto Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective," in Reinhard Bendix and others,

between the state and the hierocracy occurred much later. Shi'ism was declared the state religion of Iran in 1501, but the hierocracy remained heteronomous and subordinate to the state for a long time, consolidating its power and autonomy only at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The curtailment of the power of the hierocracy and the appropriation of many of its prerogatives and functions by the state took place in the 20th century. The Shi'ite religious authorities were and remained doctrinally and institutionally independent of the state, however: they retained their autonomous religious authority as well as their control over appreciable resources independent of the state bureaucracy.[17]

The Western revolutions were directed against state *and* church. The church had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and disestablished by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, it was an integral part of the monarchical regime. In the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the entire beleaguered Shi'ite hierocracy rose against the state. (This was partly due to the Shah's fateful ineptitude in not splitting the Shi'ite hierocracy in time; there is now evidence that some of the grand ayatollahs were ready for a compromise by the summer of 1978, and a split did in fact occur after the revolution.)

For analytical reasons, too, it is important to conceive of the societal structure of domination in more inclusive terms. Revolutionary situations occur because of the disintegration of central authority. With the disintegration of the authority of the state, other elements of the societal structure of domination assume greater importance. Corporations and individuals with authority in other spheres of life can extend their authority to the political sphere and assume positions of leadership. In such situations, they emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. The hierocracy and men of religion can use their traditional authority in this fashion, and have often done so—for instance, in Spanish history.[18] In

eds., *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 63, 110-11.

[17] Said A. Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[18] We encounter this kind of situation in rebellions in Castile in 1520, where Franciscan and Dominican monks figured prominently among the leaders of the Comuneros. Similarly, as the president of the Catalan Diputacio, the priest Pau Claris assumed the leading position in the rebellion of the summer of 1640. When the Spanish people rose against Napoleon in 1808 without any king or government, they were led by the church—priests and monks. See Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 42; Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), I, pp. 266-67.

Iran, many of the high-ranking members of the Shi'ite hierocracy led the popular opposition to the monarch during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906. In 1978, many groups and individuals who wanted the Shah out but had no interest whatsoever in a theocracy accepted Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership.

The centralization of the state necessitates the concentration of economic, coercive, and symbolic resources. It entails encroachments upon local and provincial privileges as well as fiscal and constitutional immunities; and it entails the dispossession of certain privileged social groups. It thus sets in motion an intense and continuous political struggle. The reaction of privileged groups and of autonomous centers of power against the expansion and centralization of the state is a major source of most if not all of the early modern European revolutions:[19] the revolt of the Comuneros of the cities of Castile against Charles V in 1520; the revolt of the Netherlands in reaction to the centralizing policies of Philip II in the 1560s; the French Civil War of the 16th century; the revolt of the Catalans once Olivares had consigned their "constitutions" to the devil, and of Portugal in 1640; the early phase of the English Revolution;[20] and the Fronde and the aristocratic pre-revolution of 1787-1788 in France.[21] In all these cases, estates and corporations reacted when their autonomy and inherited privileges were threatened by the state; and they usually found men of religion as their allies. The dispossessed or debt-ridden nobility of the Netherlands, for instance, found allies in Calvinist preachers and iconoclasts.[22] In the Iran of the 1970s, the preachers and the chief dispossessed solidary group capable of reaction were the same group.

Three major privileged social groups were victims of the centralization of the state under the Pahlavis. The first consisted of the tribal chiefs. The pacification campaigns of Reza Khan (later to become Reza Shah) in 1921-1925 broke the power of the tribal chiefs and eliminated many of them physically,[23] even though resistance in the most peripheral areas such as Luristan continued until the early 1930s. The land and property registry law of 1922 converted the surviving tribal chiefs into big land-

[19] Eisenstadt (fn. 5); Baechler (fn. 3), 139; Goldstone (fn. 5), 194-95.

[20] By 1640, the English Crown had alienated a large segment of the elite which included, notably, the proponents of aristocratic constitutionalism and the rising local landed gentry who resisted its increasingly statist policies. See Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 30, 57, 92, 124.

[21] De Tocqueville (fn. 4); Alfred Cobban, *Aspects of the French Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1968); Zagorin (fn. 18).

[22] *Ibid.*, II, p. 94.

[23] Richard Tapper, Introduction to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 26-28.

lords.[24] As such, they became members of the city-dwelling, landowning upper class, and, as individuals, many of them entered the Pahlavi political elite.

The Shi'ite hierocracy was next to come under fierce attack by the centralizing Pahlavi state. Under Reza Shah, the state deprived it of all its judiciary functions, eliminated its prebendal, fiscal, and social privileges, and greatly reduced its control over education and over religious endowments. In the face of Reza Shah's determination and severity, it did not react in any significant fashion.

Reza Shah had reached an accommodation with the class of big landlords, "the thousand families," who predominated in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) until 1960. It was during the first—and only genuine—stage of Mohammad Reza Shah's land reform in 1962 and 1963 that the landowning "thousand families," including the tribal chiefs, were liquidated as a class. Once the Majlis was dissolved, the "feudal" landowning class had no autonomous institutional basis and could not react against its complete political and partial economic dispossession by the state. Though many of its members retained large holdings of land and became mechanized commercial farmers, thus joining the petro-bourgeoisie, and though many of them remained in the Pahlavi political elite, the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was the power basis of the landowning class and accounted for its prominence in the Majlis, had undoubtedly been destroyed.[25]

Relations between the hierocracy and the monarchy had improved after the resignation of Reza Shah—especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the monarchy was weak and the hierocracy was alarmed by the threat of communism. The state resumed its aggressive posture in the 1960s and 1970s, this time encroaching upon the religious sphere in the strict sense.[26] In contrast to the landowning class, the partially dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate did have an autonomous institutional basis. It could react to the expansion of the state, and eventually did.

In the political struggle set in motion by the centralization and mod-

[24] Ann K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), chap. 15.

[25] Ahmad Ashraf "Dehqanan, Zamin va Enqelab" [The Peasantry, Land and Revolution], in *Kitab-e Agah* (1982/136), 1, 11-12; Eric Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 79, 81; Ann K.S. Lambton, "Land and Revolution in Iran" (Review Article), *Iranian Studies* 17 (No. 1, 1984), 76-77. The destruction of the peasant-landlord relationship was completed in the 1960s, during the second and third phases of the reform, with the schemes for division of land between peasants and landlords. Though the redistributive effect of these phases was negligible, their sociopolitical effect in breaking the traditional links between peasants and landlords was profound.

[26] Said A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," *Government and Opposition* 16 (Summer 1981), 293-316.

ernization of the state, the dispossessed social groups that retain an institutional basis for reacting against the expanding state still need to create *coalitions* with other social groups and classes if they are to succeed. In the early 1960s, elements from the hierocracy, the landlords, and the tribal chiefs made poorly coordinated attempts to forge a coalition, but the separate uprisings of Khomeini's followers and the Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad tribes of Fars in 1963 were ruthlessly suppressed.[27] In 1978, when an effective coalition did come into being, it carried out a revolution.

Because of their common hatred of the Shah, the revolutionary coalition of 1978 included the bulk of Iran's urban population. The peasantry did not play a role in the Islamic Revolution, and neither did the industrial working class. All other segments of the population actively opposed the Shah and accepted Khomeini's revolutionary leadership. The two most important coalition partners of the militant clerics consisted of the new middle class—government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia, and the white-collar workers in the service sector—and the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar.

The coalition between the Shi'ite clerics and the new middle class was highly unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on the part of the former and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long: having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no time in liquidating the Westernized intelligentsia.

The coalition between the revolutionary clerics and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the other hand, rested on more tangible grievances on both sides and on a more solid historical basis. It has been more enduring. It is the latest instance of the alliance of the mosque and the bazaar, and resembles the alliance of the urban bourgeoisie and the church in the 11th and 12th centuries in Western Christendom. It was forged in the late 1970s, under the immediate impact of the Shah's destruction of the seminaries in Mashad and his massive antiprofiteering campaign against the bazaar merchants and retailers.[28]

Why did the new middle class lose out? History could have gone the other way—as it did in the case of Nasser's temporary coalition with the Muslim Brothers who had wide popular support and were in some ways much better organized than the mullahs. In 20th-century Iran, the

[27] Ann K.S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 102-13; Tapper (fn. 23), 29.

[28] According to Bakhash, 8,000 shopkeepers were jailed and as many as 250,000 fined during this campaign in 1975 and 1976. Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 13. The last figure seems too high.

centralizing state had atomized society to a considerable degree. It had detached the tribal chiefs and dissolved the landowning class; and it had created an intelligentsia, a bureaucratic class, a body of army officers and, lately, an industrial/entrepreneurial group; all of these were unattached to any solidary social community, be it a tribe, an estate, or a corporation. In partial contradistinction to prerevolutionary France, however, three elements of the old civil society had escaped the atomization of Iranian society: the Shi'ite clerical estate; the bazaar and traditional bourgeoisie; and urban communities in certain older city quarters that were dominated by the previous group. To these, one should add the new urban communities created by chain migration from rural areas and small towns into the larger cities. It is not surprising, then, that the atomized new middle class proved to be the proverbial Marxian "sack of potatoes" while the other solidary social groups in the coalition were capable of remarkably concerted political action, and soon took over.[29]

The Shah had kept the new middle class under constant supervision by the secret police and had not allowed it to form associations or to gain any political experience. Moreover, its ability to act was seriously impaired because the army officers were isolated from the rest of its elements. Thus, the political representatives of the new middle class could not easily form a coalition with the army, which was too closely identified with the Shah and his regime. They therefore decided to form a coalition with the Shi'ite hierocracy.

According to Tilly, contenders who are in danger of losing their place in a polity are especially disposed to "reactive" collective action. He rightly observes that for centuries the principal form of collective action followed a "reactionary" pattern—i.e., it was "reactive" and "communal." Thanks to social evolution, however, that is no longer the case, and collective action has become predominantly "proactive" in modern times.[30] This conceptual distinction seems of dubious value: a whole set of revolutions analyzed in this paper are both "reactive" and "proactive."

[29] It is interesting to compare the heterogeneity and lack of cohesiveness of Iran's new middle class with the same features associated with its Western counterpart, which Gouldner erroneously portrays as a new class in the Marxian schema. Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury, 1979).

[30] Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, III: *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 507-10. It is highly revealing that the period identified by Tilly as marking the transition from traditional to modern forms of collective action, the mid-19th century, coincided with the *end* of the classic age of revolutions. Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-1855," in William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

In reality, collective action that Tilly had typified as "reactive" does not lose its importance after the middle of the 19th century; and it usually continues to draw on communal traditional solidarities. Whenever these communal solidarities are class solidarities, they pertain not to rising but to *declining* or threatened social classes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran alerts us to the undeniable importance of reactive action in the revolutionary movements of the last two centuries, including those that Marx took to be revolutions of rising classes.

Fascinating evidence for the importance of reactive action and traditional communal solidarities in revolutionary movements has recently come to light; it concerns the very groups who inspired Marx with the theory of revolution that has distorted our understanding of the phenomenon for over a century. The myth of the middle class in the English and the French Revolutions has long been exploded, notably by Hexter and Cobban. Trevor-Roper's characterization of the English Revolution as the declining "mere gentry's" revolution of despair contains an element of truth, but also much exaggeration.[31] On the other hand, we now know that the revolutionaries of 1789 were *not* the capitalist bourgeoisie,[32] and that the revolutionaries of the first decades of the 19th century in England and of 1848 were *not* the industrial working class. The English revolutionary working class of that time in fact consisted of the artisans and craftsmen who were threatened by capitalist industrialization and were holding on to the memory of the golden age of a community of small producers based on mutual ties and cooperation.[33] A recent study of these "reactionary radicals," as one observer calls them, concludes that "commitment to traditional cultural values and immediate communal relations are crucial to many radical movements." Communal relations are seen to be important resources for mobilization as they enable traditional communities to remain mobilized for a long time and in the face of considerable privation.[34] Shopkeepers and artisans predominated in the French insurrections of the 1830s.[35] The same group of artisans reacting against industrial capitalism and proletarization, who

[31] For an assessment of Trevor-Roper's idea, see J. H. Hexter, *Reappraisals in History*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 129-31.

[32] Alfred Cobban, *Social Interpretations of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Jack A. Goldstone, "Reinterpreting the French Revolution," *Theory and Society* 13 (September 1984).

[33] Krishan Kumar, "Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-Century England: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," *European Journal of Sociology* 24 (No. 1, 1983).

[34] Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (No. 5, 1983), 886, 897, 908.

[35] Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 374-75.

drew their standards and idiom of protest from the past, constituted the backbone of the 1848 revolutions in France and Germany. In France, the journeymen's brotherhoods which perpetuated the traditional corporate consciousness and solidarities of the *ancien régime* constituted the leading revolutionary element in 1848. In Germany, artisan groups were prominent in the revolutionary movement of 1848 while the proletariat was the most quiescent of all social entities.[36]

"Reactionary radicals," concludes Calhoun, "have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacy in revolutions. But at the same time, revolutions worthy of the name have never been made without them."[37] With the Islamic Revolution, a group of reactionary radicals under the leadership of the custodians of the Shi'ite tradition have at last gained supremacy in what is theoretically the most interesting of modern revolutions.

Let us move on to consider some movements that Marx did not study. First, there are the peasant rebellions. Generally speaking, the Islamic Revolution has this in common with peasant rebellions: it draws on corporate solidarities and communal and kinship ties, and consequently has many conservative and defensive features.[38] In Mexico, there was the massive peasant rebellion of 1810 led by Father Hidalgo and Father Morelos, both parish priests.[39] In Spain, the Carlists' aim in the 1830s has been described as the "restoration of 'monkish democracy' ": the clergy led the prosperous Basque and Aragonese yeomanry in rising to defend their local autonomy and their *fueros* against the centralizing policy of the Bourbon government.[40] In the present century, there was the revolt of Zapata in defense of the local autonomy of traditional agrarian communities against the expanding *haciendas* in Mexico. Thanks to the devout Zapatistas (laws of 1915 and 1917) and to Cárdenas (1934-1940), the Mexican Revolution established the security of the *ejido*—community-owned, inalienable individual or communal holdings in the villages. It should be added that the outcome of the Mexican Revolution would have been much less secularist and more conservative if the Cristero movement, organized by priests and lay Catholics in reaction to the anticlerical policies of central government, with the motto

[36] William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 126, 127.

[37] Calhoun (fn. 34), 911.

[38] Georges Lefebvre, "La Révolution française et les paysans [The French Revolution and the peasants], in *Études sur la Révolution française* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1954 [1933]), 250, 254; Tilly (fn. 30, 1975), 498; Zimmermann (fn. 2).

[39] Dunn (fn. 13), 52-53.

[40] Brenan (fn. 18), 206-11, 213, note A. In the Second Carlist War (1870-1876), monks and priests again led the guerrilla bands.

Viva Cristo Rey (Long live Christ the King), had succeeded in 1927-1928.[41]

The pernicious idea that fascism was a movement of the petty bourgeois class has finally been laid to rest.[42] The petty bourgeoisie was somewhat overrepresented in most fascist movements, and it is undoubtedly overrepresented in the Islamic movement in Iran. But it is overrepresented in all sorts of radical movements. We find the "little people," the "*menus peuple*," in the religious riots in 16th-century France on both sides.[43] We find them among the stormers of the Bastille[44] and, as we have just seen, we find them among the 19th-century radicals who, for E. P. Thompson, *made* the English working class. Recent studies clearly show that fascist parties were supported by elements from *all* social groups, but especially the dislocated, the dispossessed, and the declassed. What is more to the point (and not disputed) is that the *leadership* of the fascist movements came disproportionately from the *declassé* and the dispossessed, from demobilized army officers, from displaced or unemployed bureaucrats (especially those dislocated by the redrawing of national boundaries), and from the occasional dispossessed aristocrat. The Nazis also did not fail to tap the traditional communal solidarities of the Protestant countryside.[45]

European fascism and the Islamic movement in Iran are similar in that they were led by dispossessed elements. But there are two important differences. First, the fascist leaders were a heterogeneous group, whereas Khomeini's militant clerics form a homogeneous solidary group. Second, the fascist leaders did not have exclusive control over any cultural assets, and had to get their ideas where they could find them. The Shi'ite hierocracy consisted of the custodians of a rich religious tradition. The consequences of these differences will become apparent presently.

[41] Dunn (fn. 13), 49, 64-69; François Chevalier, "The *Ejido* and Political Stability in Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 161-69; Guenter Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 16; Alistair Hennessy, "Fascism and Populism in Latin America," in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 280.

[42] Stein U. Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust, *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980); Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[43] Natalie Z. Davis, "Religious Riots in Sixteenth-Century France," *Past and Present* 59 (1973), 85-86.

[44] George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 387.

[45] Francis L. Carsten, "Interpretations of Fascism," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 416-19; Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," *ibid.*, 38-39; Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing the Fascist Movements," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 764, 789; Miklós Lackó, "The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: The Arrow Cross," *ibid.*, 395-96; Hamilton (fn. 42), esp. 444-55.

C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL DISLOCATION

We can now turn to the preconditions of revolution—the social dislocation and moral disturbance that follow rapid social change. Let us begin with normative disturbance at the most superficial level.

The conspicuous consumption on the part of Iranian high society and the abundance of *nouveaux riches* produced an acute sense of relative deprivation among the new middle-class government employees, white-collar workers in the private sector, and schoolteachers. At times, there was the added discomfort of absolute deprivation, which resulted from an acute housing shortage that was aggravated by the influx of a sizable foreign work force and American advisers.

In this context, it would be valid to speak of the widespread discontent of 1977-1978 as a confirmation of Davies's J-curve of continuous rising expectations and sudden frustrations.[46] Iran's GNP grew by 30.3 percent in 1973-1974 and by a further 42 percent in 1974-1975. Then came the economic debacle—despite, or rather because of, the massive unregulated inflow of oil revenue. Severe bottlenecks in skilled manpower and infrastructure halted economic growth in 1976.[47] The problem was more deep-rooted, however. What underlay the widespread desire for revolutionary change was a fundamental disorientation and *anomie* more than a superficial and short-run frustration of material expectation. As Durkheim has pointed out, "crises of prosperity" generate disorientation by disturbing the collective normative order.[48] There can be no doubt about the tremendous confusion and disorder created by the massive inflow of petrodollars, just as there can be little doubt about similar confusions in Nigeria and Mexico today. The consequent sense of moral disorder and desire for the reaffirmation of absolute standards should not be minimized. There was a widespread cultural malaise throughout Iranian society, ranging from general confusion and disorientation on the part of the *nouveaux riches* to sharply focused and intense rejection of foreign and antireligious cultural influences on the part of the mullahs and the merchants of the bazaar.

In Europe, the socialist and fascist mass movements were part of the extraordinary wave of mass political mobilization and national integration that swept the continent in the early decades of the 20th century.[49]

[46] James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (No: 1, 1962).
[47] Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).
[48] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951 [1897]).
[49] Merkl (fn. 45), 760-62.

It is easy to recognize that these movements acted as vehicles for the integration of the recently mobilized masses into societal community. But one should not forget that religious movements have often performed the same function in the past.

Political mobilization comes about as a result of basic social change which also entails considerable social dislocation. Social change displaces a large number of persons from the strata into which they were born. These persons yearn for and demand inclusion in new forms of societal community. Religious movements and sects are age-old channels for the reintegration of such dislocated individuals. Political movements and parties are the new channels for societal reintegration. The Islamic Revolution demonstrates that the old and the new can combine.

Urbanization and the expansion of higher education in the two decades preceding the revolution are the two dimensions of rapid social change most relevant to the problem. Between 1956 and 1976, the urban population of Iran increased from 31 percent to 47 percent (from 6 to 16 million). Rural-urban migration accounts for a substantial proportion of this shift—over one-third for the decade 1966-1976, the rate being even higher for Tehran. This decade also witnessed an unprecedented expansion of higher education. The number of persons with higher education quadrupled (to about 300,000) and the enrollment in universities and professional schools in Iran trebled (to about 150,000). These factors contributed significantly to the rise of the Islamic movement. Thousands of religious associations spontaneously came into being in cities and in universities, and acted as the mechanism for the social integration of a significant proportion of the migrants into the cities and of the first-generation university students.[50] By contrast, the Shah's parallel attempt to integrate these same groups into his one-party political system proved to be a fiasco.

There is nothing new about dislocated, uprooted men and women finding new moorings in religious associations, sects, and revivalist movements. In England, for instance, many "masterless" men became sectaries in the 16th and 17th centuries.[51] As early as the 1570s, Presbyterian classes were attended by laymen, but it is in the 1620s and 1630s that Puritan lectureships took root in towns to an astonishing degree, to the dismay of the Anglican Church. Laymen became patrons and paymasters of the Puritan lecturers, and the congregations clustering around the latter became "models for ideological party organization."[52] The situation

[50] Arjomand (fn. 26).

[51] Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975), 45-48.

[52] Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21.

strongly resembles the growth of lay religious associations in Iran in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, where the mullahs preached—at first in person but later, when demand outstripped supply, through cassette players—to avid audiences of urbanites. We find an even closer parallel in the rise of Methodism. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, migrants into the new industrial towns of England flocked to the assemblies of the Methodist preachers. Here, the perspective of integration into societal community brings out the sociological cogency of Halevy's famous thesis: the Methodist Revival integrated the recently urbanized masses into societal community and thus prevented a political revolution in England.[53]

Fascism, too, acted as the vehicle of integration of rural-urban migrants into societal community. In Germany, for instance, "many of the new urbanites failed to complete their cultural adjustment to city life and instead remained curiously vulnerable to the agrarian romanticism of *völkisch* ideologues."[54] One-half of the top Nazi party leaders were born in large villages.[55]

Literacy and Puritanism went hand-in-hand. The same is true of the growth of Islamic scripturalism. Islamic fundamentalism spread in Iranian universities just as Puritanism had spread at Oxford and Cambridge.[56] Many of the Islamic activists of the 1970s, who currently form the lay second stratum of the Islamic regime, discovered "the true Islam" in university associations, just as Cromwell was reborn at Cambridge. Fascism spread at European universities in a parallel fashion. In Eastern Europe in particular, university students and young activists constituted the core of the fascist parties and their leadership. Rumanian fascism is of particular interest in this respect. In the early 1920s, its leaders, Codreanu and Mota, were founders of university associations for Christian reform and national revival in the universities of Iasi and Cluj, respectively.[57]

The *combination* of higher education and social dislocation is of particular importance for explaining the politicization of integrative movements. The key to the social composition of Islamic and university

[53] Elie Halévy, *The Birth of Methodism in England*, trans. and with an introduction by Bernard Semmel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

[54] Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

[55] Linz (fn. 45), 50.

[56] Stone (fn. 20), 96-97; Michael Walzer, *The Revolutions of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 140-43.

[57] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 3d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1956), 44; Carsten (fn. 45), 418; Linz (fn. 45), 48-50; Juan J. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 167; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspective on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania," *ibid.*, 385-87.

activists of the 1970s is that they either moved from small towns to big cities to go to universities, or they were the first generation from traditional lower middle-class backgrounds to attend universities, or both.[58] These young men contributed to the revolutionary politicization of the Islamic revival of the 1960s and 1970s in the same way in which the educated country gentlemen in England had contributed to the revolutionary politicization of Puritanism. The parallel with Rumanian fascism is even more striking. As the last Iron Guard leader, Sima, put it, "in 1926-27, our universities were flooded by a big wave of young people of peasant origin ... who brought with them a robust national consciousness and were thus destroying the last strongholds of foreign spirit in our universities."[59] According to Eugen Weber, "legionary leadership came from the provincial, only just urbanized intelligentsia: sons or grandsons of peasants, schoolteachers, and priests."[60]

Max Weber once remarked that with the advent of modern mass politics, the condition of clerical domination itself changes. "Hierocracy has no choice but to establish a party organization and to use demagogic means, just like all other parties."[61] Rapid urbanization and the Shah's failure to integrate uprooted elements—especially the socially mobile, newly educated elements—into his political system offered Khomeini and the cornered Shi'ite hierocracy an unparalleled opportunity for creating a politicized revolutionary mass movement. Using the organizational network of the lay religious associations and Islamic university students, the mullahs periodically organized the massive anti-Shah demonstrations and closures of the bazaar which amounted to a general strike of unprecedented duration. Perhaps they could even have brought down a stronger regime; we will never know. What is certain is that the clerically led general strike did bring down the fragile Pahlavi regime and its vacillating ruler.

D. THE POLITICAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF THE SUPPORTERS OF REVOLUTION AND THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS INTEREST

Political motive may be defined as the motive to retain or recover political and institutional assets threatened or expropriated, and to gain political power by membership in, and maximally, control of, political society. On the negative side, the moral motive for supporting a revo-

[58] Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "State and Social Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution," *State, Culture and Society* 1 (No. 3, 1985).

[59] Barbu (fn. 57), 392.

[60] Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 107.

[61] Max Weber (fn. 15), II, p. 1195.

lution may stem from the condemnation of a regime because it is unjust, because it is servile to foreign powers, or because it is instrumental in spreading an alien culture and undermining authentic traditional cultural and religious values. The moral condemnation of the regime as unjust may, in turn, be due to its being perceived as tyrannical, or it may be due to a sense of relative deprivation. On the positive side, the moral motive for supporting the revolution may result from the acceptance of the modern myth of revolution as a redemptive collective act. Finally, class interest can act as a motive for supporting the revolution if the economic interests of a class (so defined by virtue of their position in the mode or system of production) are protected or furthered thereby. With this schema, let us examine the motives that can plausibly be attributed to the social groups who supported the revolution against the Shah.

Political and moral motives are closely intertwined in the attitude of Shi'ite hierocracy. The primary material interest of the clerical leaders was to regain the prerogatives and functions they had lost as a result of the centralization and modernization of the state. This was true of the leading clerical militants who came from traditional urban backgrounds, were in their forties or fifties at the time of the revolution, and had a keen awareness of the dispossessions of the Shi'ite hierocracy by the Pahlavi state. The younger militant clerics, who were primarily drawn from humbler rural and small-town backgrounds, saw all avenues of upward social mobility for people in their profession blocked under the Pahlavis.[62] They expected an Islamic government to guarantee them rapid social ascent and full incorporation into the political system.

Both the clerical leaders and the militant seminarians were morally indignant at the spread of immorality, libertinism, and an alien culture under the Pahlavi regime. In a significant statement, Khomeini's son identified the conservative members of the Shi'ite hierocracy who supported the revolution against the Shah as persons whose motivation was exclusively moral.[63]

The political and moral motives are also entwined for the intensely politicized lay Islamic activists. These first-generation provincial and lower middle-class university students and graduates, mostly in the applied sciences and engineering, saw themselves barred from the Westernized upper echelons of society and high government positions. They,

[62] Michael M.J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[63] Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 87 (May 1980), 26.

too, were motivated by the desire to remove these barriers to their upward social mobility. It would be absurd to attribute any class interest to this young "petty bourgeois" group other than the desire to gain power and entry into the political system, to move up on the social ladder, and to put an end to a cultural climate they found alien and resented deeply.

The motives of the new middle class were both political and moral. Many of its members—including the recently mobilized middle-class women who figured prominently in the anti-Shah demonstrations—wanted inclusion in the political society. They considered the Pahlavi regime tyrannical and unjust, and accepted the myth of revolution. It should be noted, however, that the potency of the political myth of revolution caused the new middle class, especially the women, to join the Islamic revolutionary movement against their class interests—indeed suicidally.[64]

The traditional bourgeoisie—the merchants of the bazaar, the petty bourgeoisie of distributive trades, and the craftsmen of the bazaar guilds—was the one social group for which class interest was the primary motive for overthrowing the Shah. These groups felt threatened by the developmental economic policies of the state which, among other things, excluded them from easy access to credit; they also feared the encroachment of the modern sector of the economy on their territory in the form of competing machine-made goods and new distributive networks of supermarkets and chain stores. To this motivating class interest was added a sense of relative deprivation caused by the tremendous gains made by court-connected industrialists, as well as considerable moral indignation caused by the disregard of Islam and traditional values under foreign cultural influence.

II. The Teleology of the Islamic Revolution

A. Moral Rigorism and the Search for Cultural Authenticity

The fact that integrative social movements are reactions to social dislocation and normative disorder explains the salience of their search for cultural authenticity and their moral rigorism.

[64] It was neither the first nor the last time that a social class participated in a revolution which did not further its interests. As Barrington Moore has pointed out, peasants have often been the principal victims of modernization brought about by communist governments they helped create by their participation in revolutionary movements. See Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 428-29; also see Zimmermann (fn. 2), 339-41, 356. Similarly, the outcome of the French Revolution was not especially favorable to the *petite bourgeoisie*, the *sans-culottes*, who most vigorously participated in it. *Ibid.*, 387, 407.

"Fascism was a revolution, but one which thought of itself in cultural, not economic terms."[65] The same is true of the Islamic Revolution, which emphatically saw itself in these terms—even when not explicitly so, as in the "Islamic cultural revolution" against Westernism and (Eastern) atheistic communism inaugurated with the closing of the universities in April 1980. Since the revolution, Iran's secular judiciary sytem has been systematically Islamicized, the Shi'ite Sacred Law has been codified for the first time in history, and Islamic morals and coverage of women are strictly enforced by an especially created official vigilante corps.

Disoriented and dislocated individuals and groups cannot be successfully integrated into a societal community without the creation or "revitalization" of a moral order.[66] Walzer emphasizes that Puritanism was primarily a "response to the *dis*order of the transition period."[67] Ranulf has correctly underscored the moral rigorism of Nazism and compared it to Puritanism.[68] The intense and repressive moralism of the Islamic revolutionaries in reaction to the moral laxity and disorder of Pahlavi Iran finds a strict parallel in Puritan moralism in reaction to the moral laxity and sensuality of the Renaissance culture, and in Nazi moralism in reaction to the decadence of the Weimar period. Furthermore, the parochial rejection of cosmopolitanism is a common feature of the Islamic Revolution and Nazism, and especially of Eastern European fascism.[69] The vehement rejection of cultural Westernism in favor of revitalized Christianity in Rumania and Hungary finds a counterpart in Khomeini's more systematic and successful determination to extirpate Western cultural pollution by establishing an Islamic moral order.

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS

The revolutions of early modern Europe were made by men for whom restoration was the key word, and who "were obsessed by *renovation*—by the desire to return to an old order of society." The confused teleology of these revolutions was marked by an *absence of ideology* and by a corporate or national constitutionalism "which was mainly the preserve of the dominant social and vocational groups."[70] In the English Revo-

[65] George L. Mosse, "The Genesis of Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 22.

[66] Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for their Comparative Study," *American Anthropologist* 58 (April 1956).

[67] Walzer (fn. 56), 313, 315.

[68] Svend Ranulf, *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology* (New York: Schocken, 1964 [1938]).

[69] Eugen Weber, "Rumania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Istvan Deak, "Hungary," *ibid.*, 394; Barbu (fn. 57).

[70] John Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past and Present* 42 (1969), 42-44, 48.

lution, "with the nature, source, and grounds of political legitimacy all up for grabs, there was almost inevitably a great effusion of claims to legitimacy on all sorts of grounds, old and new."[71] Nevertheless, two elements predominate in the teleology of the English Revolution: parliamentarianism, and Puritanism and its offshoots.

If the French Revolution instituted one thing for all subsequent revolutions, it is the presence of ideology. It gave birth to Jacobinism as the classic form of modern revolutionary ideology. The ideas of constitutional representation and national sovereignty were coupled at the beginning. As the revolution progressed, however, the source of legitimacy drifted from the representation of estates to the symbolic embodiment of the will of the people. The claim to embody the will of the nation as a single homogeneous entity could only be made through the manipulation of the maximalist language of consensus. Presumed embodiments of the will of the people became the sole and sufficient basis of legitimacy. During the period of Jacobin ascendancy, revolutionary legitimacy triumphed; and with its triumph, revolutionary ideology "filled the entire sphere of power" and "became coextensive with government itself."[72] The distillation of the Jacobin experiment was the modern political myth of revolution. Revolutionary legitimacy became an autonomous and self-sufficient category.

In the 19th century, revolutions became "milestones in humanity's inexorable march toward true freedom and true universality."[73] Leninism combined this conception of revolution with the Jacobin myth; it has become the justification for the seizure of power by revolutionaries who proclaim themselves in charge of realizing the next stage of socio-historical development.[74] With the consolidation of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, Leninist revolutionary ideology "obtained control over the interpretation of world history."[75] It is this control that is challenged by the fascist and the Islamic revolutionaries even while they are upholding, like the Bolsheviks, the myth of revolution as an act of redemption and liberation of oppressed masses and nations.

Both fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movement are latecomers to the modern international political scene. As such, they share a number of essential features. The foremost of these is the appropriation of the

[71] Hexter (fn. 31), 178.

[72] François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. 29, 48-49, 70-74.

[73] Eugen Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution: Nomos VIII* (New York: Atherton, 1966), 126.

[74] Dunn (fn. 13), 8-11.

[75] Jules Monnerot, *Sociology and Psychology in Communism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 [1949]), 12.

legitimatory political myth of revolution. The Italian fascists boasted of their "revolutionary intransigence," and the Nazis contrasted their revolution, the revolution of the German *Volk*, to the "subhuman revolution" of 1789.[76] Similarly, Iran's revolutionaries take great pride in the historic mission of the Islamic Revolution.

"Economics was indeed one of the least important fascist considerations."[77] The same is true of the Islamic Revolution. (Khomeini, responding to complaints about the state of the economy, once remarked, "we did not make the Islamic Revolution so the Persian melon would be cheap.") Furthermore, like the European fascists, the Islamic militants aim at integrating all classes, including the working class, into a national community. The fascists substituted "nation" for "class" and developed the concept of "the proletarian nations." Class conflict was thus replaced by the conflict *between* nations, rich against poor. With the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, we have an identical transposition of the theme of exploitation of one class by another into the exploitation of the "disinherited" (*mustaz'af*) nations by the imperialist ones.[78]

"The fact that fascism is a latecomer," writes Linz, "helps to explain, in part, the essential anti-character of its ideology and appeal." Furthermore, "it is paradoxical that for each rejection there was also an incorporation of elements of what they rejected."[79] Like fascism, the Islamic revolutionary movement has offered a new synthesis of the political creeds it has violently attacked. And, like the fascists, the Islamic militants are against democracy because they consider liberal democracy a foreign model that provides avenues for free expression of alien influences and ideas. (Also like the fascists, however, the Islamic militants would not necessarily accept the label of "antidemocratic.")[80] Similarly, both groups are antibourgeois, resenting the international cosmopolitan orientation of the new middle class. Both movements are anti-Marxist—i.e., anticommunist and antisocialist—while appropriating the ideas and certainly the slogans of social justice and equality. The Islamic revolutionary movement has the considerable advantage over fascism, however, of combining this "anti-character" with strong traditionalism. Here

[76] Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: New American Library, 1969), 281; Baechler (fn. 3), 10, n. 15.

[77] Mosse (fn. 65), 21.

[78] Linz (fn. 45), 16. Once the attempt to export the Islamic Revolution, temporarily checked by the setback in the Iran-Iraq war, is resumed fully, one may expect further resonances of the Italian fascist ideas of "an imperialism of the poor" and "proletarian imperialism." Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 334-35; Joseph Baglieri, "Italian Fascism and the Crisis of Liberal Hegemony: 1901-1922," in Larsen (fn. 42), 322-23.

[79] Linz (fn. 45), 5.

[80] *Ibid.*, 20-21.

we can see the consequence of the fact that the dispossessed leaders of the Islamic Revolution were not a heterogenous but a homogeneous solidary group and, furthermore, one that guarded the Shi'ite religious tradition. In contrast to the Nazi "Revolution of Nihilism" (and to the striking lack of reference to Japan's own intellectual tradition in the writings of the leaders of the fascist New Order Movement of the late 1930s),[81] the Islamic Revolution combines the rejection of other alien political ideologies with a vigorous affirmation of the Islamic religious and cultural tradition. I have therefore characterized it as "revolutionary traditionalism."[82]

In addition to their common anti-character and other incidental features, fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movements both have a distinct constitutive core. Racism and anti-Semitism were the most obnoxious features of European fascism, but, as Mosse and others have convincingly shown, not its core component. The constitutive core of fascism that goes beyond European fascism and continues to live in a variety of forms as a vigorous ideological force in the third world is the combination of nationalism and socialism. As George Valois put it in 1925, "nationalism + socialism = fascism." The marriage of nationalism and socialism was in the cards after World War I.[83] This fact by far transcends the particular conditions of any dispossessed stratum, any European country, or, for that matter, of interwar Europe. It was arrived at by different fascist leaders in different European countries, and it has been arrived at independently by many third-world ideologues since 1945.

An enduring feature of fascist ideology has been its insistence on the reality of the nation and the artificiality of class. To the emotionally unattractive idea of perpetual class struggle, the French fascist thinker Marcel Deat contrasts the appeal of belonging to a community untainted by divisive conflict and fragmentation: "The total man in the total society, with no clashes, no prostration, no anarchy."[84] The Arab nationalist thinkers sought to utilize the appeal of belonging to a community by similarly replacing class by nation. The advocates of Islamic ideology only needed to take one step further to replace the nation by the *umma*, the Muslim community of believers.

Thus, the emergence of an Islamic revolutionary ideology has been

[81] William M. Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

[82] Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Arjomand, *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, and Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).

[83] Sternhell (fn. 78), 320-21, 326, 335-37.

[84] Quoted, *ibid.*, 335, 347.

in the cards since the fascist era. It has been in the cards irrespective of the plight of the dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate in Iran. The latter did have the advantage of institutional autonomy and of independence in the exercise of religious authority, something the Sunni Islamic ideologues like Rashid Rida could only dream of. But it was exceedingly slow in creating a consistent ideology in order to defend itself against the state. In fact, the Islamic *ideology* was developed elsewhere, by publicists and journalists like Mawdudi (d. 1979) in Indo-Pakistan and Qutb (d. 1966) in Egypt. Its essence consisted in presenting the secular state as an earthly idol claiming the majesty that is God's alone. When Khomeini finally rose against the Shah, he imported the Islamic ideology from Pakistan and Egypt as a free good.

In 1926, in a work that anticipates most of the ideological developments of the past two decades, the youthful Mawdudi had declared: "Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch . . . and *jihad* (holy war) denotes the revolutionary struggle." Mawdudi conceived the modern world as the arena of the "conflict between Islam and un-Islam," the latter being equated with pre-Islamic Ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and polytheism. Modern creeds and political philosophies were equated with polytheism and Ignorance. Their predominance necessitated the revival of Islam. A few decades later, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb adopted the contrast between Islam and un-Islam—conceived as Ignorance—from Mawdudi and made it the cornerstone of his revolutionary Islamic ideology. For accepting secular states, contemporary Muslim societies are branded as societies of Ignorance. To extirpate Ignorance from these societies, an Islamic government has to be established and the Sacred Law applied. To establish an Islamic government—that is, to establish the rule of God—Islamic revolution is necessary.[85]

The distinctively clericalist Shi'ite idea of Islamic government, to be realized after the revolution of 1979, was *not* directly influenced by the trend in Sunni Islam. It is best understood in the context of the struggle between the Shi'ite hierocracy and the centralizing monarchy discussed earlier. Though a novelty in Shi'ite history, Khomeini's idea of Islamic government, first put forward in 1970, was stated in the traditional Shi'ite frame of reference and does not betray any influence of the

[85] Abu'l-A'la' Mawdudi, *Process of Islamic Revolution* (Pathankot, Punjab: Makteb-e Jamaat-e Islami, 1947); Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (October 1981), 500; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *The Middle East Journal* 37 (No. 1, 1983).

ideological innovations of Mawdudi and Qutb. It simply extended the general judiciary authority of the jurist (*faqih*), as well as some of his very specific rights of gerency, to include the right to rule.[86]

Nevertheless, Mawdudi and Qutb were read avidly, in Persian translation and/or in Arabic, by Khomeini's militant followers, who adopted the fundamental revolutionary idea that obedience to the impious secular state—in this case the Shah's—was tantamount to idolatry. The centrality of this idea is unmistakable in the revolutionary slogans and pamphleteering, most notably in the application of the term *taghut* (ungodly earthly power) to the Pahlavi political order. Its influence has become more pronounced since the elimination of the moderates and Islamic modernists in 1980-1981, and is easily noticeable in the speeches of the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Ayatollah Safi has no difficulty whatsoever in combining the advantages of the ideologies of Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalist ideas of Khomeini. For him, the government of the jurist on behalf of the Hidden Imam is the true government of God on Earth, vowed to the implementation of His Law. All other political regimes are ungodly orders, regimes of Ignorance and of *taghut*. The Islamic Revolution will continue until the overthrow of all these regimes.[87]

C. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM, AND THE TELEOLOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF PROGRESS

The Islamic Revolution in Iran should draw our attention to the neglected importance of reactive and reactionary elements in all revolutions. The ideology of proletarian revolution, as Mannheim has shown, incorporated many of the elements of the romantic, reactionary critique of the Enlightenment.[88] On the other hand, Nazism, as both its ideologues and its historians (notably Bracher) have insisted, contained revolutionary as well as reactionary elements.[89]

The Islamic Revolution constitutes a wry comment on the debate among historians as to whether the early modern European revolutions were conservative or liberal, reactionary or progressive. It also demonstrates that revolutionaries often act in defense of traditional values. Baechler is right when he notes, "contrary to appearances and accepted

[86] Said A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Arjomand, *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism* (forthcoming, 1987).

[87] Lotfollah Safi, *Nezam-e Emamat va Rahbari* [Regime of Imamate and Leadership] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Be'that, 1982/1361), 16-18.

[88] Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays on Sociology and Psychology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).

[89] Karl D. Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 7-13; Carsten (fn. 45), 428.

belief, conservative revolutions are supported less by the elite than by the people."[90] Not surprisingly, some important teleological elements in the clerically led popular uprisings such as Carlism and the Cristero movement[91] find resonance in the Islamic Revolution in Iran: repudiation of foreign and cosmopolitan influences and values, and vehement opposition to anticlerical policies of modernizing governments, including, of course, atheism. Marx's famous idea that the French revolutionaries parodied the Roman republicans because they had not yet developed a political language of their own should not automatically be generalized. The revolutionaries who draw on traditional imagery can vary greatly in their knowledge of and professional identification with tradition. The Ayatollahs were the official custodians of the Shi'ite tradition and knew their methodology of Shi'ite jurisprudence. In the past six years, they have proved this by their sustained efforts to Islamicize Iran's judiciary system, by institutionalizing substantial political functions for the Friday prayer leaders, and by presiding over the strict enforcement of Islamic morals.

Islamic revolutionary traditionalism does have its modern trappings. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic pays lip service to equality and especially to social justice, and it guarantees freedom of the press, of the expression of political opinion, of political gatherings and groups—provided, needless to say, that they are not contrary to the interests of Islam. Finally, there is another modern element that is more than a trapping: the Majlis, or parliament. The constitutionalism of the early-modern European revolutions was the idealization of practice, and closely linked to the aim of preserving local liberties. In Iran, even though constitutionalism entered as an imported panacea in 1905-1906, the mullahs used the constitutionalist ideology when opposing the Shah. Consequently, the Majlis is an enduring feature of the Islamic regime. Its legislation, however, is rigorously supervised by the clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians. In addition, both the ruling clerics and the lay Islamic second stratum of the regime have a keen interest in technology. They love broadcasting, being televised, and being interviewed by the press, and they love organizing seminars and congresses and using modern-sounding phrases such as "political-ideological bureaus."

When the notions of revolution and progress are linked, as they were in the 19th century and as they still are today, a line can clearly be drawn between revolution and counterrevolution. The evidence offered in this paper makes it impossible to draw such a line. It has been pointed

[90] Baechler (fn. 3), 108.

[91] Hennessy (fn. 41), 258.

out that all revolutions contain counterrevolutionary elements. The obverse is also true: all counterrevolutions must incorporate revolutionary innovations in order to restore what they consider to be the traditional order. This is clearly the case with Islamic revolutionary traditionalism in Iran. As I have argued elsewhere, it has in fact brought about a revolution *within* Shi'ism.[92] Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution has stimulated considerable growth in the size of the state and the number of persons employed by it. One can legitimately see these factors as the continuation of a trend in modernization. It is, however, best treated as a universal trend making for continuity with the past rather than as specific to the teleology of this revolution as distinct from others.

D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

Comparative evidence not only requires that we sever the conceptual link between revolution and progress, but also suggests that we link revolution and religion. Religion was an important factor not only in the Puritan Revolution, but in all early-modern European revolutions except the Fronde.[93] Walzer is right in considering the Puritan Marian exiles of the 1550s to be forerunners of modern revolutionary ideologues.[94] But the same is true of the clerics of the Catholic League thirty years later.[95] In 1640, the Puritan preachers were calling the House of Commons God's chosen instrument for rebuilding Zion.[96] In the same year, their Catholic counterparts in Catalonia were also engaged in revolutionary activity. Here is the commander of the Spanish king's forces in Rossello complaining of the sedition and licentiousness of the clergy:

> In the confessional and the pulpit they spend their entire time rousing the people and offering the rebels encouragement and advice, inducing the ignorant to believe that rebellion will win them the kingdom of heaven.[97]

There are striking parallels between the Puritan Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini as Abraham and Moses in one; for the Puritan Saints, we have the militant mullahs; and for the fast sermons of 1642-1649,[98] we had, under the

[92] Arjomand (fn. 86).

[93] Zagorin (fn. 18), I, p. 741.

[94] Walzer (fn. 56), 92-113.

[95] Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies, 1450 to the Present*, trans. by Peter Evans (New York: Schocken, 1973), 50, 61; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, chap. 10.

[96] Stone (fn. 20), 90.

[97] John Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 487.

[98] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament," in Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1972).

Shah, the gatherings at forty-day intervals to commemorate the "martyrs"; after the revolution, we have the Friday sermons at congregational prayers. Important differences, however, affect the teleologies of these respective revolutions. There were strong anarchic elements in Puritanism—especially Independency, which considered itself the true Church within the corrupt church. Such anarchic innerworldly millenarian precepts of the Independents militated against their acceptance of a Presbyterian national church government. These precepts could also lead in the direction of the Levellers' conception of man as a rational being in the image of God, and hence to natural rights. The corporate solidarism of the militant Shi'ite clergy contrasts as strongly with the factionalism of the Puritan Saints as methodologically grounded legalism contrasts with the Saints' millenarian idea of Christ as the Lawgiver. Finally, the revolutionary Shi'ite clericalist theory of the sovereignty of the jurist is in sharp contrast to the idea of congregational representation—especially in Presbyterianism.[99]

The situation *is* different with regard to the modern revolutions; but let us see how. De Tocqueville knew that the French Revolution had produced a new religion. It aimed at

> nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race. . . . It developed into a species of religion, if a singularly imperfect one, since it was without a God, without a ritual or promise of a future life. Nevertheless, this strange religion has, like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants and martyrs.[100]

The terms "secular religion" and "political religion" have aptly been used to describe communism and fascism.[101] Modern revolutions *do* require political religions. The crucial issue is whether there is any necessary incompatibility between religion and political religion.

The Bolshevik Revolution was militantly atheistic. But before we draw any conclusions, let us think of its totally imported ideology and of the exceedingly narrow social base of its political elite. What about the French Revolution? De Tocqueville did not see any incompatibility between Christianity and the political religion of the revolution. Anticlericalism and the campaign against religion stemmed from the identification of the Church with the *ancien régime*, and not from any wide-

[99] Tai Liu, *Discord in Zion: The Puritan Divines and the Puritan Revolution 1640-1660* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 50-51, 94-97, 146-60; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, p. 166.

[100] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, new trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), 13, 156.

[101] Monnerot (fn. 75); Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two Essays* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1968). It is interesting to note that in 1949 Monnerot described communism as "the twentieth-century Islam."

spread anti-Christian sentiment.[102] What about the fascist revolution? European fascism was often associated with anticlericalism, but this association is neither general nor fundamental. The Nazis glorified the mythical pre-Christian German tradition and were anti-religious. The same is true of other fascist movements in Western and Northern Europe. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Rumanian, the Hungarian, the Slovak, and the Croation fascist movements were emphatically Christian and aimed at establishing Christian corporatist states.[103]

Clerical leadership and participation in the Slovak Republic established by Father Hlinka's People's Party (presided over by Father Tiso) and in the Ustasha movement in Croatia offer interesting points for comparison with Iran.[104] But the most illuminating parallel is between Shi'ite revolutionary traditionalism and the Rumanian Iron Guards, the Legion of Archangel Michael. Both movements are characterized by extraordinary cults of suffering, sacrifice, and martydom. Priests figured prominently in the legionary movement, side by side with university students. Legionary meetings were invariably preceded by church services, and their demonstrations were usually led by priests carrying icons and religious flags. The integral Christianity of the Legionaries differentiated them from the Nazis and the Italian Fascists. This they knew. As one of their leading intellectuals explained, "Fascism worships the state, Nazism the race and the nation. Our movement strives not

[102] It was "a spectacular but transient phenomenon ... in no sense basic to its program." Therefore, the antireligious features faded as the true political teleology of the revolution unfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. 100), 5-7. On the vitality of religious sentiment among the insurgent masses during the French Revolution, see Albert Soboul, "Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la révolution: Saintes patriotes et martyrs de la liberté" [Religious sentiment and popular cults during the revolution: patriotic saints and martyrs of liberty], *Archives de sociologie des religions* 1 (No. 2, 1956).

[103] These variations become intelligible in the light of Linz's demonstration that the extent of organized preemption of the political space by Christian-democratic or Catholic-conservative parties was a decisive factor in inhibiting the growth of fascism (as in Spain and Belgium). Where such parties existed and had carved up electoral territories for themselves, fascism found a formidable rival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlerical in order to differentiate itself from the rival religious party (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-à-vis the Zentrum party). See Linz (fn. 45), 16-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), 156; Hamilton (fn. 45), 37-41.

Mexican fascism, the Sinarquism of the late 1930s and early 1940s, also fits Linz's pattern. The movement declined when its middle-class supporters defected to the Catholic Accion National. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280-82. Linz's account of cases in which fascism was not anticlerical but intensely Christian is unsatisfactory, however; see Linz (fn. 45), 16, and Linz (fn. 57), 164, 184, n. 51. The reverse side of Linz's argument is well put by Merkl: "There is ample evidence that religious decline and confrontations played a role in fascist development ..., creating a massive reservoir of confused quasi-religious fears and longings open to exploitation by fascist demagogues." Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

[104] Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement," in Larsen and others (fn. 42).

merely to fulfill the destiny of the Rumanian people—we want to fulfill it along the road to salvation." The ultimate goal of the nation, Codreanu and others emphasized, was "resurrection in Christ."[105]

Finally, we must consider Brazilian Integralism, the most important fascist movement in Latin America. Its founder, Plinio Salgado, met Mussolini in 1930. The meeting made a deep impression on him, and he certainly saw no incompatibility between the fascist political religion and Catholicism. He returned to Brazil to "Catholicize" Italian fascism. Taking advantage of an extensive network of lay religious associations, which had been brought into existence by Cardinal Leme, he founded the Brazilian Integralist Action with the aim of creating a corporatist, integralist state. Integralism appealed to Catholic intellectuals because of its promise of a "spiritual revolution" and of an Integral State "which comes from Christ, is inspired in Christ, acts for Christ, and goes toward Christ." Salgado accordingly criticized the "dangerous pagan tendency of Hitlerism" and lamented the lack of a Christian basis in Nazi ideology.[106]

Few would find the statement that political revolutions are a modern form of millenarianism objectionable. Russian communism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Rome, and Nazism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Reich, "the Thousand Year Reich of national freedom and social justice."[107] As was the case with religion and political religion, political and religious millenarianism are by no means mutually exclusive. The religious chiliastic element may predominate, as in the Taiping Rebellion which aimed at establishing the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace;[108] or it may play an important subsidiary role, as in the Puritan Revolution in England and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In the Puritan Revolution we encounter two forms of millenarianism: the milder, more inner-worldly millenarianism of the Independent divines, and the better known, activist one of the men of the Fifth Mon-

[105] E. Weber (fns. 60 and 69); Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), 247, 266-70.

[106] Stanley Hilton, "Acaõ Integralista Brasileira: Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 9 (No. 2, 1972), 12; Margaret T. Williams, "Integralism and the Brazilian Catholic Church," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 54 (No. 3, 1974), 436-40. In this typical search for "a third way," Salgado also sought to "Brazilianize" Italian fascism. He considered the two aspects of his project fully compatible, and declared, "My nationalism is full of God." *Ibid.*, 434-36.

[107] Monnerot (fn. 75), chap. 3; Nicholai A. Berdiaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961); James M. Rhodes, *The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 79.

[108] Lewy (fn. 41), chap. 7.

archy. There can be no doubt that revolutionary political millenarianism played a crucial role in the motivation of the Iranian intelligentsia and other groups. But in addition, the Shi'ite doctrine contains an important millenarian tenet: the belief in the appearance of the Twelfth Imam as the Mahdi to redeem the world. This belief was as convenient for Khomeini's revolutionary purpose as it had been for the founder of the Safavid Empire in 1501.[109] Although Shi'ite millenarianism played an important role in the Islamic Revolution, it did not have any of the divisive and anarchic consequences of Puritan millenarianism because the clerics were firmly in control of its interpretation, and in fact partly derived their legal/juristic authority from it.

Conclusion

The success of the Islamic revolutionary ideology is the novel and teleologically distinct mark of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ideology is a powerful response to the contemporary politicized quest for authenticity. It has been constructed through the unacknowledged appropriation of *all* the technical advantages of the Western ideological movements and political religions, with the added—or rather, the emphatically retained—promise of other-worldly salvation. In a sense, it has a considerable ideological advantage over Nazism and communism, both of which clashed with religion. Rather than creating a new substitute for religion, as did the communists and the Nazis, the Islamic militants have fortified an already vigorous religion with the ideological armor necessary for battle in the arena of mass politics. In doing so, they have made their distinct contribution to world history.

[109] Arjomand (fn. 17), 269-70.

Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories

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WRITING THE INTIFADA
Collective Action in the Occupied Territories

By IAN S. LUSTICK*

Rex Brynen, ed. *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991, 314 pp.
Joost R. Hiltermann. *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movement in the Occupied Territories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 265 pp.
Michael C. Hudson, ed. *The Palestinians: New Directions*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990, 268 pp.
F. Robert Hunter. *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, 292 pp.
Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation*. Boston: South End Press, 1989, 423 pp.
David McDowall. *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 322 pp.
Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds. *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*. New York: Praeger, 1990, 347 pp.
Don Peretz. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990, 246 pp.
Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, Israel's Third Front*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, 352 pp.

THE Palestinian intifada (uprising) began on December 9, 1987, as a series of confrontations between Israeli soldiers and crowds of angry Palestinians. To the amazement of almost everyone, these clashes led to the most prolonged episode of militant Palestinian oppositionism in the hundred-year history of Zionist-Arab relations in Palestine/the Land of Israel. Indeed, almost five years later, in October 1992, the Israeli chief of staff warned his countrymen that the uprising had still not ended.

From the beginning of its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel outlawed almost all forms of political activity by the Arab inhabitants of those areas. It was therefore not at all uncommon for Palestinians protesting various aspects of the occupation to meet with

* I would like to thank Jerrold Green for his comments on a preliminary version of this article.

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violent responses from Israeli troops. Customarily these outbursts died down after the army opened fire; in December 1987, however, the crowds did not disperse after the army began to shoot. Instead, the demonstrations expanded, drawing such large numbers of protestors into the streets that Israeli units were overwhelmed.

Within weeks there emerged a clandestine coordinating committee that helped sustain an uninterrupted series of commercial and general strikes and mass demonstrations. In the first exhilarating months of the uprising, "liberated" zones were established within Palestinian villages, towns, and refugee camps. Israel's elaborate system of collaborators and informers was on the verge of almost total collapse. Israeli vehicles on roads in the occupied territories were subjected to constant harassment by youths throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. Despite dozens, then scores, then hundreds of Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers, police, and settlers, and official policies of beatings, mass arrests, and collective punishment, the intifada continued. It was soon clear that a genuine civil rebellion was under way, unlike any other form of Palestinian resistance to the twenty-five-year-old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The flow of Israeli settlers to the territories slowed to a trickle; and in some settlements houses were abandoned by residents who returned to the relative safety they associated with life within the borders of Israel proper.

In addition to being unprecedented in the Palestinian context itself, the intifada was also the first of many mass-based, illegal, nonviolent or semiviolent challenges to nondemocratic governing structures to burst upon the world scene at the end of the 1980s. Algeria and Jordan erupted in 1988. Mass mobilizations subsequently appeared in Burma, in the Baltic states, and in most East European countries in 1989, then in China, South Africa, Kenya, and in many of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union. As a phenomenon they drew the attention of both the media and scholars to the brightening prospects for democratization and to the heroic nature of struggles by oppressed peoples rising up against the coercive power of states to demand political and economic rights. But although the Palestinians may have been first chronologically, and although their efforts were sustained over a longer period of time than were the "uprisings" in the other cases, the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation has usually been omitted from media accounts of the worldwide trend toward "democratization" and from scholarly consideration of circumstances leading to such measured forms of revolutionary collective action.

In this essay I seek to respond to these omissions in two ways. First,

by assessing many available treatments of the intifada, I can trace the contours of the movement and identify both the questions asked in this substantial body of work and the range of answers offered. Second, by surveying recent developments in literatures whose organizing questions pertain to the etiology and dynamics of mass collective action, I can establish the degree to which the intifada is comparable to other contemporary mass movements for radical political change, which in turn will suggest how much the intifada, and the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in general, has to offer students of comparative politics. In the process I raise an often ignored methodological complication in the use of monographic materials to evaluate theoretical claims.

The Status Quo Ante

Two kinds of questions, corresponding to two different kinds of assumptions, can be asked about the occurrence of the intifada or of any other case of illegal mass political action. Reflecting beliefs about the likely stability of established authority structures, about the superficiality of the common political identity claimed by those who might be expected to revolt, or about the likely decisiveness of free-rider, cultural, or psychological barriers to the joint pursuit of shared interests, one type of question asks why such an upheaval should occur at all. If for these assumptions one substitutes expectations that identities claimed by masses of people are likely to be genuine and determinative and that their severe discontent cannot be easily contained, then the opposite question becomes salient: why such an upheaval should not have occurred earlier.

The studies and reports about the intifada reviewed here ask both questions, although the emphasis is clearly on the former. Why, ask most of these authors, in thousands of defiant encounters with Israeli troops, police, and settlers, did the Palestinians of the occupied territories suddenly demonstrate a willingness to endure substantial and prolonged punishment for the sake of ending the occupation? Although some authors do point to what they call an unappreciated series of precedents for sustained mass action and acceptance of high casualties by Palestinians in the territories, even they concede that no previous episode lasted more than four to six weeks, that none approached the intifada in the proportion of the population mobilized for political action, and that none elicited the scale of sacrifice associated with the uprising.

For years Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip were asked an uncomfortable, cruel, but not unreasonable question: if the occupation is so onerous and you are so discontented, if you

expect to achieve national liberation and a state of your own, then why have you not shown the same discipline and willingness to sacrifice that the Vietnamese, Cubans, Algerians, Iranians, Afghans, or even pre-1948 Zionists displayed in their respective struggles? It was a telling critique despite the undeniable fact that the Palestinians confronted a determined and well-equipped antagonist in topographical circumstances peculiarly unsuited to guerrilla warfare. Certainly, the PLO outside of Palestine did mount an armed struggle that produced long lists of martyrs, but many Palestinians on the inside, in the West Bank and Gaza, seemed either willing to let history have its way with them or particularly susceptible to the techniques of control exercised by the Israelis.

Virtually all analysts unconnected to the Israeli authorities have emphasized the injustices of the occupation, the active discontent of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, and the uniformity of Palestinian aspirations for independence from Israel. Accordingly, no one has seriously argued that the relative quiescence of Palestinians under Israeli occupation was due to a convenient or manipulated consciousness among them that made Israeli rule appear more satisfactory than it would have otherwise. Israeli domination was domination without hegemony. Instead, most explanations for the limited nature of West Bank and Gaza Palestinian resistance stressed the impediments to guerrilla fighting in such open and small areas, Israel's enormously sophisticated apparatus of surveillance and punishment, and the corruption of traditional Palestinian elites.

Under these circumstances, for ten years at least, the carrot-and-stick occupation policy implemented by Israeli defense minister Dayan in 1967 was extraordinarily effective. After an initial wave of nationalist mobilization and some (failed) attempts at violent resistance, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip reached a modus vivendi with the Israeli occupation. Although politically active Palestinians were treated severely, no Palestinian was required publicly to support the legitimacy or continuation of Israeli rule. The great majority of Palestinians refrained from mass political action or armed mobilization and in return were allowed to make money by working in Israel, to maintain their social institutions, and to preserve their ties with Jordan and the rest of the Arab world via the "open bridges" policy over the Jordan River.[1] In the meantime Israel for its part refrained from advancing formal claims to sovereignty over the areas (apart from expanded East Jerusalem). It con-

[1] The "open bridges" policy describes the Israeli practice of allowing, subject to sometimes rigorous and discriminatory screening procedures, movement of people and goods across the bridges linking the West Bank and Jordan.

ducted its settlement and land expropriation policies discreetly and promised that the eventual peace would be based on an end to the occupation. Dayan's policies were enforced in the main, not by terror or direct physical coercion, but by threats—of imprisonment, deportation, housing demolitions, and bureaucratic harassment.

In accord with Dayan's objective of gradual, de facto, but permanent "incorporation" of the territories into an Israeli sphere of control, and in return for employment possibilities in Israel and opportunities for trade and travel across the Jordan River, the Arabs of the territories assumed a generally passive role. This seemed moreover to grant the PLO the leadership role it desired while also providing an excuse to let events on the ground take their course. In this context commercial strikes could be called to protest new restrictions or taxes, petitions and court appeals could be filed ad infinitum in protest against land expropriation and settlement practices, and innumerable appeals could be issued to foreign dignitaries or sympathetic Israelis, but no general strikes could be sustained, no period of violent or semiviolent protest could be maintained for more than a month or two, and no territories-wide, coordinated attempts to overcome Israeli repression were forthcoming.

Explaining the Intifada as a Revolutionary Episode

So what accounts for the intifada? Before examining answers that have been offered, some comments on the literature it has generated are in order. Most of what has been written about the intifada, including books reviewed here, has focused on documenting its character as a heroic, mass participatory, sustained, but mostly nonviolent (or only "semiviolent") rebellion. Most of these studies are written by Palestinians, by Arab, American, or European scholars sympathetic to the historic plight of the Palestinians, or by participant-observer journalists or anthropologists. Reading their work, particularly the contributions in the Lockman and Beinin and Nassar and Heacock volumes, it is easy to appreciate the tremendous surge of enthusiasm, excitement, and wonder that accompanied the first few months, or even most of the first year of the uprising. For the first time in twenty years of occupation the Israelis appeared to be on the defensive. The response of the political authorities and the army was confused and ineffective. The reversal of the David and Goliath template, with Palestinian youth now holding the slingshot, attracted enormous media attention and was as exhilarating to Palestinians and their friends as it was depressing and maddening to Israelis who did not sympathize with the Palestinian struggle. While *Les Miserables* was fill-

ing theater halls in Israel, offering audiences the vicarious thrill of justice demanded against all odds, Palestinians built their own barricades and savored the real thing.

Three kinds of leaders emerged within weeks of the initial outburst. In urban neighborhoods, villages, and refugee camps thousands of young men and women assumed day-to-day responsibility for organizing "popular committees" to deal with specific issues, such as food, health care, security, education, and protest activities. Out of public view there also emerged a central coordinating leadership that issued communiqués in the name of the Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNLU) and the PLO. These contained instructions and advice for sustaining the uprising, schedules for strike activities, hours when businesses were to be opened and closed, and themes and slogans to be emphasized on different days. The Unified Command was comprised of representatives of each of the four main nationalist factions in the territories (that is, it did not include representatives of Muslim fundamentalist groups). Many of its most active members managed to elude capture for many months, and for several years at least the Command was able to replenish its ranks. It operated on the basis of consensus and assumed responsibility for judging how much to ask of Palestinians in their daily confrontation with Israeli soldiers and settlers. It maintained regular contact with the PLO's external leadership via telephone lines and facsimile machines, but (for the most part) deferred to the PLO leadership on the outside for strategic, diplomatic, or political decisions.

The third type of Palestinian leader associated with the uprising included professors, journalists, and familiar political personalities who mediated between the clandestine UNLU, the PLO, and the international and Israeli media. These people, like Sari Nusseibeh, Faisal Husayni, Hanan Ashrawi, Ziad Abu Ziad, Fayez Abu-Rahmah, and Hana Siniora, associated themselves with the uprising and claimed to articulate the sentiments of both Palestinians in the territories and the PLO; they used their ties with American and European diplomats and their status as media stars to dissuade the Israeli authorities from imprisoning or deporting them for their role in the intifada.[2] Though sometimes referred to with some cynicism by streetwise activists as the "Mickey Mouse" leaders, these are the people who emerged after the first years of the intifada as the PLO's link to the Palestinian delegation in Madrid and as those mainly in charge of conducting continuing negotiations with Israel and the United States.

[2] Most of these individuals, however, were held in administrative detention for various periods of time.

In its scale, intensity, and duration, if not in its tactics, the campaign of protest, resistance, and disengagement that these three strata of leaders were able to sustain was reminiscent of the Irish struggle against the British from 1919 to 1921. Between January 1919 and August 1921 British security forces killed 752 Irishmen and wounded 866. Five hundred and sixty soldiers and police were killed by the Irish during the same period. The rate of Irish Catholic deaths was approximately 23 per 100,000. With these figures in mind, one can appreciate the breadth of Palestinian mobilization, the massiveness of the repression exercised to contain it, as well as the distinctively nonlethal character of Palestinian actions against Israelis.

The total Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1987 was approximately 1.7 million. From the beginning of the uprising in December 1987 to the end of February 1991, 787 Palestinians in these areas were killed by soldiers, police, and Israeli settlers. During that same period 349 Palestinians were killed by other Arabs, under conditions of general lawlessness or as suspected collaborators. The rate of Palestinian deaths (at the hands of Israelis) was 43 per 100,000 inhabitants—nearly double that for the Irish during the Anglo-Irish War. In September 1990 the Israeli Army released statistics showing that 13,100 Palestinians had been wounded in the first thousand days of the uprising (compared with 2,500 Israeli soldiers and 1,100 Israeli civilians).[3] Palestinian sources reported much higher Arab casualty levels, showing more than 100,000 serious injuries suffered by Palestinians during the first three years of the uprising.[4] In the region of Nablus, in the northern West Bank, it was reported that 5 percent of the total population (9,740 out of 200,000) had been hospitalized for wounds, although most injured Arabs were not hospitalized (Hunter, 207). In the first two years of the uprising the army demolished 350 Arab homes and arrested 60,000 Palestinians.[5] Sixty people were deported, and 40,000 were held in administrative detention, that is, without indictment or trial.[6] One Israeli lawyer estimated that about

[3] *Haaretz*, April 2, 1991; and *Maariv*, September 5, 1990. Between December 1987 and February 1991, twenty-six Israelis were killed by Palestinians. The Israeli human rights group, Btzelem, also reported that during this period eighty-five additional Arabs, including thirty babies, died shortly after exposure to tear gas. More recently Btzelem reported that after five years of the intifada a total of 923 Palestinians had been killed by the security forces (i.e., excluding those killed by settlers) and that 675 Palestinians had been killed by other Palestinians. Kol Yisrael (Radio Israel) broadcast, December 8, 1992, transcribed by FBIS, *Daily Report: Near East and South Asia*, December 10, 1992, p. 31.

[4] See "The Human Costs of the Uprising," *Palestine Human Rights Campaign Newsletter* 11 (January 1991).

[5] *Davar*, October 31, 1989.

[6] As reported by the Israeli minister of justice, *Maariv*, November 17, 1989. In December 1991 the Israeli chief of staff reported that since the beginning of the uprising "nearly

25 percent of the Palestinian population passed through the military court system in the first years of the uprising (Hunter, 26). The economic losses sustained by the Palestinians in this short time were also substantial. In 1989 Palestinian incomes were between one-half and one-third of what they had been two years earlier (Hunter, 195).

All the authors whose work is represented in these volumes agree that particular events or developments acted as catalysts for the intifada, helping to explain its timing. To their credit, however, none contend that such "accidental" factors can explain more than that. A number of precipitating events figure prominently in these accounts: Palestinian disappointment at the failure of the 1987 Amman summit to attach a high priority to the predicament of Palestinians in the occupied territories; the inspiring success of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command hang glider attack on an Israeli army base in the Galilee; a bloody road accident in the Gaza Strip; Israeli attempts to commandeer water resources in the Bethlehem area; and brutal behavior of Druse border patrolmen in a large West Bank refugee camp. Again, these events are not put forth as explanations. Rather, their importance is identified only in relation to background developments or underlying processes whose effects created new conditions, conditions that then allowed incidents such as these to have a radically different kind of effect at the end of 1987 than similar events had had during the previous twenty years of occupation.

Explanations for the intifada, for this sudden, sustained, revolutionary expression of Palestinian political militance, can be sorted into variations on four overlapping themes:

—the intifada as an explosion caused by pent-up despair and humiliation

—the intifada as a strategic extension of the PLO's struggle to gain Palestinian national liberation

—the intifada as having sprung from and been modeled after grass-roots organizations active in the territories during the preceding decade

—the intifada as the reflection of changes in Israeli politics and policies toward the territories

The volume by Schiff and Ya'ari, Israel's veteran military and Arab affairs journalists, was published before the others; the Hebrew version appeared in early 1989. The first chapter (titled "The Surprise") describes the technical and tactical errors made by then Defense Minister

100,000" Palestinians had been held in various detention centers or prisons for intifada offenses.

Yitzhak Rabin, and the failures committed by the security services and military intelligence, which the authors say allowed the disturbances to erupt and prevented them from being brought under control quickly. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to provide the groundwork for an explanation of the intifada as an avoidable "accident." In fact the book concludes with an argument that conditions in the territories will require Israeli withdrawal and that such a move would serve Israel's national interests, including its security interests.

The purpose of this first chapter is instead to establish a rapport with Israeli readers. To put their controversial argument across, the authors need to avoid giving the impression of "vegetarianism" (Israeli slang for bleeding-heart attitudes toward Arabs). By offering the same sort of technical, tactical, and professional critiques leveled at the security establishment after the 1973 war and the Lebanon War, and by delivering harsh criticism of politicians (such as Yitzhak Rabin) identified with the antiannexationist side of the spectrum, they seek to earn the trust of Israeli readers as "professional," hardheaded, nonideological judges of Israeli interests. For similar reasons the authors are eager to demonstrate their "insider status" by explicitly citing their personal and confidential relations with Israeli military officers, the security services, the prison authorities, and the police. Indeed their primary source of information about participants in the intifada comes from classified reports by, and private interviews with, unnamed officers, operatives within various branches of the Israeli intelligence community, and Shin Bet (security service) interrogators.

Above all, Schiff and Ya'ari's explanation for the intifada emphasizes the cumulative rage of Palestinian refugees, workers, and farmers. In particular, they stress the unbearable conditions in Gaza refugee camps, the frightening new threats to divert some of what remained of the farmers' water resources to Israeli settlers, and, especially, the bitterness of Palestinians employed inside Israel at the routine humiliations inflicted upon them by soldiers, policemen, and border patrolmen. Even though they knew or cared little about the PLO or Palestinian nationalism, say Schiff and Ya'ari, once they witnessed a number of dramatic, horrifying, and/or inspiring confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians in 1986 and 1987, the Arab masses of the territories—villagers, refugees, and workers—could no longer contain their fury. When their rage erupted, it did so with such force and constancy, and in so many localities at roughly the same time, that the small Israeli units stationed in the territories lost their deterrent effect.

Schiff and Ya'ari credit the early organizers of the UNLU (most of

whom, they note, were deported) with courage, sophistication, and effectiveness. By contrast, they portray Arafat and the "outside" PLO as undeserving but jealous claimants to the mantle of Palestinian leadership—as individuals who claimed responsibility for a mass mobilization of Palestinian sentiment that they neither anticipated nor understood.

The other authors of these studies are more explicitly sympathetic to the goals of the intifada and the aspirations of Palestinians. While they would agree with Schiff and Ya'ari about the privations endured by Palestinians under Israeli occupation and about the dimensions of popular anger, most would reject as inadequate or pejorative the "volcano" theory of the intifada these two authors are said to present, a theory that attributes Palestinian mobilization to the kind of blind emotion usually associated with mobs or with primitive peoples, but not with disciplined and worthy national movements. Opponents of this explanation argue that it devalues Palestinian political action, Palestinian heroism, and the effectiveness and sophistication of Palestinian organization. They hold that reliance on overwhelming, determinative surges of emotion recapitulates analytically the same kind of error made by those who before the uprising had adopted the view of an irreversible juggernaut of Israeli annexation, thereby underestimating the autonomous importance of political and organizational factors.[7]

While stressing the unleashed rage of Palestinians as an underlying factor, almost all interpreters of the intifada characterize it as an unprecedentedly broad and sustained mobilization of the Palestinian masses in a direct, disciplined political struggle against Israelis. Since most observers agree that the degree of oppression and discontent in the occupied territories had long before the late-1980s reached a point capable of justifying the sacrifices necessary in such a struggle, explanations for the timing of the intifada, its character, its successes, and its failures resolve into explanations of how the Palestinians finally managed to develop organizational frameworks and mobilizational techniques to overcome Israeli repressive capacities.

The enthusiasm for the intifada of some of these writers is tempered somewhat by their obvious concern that its success might contribute to Israeli efforts to marginalize the PLO by substituting the problem of the West Bank and Gaza for the larger historical problem of Palestinian self-determination and the future of masses of Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. An argument devel-

[7] See Hiltermann, 174–76; Samir Abdallah Saleh, "The Effects of Israeli Occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip," in Nassar and Heacock, 48; and Salim Tamari, "What the Uprising Means," in Lockman and Beinin, 134.

oped and emphasized by Helga Baumgarten and Ali Jarbawi in their contributions to the Nassar and Heacock volume, Rashid Khalidi in his contribution to the Lockman and Beinin volume, and by Don Peretz is that although the intifada was in some degree "spontaneous," it must be understood as the product of a partnership between inside and outside leadership cadres, all affiliated with the PLO or, more specifically, with the four major factions associated with it—Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party. Without the nation-building work, organizational foundation, and political experience gained from twenty years of PLO activity, they contend, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza would not have had the political maturity or the organizational density to sustain their struggle beyond an initial outburst.[8] Nor would the Palestinian people as a whole have been able to translate sacrifices on the ground into diplomatic achievements and international pressure on Israel. While Baumgarten goes so far as to suggest that the intifada was instigated according to a plan developed by Arafat, this is an extreme view and shades into an early Israeli interpretation of the uprising that most of these writers (including Baumgarten) reject out of hand, namely, that the intifada was the result of "outside agitation."[9]

The politically correct Palestinian position, advanced by most writers, runs as follows: The timing of the intifada was spontaneous, the result of circumstances on the ground in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its energy was drawn from the grass-roots level of Palestinian society. There is not and never was any real separation at all between intifada activists in the occupied territories and the "external" PLO leadership. The Pales-

[8] Helga Baumgarten, " 'Discontented People' and 'Outside Agitators': The PLO in the Palestinian Uprising," in Nassar and Heacock, pp. 207–26; Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories: Stability and Change through the *Intifada*," in Nassar and Heacock, 287–305; Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinian People: Twenty-two Years after 1967," in Lockman and Beinin, 113–26; Peretz, 87–90.

[9] Although both Israeli officials and experts fairly quickly abandoned early characterizations of the uprising as the transient result of the activities of a small number of inciters, much of the work that has been done on the intifada by Israeli Arabists (professional advisers and experts on Arab affairs often enjoying close ties to the government and the security services) does tend to ignore the populist base and cellular organization of the uprising, which were among its most salient features. Ironically, by focusing on the role of the external PLO leadership, these studies implicitly endorse a view of the PLO, led from the outside, as virtually the only mobilizational framework within the Palestinian community—a view substantially in tension with the official Israeli rejection of the PLO as the Palestinians' "sole legitimate representative" and its insistence on the separability of the problem of the inhabitants of the territories from that of Palestinians living outside Palestine. See especially contributions by Asher Susser, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, and Matti Steinberg, in Gad Gilbar and Asher Susser, eds., *B'Ayn HaSichsuch: HaIntifada* (At the core of the conflict: The intifada) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1992).

tine Liberation Organization, it is said, enjoyed the allegiance of Palestinians from all walks of life both "inside" (in the occupied territories) and "outside" (in the Palestinian diaspora). On that basis, it was able to build an organizational structure of resistance that empowered Palestinians to revolt, produced a united leadership on the ground to guide the revolt, and then coordinated an international political and diplomatic campaign to exploit the new circumstances created by the intifada. Once launched, the tasks of leadership were divided between the UNLU (including representatives of each of the three main PLO factions and the Palestinian Communist Party), which decided on tactics and schedules for protest activities, and the PLO leadership outside, which decided on political and diplomatic moves.

The intifada is thereby cast as but one stage in the long-standing Palestinian struggle for national liberation, not as the Palestinian revolution itself. A number of writers, however, even while paying lip service to the PLO's status as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," analyze the cause of the intifada as associated with the PLO's failures—failure to cope with the real needs of the people under occupation, failure to produce a plan capable of halting Israel's de facto incorporation of the territories, and failure to maintain unity among its factions. An unintended result of these failures, these authors argue, was that Palestinians in the territories developed their own organized resistance to the occupation, which was more effective than anything the external leadership of the PLO had been able to devise or implement. These arguments are presented against a generally agreed-upon background narrative of the PLO's struggle, which in the context of this review must be made explicit.

Once Israel crushed PLO attempts in the first few years of the occupation to wage a Guevara-type guerrilla war in the territories, the organization cast about for ways to maintain its leadership position. The PLO was uncomfortable with communist efforts in the early 1970s to organize the Palestinian National Front (PNF), a semiclandestine umbrella organization coordinating political struggle within the territories with the explicit aim of creating an independent Palestinian state alongside of Israel. Fearing that such initiatives might lead to a local leadership operating outside its control, the PLO gave the PNF only lukewarm support and was not displeased when it was uprooted by the Israelis. On the other hand, the PLO fully endorsed the Egyptian and Syrian war launched in October 1973 as a means of liberating captured Arab territories. But that conflict, although it led to return of the Sinai to Egypt, left Syria with only a small slice of the Golan and left the Palestinians

with nothing but an offer of Begin-style autonomy—that is, a fig leaf for de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel.

The PLO's primary response to the Camp David Accords was to strengthen its political and military base in Lebanon while joining with Jordan and other Arab states to channel funds to its supporters in the territories. The state within a state in Lebanon was meant to shelter the military and civilian PLO organizations, while keeping at least the principle of armed struggle alive. Financial contributions from the Arab states, delivered to Palestinians in the territories under the joint auspices of the PLO and Jordan, were calculated not only to increase local "steadfastness" against Israeli efforts to buy land and encourage large-scale emigration but also to prevent the emergence within the occupied territories of an alternative leadership with the prestige and resources to challenge the PLO on the outside.

But the PLO suffered crippling blows when Israel invaded Lebanon, on a small scale in 1978 and on a much larger scale in 1982. The 1982 war was an extended operation that penetrated all the way to Beirut and destroyed the PLO's political, economic, administrative, and military base in that country. Although the organization survived and continued to enjoy the expressed loyalty of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians, its forced relocation to Tunis was symbolic of its estrangement from the daily life of Palestinians under Israeli occupation.

After the war the PLO was caught in an increasingly cruel dilemma. The settlement and land expropriation policies of the Begin and then Shamir governments in the early 1980s aroused fear among West Bank and Gaza Arabs that permanent incorporation of the territories into Israel would soon be an irreversible fact of life, setting the stage for Israel to push them out of Palestine entirely. This led to calls for drastic compromise, to "save what could be saved" before it was too late; if the PLO accepted this logic, however, it would risk displacement by Jordan or by leaders from the territories with whom the Israelis would be more likely to negotiate. Furthermore, it would open itself to accusations of betrayal by its core constituencies within the Palestinian diaspora who hoped for a state in Palestine to which they might someday return. On the other hand, if the PLO rejected pleas by West Bank and Gaza Palestinians for more flexibility, it risked losing whatever chances for a negotiated solution still existed and alienating itself from the mass of Palestinians still living in Palestine. Meanwhile, the PLO's rivalry with Jordan, corruption of many of its agents in the territories, factional disputes over political strategy and the disbursement of funds, and increasingly stringent Israeli policies pushed Palestinians toward new forms of mobilization.

According to some of the most perspicacious studies of the intifada, the secret of the uprising lies in the weakening of the PLO's direct influence over events in the territories and in the frustration of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians with its ineffectiveness or venality. These analysts emphasize the crystallization of grass-roots organizations in all spheres of Palestinian life under occupation—organizations that began forming in the late 1970s. They provided needed services within a nationalist context, but without relying on external financial assistance or guidance from national-level leaders.

David McDowall advanced one of the strongest versions of this argument: he portrayed West Bank and Gaza Palestinians as having become disillusioned with a PLO leadership it considered too close to Jordanian interests and too ready to make concessions to Israel. According to McDowall, in the late 1970s and early 1980s local Palestinian intellectuals realized the corrupting and debilitating effects of donations from abroad on Palestinians in the territories; this referred not only to funds delivered by the PLO-Jordan Joint Committee, but also to aid from international charities and remittances from relatives working in oil-rich states of the Gulf. Their response was to build frameworks for action that blended nationalist purposes with practical solutions to housing, educational, health, legal, and economic problems. These organizations were to constitute a Palestinian mobilizational base free of outside influence and capable of sustaining a long struggle for the complete liberation of Palestine. As described by McDowall, these intellectuals envisioned grass-roots organizations operating under local leadership and according to participatory norms that would produce more Palestinian activists than Israel could ever imprison or deport.

McDowall's portrayal of this movement as an engineered response by West Bank intellectuals to PLO policies perceived as dangerously moderate, or as reflecting their strategic, a priori analysis of the Palestinian predicament, is overdrawn. By "intellectuals" he seems to mean the second-echelon leaders of the Communist Party and the main anti-Fatah factions of the PLO—the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These elements did play a crucial role in the intifada and many of them did resent and distrust the external PLO leadership. But in the early 1980s the majority of Palestinians in the territories, including intellectuals, greatly feared the near-term consequences of Israel's annexationist policies. Their frustration with the PLO was not that it was wavering in its commitment to the complete liberation of Palestine, but that it did not seem capable of beginning negotiations with Israel over more attainable goals or of re-

sponding to the actual needs of Palestinians in the territories confronted with the apparent Israelization of the territories. Studies of volunteer work cooperatives, health care organizations, women's organizations, trade unions, student associations, youth groups in refugee camps, and other grass-roots organizations repeatedly show that these mobilizing frameworks for collective action evolved gradually, from discrete, small-scale, cooperative responses to the practical needs of Palestinians in various sectors or locales, into networks linked through representatives of the various PLO factions to the overall nationalist movement.[10] The predominant tone of their nationalist appeals was not a rejection of compromise with Israel, but a more generalized commitment to Palestinian statehood and to the principle of basing the struggle for national rights on the empowerment of masses of Palestinians. The strategic emphasis was disengagement from Israel, leaving political and diplomatic decisions to the external leadership of the PLO.[11]

Nonetheless, McDowall's identification of the "popular organizations" as a crucial innovation in Palestinian resistance to the occupation, his contention that they emerged as the result of frustration with the PLO, his identification of the crucial role of activists from various PLO factions in their formation, and his argument that they formed the seedbed of the intifada are echoed by excellent studies published subsequently by Joost Hiltermann, F. Robert Hunter, and Salim Tamari. Although Hunter argues that the PLO sought to control the influence of grass-roots movements in the territories by authorizing mayors, intellectuals, and notables

[10] For accounts of the pre-intifada development of such grass-roots organizations and the crucial mobilizational role they played, see Islah Abdul Jawwad, "The Evolution of the Political Role of the Palestinian Women's Movement in the Uprising," in Hudson, 63–76; Lisa Taraki, "The Development of Political Consciousness among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, 1967–1987," in Nassar and Heacock, 59–62; Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, "The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance: The Case of Health," in Nassar and Heacock, 73–87; Hiltermann, passim; Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the *Intifada*," in Nassar and Heacock, 107–9; Peretz, 74; Salim Tamari, "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising," in Brynen, 20–22; and Hillel Frisch, "MiMaavak Mizuyan Legiyus Politi: Temurot BiEstrategiya shel Ashaf BiShtachim" (From armed struggle to political mobilization: Trends in PLO strategy in the territories), in Gilbar and Susser (fn. 9), esp. 50–58. On the predominant role of the four major PLO factions in the territories, see esp. Hiltermann, 64–66, 173–217; Hunter, 65–66; Jarbawi (fn. 8), 296–300; and Jawwad, in Hudson.

[11] Regarding pre-intifada attitudes of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians toward a "separate state" solution with Israel, see Ann Mosely Lesch, *Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1980); Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988); Moshe Ma'oz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); Ann Mosely Lesch and Mark Tessler, *Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *Middle East Journal* 42 (Winter 1988).

to act as its semiofficial representatives, he also cites Fatah's mobilization of its West Bank supporters to compete with Communist Party/PNF organizing in the late 1970s as a key step in the development of a mass-based nationalist movement in the territories (pp. 31, 78–79). Hiltermann's book contains a detailed, informant-based analysis of Palestinian labor and women's organizations in the decade preceding the uprising. According to Hiltermann, the PLO provided the strategic context for these and other popular organizations to contribute to the nationalist movement. He criticizes intra-PLO factionalism as the biggest obstacle to the attainment of Palestinian rights and like other authors cites the PLO Congress in Algiers in April 1987, where substantial progress was made toward unity among rival organizations, as an essential precondition for the beginning of the intifada.

Hiltermann's main purpose, however, is to explain the growth of the popular organizations as the response of (mostly leftist) activists in the territories to the conservatism of Fatah's policies from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. Although, as Hunter points out, the PLO authorized formation of mass-based organizations, the established leadership of Fatah channeled its monetary resources to businessmen, urban notables, and established professionals, thereby delaying the growth of these organizations and intensifying factional jealousies within them. But as these "joint (Jordanian-PLO) committee" funds dried up, disappearing entirely in 1985, the popular organizations were forced to find their own resources. Hiltermann identifies resource scarcity and intense competition among rival factions as conditions helping to lay the groundwork for the intifada by increasing the number of Palestinians mobilized by the unions and women's organizations. No longer able to depend on outside funds, they were forced to develop innovative techniques for responding to the concrete problems of their constituents. Fearful that their own organizations would be overshadowed by more successful rivals, each PLO faction, in every locality and organizational setting, worked desperately to mobilize recruits from among groups not previously drawn into political activity—especially women, refugees, and workers commuting to jobs in Israel. By competing with each other within each organizational setting the PLO factions not only added useful services to the nationalist appeals they offered but also decentralized and democratized their operations.[12] By proliferating at the grass-roots level, these organizations produced enough capable leaders in enough different localities to

[12] Hiltermann, pp. 65–66; Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919–1989," in Nassar and Heacock, 131; Salim Tamari (fn. 10), 22; and Taraki (fn. 10), 67.

frustrate the Israeli policy of decapitating Palestinian organizations by regularly imprisoning or deporting leaders who emerged at the national or regional level.

In one of his three contributions to these volumes Salim Tamari emphasizes the failure of the Palestinians in the territories to launch the uprising earlier. His explanation for this "nonevent" includes unusually pointed criticism of both the PLO and its most visible supporters within the territories (Tamari, in Brynen, 13–28). The funds for "steadfastness" (*sumud*) distributed by Jordan and the PLO, he argues, smothered the development of nationalist consciousness, reinforced the power of clan leaders and other traditional elites, and stifled the growth of effective forms of resistance—not in the least by allowing the Palestinian bourgeoisie to appear patriotic simply by staying in Palestine and feathering its nest. According to Tamari, the radically populist grass-roots organizations that propelled the intifada were the response of thousands of lower-echelon activists disgusted by the model of a nationalist resistance leadership whose only form of struggle was the construction of more lavish residences.

Tamari's candid and critical treatment reflects one of the many ironic symmetries between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. A prominent and psychologically revealing theme in Israeli analyses of Zionism's success and its validity as a national movement is the extent to which the development of Zionism was a function of stresses, forces, ideas, and choices made *within* the Jewish community. By explaining outcomes as functions of *self-created* conditions and real struggles *inside* their community, for status, power, and material resources, Palestinian authors highlight in the structure of their argumentation the ontological integrity of their people's claim to separate national existence. By advancing this kind of analysis, rather than portrayals of Jews or Palestinians as reacting to or manipulated by outside forces, both Zionists and Palestinian nationalists have sought to establish their peoples as subjects, not just objects, of politics and history—even at the cost of exposing unattractive aspects of their own communities. Thus, much of the impetus for the kind of explanations for the intifada advanced in the work by Palestinians (and other sympathetic analysts, most notably Hiltermann) is to depict their people as commanding their own fate by reacting to their own self-created predicaments in creative and determinative ways.

An equally prominent theme in the studies under review is an effort to trace forms of Palestinian struggle and their differential success to the nature of the Palestinians' primary antagonist and to changes in Israeli politics and policies. On the simplest level this is the argument of the

colonial dialectic. By seeking ruthless and complete domination over Palestinians in the territories, and by making real threats to force them out of Palestine altogether, the "internal colonization" of the territories is seen as having "sown the seeds of its own destruction," giving rise to counterhegemonic mobilization based on the unification of the entire Palestinian community.[13]

Construed as a colonialist phenomenon, one of the distinctive aspects of Zionism, both inside Israel and within the territories, is its exclusivity—its unwillingness, in principle as well as in practice, to consider non-Jews, and particularly Arabs, as capable of becoming full-fledged members of the Israeli-Jewish national community.[14] Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock thus make a telling point in their discussion of the intifada's unprecedentedly successful campaign against collaborators and informers.[15] In light of Zionism's ethnonational exclusivity, and in the absence of any Israeli formula for satisfying minimal Palestinian political and material demands, they note that "even collaborators were never and could never have become convinced Zionists, proponents of Greater Israel, or even convinced advocates of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands." Accordingly, the only Palestinians used in this way by the Israelis were individuals with highly suspect personal histories who commanded no respect among Palestinians generally and/or against whom the authorities could use various types of blackmail and bribery (Nassar and Heacock, 202). In this sense the ideological inability of Israel to advance a plausible hegemonic project for Palestinians as part of its control of the territories made those it called *shitufei peula* (collaborators) less useful than those who served the British (the Royal Irish Constabulary in Ireland; the Gurkhas and the Raj in India; the monarchy in Egypt) and French (tribal chiefs and *évolués* in French West Africa; traditional regional magnates in Morocco; the *harkis* in Algeria) in comparable capacities. This meant, ceteris paribus, that a united "anticolonialist" counter-

[13] Samih K. Farsoun and Jean M. Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the *Intifada*," in Nassar and Heacock, 19.

[14] See Ian S. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); and Yoav Peled, "Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State," *American Political Science Review* 86 (June 1992), 432–43.

[15] This campaign against informers was highly successful in the first year of the uprising; but it degenerated later after a prolonged period of lawless conditions within Palestinian communities whose policemen had resigned, and as a result of systematic disinformation and ruthless counterintelligence operations by the Shin Bet and special Israeli army units disguised as Arabs. The best evidence for this sequence is the virtual prohibition imposed by Israeli censors on public discussion in Israel about Palestinian anticollaborationist activities in the first year of the uprising, followed, in 1989, by the high profile accorded by Israeli government officials to Palestinian killings of "suspected collaborators."

mobilization was easier for Palestinians to achieve than it otherwise might have been.

I have already noted the extent to which these authors explain the grass-roots "cellular" nature of the uprising as an unintended consequence of Israeli policies that criminalized politics of any sort and targeted regionally or nationally based Palestinian leaders for imprisonment or deportation. In these works the timing of the intifada—the fact that it took twenty years to materialize—is also seen at least in part as a function of change in the nature of Israeli policies. Specifically, many of these authors trace the uprising to the consequences of the 1977 political "reversal" in Israel.[16]

The Labor Party–led coalition governments that formulated and implemented occupation policies from 1967 to 1977 were fundamentally ambivalent about the future of the territories, fearful of embarking on decisive attempts to absorb or relinquish them because of the imperatives of coalition politics, and convinced of the advisability of using a carrot-and-stick approach with the Arabs who lived there. Despite land expropriation, strict limits on water use, and irritating restrictions on their daily life, many Palestinians managed to get along, if not prosper economically, as long as they stayed well clear of politics. When the Likud replaced the Labor Party as the organizer of Israeli governments, however, the fundamental meaning of the occupation changed. Under Begin, Sharon, and Shamir, the official policy of the government was to do everything possible to ensure that the territories could have no future other than permanent absorption by Israel. The carrots were largely removed from Likud government policies toward the Arabs, massive land expropriations were implemented, and under Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan and Defense Minister Sharon, policies of repression became markedly more brutal and less discriminating. Along with large-scale programs of Jewish settlement, these policies were designed to make life for Arabs so miserable that as many as possible would choose to leave.

The effect, however, was to unify the Palestinian population behind the idea of struggling collectively against the occupation rather than seeking individual options of accommodation. Tamari's essay in the Nassar and Heacock volume, for example, focuses on the merchants and the urban bourgeoisie, groups that had managed to do rather well under the occupation until Israel's introduction of a value-added tax in the territories in 1976. When the second Likud government greatly intensified

[16] Israeli commentators have labeled the return of the Labor Party to power after the June 1992 elections, following fifteen years of Likud domination of the political scene, as another *maapach*.

tax collection activities and staffed the military government with officers hostile to the very existence of Arab communities in the West Bank and Gaza, merchants, shopkeepers, and urban entrepreneurs found themselves unable to maintain their middle-class standard of living. This left them as frightened of the consequences of continued Israeli rule as other, previously more vulnerable classes of Palestinians. As Tamari puts it:

> A combination of increasing tax pressures and a shift in the perception of the military government, which now saw the urban middle classes as part of a hostile subject population rather than as part of a "pragmatic majority that wants to live quietly" (a shift that was itself brought about by the ascendancy to power, and the staffing of the military government, by extreme right-wing elements) . . . hastened the process of involving the shopkeepers as willful activists in the uprising.[17]

The most profound sense in which the intifada is a reflection of its antagonist has to do with Palestinian perceptions of Israel as "rational." Thus, the uprising is described by almost all of these analysts as in large measure an attempt to change the balance of costs and benefits experienced by Israelis in their rule of the territories—an attempt rooted in the belief or unexamined assumption that Israelis and the Israeli political system are rational enough to respond to determinations that the occupation is not worth the price needed to sustain it. Indeed, it is ironic that in the 1980s, while many Israeli antiannexationists were despairing of their country's decline into the irrationalities of Jewish fundamentalism and ultranationalism, and while others believed their state to be locked into an antiaccommodationist stance by processes of settlement pushed well beyond the "point of no return," most Palestinians retained an image of Israel, if not of the Likud government, as a rational, responsive, adaptive entity.

The strategic rationale for the intifada as a calibrated mobilization designed to effect profound changes in Israeli public opinion and Israeli government policies is manifested in these writings by evaluations of its relative success in terms of changes made in Israeli cost/benefit calcula-

[17] Salim Tamari, "The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie: Urban Merchants and the Palestinian Uprising," in Nassar and Heacock, 163. Regarding this particular dialectic between exclusivist Israeli annexationism and the widening basis for Palestinian mobilization, see also Tamari (fn. 10), 14–18; Samir Abdallah Saleh, "The Effects of Israeli Occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip," in Nassar and Heacock, 37–51; Farsoun and Landis (fn. 13), 19–27; and Hunter, 47. For a case study of a Palestinian family that illuminates how the transformation of Israeli policies under the Likud eliminated any economic opportunities for Palestinians willing to accommodate themselves to Israeli rule (thereby producing the basis for the broad, cross-class alliance of forces that produced and sustained the uprising), see Beshara Doumani, "Family and Politics in Salfit," in Lockman and Beinin, 143–54.

tions regarding the value of continuing the occupation. All agree that the uprising changed these calculations. Most describe the occupation as having been a net benefit to Israel (in economic terms especially) before 1987 and a net drain afterward; they note this shift as a necessary but not sufficient condition for bringing an end to Israeli rule.

Raja Shehadeh, for example, while acknowledging the difficulties of estimation associated with Israel's refusal to announce its own budget for administering the territories, states "without reservation" that before the intifada "the occupation in no way constituted an economic burden for Israel." Quoting from work done by Meron Benvenisti's West Bank Survey Data Project, Shehadeh reports $800 million in nonlocal taxes paid to Israel by Arab inhabitants of the territories in the first twenty years of the occupation. Another $1 billion in insurance and benefits were deducted from the wages of Palestinians working inside of Israel and transferred to Israeli general accounts to which Palestinians have virtually no access. Other sources of revenue include a host of fees and permits required of Arabs in the occupied territories. In 1986, for example, $35 million was collected in permits, fees, and travel taxes at the Jordan River bridges.[18] By contrast, the Bank of Israel reported that in its first year the intifada cost Israel $650 million in export losses, reduced business sector production by 1.5 percent, sharply reduced Israel's "trade surplus" with the territories, and produced $180 million in "nationally motivated" arson. In September 1989 the Defense Ministry announced that it expected the simple military cost of fighting the uprising to reach $1.8 billion by the end of fiscal year 1990.[19]

In his somewhat more nuanced analyses Azmy Bishara portrays the intifada as having "made the occupation a losing economic proposition for Israel," but emphasizes that "the uprising cannot defeat Israel economically" (in Lockman and Beinin, 225–26). Because of the polarization of Israeli politics on the issue of the disposition of the territories, Bishara argues that transformation of the occupation into an economic and even political liability is a necessary but hardly sufficient condition for Israeli withdrawal. An Israeli decision to leave the territories, he suggests, will

[18] Shehadeh, "Israel and the Palestinians: Human Rights in the OTs," in Brynen, 37.

[19] Ibid., 38. Howard Rosen uses the figure of $1 billion, or 2–2.5% of Israel's annual GDP, as the cost of the intifada to the Israeli economy in 1988 and 1989. Rosen, "Economic Consequences of the Intifada," in Robert O. Freedman, ed., *The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers* (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991), 384. Quoting figures published in the Israeli press, Azmy Bishara reports that Israel's annual pre-intifada tax revenue from the territories exceeded its expenditures there by $143 million. See Bishara, "The Uprising's Impact on Israel," in Lockman and Beinin, 225–26. See also Peretz, 150–51. Samir Abdallah Saleh's judgment in 1989 was that if the intifada had not made the occupation a net economic liability for Israel, it had made it "tangibly less profitable." Saleh (fn. 16), 49.

require more Israeli casualties, strong external pressure, and an alliance between Israeli antiannexationists and Palestinians to overcome the political power of the Israeli right wing and make the "irrationality" of the occupation politically decisive.[20]

The predominant view of the intifada—as the Palestinians' response to their confrontation with an adversary perceived to be at least sluggishly rational—is also reflected in the sparse and generally hostile treatment most of these authors give to the Islamicist dimension of the uprising. Apart from Jean-François Legrain's excellent treatment of the role played by Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the outbreak of the intifada in the Gaza Strip, and Schiff and Ya'ari's discussion of the difficulties encountered by Israeli interrogators as they sought to "crack" imprisoned members of these organizations (p. 230), few of these authors offer any serious consideration of Muslim fundamentalism in the uprising.[21] This lacuna is mainly attributable to the political sympathies of the authors. It reflects the dominant Palestinian view of Israel, at least as conveyed by these books, as rational, adaptive, and capable of change in response to convincingly and painfully sustained Palestinian demands. The Islamicists challenge this view, and undermine the strategy based upon it, by describing Israel as evil incarnate and rejecting any accommodation with the Jewish state. They equate the intifada with jihad and promote images of Israel as a blind, nonrational power structure incapable of satisfying the minimal needs of Palestinian Arabs. For Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the solution to the problem of the Palestinians is not, as the nationalist leadership of the intifada presents it, to elicit change in and from Israel (via application of direct or indirect pressures) but to define the problem as part of the worldwide challenge facing Islam and then to mobilize Islamic forces inside and outside of Palestine to destroy or dismantle the Jewish state.[22]

Consequences of the Intifada

It is not surprising that these books, written while the intifada was still unfolding, spend much more time explaining its etiology and dynamics

[20] Bishara, "The Third Factor: Impact of the Intifada on Israel," in Nassar and Heacock, 276–85.

[21] Jean-François Legrain, "The Islamic Movement and the Intifada," in Nassar and Heacock, 175–90.

[22] See, e.g., Lisa Taraki's attack on Hamas as either an instrument of Israel or a cynical attempt to carve out a niche for itself in the future Palestinian state as the "Islamic opposition." Implicit in Taraki's depiction of Israel, and of her praise of the UNLU for the "clarity of its political vision and . . . the concreteness of its aims" is that the Jewish state is substantially more rational than Hamas's desperate strategy implies. Taraki, "The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising," in Lockman and Beinin, 174–75.

than its consequences. The Brynen and Hudson volumes do contain many contributions that treat the uprising's effects on various Arab countries, Europe, the Soviet Union/Russia, and the United States. But despite initial claims by the editors of these volumes about the powerful regional and international repercussions of the intifada, most of the essays show the opposite—that except for Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian communities in Israel and the territories, the uprising has not been a watershed of any kind. Rather, both masses and elites elsewhere tended to experience it as one digressive, short-lived episode among many, which was soon subsumed within the patterns, cycles, and categories of political life in each country. In Egypt, Syria, and North Africa the impact of the uprising on events and attitudes was either marginal or short-lived or both. In the United States its impact, though also shallow, was nevertheless consequential, because of America's enormous importance in the Arab-Israeli political equation. Of greatest significance was the new impetus toward "evenhandedness" and diplomatic activism in American foreign policy in the waning months of the Reagan administration and during the Bush presidency.[23]

Among the Palestinians and in Israel, however, the uprising is portrayed as having effected a fundamental break with the past. Having finally succeeded in putting Israel on the political, diplomatic, and moral defensive, and with Jordan having officially and substantially cut its ties to the West Bank and Gaza, their Arab inhabitants, it is said, will never again be consigned to the political oblivion of the previous twenty years—neither by Israel nor by the PLO. The former leadership of the notables, already weakened, is now gone for good. If the uprising has not led to a revolution in gender relations or cultural attitudes, it has mobilized tens of thousands of men and women into an active engagement in political life of a sort they had never imagined possible.[24]

Within Israel, as Mark Tessler describes most systematically, the inti-

[23] The most useful discussions of the particular effects of the intifada in various Arab countries are Lamis Andoni, "Jordan," in Brynen, 165–94; and Fred Lawson, "Syria," in Brynen, 215–34. See also F. Gregory Gause III, "The Arab World and the Intifada," in Freedman (fn. 18), 191–219.

[24] Regarding the greatly increased clout of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians within the Palestinian movement as a whole, see Khalidi (fn. 8), 124–26. On the irreversible effect of the intifada's psychological, cultural, and political vitalization of the occupied territories on Palestinians, see Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, "The Politics of Cultural Revival," in Hudson, 77–83; Rex Brynen, "Israel and Palestine: Implications of the Intifada," in Brynen, 7–9; and Hunter, 216. Regarding the displacement of traditional elites, see, for example, Bargouti (fn. 10), 110–18. On the significant but very incomplete success of Palestinian women in their efforts to use the intifada to advance gender equality, see Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, "Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers," in Lockman and Beinin, 155–70; Jad (fn. 11), 125–42; and Jawwad (fn. 10), 63–76.

fada forced the previously most popular policy toward the territories—maintenance of the status quo—virtually to disappear from surveys of public opinion as an option favored by respondents. While short-run reactions included higher proportions of Israelis favoring mass deportations of Arabs, the more lasting and substantial effect of the intifada was to convince more Israelis more fully of the attractiveness of separating the two communities—whether by banning entry of West Bank and Gaza Arabs into Israel proper, deporting them from the territories, or by ending Israeli rule of the territories.[25] Although the rise to power of a Labor-led government that would in principle be willing to grant Palestinian demands for an end to Israeli rule was the central objective of the uprising leadership, no author anticipated that it would occur as rapidly as it did.

Still the most prominent judgments offered about the effects of the intifada on Israel are consistent with images of the Jewish state as at least sluggishly adaptive. Tessler and other authors stress the significance of reinvigorating the substantive importance of the pre-1967 border, the "green line" separating Israel from the territories. The intifada delivered a mortal blow to Israeli annexationist efforts to erase that line from the everyday life of Israelis, to routinize the incorporation of the territories into Israel and thereby remove the question of what to do with the West Bank and Gaza from the agenda of Israeli politics (Tessler, in Brynen, 63–66). If the Palestinians are ever to see an end to the occupation and the fulfillment of their demand for national self-determination, this reproblematization of the territories—making changing cost/benefit calculations meaningful in the Israeli political debate and relevant to Israeli policy choices—was a necessary step.[26]

A crucial element in this regard was the insistence of the intifada leadership and of the PLO outside that the appropriate role of Israeli Arabs (the "Palestinians of 1948") was not to join the uprising but to support it from within Israel with material assistance and political pressure. As Nadim Rouhana's research thoroughly documents, Israeli Arabs steered clear of integrating themselves into the uprising, which vividly reinforced the green line by allowing their legal status as citizens within Israel to take precedence over their emotional, national, and even family

[25] Tessler, "The Impact of the *Intifada* on Israeli Political Thinking," in Brynen, 43–96. The question of whether the Rabin government will actually reach and implement an agreement with the Palestinians that would lead to such an outcome is an open and quite different question. For another highly nuanced analysis of the impact of the first year and a half of the intifada on Israeli society, see Peretz, 119–62.

[26] See Ian Lustick, "Israeli State-Building in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Theory and Practice," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987).

ties to Arabs a few miles away in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[27] As a result of what in this and other respects was an extraordinarily well calibrated struggle, leading Israelis to feel relatively safe on one side of the green line and in danger on the other, few Israelis could insist that there were no differences between Jewish-ruled territory on either side of the green line or that the eventual disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was not an open and serious question facing the country.

The Intifada as Evidence for Theories of Collective Action

Conspicuously missing from these studies of the Palestinian uprising is any sustained discussion of conceptual or theoretical issues. With the partial exception of Hiltermann, no serious attempt is made to use theories or concepts of collective action or revolution to explain the onset, development, or consequences of the uprising. Nor are these authors interested in criticizing or corroborating claims advanced in those literatures on the basis of what they learned from the events they recounted. Even Hiltermann limits himself to introductory nods to work by Jeffery Paige and Charles Tilly and an overall Smelserian framework for considering how mobilizational facilities combine with increasing structural strain to produce mass political action.

The most prominent themes and motifs in these studies do, however, correspond to the main points of contemporary debate about how revolutions and other forms of collective action should be studied. Recall, for example, the strong attacks by most of these authors on "volcano" accounts of the intifada, accounts that attribute the uprising to an uncontrolled explosion of pent-up anger and resentment. These attacks echo what has now become conventional wisdom in pertinent theoretical discussions—rejection of efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s to explain revolts, implicitly classified as nonrational, violent, and/or "deviant" outbursts of disorder, by aggregate measures of discontent, frustration, or anomie.

The single most important theoretical impetus for studying the relationship between discontent and collective action has been rational choice. Rational-choice and game-theoretic models encourage analysts to replace images of the "irrational mob" with models of dissidents as motivated by the same rationalist calculi as operate in the minds of those

[27] Rouhana, "Palestinians in Israel: Responses to the Uprising," in Brynen, 97–117. For a different view, one more reflective of traditional Israeli Arabist perspectives, stressing the uprising's "Palestinianizing" impact on Arabs in Israel, see Elie Rekhess, "The Arabs in Israel and the Intifada," in Freedman (fn. 19), 343–69.

representing the "forces of order." Equally important in explaining the enthusiasm with which rational-choice models have been applied to revolution and revolt is that the main intellectual challenge confronting rational-choice theory—explaining collective action despite the logical force of the free-rider problem—is posed starkly in studies of illegal mass political action, where, it would appear, risks associated with participation are high and the salience of individual contributions negligible. By studying popular revolts and revolutions, scholars can test the validity of their conceptual inventions while responding to an important challenge in a prestigious academic field.

Monographic studies of episodes of illegal mass collective action, including the kind of work reviewed here, provide both comparativists and collective-action theorists with a way to respond to the claim of Edward Mueller and Karl-Dieter Opp that thought experiments and survey research are the only methods for determining how collective-action problems are really solved.[28] Intensive, nonquantitative consideration of specific cases provides an attractive and popular alternative for testing hypotheses or at least corroborating hunches.

The difficulty with this approach is that the ideographic renderings of the cases upon which the individual theorists rely to test their theories are themselves organized around prior, usually implicit determinations of which variables and which mechanisms were responsible for outcomes. Such an expectation does not require any conscious suppression of unfavorable evidence. All that would be required is the expectation that political scientists facing their operational database (that is, the monographic literature on their cases) would exhibit the same tendency toward "experimenter demand" that is so well established in the social psychology literature. It has been amply documented in that field that unless precautions are taken to ensure that subjects are blind to the purpose of the research, or even under false beliefs about its purpose, the likelihood of responses supportive of the investigator's hypothesis is significantly increased. The same logic applied in this domain, where the database is monographic literature rather than responses by experimental subjects, leads to the expectation that researchers will treat some sources and some interpretations or readings of sources as more salient and persuasive than others. Specifically, it is highly probable that sources or interpretations of sources that are supportive or consistent with theories and hypotheses under consideration will be deemed more salient than those organized according to different categories and/or whose findings

[28] Mueller and Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," *American Political Science Review* 80 (June 1986), 475.

run counter to hopes or expectations. Monographic treatments of the intifada, for example, are better understood as writings *of* it—accounts that, in a sense, create it (for the comparativistically inclined analyst)—rather than as discussions *about* it, which would imply some independent and unambiguously available narrative of what it was or is.

This reality means that the actual role of monographic evidence for the collective-action theorists is not to provide a transparent, inclusive record of "the facts" with which to test and refine independently generated theories. Instead, when theorists cite such material in support of their propositions, we learn that the hypothesis or theory advanced by the researcher, or at least the underlying categories, was also the hypothesis, theory, or categories chosen by the author of the monograph as best able to elucidate the "facts" as he/she had collected them. It is therefore no simple matter to mobilize secondary source material in *decisive* support of one set of theoretical claims over others. At the same time it is unnecessarily pessimistic to ignore the usefulness of the weight of monographic evidence, indicating, ceteris paribus, that the postulates and lines of analysis judged most useful by those closest to the primary sources are consistent with theories advanced by the researcher.

Both the promise and the limitations of this strategy for testing solutions to the collective-action problem can be illustrated by showing that many of the contending claims of those who have been grappling with it can find support in the record of the intifada, a record substantially established by the works under review.

In 1981 Harvey Waterman characterized the theories of rebellion, revolt, and revolution that had been popular in the 1960s and early 1970s as assuming the nonrational character of mass revolutionary action. This approach traced illegal mass action to the emotions of crowds and explosions of accumulated passions unconnected to calculations that collective mobilization could effect desired improvements. This approach, which was associated with models of relative deprivation, notions of anomie, and images of disequilibrium, discouraged consideration of collective political action as the product of rational calculation. Rather, it treated the occurrence of uprisings or revolts as an artifact of particularly stressful junctures in the process of modernization, or it focused on violence (deemed deviant) as the dependent variable rather than on the broader and analytically more interesting category of collective political action.

To evaluate this overall perspective, Waterman surveyed the findings of fifty-eight studies of mass political activity. In Waterman's account, scholarly treatments of cases ranging from the Poujadists, to the East German revolt of 1953, to the Basque national revival movement were

seen as having advanced much beyond the older nonrational, "expressivist," or accidental constructions of collective political action.[29] Waterman argues that by understanding collective political action in value-added terms, newer work was able to link claims about historical, economic, or social preconditions for various types of mobilization to a model of mass mobilization as rational—a function of the perceived desirability of mass action by participants purposively seeking to better the circumstances of their lives. Waterman's basic point corresponds directly to the rejection by most writers on the intifada of "volcano" models of the uprising, and to their vigorous insistence on the collective rationality of Palestinian behavior—including mass demonstrations, riots, stone throwing, and harassment—as calculated to have specific and beneficial political consequences.

From the perspective of most work on the topic during the last decade, however, it is Waterman's perspective that seems archaic. Implicitly he assumed that there is always a latticework of organizations among potential participants in collective political action, thereby permitting expression of the collective rationality of action despite what would appear to be the irrationality for any single individual to take the risks or pay the costs of participation. In the Palestinian case it was precisely the absence of organizational frameworks in the 1960s and 1970s and their crystallization in the 1980s that made the intifada possible. Closer to the mark, therefore, is Rod Aya's critique of theories of revolution associated with Ted Robert Gurr, James C. Davies, Neil Smelser, and Chalmers Johnson. Like Waterman (and most writers on the intifada), Aya insists that "collective violence is no mere eruption of rage" and cannot be satisfactorily explained by treating it as an epiphenomenon of social change, as a reflection of disequilibrium, or as the result of shifts in aggregate levels of discontent, whether absolute or relative.[30] Reflecting work done by Charles Tilly and his students, Aya emphasizes the political, organizational, and mobilizational tasks that need to be accomplished to translate diffuse anger into collective political action and that, once accomplished, provide strategic explanations for its occurrence. In the treatments of the intifada surveyed above, the theme of the uprising as a result of disciplined political organization by Palestinians who had too often been deemed only objects but not subjects of history conforms pre-

[29] Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 33 (July 1981), 558–60.

[30] Aya, "Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations," in Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds., *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 326.

cisely to Aya's critique of older theories of revolution and the proper new orientation of what he calls "the political model of mass mobilization."[31]

Beginning in the late 1970s, analysts of revolutions and other less spectacular forms of collective political action have taken as givens its value-added character, its collective rationality, and the need for organized, mobilizing frameworks for action. These assumptions have allowed and encouraged them to frame their analyses more specifically as explanations of collective political action, especially revolutionary behavior, by identifying mechanisms for overcoming the free-rider problem, that is, for producing collectively rational coordinated activity out of what would appear to be individually irrational choices. Although writers of the intifada virtually never explicitly cite this work as inspiration or support for their own arguments, most of the mechanisms identified or hypothesized by collective-action theorists can be found in the works reviewed here, as they seek to specify (1) the mobilizational techniques and responses that translated generalized discontent into sustained collective action and (2) the larger circumstances that account for the occurrence of revolutionary mobilization only in the late 1980s and not earlier.

In his influential work on revolutionary activity by Vietnamese peasants, Samuel Popkin emphasizes the importance of locally active political entrepreneurs who offer peasants the opportunity to solve existential problems by collective action with revolutionary payoffs.[32] Once they are convinced that only through cooperation can they survive, and knowing that noncooperators will benefit much less, if at all, from the direct action of those who do cooperate (such as raiding Japanese food-storage facilities), cooperation rather than defection becomes a dominant strategy. A subsidiary but crucial element in Popkin's account is the role that countrywide organizations and ideologies play in providing local entrepreneurs with the information, skills, and reputation for trustworthiness they need to begin the mobilization process. Another dimension of his "solution" to the free-rider problem is akin to one suggested originally by Mancur Olson, namely, that if groups are small (for example, organized on the village level), monitoring of defectors is expected, the risks of free riding are increased, and the rationality of participation enhanced.

Ample support from the Palestinian case is available for Popkin's model of rational villagers mobilized by local entrepreneurs to "bootstrap" themselves over the free-rider problem into mass collective action.

[31] See Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered," *Theory and Society* 8 (July 1979).
[32] I draw from Popkin's account in his essay "Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam," in Michael Taylor, ed., *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Hiltermann, for example, shows in great detail how operatives of the various PLO factions with nationalist, revolutionary motivations created grass-roots techniques for providing, through participation in labor unions, youth organizations, and women's groups, needed services to individual Palestinians.[33] Precisely consistent with Popkin's model is the identification in many of these studies of several thousand local leaders active in networks of small, local, grass-roots organizations. Through these organizations, leaders could provide selective, concrete benefits to participants, monitor individual defections, and ready themselves to shift the mobilizational potential of their groups to a national struggle when the opportunity presented itself. Equally consistent with Popkin's argument is the emphasis I have noted in these same studies on the importance of the PLO's overarching position as the recognized representative of Palestinian nationalism and the status of local bootstrapping leaders as representatives of the PLO through its various factions. There is, however, one mechanism of bootstrap mobilization that receives little attention from Popkin but is identified (though not named as such) by Hiltermann, Tamari, Jad, and Taraki—competitive intensification of factional efforts to expand constituencies by providing new incentives.[34]

In contrast and in response to Popkin's work, James Scott and Michael Taylor have cited as primary one of the factors that Popkin treats as subsidiary—a preexisting sense of community among participants in collective revolutionary action that makes it possible for organizers to appeal to the rationality of their constituents as a basis for participation.[35] Indeed evidence for this critique is as available in the accounts of the intifada I have surveyed as is material illustrating Popkin's argument. Two important themes recur in discussions of the etiology of the uprising and its resilience: the vitalization of nationalist consciousness in the occupied territories in the decade prior to the uprising and the solidarities of family, clan, neighborhood, and locale that lay behind the willingness of individuals to take the risks associated with confronting Israeli soldiers and Shin Bet (security service) agents. The crucial early role in the uprising played by villagers and inhabitants of refugee camps is vividly depicted: close-knit communities transformed themselves from be-

[33] On the crucial activity of intifada activists as seeking, with direct services to constituents, to "outadminister" the Israeli authorities and draw previously nonpoliticized individuals into the national struggle, see Hiltermann, 53–57, 68, 78, 87–89, 126–28, 143, 163–72, 209–11; Hunter, 121–41; George T. Abed, "The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State," in Hudson, 210–11; and other sources cited in fn. 10.

[34] See fn. 10.

[35] See Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," *Politics and Society* 7, no. 3 (1977); and Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in Taylor (fn. 32).

ing convenient for the operation of informer networks to protective and supportive environments for self-help projects and militant resistance.[36]

Michael Hechter's argument is a representative response to this "community," "iterated game," or "preexisting norm" explanation for collective action. Examined closely, writes Hechter, these notions camouflage some larger, already solved collective-action/free-rider problem and so cannot themselves be considered the solution to the problem itself. Returning to Popkin's theme, Hechter emphasizes the key role of formal organizations (in contexts permitting monitoring of contributions to joint efforts) in activating community solidarities and associated norms.[37] This line of argument is also present in depictions of the intifada. Indeed, virtually all the accounts just cited as emphasizing preexisting or latent community identities as ingredients in the intifada include at least some discussion about how the actions of specific kinds of individuals with more education, prison experience, ideologically organized beliefs, direct ties to PLO factions, and/or special leadership qualities were instrumental in eliciting these identities and endowing them with revolutionary meaning.

Following Mancur Olson, traditional rational-choice approaches have little difficulty explaining why elites participate in collective action: the payoff for collective success is tangible, direct, and individual—the consolidation or advancement of their status as leaders. This "selective incentive" explanation for activism by elites is less satisfying, however, to the extent that the following conditions are present: the settings involved are only embryonically organized, the size of the group to be organized is small (and hence, presumably, less "profitable" to lead), the prospects of success are dim, the cost of failure is extremely high, and the number of competing or parallel groups is large. Under these circumstances, explaining activism by elites or by those who view themselves as potential leaders faces virtually the same free-rider problem as does explaining nonelite participation. In very great measure these are the circumstances

[36] On the crystallization of a distinctive Palestinian nationalist consciousness among Arabs in the territories in the 1970s and 1980s and its relationship to the intifada, see especially Taraki (fn. 10), 53–71. On the emergence of latent *gemeinschaft* affinities in Palestinian villages and refugee camps as an ingredient in the uprising, see Adil Yahya, "The Role of the Refugee Camps," in Nassar and Heacock, 91–106; Bargouti (fn. 10), 107–23; Hunter, 120–48; Penny Johnson and Lee O'Brien with Joost Hiltermann, "The West Bank Rises Up," in Lockman and Beinin, 29–42; Anita Vitullo, "Uprising in Gaza," in Lockman and Beinin, 43–56; Melissa Baumann, "Gaza Diary," in Lockman and Beinin, 57–66; and Giacaman and Johnson (fn. 24), 155–70. For illustration of the complex interconnections between familial and local community ties that bind individuals together while opening opportunities for collaborators to penetrate villages on behalf of the Israeli authorities, see Helen Winternitz, *A Season of Stones: Living in a Palestinian Village* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991).

[37] Hechter, "Comment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems," in Karen Schweers Cook and Margaret Levi, eds., *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 240–49.

under which the intifada was ignited and sustained. Hence, the problem is posed: why would thousands of people, despite the risks and costs, make such enormous individual efforts to assemble separate, largely self-contained organizations and committees? In this instance, after all, they had no reason to think that their individual efforts would make a decisive contribution to the end of the occupation or advance them toward leadership positions within the Palestinian community as a whole.[38]

One approach to this problem departs in two important ways from Olson's seminal treatment: by considering the "psychic rewards" of various behaviors as part of the economy of rational choice; and by introducing differences among interacting rational actors in the sophistication or substance of their intrapsychic operationalization of rationality. Mueller and Opp argue that rebellious behavior is best explained by a combination of sophisticated calculations of the relationship between public goods and private interest. These calculations lead individuals to perceive their personal interests as best served by redefining Prisoners' Dilemma–type games as assurance games. Mueller and Opp also cite a "martyr syndrome," which leads some participants to prefer the risks of great personal sacrifice to inaction that does not advance prospects for achieving public goods.[39] Jon Elster's treatment emphasizes the differential internalization of social norms, leading to a dynamic mixture of motivations among those having to choose whether to participate in collective action.[40] Timur Kuran explains the puzzling suddenness of revolutionary upheavals by postulating differences in the propensity of individuals to tolerate the psychic distress of contradicting private preferences or beliefs with public behavior. Embracing a kind of Guevarist "foco" theory of collective action, Kuran proposes that cascading patterns of transformation—from collective apathy toward acquiescence in, or support for, an authority structure, to collective defiance and explicit renunciation of its claims—are traceable to the catalytic effect of actions by individuals with low thresholds for tolerating psychic dissonance when many other individuals are near their thresholds.[41]

An obvious difficulty associated with testing this sort of approach to

[38] According to one estimate, there were 45,000 "popular committees" at the neighborhood, village, and block level in the occupied territories by mid-May 1988. *New York Times*, May 15, 1988. Cited and discussed by Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, "The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians under Occupation," in Nassar and Heacock, 199.

[39] Mueller and Opp (fn. 28), 471–88. For accusations that Mueller and Opp have abandoned rational choice altogether and for their response, see George Klosko, Edward N. Mueller, and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rebellious Collective Action Revisited," *American Political Science Review* 81 (June 1987), 557–66.

[40] Elster, *The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–49, 248–87.

[41] Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics* 44 (October 1991).

collective action is the need to observe intrapsychic phenomena in order, for example, to classify individuals according to Elster's different types of moral rationality and to do so independent of the behavior these differences are supposed to produce.[42] Nevertheless, many of the themes and motifs within the literature on the intifada are not only consistent with the claims and models put forward by Mueller and Opp, Elster, and Kuran, but also support their insistence that revolutionary collective action cannot be explained within the parameters of what Elster and Taylor have called "thin rationality."[43]

There are of course plenty of references in the works under review to the heroism, self-sacrifice, and dedication of Palestinian participants in the intifada. Anecdotes abound of individuals and villages willing to endure great hardship to make minor material or symbolic contributions to the collective struggle, and there are many descriptions of the sense of satisfaction reported by those whose losses would appear to have been most severe, including the "mothers of martyrs." The very secrecy that protected the identity of midlevel activists and made possible the sustained operation of the United National Command of the Uprising also deprived that leadership of almost any hope of personal reward for its efforts. Schiff and Ya'ari, Peretz, Said, Hunter, and Jarbawi emphasize an accumulation of rage and humiliation that seemed, in combination with catalytic instances of exemplary sacrifice, suddenly to reverse the terms of the collective-action problem. It shattered the psychological barrier of fear, which in turn removed the deterrent effect of the Israeli army, reduced the external cost of bringing public behavior in line with private preferences, and forced those seeking the most prudent course to adopt public behaviors consistent with the intifada rather than with the demands of the Israeli authorities.[44]

A prominent point of contention in treatments of revolution relates to the agent-structure problem. As Theda Skocpol has framed it: to what extent do revolutions (and we may say other sorts of mass collective action) "come"; to what extent are they made? Typically, "structuralist" approaches such as those advanced by Eric Wolf, Jeffery Paige, and Skocpol are counterposed to "voluntarist" arguments such as those of Taylor, Popkin, and Scott. As is often pointed out, however, these approaches are not necessarily contradictory. Structuralist theories can be

[42] There is of course the additional practical problem of making the required observations of so many individuals while a revolutionary process is under way.

[43] See Taylor (fn. 35), 66–67.

[44] See, e.g., Edward Said, "Intifada and Independence," in Lockman and Beinin, 14; Jarbawi (fn. 8), 296; Peretz, 39–52; Joe Stork, "The Significance of Stones: Notes from the Seventh Month," in Lockman and Beinin, 67–80; and Hunter, 89, 220.

understood as identifying the conditions shaping the distribution of probabilities that one or more of the "voluntarist" techniques for overcoming the collective-action problem will succeed. When Goodwin and Skocpol predict revolution as more likely in colonial settings characterized by exclusionary policies, featuring cross-class solidarities among the excluded, and incentives for broad-based, illegal mobilization, they are in effect identifying the conditions which make it more probable that Popkin's service-oriented, bootstrapping entrepreneurs, Elster's "everyday Kantian" activists, or Kuran's "foco" exemplars will produce solutions to the free-rider problem that can match mass action to aggregate rationality.[45]

Again, Goodwin and Skocpol's argument predicting revolution from the characteristics of the political space permitted by the governing regime for the expression of discontent finds substantial corroboration in the timing of the intifada and in the nature of Likud policies toward Arabs in the territories. They were policies that led virtually all Palestinians to consider themselves as equally and dangerously at risk from a continuation of the occupation. A similar sort of integration of structure and agency in explanations of collective action is achieved by Jeffrey Berejikian. Drawing on the work done by Amos Tversky and his collaborators on asymmetric framing of decisions in order to mitigate losses or to pursue possible gains, Berejikian argues that revolution is much more likely (that is, the various obstacles to collective action are more likely to be overcome) when discontent is framed as a response to threats of loss rather than as associated with missed opportunities for gain.[46] That is, of course, precisely what Tamari, Hunter, Peretz, Schiff and Ya'ari, and others whose work I have summarized say about the nature and effect of Likud policies of de facto annexation, of substituting sticks for all carrots in the implementation of occupation policy, and of the frighteningly prominent discussion of mass deportation as a solution to the "Arab problem."

In sum, then, the experience of the intifada, at least as presented in the works under review, provides strong support for the argument that new kinds of organizations are likely to be the decisive variable in producing sustained collective action where before there had been only widespread discontent. These are organizations that match real needs of individuals

[45] Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17 (December 1989). This is the only theoretical or general work of which I am aware that explicitly includes the intifada as a case, or potential case, of revolutionary collective action.

[46] Jeffrey Berejikian, "Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem," *American Political Science Review* 86 (September 1992), 647–57.

to larger political purposes and are designed for, evolved in accordance with, or correspond to the distinctive contours of available political space, that is, the particular combination of constraints and opportunities that doom some forms of struggle while enabling others. With respect to the occurrence, timing, and persistence of the intifada, this conclusion accords, not only with the best substantiated and most frequently cited claims within the monographic works under review, but also, happily, with the general direction taken by theorists of collective action over the last decade.

To be sure, a host of less popular explanations of mass collective action, such as the crucial contribution of young people or the importance of the "entertainment value" of such activity, could also find corroboration within this body of work on the intifada.[47] In conclusion it is worth repeating, however, that there is at least one important explanation for the nonoccurrence of collectively rational action that no writer on the intifada even implicitly uses to explain why the uprising took more than twenty years to erupt. This unused line of argument is based on the distortion of individual perceptions and calculations associated with hegemonic beliefs. One might be tempted to infer support from this lacuna for James Scott's strenuous rejection of hegemonic explanations for patterns of collective inaction (at least among peasants).[48] It would be wrong to do so, since neither Likud nor Labor governments in Israel have even attempted to find a basis for advancing a hegemonic formula attractive to Palestinians. Nevertheless, the very absence of attempts by Israel to mystify its domination of Palestinians in language that Palestinians might conceivably accept and the unavailability of a plausible basis for such an appeal are themselves excellent reasons to predict that as long as the Palestinians remain in the occupied territories and under Israeli rule, the collective-action problem will not be a decisive barrier against sudden rebellion or sustained resistance.

[47] Gordon Tullock, "The Paradox of Revolution," *Public Choice* 11 (1971). On the vanguard role of youth in the uprising and the obvious thrill involved in confronting confused Israeli soldiers in the first weeks of the uprising, see Stork (fn. 44), 67–81; Hunter, 67; Hiltermann, 42, 210; Johnson and O'Brien with Hiltermann (fn. 36), 34; and Legrain (fn. 21), 186.

[48] See Scott, *Weapons of the Weak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). For evidence directly challenging Scott's thesis, see Susan C. Stokes, "Hegemony, Consciousness, and Political Change in Peru," *Politics and Society* 19, no. 3 (1991).

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William E. Shepard

ISLAM AND IDEOLOGY: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY

It is probably fair to say of labels such as "fundamentalist," "modernist," and "secularist," which are in common use today in writing about modern Islam, that we cannot live very easily with them, but that we certainly cannot live without them.

On one hand, such labels have undoubtedly often functioned as obstacles to understanding the actual people and tendencies involved, in part because they are frequently used without explicit definition, in part because they perforce lump together widely differing phenomena, and in part because they often convey an implicit bias or value judgment. In my view, this is particularly true of the label "fundamentalist."[1] On the other hand, we cannot avoid labels if we are to talk about things, and we certainly cannot begin to make sense of an area as vast and complex as the modern Muslim world unless we can analyze its manifold phenomena into a manageable number of categories with suitable designations. It is not a question of whether we use labels, but how we use them. One purpose of this article is to contribute to the quest for suitable labels in this area. Another, and of course more important one, is to contribute to an understanding of those so labeled. I shall attempt to do this by presenting and discussing a typology of "ideological orientations." The main types will be called "secularism," "Islamic modernism," "radical Islamism," "traditionalism," and "neo-traditionalism," with subtypes discerned in several cases. It is not claimed, of course, that either the typology or the labels are radically novel. In fact, I think they reflect what is a fair degree of scholarly consensus, but it is hoped that the presentation and discussion will help to refine and clarify, and perhaps at some points modify, that consensus.[2]

It will help to minimize the dangers of labeling if we think of these to some extent as Weberian "ideal-types," that is analytical constructs which may or may not correspond in detail to actual cases but which help us analyze and compare a large number of cases.[3] I also hope to minimize the dangers by presenting them not as "pigeon-holes" or "boxes" but as points on a two-dimensional spectrum, one axis of which we may label as "Islamic totalism" and the other as "modernity." It will be argued that the first three types are all very high on the scale of "modernity" but vary widely on the scale of "Islamic totalism," while traditionalism and neo-traditionalism vary from them primarily on the scale of "modernity."

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By "Islamic totalism" I mean the tendency to view Islam not merely as a "religion" in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behavior. Commonly this takes the form of the claim that Muslims should have an "Islamic State," that is, a state in which all law is based on the Shariʿa. It is not here assumed, however, that those who assert this are necessarily "better" Muslims in a general sense than others.

By "modernity" I mean in the first place a tendency to place a high value upon modern material technology and to use modern techniques of social organization and mobilization, but also a tendency to accept certain modern institutions such as parliaments and political parties, certain attitudes such as a positive orientation toward change, and certain ideas such as a belief in "progress."[4] "Modernity" also includes the highly ambivalent attitudes toward the West that have attended the Western impact of the last two centuries, and the spiritual crisis so eloquently described by Wifred Cantwell Smith:

> The fundamental *malaise* of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history: to set it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely-guided society should and must.[5]

Our typology may be said to be a typology of responses to the Western impact and of proposals for rehabilitating Muslim history.[6] It is beyond the scope of this article to deal in any detail with the vexed question of whether "modernization" necessarily involves "Westernization." Suffice it to say that in my view they are conceptually distinct but up till now have been largely identical in practice. Whether they need to be so in the future is perhaps the most important issue on which the types here presented vary. The radical Islamists, in particular, are committed to the proposition that they need not and must not be the same.

The expression "ideological orientation" is used to underline the fact that we are dealing with ideological issues but not necessarily with particular ideologies as such—a type such as "secularism" includes several different and even radically opposed ideologies—while insofar as ideology is a modern phenomenon, the traditionalist positions could not be said to involve ideology in the strictest sense.[7] For the tendency to view Islam as an ideology I shall use the term "Islamism." We could to some extent summarize the presentation that follows by saying that as we move to the "right" along the scale of Islamic totalism from secularism toward radical Islamism, ideology becomes more Islamic, while as we move "up" the scale of modernity away from pure traditionalism, Islam may become more ideological.

The focus here is upon the doctrinal content of the ideologies and teachings involved, and not upon the leadership styles, political methods, or social locations that may be associated with them. Thus, this typology is complementary to other possible typologies, such as James Bill's distinction between "establishment Islam" and "populist Islam."[8] In principle, at least, each of these ideological orientations may be either "establishment" or "populist." Likewise each may be more or less oriented toward charismatic leadership, more or less elitist, and most may be

more or less violent (in word and/or deed) and more or less revolutionary.[9] They may also be either Shiᶜi or Sunni.[10] It is important to stress, furthermore, that each type may be more or less sophisticated and intellectually consistent, though it does not follow that they are all equally viable, that is, capable of actually becoming the ideological basis of the Islamic community or a significant part of it over the long term. I shall make some suggestions about the viability of these types in the last section of this article.

SECULARISM

The term "secularist" is here applied to any view that would openly follow an ideology other than Islam in most areas of public life.[11] The most radical form of secularism, of course, would be one that wants to replace Islam in all areas, public and private, as in Marxist Albania, whose constitution makes virtually no reference to religion and whose government has closed the mosques and churches.[12] Such a radical secularism has been unusual in Muslim countries, however.[13]

Far more influential has been a "moderate secularism" which seeks to "separate" religion from politics and other areas of public life. In this case the ideology is generally nationalism in diverse alliance with others such as capitalism, socialism, liberalism, etc. In a "moderate secularist" constitution Islam is not the religion of state and sovereignty is not vested in God but in the "nation" or the "people." The best known example is Turkey, which in 1928 removed from its constitution the clause that made Islam the religion of state. At present the relevant article reads: "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law, . . . loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental principles set forth in the Preamble" (Article 2). The preamble vests sovereignty "unconditionally" in the nation and explicitly separates "the sacred tenets of religion" from "state affairs and politics."

A still more moderate type of secularism is found in the Indonesian constitution, which affirms belief in "One, Supreme Divinity"[14] as the first of its "five principles" (*pancasila*), but not Islam nor even "Allah." Perhaps we might label the Turkish type of secularism "neutral secularism" and the Indonesian type "religious secularism."

Constitutions that make Islam the religion of state do not conform to the "pure" secular type but may be closer to it than to Islamic modernism on the scale. The Egyptian constitution of 1972 says, "Islam is the religion of the State" and "The principles of the Islamic Shariᶜa are primary sources of legislation," but also says that "sovereignty belongs to the people only, who are the source of authority" (Articles 2 & 3). Popular sovereignty along with the fact that the principles of the Shariᶜa are, by implication, not the only source of legislation make this constitution substantially secular. We might label such constitutions, common in the Arab world, "Muslim secularist."

In the area of legal reform, secularism in its "pure" form replaces the Shariᶜa in all areas of public law with codes of other, in practice Western, origin and makes citizens of all religions in principle equal before the law. The best known

example of this is, of course, the Turkish legal reforms of the 1920s. Most other Muslim countries have in fact done the same thing in many areas, usually excepting the more "sensitive" areas relating to family life, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. This, too, is secularism insofar as it establishes substantial areas where the Shari^ca does not apply, although the line between the "religious" and the "secular" is drawn in a different place from where it is drawn in the West.

We may discern two major sets of motives to which the first two different types of moderate secularism to some extent correspond. The first set involves a concern for "progress" and national strength, which, when allied with the conviction that the way to achieve these is to follow an essentially Western model, leads to "neutral" secularism of the Turkish type.[15] The other motive is a concern for national unity where there is a significant non-Muslim minority. In Indonesia, with its Christians and Balinese Hindus, "divinity" is affirmed but not a specific kind of divinity, as noted above. In Egypt, with a significant Coptic minority, political rhetoric often speaks of "religion" rather than "Islam."[16] Of course, in Egypt and Indonesia the concern for "progress" and national strength is also present.[17]

To speak of secularism as "separation" of religion from public life is misleading, however, since Muslim secularism has not involved a separation of "mosque" and state on the pattern of the American separation of church and state. Secularist governments both support and control religious teaching and institutions to a considerable degree. Essentially, secularism has meant state control of religion and state effort to use religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental goals.[18] Furthermore, particularly in its nationalist form, secularism is by no means inconsistent with an appreciation of Islam as cultural heritage, and may even see it as a necessary component of the national identity. No one is considered a "Turk" who is not also a Muslim,[19] while Shi^cism was an important element in the Iranian identity pushed by the late Shah.[20] Likewise, Arab nationalists, whether Christian or Muslim, have emphasized the role of Muhammad and his companions as Arab national heroes.[21] What makes all of these secular is the subordination of Islam to national identity and the tendency to view the Islamic heritage as a human cultural achievement rather than a response to Divine initiative.

Likewise, Pan-Islamism may be secularist, insofar as it means loyalty to and/or feeling for Muslim peoples, but does not call on them to rule themselves by the Shari^ca. Since Pan-Islamism is also consistent with Islamic modernism and radical Islamism, it can provide an ideological basis for cooperation among adherents of these types, in spite of their major differences.

It is important to stress that moderate secularism is not necessarily "irreligious." A secularist may perform faithfully all of the Islamic rituals and follow an Islamic code of ethics in his or her personal life. They may be actively concerned with *da^cwa*, whether in the sense of calling Muslims to more faithful ritual and ethical practice or non-Muslims to Islam. They may actively promote Muslim charitable organizations and the like. Secularists may also, quite consistently, view religion as a desirable or even necessary support for personal ethics and,

thus, for public order and well-being. They may hold the common idea that religion is necessary for the cultivation of the feelings, as distinct from reason.[22]

In fact, under certain circumstances, secularist styles and rhetoric may be highly Islamic. Ataturk resisted the Greeks under Islamic colors and even received the Islamic title "Ghazi" for his efforts. Having established such Islamic "credentials" was undoubtedly another condition of his later success in "reforming" Islam. On similar grounds, I suspect that close analysis would lead us to consider Colonel Qaddafi a secularist, for all his "fundamentalist" rhetoric.[23] These considerations mean that to the extent that Islamic "resurgence" involves increased devotional practice, concern with cultural heritage and Pan-Islamic feeling, it can be expressed within a secularist framework.

ISLAMIC MODERNISM

In formal contrast to secularism, Islamic modernism[24] insists that Islam does provide an adequate ideological base for public life. The Egyptian statesman, Abd al-Rahman ᶜAzzam, whose book, *The Eternal Message of Muhammad*, may be taken as representative of this orientation, states

> The difference between Islam and most other religions is that it did not content itself with merely establishing acts of worship and abandon the needs of society to a Caesar or any form of temporal governing body. Rather, Islam established ways of conduct, relationships, and rights and obligations for the individual vis-à-vis members of his family and the nation and for the nation vis-à-vis other nations.[25]

The 1973 constitution of Pakistan, likewise modernist[26] in my view, asserts that "sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone" and that the authority of the people is a "sacred trust" exercised "within the limits prescribed by Him" (Preamble).

This Islamist position is, however, qualified by a very strong tendency to emphasize the flexibility of Islam in the public sphere and to use this flexibility to interpret Islam in terms congruent with, or at least in very positive dialogue with, one or more Western ideologies. Among Sunnis this commonly includes the insistence that the "gate of *ijtihad*" be reopened, that Muslims not rely on the "medieval synthesis" represented by the four schools of jurisprudence (*madhahib*), but that they go back directly to the Qurʾan and the Sunna to seek a fresh interpretation and synthesis for modern times, and also, of course, that "superstitions" derived from local pre-Islamic cultures be eliminated. ᶜAzzam says:

> When we look at the Scripture, the Sunnah, and Muslim history in the days of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, we find that Islam is definite and conclusive on all general principles suitable for all times, places, and peoples. When it comes to implementing these principles, one can see clearly the flexibility of the Islamic Shariᶜa and the authority it gives to our reason and our ijtihad. The Shariᶜa in effect upholds the guidance given by the Prophet when he said, "You know best about your earthly matters." Thus there is wide scope for human opinion and it is up to reason and experience to distinguish correct from incorrect action, to show the road to the general welfare and to steer clear of harm.[27]

The latter part of this quote may appear to be virtually a justification for secularism and, in fact, some Islamic modernism comes very close to this. Furthermore, ᶜAzzam's "general principles," which include justice, freedom, brotherhood of man, the value of work, religious tolerance, and the redistribution of excess wealth,[28] sound very Western, as does the order envisaged by the Pakistan constitution, "wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed" (Preamble). Modernists may also insist that Islamic social principles are capable of development and able to "keep up with the times."[29] The crucial point, however, is that, unlike the secularists, the modernists are at pains to justify the general principles and the developments in terms of the Qur³an and the Sunna.

As suggested earlier, legal reform in the "sensitive" areas of family-related law has commonly been done in a more modernist than secularist way, although to the extent that it has been justified by traditional legal devices rather than an open exercise of absolute ijtihad,[30] it moves in a traditionalist direction.

Modernism achieves flexibility in three main ways. The first is by the tendency to restrict the specific and detailed content of the authoritative tradition as much as possible by limiting it to the Qur³an and the authentic Sunna and then possibly limiting the latter by a radical Hadith criticism.[31] This does not mean that the later tradition is necessarily ignored, but the tendency is to use it selectively. A few, such as Parwez in Pakistan, would go even further and treat only the Qur³an as absolutely binding.[32] Still more radical is the teaching of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the recently executed leader of the Republican Brothers in the Sudan, who would restrict it to the Meccan part of the Qur³an.[33] Open advocacy of these more radical approaches is rare, however.

The second way is a more or less radical (re)interpretation[34] of the authoritative sources. This is particularly the case with the Qur³anic texts on polygyny, the *hadd* punishments, *jihad*, and the treatment of unbelievers,[35] which appear to conflict with "modern" views. In some cases modernist (re)interpretation can find considerable support in the text, such as the requirement of four witnesses to adultery,[36] which may have the effect of voiding the hadd in practice, or the well-known argument that the Qur³anic permission of four wives is conditioned on the ability of the husband to treat them fairly, which ability is denied by another passage.[37] A more subtle form of this argument is that the Qur³an at the legal level limited the number of wives to four but affirmed monogamy as an ideal toward which the community should strive.[38] This underlines the flexibility of the Shariᶜa, which allows polygymy since circumstances sometimes require it but provides a clear impetus toward monogamy. The modernist tendency has been to interpret jihad as defensive war and to stress the texts that call for tolerance of non-Muslims.[39] In some cases modernist (re)interpretation in these and other areas may avail itself of traditional *fiqh* doctrines, although to the extent that it does so, it may move in a traditionalist direction.

(Re)interpretation in its extreme form would lead to the "neo-modernism" proposed by Fazlur Rahman, in which all the specific cases in the Qur³an and the Sunna would be in effect converted into moral principles. The specific cases would be studied in the light of their context to see what moral principles they exemplify, and it is these principles that would be considered authoritative.[40]

The third way is an apologetic which links aspects of the Islamic tradition with Western ideas and practices, and may claim that the Western practices in question were originally derived from Islam. This may be a simple identification, as, for example, the Nasserist writer who defends the adaption of Yugoslavian "direct democracy" in Egypt on the grounds that "This recent concept of 'direct democracy' is not original. It was to be found in early Islamic democracy."[41] More subtly, the claim may be that the Western practice represents the best way to carry out the traditional Islamic injunction under modern conditions. Ahmad Bahgat says of the Qurʾanic injunction to the ruler to consult others (*shura*): "*Shura* in modern political terminology is democracy. Islam did not explain the form, type, or stages of this democracy but left this to the minds of the Muslims and the considerations of time and place."[42]

It is not just a matter of identification, however, since Islam is usually claimed to be superior in some respect. It may be that it adds a spiritual dimension to what in the West is a purely materialist institution, or that it provides a *via media* between opposing Western ideologies or the solution to dilemmas inherent in such ideologies. Mustafa Mahmoud says: "As a dialectical synthesis of two extremes [i.e., communism and capitalism] it [Islam] combines the virtues of both; but then it goes further than either by giving man ineffable bliss—spiritual satisfaction."[43] According to Ali Shariati, Islam and in particular the first Shiʿi Imam, ʿAli, incorporated the positive aspects of "Mysticism, Equality, and Freedom," the last two in their separated and thus negative forms being found particularly in Marxism and Western existentialism.[44]

Modernist apologetic has been severely criticized by many scholars as superficial, tendentious, and even psychologically destructive,[45] so much so that the term "apologetics" has almost become a term of abuse in the literature on modern Islam. Apologetics as such, however, is not necessarily bad. Indeed, it must feature in any religion that would defend itself at the bar of reason or recommend itself to outsiders. If modernist apologetics are open in practice to such criticism, its failings are not inherent in the type, but result rather from the difficult psychological position in which modern Muslims have found themselves. Although it may seem at times that apologetic modernism is little more than a cover for what secularists do more openly, it at least allows Islam to act as a principle of selection among competing Western ideologies. This is undoubtedly one reason why ideologies such as nationalism and socialism find more ready reception among Muslims than Marxism or fascism. It will also tend subtly to Islamicize any ideology or practice adopted. To call democracy shura, for example, will encourage an interpretation of the concept in the direction of the traditional Islamic practice of shura, especially in the minds of those who do not speak a Western language.

Modernist ideologies will, of course, vary depending on which of these three ways are most prominent in a given case and which Western models are followed. Thus, one may speak of an "apologetic" modernism which relies heavily on the less subtle forms of "identification," and a "(re)interpretive modernism," which seeks to avoid this. One may, likewise, speak of a "liberal-nationalist" modernism, a "socialist" modernism (such as "Islamic Socialism"), or a "third-world radical" or "post-Marxist revolutionary" modernism (e.g., the Shah's "Islamic Marxism").

This last uses the Qur'an and the Sunna in a very flexible way and draws on modern tendencies that have major roots in the West, in writers such as Marx, Weber, and Fanon, and is exemplified by Ali Shariati and the Mujahidin-i Khalq of Iran.[46]

RADICAL ISLAMISM

By "radical Islamism" I mean the orientation of many of those who are often called "fundamentalists." This type is especially well represented by Sayed Abul Aʿla Mawdudi and the later writings of Sayyid Qutb,[47] and in only slightly lesser degree by Imam Khomeini and other current Iranian leaders.

Like modernists, but even more insistently, radical Islamists claim that Islam is for all aspects of social as well as personal life. They agree with the modernists that Islam is flexible and that un-Islamic "superstitions" must be eliminated. They also accept the need for absolute ijtihad, but they are likely to grant it less scope and they emphasize that it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West. Mawdudi says, "The purpose and object of *ijtihad* is not to replace the Divine law by man-made law. Its real object is to understand the Supreme Law."[48] Sayyid Qutb says that Islam is "flexible" but not "fluid"[49] and stresses that "if there is an authoritative text (*nass*), then that text is decisive and there is no scope for *ijtihad*. If there is no *nass*, then comes the time for *ijtihad*, in accordance with the established principles of God's own method."[50] Consistently with this, radical Islamists tend to accept more of the past ijtihad of the scholars and to emphasize somewhat less the failings of the community in pre-modern times and somewhat more the distortions caused by Western colonialism.[51]

They also strongly emphasize the distinctiveness of Islam. Mawdudi objects to those who wish to identify Islam with "democracy," "communism," or "dictatorship" on the grounds that such identifications result from "the belief that we as Muslims can earn no honour or respect unless we are able to show that our religion resembles modern creeds."[52] They tend to reject terms like "Islamic socialism," and Khomeini even refused to include the word "democratic" in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[53] By contrast, the Mujahidin-i Khalq, for example, do speak of the "Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran." This concern for distinctiveness may manifest itself in an insistence on clearly distinctive Islamic laws, such as the hadd penalties. More subtly, though, distinctiveness is achieved by emphasizing that Islam as a whole is a distinct and integrated system, so that even if individual elements do not seem distinctive, their place in the Islamic system makes them different.[54] Consistently with this approach, some say that punishments like cutting off the hand of a thief should be carried on only after a truly Islamic society is established.[55]

In accord with this concern for authenticity and distinctiveness, radical Islamists place less emphasis on apologetics. In practice this may be only a difference of degree, but in intention it is more than that. Both Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb see an "inferiority complex" in modernist apologetics.[56] Notably, they tend to be uncompromising on the question of non-Muslim minorities.

Mawdudi openly attacks "equality before the law" as a sham and defends the Islamic provision for *dhimmi* status.[57]

More than others, the radical Islamists emphasize the urgency of putting the Shari^ca into practice. It is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed. This, in fact, is the main burden of Khomeini's lectures on *Islamic Government*.[58] At this point, though, there are significant variations of strategy. Some are more willing to accept a gradualist approach to Islamic legislation and to cooperate with those of other ideological persuasion. In Egypt in 1984, some Muslim Brothers were elected to parliament as members of the Wafd, the leading secularist party of the pre-Nasser era. Other radical Islamists are more oriented toward violent or revolutionary action, as in the Iranian revolution or the assassination of Anwar Sadat. These may accuse the former type of "selling out."[59]

In spite of its conscious stress on authenticity, however, radical Islamism is still very modern and accepts much that is borrowed from the West. In some ways this is hardly surprising since it arose primarily as a reaction against Westernizing trends, and reactions commonly take on some of the characteristics of what they react against. Most obviously, it has no difficulty accepting modern material technology, as the role of the cassette tape recorder in the Iranian revolution and the clash of modern weapons in the Iran–Iraq war dramatically illustrate. This does not compromise its authenticity since classical Islamic civilization had little problem borrowing purely material technology. In fact, the hadith quoted above by ^cAzzam ("You know best about your earthly matters") refers in context to the pollination of date palms, a matter of agricultural technology. Beyond this, however, radical Islamists have been able to accept and use effectively many modern methods of political and social organization that are of Western provenance and to adapt at least some Western political ideas and symbols. The Islamic Republic of Iran has political parties, elections, and a parliament, and its "Crusade for Construction" (*Jihad-i Sazandegi*) is at least distantly reminiscent of the U.S. Domestic Peace Corps. The youth organizations and cooperatives developed by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt afford another example. In the realm of ideological concepts, Khomeini may have rejected "democratic" but he accepted "republic," and the ability of the Iranian leaders to use populist and third world revolutionary rhetoric is well known. Mawdudi says that "Muslim is the title of that International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam" and that jihad refers to "revolutionary struggle,"[60] while Sayyid Qutb speaks in a similar context of a "vanguard,"[61] and describes Islam as "a universal proclamation of the liberation of man."[62]

Although radical Islamists try to avoid following Western models, these models do undoubtedly exercise some influence on them and lead to some variation among them. Thus Mawdudi is sometimes said to be more "capitalist" and Sayyid Qutb more "socialist," and similar differences have apparently surfaced in Iran. Still, the variations within this type are less than within any of the others.[63]

Particularly important is the fact that radical Islamists accept the idea of progress. With their zeal for following the Sunna of the Prophet, they are commonly accused of wanting to turn the clock back to seventh century Arabia,

but this is a serious misapprehension. They not only want progress but insist that Islam is the way to get it. Khomeini, for example, describes Islam as "progressive,"[64] and Mawdudi says, "we can accelerate the onward march to progress only on the strength of the moral values enunciated by Islam."[65] In fact, far from reflecting a rejection of the idea of progress, their zeal reflects an acceptance of it, since the idea of progress cuts the ground out from under one of the most common traditional justifications for inaction, the view that historical decline is more or less inevitable so that the ideal of the "golden age" of the Prophet cannot be realized in later times.[66] Radical Islamists undoubtedly want to undo many of the effects of Western-style "progress," but this is not the same as wanting to turn the clock back.

The social and political activism of radical Islamists also bespeaks a much more worldly orientation than has been usual among pious Muslims in the past, and they are strikingly characterized by what Weber called "inner worldly asceticism." This must be kept in perspective, though. They are not unconcerned for otherworldly things, and to some extent their emphasis on this-worldly things is a function of the fact that it is mainly in the this-worldly sphere that secularism has called Islam into question. The ability of Shiᶜi radical Islamism, in particular, to combine otherworldly concern with this-worldly action in martyrdom has been dramatically demonstrated on the city streets and on the battlefield.

We may note in passing two other "Protestant" tendencies of radical Islamism. One is a clear tendency to urge a "Weberian" work ethic, and the other is a tendency to "simplify" the Islamic symbol system[67] by concentrating on certain basic elements. Both of these it shares with Islamic modernism, but in the latter case the motivation is different. Whereas modernism simplifies the symbol system in the interests of "flexibility," radical Islamism does so more in the interests of authenticity. Seeing the basics as under threat, it wishes to reinforce them and relate everything more firmly to them. In fact, its long-range tendency may be more to "rationalize" than to simplify the symbol system.

Its tendency to view Islam as a "system" is also modern, I think.[68] Traditionally, the political provisions of the Shariᶜa were understood as commands incumbent on the ruler rather than as a "system" in the usual sense of the term.[69] Related to this is their strong tendency to "reify" Islam, which W. C. Smith has argued is a modern phenomenon, although with roots in the past.[70]

The "modernity" of radical Islamism is related to the fact that in the Sunni world radical Islamists have tended to be "laymen,"[71] and thus probably not so fully aware as the ulama of the complexity and resources of the past tradition. Among Shiᶜis, on the other hand, it has been led by the ulama, partly because the "gate of ijtihad" was not closed among Shiᶜis. This may have made Shiᶜi ulama a bit more flexible in interpretation, but more importantly it has given them more authority over their followers and allowed them to maintain much greater independence of Westernizing governments than was possible for their Sunni counterparts. The fact that Shiᶜi radical Islamism is ulama-led means that it has a greater rootage in the past tradition and tends in a somewhat "neo-traditionalist" direction.

Apart from the area of material technology, it is often hard to say whether "borrowing" is the best way of describing the relationship of radical Islamism to

Western ideas and practices. In many cases it would be more accurate to say that it develops certain aspects of the basic Islamic symbol system in certain ways in response to the Western challenge. In either case, of course, the effect of the modern West is extremely significant and often decisive. In both cases, also, Islamic modernism has played an important mediating role, to the extent that radical Islamism has accepted its "borrowings" or its interpretations.[72] The conscious concern of the radical Islamist, however, is that where there is borrowing it be controlled by the Islamic symbol system. Particularly with ideological symbols, it is important that they have a clear Islamic rootage.[73] We might say that the radical Islamist in a secularist country is like a person who has grown up in a house whose structure he does not like and who would like to take it over and demolish it and rebuild it to a different plan, but is quite willing to use some of the old materials in the process. In Iran the process has begun.

THE SCALE OF "ISLAMIC TOTALISM"

As indicated earlier, the three orientations so far discussed vary primarily along the scale I have labeled "Islamic totalism," that is, the degree to which Islam is accepted as the guide to social action and public legislation. At the extreme "left" of radical secularism, Islam is totally rejected even as "religion," somewhat to the right of this it is accepted as "religion" but rejected as the guide to public life, while at the extreme right of radical Islamism, it is insisted upon as both "religion" and ideology. In between, there is some effort to have it both ways.

If we were to locate the constitutions of several Muslim countries along this spectrum, we might come up with the following order from left to right: Albania (radical secularist), Turkey (neutral secularist), Indonesia (religious secularist), Syria, Iraq, Egypt (Muslim secularist), Pakistan (Islamic modernist), Iran (between radical Islamist and Islamic modernist). When the Egyptian constitution was amended in 1980 to make the principles of the Shariᶜa "the primary source" rather than "primary sources" of legislation, this represented a slight shift to the right; but it is still closer to the secularist type, since the principles of the Shariᶜa are still not the only source and it is still presumably "the people" who have the authority to determine when they will and will not be followed.

On the scale of modernity, these three types are fairly close, but there is some difference since radical Islamism would be less willing to sacrifice elements of Islam to the needs of "modernity." For example, they would certainly not be willing to modify the fast of Ramadan in the interests of development, as Bourgiba wanted to.

The discussion so far has drawn mainly on the areas of political ideology and legal reform. The same typology, however, could be applied to other areas. For example, I view the current movement for "interest-free" banking as radical Islamist. The secularist position would be, of course, that economics and religion are separate. A capitalist oriented modernism might justify modern interest by arguing that the Qurʾanic term *riba* does not really apply to modern banking practices,[74] while a socialist oriented modernism might generalize the prohibition into an attack on capitalist economic injustice.[75] The radical Islamist position represents a reaffirmation and in some ways an intensification of the traditional

prohibition and is prepared to restructure the banking system in a major way to accomplish this. The new female Islamic garb is radical Islamist insofar as it involves a traditional prescription but not the traditional styles. It is possible, obviously, for one to be modernist or secularist in some respects, for example, political ideology, and radical Islamist in others, for example, female garb.

TRADITIONALISM

A traditionalist may be defined as one whose allegiance is to what many would consider the particular "mix" of Shariᶜa and non-Shariᶜa elements characterizing his area on the eve of the Western impact, and who has not significantly internalized the Western challenge, that is, who has not felt the attraction as well as the threat of Western ways, and thus has not fully appreciated the depth of the threat. He will probably be more "otherworldly" than the types so far discussed and certainly more given to traditional "superstitions."

Traditionalists respond to the Western challenge strictly in terms of the paradigms offered by the tradition for coping with adversity. The Westerners may be *kafirs* to be resisted by force or to be tolerated as one of the punishments God visits upon his faithful for their sins or one of the trials by which He tests their faith.[76] To some extent the Crusades and the Mongol invasions can offer historical precedents.[77] Some have taken consolation in the thought that God may grant *kafirs* worldly success but reserves the bliss of paradise for the Muslims.[78] Nevertheless, even the traditionalists are slightly "modern," insofar as they have had to make this much response. Those who have made no response at all we could call simply "traditional." In the nineteenth century and decreasingly in the twentieth, the traditionalist orientation has generally characterized the ulama and other traditional elites, the Sufi orders, and the lower classes, especially the peasants, except that many of these last, along with higher classes in areas such as central Arabia and Afghanistan were presumably traditional into the twentieth century.

We may discern a scale of traditionalism from "rejectionist" on the right to "adaptationist" on the left.[79] The rejectionists would be those, particularly in the nineteenth century, who mounted revolts and resistance against the encroaching colonial powers, or violently resisted the reform efforts of the Westernizing Muslim rulers, but without significant efforts to reform the understanding of the Shariᶜa or to extend it in practice to areas of life where it had traditionally held less sway, or to assert its relevance to distinctively modern issues.

The adaptationists would be those who have gone along or at most used delaying tactics. Their actions make sense within the framework of a view that the times are inherently corrupt, due to the distance from the ideal time of the Prophet, and that necessity, therefore, makes such adaptation appropriate.[80] They may in fact prefer to allow the ruler the traditional, but implicitly secularizing, expedient of removing certain classes of cases from ulama jurisdiction, than to allow Islamic modernist reformers to tamper with the ideal. It may be such an attitude that explains the opposition of the Azharis to the reforms of Muhammad ᶜAbduh and his followers.

Traditionalists have often been accused of a rigid conservatism (*jumud*), but such an accusation may be unfair. The tradition has always had its ways of gradually coping with change. Even if the gate of "absolute" ijtihad had been closed,[81] ijtihad within the framework of tradition has always been possible. The traditionalists have been those who felt that the time-honored ways of change were adequate or, if they became rigid, did so in reaction to the modernizing pressures put upon them.

The most conservative elements in Saudi Arabia are best described, I think, as traditionalist, and certainly those who opposed the introduction of television, for example, were at the rejectionist extreme. The fact that Saudi Arabia does not even have a constitution, in the modern sense, argues for considering it traditionalist. Analysis of present thinking and practice in Saudi Arabia would, I think, uncover both modernist and radical Islamist, and perhaps even secularist tendencies, with modernist tendencies probably strongest in official circles.[82] Those who took over the sanctuary in Mecca in 1979 may have been radical Islamists reacting against other trends, although "rejectionist neo-traditionalist" may be a better label.

NEO-TRADITIONALISM

When the traditionalist begins to come more deeply to grips with the Western challenge, he may become a "neo-traditionalist." Here, too, we may discern "rejectionist" and "adaptationist" extremes. Neo-traditionalism may be viewed as a transitional stage on the way to secularism, modernism, or radical Islamism, but it is also possible that it may generate more permanent and distinctive types.

The neo-traditionalist accepts the need for modern technology, but is likely to be more selective than the modern types in appropriating it, and likely to give it less symbolic, as distinct from functional, value.[83] He is also likely to have internalized other Western ideas and values somewhat less, particularly the idea of progress and the "Weberian" work ethic. To the extent that he is less committed to the idea of progress, he may feel it less urgent that the Islamic ideal be translated at once into social practice, and, if he is of the adaptationist sort, he may feel that the traditional ways of coping with change are adequate in the long run though perhaps not in the short run and thus that it is better to have a temporary secularist gap between ideal and reality for a time than to have an overhasty modernist or radical Islamist tampering with the ideal. At the same time, he may feel it appropriate to use "obstructionist" tactics to slow down a secularist government's ill-considered rush to certain forms of modernity.[84] He will prefer gradual to revolutionary change. The rejectionist neo-traditionalist, on the other hand, may feel the need for more revolutionary action but may derive the motivation for this more from traditional Mahdist ideas than from the modern idea of progress.[85]

The adaptationist neo-traditionalist may see positive value in local traditions *qua* local traditions, over against Western ways and also over against the more unitary Islamic model advocated by the radical Islamists. He is more likely than the other types to recognize that certain local customs are both non-Islamic in

origin and non-"modern," and yet still value them. One of the leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia has criticized radical Islamism for its "rejection of the past adaptive ways of Islam as a religion 'living' in a concrete local tradition."[86]

The neo-traditionalist is likely to value the depth and complexity of the past Islamic tradition as represented by the learning of the ulama and the wisdom of the Sufi sheikhs more than the more modern types. Thus, a case might be made for considering the Iranian revolution more rejectionist neo-traditionalist than radical Islamist, both because of the place of the ulama and because of its distinctively Shiᶜi and Iranian elements. In fact, I would be inclined to place it somewhere on the scale between the radical Islamist and rejectionist neo-traditionalist types. The same may be true of some of the recent violent or potentially violent manifestations of Sunni "fundamentalism" in the Arab world.[87]

I believe that many of the ulama and members of Sufi orders in Egypt today are best seen as adaptationist neo-traditionalists.[88] The Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya order, as described by Gilsenan, fits this type quite well.[89] Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Iran could probably best be placed here. I believe that writers such as Sayyid Hossein Nasr and Martin Lings[90] are best seen as neo-traditionalists, and this suggests that neo-traditionalism may be able to draw support from more recent Western doubts about aspects of "modernity," such as reservations about "progress" and the effects of technology on the environment.

THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPECTRUM

We can now fill out our spectrum and present it in its two dimensions (see Figure 1). On the scale of "modernity," we have already seen some differences among the non-traditionalist types, but obviously it is on this scale especially that the traditionalist types vary from all of them, with pure traditionalism at the lowest point and neo-traditionalism intermediate. I see no reason for placing the rejectionist and adaptationist types of pure traditionalism any differently on this scale, but adaptationist neo-traditionalists will rank a bit higher than rejectionist neo-traditionalists for reasons like those that put secularists higher than radical Islamists. On the scale of "Islamic totalism" rejectionist traditionalism is considerably to the left of radical Islamism because of the many areas of life that even the "fundamentalist" forms of traditional Islam did not seek in practice to bring strictly under the sway of the Shariᶜa. Probably rejectionist traditionalism should be placed even to the left of the strictest forms of Islamic modernism (whether in the "apologetic" or "neo-modernist" mode). The sides of the diagram are skewed to the right because I think rejectionist types have probably moved more quickly to the "right" on the Islamic totalism scale than "up" on the modernity scale, while positions corresponding to a strict secularism of even the moderate type have not been part of the traditionalist option. The term "fundamentalism" is sometimes used to refer to everything to the right of a line drawn vertically from rejectionist traditionalism to modernism, but if it were to be used at all, I would rather limit it to radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism (see Figure 1), since these are the positions that have both the radicalness and the modernity that seem to me implicit in the term. In fact,



RS = Radical Secularism

MS = Moderate Secularism

M = Islamic Modernism

RI = Radical Islamism

ANT = Accomodationist Neo-Traditionalism

RNT = Rejectionist Neo-Traditionalism

AT = Accomodationist Traditionalism

RT = Rejectionist Traditionalism

"Fundamentalism" widely defined

"Fundamentalism" narrowly defined

FIGURE 1.

however, this term seems to me a seriously misleading one and I would suggest that "Islamic radicalism" be used instead.[91]

It may be observed that the types will tend to show more ideological diversity within them the further they are from the extreme of radical Islamism in either direction. Secularism, in principle at least, can include a wide variety of Western-derived ideologies, while traditionalism will reflect the diversity of the traditional Islamic world. Radical Islamism should show the least diversity both because it most strictly insists on making "Islam" its ideology and because it tends to "simplify" that Islam and stress the widely shared basics.



FIGURE 2.

While this diagram may suggest a greater degree of precision than is in fact possible, it should be possible to plot various modern Islamic phenomena on it in a rough way, and it should help us to avoid the danger of "pigeon-holing." In Figure 2, I have very provisionally suggested locations for (1) Gamal Abdel Nasser, (2) Anwar Sadat, and (3) Imam Khomeini. A writer such as Sayyid Qutb may be said to have moved on the scale over the course of his life in a manner suggested by the line (4).

BY WAY OF EVALUATION

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the various types here described, and what might the future hold? The following remarks represent a very tentative effort at assessment, based on the assumption that to be viable in the long term an ideology must have a somewhat realistic assessment of the actual situation and must be able to call forth a high degree of moral commitment.

Undoubtedly the greatest strengths of secularism lie in the "practical" areas. It follows what are, to a considerable degree, tried and proven models. While Western prestige in the third world is undoubtedly not what it once was, it is still undeniable that many nations have been able to develop technologically on the

basis of ideologies such as liberal nationalism and Marxism, whereas no fully non-Western ideology has yet demonstrated its capacity in this regard.

Furthermore, with its ideals of religious freedom and equality before the law, modern secularism provides a widely accepted way of dealing with religious plurality. The presence of non-Muslims has probably been the most important single factor in pushing countries such as Indonesia and Egypt toward secularism. Likewise, secularism would seem the best ideology for Muslims who are minorities in the countries in which they live. A discussion of Muslim minorities is beyond the scope of this article, but their relevance is undeniable. Beyond this is the fact that the Muslim *umma* is a minority in the world population as a whole and even the most anti-secularist Muslim regimes have to contend with this. Presumably when Iranians convince North Koreans to sell them arms or proclaim solidarity with Nicaraguans, they do not advance Islamist arguments.

The closeness of secularists to Western ways of thinking is both a strength and a weakness. On one hand, they are more likely than others to know how to deal with Westerners and to have an appreciation of the sources of Western strength.[92] On the other hand, they are more likely to have an indiscriminate admiration for all things Western, or at least to appear to, although this is perhaps less true today than it once was.[93] The foreign provenance of basic secularist ideas is clearly a disadvantage in today's climate.

The clarity and consistency of secularism's position on the Shari^{c}a may also be either an advantage or a disadvantage. Clarity is often not an advantage in day-to-day politics, where conceptually vague slogans may appeal to a wider range of people. But an uncompromising clarity and consistency may mobilize a greater depth of commitment in a revolutionary situation and may help assure that a program of radical social change is carried through consistently and effectively in the long run.

Still another aspect of secularism that cuts both ways is the fact that its constituency has been largely among the social, political, and economic elite. On one hand, this has meant that its adherents have been better positioned to put their beliefs into practice, but on the other hand, the weakness of secularism among the masses makes its position always somewhat insecure, and contributes to the sort of gap between the Westernized elite and the rest of society that exploded so dramatically in Iran.

A particular problem for secularism is its relatively weak roots in the Muslim past, although these are not totally absent. Some precedent for the separation of religion from other areas of life can be found in the fact that the Shari^{c}a was spelled out in far more detail and far more regularly followed in areas of personal ritual and family matters than in other areas of public law. Particularly if secularism allows the areas of family law to be placed on the sacred side of the sacred-secular divide, it can be argued that secularism merely carries traditional practice a logical step further. In a similar way, equality before the law can find precedent in the high degree of tolerance given to non-Muslims in the periods of greatest Islamic cultural flourishings, such as ^{c}Abbasid Baghdad, Umayyad Spain, and Akbar's Mogul India; and nationalism certainly can find nourishment in ethnic feelings and local loyalties that have existed for centuries. On the other hand, down through the ages the most pious and committed Muslims have

probably felt their ethnic identity less than others, certainly viewed the failure to enforce the Shariʿa as a sign of corruption, and tended to be restive when rulers gave too much freedom and recognition to non-Muslims. In general, the elements in traditional Muslim practice upon which secularism can call for support are those that have been least well integrated into the central Islamic symbol system.

In fact, a very major reinterpretation of Islam will be necessary before it can be congenial to secularism. A step in this direction is a reinterpretation of Islamic history that puts the relatively secular Umayyads in a much better light than pious Muslims have usually seen them, that emphasizes the secular elements in the ʿAbbasid period of glory, and deemphasizes the cultural (as distinct from more strictly "religious") significance of the early Medinan state and the Rightly Guided Caliphate;[94] but I doubt if this is sufficient. Beyond this, it would be necessary to develop a secularist interpretation of the basic Islamic symbol system as found in the Qurʾan and the Sunna, both of which have a lot to say about public life. Reinterpretations of this magnitude needed are by no means unknown to the history of religion, and secularists sometimes point to the Protestant Reformation as a possible model.[95] The best known effort is ʿAli Abd al-Raziq's *al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm*, published in Cairo in 1925.[96] The violent attacks to which the book and its author were subjected effectively stifled further public developments along this line in Egypt, and the climate today in the Muslim world seems even less conducive to such an effort.[97]

In the past, it has been Islamic symbols that have mobilized moral commitment in the Muslim world, and I do not think any secularist ideology has yet given a really convincing demonstration of its ability to do this in other terms. The Palestinians might be an exception to this point, but their situation is distinctive and even among them of late an increase in Islamism is reported. The record of secularism so far in providing a basis for development and social integration in the Muslim world is much poorer than was widely expected a generation ago, and it is not surprising that many are seeking an alternative. Secularism is currently on the defensive, but the vast majority of Muslims still live under secularist governments and these governments will not yield power easily.

By contrast, the strength of radical Islamism lies precisely in its claim to Islamic authenticity and its consequent ability to call forth commitment; radical Islamists are commonly respected by others for their sincerity and willingness for self-sacrifice if for nothing else. Since it combines this with many modern characteristics, it has an appeal to those who have been exposed to "modernity" in a major way, but still value tradition, and to those who may have experienced more of the disruption than the benefits of modernization. These include many young people and recent immigrants from the countryside to the city, groups undoubtedly crucial for the future of developing countries.

The fact that radical Islamism takes a position on the place of the Shariʿa clearly and diametrically opposed to secularism and its tendency to be intolerant of other views allows it easily to be labeled "fanaticism" or "extremism," but also helps make it a suitable vehicle for movements of protest or revolution.

Perhaps the greatest long-run challenge for radical Islamism is the very size of the task to which its inner logic impels it. As already suggested, the undertaking

implicit (and sometimes explicit) in it is to "dismantle" Western civilization and rebuild using many of its elements. The resulting society would be at least as different from present "free world" and communist societies as each of them are from the other, perhaps more so. Few radical Islamists, I think, realize the size of this undertaking.[98] Whether this is possible in today's shrinking world in the face of the continued vitality of both the liberal and Marxist forms of Western civilization is not clear. On the other hand, the very size of the task may force radical Islamists to be more creative than either they or others expect. Their combination of a central concern for authenticity with a very real openness to change may well be the best recipe for a genuinely Islamic creativity. In fact, radical Islamists might conceivably generate changes in the Islamic symbol system of the magnitude, if not of the kind, that secularism needs. The doctrine of *vilayat-i faqih* in Iran today suggests such a possibility.[99] If they should accomplish this, the implications could be no less earth-shaking than was the Protestant Reformation, which in many ways sought to "go back" but in fact released energies that impelled society forward. To realize this possibility, however, radical Islamism will have to show that it can elicit moral commitment not only for oppositional efforts but for constructive ones as well.[100]

In short, radical Islamism has the strengths and weaknesses of any revolutionary ideology. Its power is great and the obstacles to it formidable; its potential for long run significance is probably greater than most observers are prepared to recognize.

Modernism may be said to attempt to combine Islamic authenticity with adherence to the "tried and proven" models for development drawn from the West. To the extent that it can do this, it can draw on traditional sources of moral commitment more effectively than secularism, while avoiding the disruption and "risk" involved in radical Islamism. On the other hand, it often involves a desire to "have one's cake and eat it too" and is apt to be used as a "cover" for essentially secularist programs. "Modernist" legislative reform has tended to be a matter of finding Islamic precedents for laws desired on essentially secularist grounds, rather than a serious reformulation of the tradition by absolute ijtiḥad.[101] To this extent, its claim to authenticity loses credibility.

The apologetic effort to interpret Islam in "Western" terms is not without significant basis, for Western and Islamic civilizations are historically affiliated and have much in common, and the West did in fact borrow much from the Muslims. This all too often, however, developed in a shallow and intellectually inadequate way. Modernist apologetic is particularly inadequate at the point where secularism has one of its greatest strengths, and radical Islamism is at least forthright, in the response to religious plurality. Despite its insistent proclamation of Islamic tolerance and its ability to adduce some impressive examples from past Muslim history, it rarely if ever comes to real grips with the fact that traditional dhimmi status is simply not the same as modern "equality before the law."[102] Hence, it is less than convincing to skeptical non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately, the pressures of the modern situation make this sort of thing almost unavoidable. This issue is so sensitive that it is hard to allow the kind of frank public discussion that is necessary to arrive at less superficial positions.

It seems to me that Islamic modernism may play a useful role in easing some of the psychological and social strains of modernization by giving it a less alien face, but that it is unlikely to provide a really sound basis for social development in the long term unless it can develop the sort of radical reinterpretation proposed by Fazlur Rahman as "neo-modernism." There is undoubtedly an awareness of the need for this in some quarters, but whether the climate is much more ripe for it than for a "secularist" reinterpretation may be doubted. Short of this, modernism is likely to remain an essentially unstable stopgap or halfway house.

The distinctive strength of the traditionalist and neo-traditionalist positions is their rootage in the past tradition. Particularly insofar as they are members of the ulama, they are likely to have an awareness of and access to the riches of the past tradition that the more "modern" types often lack. Undoubtedly, pure traditionalism does not feel the Western challenge deeply enough to come up with an adequate response, but neo-traditionalism in some cases may feel the challenge sufficiently to respond while at the same time not being so "hung up" on the Western temptation-cum-threat as the more "modern" types. It may therefore be capable of a more balanced and critical assessment of the West in the long run. Adaptationist neo-traditionalism may provide the best framework for an evolutionary adaptation of the Islamic tradition to "modernity," while rejectionist neo-traditionalism may provide a revolutionary radical Islamism with the rootage it needs for long term survival, as may be happening in Iran.

What of the future? At present there is considerable "rightward" and perhaps some "downward" pressure everywhere, but also considerable resistance by the secularized elites. Further Islamic radical (i.e., radical Islamist or rejectionist neo-traditionalist) takeovers could happen in the near future but seem a bit less likely today than a few years ago. In the short term, I would expect secularist ideologies to maintain themselves, though with some "erosion" to the right. In the medium term, much will depend on the ability of the Iranian revolution to institutionalize itself and appeal to Muslims outside Iran. Assuming that it does so and "moderates" to some degree, one might foresee a situation in which the two main options are a very moderate and slightly traditionalist secularism and an Islamic radicalism intermediate between radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism. Equally likely, though, unforeseen developments may confuse the categories of academic observers and confound their prophecies.

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NOTES

Author's note: This article is based on ideas that I have been developing over a period of about seven years. In an earlier version it was presented to a conference in New Zealand in 1981 and later published and circulated locally as "Working Paper No. 2" by the Australasian Middle East Studies Association under the title "Towards a Typology of Modern Islamic Movements?" (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1982). Later versions were presented informally in Jakarta and Yogyakarta in 1984, in Cairo in January 1985, and as a paper at the XVth Congress of the International

Association for the History of Religions in Sydney, Australia, in August 1985. Let me express my appreciation to those who have heard and responded to these ideas and particularly to the unnamed evaluators whose comments, both acerbic and constructive, have provided stimulus and guidance for the final revision. Appreciation is also due to Dr. David Brewster, my predecessor at the University of Canterbury, one of whose class handouts bequeathed to me started my thinking on the subject. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from constitutions are from A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1984).

[1]Yvonne Haddad rightly complains of "the tendency of Western readers to dismiss 'fanaticism' and 'fundamentalism' as passing fads that need to be ignored because of their transient nature" (*The Link*, 15, 4 [September/October, 1982], 4). Also, the term carries with it many associations from its original use in a Protestant Christian context that are inappropriate for an Islamic context. My current preference for an alternative is given below, p. 321 and fn. 91.

[2]Space prohibits a thorough examination of the literature relevant to this subject, but let me indicate how I see this typology in relation to a few recent treatments. Leonard Binder in *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 31–40, appears to use "secularist" and "modernist" much as I use "secularist" and "Islamic modernist." His "traditionalist" (or "traditional Islam") appears to correspond to my adaptationist (neo-)traditionalism, his "early fundamentalism" to my rejectionist traditionalism, and his "[later] fundamentalism" to my radical Islamism and probably the "right-wing" of my Islamic modernism. He claims to find a basically similar analysis in the works of H. A. R. Gibb, W. C. Smith, and Albert Hourani. John Esposito's "four positions or attitudes toward modernization and Islamic socio-political change," "secularist," "conservative," "neo-traditionalist," and "Islamic reformist" (along with "modernist"), correspond to my "secularist," "(neo-)traditionalist," "radical Islamist," and "Islamic modernist" respectively (*Islam and Politics* [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984], pp. 216–18). H. Mintjes uses the terms "secularist," "modernist," and "traditionalist" pretty much as I do and his "fundamentalist" corresponds to my "radical Islamist" ("Mawlana Mawdudi's Last Years and the Resurgence of Fundamentalist Islam," *Al-Mushir*, 22, 2 [1980], 46–73). R. Stephen Humphreys' use of the terms "secularist," "modernist," and "traditionalist" seems to correspond to mine ("Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria," *Middle East Journal*, 33, 1 [Winter 1979], 1–19). His "fundamentalist" seems to correspond to my "rejectionist neo-traditionalist" but whether it includes my "radical Islamist" is less than clear. He describes Sayyid Qutb as "militantly Fundamentalist in tone, Modernist in content" (p. 6) but he may have in mind his somewhat earlier, more "moderate" works (see fn. 47 below). In describing fundamentalism as a "tendency" and a "set of attitudes" (p. 4) rather than a group or a movement, he appears to be making the same point that I make by speaking of ideological "orientations." Yvonne Haddad, in *Contemporary Islam and the Challenge of History* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), esp. pp. 7–23, and "The Islamic Alternative" (*The Link*, 15, 4 [September/October, 1982], 1–14) presents a threefold typology: "acculturationist," "normativist," and "neo-normativist." The first seems to correspond to my "secularist," the second to my "rejectionist traditionalist," and the third to my "radical Islamist" and "rejectionist neo-traditionalist." My "modernist" category would probably be divided between her "acculturationist" and "neo-normativist" categories, but I do not know where she would put my "adaptationist (neo-)traditionalist." My typology in its formal aspect is, I think, particularly close to that of Fazlur Rahman as found in several writings: "Revival and Reform in Islam" (*The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970], part VIII, ch. 7); "Islamic Modernism: Its Scope, Method and Alternatives" (*IJMES*, 1, 4 [October, 1970], 317–33); "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities," in A. T. Welch & P. Cachia, eds., *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979), pp. 315–30; *Islam*, 2nd edition (Chicago & New York: University of Chicago Press, 1979), chs. 12–14; and "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism," in Philip H. Stoddard et al., eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 23–35. My "Islamic modernism" corresponds on the whole to the various forms of "modernism" that he discusses, and my "radical Islamism" corresponds to his "neo-revivalism" or "neo-fundamentalism" (sometimes "fundamentalism" in the earlier writings). While I disagree with his analyses and critiques at some points, I have unfailingly found his views immensely stimulating. Another writer whose categories bear a significant and interesting relation to mine is John Voll (see "The Sudanese Mahdi: Frontier Fundamentalist," *IJMES*, 10, 2 [May, 1979], 167–86; *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* [Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982]; and "Wahhabism and Mahdism: Alternative

Styles of Islamic Renewal," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 4, 1 & 2 [1982], 110–26). In *Islam: Continuity and Change* he presents four "styles of action": "adaptationist," "conservative," "fundamentalist," and a style which emphasizes "the more personal and individual aspects of Islam" (pp. 29–31). The first three correlate with my types as follows: his "adaptationist" = my "secularist" and "adaptationist neo-traditionalism," his "conservative" = my "adaptationist traditionalist," and his "fundamentalist" = my "radical Islamist" and "rejectionist (neo-)traditionalist." It is from him that I have adapted the term "adaptationist." His fourth type seems to me relevant to a different scale, text-oriented/leader-oriented (see fn. 9, below). Thus, like Yvonne Haddad, he in effect divides the spectrum into three rather than four types. An important difference between his treatment and mine is that he is describing "styles of action" while I am describing "ideological orientations." One might say that a given "style of action" issues from or is congenial to a given "ideological orientation," but they are not identical. This may be why he classes as "fundamentalists" figures such as Qaddafi and Ali Shariati whom I will put elsewhere (cf. fn. 46 below). Another difference between our treatments is that his categories are intended to apply to the whole of Islamic history, while mine are designed specifically for the modern period. My "secularism" and "radical Islamism" could be considered as distinctively modern manifestations of his "adaptationism" and "fundamentalism" respectively.

[3]Humphreys makes the same point in "Islam and Political Values," p. 2.

[4]My use of the term "modernity" here fits very well with the definition of modernization as an increase in conscious human control over the environment, especially if that includes the social as well as the physical environment. On this definition certain recent tendencies in the West, connected, e.g., with environmentalism, that question the ideal of complete human control of the environment and prefer to speak of harmony with it, might be called "post-modern."

[5]*Islam in Modern History* (New York: New American Library, Mentor, 1957), p. 47. See chapters one and two for what in my view is still an excellent analysis of the spiritual crisis of modern Islam.

[6]It is not intended here to imply that only external factors have shaped modern Muslim developments. Obviously internal factors, such as pre-modern revivalist movements, have also been important, but in terms of this typology their importance has been in influencing which types of responses particular Muslims would give, rather than the typology as such.

[7]It seems to me we might define ideology as a systematically developed worldview oriented toward stimulating and guiding social change (cf. the definition proffered by Ronald Bruce St. John, "a system of ideas, beliefs and myths justifying or attacking a given social order," *IJMES* 15, 4 [November 1983], 471). What is new, in relation to traditional Islam, is the greater social and worldly orientation, the conscious and systematic elaboration of a social doctrine, and the expectation of significant social change wrought by human effort.

[8]"Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, 63, 1 (Fall 1984), 108–27. Bill does not make clear the doctrinal content of "fundamentalism" as he uses the term, but it seems to correspond to my radical Islamism and rejectionist (neo-)traditionalism. Insofar as he identifies fundamentalism with "populist" Islam, he fails to take account of the fact that "fundamentalism" is now the establishment in Iran and to a considerable degree in Pakistan. It also obscures the fact that certain forms of modernism, such as that of Ali Shariati and the Mujahidin-i Khalq (see pp. 313–14) can be "populist" in his sense (see also note 9).

[9]This is the case also with Voll's distinction between "text-oriented" and "leader-oriented" ("Wahhabism and Mahdism"). Ataturk's movement was a "leader-oriented" secularism and the Iranian revolution was certainly "leader-oriented," while ᶜAli ᶜAbd al-Raziq's book presents a "text-oriented" secularism and both Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb a "text-oriented" radical Islamism. Similarly, "the Technical Military Academy group" and the "Takfir wa-Hijra group" as described by Saad Eddin Ibrahim ("Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," *IJMES* 12, 4 [December, 1980], 423–53) would appear to be fairly close in ideological orientation, but the former seems more "text-oriented" and the latter more "leader-oriented."

[10]Space forbids more than occasional reference to the ways in which Shiᶜi-Sunni differences may affect these types. Suffice it to say that I believe all the types may be found, with the characteristics ascribed to them here, among both Sunnis and Shiᶜis, although Shiᶜis probably tend more toward the extremes of the Islamic totalism scale.

[11]Fazlur Rahman says, "Secularism in Islam . . . is the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions *without reference to Islam*, i.e., without their being derived, or organically linked

to the principles of the Qur'an and the Sunna . . . Islamic modernism . . . means precisely the induction of change into the content of the *Shariʿa*" ("Islamic Modernism," p. 311).

[12]The only references to religion in the constitution are in Articles 37 and 55. The former reads: "The state recognizes no religion whatever and supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook in people," and the latter reads "Fascist, anti-democratic, religious, war-mongering, and anti-socialist activities and propaganda . . . are prohibited." Mosques and churches were officially closed in 1967.

[13]The 1980 Afghanistan constitution speaks of "the resolute following of the principles of the sacred religion of Islam" (Basic Principles) and includes the "rules of Shariʿah law" as residual law (Art. 56). The South Yemeni constitution recognizes Islam as religion of state, although not until Article 46.

[14]My translation of *ketuhanan yang maha esa*, though *ketuhanan* is more literally "lordship" than "divinity." It is worth noting that the Indonesian phrase not only uses a very abstract term for God but also avoids words of Arabic derivation, which have a more Islamic flavor. The Jakarta Charter of 1945 included a provision that Muslims should be obliged to follow Islamic law, but this was not included in the constitution. For further details see B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 24–39.

[15]The preamble to the Turkish constitution notes "the determination of the Turkish Republic, an equal and honorable member of the family of nations, to insure its everlasting existence, welfare, and material and spiritual well-being and its determination in attaining the standards of contemporary civilization."

[16]For example, the following from Nasser: "We boast that we stick to religion, each one of us according to his religion. The Muslim upholds his religion and the Christian upholds his, because religion represents the right and the sound way. . . . It is the great secret behind the success of this Revolution: the adherence to religion" (D. E. Smith, ed., *Religion and Political Modernization* [New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1974], p. 275).

[17]For example, the well known statement of Taha Hussein, "In order to become equal partners in civilization with the Europeans, we must literally and forthrightly do everything that they do; we must share with them the present civilization, with all its pleasant and unpleasant sides" (*The Future of Culture in Egypt*, S. Glazer, trans. [Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954], p. 21).

[18]Turkey's efforts to have the *adhan* recited in Turkish are an extreme example of government interference in religion for nationalist goals, but not the only one there. On the efforts of the Egyptian government to use religion for its own purposes, see especially Daniel Crecelius, "The Course of Secularization in Modern Egypt," chapter 3 in J. Esposito, ed., *Islam and Development* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 69–70.

[19]Noted, for example, by Smith in *Islam in Modern History*, p. 85. The very firmness and security of this identity must have been one of the factors that made it possible for Atatürk to undertake his radically secularist reforms.

[20]Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson, 1961), pp. 20, 23–24.

[21]See S. G. Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 57–64, 167–71, 214. The close relation between Arabism and Islam is stressed by ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz in "Islam and Arab Nationalism" (ibid., pp. 172–88), although he seems to me here more Islamic modernist than secularist since he justifies Arab Nationalism at the bar of Islam, rather than vice-versa.

[22]For example, Taha Hussein's well known distinction between a "reasoning" personality "that investigates, criticizes, analyses," and a "sentient" one "that feels pleasure and pain, rejoices, sorrows, . . . without criticism, investigation or analysis" (*al-Siyasa al-usbuʿiyya* [Cairo], July 17, 1926, 5, cf. translation in Charles Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* [London: Oxford University Press, 1933], p. 258). See also my discussion of this and similar views held by Taha Hussein's colleague, Ahmad Amin, in my *The Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual* (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Islamic Studies in Association with Vikas, 1982), pp. 8–9, 68–83.

[23]This comment is based on material contained in two recent articles: Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Ideology of Muʿammar al-Qadhdhafi: Theory and Practice," *IJMES*, 15, 4 (November, 1983), 471–90, and Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic Resurgence or New Prophethood: The Role of Islam in

Qadhdhafi's Ideology," in Ali E. Dessouki, ed., *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 196–220, and on perusal of the English translation of his *Green Book* (Tripoli: Public Establishment of Publishing, Advertising and Distribution, n.d.).

[24]A label such as "moderate Islamism" might be more consistent with the next label, "radical Islamism," but it seems to me that "moderate" may be a bit misleading for a type that includes groups such as the Mujahidin-i Khalq of Iran. "Islamist modernism" would be better and would fit my definition of Islamism as Islam qua ideology, but I stick with "Islamic modernism" as the better known term and one that is generally adequate.

[25]English translation by Caesar E. Farah (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 82; cf. *al-Risala al-khalida* (Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿla li-al-shuʿun al-Islamiyya, 1964), p. 53. In my view the title would be better translated "Eternal Mission" and may be compared with the "eternal mission" of the Arab nation in Baʿathist thinking. A slight variation on this position is that of Muhammad ʿAmara, who speaks of a "distinction" (*tamayuz*) but not a "separation" (*infisal*) between "Islamic religion" (*al-din al-islami*) and "the thought of Muslims" (*fikr al-muslimin*) in worldly matters (*al-Islam wa-al-mustaqbal* [Cairo & Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1405/1984], p. 43). In the latter area there is considerable freedom for ijtihad even where there are authoritative texts (pp. 31ff.).

[26]For convenience, I shall use "modernist" instead of "Islamic modernist" where the context makes the meaning clear. "Modernist" sometimes is used to include secularists as well as Islamic modernists. For example, C. C. Adams includes both ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq and Taha Husayn in the chapter on "The Younger Egyptian Modernists" in *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968, originally published in 1933), pp. 253–68.

[27]*Risala* (Arabic), p. 212, my translation; cf. English translation, p. 105.

[28]*Risala*, English translation, pp. 54ff., 90–92, 101–2. In the chapter on "The Islamic State" it is hard to say whether the Shariʿa means much more than the fact that there are moral laws that even a sovereign nation may not rightfully violate (pp. 111–14), something Smith claims for the Turks (*Islam in Modern History*, pp. 185–87).

[29]E.g., Mahathir Muhammad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, as quoted in the *New York Times*, May 16, 1985, 2.

[30]See especially J. N. D. Anderson, *Law Reform in the Muslim World* (London: Athlone Press, 1976), ch. 2.

[31]Muhammad ʿAbduh, for example, said that a Muslim was obliged to accept only *mutawatir* hadith, and was free to reject others about which he had doubts (*Risalat al-Tawhid*, 17th Printing [Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahira, 1379/1960], pp. 201–3; English translation by K. Cragg and I. Masaʿad, *The Theology of Unity* [London: Allen and Unwin, 1966], pp. 155–56). Ahmad Amin, in his popular series on Islamic cultural history, cautiously suggested that there were few if any mutawatir hadith (especially, *Fajr al-Islam*, 10th edition [Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1965], p. 218); see also G. H. A. Juynboll, *The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt* (Leiden: Brill, 1969), and my *Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual*, p. 113.

[32]Sheila McDonough, *The Authority of the Past: A Study of Three Muslim Modernists* (Chambersburg, Pa.: American Academy of Religion, 1970), p. 37.

[33]According to him, the Medinan part of the Qurʾan, which contains the legal details, is the "First Message of Islam," which was necessary at the time of the Prophet but is now superseded by the "Second Message" of Islam, which is found in the general principles contained in the Meccan part. On Taha and his movement see Paul Magnarella, "The Republican Brothers: A Reformist Movement in the Sudan," *Muslim World*, 72, 1 (January 1982), 14–24, and Richard P. Stevens, "Sudan's Republican Brothers and Islamic Reform," *Journal of Arab Affairs*, 1, 1 (1981), 135–46.

[34]In Arabic, *taʾwil*. Whether interpretation or reinterpretation is a debatable issue which I do not wish to prejudge here.

[35]See Qurʾan 4:3 on polygyny, 5:38 on cutting off the hand of the thief, 24:2–5 on whipping for fornication (the provision for stoning for adultery is in the Hadith). On jihad and the treatment of unbelievers, the difficult passages for modernists are the so-called "verses of the sword," such as 9:5 on the Arab pagans and 9:29 on the people of the Book. In these and other Qurʾanic references I follow Pickthall's numbering (*The Meaning of the Glorious Koran* [New York: New American Library, Mentor, n.d.]).

[36]Qur'an 24:4.

[37]Qur'an 4:129.

[38]For an example of this argument, see Rahman, *Islam*, 2nd ed., p. 38.

[39]On the modernist treatment of jihad, see R. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), ch. 4.

[40]"Islamic Modernism" in *IJMES*, 1, 329–31, and "Islam: Challenges and Opportunities," in Welch & Cachia, pp. 323–27.

[41]Said, Abdel Moghny, *Arab Socialism* (London: Blanford Press, 1972), p. 50. Ahmad Shalaby sees the annual meeting of the U.N. as copying the Islamic Hajj (*Islam, Belief, Legislation, Morals* [Cairo: Renaissance Bookshop, 1970], p. 225). See note 43, below.

[42]*Anbiya' Allah* (Cairo & Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1977), p. 436. Cf. Muhammad Iqbal's discussion of *ijma*ᶜ as a legislative assembly (*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* [Lahore: Ashraf, 1960], pp. 173–74, and Abbas Mahmoud al-Akkad [Aqqad], *The Arab's Impact on European Civilization*, Cashmiry & Al-Hadi, trans., 2nd ed. (Cairo, Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, n.d.), pp. 140–46. Along the same line, though more subtle, is Iqbal's interpretation of the finality of prophethood as involving the enthronement of reason (*Reconstruction*, pp. 126–27) and the idea that *tawhid* involves resistance to tyranny and rejection of superstition (see, e.g., Iqbal, *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, A. J. Arberry, trans. [London: John Murray, 1953], pp. 21–23, and Shepard, *Faith of a Modern Muslim*, pp. 99–111).

[43]*Marxism and Islam*, M. M. Enan, trans. (Cairo, n.d.), p. 21; cf. Shalaby: "But modern civilization . . . could not fully copy Islam's attitudes. The United Nations Organization has been content to derive from the Pilgrimage its material part, that is, the annual meeting. It has forgotten that Islamic legislation furnished the Pilgrimage spirituality" (*Islam*, p. 225).

[44]"Mysticism, Equality, and Freedom" in *Marxism and Other Western Fallacies*, R. Campbell, trans. (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1980), pp. 97–111, esp. pp. 118–19. It is not that Shariati identifies Islam with either Marxism or existentialism, but he presents Islam as a solution to a Western dilemma presented in essentially Western terms.

[45]See, e.g., Smith's criticism of Farid Wajdi in *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 139–59, and Gibb's complaint about "the intellectual confusions and the paralyzing romanticism which cloud the minds of the modernists of today" (*Modern Trends in Islam* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947], pp. 105, 106).

[46]That Shariati is to be seen as modernist and not "fundamentalist" may be illustrated by his virtual identification of God and "the people" (*al-nas*) on social matters; "wherever in the Qur'an social matters are mentioned, Allah and *al-nas* are virtually synonymous . . . 'Rule belongs to God' [means] rule belongs to the people" (*Sociology of Islam*, Hamid Algar, trans. [Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1979], p. 116). One could hardly imagine people like Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, or Khomeini (contrast *Islam and Revolution*, Hamid Algar, trans. [Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981], p. 55) saying anything like that.

[47]A comparison of earlier and later editions of *al-ᶜAdala al-ijtimaᶜiyya*—the third edition (Cairo: Matbaᶜat al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1952) and a much later edition (Dar al-Shuruq: Cairo and Beirut, in 1394/1974) have been available to me and illustrate how Sayyid Qutb shifted to the right along the spectrum in his later years. In these he shows the influence of Mawdudi at several points. The Muslim Brothers are generally thought of as "fundamentalist," or radical Islamist in my terms, but in fact they undoubtedly contain a spectrum of views, some of which may be closer to modernist than radical Islamist (see fn. 53, below).

[48]*The Islamic Law and Constitution*, Kurshid Ahmad, trans. and ed., 5th ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1975), p. 72.

[49]"Flexibility is not fluidity (lit. "melting")," *Maᶜalim fi al-tariq*, 1975, p. 121, cf. English translation: *Milestones* (Beirut & Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House for the I.I.F.S.O., 1978), p. 197.

[50]*Maᶜalim*, pp. 94–95; cf. *Milestones*, pp. 157–58.

[51]Mawdudi states that the Shariᶜa was in effect in India until the British took over (*The Islamic Law*, p. 118). The later edition of Sayyid Qutb's *ᶜAdala* puts much less emphasis on the failings of post-Rashidun community than the earlier edition (cf. fn. 47, above). In the earlier edition, for

example, the coming to power of the Umayyads is described as a virtual disaster for Islam (1953 ed., p. 198, Hardie translation, pp. 197–98), while in the later edition it is said only to lead to a decline (1974 ed., pp. 216–17).

[52]*The Islamic Law*, p. 118.

[53]*Islam and Revolution*, pp. 337–38.

[54]E.g., Sayyid Qutb, *ʿAdala*, 1974 ed., p. 94; cf. *Social Justice*, Hardie, trans., p. 88.

[55]See, e.g., R. P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 240–41.

[56]Mawdudi, *The Islamic Law*, p. 118; S. Qutb, *Milestones*, pp. 259–61.

[57]*The Islamic Law*, pp. 265–68.

[58]In *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 27–165.

[59]See, for example, the article "Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin" in *Echo of Islam* (Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Tehran), June–July, 1982, 23, 70, and Ibrahim, "Anatomy," pp. 434–36.

[60]*Jihad in Islam*, p. 5.

[61]*Maʿalim*, p. 9; *Milestones*, pp. 16–17.

[62]*Maʿalim*, p. 59; *Milestones*, p. 103.

[63]On Mawdudi and the Muslim Brothers, see, e.g., Mintjes, "Maulana Maududi's Last Days," p. 73, fn. 85. Sayyid Qutb became less "socialist" as he became more radical Islamist (compare, e.g., *ʿAdala*, 3rd ed., pp. 108, 144; and *Social Justice*, Hardie, trans., pp. 106–7 with *ʿAdala*, 1974, pp. 115–16, 160–61). Comments on Iran are based on Western press reports and indications in the *Tehran Times*.

[64]*Islam and Revolution*, p. 30.

[65]*The Role of Muslim Students in the Re-Construction of the Islamic World*, N. A. Khan, trans. (I.I.F.S.O., 1401/1981), p. 16. For Sayyid Qutb see my "Role of Islamic Fundamentalism" in John M. Ker and Kevin J. Sharpe, eds., *Religion's Response to Change* (Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Chaplaincy Publishing Trust, 1985), pp. 40–41, also *Khasaʾis al-tasawwur al-Islami wa-muqawwimatuh* (Cairo & Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1403/1983), p. 72.

[66]On the absence of the idea of progress from traditional thinking, see fn. 80, below.

[67]I prefer the expression "Islamic symbol system" or "basic Islamic symbol system" to "Islam" here. What I mean by the "basic Islamic symbol system" is those central beliefs and practices, such as the unity of God (*tawhid*), the final prophethood of Muhammad, and the five "pillars," found in the Qurʾan and the Sunna and viewed as an organized system. This is not simply the same as the Qurʾan and the Sunna; for example, the doctrine that Muhammad is the last prophet is a central and essential part of the "symbol system" but is mentioned only once in the Qurʾan. For the idea of religion as a "symbol system" see especially Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System" in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds., *Reader in Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 205–16; also Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," in ibid., pp. 73–87. Modernists insist that Islam is an essentially simple religion and one way they "simplify" the symbol system is by reducing the obligatory content of the Hadith and rejecting much of traditional fiqh. Radical Islamists such as Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb do these things too to some extent, but they also simplify the symbol system with their stress on tawhid in the sense of obedience exclusively given to God as the central linchpin of their system.

[68]Smith has remarked on this in relation to Mawdudi (*Islam in Modern History*, p. 236), as has Charles Adams ("The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi" in D. E. Smith, ed., *South Asian Politics and Religion* [Princeton University Press, 1966], pp. 394–95). Sayyid Qutb also sees Islam as a system, or perhaps as a program or a method (*manhaj*) which gives rise to a system (see fn. 62, above). The idea of Islam as a system is closely related to the idea of Islam as an ideology (Adams, ibid.).

[69]Marshall Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, Vol. 3, *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 389.

[70]*The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1962 and New American Library, Mentor, 1964), ch. 4.

[71]Mawdudi, Qutb, and Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers, were all "laymen" and this point is commonly made concerning Sunni "fundamentalists" (e.g., Mintjes, "Mawlana Mawdudi's Last Years," p. 54; Ibrahim, "Anatomy," p. 434). Nevertheless, there certainly are

"fundamentalist" ulama in Egypt today, and I presume elsewhere too. Khomeini is, of course, one of the ulama, as were also the earlier figures, Abu al-Qasim Kashani and Mujtaba Nawwab Safawi (see Voll, *Islam. Continuity and Change*, p. 204).

[72]Though in some cases radical Islamism uses modernist interpretations in its own ways. Examples would be the idea of tawhid as meaning rejection of the worship of any but God, which modernists present as the charter of political freedom (see note 42, above) and radical Islamists use to stress the necessity of relating every area of life to Islam, and also the idea of jihad as necessary so that Islam may be freely preached, which modernists use to restrict the need for jihad where a non-Muslim government allows Muslims religious freedom but radical Islamists use to insist that government must be in the hands of Muslims (for examples see Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, pp. 125–31).

[73]I suspect that Khomeini could accept "republic" but not "democracy" because the former in Persian (*jumhuri*) comes from an Arabic root, though so far as I know its use in the sense of "republic" is new.

[74]See Fazlur Rahman's suggestion ("Islam: Challenges," p. 326).

[75]E.g., Mahmud Shaltut, *al-Islam, ᶜaqida wa-shariᶜa* (Cairo & Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, n.d.), pp. 270–75.

[76]See, for example, the attitude of Ahmad Amin's father toward the British occupation of Egypt (Shepard, *Faith of a Modern Muslim*, p. 15).

[77]The following reaction of the scholar Ahmad ibn Saᶜd to the fall of the Sokoto caliphate to the British in 1903 seems to me a good example of traditionalism: "We have a precedent in what the unbelievers did with . . . Baghdad. They burnt it, destroyed it, desecrated the graves of the saints, tore the community apart, and killed the Caliph such that the world was without a Caliph for a while. We have a precedent and a consolation in the Qarmatian unbeliever whom God granted the power over Mecca on the Day of Sacrifice. . . . Even the Black Stone he took and went away with it. As God restored normalcy for the Muslim by the return of the Stone and the Caliphate to them, so also do we hope God will resolve this matter for us and grant us amelioration by His power and His grace." (Quoted in *Inquiry*, 1, 7, December 1984, 54.) Secularists, modernists and radical Islamists all realize that "normalcy" is gone forever. Cf. Fazlur Rahman, "For the traditionalist there is no new age in the real sense of the word" ("Roots," p. 32).

[78]For an example, see G. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 270.

[79]These may be seen as continuations of the "adaptionist" and "fundamentalist" styles of traditional Islam described by Voll (see note 2, above).

[80]Traditional Islam, like other traditional religions, did not hold the Western myth of progress, a point argued forcefully by Martin Lings writing under his Muslim name, Abu Bakr Siraj ed-Din, in "The Islamic and Christian Conceptions of the March of Time," *Islamic Quarterly*, 1, 4 (December, 1954), 229–35.

[81]In fact, there is debate about this. See, e.g., Rudolph Peters, "*Idjtihad* and *Taqlid* in 18th and 19th Century Islam," *Die Welt des Islams*, 20 (1980), 131–45.

[82]Zaki Yamani's article, "Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues," in Charles Malik, ed., *God and Man in Contemporary Islamic Thought* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1972), pp. 49–82, strikes me as modernist. Dekmejian reports that in 1983 the King Fahd "called upon Islamic scholars to hold an international conference to modernize Islamic law through rigorous *ijtihad*" (*Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* [Syracuse University Press, 1985], p. 148 and fn. 26). This has a modernist ring to me.

[83]The attitude is illustrated by the following from Sayyed Hossein Nasr: "Of course we do not propose that Muslims should remain oblivious of the world around them. This is neither desirable nor possible. No Islamic state can avoid owning trains and planes" (*Islamic Life and Thought* [Albany: SUNY Press, 1981], p. 28). This seems to suggest that modern technology is more something that cannot be avoided than something to be positively valued.

[84]D. Crecelius accuses the ulama of the Azhar of subservience combined with obstructionism in "Non-Ideological Responses of the Egyptian 'Ulama' to Modernization," chapter 7 in Nikki Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

[85]This seems to be the case with ᶜAbd al-Salam Faraj in *al-Farida al-ghaʾiba* (n.pl., 1402/1982, pp. 7–8, English translation, *Jihad: The Forgotten Pillar*, Ottawa [?], n.d.), pp. 8–10. The idea of

Khomeini as a precursor to the return of the Twelfth Imam is evidently held by some in Iran; e.g., the author of the wall slogan I saw in Tehran in 1984, "O God, O God, protect Khomeni until the revolution of the Mahdi" and the article, "Who will be the next president of Iran?" in the *Tehran Times*, Sept. 14, 1981, 1–2.

[86]"Is There 'Islamic Fundamentalism' in Indonesia Now?" mimeographed copy of article prepared for *The New Internationalist*. One of the best known policies of the Nahdatul Ulama, their holding to the four *madhahib* over against groups such as the Muhammadiyya, marks them as (neo-)traditionalist.

[87]See note 85, above. Hassan Hanafi states that some of these groups rejected the use of radio and television and practiced traditional rather than modern medicine (*al-Haraka al-Islamiyya*, part 2, *al-Wadan*, November 20, 1982, page numbers, etc., not available to me).

[88]Though many of the leading Ulama today might better be described as modernist. The fatwa of the sheikh of the Azhar against *al-Farida al-gha᾽iba* claims that Islam teaches that "the nation is the source of authority" (*al-Fatawa al-Islamiyya min Dar al-Ifta*ᶜ *al-Misriyya*, 10, 31 [Cairo, 1404/1983], p. 3750), almost a secularist position. On the other hand, the argument that a ruler should be considered a Muslim, and thus not the object of jihad, if he does no more than perform Salat, even if he does not rule by the Shariᶜa (ibid., pp. 3744), has an adaptationist traditionalist flavor.

[89]Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

[90]Nasr's discussion of "secularism" as "all that is, from the human point of view, non-sacred or non-divine" (*Islamic Life and Thought*, p. 8) seems to me a bit more in line with traditional Islamic thinking than most definitions of secularism. Note also his attack on progress as a "false idol" (ibid., p. 27), his willingness to accept the traditional limitation of the Shariᶜa to the area of "personal law" (pp. 27–29), his concern for the full "intellectual and spiritual riches" of Islam (p. 32), and his concern that Islam be the judge of "the times" and not vice-versa while at the same time desiring that the traditional truths of Islam be translated into contemporary language and urging that Muslims must know the West well, not just at second hand (p. 32). Cf. note 83 above. On Lings, see note 80.

[91]This term has been used by Eric Davis in "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 134–57.

[92]They are, I think, more likely than others to appreciate the moral commitment that is a condition of modern science and technology and that underlies secular ideologies; e.g., Taha Hussein, *Future of Culture*, p. 21.

[93]E.g., Taha Hussein's oft-quoted statement about "literally and forthrightly doing everything" the Europeans do, quoted in note 17 above.

[94]One finds these things in Ahmad Amin's popular series on Islamic cultural history, *Fajr al-Islam* (Cairo, 1929 and later editions), *Duha al-Islam*, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1933–1936 and later editions), *Zuhr al-Islam*, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1944–1955, and later editions). Such writing has undoubtedly contributed to the considerable amount of secularist opinion in educated circles in Egypt.

[95]See, e.g., Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 206–7. Other examples, at least as relevant, would be the major changes in Judaism involved in the transition from ancient to "Rabbinic" Judaism and in modern times from this to either Reform Judaism or Zionism. Whether Islam has ever undergone such a shift in its basic symbol system may be doubted.

[96]*Al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm* (Cairo, 1925); French translation, "L'Islam et les bases du pouvoir," by L. Bercher, *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, 7 (1933), 353–91, and 8 (1934), 163–222. See also the summary and discussion of this in A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 184–92.

[97]According to Kenneth Cragg, writing in 1955, ᶜAli ᶜAbd al-Raziq's view was a "now largely accepted reinterpretation of the Caliphate" (Richard N. Frye, ed., *Islam and the West* [The Hague: Mouton, 1957], p. 158). This may be so in many circles, but I am not aware of any serious public discussion that has led to it.

[98]One who does recognize it, at least in the area of intellectual endeavor, and who may perhaps be located somewhere between modernism and radical Islamism on the scale, is Ziauddin Sardar. See "Is There an Islamic Resurgence?" *Afkar International*, 1, 1 (June 1984), 35–39, and "Reconstructing the Muslim Civilization," *Inquiry*, 1, 6 (November 1984), 39–44.

[99]That the doctrine of *vilayat-i faqih* is new has been recognized by more than one scholar, e.g., Said Amir Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Iran," in S. A. Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 222–23.

[100]Iran is of course crucial here, but its war with Iraq and international ostracism tend to keep it in an "oppositional" mode.

[101]See, for example, the story reported by Anderson in *Law Reform*, p. 75; also Schacht's comments in "Problems in Modern Islamic Legislation," in R. H. Nolte, ed., *The Modern Middle East* (New York: Atherton, 1963), ch. 11, esp. pp. 190–91, 199.

[102]ʿAzzam, for example, equates dhimma with "modern citizenship" in *The Eternal Message*, p. 124, but never mentions the "verse of the sword" that relates to the people of the Book (Qurʾan 9:29).

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THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS

Jihane al-Halafawi's small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-year-old mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt's parliamentary elections in fall 2000, the state geared up a massive security force outside polling stations; leftists shrugged her off as a "front" for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the electoral empowerment of women were silent. When Halafawi outperformed her ruling-party rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing the elections.

Alexandria's al-Raml district went without parliamentary representation for two years as al-Halafawi and her legal team battled the state in the courts. Finally, in June 2002, a Supreme Administrative Court ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the by-elections. On election day, security forces blockaded roads leading to polling stations, arrested al-Halafawi's legal team and 101 of her supporters, roughed up journalists, and stepped aside as public-sector workers bused in from outside the district voted for her rival. Unusually, the six o'clock news was interrupted that evening to announce the sweeping victory of the two ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates in the Raml by-elections.[1]

Al-Halafawi's experience is one dramatic piece of a larger story, the story of the group of which she is a part: the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun).[2] Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan) has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated, savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-Banna (1906–49). With a vision of an Islamic renaissance and a chalkboard under his arm, al-Banna recruited members door-to-door and built a welfare society–cum–athletic

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league–cum–anticolonial movement held together by meticulous organization and strict master–disciple relations. Today, the social-welfare activities of the Ikhwan are as strong as ever, but the enforced top-down unanimity of the group is a thing of the past.

The Ikhwan have come to experience organizational and ideological transformations endemic to any party or social movement: splits along generational lines, intense internal debates about strategy, and a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests. I argue that the Ikhwan's energetic capitalization on Egypt's sliver of electoral competition for seats in Parliament, the professional unions, and municipal councils has had an especially profound effect on their political thought and organization. The institutional rules of authoritarian electoral politics have led to both organizational and ideological change within the group.

Organizational change is most conspicuous in the rise of middle-aged Ikhwan professionals who came of political age on college campuses in the 1960s and 1970s, fundamentally different creatures from the Ikhwan elders who cut their political teeth in the tumultuous, ideologically polarized Egypt of the 1940s. While the group's highest executive post is still the turf of the older "prison generation," middle-aged members formulate policy, act as spokesmen, and represent the group in Parliament and professional unions. Indeed, generational dynamics are behind organizational rumblings in all Egyptian political institutions, including the NDP, as disenchanted younger activists turn their backs on ossified "historical leaders" and craft new political projects based on their independent assessment of existing institutional constraints.

Ideologically, one of the most visible byproducts of the Ikhwan's political engagement has been a decisive move away from the uncompromising notions of Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) as outlined in his tract *Ma'alim fi al-tariq* (*Signposts*) and toward a cautious reinterpretation of the ideas of founder al-Banna. A related innovation is the Ikhwan's appropriation of moderate Islamist thinkers' works authenticating democracy with Islamic concepts. Democracy here is defined as (1) broad, equal citizenship with (2) binding consultation of citizens with respect to governmental personnel and policies, and (3) protection of citizens from arbitrary state action.[3] Several position papers issued by the Muslim Brothers in the 1990s document the group's prodemocratic turn and its revamped views on women's rights, parties and political pluralism, the role of Egyptian Copts, and the morality and utility of political violence.

The transformation of the Muslim Brothers from a religious mass movement to what looks very much like a modern political party has its roots in electoral politicking that began in the 1980s. Yet this change has been eclipsed by both Ikhwan critics and boosters, the former denying any change or belittling it as mere posturing by the Muslim Brothers to gain power, the latter folding any innovation into the prearranged plan of the all-wise founder al-Banna. Both are inaccurate. The Ikhwan are in no way invulnerable to the political changes that have engulfed Egyptian society over the past twenty-five years, both good and ill. The Muslim Brothers are consummate political actors, neither extraordinarily gifted at mobilization nor historically adept at deception. The fevered attention accorded Islamist groups by Western policymakers, Arab state elites, and some academics exaggerates their perceived threat (to democracy, Western interests, stability, or "national unity") and organizational capabilities and occludes clear thinking on how they are shaped by their institutional political environment.

My argument implies the following. First, different questions need to be asked about Islamists' participation in politics. Conjectural, aimless "are they or aren't they?" debates about Islamists' commitment to democracy should take an analytical back seat to how Islamists actually behave in semidemocratic political theaters. Second, if Islamists are treated as political actors jockeying for advantage, relevance, and support, their ideological pronouncements can be analyzed as effects and not predictors of their political experience. This is not a call for a purely instrumentalist understanding of ideology nor an intervention into the perennial debate on which has causal primacy, ideology or action. It is to argue for a critical rethinking of the assumption of exceptionalism with which Islamist movements are approached. Finally, since Islamist parties are subject to the same institutional rules of the political game, then it is reasonable to assume that they will show some, if not all, of the stresses experienced by their non–Islamist competitors. The influence of common institutional variables on the organization and ideology of both secular and religious political parties merits further study.

WHY AND HOW POLITICAL PARTIES CHANGE

In 1914, the radical German Social Democratic Party (SPD), a major antiwar platform, rushed to support the world war as soon as it was declared. As Seymour Martin Lipset reports, Lenin "was convinced that the issue of the party newspaper *Vorwarts* calling for support of the war effort was a forgery."[4] Neither a cynical bid to curry favor with the authorities nor a clumsy grab at popularity, the SPD's decision was beholden to a deeper force: the "instinct for self-preservation," as Roberto Michels famously argued. In his classic 1911 study of the SPD, much of which presaged the party's prowar stance, Michels postulated an "iron law of oligarchy" where the imperative of organization necessitates rule of a minority over a hapless majority even in the most avowedly democratic organizations. The one party one would expect to resist fads and stay true to its principles was compelled to follow a more bewitching siren.

Michel's heirs shifted their focus from the logic of organization to the exigencies of electoral participation. Otto Kirchheimer argued that following World War II, traditional class mass and denominational parties were giving way to streamlined "catch-all" parties that are "non-utopian, non-oppressive, and ever so flexible." The imperative of vote-maximization led parties to shed ideological baggage, move to the center, and woo the elusive "median voter."[5]

Party analysts revisited the case of European socialists in the 19th century, tracing how socialist parties that set out to bring about a socialist revolution through the ballot box were instead irrevocably transformed themselves.[6] Since then, socialist parties' goals were endlessly modified and entire planks abandoned to signal credibility and ensure inclusion in the democratic game. After World War II, spurred by a new generation of socialists, the German SPD publicly disavowed its central ideological tenets and purged radicals from its ranks at the Extraordinary Congress at Bad Godesberg in 1959.[7] The Ikhwan's public repudiation of Sayyid Qutb in 1969 and adoption of democracy in 1995 are but echoes of the "Godesberg effect."

What about parties in authoritarian–democratic hybrids where the contest for votes is stunted by state repression? The growing literature on electoral authoritarian regimes

suggests that an electoral logic is also palpable in such environments, but scholars have had to modify the standard typology of parties as vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking organizations. As Scott Mainwaring sensibly states, "Rational party leaders will not make vote maximizing their first priority if votes are not the primary currency of politics."[8] Mainwaring argues that parties in authoritarian regimes play "dual games": an electoral game with the objective of winning votes and seats, and a regime game. The regime game can either be steady participation with the hope of effecting a transition to democracy or a delegitimation game where parties work to undermine the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Parties in authoritarian regimes play electoral and regime games simultaneously, with emphasis on the regime game.[9]

Many of the internal factional struggles in parties operating in authoritarian contexts revolve around which games to prioritize and how to balance the regime and electoral games. Seen in this light, parties are by definition dynamic organizations in perpetual transformation, and religious parties are no exception. The trajectories of Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America show that they are as much products of political entrepreneurship as "ordinary" parties and are just as malleable, neither uniquely refractory nor beholden to nonnegotiable ideological codes.

1928–81: THE RISE AND ECLIPSE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS

At its founding in 1928, the Society of Muslim Brothers was one prominent part of a handful of ideological mass-based parties led by political mavericks seeking to challenge the dominant style of politics of notables. A decade into its existence, the society had built its identity as an internally disciplined, financially resourceful, pro-Palestine anticolonial movement appealing to educated lower-middle- and middle-class effendis who were alienated by the exclusionary political and economic system of interwar Egypt.[10] Hasan al-Banna's vision of moral uplift based on faith-based action and self-improvement was also an explicit response to influential, state-sponsored secular projects, exemplified by Taha Husein's Europhile tract *Mustaqbal al-thaqafa fi misr* (*The Future of Culture in Egypt*).

Instead of slavishly aping Western ideas, al-Banna argued, a return to the precocious wisdom of Islam was the solution:

> The Muslim Brothers believe that when Allah most High revealed the Qur'an and ordered this worshippers to follow Muhammad, He placed in this true religion all the necessary foundations for the renaissance and happiness of nations ... globalism, nationalism, socialism, capitalism, Bolshevism, war, the distribution of wealth, the relationship between producer and consumer and everything near and far to these concerns that preoccupy the politicians of nations and philosophers of society. We believe Islam has gone to the heart of all these issues.[11]

Working for a Muslim state was not a priority; calling for Islamizing society and applying shari'a were.[12]

The details of its founding and early history reveal that the Society was poised to be a highly adaptive political creature, weathering the permutations of ordinary parties and experiencing their usual crises. Internal schisms and challenges to al-Banna's leadership surfaced in 1932 and 1939, the latter when a splinter group calling itself Muhammad's Youth seceded or was expelled for protesting al-Banna's political pragmatism.[13]

Al-Banna enthusiastically embraced elections and ran and lost in parliamentary contests in 1942 and 1945.[14] The Muslim Brothers promulgated their political and economic platform in 1952 when relations with the new military regime were still warm, but the experiment was soon aborted.[15] The subsequent dissolution of the Society in 1954 and years-long imprisonment of its leaders and followers by the Nasser regime promised to completely extinguish its presence in political life. It was only after its cadres emerged from prison during Sadat's de-Nasserization that the society began to engineer its reentry into an altered Egyptian political landscape. The Ikhwan's activism since the 1970s is thus the first sustained engagement with state institutions and competing political groups that can be analyzed to gauge their political transformation.

First, a look at the structure of the Society of Muslim Brothers. There are three pillars of the group's organization. The 100-member Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura), is the group's legislative body, responsible for issuing binding resolutions and reviewing the annual report and budget. The Shura Council convenes periodically every six months; members serve four-year terms and must be at least thirty years old. The council elects the thirteen-member Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-Irshad), the Brothers' politburo where all policy decisions passed by the Shura Council are executed. Members of the Bureau serve renewable four-year terms and must also be at least thirty years of age. The highest executive office is that of the General Guide (*al-murshid al-'ămm*), who is the chief executive officer and official spokesman of the group. The General Guide must be at least forty and is elected by an absolute majority of the Shura Council from candidates nominated by the Guidance Bureau.[16]

This organizational structure remained essentially intact until 1992, when a provision was added for the reelection of the general guide and terms of office were set at five years, although no term limits were specified.[17] Yet because of the Society's illegal status and attendant security clampdowns, it has been difficult to convene the required institutions in accordance with the bylaws. In 1977, the second General Guide, Hasan al-Hudaiby, died, and 'Umar al-Tilmissany was selected as his successor. 'Umar al-Tilmissany reports in his reflections that, since the group could not activate regular internal election procedures, his selection as the third general guide was based on his status as the seniormost member of the Guidance Bureau.[18]

The selection procedures of the subsequent general guides Muhammad Hamed Abu al-Nasr (1986–96), Mustafa Mashour (1996–2002), and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi (2002–2004), son of the second general guide, were secretive affairs that followed no clear logic of seniority or election. Instead they were shaped by the force of circumstance and internal maneuvering for power. A significant change followed the death of al-Hudaybi at age eighty-three in January 2004 with the announcement that the next guide would be selected by a majority vote of the Guidance Bureau. The reasons for this change are explored later.

THE 1980S: ELECTORALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ADAPTATION

The thaw in state–Ikhwan relations begun under Sadat continued under the regime of Husni Mubarak, but there was no question of legalizing the Muslim Brothers, only de facto toleration. Not content to assert their presence merely through their newsletter *al-Da'wa* (*The Call*) or financing social welfare activities, the Ikhwan began to develop

the sedulous electioneering strategy that would become a centerpiece of their self-preservation. Al-Tilmissany, the society's third general guide, recalled the decision to contest the 1984 elections:

> When we were released from the 1981 detention, we were in a state of near-recession. We set to looking for a lawful means to carry out our activities without troubling security or challenging the laws. Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in the views of officials. The parliamentary session had just ended and thinking began on the new parliamentary elections. It was the opportunity of a lifetime, had the Ikhwan let it slip from their hands they would surely have counted among the ranks of the neglectful.[19]

Not one to pass up a political opportunity, al-Tilmissany negotiated an alliance with the Wafd, one he insisted on calling a "cooperation" and not a tactical or strategic move. Perhaps to authenticate the partnership, he explained that in the 1930s he had been an old Wafdist "with all my being" while a devoted member of the Ikhwan at the same time.[20] In February 1984, at the home of the Wafd's chairman, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, a bargain was struck. The eminently reasonable logic was that the Wafd provided a legal channel while the Ikhwan offered a popular base, both seeking to reclaim their place on the national stage after long years of state-enforced absence.

There was an even more compelling institutional cause of the Wafd–Ikhwan alliance, however. The controversial Electoral Law 114/1983 passed by the outgoing Parliament was a consummate instance of electoral engineering. The government acceded to the opposition's demands for a more equitable proportional representation system in contrast to the plurality systems of the past, but with a twist. For the first time in Egyptian electoral history, party lists under a proportional representation system replaced single-member constituencies, which ruled out anyone running as an independent. The law specifically prohibited candidates of different parties from running on the same lists, in effect deterring parties from pooling their efforts.[21] An added novelty was that the electoral law then set a relatively high threshold of 8 percent of the national vote for a party to qualify for parliamentary representation. Votes to opposition parties that fell short of 8 percent were automatically transferred to the NDP. The restrictions of Parties Law 40/1977 and Election Law 114—throttling party formation, eliminating independents, and setting new barriers to parliamentary access—impelled the Wafd and Ikhwan to collude or perish.

The law had its intended effect: only the Wafd–Ikhwan alliance overcame the threshold, securing 15.1 percent of the national vote, while the Labor party got 7.7 percent. Out of 448 seats, the Wafd slate gained fifty-eight, eight of which went to Ikhwan candidates and an additional two to independent Islamists. The NDP garnered 389 seats, or 87.3 percent. Postelection evidence suggests that the Ikhwan paid particular attention to their oversight role: while they constituted only 1.8 percent of parliamentary membership, they were responsible for 18.5 percent of interpellations delivered during the three-year parliamentary term from 1984 to 1987.[22]

The Wafd–Ikhwan cooperation inside Parliament nearly evaporated after the elections due to the restrictive nature of parliamentary rules, which are explicitly designed to thwart collaboration between opposition parties.[23] The 1984 elections, however, established the Ikhwan as a leading political contestant, striking electoral alliances in both Parliament and the professional unions and joining the opposition in extraparliamentary coalitions

for reform. The Ikhwan were poised for the next round of electoral sparring with the government. In 1986, when the president dissolved Parliament in expectation of a ruling of unconstitutionality by the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Law 114/1983 for discriminating against independents, the government quickly passed Electoral Law 188/1986. The new law maintained the 8 percent threshold and the party-list system but canceled the automatic transferring of all votes below 8 percent to the majority party and reserved forty-eight of Parliament's 448 seats for candidates running as independents.

The opposition immediately began to devise ways to overcome the hurdles of Electoral Law 188. Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, approached the Ikhwan's new general guide, Muhammad Hamed Abu al-Nasr, and proposed an alliance. A deal was struck, and the minuscule al-Ahrar party also signed on, having failed to get more than .7 percent of the national vote in 1984. It was agreed that the slate would be apportioned with 40 percent for the Ikhwan, 40 percent for Labor, and 20 percent for Ahrar. The motives of the Labor Party were clear: stung by its 1984 failure to meet the required threshold, it sought to guarantee its chances in 1987 by courting a movement with a tangible street presence and electoral track record.

As for the Ikhwan, their 1984 alliance with the Wafd had shown them the limits of augmenting their participation from the perch of an established and ideologically coherent party such as the Wafd. By 1987, the Ikhwan had clearly outgrown their junior-partner status in the Wafd alliance and wagered on the weaker and more ideologically flexible Labor Party as a base of operations for the next stage of their development.

What was soon billed as the "Islamist alliance" (*al-taḥāluf al-islami*) was the biggest news of the 1987 elections, paving the way for the progressive Islamization of the Labor Party and its mouthpiece, *al-Sha'b*. Both as a response to critics of the Muslim Brothers' indeterminate election slogan "Islam Is the Solution" (*al-islam huwa al-ḥall*) and the exigencies of vote seeking, the Muslim Brothers-dominated alliance distributed a booklet detailing its seven-point electoral program. The booklet stated that Copts are full citizens and that applying and codifying (*taṭbīq wa-taqnīn*) shari'a is a long-range process not confined to Islamizing penal provisions but extending to the entire legal infrastructure. It called for closing down government liquor manufactories and the banning of nightclubs and casinos, as well as comprehensive government regulation and strategic planning of the economy.[24] Unsurprisingly, the anti-systemic Jama'at al-Islamiyya's statement against the elections echoed the protestations of radical socialists in the 19th century. It lamented the naivete of the Ikhwan for participating in a farce and accused it of burnishing the image of the regime and, tellingly, "helping to build the institutions of the secular regime."[25]

In what would become a familiar election ritual, hundreds of Muslim Brothers' supporters and poll watchers were arrested and detained a few days before the elections. On election day on 6 April, observers reported a far less free atmosphere than the 1984 poll, with rampant government meddling, ballot stuffing on behalf of the NDP, and outright turning away of voters for opposition candidates. The government's legal engineering before the elections, coupled with physical interference during and after the vote and questionable allotment of losing party votes, conspired to give the NDP a parliamentary majority of just under 80 percent. The alliance garnered 17 percent of the national vote, which translated into fifty-six seats. Thirty-six went to Muslim Brothers. The Wafd secured thirty-five seats. Immediately after the elections, prominent old-guard Muslim

Brothers members and future General Guide Mustafa Mashour articulated the emerging electoral creed of the Ikhwan:

> We must benefit from the experience of elections for our future, for elections are an art with its own rules, expertise, and requirements, and we must push those who have given up on reforming this nation, push them to get rid of their pessimism and register to vote as soon as possible.[26]

The Ikhwan's relatively large presence in the 1987 Parliament as leaders of the opposition for the first time in Egyptian history raised the specter of divisive identity politics, especially regarding the application of shari'a.[27] But gloom-and-doom forecasts did not pan out. The Ikhwan deputies' behavior under the rotunda veered between dramatic performances in plenary sessions, in intricate coordination with Parliamentary Speaker Rif'at al-Mahgoub, and routine committee work away from the limelight. Parliamentary leaders from the NDP and Ikhwan MPs incessantly negotiated and renegotiated their terms of interaction, alternately escalating and containing criticisms in response to each other's cues and events transpiring outside Parliament.[28] Counterintuitively, shari'a was not the pivotal issue for Ikhwan deputies. One study shows that their priorities were political freedom and state repression; cultural and educational issues, including shari'a; and economic concerns.[29] Applying the shari'a took a back seat to heated sparring with pugnacious Interior Minister Zaki Badr over torture in prisons and police stations, security forces' storming of mosques, and police violation of Ikhwan MPs constitutional immunity, including an unprovoked assault on Ikhwan MP Essam al-Eryan by a policeman.

An astute election observer argued that the Ikhwan's success in the 1987 elections was attributable to a conspicuous cooperation between old and young Muslim Brothers.[30] Almost all of the young MPs had distinguished themselves in a previous electoral arena during the 1980s: the influential professional unions, historically powerful interest groups that organized middle- and lower-middle-class public opinion. The Muslim Brothers' visibility in the unions began in the 1984 elections to the board of the medical association and grew incrementally thereafter through shrewd alliance building and horse trading with major political groups. Significantly, the Ikhwan never fielded candidates for the chairmanship of the unions, part of a tacit understanding between the government and all opposition groups that the post be reserved for a ruling-party member to facilitate bargaining with authorities.[31] In the 1990s, the slates of Islamist candidates and their allies swept elections in all the major professional unions.[32]

Much has been written on the Muslim Brothers' "takeover" and "back-door infiltration" of the syndicates.[33] Yet informed scholarly accounts tell a different story. Amani Qandil, Egypt's leading sociologist of professional associations, observes that the Muslim Brothers' successful performance in the associations is due to their superior organizational and get-out-the-vote skills and transparent management of the syndicates' finances. Not infiltration but tireless, open campaigning in free and fair elections and the provision of a generous network of post-election services is responsible for the Muslim Brothers' success.[34]

The new generation of Muslim Brothers activists who transformed the professional unions are a major causal force behind the society's adaptation into a flexible political party, particularly its ideological amendments. While still in their thirties, they were among the masterminds of the Muslim Brothers' parliamentary alliance with the Wafd

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in 1984 and the Labor Party in 1987. Muhammad Abd al-Quddus, currently a member of the press syndicate board and a leading Muslim Brothers figure, participated in the 1984 meeting that produced the Wafd–Ikhwan alliance. Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, now a member of the Society's Guidance Bureau, was a member of the meeting that clinched the Muslim Brothers–Labor alliance in 1987. The physician Essam al-Eryan and the lawyer Mokhtar Nouh were two of the most active Ikhwan MPs in the 1987 Parliament. Abu al-Ela Madi was a driving force in the politics of the engineering syndicate in the early 1990s before his defection from the Ikhwan in 1996.

1990–95: POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF IDEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION

Just as there is a widespread yet unfounded assertion that the Muslim Brothers "took over" professional associations, there are equally ubiquitous allegations that they are driven by immutable sacred texts that make them untrustworthy political contestants,[35] "sham democrats,"[36] and avid theocrats intent on overturning the secular state.[37] None of these claims is corroborated by any credible evidence. When it comes to democracy, as Najib Ghadbian quips, "so far Islamists have been subjected to higher moral standards than the other players in the arena, as if they were the only authoritarians among an assembly of tried and true democrats."[38]

Commitment to democracy is a serious issue but cannot be gauged by hurling groundless accusations. This section probes in more detail the ideological changes wrought from the Muslim Brothers' electoral participation as a more substantive indicator of their commitment to democracy. It also traces how that participation raised the government's hackles and subjected the Muslim Brothers to a series of grave although not crippling crises. Ideological revisions and organizational turmoil were the fruit of the Ikhwan's electoral engagement.

By 1990, the Ikhwan were exceptionally attuned to the rules of the authoritarian political game. Along with the Wafd, they led a boycott of the 1990 elections after Law 188/1986 was declared unconstitutional and the 1987 Parliament was dissolved. From the perspective of the dual games employed by opposition parties, the boycott was the parties' prioritization of the delegitimation game to protest the government's incessant electoral engineering even as this strategy robbed them of a much-prized forum in Parliament. In 1990, the Ikhwan emphasized coordination with the opposition over their hallowed electoral creed while continuing their assiduous electioneering for seats on municipal councils and professional associations' boards in 1992.

The year 1992 was a turning point in the government's approach to the Muslim Brothers, shifting from tenuous toleration to further legal and then physical repression. That year, Ikhwan candidates swept elections to the medical and bar associations and outshone the government's bumbling and languorous response to the devastating Cairo earthquake in October. In response to the Muslim Brothers' efficient pooling of contributions to earthquake victims, the prime minister issued Military Decree 4/1992, requiring government approval for the collection of donations.

In February 1993, the government railroaded through Parliament during a midnight session Law 100/1993. Government spokesmen in Parliament defended the law as an effort to combat the "dictatorship of the minority," a clear reference to the Ikhwan's

effective electioneering. The Orwellian-titled "Law for the Guarantees of Democracy in Professional Associations" required a 50 percent quorum for union elections, constituting the most visible interference in internal union affairs since Sadat issued a decree law in 1981 dissolving the bar association's board for its opposition to the Camp David Accords. Professional unions immediately mobilized against the law, and the majority of members, regardless of their politics, opposed it on principle.[39] Mobilization against the law dovetailed with rising demands for political and constitutional reform.

This was the moment that the new generation of Muslim Brothers came into their own as skilled organizers and alliance builders with other middle-aged activists of varying political commitments. A two-day Conference on Freedoms and Civil Society was held in October 1994 at the medical association and organized by Muslim Brothers Essam al-Eryan and Abu al-Ela Madi, bringing together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, including government figures, to hammer out a consensus on basic rights. A delegation from the conference that included the two co-organizers visited the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express high-profile support and condemnation of his stabbing by militant Islamists. At the same time, the Ikhwan were issuing communiques condemning every attack by militant Islamists on government figures and tourists, and even brokered a cease-fire deal between the radical Islamists and the government during the United Nations' Cairo Population Conference.[40]

The first glimmers of the Ikhwan's ideological revisions emerged in 1994 and grew out of the younger generation's networking and response to their interlocutors' demands to clarify their positions on foundational issues. In March 1994, the Muslim Brothers issued definitive statements on women's rights and party pluralism. The former statement articulated their belief in the rights of women both as candidates for public office (save for the highest executive office in the land) and as voters. The position paper followed on the heels of actual practice. In a little reported incident preceding Jihane al-Halafawi's high-profile candidacy in 2000, the female doctor, Wafa' Ramadan, ran for elections to the medical-association board on the Ikhwan's slate in 1992.[41]

Mindful of their departure from both their founder's and the old guard's conservative views on women, the Ikhwan have devoted much space in their arguments on women's citizenship rights to refuting obstinate views and reinterpreting Qur'anic injunctions that specify men's tutelage over women, especially Qur'an 4:34. Their statement argues that the verse applies to household relations only and does not extend to the workplace or public affairs. The Ikhwan's doctrinal reinterpretations are laced with the Society's utilitarian electoral credo. As a Muslim Brothers apologist argues, "Limiting the Muslim woman's right to participate in elections weakens the winning chances of Islamist candidates."[42] Contrast this pragmatism to the finality with which former General Guide Umar al-Tilmissany pronounced his views on women:

> I do not like to talk about women. Modern people may find this shameful, or cowardly, but I want nothing to do with modern theories and the equality of men and women. I still believe that a man is a man and a woman is a woman and that's why God created her. . . . A woman who believes that she is equal to a man is a woman who has lost her femininity, virtue and dignity.[43]

The revamped ideology animated further political action. The Ikhwan's position paper on women was invoked by Jihane al-Halafawi as an impetus for her contestation

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of the 2000 parliamentary elections. Seasoned Ikhwan watchers were not surprised by Halafawi's candidacy, belonging as she does to the generation of middle-aged activists changing the face of the organization. Married to one of the Muslim Brothers' leading architects of electoral strategy, the Alexandria physician, Ibrahim al-Za'farani, Halafawi reflects the younger generation's signature amalgam of flexible ideology and vote seeking. She took pains to point out the critical role of women voters. In her words:

> The Muslim Brothers' views about women in public life are clear, as evidenced by the March 1994 statement. This is what encouraged me to contest the elections. My decision to run was also to make use of the opportunity presented by the state's desire to integrate women into the political process, and to clarify that Islam *does not* compromise women's rights. . . . There was tremendous support for me within the group. Women are very active in the [Muslim Brothers], though perhaps not visible. Remember that women voters are responsible for the success of the seventeen Ikhwan members of Parliament.[44]

The language of the Ikhwan's statement "Shura and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society" is a similar synthesis of Islamic values and contemporary experience.[45] It argues that the Qur'an stipulates a rule of public consultation in governance, sura, "and this means that the *umma* is the source of all powers." The statement bows to the stock demand for shari'a but affirms the need for a written constitution specifying a "balance of powers"; emphasizes public freedoms for both Muslims and non-Muslims; and calls for a legislature with oversight functions and binding decisions. Depending on one's perspective, the explicit call for a written constitution is either an evasion or realization of the Ikhwan's enduring slogan "The Qur'an is our constitution."

The statement concludes with a newfangled Qur'anic justification of political parties as a necessary institutionalization of God-given differences. As Essam al-Eryan later elaborated, "God created humans with differences, so plurality is the normal state of things. The problem is how to organize these differences without turning them into chaos, and that's why you need several parties."[46] The endorsement of multiple political parties is in blatant contradiction to Hasan al-Banna's famously hostile attitude toward parties; he derided *ḥizbiyya* (partisanship) and viewed parties as nothing more than vanity projects of warring politicians that diverted the country's energies from resisting the British.[47] To explain the discrepancy, the Ikhwan historicize al-Banna's aversion to parties. In a much quoted rationalization, the prominent scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a member of the Ikhwan in the 1950s and a longtime sympathizer based in Qatar who was offered but declined the Ikhwan's highest post of general guide in 2002 after Mashour's passing, writes:

> I am aware that the martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna deplored partisan life and the establishment of parties in Islam due to what he witnessed in his time of parties that divided the *umma* in confronting the enemy. They were parties that revolved around individuals instead of clear goals and platforms. It is all right if our interpretation differs from that of our Imam, may God have compassion on him, for he did not disallow those who came after him to have their own interpretations, especially if circumstances change and positions and ideas evolve. Perhaps if he lived till today he would see what we see. Fatwas change with changing times, places, and conditions, especially in

ever-changing political affairs. Those who know Hasan al-Banna know that he was not rigid but developed his ideas and policies according to the evidence available to him.[48]

Ideological amendments continued despite a traumatic series of events for the Muslim Brothers beginning in 1995, when their heretofore opaque organizational dynamics were laid open for all to see and the group ceased to speak with one disciplined voice in public. In retrospect, it is clear that a confluence of events immediately before and during 1995 proved decisive and catastrophic for the Ikhwan. In the early 1990s, American officials made contacts with Ikhwan members, prompting President Mubarak to comment angrily to the American journalist Mary Anne Weaver in November 1994:

Your government is in contact with these *terrorists* from the Muslim Brotherhood. This has all been done very secretly, without our knowledge at first. You think you can correct the mistakes that you made in Iran, where you had no contact with the Ayatollah Khomeini and *his* fanatic groups before they seized power. But I can assure you, these groups will *never* take over this country.[49]

In January 1995, at the very beginning of the parliamentary election year, eighty-two of the Ikhwan's leading middle-aged activists convening the Muslim Brothers' Shura Council were rounded up and detained in the first round of a sweeping crack-down unseen since the 1950s. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the regime and referred to a military tribunal, a forum heretofore reserved for Islamist radicals.

On 26 June, a failed assassination attempt on Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, further inflamed the already tense relations between the Ikhwan and the regime and pushed the regime to dispense with any distinctions between radical Islamists and the Muslim Brothers. Though the Ikhwan scrambled to condemn the assassination attempt, rumors swirled that they had known about the plot, and the state's stance soon took on the character of a vendetta. On 23 November, a week before the start of elections, the military tribunal sentenced fifty-four Muslim Brothers to three to five years in prison, including many of the Ikhwan's election whiz kids who had planned to run in the elections, chiefly Essam al-Eryan, Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futouh, Muhammad al-Sayed Habib, Muhammad Khayrat al-Shater, and Ibrahim al-Za'farani. Yet as hundreds of Muslim Brothers poll watchers were preemptively detained by the Interior Ministry days before elections, the Ikhwan still did not resort to the delegitimation game. Instead, they fielded approximately 150 candidates. Following the most violent vote in Egyptian electoral history, resulting in 61 dead, 1,313 injured, and 2,400 detained, the Muslim Brothers secured only one parliamentary seat.[50]

At the height of the crackdown, the Ikhwan continued to produce incrementally more detailed statements of their positions. By far the most significant document was what the Muslim Brothers dubbed the "Statement on Democracy," a document whose purpose was to affirm the society's commitment to playing the democratic transition game despite state repression. The paper outlined the Society's stance on four pivotal issues: non–Muslims, the relationship between religion and politics, violence and politics, and human rights. It was the closest the group had come to a public announcement of its revamped ideology and as such deserves some attention.[51]

On the issue of non–Muslims, the statement asserts:

We the Muslim Brothers always say that we are advocates and not judges, and thus we do not ever consider compelling anybody to change his belief, in accordance with God's words: "No compulsion in religion." Our position regarding our Christian brothers in Egypt and the Arab world is explicit, established and known: they have the same rights and duties as we do. . . . Whoever believes or acts otherwise is forsaken by us. [This and all subsequent extracts from the Ikwan's democracy statement can be found in *Rowaq Arabi*, n. 51.]

As attacks by radical Islamist groups on the life and property of Coptic Christians mounted in the mid-1990s, the Muslim Brothers were pushed to enunciate a clear position on the status of Copts in their ideal Muslim state. Their affirmations of Copts' equal status ranged from hagiographic narratives of Hasan al-Banna's warm relations with Copts to more substantive ideological constructions such as the one quoted above.[52] The Ikhwan's emphasis on Copts' full citizenship rights relies heavily on the pan-confessional concept of citizenship developed by the moderate Islamist thinker and former judge, Tariq al-Bishri.[53]

On religion and politics, the Muslim Brothers' statement asserts that there is no ineluctable contradiction between vox populi and vox dei—that is, popular sovereignty and a shari'a-based system. "The legitimacy of government in a Muslim society should be derived from the consent and choice of the people . . . people have the right to invent different systems, formulas, and techniques that suit their conditions, which definitely would vary according to time, place, and living conditions." They restate the constitutionalist justification for an organized opposition made in the 1994 pluralism statement and devote considerable space to refuting the charge that they countenance violence.

On human rights, the statement rather bombastically claims that "Islam has been and still is the only intellectual and political model that honors man and humanity, disregarding differences in language, color, and race." Perhaps as a nod to criticisms, the statement is also addressed to Muslim Brothers, calling on each one "to open his mind and heart to all people; he should not treat anybody haughtily or insolently," in effect admitting and vowing to spurn the Muslim Brothers' self-image as a political movement a cut above the rest.

1995–2000: CRISIS AND THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL TURMOIL

The state's targeting of the group's middle-aged cadres in 1995 took a serious toll, and the Society of Muslim Brothers began to show the organizational stresses familiar to other Egyptian political parties and from which the group had long considered itself exempt. The period from 1995 to 2000, when the Muslim Brothers' best minds were imprisoned, witnessed the selection of a new, intransigent general guide; factional disputes and devastating public splits; worrying ideological reversals rather than renewals; and a seeming end to the fruitful collaboration between older Muslim Brothers and the younger generation that had made the society such a resilient and energetic organization. The first indication of reversals came in August 1995, when all opposition parties were on the cusp of signing a document of "national concord" (*al-wifāq al-waṭanī*) outlining their united stance on a basic minimum set of democratic rights ahead of the fall parliamentary elections. The initiative fell apart when Ma'mun al-Hudaybi refused to sign the document

and proffered his own alternative plan filled with clauses on shari'a.[54] Left in the hands of the old guard, the common ideological front with other political parties painstakingly built by the Muslim Brothers' younger cadres was unmistakably eroding.

Much as the Ikhwan claimed that, unlike other Egyptian groups, they were an organization based on rules and not persons, the selection of Mustafa Mashour as general guide in 1996 had a profound influence on the group's trajectory. The death of ailing fourth General Guide Muhammad Hamed Abu al-Nasr in 1996 led to a quiet leadership handover to Mustafa Mashour, the now infamous "cemetery pledge of allegiance" (*bay'at al-maqabir*) that evaded the Ikhwan's bylaws. Immediately after the burial of Abu al-Nasr, a tight-knit circle led by Guidance Bureau members Ma'mun al-Hudaybi and Mashour himself essentially anointed Mashour to the highest executive post without election or consultation with Shura Council members, citing as justification the security clampdown on the last Shura Council meeting in 1995.

Mashour had been a member of the Muslim Brothers' controversial paramilitary wing, the Special Apparatus (al-Nizam al-Khas), formed in 1940; its establishment irrevocably altered the organization and bred a cadre of hard-line militants steeped in the conspiratorial political mind set of the 1940s. Mashour was imprisoned in 1954 and emerged in the 1970s as a key decision-maker during the tenures of General Guides al-Tilmissany and Abu al-Nasr. One Ikhwan analyst claims that these two guides were deliberately chosen as mild-mannered fronts for the real power residing in Mashour and a handful of ironfisted former members of the Special Apparatus.[55]

Tangible power dynamics rather than adherence to the group's bylaws also governed the role of Mashour's confidant Ma'mun al-Hudaybi. The latter carved out a high-profile position for himself as "official spokesman," though this post is nonexistent in the Ikhwan's bylaws. Members rationalize that this was made necessary by General Guide Abu al-Nasr's failing health and Mustafa Mashour's "personal reasons"—namely, that "he was not very patient," in the words of Guidance Bureau member Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh.[56] That might have been a politic reference to a disastrous interview given by Mashour in 1997 in the midst of local council elections that Muslim Brothers members were contesting. In a taped interview, Mashour maintained that in an Islamic state, Coptic citizens should be barred from top posts in the army to ensure complete loyalty in confronting hostile Christian states, and a special tax (*jizya*) would be collected from them in exchange for protection by the state.[57] The remarks did nothing to help Muslim Brothers election candidates and cast serious doubts on the Ikhwan's ideological revisions. Al-Hudaybi wrote letters of "clarification," but attempts at damage control only reinforced suspicions of a bigoted group masquerading as a tolerant movement.[58]

Under Mashour and al-Hudaybi's tenure, rumblings of organizational discontent rose to the surface in an unprecedentedly public manner. The most serious rift to beset the Ikhwan since the 1950s came in 1996 when the engineer Abu al-Ela Madi and several associates petitioned the government's Political Parties Committee to form the Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat). The initiative was initially thought to be a Muslim Brothers project fronted by its youthful members, but it soon became all too clear that the Wasat was a group of Muslim Brothers breakaways who felt muzzled by the Ikhwan's rigid, top-down structure. As the voluble Wasat member Essam Sultan asserted, there was pervasive "organizational unemployment" within the Muslim Brothers, and plenty of young cadres found themselves with no say in the running of the organization.[59] Mashour

and al-Hudaybi reacted furiously to Madi and his associates' project, threatening Muslim Brothers who supported the Wasat with disciplinary action and dismissal and going so far as to aid the government's case against the fledgling group. The government swiftly referred the Wasat founders to a military tribunal, the first time in Egyptian history that citizens were tried for petitioning to form a legal party, and the tribunal sentenced some of the founders to prison terms.[60] The irony of old-guard members in both the state and Ikhwan colluding to stifle the Wasat did not go unnoticed.

The Ikhwan–Wasat split received an enormous amount of local and international press coverage and generated a veritable cottage industry of Ikhwanology, endless media speculations over the supposedly cut-throat politics and factionalism of the famously tight-lipped organization. The row had all the makings of a choice political scandal: the prominent Anglican scion Rafiq Habib is a founding member of the Wasat; the dissident Essam Sultan's wife is Ma'mun al-Hudaybi's niece; famous figures from across the political spectrum threw their weight behind the Wasat, from the Doha-based Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi to the leftist doyen Muhammad Sid Ahmed. Madi and his associates became darlings of the secular intelligentsia and used the media to their advantage, accusing their former leaders of dictatorial management and stale thinking, while al-Hudaybi and other Ikhwan shrugged off the Wasat as a bunch of media-hungry self-promoters bent on tarnishing the Muslim Brothers.

Less well noted is that the split coincided with a spate of similar tribulations in virtually all Egyptian opposition parties, where paralyzing disputes erupted between hoary party elders and restless middle-aged activists with a fundamentally different vision of how to play the electoral and regime games. Young activists had almost completely abandoned the leftist Tagammu', so the dictatorial mien and pro-government fawning of its secretary-general (now chairman) Rif'at al-Said came in for open criticism from seasoned party activists of his own generation. Forty-something Nasserists broke off from their party to form their own groups—notably, Hamdeen Sabahy's Karama (Dignity) movement. And soon, the new Wafd Party chairman, No'man Gom'a was expelling and alienating members and MPs for daring to disagree with him.[61] The Wasat episode heralded the normalization of the Ikhwan into a typical Egyptian opposition party, experiencing the same organizational ills other parties had been less adept at concealing.

A NEW MILLENNIUM AND A NEW SOCIETY OF MUSLIM BROTHERS?

As parliamentary elections approached in the fall of 2000, the government struck again with a roundup of twenty would-be candidates who were then tried and sentenced by a military tribunal in November 2000. Steering a median course between participating and lying low, the Ikhwan fielded only seventy-five candidates, including Jihane al-Halafawi. The group secured seventeen seats under the individual candidacy system, more than all the opposition parties combined. Several months later, the Muslim Brothers emerged victorious in another electoral arena. In February 2001, in the first elections at the bar association since Law 100/1993, a "national slate" put together by the Ikhwan comprising eight Muslim Brothers, four NDP members, a Nasserist, a Wafdist, and a

Copt won elections to the board.[62] The parliamentary and bar elections hinted at a revival of the Ikhwan and its matchless electoral deal-making skills.

The unknown second-tier Muslim Brothers members turned parliamentary deputies soon made a national name for themselves, adopting the simultaneously confrontational and low-key style of their predecessors in the 1987 Parliament. Not surprisingly, culture and identity issues were among Ikhwan deputies' main but certainly not sole concerns. Muslim Brothers parliamentary deputy Gamal Heshmat caused a stir when he filed a routine parliamentary inquiry regarding what he claimed were state-funded racy novels.[63] His Muslim Brothers colleagues under the rotunda decried the frivolity of the Miss Egypt beauty pageant at a time that Palestinians were being brutalized by Israelis, they said, and filed inquiries about such matters as the distribution of feminine sanitary napkins in junior and high schools. Asked to explain the rationale for the latter move, Muhammad Mursi, the spokesman for the unofficial Muslim Brothers bloc, first said, "In our culture, these matters are dealt with between a mother and her daughter in the privacy of the home." When asked for further clarification on why the issue was worthy of being raised in Parliament, Mursi said, "We object to the use of schools as advertising space for certain brands of sanitary napkins. They were distributing only the American Always brand; schools shouldn't be used to market specific products to students."[64] Also similar to the 1987 Parliament, Ikhwan deputies focused on cases of abuse by security forces and devoted considerable time to their constituents' bread-and-butter issues, unemployment topping the list.[65]

Authorities made clear their displeasure with at least one Ikhwan parliamentarian, engaging in the novel mechanism of electoral engineering *after* the 2000 vote to unseat the irksome Gamal Heshmat. For the first time since 1991, the parliamentary leadership decided to implement a court report on election irregularities, even though it had rejected or ignored hundreds of such reports challenging NDP deputies' election. Heshmat was stripped of his parliamentary membership, and in January 2003 the government orchestrated a rerun of the election in his Damanhour district, installing 500 trucks filled with riot police to prevent Heshmat's supporters from voting. The elections were a replay of the tampered with Alexandria byelections in June 2002 orchestrating al-Halafawi's defeat, although this time Heshmat's seat went to a Wafd member.[66]

A former Nasserist and a physician by training, Heshmat blamed "the media" for exaggerating his parliamentary activities to bring about a crisis with the government. After his ouster, he went back to college to obtain a postgraduate diploma in parliamentary studies and was subsequently detained for several months and then released in 2004. Before his detention, Heshmat insisted that he had been ousted from Parliament because of his active parliamentary oversight activities:

> The government couldn't stand to have a representative who actually listened to his constituents. When they saw that I as a Muslim Brothers deputy didn't speak in an offensive, preachy way but used modern language, they feared this even more. In the two years I was an MP, my thoroughly documented parliamentary questions and requests for clarification led to the dismissal of six officials, including a deputy minister of education in Beheira Province and a supervisor of the Mubarak job-training program for college graduates. This was the reason for my ouster.[67]

As the seventeen turned-sixteen deputies were maintaining a visible Ikhwan presence in Parliament, the cadres interned in 1995 emerged from prison in 2000 and seamlessly

assumed their leadership roles in the Muslim Brothers organization, patching up the Wasat split and reestablishing both ceremonial and substantive ties with other political groups. The annual tradition of the Ikhwan's Ramadan *iftar* at a five-star hotel was spruced up with noticeable women and secular guests; in 2001, the American University in Cairo sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, himself now a prison graduate, was prominently seated at the head table next to Ma'mun al-Hudaybi. Conspicuously, the Muslim Brothers never missed a chance to cooperate with state authorities, even as a military tribunal sentenced sixteen more of their members to prison in July 2002. In the wake of the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Muslim Brothers coordinated with the government and organized a thousands-strong antiwar rally, invoking their stock argument of preserving national unity in the face of foreign occupation. Starting in April 2003, however, security forces resumed detaining leading Muslim Brothers figures in various provinces who had been active in managing antiwar activities.[68]

Incremental ideological articulation picked up where it had left off in 1995. The released Muslim Brothers redoubled their efforts to standardize and fine-tune the group's ideological pronouncements, restating their positions on democracy, women's rights, and, especially, Coptic rights, diligently working to erase Mashour's 1997 comments from national memory. The physicians Essam al-Eryan and Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, members of the Shura Council and Guidance Bureau, respectively, emerged as the most visible spokesmen and ideologues of the Ikhwan, granting interviews and penning articles in a variety of non-Ikhwan media. In the pair's pronouncements, ambiguous issues became more concrete: the Ikhwan would respect a democratically elected communist government; democracy is not simply compatible with shura but "part of a common human heritage"; the Muslim Brothers would unconditionally accept a Coptic president of Egypt elected in fair elections; the issue of an Islamic state was already resolved since "the constitution already says that Egypt is an Islamic state and that Islamic shariʿa is the basis of legislation;" the Muslim Brothers consider the constitution and the ballot box to be the ultimate judges; women's "*hijab* is merely a question of identity and belonging, just as saris are for Indians"; the Muslim Brothers "engaged in military activities when the country was under occupation. This is a historical fact, but there is no room for its repetition in a country governed by its own citizens, regardless of how divergent they may be in opinions and attitudes."[69]

The passing of Mashour in 2002 and of al-Hudaybi in 2004, as the last of the influential old guard, is the most significant opening for the further transformation of the Society of Muslim Brothers. Indeed, as the customary speculation raged over who would steer the group, Guidance Bureau members for the first time announced to the public a specific procedure for electing the coming general guide,[70] and the circumstantial position of "official spokesman" carved out by al-Hudaybi was scrapped. Also, the posts of two deputy General Guides stipulated by the Ikhwan's bylaws were filled with "younger" generation Brothers, geologist Muhammad Habib and computer engineer Khayrat al-Shater. As soon as he was elected in January 2004, Muhammad Mahdi Akef reiterated the group's desire to operate as a legal political party, and in a dramatic gesture he convened a press conference on 3 March 2004 to announce the Muslim Brothers' vision of a republican, civil government bound by law. Aside from the usual demand for applying shariʿa, Akef's program did not depart in any meaningful sense from every demand of the Egyptian opposition over the past thirty years. Immediately, Interior

Minister Habib al-Adli stated that as an illegal organization the Muslim Brothers had no business floating programs and rebuked the press syndicate for offering Akef a venue.[71]

For the first time, ideas developed by the comparatively young members of the Muslim Brothers were officially and publicly adopted by their general guide. Akef's message was intended for several audiences: the Egyptian government; opposition parties and independent intellectuals; and all-important foreign parties demanding Arab reform, principally the Bush administration and its "Greater Middle East Initiative." To American and European policymakers, Akef's announcement was a riposte to government claims that Islamists constitute the most potent danger to the future of the Arab world. It also signaled an end to the entrenched tradition jealously guarded by Arab governments of claiming all-knowing tutelage over their citizens and their exclusive representation abroad. To other Egyptian interlocutors, it was a message that the Muslim Brothers and they are in one camp, speak the same constitutionalist language, agree on the foundational issue of the division and rotation of political powers, and can be counted on in any future common initiatives.

Above all, Akef's announcement was self-preservation through self-clarification, an attempt to heal the rift between old and new generations and reestablish a coherent, revamped ideological line for the group's adherents and potential members. Muslim Brothers leaders' increasingly transparent and forthcoming imparting of information on decision-making procedures is directed in the main to potential members, a reassurance that decisions are made relying not on the seniority principle or a prison stint but the modern electoral mechanism of one man, one vote. "Of course, we're a part of Egyptian society which is naturally very paternalistic, but the truth is that the Murshid has only one vote, no more."[72]

CONCLUSION

Setting out to win Egyptian hearts and minds for an austere Islamic state and society, Hasan al-Banna's Society of Muslim Brothers was instead irrevocably transformed into a flexible political party that is highly responsive to the unforgiving calculus of electoral politics. The Muslim Brothers have left no political opportunity untapped, plunging with gusto into the vote-seeking game, pushing other political forces and the state to take seriously what began as a farcical margin of electoral competition in the 1970s. The case of the Ikhwan confirms that it is the institutional rules of participation rather than the commandments of ideology that motivate political parties. Even the most ideologically committed and organizationally stalwart parties are transformed in the process of interacting with competitors, citizens, and the state. Ideology and organization bow to the terms of participation.

The ghost of Roberto Michels looms large over the Ikhwan's trajectory, and his moralized critique is echoed by many of their critics: "Party life involves strange moral and intellectual sacrifices."[73] Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading member of the Egyptian Jihad group, right-hand man to Osama bin Laden, and fierce critic of the Ikhwan, rues:

> The Ikhwan participate in elections in Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, Algeria, Syria, and other Muslim lands governed by infidel governments. What is truly regrettable is the Ikhwan's rallying of thousands of duped Muslim youth in voter queues before ballot boxes instead of lining them up to fight in the cause of Allah. They have substituted Allah's bidding with the conditions and regimes of the infidels.[74]

Yet as this article has argued, regardless of moral valuations, the rules of political engagement hold powerful sway over the behavior and make-up of political actors. There is no clearer evidence of this than the recent desire of radical Islamist groups in Egypt to morph into legal political parties partaking of the electoral game, stunted and distorted as that game is in authoritarian Egypt.[75]

Yet it behooves us to note that the Ikhwan are not losing ideological uniqueness and becoming a "catch-all" party. As their behavior in the 2000 Parliament indicates, they still grant culture and identity issues pride of place in their platform, with the caveat that as the culture wars rage on in Egypt, particularly over Americanized globalization, the Ikhwan's gripes over the moral turpitude of Egyptian culture are sounding less and less distinctive.[76] Unlike other Egyptian organizations—notably, opposition parties and advocacy nongovernmental organizations—the Ikhwan seem to have successfully managed and formalized, if not resolved, different currents of opinion within their group, so that the high-profile expulsions and dissension from the party leader's line still routine in other Egyptian parties are now less visible among the Ikhwan, despite the sensationalism with which the press continues to speculate over struggles for power within the group's ranks.

The Ikhwan's evolution holds an important lesson for theories of party transformation developed out of cases in advanced industrialized democracies. Electoral authoritarian regimes such as Egypt's show that party adaptation is still possible and even considerable, but not due solely to damaging losses at the ballot box. Instead, parties in electoral authoritarian regimes adapt to fend off state repression and maintain their organizational existence. It is not Downsian vote seeking but, rather, Michels's self-preservation that is the objective of a party in an authoritarian regime, self-preservation defined broadly to include jockeying for influence and relevance with the public and influential international actors. If the Ikhwan have responded with such flexibility to the threats and opportunities of their authoritarian environment, one can speculate how much more they would acclimate themselves to the rigors of free and open electoral politics undistorted by repression.

The trajectory of the Egyptian Ikhwan urges a return to empirical studies of Islamist groups and their interaction with their political contexts, informed by the accumulated knowledge on party behavior in 19th- and 20th-century advanced industrialized democracies. It is by no means a law that parties adapt or moderate their platforms in response to electoral participation, and there are well-known cases of reversals or adoption of more extreme ideological and policy positions.[77] But it is striking how a majority of party organisms, regardless of ideology, modulate their organizational and ideological features to align with changing environmental cues and incentives. Islamist parties are no exception.[78]

NOTES

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[1] For a description of the byelections, see Abdalla Hasan, "Democracy Died Today," *Cairo Times*, 4–10 July 2002.

[2]I use the terms "Society of Muslim Brothers," "Muslim Brothers," and "Ikhwan" interchangeably in this article. The ubiquitous "Muslim Brotherhood" is a glaring but persistent mistranslation, reinforcing mystification of the Ikhwan's genesis and development. Issues of translation are more than semantic. The sociologist Bryan Turner proclaims, "Indeed, the word *brotherhood* itself indicates the presence, in Weber's terms, of closed/communal ties within the open/associational world of state arrangements": Bryan Turner, "Islam, Civil Society, and Citizenship: Reflections on the Sociology of Citizenship and Islamic Studies," in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, ed. Nils Butenschon (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 28–48. Arabic-speaking scholars are not immune from mistranslation. The highest post of the Muslim Brothers, the general guide (*al-murshid al-ʿāmm*), is rendered ominously the "Grand Master" in Larbi Sadiki, *The Search for Arab Democracy: Discourses and Counter-Discourses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 358.

[3]This definition is a median between purely procedural and substantive components of democracy. See Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identities, and Political Change* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 94.

[4]Seymour Martin Lipset "Introduction," in Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1962), 19.

[5]Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 177–200. Kirchheimer was influenced by Anthony Downs's theory of parties as vote-maximizing machines: Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

[6]Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

[7]Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Commitment Problems in Religious Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties," *Comparative Politics* 32, 4 (2000): 379–98.

[8]Scott Mainwaring, "Party Objectives in Authoritarian Regimes with Elections or Fragile Democracies: A Dual Game," in *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 18.

[9]Ibid., 3–29.

[10]Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928–1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998).

[11]*Majmu'at al-rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (The Collected Epistles of the Martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna) (Beirut: Dar al-Hadara al-Islamiyya, 1981), 46–47.

[12]Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 236, 245.

[13]Lia, *Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 249.

[14]Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, 307–13.

[15]The program is reprinted in Mahmud Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: ru'ya min al-dakhil* (The Muslim Brothers: An Inside View) (Alexandria: Dar al-Da'wa, 1985), 118–25.

[16]See the Ikhwan's bylaws, reprinted in Abdalla al-Nafisi, ed., *al-Haraka al-islamiyya: ru'ya mustaqbaliyya* (The Islamist Movement: A Future-Oriented View) (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1989), 401–16.

[17]Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh, member of the Guidance Bureau, interview with the author, Cairo, 24 June 2003. Al-Futuh expressed regret that no term limits were set and indicated that this would be the first order of business in upcoming amendments to the statute.

[18]Umar al-Tilmissany, *Dhikrayat la mudhakkirat* (Memories Not Memoirs) (al-Qahira: Dar al-Tiba'a wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1985), 212.

[19]Ibid., 197.

[20]Ibid., 22.

[21]For a fine-grained analysis of the numerous additional restrictions of the law, including gerrymandering, see Hasanayn Tawfiq Ibrahim and Hoda Raghib Awad, *al-Dawr al-siyasi li-Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi dhil al-ta'addudiyya al-siyasiyya al-muqayyada fi misr* (The Political Role of the Society of Muslim Brothers in the Context of Restricted Political Pluralism in Egypt) (Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrusa, 1996), 44–60.

[22]Ibid., 196.

[23]For more detail, see ibid., 191–217.

[24]The program is reprinted in Ahmad Abdalla, ed., *al-Intikhabat al-barlamaniyya fi misr: dars intikhabat 1987* (Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: The Lesson of the 1987 Elections) (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth al-Arabiyya, 1990), 305–17.

[25]Al-Jamaʿat al-Islamiyya statement, reprinted in ibid., 318–20.

[26]Cited in Tawfiq Yusuf al-Wa'i, *al-Fikr al-siyasi al-muʿasir ʿinda al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (The Muslim Brothers' Contemporary Political Thought) (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Manar al-Islamiyya, 2001), 165.

[27]See Salaheddin Hafez, "Our Constitution . . . Put to the Test!" *al-Ahram*, 6 April 1987, 13.

[28]For the minutes of parliamentary plenary sessions featuring the Ikhwan, see Mohsen Rady, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun taht qubbat al-barlaman* (The Muslim Brothers under the Parliamentary Rotunda), 2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, 1990). For an analysis of Ikhwan MPs' parliamentary conduct, see Ibrahim and Awad, *al-Dawr al-siyasi*, 361–406.

[29]Ammar Ali Hasan, "Ada' al-tahaluf al-islami fi majlis al-shaʿb khilal al-fasl al-tashriʿi al-khamis: dirasa fi al-riqaba al-barlamaniya" (The Performance of the Islamist Alliance in the Fifth Legislative Session of Parliament: A Study in Parliamentary Oversight), in *al-Tatawwur al-siyasi fi misr 1982–1992* (Political Development in Egypt 1982–1992), ed. Muhammad Kharbush (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya, 1994), 133–60.

[30]Bertus Hendriks, "Egypt's New Political Map," *Middle East Report* (July–August 1987): 23–30.

[31]Lawyers and journalists upended that tradition in their transformative elections of 2001 and 2003, voting in the Nasserist activists Sameh Ashour as chairman of the bar and Galal Aref as chairman of the journalists' union. In a bid at cooptation, both were appointed to the government's National Human Rights Council in January 2004.

[32]For specifics, see Amani Qandil, *al-Mujtamaʿ al-madani fi misr fi matlaʿ alfiyya jadida* (Civil Society in Egypt at the Dawn of a New Millenium) (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya bi-l-Ahram, 2000), 31.

[33]For the "takeover" view, see Turner, "Islam, Civil Society, and Citizenship," 47; Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society," *Perspectives on Politics* 1, 2 (2003): 257–72; Ahmad Husein Hasan, *al-Suʿud al-siyasi al-islami dakhil al-niqabat al-mihaniyya* (The Islamist Political Rise in the Professional Associations) (Cairo: al-Dar al-Thaqafiyya li-l-Nashr, 2000).

[34]Amani Qandil, "al-Tayar al-islami dakhil jamʿat al-masalih fi misr" (The Islamist Trend in Egyptian Interest Groups), *Qadaya fikriyya* (October 1989): 162–68. See also Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), chap. 8.

[35]John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," in *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, ed. Ghassan Salame (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 45.

[36]As Fareed Zakaria opines in "How to Save the Arab World," *Newsweek*, 24 December 2001, 24.

[37]Hala Mustafa, member of the NDP Policies Secretariat, is a consistent exponent of this view: see Hala Mustafa, "Building Arab Democracy," *Washington Post*, 18 November 2003.

[38]Najib Ghadbian, *Democratization and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 76.

[39]For a detailed discussion of the law and its 1995 amendments, see Abdalla Khalil, *Azmat Niqabat al-Muhamin* (The Crisis of the Bar Association) (Cairo: Markaz al-Qahira li-Dirasat Huquq al-Insan, 1999), 108–21.

[40]See three such press releases in Muhammad Muru, *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi misr min 1928 ila 1993* (The Islamist Movement in Egypt from 1928 to 1993) (Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyya li-l-Nashr wa al-Tawziʿ, 1994), 199–201. The Ikhwan's brokerage is reported in Robert Fisk, "Deal Silences the Cairo Hard Men," *The Independent*, 11 September 1994.

[41]Ramadan was not successful. Amani Qandil, *al-Dawr al-siyasi li-jamaʿat al-masalih fi misr* (The Political Role of Interest Groups in Egypt) (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya bi-l-Ahram, 1996), 72.

[42]Al-Wa'i, *al-Fikr al-siyasi al-muʿasir*, 253.

[43]Al-Tilmissany, *Dhikrayat*, 21.

[44]Jihane al-Halafawi, interview with the author, Alexandria, 11 June 2003.

[45]The statement is reproduced in al-Wa'i, *al-Fikr al-siyasi al-mu'asir*, 127–32.

[46]Quoted in "The Doctor Is Out," *Cairo Times*, 9–22 March 2000, 14–16. The statement on pluralism is reprinted in al-Wa'i, *al-Fikr al-siyasi al-mu'asir*, 127–32.

[47]*Majmu'at al-rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid*, 326.

[48] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Min fiqh al-dawla fi al-Islam: makanatiha, tabi'atiha, mawifuha min al-dimuqratiyya wa-l-ta'addudiyya wa-l-mar'awa ghayr al-muslimin* (On the Theory of the State in Islam: Its Role, Characteristics, Nature and Positions on Democracy, Pluralism, Women, and Non-Muslims) (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1997), 157.

[49] Mary Anne Weaver, *A Portrait of Egypt: A Journey through the World of Militant Islam* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), 165; emphasis in original. For a recent interview with Mubarak in which he expressed similar sentiments, see "Democracy: Be Careful What You Wish For," *Washington Post*, 23 March 2003.

[50] See the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), *Democracy Jeopardized: Nobody Passed the Elections: The EOHR's Account of the 1995 Egyptian Parliamentary Elections* (Cairo: EOHR, 1996).

[51] The complete 1995 statement is reprinted in *Rowaq Arabi*, January 1997, 139–43.

[52] The Islamist writer and Muslim Brothers sympathizer Fahmi Huwaydi waxes poetic about al-Banna's close ties to Coptic figures such as MP Louis Vanos and prominent Coptic scion Makram Ebeid: Fahmi Huwaydi, *al-Islam wa-l-dimuqratiyya* (Islam and Democracy) (Cairo: al-Ahram li-l-Tawzi' wa-l-Nashr, 1993), 278–79.

[53] See his seminal *al-Muslimun wa-l-aqbat fi itar al-jama'a al-wataniyya* (Muslims and Copts in the National Community), 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1988). For analysis of Bishri's concept of citizenship, see Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 243–92.

[54] Nabil Abd al-Fattah, ed., *Taqrir al-hala al-diniyya fi misr* (Egypt State of Religion Report), 5th ed. (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya bi-l-Ahram, 1997), 171.

[55] Abdalla al-Nafisi, "al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi misr: al-tajriba wa-l-khata'" (The Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Experience and the Mistake," in *al-Haraka al-islamiyya: ru'ya mustaqbaliyya*, 234-39.

[56] Abu al-Futuh, interview.

[57] The journalist Khaled Dawoud then handed the tape to the government weekly tabloid *Ruz al-Yusuf*, a leading anti–Muslim Brothers mouthpiece, which published the interview as "The Latest Invention of the Muslim Brothers: Kick Them Out of the Army!" *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 14 April 1997, 22–23.

[58] Ahmad Hamroush, "A General Guide in Need of Guidance!" *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 28 April 1997.

[59] Sultan interviewed by Mahmoud Sadeq, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: al-azma wa-l-tashattut* (The Muslim Brothers: Crisis and Division) (Cairo: Akhbar al-Yawm, 2002), 181–92.

[60] Anthony Shadid, *Legacy of the Prophet: Depots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 253–71. See also Tal'at Rumeih, *al-Wasat wa-l-Ikhwan* (The Wasat and the Brothers) (Cairo: Markaz Yafa li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1997).

[61] Paul Schemm and Simon Apiku, "The Battle of the Generations in Egypt's Opposition," *Middle East Times*, 23 August 1998. Muhammad Hamdi, "Egyptian Parties Aflame with Splits," *al-Ahram al-arabi*, 20 November 1999. In June 2002, The Tagammu' politburo member Abd al-Ghaffar Shukr wrote a position paper titled, "Toward a Serious and Sincere Discussion of the Future of Tagammu'," calling for a thorough overhaul of the party's personalized leadership style and collusion with the government: Abd al-Ghaffar Shukr, interview with the author, Cairo, 9 July 2003.

[62] Voter turnout was 49.7 percent: "Springtime of the Syndicate," *Cairo Times*, 1–14 March 2001.

[63] "We're Innocent, Your Honor," *Cairo Times*, 18–24 January 2001.

[64] Muhammad Mursi, interview with the author, Cairo, 26 June 2002.

[65] For a roundup of Parliament's first season, including the Muslim Brothers deputies' performance, see "Arisen," *Cairo Times*, 19–25 July 2001.

[66] See "Hard Times for Heshmat," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 19–25 December 2002; and "Brotherhood Barred at the Poll," *al-Ahram Weekly*, 16–22 January 2003.

[67] Gamal Heshmat, interview with the author, Cairo, 24 June 2003.

[68] "Jilted Brothers," *Cairo Times*, 24–30 April 2003.

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POST-ISLAMISM AND THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE OF ʿABD AL-SALAM YASIN

For more than a decade, post-Islamism has been at the center of a major debate in French academia regarding the historical evolution of Islamism. The concept was put forth in the early 1990s as an attempt to apprehend the apparent crisis within many Islamic movements of the Middle East. In Iran, the increasingly authoritarian character of the Islamic republic, as well as the predominance of the mullahs' discretionary powers, seemed to undermine the credibility of the Islamist alternative. Elsewhere, as in Egypt and Algeria, the advent of an Islamic order never came to pass and appeared illusory. Islamists were unable to cope with the repression and the containment policies of secular states. Therefore, a number of French scholars argued that Islamism—that is, the holistic, populist, and often revolutionary ideology whose goal is the establishment of an Islamic state and the governance of all aspects of society according to Islamic principles—had reached a dead end. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu al-Aʿla al-Mawdudi were passé. An era of post-Islamism was dawning.[1]

Initial articulations of this argument posited that Islamism was shifting toward practical and ideological compromises vis-à-vis politics. This idea remains the cornerstone of recent theoretical developments, which isolated a series of independent features for defining post-Islamism and its manifestations.[2] First, post-Islamists may remain politically active but have more modest agendas than their predecessors: "[t]oday, Islamists everywhere evolve into Islamo-nationalist movements (Turkish Refah, Palestinian Hamas, Algerian FIS) for which the *umma* becomes a slogan for internal use."[3] Second, post-Islamists are creating a de facto secular space by re-routing religious activism away from the state and, sometimes, from political issues altogether. The recrudescence of Sufi brotherhoods and Salafi neofundamentalist movements is thus considered symptomatic of post-Islamism. While the former promote quietist mysticism, the latter focus on individual orthopraxy and often tend to eschew the political sphere. Groups calling for the implementation of the shariʿa are increasingly unwilling to take political responsibilities and prefer to leave the task to current regimes. Third, post-Islamism implies theological and philosophical reformulations. Coping with the intellectual failure of political Islam, some thinkers articulated secular or apolitical positions. Examples of post-Islamist thought range from the hermeneutics of Abdolkarim Soroush, who disputes

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the doctrinal rigidity of the Shiʿi establishment in Iran, to the Syrian-based *ʿālim* Saʿid Ramadan al-Buti, who emphasizes Islamic spirituality and ethics.[4]

For the student of contemporary Morocco, post-Islamist theory is simultaneously intriguing and perplexing. Prima facie, it could explain multiple recent phenomena, including the advent of the moderate Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and the unprecedented visibility of the Butshishiyya Sufi order. Yet the theory is still lacking in evidence. The notion of post-Islamist thought is particularly embryonic. According to Olivier Roy's own avowal, it is the least substantiated aspect of post-Islamist theory.[5] This paper proposes to examine the concept's validity by using the religious discourse of the Moroccan Islamist ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin as a case study. Indeed, several markers of post-Islamist thought—such as the significance of spirituality and ethics—are highly suggestive of Yasin's ideas.

For the past thirty years, ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin has been one of the major Islamic activists and intellectuals of his country. In addition to being Supreme Guide of al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Beneficence)—an illegal yet tolerated movement that aims at the re-Islamization of society—he is also a prolific writer. Since 1972, he has published nearly thirty books in addition to several articles. Although political, social, and economic issues are prominent in his corpus, they should not distract analysts from the equally abundant spiritual content. Post-Islamist theory provides an opportunity to delve into the specifically religious and nonpolitical aspects of Yasin's thought, which historians and social scientists have often neglected.[6] The theoreticians of post-Islamism themselves have overlooked the apparent congruence between Yasin's discourse and the concept of post-Islamist thought.

Superficial congruence, however, requires verification. What exactly does Yasin's religious discourse consist of, and how is it novel? Is the notion of post-Islamist thought capable of conveying its specificity? This paper will show that a detailed analysis of Yasin's discourse fails to validate post-Islamism; instead, it unveils some of the theory's weaknesses and provides clues to solve them. Since the term "post-Islamist" cannot adequately make sense of Yasin's nonpolitical ideas, this paper will argue that "post-Salafism" is a more appropriate and meaningful category. From a strictly religious viewpoint, Yasin's discourse is distinctive by transcending the broad Salafi epistemology that exalts exoteric scripturalism and formal instruction (*taʿlīm*) at the expense of mysticism and spiritual guidance (*tarbiya*). Unlike the notion of post-Islamist thought, post-Salafism does not depend on the prior failure of political Islam; nor does it focus on political attitudes and ideas. Instead, it indicates changes in the dominant Salafi-oriented approach to religion that characterizes most Sunni Islamists and many alleged post-Islamists.

REHABILITATING MYSTICISM

Post-Islamist theory hinges on a historical narrative. It assumes a chronological sequence in which Islamism rose, failed, and critically needed to reconsider its political, social, and intellectual nature. According to this scenario, the 1970s were the prime of Islamism. During that decade, the Muslim Brotherhood's radical offshoots gained ground in Egypt following the defeat of Nasserism. In Pakistan, General Zia ul-Haq toppled the socialist regime of ʿAli Bhutto in 1977 and allowed the political ascent of al-Mawdudi, his

disciples, and his ideas. The decade culminated in Iran with the resounding victory of the Islamic Revolution over the Shah's regime in 1979. The gradual passage to post-Islamism occurred only later, after political disillusionment began in Iran in the mid-1980s and intensified with the global debacle of Islamism throughout the 1990s.[7] Consequently, the failure of political Islam would have triggered the formulation of substitute discourses revolving around spirituality.

This narrative not only distinguishes Islamism from post-Islamism in time; it also reveals what factual information has been used to characterize both categories. Based primarily on data from Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan during the 1970s, the first part of the narrative is somewhat selective. It disregards the historical conditions that forged Islamism in countries such as Morocco, for which less scholarly research is available. As a result, it assumes that Islamism boomed systematically in reaction to the bankruptcy of secular nationalist regimes that had weak religious legitimacy. Those who filled the void in the name of religion were Islamists influenced by Qutb, Khomeini, and al-Mawdudi: they boldly called for an Islamic state, privileged a political reading of the Qur'an, and had little or no spiritual objectives per se. Such a narrative is acceptable insofar as it conveniently summarizes the upsurge of Islamism in core Middle Eastern countries and in Pakistan. The proponents of post-Islamism, however, use this portrayal of the 1970s as a historical and intellectual archetype, which then becomes a yardstick for identifying later signs of post-Islamism everywhere, from Istanbul to the suburbs of Paris. Such a methodology is too inductive to be taken at face value. Different historical conditions shaped different approaches to Islamism. Indeed, post-Islamist theory is unable to account for the fact that spirituality has been central to ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin's discourse since 1972—that is, well before the alleged failure of political Islam.

The Moroccan Context

The logical explanation for this theoretical anomaly is that the political and religious landscape of Morocco in the early 1970s did not fully correspond to the Egyptian, Iranian, or Pakistani paradigms. Although Yasin responded to the successes and tribulations of Islamism abroad, he developed his ideas in a unique local context. At the time, Moroccan Islamists faced religious competition. On the one hand, the monarchy had deep Islamic foundations. King Hasan II asserted his sharifian origins and his pre-eminence as Commander of the Faithful (*amīr al-muʾminīn*). On the other hand, one of the regime's major political challengers—the nationalist Istiqlal party—already used an Islamic idiom to articulate some of its grievances. From its inception in the 1930s, Moroccan nationalism had been tied to the Salafiyya. ʿAllal al-Fasi (d. 1974), who headed the Istiqlal from 1956 until his death, was an Islamic modernist à la Muhammad ʿAbduh.[8]

This situation contributed to making the rise of Islamism much less exuberant in Morocco than it was in Egypt, Iran, or Pakistan. During the 1970s, Moroccan Islamists were generally fragmented and restrained.[9] The advocates of the nationalist Salafiyya within the Istiqlal faced similar difficulties. Their old message of Islamic reform hardly answered the problems of independent Morocco, especially its socio-economic and political inequalities. By 1959, the Istiqlal had split, spawning an important new oppositional current based on secular socialism. Such ideological divisions benefited the

monarch, who elevated himself above rivalries and consolidated his power. Nationalist Salafis and Islamists shared religion as a vehicle for oppositional politics, yet none of them appeared capable of fostering any real change within Moroccan society.[10] In this context, Yasin's interest for mysticism had a tactical value.

Indeed, nationalist Salafis and Islamists were restricted by a common epistemological stance: they both neglected spiritual devotion and mystical fulfillment, which were still central to the Moroccan masses' religious life.[11] The nationalist Salafiyya was a scriptural and elitist reform movement that tended to belittle the popular mystical dimension of Islam. While older Moroccan Salafis such as Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali (d. 1937) had been open to conciliation, their younger disciples were not. The anti-colonial struggle required al-Fasi to assert that Islam was inherently rational, progressive, and conducive to modernity. Therefore, he repeatedly claimed that Sufism had obscured the true nature of Islam, which was found in the Qur'an, the hadith, and the practice of the pious ancestors (*salaf*).[12] He also condemned Sufi brotherhoods for their collaboration with French imperialism. Upon independence, Sufism was a marginal form of religiosity among the nationalist Moroccan elites.

Similarly, the most prominent Islamist organization of the early 1970s, al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Youth), ignored mysticism. In keeping with the dominant intellectual Islamist current of the period, al-Shabiba abided by a Salafi epistemology. The organization followed the doctrines and the exegesis of Sayyid Qutb, which had wide political implications but provided no real spiritual solace.[13] By connecting mystical elements to Islamism, ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin could aspire to transcend this hegemonic Salafi epistemology and reach out for the Sufi sensibilities of Moroccan masses. This is not to say that Yasin's approach was strictly a tool of self-promotion. While the re-appropriation of mystical elements certainly corresponded to his personal religious beliefs, it also allowed him to lay the foundations for a more comprehensive, uniting, and mobilizing approach to Islamism in Morocco.

Yasin was fully aware of the potency of mysticism because it had been a determinative experience in his life. Born in 1928, Yasin is the son of a Berber fellah and allegedly comes from a poor family. He started to read the Qur'an at an early age and studied in a private elementary school in Marrakech. At fifteen, Yasin entered the Bin Yusuf Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, where he studied for four years. In 1947, he moved to Rabat to attend a pedagogical school for teachers, and he began a long career in education, mainly as an Arabic teacher, the following year. In 1955, Yasin successfully passed a national examination to become education inspector and took up this new line of work in a primary school in Casablanca. During the following years, he moved frequently between Beni Mellal, Marrakech, and Casablanca to occupy higher managerial positions in the primary and secondary school system.[14] Around 1967, however, illness prevented him from pursuing his career. This hitch coincided with a mid-life crisis that manifested itself through spiritual anguish. Approaching the age of forty, Yasin suddenly became preoccupied with existential questions regarding Islam and the meaning of human life.

Searching for answers, he was drawn to a Sufi master—al-Hajj al-ʿAbbas ibn al-Mukhtar al-Qadiri—who headed the Butshishiyya order.[15] Yasin found in him and in Sufism the guidance and spiritual fulfillment he had been looking for. He affirms that al-Hajj al-ʿAbbas liberated him from his ignorant, inherited understanding of Islam

(*al-Islām al-mawrūth al-majhūl*).[16] Yasin remained closely associated with the leader of the Butshishiyya until al-Hajj al-ʿAbbas died in 1972. At that point, Yasin disagreed with Hamza—the son and successor of al-Hajj al-ʿAbbas—with respect to the orientation that the Sufi order should adopt. While Hamza was faithful to the quietist tradition of the Butshishiyya, Yasin wanted the order to move toward greater activism in the public arena.

Therefore, Yasin left the Butshishiyya in 1972 and began a life of social involvement as an Islamist intellectual. He founded no organization until the following decade and so devoted all his energies to writing. With respect to politics and economics, Yasin's discourse is often commonplace and recapitulates ideas that Qutb and al-Mawdudi previously addressed. What truly distinguishes him is his religious discourse, which remained permeated with mystical elements, despite his conversion to Islamism. By the 1970s, the ideas of Qutb and al-Mawdudi enjoyed unprecedented popularity and authority among Islamists but were almost exclusively concerned with temporal issues. Yasin disputed this limitation and believed that the religious dimension of Islamism should address spiritual matters, as well. Yasin's mystical inclination, however, did not result from disillusionment vis-à-vis politics, as post-Islamist theory suggests, nor did it chronologically follow the alleged failure of political Islam. On the contrary, from the early 1970s onward, Yasin viewed mysticism as essential for the success of Islamism in Morocco and throughout the Muslim world.

Main Spiritual Concepts

Yasin justifies his post–Salafi discourse in terms of medical analogies. According to him, the contemporary *umma* suffers from a disease: its body is ailing because its spirit is sick. Muslims have lost their spiritual bond by growing too enamored with this world (*dunyā*) and becoming averse to death. Thus, Yasin argues that Islamists like himself must put forth a religious medication that corresponds to this diagnosis. The appropriate remedy, he claims, is spiritual guidance (*al-tarbiya al-rūḥiyya*).[17] For him, Islamic fervor requires a mystical knowledge (*ʿilm ladunī*) that reason alone fails to grasp. Although he acknowledges the intellectual exertions of Muhammad ʿAbduh, he draws inspiration from the theosophy of Sufi teachers such as the Moroccan shaykh, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Dabbagh (d. 1719).[18] Indeed, Yasin's literary production is replete with concepts that have Sufi overtones. Three of them are particularly recurrent: *ṣuḥba* (spiritual companionship), *dhikr* (remembrance), and *iḥsān* (beneficence). From the onset, companionship and remembrance have been prominent subject matters in his corpus, especially in the first two books he published in 1972 and 1973. Both concepts imply what Annemarie Schimmel calls mysticism of personality—that is, the cultivation of love relations between God and individual believers.[19]

The term *ṣuḥba* usually refers to the interaction between the members of a Sufi order and the shaykh who guides them. For Yasin, it remains a form of spiritual tutorship between two or more individuals but is no longer confined to Sufi orders. Thus, *ṣuḥba* means seeking the company and the positive influence of believing Muslims who may serve as guides or role models. Yasin argues that sound companionship is the necessary condition for creating an environment that is conducive to spiritual progress. In some cases, *ṣuḥba* may entail sacrifices, such as the departure (*hijra*) from a familiar but

improper social circle or the renunciation of distracting luxury. In return, Muslims shall find solidarity and spiritual support to experience the love of God (*maḥabba*) and to taste the sweetness of faith (*ḥalāwa al-imān*).[20] According to Yasin, the communal dimension of *ṣuḥba* is also key because it can help to overcome the intellectual and sometimes physical dissension (*fitna*) that occurs among Muslims. For this reason, he views spiritual companionship as the first step toward building a strong and united Muslim community, as Medina was under the pious ancestors.[21]

Through *ṣuḥba*, Yasin aims to fill the gaps left by the foremost proponents of the Salafi epistemology: "[w]ell-known preachers such as Muhammad ʿAbduh, al-Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb refer to the glorious Islamic model in their books; they recommend to adhere to the sunna and to observe the example of the Prophet. Yet they never explain to us how to do this."[22] Spiritual companionship, Yasin claims, is one such means. Indeed, he criticizes al-Mawdudi for being wary of *ṣuḥba* and for associating it with dubious Sufi practices.[23] He also complains that Qutb wrote virtually nothing about spiritual companionship in his body of literature, even though he spent more than twenty years studying the formative texts.[24] Yasin suggests that the sociopolitical projects of Qutb and al-Mawdudi failed to become mass movements because they neglected *ṣuḥba*. In turn, he attributes the original success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the mystical convictions of its founder—Hasan al-Banna—and his concern for *ṣuḥba*. Yasin is keen on reminding his readers that al-Banna, like him, was a former Sufi.[25]

The second mystical concept that recurrently appears in Yasin's writings is *dhikr* (remembrance), which is also typical of Sufi practice. It usually refers to the ritualistic and repetitive mention of formulas that evoke God's name. In the Butshishiyya order, for instance, *dhikr* was prominent and involved Qur'anic liturgy combined with a specific phrase-patterned litany (*wird*). Yasin, for his part, merely emphasizes the profession of faith (*shahāda*). His *dhikr* consists of repeating "there is no god but God" several hundred times a day, alone and in groups.[26] He upholds the orthodoxy of such practice by stressing that *dikhr* is a Qur'anic recommendation and that more than seventy hadiths underline the importance of the *shahāda*.[27] Even though his *dhikr* is simpler than the one practiced in the Butshishiyya, Yasin openly pursues the same mystical objective as his former Sufi masters. He claims that invoking and remembering God on a constant basis is a means to purify one's heart and link oneself to the metaphysical reality (*al-ghayb*) that positivist thinkers deny. Thus, remembrance is an integral part of spiritual guidance and a complement to companionship as it teaches Muslims to love and fear God and leads them to perform good deeds.[28] As a further justification, Yasin often underlines that Hasan al-Banna, in his own time, had also insisted on the importance of *dhikr*.

In the 1980s, Yasin began focusing more intensively on the notion of beneficence (*iḥsān*), which became the single most important ethical principle of his discourse. In Yasin's thought, beneficence is not a means of spiritual guidance per se, like *ṣuḥba* or *dhikr*. Rather, it is a superior stage of consciousness (*maqām*) to which all Muslims should aspire. It supersedes the previous two concepts because it refers to the high moral and spiritual condition that one reaches through guidance. The term "*iḥsān*" is found in the hadith literature and has a Qur'anic origin, as well: "[s]urely, God bids to justice and good-doing (*iḥsān*) and giving to kinsmen; and He forbids indecency, dishonour, and insolence, admonishing you, so that haply you will remember."[29] For Yasin, *iḥsān* implies an ethical and responsible behavior toward oneself and the community to enhance life

in this world (*dunyā*) and to prepare souls for salvation in the hereafter (*ākhira*).[30] Thus, *iḥsān* is a way of being, thinking, and acting that translates a love for God and his creation. Examples include fighting one's ego, providing money for the poor, and even protecting the ecosystem.[31]

The notion of *iḥsān* implies a framework of mystical gradation that is typical of Sufism. Yasin does not deny the succession of stages and the relevance of guided initiation:

> Islam is ascension. Islam is not a stationary state. The first step is that of the practicing Muslim who makes sure to fulfill the duties that the law prescribes to him and to all Muslims. The second step is that of iman [faith]: a high step where adoration and moral rectitude are on a par. The third degree is *iḥsān*, which is the starting point and the infinite space of the great spiritual journey. In the latter's utmost stage, a spiritual guide is necessary because the trip is long and full of difficulties.[32]

Undoubtedly, the concepts that Yasin borrowed from Sufism proved useful when he decided to found his first Islamist association in 1981, Jamaʿa al-Usra, which transformed into al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan in 1987. Indeed, companionship, remembrance, and beneficence provided him with a basic structural, ritual, and disciplinary framework. It should be noted that references to Sufism also endowed Yasin with a certain political authority (*wilāya*). In Morocco, the model of the Sunni Muslim saint as an active religious-cum-political figure dates from the mid-15th century. There is a long history of pre-modern Moroccan Sufis partaking in socio-political life and reminding the sultans of their duty on behalf of the population.[33] In a way, Yasin can be viewed as a continuation of this tradition. In the famous open letter he sent to King Hassan II in 1974, which was titled "Islam or the Deluge," Yasin claimed a moral and spiritual ascendance. He admonished the king to repent, to return to God, and to follow a straight path for his own sake and for the good of his community.[34]

Seeking Acknowledgment and Consensus

Yasin's rehabilitation of mystical elements clashed with the fundamentals of Salafi epistemology. In Morocco, his theosophical ideas have been subjected to sharp criticism by Wahhabi-inspired Salafis and by fellow Islamists whose religious philosophy derives from Salafi principles. In 1983, the movement al-Islah wa-l-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal), a splinter group of al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya, published a short document attacking the Sufi inclination of Yasin's thought. According to this group, Yasin unsparingly relied on weak (*daʿīfa*) hadiths and Sufi lore, which led him to overemphasize *dhikr* and to distract Muslims from the Qur'an. In a typical Salafi fashion, the document invokes the intellectual authority of Ibn Taymiyya to condemn the mystical dimension of Yasin's religious discourse.[35]

It is true that Yasin's initial publications naively referred to controversial Sufis and their vocabulary. In his first book, for instance, Yasin devoted an entire section to the praiseworthy science of Muslim "saints" (*awliyā'*) and even mentioned Ibn ʿArabi (d. 1240)—whom the proponents of Salafi epistemology despise and typically accuse of existential monism—as a source of wisdom.[36] Such references were too marginal within Islamist circles to escape criticism. In his subsequent books, Yasin tried to remove such obvious sources of discredit. He virtually abandoned the notion of saint and no longer

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referred to Ibn ʿArabi. By 1980, he had considerably reduced his allusions to the most esoteric or supernatural issues. In *L'islam à l'heure de la révolution*, for instance, one finds only a lone reference to dream interpretation as a means of spiritual guidance. Dreams, Yasin argued, may serve to indicate spiritual maturity: at a higher stage of *iḥsān*, a Muslim is likely to have explicit visions of the Prophet.[37]

Trying to avoid controversy, however, was insufficient to secure the religious legitimacy of an eclectic combination between mysticism and Islamism. In the 1980s, Yasin faced a dilemma: to defend the validity of his unusual approach or to cave in to his detractors and abandon the mystical elements of his discourse. He chose the former option and attempted to prove his critics wrong. To transcend the dominant Salafi epistemology, he had no choice but to demonstrate that certain spiritual matters, though often rejected out of hand as being "Sufi," were indeed compliant with scripturalist orthodoxy. Through this plea, Yasin endeavored to gain recognition from other Islamic activists and, ultimately, to foster a truly consensual discourse. In a book originally written around 1989, he seeks the indirect approval of reputable Muslim scholars, be they dead or alive. One of his main points is to show that mysticism was inherent to the religious worldview of great medieval Muslims.

For this purpose, he distinguishes between orthodox "Salafi" Sufism (*al-taṣawwuf al-salafī*) and "philosophical" Sufism (*al-taṣawwuf al-falsafī*).[38] Salafi Sufism is presented as a shariʿa-abiding type of mysticism that is also concerned with the welfare of hearts and souls. Two of its famous representatives were ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), the founder of the Qadiriyya order, and Ahmad al-Rifaʿi (d. 1182). Philosophical Sufism, in turn, designates a gnosis whose origins, according to Yasin, are found in neo-Platonism. He accuses this type of mysticism of being antinomian, tainted by foreign ideas, and sullied by spiritual ecstasies of divine infusion and union (*al-ḥulūl wa-l-ittiḥād*). These charges tacitly refer to the mysticism of al-Hallaj (d. 922) and Ibn ʿArabi. Without further elaboration, Yasin dismisses philosophical Sufism as non–Islamic. Rather, he wants to emphasize Salafi Sufism and its significance.

Yasin affirms that some of the most eminent Muslim scholars of the medieval period were not mere ulamas, but also jurists of guidance (*fuqahāʾ al-tarbiya*) and spiritual doctors who could cure hearts (*aṭibbāʾ al-qulūb*).[39] Judging by his extensive, though selective, quoting, the "doctors of the hearts" are numerous and come from all Sunni legal schools (*madhāhib*). Yasin wishes to underline that, for such scholars, spiritual growth was as significant as scripturalism and legal sciences. The Maliki jurist al-Shatibi (d. 1388), for example, wrote passages in which he admitted the validity and ethical benefits of orthodox Sufism.[40] So did Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1200), the Hanbali author of *Talbis iblis* (The Devil's Delusion)—a book that the proponents of the Salafi epistemology often hail as the utmost denunciation of Sufism. While al-Jawzi condemned certain practices such as dancing (*raqṣ*) and liturgical concerts (*samāʿ*), he considered that dry legalism was insufficient to fulfill inner longings and that only a sober form of mysticism could appease one's heart.[41] As for the Shafiʿi scholar Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d. 1505), he sought spiritual guidance from the masters of the Shadhiliyya order after completing his formal religious studies.[42]

To be sure, Yasin's favorite model is al-Ghazali (d. 1111), whom he recognizes as the archetypal unifier of Sufism and traditional Islamic knowledge (*ʿilm*). Yasin is prone to identify himself with his intellectual muse, especially since they have in common

a mid-life spiritual crisis that led them to embrace mysticism. Al-Ghazali, however, is not the most authoritative or inspirational figure among contemporary Islamists. Therefore, Yasin endeavors to unveil evidence of mystical affinities in the writings of the most zealous Hanbali scholars—such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and his pupil Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350)—to whom his Salafi-oriented detractors are indebted. Using specific quotations, Yasin argues that both scholars respected the ethical value of orthodox mysticism, even though they disliked the word "Sufism." Ibn Taymiyya did not believe that Sufis were blamable per se; instead, he wrote that Sufis were liable to error, just like any other Muslim seeking truth. As for Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, he declared that orthodox Sufism was among the noblest of Islamic sciences, second only to the theology of God's unity (*ʿilm al-tawḥīd*).[43]

Yasin contends that today's advocates of the Salafi epistemology, which include Islamists and Wahhabi-inspired Salafis, are misreading their sources. As a result, they cast undue discredit on Sufism and deprive the *umma* of much needed spiritual guidance. To buttress this delicate argument, Yasin invokes a contemporary *ʿālim* who shares his point of view. This scholar is Saʿid Ramadan al-Buti, who, according to Olivier Roy, exemplifies the concept of post-Islamist thought. Like Yasin, al-Buti challenges the standard Salafi reading of Ibn Taymiyya, whom he refuses to portray as an enemy of Sufism.[44] Al-Buti is different, however, in that he enjoys widespread popularity as a television preacher and benefits from a solid reputation as a graduate of al-Azhar and as a professor in the faculty of Islamic law at the University of Damascus. By referring to al-Buti, Yasin is able to compensate for his own lack of formal academic credentials while lending credibility to his religious discourse.[45]

This rhetoric, however, is a double-edged sword. Since Yasin aims to transcend the Salafi distrust vis-à-vis Sufism, he ipso facto confronts a new problem. Indeed, he cannot accept one of the logical conclusions of his own argument, which would be to invite contemporary Muslims to join orthodox Sufi orders or to seek the guidance of an orthodox Sufi shaykh. Yasin does not wish to rehabilitate Sufis as religious competitors; nor does he want to acknowledge Sufism as an alternative to political Islam. His intention remains to foster a credible, uniting, and eclectic Islamist ideology that can appeal to as many Muslims as possible. Therefore, Yasin finds himself in an awkward position. While attempting to rehabilitate a certain form of Sufism, he must simultaneously struggle to dissociate himself from it. He readily proclaims that orthodox Sufism is not a proper Islamic medication: "I do not propagandize Sufism; I like neither the noun nor the form [its practice takes] because I cannot find them in the book of God or the sunna of his Prophet."[46] Instead, Yasin contends that orthodox Sufis are relevant only insofar as they hold the key to *iḥsān* and preserve the means of spiritual guidance. However, nothing good can be expected from them because they are disengaged from socio-political life and cannot escape their solitary contemplation even when injustice is omnipresent. Although Yasin admits he owes everything to his Sufi masters, he argues that criticizing them for their quietism is an essential part of the contemporary Islamic renewal.[47] Thus, he uses the adjective "Sufi" only to describe his past convictions (*sawābiq*).[48]

Despite such ambiguities—or perhaps because of them—it appears that Yasin's partial rehabilitation of mysticism was rewarding. It provided him with a distinct yet inclusive religious ideology that eventually contributed to turning al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan into one of the most popular Islamist organizations in Morocco. Though unusual, Yasin's religious

discourse cannot reasonably be referred to as post-Islamist, as his emphasis on spirituality and ethics does not imply a prior political failure or a retreat from political issues. Mystical elements were inherent in his articulation of Islamism since the 1970s because, in a Moroccan context, they proved to be empowering. For this reason, "post-Salafism" may better convey the particularities of Yasin's epistemology. To achieve success, he broke away from the deeply entrenched Salafi prejudices toward mysticism.

POST-SALAFI RE-ISLAMIZATION OF SOCIETY

Post-Islamist theory touches on the religious substance of discourses but also addresses modes of action. In Roy's theoretical framework, Islamists are presented as activists whose top priority is the establishment of an Islamic state. It is true that since the 1970s many Islamists inspired by Qutb, al-Mawdudi, and Khomeini have argued that the process of re-Islamization should occur through the state—that is, from the top down. Yet in the wake of Hasan al-Banna, other Islamists continued to believe that re-Islamization could occur from the bottom up. For them, the establishment of an Islamic state is an ulterior step that should follow the reeducation of Muslim society. They engage in active advocacy in the public sphere, but their priority is not to gain political power. Post-Islamist theory tends to overlook this second group, as though al-Banna's strategy had reached a dead end everywhere by the 1970s. Through a semantic shift, Roy suggests that only the first group deserves the label "Islamist."[49] As a result, he uses the label "post-Islamist" to describe various contemporary activists who embark on the re-Islamization of society from the bottom up.

Yasin does not corroborate this analytical model. He became an Islamist in the 1970s but favored al-Banna's old strategy of re-Islamization instead of Qutb's state-oriented platform. Although the monarchy's coercion and intimidation certainly influenced him, historical conditions may shed light on his choice. Islamism in Morocco emerged for the first time in the late 1960s, four decades after the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. No large-scale re-Islamization of society had taken place in previous years. Nationalist Salafis such as al-Fasi had used Islamic symbols to muster the people into the anti-colonial struggle, but their achievements in terms of *daʿwa* were mostly limited to academic circles. This context bears a strange resemblance to Egypt in the late 1920s. Though separated by forty years, Yasin and al-Banna both advocated Islamism in reaction to the decline of modernist Salafis and their failure to reach the masses.[50] They both dealt with a population that, for the most part, had never experienced a systematic process of Islamic reform and mobilization. In such circumstances, Yasin's decision to emphasize education and grass-roots activities can hardly be branded "post-Islamist." These were appropriate means for implanting Islamism in Morocco in the early 1970s.

In any case, the label "post-Islamist" cannot capture the religious distinctiveness of Yasin's intellectual practice. According to Roy, any attempt to re-Islamize society can be subsumed under post-Islamism as long as it is quietist or de facto tolerant of current regimes. Thus, Sufism and puritanical neofundamentalism (or Wahhabi-inspired Salafiyya, as it is called in Morocco) may exemplify what he calls "post-Islamist Islamization" because they both target individuals rather than the state. While Sufi shaykhs impart theosophical knowledge to their personal followers within a closed circle, neo-fundamentalists issue strict legal ordinances (*aḥkām*) that men and women

should observe in their daily life.[51] To be sure, these two types of re-Islamization occur outside the political arena, yet they entail two very different articulations of Islam and imply different modes of religious education and intellectual work. The label "post-Islamist" is incapable of conveying such distinctions.

The Prophetic Method

Yasin's intellectual strategy of re-Islamization is complex and multi-layered. To understand its particularities, it is necessary to specify Yasin's religious standpoint. Because of his eclectic convictions and ambitions, he is difficult to categorize. Technically, he is not merely a Sufi, as one historian has contended.[52] Nor is he a typical Salafi, as another author recently suggested.[53] Rather, he is an Islamist who strives to merge two religious styles in an attempt to walk the surest path between the mystical and the legal dimensions of Islam—that is, between the *ṭarīqa* and the *shariʿa*. This third way is what Yasin calls the prophetic method (*al-minhāj al-nabawī*). It proceeds from the assumption that one must combine Sufi spirituality and Salafi legalism to revive Islam and to respond to the problems of the contemporary *umma*. According to Yasin, Muslims must return to the comprehensive religious epistemology of the Prophet. While Muhammad interpreted and applied God's laws, he simultaneously cultivated his people's spirituality. Today, however, Yasin laments, the two aspects no longer intersect: Salafi legalism focuses only on the external aspect of human existence (*ẓāhir*), while Sufi spirituality emphasizes only the Muslims' inner soul (*bāṭin*).[54]

The prophetic method is a religious stance but also an Islamist blueprint for action. Yasin mentions that the word "*minhāj*" refers simultaneously to a path and the way one should walk it.[55] To illustrate his thought, he singles out a passage from the Sura *al-Balad* (The Land): "Have we not appointed to him [man] two eyes, and a tongue, and two lips, and guided him on the two highways? Yet he has not assaulted the steep."[56] While the two highways represent good and evil, the steep represents the challenge of human life. For Yasin, it implies a constant struggle against gravity or, metaphorically, against the various temptations of hedonism and egoism. The *minhāj* is an ascending path that requires effort and dedication. Assaulting the steep means that Muslims must act to improve their vertical relationship with God as well as their horizontal relationships with fellow human beings.[57]

Yasin's own religious discourse is one means of implementing the prophetic method.[58] His writings often serve as a tool of re-Islamization insofar as they provide guidance for readers who wish to improve their vertical relationship with God. Indeed, like a majority of Islamist intellectuals, Yasin considers that religious renewal (*tajdīd*) and proselytism (*daʿwa*) are essential for addressing the problems of Muslim society. Yet his eclectic convictions confront him with the burden of renewing both the inner and the outer aspects of Islamic life. As might be expected, Yasin chooses to concentrate on what he deems more important or urgent. Here he differs from most proponents of the Salafi epistemology in that he emphasizes faith (*imān*) rather than doctrine or jurisprudence:

> It is said in the tradition that faith is maintained by the tongue, belief by the soul (which is the heart), and practice by the pillars of Islam. Yet faith originates from the heart and resides there. So if the impulses of the faith are staggering in one's heart, practice becomes invalid and the

tongue speaks hypocrisy. In turn, whenever faith becomes stronger in one's heart, the impulses of practice are reinforced. Therefore, the renewal that the *umma* requires is the renewal of its faith's impulses.[59]

This reference to the primacy of faith summarizes Yasin's strategy of re-Islamization. In theory, his prophetic method implies that legalism and spirituality are equally significant for ensuring the revitalization of the *umma*. In practice, however, Yasin readily admits that his priority is to renew faith, as though to compensate for the lacunas of the Salafi-inspired agenda that most Sunni Islamists and many alleged post-Islamists share. As a tool of re-Islamization, Yasin's nonpolitical discourse tends to privilege spiritual guidance for the heart (*tarbiya*) over formal religious instruction (*taʿlīm*). Therefore, he transcends—and sometimes outflanks—the Salafi-oriented methods of re-Islamization that revolve around pragmatic exegesis, legal methodology, and legal prescriptions.

An Epistemological and Spiritual Daʿwa

Islamist intellectuals, be they politically moderate or radical, insist that the Qurʾan and the sunna can yield superior alternatives to the ideas and institutions of modernity. This scripturalist assumption, which is a legacy of the modernist Salafiyya, has led them to scrutinize the formative texts of Islam to find pragmatic solutions to the social, political, and economic problems of their community.[60] Perhaps the most representative example of this Salafi-inspired type of intellectual activism is Sayyid Qutb's seminal exegesis (*tafsīr*) titled *Fi zilal al-Qurʾan*. In it, Qutb set the tone for a very pragmatic and this-worldly analysis of the scriptures. His goal was not to renew faith per se, but to demonstrate the immediate applicability of the Qurʾan in the fields of politics, social justice, and religious praxis.[61] To be sure, Islamist intellectuals acknowledge that action requires firm belief. However, most of them—including Khurshid Ahmad, Hasan al-Turabi, Rashid al-Ghannushi, and many others—prefer to teach their readers what to believe and what concrete reforms to implement. Few embark on the abstract task of teaching their readers how to cultivate a deep and sincere faith. This option is indeed less congruent with the Salafi epistemology that tends to disregard mysticism. Therefore, most Islamists have been prone to limit their intellectual exertions to outer rather than inner reforms and to initiate the concrete re-Islamization of institutions, policies, creed, and behaviors.

Yasin applauds and, to a certain extent, emulates such pragmatic exegesis. Yet, as a post-Salafi intellectual, he refuses to treat faith as a residual question. Indeed, he has always been prompt to defend spirituality against materialist and atheist worldviews—especially Marxism–Leninism—because he embraced Islamism during a period of unprecedented leftist effervescence among the elite and the educated youth of Morocco.[62] However, his most elaborate strategy of spiritual proselytism dates from the 1990s, when he encountered postmodern literature and the critiques of the scientific method. In such works, Yasin found new intellectual ammunition to attack all Western philosophies based on secular rationalism. In his 1998 book *Islamiser la modernité*, he undertakes what can be called an epistemological and spiritual *daʿwa*, in which he attempts to debunk the rational assumptions that have characterized philosophical modernity since the Enlightenment. His intention is not merely to assert the superiority of Islam or to

criticize its detractors, as other Islamists have done. Instead, he wishes to liberate the advocates of modernity from their epistemological limitations while opening their hearts to spirituality and Islam.[63]

Yasin begins his epistemological *daʿwa* by denying modernity any quintessential value. In the wake of postmodern thinkers, he claims that its underpinning system of thought is a constructed reality—that is, a "Western-engineered building."[64] According to him, the philosophical foundations of modernity, including its rational-scientific axioms, are frail man-made myths: they may enjoy an aura of truth, but they are illusory assumptions of knowledge. Therefore, Yasin engages some of modernity's engineers, such as Descartes, Comte, Marx, and Freud. Questioning the epistemological foundations of their thought is critical, Yasin claims, because the normative power of ideas is the most dangerous and insidious weapon in the arsenal of modernity.[65]

Yasin views Darwinism as the main obstacle to faith and spirituality because it elevated a "bestial postulate" to the status of dogmatic truth. As a result, philosophical modernity assumes that human beings are merely a higher form of animal life resulting from a slow evolutionary process. According to Yasin, this bestial postulate implies a series of blind rejections: there exists no creator, no God, and no hereafter. The Darwinist mythology, as he calls it, strips life of its essential meaning and is tantamount to spiritual murder.[66] Yasin affirms that such rationalist secular ideas keep human beings away from the message of Islam and from *iḥsān*. In other words, modernity turns men and women into hostages of nihilism and leads them to spiritual chaos, sadness, and anomie. Clearly, Yasin's epistemological *daʿwa* stems from his conviction that the advocates of philosophical modernity will reject a standard call to Islam as long as they maintain their current epistemological assumptions; rather, they will continue to seek truth in the material world and to discard anything that is not scientifically measurable. Yasin admits that the bestial postulate is difficult to counter because it is rooted in a powerful dogmatic positivism that rejects metaphysical discussions.[67]

Consequently, he tries to oppose Darwinism—and, by the same token, all of philosophical modernity—by challenging the sanctification of positivism and rational secularism. For that purpose, he resorts to critical figures in the Western sociology of knowledge, such as the Austrian-born philosopher and scientist Karl Popper, the Belgian Nobel Prize-winner Ilya Prigogine, and the French sociologist and philosopher Edgard Morin. Yasin invokes these scholars because they themselves expose, to a certain extent, the social construction of modern epistemology and some of its limitations. Popper, for instance, is known as the main proponent of the theory of falsification, which he articulated in response to the dominant logical positivism of the 1930s. His basic argument is that empirical evidence cannot verify a scientific theory; it can only falsify or disprove it. Thus, Popper questioned the validity of scientific knowledge and the methods used to reach it. His argument implies that all scientific theories are speculations whose veracity is logically impossible to establish.[68]

By questioning modernity's dogmatic assumptions through Popper and others, Yasin wants to instill some sense of uncertainty in his readers. If the scientific method is not truly reliable, or if human rationality proves unable to provide definitive truths, then the entire edifice of modern knowledge may appear unstable. As a corollary, Yasin wants to legitimize irrationality and faith: "[t]he incoherence and limitations of those [modern thinkers] who reflect upon complex matters come from their confinement to rationality.

Yet questioning the epistemological value of modern knowledge is, in itself, a promising opening."[69] Yasin uses this epistemological breach to reintroduce existential questions concerning the raison d'être of the universe and the meaning of life.

At this point, however, Yasin abandons the Western thinkers who have helped him to shake the foundations of the Western-engineered building. He argues that such scholars lead to a dead end: they can expose the epistemological myths of modernity, but the anti-spiritual atmosphere of Western academia prevents them from providing real answers.[70] Thus, Yasin uses the critical sociology of knowledge, but only as a springboard for the reaffirmation of spirituality. The ultimate aim of his epistemological *daʿwa* is to rehabilitate the *fiṭra*—a Qur'anic concept often associated with matters of conversion and repentance (*tawba*). The *fiṭra* is the essential and innate repository of faith and spirituality that lies in every human soul.[71] Yasin argues that if modern men and women reconnect with their *fiṭra*, the true meaning and purpose of life, which is to serve and love God, will become obvious to them. Yet this process can occur only if the hegemony of positivism and nihilism is undermined. Unless these individuals' hearts and minds are ready to welcome spiritual matters, the re-Islamization of society is doomed to fail. A rehabilitated *fiṭra*, however, would allow the hostages of modern worldviews to become receptive to the message of Islam.

In *Islamiser la modernité*, Yasin calls this message the "science of the Qur'an." It is not so much a body of specific regulations or commands as a series of prophetic paradigms. The science of the Qur'an includes the stories of Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other exemplary figures worth imitating. Because of their virtue, these paradigms provide an essential source of spiritual guidance. Yasin has a particular predilection for the story of Noah and the deluge. It provides him with the necessary metaphorical vocabulary for defining his views and activism. The deluge is a constant theme in his work. It was already a key symbol in the open letter he sent to King Hassan II in 1974. In *Islamiser la modernité*, Yasin writes: "[this book's] other ambition is to invite an unfaithful modernity to settle down so that it can avoid the kind of shipwreck that was experienced by the unfaithful people of Noah during the deluge."[72] The same story fosters additional naval metaphors. Yasin warns that human existence is a challenging adventure at sea; that the Qur'an is a beacon; and that those who ignore God will get lost.[73]

Fiqh as a Residual Issue

Within the larger framework of the prophetic method, the specific determination of righteous actions belongs to the domain of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Yasin reminds his readers that anyone who reaches the stage of *iḥsān* must continue to follow Islamic law and the sound prescriptions of the jurists. Indeed, his insistence on faith and spirituality is not tantamount to a rejection of scripturalism. Yasin is often as fundamentalist as the proponents of the Salafi epistemology. However, he does not read formative texts for the sole purpose of finding legal regulations: "[t]hose who read the history of the first community and the Islamic texts looking only for the law will never reach *wisdom*. Law is the container; it is extremely important, but the content is the essential part."[74] Although Yasin does raise issues of Islamic jurisprudence, he more often prefers to delve into the Qur'an and the sunna to find sources of spiritual growth.

Undoubtedly, Yasin's agenda departs from another fundamental aspect of Salafi re-Islamization—that is, the rejuvenation and application of Islamic jurisprudence—which has been a major preoccupation of the modernist Salafis, Islamists, and neo-fundamentalists throughout the 20th century. In the wake of Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida, modernist Salafis were deeply concerned with the revitalization of *fiqh* and its adaptation to current conditions. In Morocco, ʿAllal al-Fasi pursued these objectives in a number of elaborate, technical, and didactic books about Islamic jurisprudence. On the one hand, he addressed the nature of *fiqh*, its sources, the specificities of its implementation, and the functions of its executors.[75] On the other hand, he endeavored to renew jurisprudence on the basis of rational concepts such as *istiḥsān* (preference) and *maṣlaḥa* (utility).[76] To some extent, Islamists have built on the legacy of Islamic modernism and continued to advocate the adaptation and the implementation of the shariʿa. Depending on their personal qualifications, they addressed these issues in a more or less erudite manner. An *ʿālim* such as the Sudanese Islamist Hasan al-Turabi, for instance, was able to propose a deeper reform of *fiqh* than the one outlined by Sayyid Qutb, who had not received an advanced traditional education.[77] The typical Salafi predilection for legal issues also extended to rigorous neo-fundamentalists, whom Roy regards as post-Islamists. In Morocco, Taqi al-Din al-Hilali (d. 1987), a Wahhabi-inspired Salafi closely linked to the religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, was the intellectual forefather of this current. He preached in the mosques of Casablanca, issued fatwas, and published legal compendiums on proper devotional behavior.[78]

In opposition to all these proponents of the Salafi epistemology, Yasin tends to avoid re-Islamization through *fiqh*. He does not strive to develop a new theory of legal hermeneutics; nor does he issue legal ordinances on what is *ḥalāl*, *ḥarām*, or *bidʿa*. However, like all other Islamists, Yasin cannot avoid calling for the implementation of the shariʿa and its adaptation to changing conditions. Yet he does not present legal matters as a priority, and he does not introduce himself as the person who might undertake the reforms he is calling for.[79] Yasin does touch on some broad issues of legal rejuvenation but hardly goes beyond general statements about the necessity of informed legal reasoning (*ijtihād*). He remains evasive as to how these prescriptions should be implemented.[80]

When Yasin deals more extensively with the law, as in the 1990 book *Naẓrat fi al-fiqh wa-l-taʾrikh*, he tends to focus on political jurisprudence (*fiqh siyāsī*) as a way to criticize despotic regimes and their state jurists (*fuqahāʾ al-quṣūr*).[81] Thus, the book is a manifesto rather than a treatise. One finds little technical discussion besides a few short sections devoted to the finalities of the shariʿa (*ʿilm al-maqāṣid*)—a branch of jurisprudential philosophy that was dear to ʿAllal al-Fasi. Here again, Yasin is not particularly thorough or innovative. He invokes al-Shatibi (d. 1388), the foremost authority in the field, and reiterates the legal necessity of preserving religious life, soul, mind, family, and property, which are the five objects traditionally associated with *ʿilm al-maqāṣid*.[82] Ironically, the most distinctive aspect of the exposé is its underlying spiritual concern. Yasin stresses that the finality of the shariʿa is not merely social stability or the material welfare of the people. These are only intermediary objectives whose raison d'être is to relieve Muslims from the mundane preoccupations of daily life. Instead, the ultimate goal of the shariʿa is to foster an environment that is conducive to *iḥsān* so that

Muslims can concentrate on spiritual growth and hope to secure their salvation in the hereafter.[83]

Yasin does not abjure the law and its specific regulations, but he clearly de-emphasizes them as an object of study and guidance. Overall, legal issues are marginal subject matter in his corpus. One may object that Sayyid Qutb was no different from Yasin in that *fiqh* was only one element within his grand totalizing ideology and never constituted the main focus of his intellectual work. However, Qutb never went so far as to claim that spirituality is superior to jurisprudence, as Yasin did. Indeed, as a post–Salafi intellectual activist, Yasin wishes to devote more efforts to reviving spirituality than to implementing or adjusting *fiqh*. He legitimizes his stance by underlining that, historically, faith and the love for God came before the Qur'an and its legal prescriptions.[84]

There are personal reasons behind his choice. Even though Yasin studied at the Bin Yusuf institute in Marrakech for four years, he never pursued advanced traditional studies in a major Islamic university, such as al-Azhar in Cairo or al-Qarawiyin in Fez. Indeed, he never portrays himself as a jurist (*faqīh*). On the contrary, he constantly reminds his readers that he is not a specialist of anything and that he does not write in a sophisticated jargon.[85] Since he cannot claim an expert status in legal matters, Yasin prefers to contribute to the Islamist cause through his Sufi experience—that is, by focusing on the renewal of faith and spirituality.

Historical conditions may have further discouraged Yasin from focusing on Islamic law, despite his lack of formal training. After the independence of Morocco, nationalist Salafis such as ʿAllal al-Fasi failed to re-establish the full jurisdiction of the shariʿa courts. Al-Fasi complained that the Western-oriented Moroccan elites—the products of French schools—had become the new exponents of Western ideas and institutions; they had used their influential positions within the government to restrict the codification of the shariʿa to matters of personal status and inheritance.[86] Therefore, according to al-Fasi, intellectual colonialism persisted in the mid-1960s even though the French had left Morocco in 1956. In this context, he viewed the renewal of Islamic jurisprudence as a critical response to the challenge posed by Western thought in post-independence Morocco. To compete with the foreign legal codes that the elite favored, the shariʿa needed adjustments to modern conditions.

Yasin still acknowledges theses problems but cannot share al-Fasi's former hopes. In the 1960s—under Muhammad V and during the first years of Hassan II's reign—al-Fasi may reasonably have thought that the implementation of a fully Islamic legal system was still possible. When Yasin became an Islamist activist, however, such hopes had already diminished. The ascendancy and resilience of Hassan II proved to be a major obstacle. The king controlled the religious field, which he used to enhance his legitimacy and silence opposition.[87] A revised Islamic jurisprudence—unless ordered by the king himself—would stand little chance of being implemented. The political context in which Yasin has operated since 1972 is less flexible than that of the 1950s and early 1960s.

CONCLUSION

A priori, the religious discourse of ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin appears to corroborate some elements of the French theory of post-Islamism, whose foremost theoretician is Olivier Roy. On the one hand, Yasin departs from the archetypal Islamist discourse of the

1970s in that he emphasizes the spiritual and ethical dimension of Islam. On the other hand, he undertakes the re-Islamization of society from the bottom up and targets individuals rather than the state. Yet post-Islamism—though superficially attractive—is not applicable to Yasin's religious discourse. Because of the vagaries of Moroccan history and Yasin's personal background, Yasin's approach to Islamism has promoted spirituality and spiritual guidance from the early 1970s onward—that is, before the alleged decline and failure of political Islam. Although post-Islamist theory is an attempt to systematize empirical data from the past thirty-five years into a coherent historical pattern, it relies on a narrow and selective definition of Islamism that cannot account for the particularities of the Moroccan context. Post-Islamism would probably prove more useful if its theoretical ambitions were to be reduced and its application restricted to specific contexts. It should remain a valid analytical device for understanding the political and ideological transformations that took place in Iran, for instance, where Islamists have been in power for more than twenty-five years. It also seems better suited to cases in which the rise and failure of revolutionary Islamism has been overt and pronounced, as in Egypt and Algeria.

One additional problem is that the label "post-Islamist" is based solely on political variables. For this reason, it fails to distinguish the various religious stances among quietist Islamic activists and cannot convey the distinctiveness of Yasin's message and *daʿwa*. The limits of such a political approach are particularly obvious with respect to the concept of post-Islamist thought, which has no inherent or precise religious meaning per se, even though it intends to shed light on spiritual and theological issues. Instead of providing specific keys for understanding the substance of religious discourses, it seeks to highlight the absence of explicit references to politics or, inversely, the explicit presence of non-political themes, whatever they may be. Thus, it appears that the concept's main purpose is to validate Roy's thesis on the failure of political Islam, and not so much to analyze the spiritual discourses that it initially targeted. In the end, political considerations alone continue to determine whether religious ideas are significant.

Therefore, a more appropriate way to qualify Yasin's religious discourse is to underscore how it transcends the standard Salafi understanding of Islam and religious guidance. It is possible to conceive of the Salafiyya as a broad scripturalist epistemology whose proponents—regardless of their political attitudes—disregard Sufism and theosophical ideas, privilege formal instruction based on scriptural positivism, and usually concentrate on the outer dimension of religious life. Yasin transcends this epistemology by attempting to rehabilitate mystical concepts and by focusing on the renewal of inner faith rather than on orthodoxy and orthopraxy. From a diachronic perspective, this is reminiscent of the approach adopted by previous Islamic activists and intellectuals who, like al-Banna (d. 1949) in Egypt, Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) in colonial India, and Saʿid Nursi (d. 1960) in Turkey, were receptive to the spiritual dimension of Islam.[88] From a synchronic perspective, however, Yasin's post-Salafi discourse is peculiar. Indeed, since the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s, most prominent Sunni Islamists have been strict advocates of the Salafi epistemology. Thus, Yasin's religious discourse is even more marginal because it endeavors to transcend an epistemology that has been relatively hegemonic within Islamist circles for the past thirty years.

NOTES

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[1]Olivier Carré, *L'utopie islamique dans l'Orient arabe* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1991); Olivier Roy, *L'échec de l'islam politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1992); Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: expansion et déclin de l'islamisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 2000). Olivier Roy, *L'islam mondialisé* (Paris: Seuil, 2002). Roy uses the terms "Islamism" and "political Islam" interchangeably.

[2]The most elaborate theoretical framework on post-Islamism is Olivier Roy, "Le post-islamisme," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 85–86 (1998): 11–30. Roy and his colleagues recognize that some post-Islamists choose blind violence over compromise to cope with the failure of political Islam.

[3]Olivier Roy, "Avant-propos: pourquoi le post-islamisme?" *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 85–86 (1998): 9. All translations are mine, except for Qur'anic passages.

[4]Ibid., 10. See also Sandra Houot, "De la religion à l'éthique: esquisse d'une médiation contemporaine," *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 85–86 (1998): 31–46. This article, however, fails to demonstrate the historical and causal links between the failure of political Islam and al-Buti's spiritual discourse.

[5]Roy, "Avant-propos," 10.

[6]The few studies on ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin emphasize the political dimension of his discourse. In English, see Emad Eldin Shahin, "Secularism and Nationalism: The Political Discourse of ʿAbd al-Salam Yassin," in *Islamism and Secularism in North Africa*, ed. John Ruedy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 167–86. In French, the most comprehensive and detailed analysis is the seventh chapter of Mohamed Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique au Maroc*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1999). In Arabic, the standard work is Muhammad Darif, *Jamaʿa al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan: qira'a fi al-masarat* (Casablanca: Manshurat al-Majalla al-Maghribiyya li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Siyasi, 1995).

[7]The historical narrative is best articulated in Kepel, *Jihad*, 61–114. Its intellectual dimension is examined in Roy, *L'échec*, 52–83.

[8]Several individuals and Islamic movements throughout modern history have identified themselves as, or were branded, Salafis. From the late 19th century onward, the term "Salafiyya" referred to the revivalist thought of Islamic modernists such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ʿAbduh. ʿAllal al-Fasi was heir to that tradition. He endeavored to reform Islam, to free Muslims from stagnation and past accretions, and to reconcile Islam with reason and modernity. More recently, literalist and puritanical Islamic militants have claimed an exclusive monopoly over the label Salafiyya, but their peremptory assertion is not valid historically. With respect to Morocco, one may avoid typological confusion by referring to al-Fasi's modernist brand of Salafiyya as a "nationalist" Salafiyya (*al-salafiyya al-wataniyya*) and to the more rigorist and literalist brand—which Roy calls neo-fundamentalism—as a Salafiyya of "Wahhabi" inspiration (*al-salafiyya al-wahhābiyya*). See Muhammad Darif, *al-Islam al-siyasi fi al-Maghrib: muqariba watha'iqiyya* (Casablanca: Manshurat al-Majalla al-Maghribiyya li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Siyasi, 1992), 135.

[9]Amina Bekkali, "Le pouvoir et les islamistes au Maroc: dieu à partager," in *Les états arabes face à la contestation islamiste*, ed. Bassma Kodmani-Darwish and May Chartouni-Dubarry (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997), 169–95; Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 172.

[10]The most serious threats to the regime came from ambitious officers in the Royal Armed Forces, who led two failed coups in 1971 and 1972. Other threats came from leftist dissidents such as Muhammad Basri (alias *le fqih*), who planned armed struggle against the state on several occasions between 1969 and 1973. Moroccan Islamists played no role in these events. See Pierre Vermeren, *Histoire du Maroc depuis l'indépendance* (Paris: La Découverte, 2002), 33–65.

[11]Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), 7–10.

[12]Out of nationalism, al-Fasi claimed that Moroccan Sufis were orthodox until the 15th century. This led him to dispute a sweeping critique of Sufism that Rashid Rida (d. 1935) had published in the journal *al-Manar*. Yet both men agreed that Sufism was a superstitious and blamable form of religiosity in the 20th century. See ʿAllal al-Fasi, *al-Tasawwuf al-Islami fi al-Maghrib* (Rabat: Mu'assasat ʿAllal al-Fasi, 1998), 19–20. Details

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on earlier Moroccan Salafis and their relationship to Sufism are found in Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 97–102.

[13]Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique*, 234–35. Qutb's thought had clear Salafi underpinnings. Though his exegesis yielded revolutionary conclusions, he was a resolute scripturalist who disregarded and even rejected mysticism. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 99–100, 146–47.

[14]Darif, *Jamaʿa al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan*, 63–64.

[15]ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *al-Ihsan* (Casablanca: Matbuʿat al-Ufuq, 1998), 7–8. This is the Sufi order of the Butshishi family from Madaq, in eastern Morocco. It is a 20th-century offshoot of the Algerian Qadiriyya order. The Butshishiyya is both elitist and mass-based. It attracts upper-middle-class disciples (university professors, engineers, bank executives, etc.) as well as illiterate followers. See Mohamed Tozy, "Le prince, le clerc et l'état: la reconstruction du champ religieux au Maroc," in *Intellectuels et militants de l'islam contemporain*, ed. Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 82–83.

[16]As quoted in Darif, *Jama'a al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan*, 64.

[17]Yasin, *al-Ihsan*, 10, 24.

[18]ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *al-Islam bayna al-daʿwa wa-l-dawla: al-minhaj al-nabawi li-taghyir al-insan* (Casablanca: Matbaʿat al-Najah, 1972), 360–61. On the limits of Islamic modernism and its rationalism, see ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *al-Islam ghadan: al-ʿamal al-Islami wa-harakiyya al-minhaj al-nabawi fi zaman al-fitna* (Casablanca: Matbaʿat al-Najah, 1973), 771–74. For more on al-Dubbagh and his posthumously published book *al-Ibriz*, see Bernd Radtke, "*Ibriziana*: Themes and Sources of a Seminal Sufi Work," *Sudanic Africa* 7 (1996): 113–58.

[19]Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 5–7.

[20]Yasin, *al-Islam ghadan*, 188–92.

[21]Ibid., 197.

[22]Yasin, *al-Islam bayna al-da'wa wa-l-dawla*, 475.

[23]Ibid., 292.

[24]Ibid., 313.

[25]ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *La révolution à l'heure de l'islam* (n.p., 1980), 27. See also Darif, *Jamaʿa al-ʿAdl wa-l-Ihsan*, 26–27.

[26]ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *al-Minhaj al-nabawi: tarbiyatan, tanziman wa-zahfan*, 2nd ed. (n.p., 1989), 52–53. The first edition was published in 1982.

[27]Ibid., 32.

[28]Yasin, *al-Islam ghadan*, 208–18.

[29]Qur'an 16:90. This Qur'anic translation and the subsequent one are from Arthur J. Arberry, *The Koran Interpreted* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955). The verse is quoted in ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *Nazrat fi al-fiqh wa-l-ta'rikh* (Beirut: al-Sharika al-Urubiyya al-Lubnaniyya li-l-Nashr, 1990), 7.

[30]Yasin, *al-Ihsan*, 17–21.

[31]ʿAbd al-Salam Yasin, *Islamiser la modernité* (Rabat: al-Ofok Impressions, 1998), 224.

[32]Ibid., 285.

[33]See Vincent J. Cornell, *The Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998).

[34]Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique*, 72–73.

[35]Haraka al-Islah wa-l-Tajdid, "Mawqif sarih," reprinted in Muhammad Darif, *al-Islamiyyun al-Maghariba: hisaba al-siyasa fi al-ʿamal al-Islami, 1969–1999* (Casablanca: Manshurat al-Majalla al-Maghribiyya li-ʿIlm al-Ijtimaʿ al-Siyasi, 1999), 222–36.

[36]Yasin, *al-Islam bayna al-da'wa wa-l-dawla*, 352. The exact same references are found in his second book, which was published in 1973: see Yasin, *al-Islam ghadan*, 777.

[37]Idem, *La révolution*, 200–201.

[38]Idem, *al-Ihsan*, 27, 32.

[39]Ibid., 22.

[40]Ibid., 29–30.

[41]Ibid., 11–12.

[42]Ibid., 47–49.

[43]Ibid., 28–29.

[44]Ibid., 370–74.

[45]There is a strong possibility that Yasin built on other arguments from al-Buti's corpus. Since the late 1950s, al-Buti has put forth strikingly similar ideas to those of Yasin's discourse. Like Yasin, al-Buti believes that orthodox Sufism is intrinsic to the true meaning of Islam; he also underscores the significance of *dhikr* and *ihsān*. A good example of al-Buti's position toward Sufism is found in his critique of the Wahhabi-inspired Salafiyya, which was originally published in 1988. See Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, *al-Salafiyya: marhala zamaniyya mubaraka la madhhab Islami* (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1998), 189–208. In English, see Andreas Christmann, "Islamic Scholar and Religious Leader: Shaikh Muhammad Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti," in *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond*, ed. John Cooper et al. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 57–81. It is worth noting that two of al-Buti's books figure in a list of readings that Yasin recommends to his readers and to the members of al-'Adl wa-l-Ihsan; see Yasin, *al-Minhaj al-nabawi*, 46–47.

[46]Yasin, *al-Ihsan*, 23.

[47]Idem, *La révolution*, 26–28.

[48]Idem, *al-Ihsan*, 7.

[49]Roy, "Le post-islamisme," 16–17.

[50]See David Commins, "Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949)," in *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, ed. Ali Rahmena (London: Zed Books, 1994), 128.

[51]Roy, "Le post-islamisme," 13, 20–27. Roy swiftly suggests that Islamization through Sufi brotherhoods is a recent sociological phenomenon that follows the modernization process of the 1950s and 1960s. Today, one's adhesion to a Sufi order may be a deliberate and individual religious statement in reaction to the disenchantment of the Islamic world. This was not necessarily the case in the past, Roy claims, when joining a Sufi order was a traditional expression of communal religiosity that implied no Islamization per se.

[52]C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 353.

[53]Pierre Vermeren, *Maghreb: la démocratie impossible?* (Paris: Fayard, 2004), 229.

[54]Yasin, *al-Ihsan*, 35–36.

[55]Idem, *La révolution*, 39–40.

[56]Qur'an 100:8–11, quoted in ibid., 50.

[57]Ibid., 54.

[58]The other means of implementing the prophetic method is al-'Adl wa-l-Ihsan. Yasin intended his movement to provide various forms of communal support, from medical services to financial help for marriages. The function of this organization is also to provide a structure for performing *dhikr* in groups and for finding spiritual companionship and guidance: see Yasin, *al-Minhaj al-nabawi*, 74–77.

[59]Ibid., 31.

[60]L. Carl Brown, *Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 141.

[61]See Abu Rabi', *Intellectual Origins*, 166–219.

[62]See his attacks on Marxist philosophy in Yasin, *La révolution*, 38, 74–77. In the early 1970s, two Marxist–Leninist organizations—23 Mars and Ila al-Amam—were particularly popular on university campuses; their members and sympathizers eventually took control of the National Union of Moroccan Students: see Vermeren, *Histoire du Maroc*, 51–54.

[63]In *Islamiser la modernité*, the advocates of modernity include Westerners and the Westernized Arab elite. The book was clearly intended for a widespread audience and was translated into English and Arabic two years after its original publication in French. The English version is Abdessalam Yassine, *Winning the Modern World for Islam*, trans. Martin Jenni (Iowa City: Justice and Spirituality Publishing, 2000). The Arabic version is 'Abd al-Salam Yasin, *al-Islam wa-l-hadatha* (Oujda: Matbu'at al-Hilal, 2000).

[64]Yasin, *Islamiser la modernité*, 137.

[65]Ibid., 47.

[66]Ibid., 139–43.

[67]Ibid., 133.

[68]See Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959).

[69]Yasin, *Islamiser la modernité*, 153.

[70]Ibid., 154.

[71]Ibid., 184–85.

[72]Ibid., 16.

[73]Ibid., 29, 55, 130.

[74]Ibid., 93; the italics are in the original.

[75]All these questions are addressed in 'Allal al-Fasi, *Madkhal fi al-nazariyya al-'amma li-dirasat al-fiqh al-Islami wa-muqaranatuhu bi-l-fiqh al-ajnabi* (Rabat: Mu'assasa 'Allal al-Fasi, 1985).

[76]Idem, *Difa' 'an al-shari'a* (Rabat: Matabi' al-Risala, 1966), 13, 32. See also Wael B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-Fiqh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 224–26.

[77]Turabi promotes a new *fiqh* based on broader analogical analysis (*qiyās*). See John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 128–31. On Qutb and *fiqh*, see Abu Rabi', *Intellectual Origins*, 196–98.

[78]Mukhlis al-Sabti, *al-Salafiyya al-Wahhabiyya bi-l-Maghrib: taqi al-din al-hilali ra'idan* (Casablanca: Manshurat al-Majalla al-Maghribiyya li-'Ilm al-Ijtima' al-Siyasi, 1993).

[79]See Yasin, *Islamiser la modernité*, 173–75.

[80]Idem, *Nazrat fi al-fiqh*, 48.

[81]Ibid., 15–16.

[82]Ibid., 70.

[83]Ibid., 60–67, 71–72, 78.

[84]Idem, *La révolution*, 118. Yasin may exemplify a more extreme form of post-Salafi re-Islamization. In Syria, al-Buti strives to rehabilitate the spiritual dimension of Islam but continues to issue legal opinions, even over the Internet: see: http://www.bouti.com.

[85]Yasin, *La révolution*, ii; see also idem, *Nazrat fi al-fiqh*, 56.

[86]Al-Fasi, *Difa' 'an al-shari'a*, 4–5.

[87]Rémy Leveau, "Réaction de l'islam officiel au renouveau islamique au Maroc," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* 18 (1979): 205–18.

[88]Sa'id Ramadan al-Buti, who is Kurdish and was born in Turkey, acknowledged that he drew inspiration from Sa'id Nursi. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that Nursi was himself a post-Salafi intellectual and activist. While he criticized Muhammad 'Abduh and the modernist Salafis for their condemnation of folk Islam, he resorted to mysticism as way to mobilize the population. Sa'id Nursi tried to combine spiritual guidance with dedication to social problems. See Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 55, 176. On Nursi's influence on al-Buti, see Christmann, "Islamic Scholar," 62.

(Excerpt from C.M. Henry, Population, urbanisation and the dialectics of globalisation, draft chapter for *Cambridge History of Islam*, VI.

Islamic finance

Perhaps the "assertion of Islamic economics ... that interest is patently un-Islamic ... sanctifies opposition to global economic integration."[1] On the other hand, Islamic banks compete with conventional banks in the international banking system and thereby help to integrate parts of the Muslim public into the global order. As Timur Kuran observes in chapter 19, "the very fact that these banks have maintained profitability for so long and attracted vast deposits proves that they have been filling a need," namely for Muslims, perhaps the majority of them,[2] who perceive the interest paid on conventional bank deposits to be *riba*, which Islam forbids.

Islamic economics may have originated in the 1940s, as our colleague suggests, as part of the effort to justify an Islamic nation on the Indian subcontinent, but their prime institutional embodiment, the Islamic banks, originally took root in other contexts, after a short-lived effort in rural Pakistan in the late 1950s. The newly independent government of Malaysia sponsored a Pilgrims Saving Corporation in 1963 that served as a precedent for creating the country's first Islamic bank in 1983. In Egypt, also in 1963, Dr. Ahmad al-Najjar, who had studied in Germany, established a system of rural privately owned cooperatives based on the German *Sparkassen*. Although other Egyptians involved in these banks may have been associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, in part explaining the collapse of the experiment in 1967, Najjar does not seem to have been affiliated with any form of political Islam. Only in the loosest sense could Islamic banking be related to the theories of Sayyid Abul A'la Al-Mawdudi (1903-79), the Pakistani Islamist who had advocated "Islamising" economics along with other aspects of social life. The bankers were also attempting to liberate Islamic jurisprudence from the colonial closet of family law, albeit only in this very narrow, yet strategic domain of banking.

Their enduring financial experiments, moreover, marked an alliance of their private sector owners – princes, merchants, and financiers -- not with Islamist politicians but rather, at least in most countries except the Sudan, with the mainstream religious *'ulama* whom the Muslim Brothers and other more radical political Islamists usually opposed. Although the first of the banks to be established, the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1974, did not have a religious advisory board until 1999, those that followed proved their Islamic credentials by selecting recognized 'ulama to be members of their shari'a boards. As Moncer Kahf explains, Prince Mohammad Al-Faisal initiated the practice in Egypt in 1976. He forged an alliance with a former mufti of Egypt in order to gain President Anwar Sadat's favour and a special law to establish the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt. Salah Kamel, a Saudi businessman, took the prince's lead. He and the prince established competing (and cooperating) transnational networks of Islamic banks, the Al Baraka Group and Dar Al-Mal Al-Islami, respectively. As they developed their networks across the Muslim world, they sought out the 'ulama because "unlike other Muslim intellectuals, the *shari'a* scholars have close contacts with businessmen with small and medium-sized

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[1] Timur Kuran, *Islam and Mammon: the Economic Predicaments of Islamism* (Princeton 2004), ix

[2] Frank Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, III, *Islamic Law and Finance: Religiion, Risk, and Return* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluer Law International, 1998), 25.

firms and middle-income earners from whom the clientele of Islamic banks is to be derived."[3]

As these private sector groups were forming, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) also, almost by accident, developed into an "Islamic" bank. Founded as a consortium bank owned by the members of the Conference of Islamic States, it was to be a regional development bank like those of Africa, Asia, or Latin America. But an unlikely founding committee of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia, none of whom would tolerate Islamic banks at home until the late 1980s, determined that the new bank should operate not just for Muslim states but, with some encouragement from Dr. al Najjar, by the rules of the *shari'a*. Like the Dubai Islamic Bank it consulted scholars on an ad hoc basis to gain some understanding of what these rules might be, and it worked closely with the Faisal and Baraka groups. The IDB finally acquired a board of *shari'a* scholars in 2003.[4]

Joined in 1979 by the Kuwait Finance House, which was 49 per cent owned by government ministries, the nucleus of Saudi-owned transnationals rapidly invested with other partners in much of the Muslim world, albeit not in Saudi Arabia (or Morocco, for that matter), where any new institution claiming an "Islamic" distinction might reflect adversely upon the ruler's legitimacy. In its core areas of strength, however, the movement faced hard times in the mid-1980s. The Kuwait Finance House, like the conventional banks, had to be rescued by the government in 1984, in the wake of the Souk al-Manakh crisis. In Egypt, so-called "Islamic" fund management companies devised pyramid schemes that collapsed with the devaluation of the Egyptian pound in 1987-88. Although the Faisal Islamic Bank was not associated with these schemes, it lost a quarter of its total assets with the collapse of the rogue Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991.

Evidently Islamic banks could attract funds as long as they could distribute profits to their "investor"-depositors that were competitive with interest rates offered by conventional banks. But Islamic banks did not have a sufficient array of investment instruments in these early years to generate the necessary revenues to fund their depositors, unless they engaged in risky commodity trading or parked their funds with other institutions such as the BCCI. Their principal instruments were the *murababa*, a contract whereby the bank purchases a good for the client and sells it to him on a deferred payment basis at cost plus profit, and *ijara*, or leasing, also for fixed returns. Some Islamic economists considered other instruments, such as *musharaka* and *mudaraba*, which were forms of equity financing akin to investment banking, to be more distinctively Islamic, but they were too risky to comprise more than 2 or 3 per cent of most Islamic banking portfolios. Profits stagnated by the late 1980s, and the market shares of these banks peaked at about 10 per cent in their strongholds, Egypt, Jordan, and the microstates of Bahrain and Kuwait. Only in Sudan, where they supported Hassan Turabi's rise to power (1989-1999), did they win a greater share of the deposits and total assets of a commercial banking system, all of which had been theoretically Islamized by decree in 1983.

Meanwhile, state sponsored Islamic banking in Pakistan and Iran produced only cosmetic changes in the respective commercial banking systems until 2000, when Iran

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[3] Moncer Kahf, "The Rise of a New Power Alliance," in Clement M. Henry and Rodney Wilson, eds., *The Politics of Islamic Finance* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 22, 23.
[4] *Ibid.*, 21-22.

permitted privately owned Islamic banks to compete with the public sector. Pakistan, obliged by law to reorganize its "Islamic" system, permitted its first privately owned Islamic bank in 2002: the Al-Meezan Bank rapidly gained market share, and other banks opened Islamic windows.[5] So also in Indonesia, General Suharto supported the founders of the Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) in 1989-1992 to gain support from Islamists in his bid to stay in power in the early 1990s prepare for elections.[6] BMI and Bank Syariah Mega Indonesia, reinforced by new Islamic windows of conventional banks, were aiming for two per cent of the market in 2005, and there were plans to establish Jakarta as a leading Islamic finance center, competing with Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Bahrain.[7] In Turkey five "special finance houses," defined by a law passed in 1983 that Turkut Özal's staff had negotiated with Saleh Kamel, were fully integrated into the country's commercial banking system in 1999, survived the financial crisis of 2001, and grew more rapidly than their conventional competitors to gain over 4 per cent of the market by 2005.[8]

With the new surge in oil prices and revenues (1999-) Islamic banking consolidated its presence in global markets.[9] Efforts since 1990 to standardize Islamic financial instruments were bearing fruit. With encouragement from the IMF an Islamic Financial Services Board was established in Kuala Lumpur, headed by the former director of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, which remained in Bahrain. The Bahrain Monetary Fund took the initiative in 2000 to launch Islamic finance's first bond issue, and it was rapidly followed by Malaysia, the Islamic Development Bank, Qatar, Kuwait, Dubai, and the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. Project finance also assumed Islamic as well as conventional components, and Islamic investors were acquiring an ever larger menu of choices, sponsored by Citigroup and Hong Kong Shanghei as well as Islamic banks. Teams of London and New York lawyers worked closely with *shari'a* scholars to devise new packages.[10] The driving force consisted of Muslim investors, principally located in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring microstates, who were steadily Islamising their portfolios, diversifying away from the standards accounts of conventional banks to their new "Islamic" windows, admitted in Saudi Arabia in the mid 1990s after being instituted in Egypt a decade earlier. Despite initial concern that Islamic finance might fall victim to measures against Islamic terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the threat of sanctions may have driven some Arab-owned funds from North America and Europe into some of the newer "Islamic" investment vehicles.

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[5] International Monetary Fund, Pakistan--Financial Sector Assessment Program--Technical Note--Condition of the Banking System (May 11, 2005):
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05157.pdf

[6] Robert Hefner, "Islamizing Capitalism: On the Founding of Indonesia's First Islamic Bank," in Arskul Salim and Azyumardi Azva, ed., *Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia*, 2003, 152-156.

[7] Shanthy Nambiar, Bloomberg News, March 2, 2005 (www.wwrn.org/parse.php?idd=9518&c=82).

[8] Ji-Hyang Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamic Capital: The Passions and the Interests in Turkish Islamic Society (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 2005), 158-165

[9] Kristin Smith, Islamic Banking and the Politics of International Financial Harmonization, in in S. Nazim Ali, ed., *Islamic Finance Current Legal and Regulatory Issues* (Cambridge, MA: Islamic Finance Project, Harvard Law School, 2005).

[10] For an illustration see Michael J. T. McMillen, "Structuring a Securitized *Shari'a*-Compliant Real Estate Acquisition Financing: A South Korean Case Study," in Ali, *Islamic Finance*

The original alliance of *'ulama*, princes, and merchants has opened up to international banks and lawyers that are reducing the transaction costs of being "*shari'a*-compliant" to meet the needs of global markets. Some critics argue that Islamic finance is compromising its ethics by mimicking international financial practices too closely. Others, in the tradition of the late Ahmad al-Najjar, argue that Islamic banks have lost their developmental impetus to service small Muslim businesses, for indeed (like conventional banks in most developing countries) they cater principally to wealthy individuals who place their funds outside the region.[11]
As Islamic finance is integrated into the global financial system, however, more Muslims acquire a stake in the system and greater familiarity with the logic of savings and investments, expressed in a shared vocabulary across the Muslim world and reaching into Europe and North America. As the enterprise grows, it may also spread the realization that the distinctively Islamic modes of finance that involve a sharing of business risks between principal and agent presuppose a transparent business environment, good corporate governance, and government accountability.[12] These banks may serve as economic educators, but they cannot generate private capital accumulation within their respective countries if investment climates remain precarious and investors dependent on political cronies for protection.

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[11] See the essays, for instance, by Mahmoud A. Al-Gamal and Walid Hegazy, in Ali, *Islamic Finance*.
[12] Tarik M. Youssef, "The *Murabaha* Syndrome in Islamic Finance:Laws, Institutions, and Politics," in Henry and Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Finance*, 63-80.

It is too early to assess the evolving role of the Majlis within the Saudi polity. There can be no doubt, however, that the Saudi political system has undergone considerable change in the last five years, with the Majlis assuming a key role in the evolutionary process. While its precise impact on decision making cannot be determined as yet, it is clear that the advisory opinions of the Majlis have been taken into account by state agencies and by King Fahd himself. Moreover, despite the statutory limitations on the Majlis, the fact that it has continued to function since 1993 signals a new openness in the Saudi political process which would be difficult to reverse, even by official fiat. The one unrivalled feature of the Majlis is that it is the only Saudi institution that embodies the nexus of a social contract between the monarchy and the citizenry.[32] As such it represents the only organ of the regime's accountability to the Saudi people. While the consequences of this change are difficult to discern, Saudi Arabia's friends and detractors in the West and the Middle East need to take notice of the dynamic forces that are shaping the kingdom at the dawn of the 21st century.



32. On the concept of 'social contract' see Al-Rasheed, "God, the King and the Nation: Political Rhetoric n Saudi Arabia in the 1990s," p. 370; and Aba-Namay, "Constitutional Reform: A Systemization of Saudi 'olitics," pp. 69–70.

MORE THAN A RESPONSE TO ISLAMISM: THE POLITICAL DELIBERALIZATION OF EGYPT IN THE 1990s

Eberhard Kienle

Since the early 1990s, Egypt has experienced a substantial degree of political deliberalization which defies the notion of a blocked transition to democracy. Repressive amendments to the penal code and to legislation governing professional syndicates and trade unions as well as unprecedented electoral fraud are only some of the indicators. Though related to the conflict between the regime and armed Islamist groups, the erosion of political participation and liberties also reflects other factors, including attempts to contain opposition to economic liberalization under the current reform program.

Compared to most Arab states, Egypt continues to be seen as a relatively liberal polity. The *infitah* (opening) of the 1970s and the more far-reaching measures of economic liberalization in and after the late 1980s reinforced property rights and reduced restrictions on private economic activities. More importantly, Egyptians appear to be enjoying many of the civil and political rights which ultimately define a liberal polity. In the eyes of many observers, Egypt remains a country in transition to democracy, even though some of them acknowledge that this process has temporarily run into trouble in the 1990s.

Looked at more closely, the notion of a blocked transition to democracy misrepre-

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sents the recent developments in Egypt. The opportunities for formal representation and participation through elections have been restricted rather than simply stopped from expanding. One of the better known examples is that of the parliamentary elections of 1995. After unprecedented violence and interference, the largest number ever of candidates belonging to the regime party were declared victorious. More than 94 percent of the parliamentary seats went to members of the National Democratic Party (NDP), compared to 79 percent in the 1990 elections.[1] Thus, an already overwhelming majority was not simply preserved but further strengthened. Earlier, in 1993, legislation was passed that gave the regime greater powers to invalidate elections in the professional syndicates. Meanwhile, other guarantees and freedoms characteristic of liberal polities have been restricted. Most notably, an increasing number of civilians has been tried in military tribunals, which like other special courts, handed down an increasing number of death sentences.

This article seeks to explain the process of deliberalization which has marked Egyptian politics in the 1990s. This process has affected a polity which was never as liberal as has been depicted. Ever since Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat officially dissolved in 1977 the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the single party formed under Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, elections have been conducted in ways that ensure large parliamentary majorities for the NDP, the ASU's successor organization. The presidential candidate of the NDP has always stood unopposed. The activities of other political parties have remained circumscribed to their headquarters, offices and papers. These parties have had to operate under numerous restrictions, and have been relegated to a playing ground demarcated by the regime and insulated from decision-making with an efficiency that can hardly be found elsewhere in the world. The state of emergency has been in force continuously since Sadat was assassinated in 1981; and though invisible on the stage, the military has always remained present in the wings. Rather than destroying a liberal polity, the process of deliberalization has reversed the relative expansion of liberties in the early 1980s, which many interpreted as a transition to democracy.

For the majority of Egyptians this process has led to the erosion of positive and negative liberties alike.[2] *Stricto sensu* positive liberties are liberties *to* participate in the selection of the rulers and in the making of policies. In contemporary Egypt, however, political participation of the majority has been restricted to more or less limited representation in parliament and its "trickle-up effects" into the higher spheres of decision-making. Thus the notion of positive liberties wil include the opportunities of such representation, even though they may not even entail informal participation, which in all issues of substance, is the privilege of a small minority. The notion will also include the freedom to select representatives at lower levels, such as trade union leaders, who are invested with some powers affecting the negative liberties of others. Defined as liberties

1. These and subsequent percentage figures were calculated on the basis of the elected deputies, the number of whom was 444 in 1990 and 1995; they do not include the additional ten deputies nominated by the President of the republic.

2. See, in particular, Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118–72.

from the interference of rulers, the latter comprise freedoms often referred to as civil rights, as well as human rights more generally.

If at all, restrictions of liberties in Egypt in the 1990s have been viewed largely as the effects of the conflict between the regime and armed Islamist groups such as the *Jama'at Islamiyya* (Islamic Groups), which turned increasingly violent in 1991–92 and enabled the regime to categorize all Islamist opposition forces as "terrorists" (Islamists loyal to the regime were not affected—a fact which points to the non-ideological character of the confrontation).

This article argues that although this explanation is valid in part, the non-political return to authoritarianism in Egypt is linked to two other factors as well: It is to some extent the largely unintended consequence of the new voting arrangements for parliament adopted in 1990 to end a major constitutional crisis. In many respects it is, however, the corollary of the economic crisis which hit Egypt in the mid-1980s, and of the economic reforms which were initiated to overcome that crisis. Under the prevailing conditions, macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment, notwithstanding their potential long term merits, initially had to, and did, entail for numerous Egyptians, material losses that were added to those already caused by the economic crisis itself. This does not mean, however, that the absence of reform would not have entailed similar losses or worse.

A number of restrictions on liberties have served, and sometimes been intended, to facilitate such reforms, or at least to contain or preempt popular apprehension about the reforms' actual, potential, or perceived consequences for the redistribution of wealth. Thus, to a significant degree political deliberalization was the immediate corollary of reforms that were meant to enhance property rights, increase private sector growth, and otherwise liberalize the economy. Whether the social fall-out from the economic crisis and the reforms was also at the root of the growing Islamist militancy, and the restrictions on liberties linked to such militancy, is a question that cannot be addressed in the present context.

THE EROSION OF NEGATIVE LIBERTIES

The beginning of the erosion of negative liberties may be dated to July 1992. It was then that in a climate of increasing political violence, parliament, dominated by NDP deputies, amended the penal code and the law concerning the Supreme State Security Courts.[3] Far stiffer penalties were introduced for belonging to organizations considered to be undermining social peace or the rule of law, or for advocating the aims of these groups, or obstructing the application of the law, or preventing law enforcement officers from performing their duties, etc. Prison terms were replaced with forced labor, temporary sentences with life sentences, and life sentences with the death penalty. Theoretically, all crimes against the security of the state and the public were to come under the sole

3. Both laws were amended by Law no. 97/1992. See *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya* (Cairo) (the official gazette of Egypt), no. 29 (*mukarrar*/supplement), 18 July 1992. These courts are special tribunals already established under Sadat.

jurisdiction of the Supreme State Security Courts, the verdicts of which could not be appealed except on procedural grounds.

Particularly harsh penalties befell the perpetrators of "terrorist" acts, a vague term which was newly introduced into the penal code. Provided force or even the threat of force were used to disrupt public order, any act which actually or potentially harmed individuals, or damaged the environment, financial assets, transport or communications, or which involved the physical occupation of sites and places, or obstructed the application of the law, could now be considered as terrorist.[4]

Although judges sitting on Supreme State Security Courts are hand-picked by the government and may easily be moved to other jurisdictions, civilians, from 1992 onwards, were increasingly referred to military courts. While in the past such cases were exceptions, the number of civilians tried in military courts rose from 48 in 1992 to 312 in 1993. The number fell to 65 in 1994, then rose again to 143 in 1995, and fell to 70 in 1996.[5] Unlike their counterparts on Supreme State Security Courts, judges in military courts are military officers and, therefore, subject to orders from their superiors. They have little legal training and their appointment and tenure are entirely at the discretion of the regime.

The respect of law enforcement agencies for the life, personal freedom and physical integrity of citizens has generally declined during the 1990s. The number of death sentences passed on civilians by military courts alone rose from 8 in 1992 to 31 in 1993. Between 1992 and the end of 1996, a total of 74 civilians were sentenced to death by military judges.[6] Since at least 1993, the number of political detainees, mostly held under emergency powers, has exceeded 10,000 and according to some sources amounted to more than 16,000 in 1996. The former minister of the interior, Hasan Alfi, himself put the number at "less than 10,000."[7] Reports of torture abound, although they are regularly denied by the regime and its representatives.[8]

Amendments to the party law, voted in December 1992, have eroded negative as well as positive liberties.[9] Under the revised law the founders of new parties are barred from accepting foreign funds and from conducting any political activity in the name of their party before it is officially recognized. The effect of this is not negligible since the legalization of parties remains a lengthy process. In the first instance, legalization depends on a government commission which, among other things, needs to be convinced that the

4. Law no. 97/1992, article 2 adding to the penal code the new article 86, which defines terrorism. See Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, no. 29.

5. Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li-Huquq al-Insan, *Qa'imat al-Qadaya wa al-Ahkam al-'Askariyya* (List of Cases and Military Court Decisions) (Cairo: Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li-Huquq al-Insan, 1996). The dynamics are more important than the absolute numbers.

6. Ibid.; Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li-Huquq al-Insan, *Halat Huquq al-Insan fi Misr: al-Taqrir al-Sanawi li-'Am 1996* (The State of Human Rights in Egypt: The Annual Report 1996) (Cairo: Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li-Huquq al-Insan, 1997), p. 13.

7. *Al-Ahram*, 28 July 1994.

8. Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li-Huquq al-Insan, *Halat Huquq al-Insan fi Misr: al-Taqrir al-Sanawi li-'Am 1996*, p. 35, and previous annual reports; see also Sa'ad al-Din Ibrahim, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Madani wa al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-'Arabi: al-Taqrir al-Sanawi 1996* (Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in the Arab World: The Annual Report 1996) (Cairo: Markaz Ibn Khaldun, 1997), in particular pp. 42, 63.

9. Law no. 108/1992. See *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 51, 17 December 1992.

program of the new party is different from those of existing parties and yet in line with the stringent requirements of the party law and the constitution. Applications rejected by the commission may be taken to an administrative court, which tends to look at them with greater sympathy but not speed.[10] Reflecting the very spirit which inspired the new legal provisions, the commission has not accepted any application since 1990. The seven new parties created after 1990 were all legalized by the competent court.[11]

The most far-reaching attempt to restrict negative liberties was the passing, at the end of May 1995, of the so-called press law. The law, which in fact largely consisted of additional repressive amendments to the penal code, imposed heavy sentences on "publication crimes" such as the printing of "mendacious information," "false rumors," or "defamations," in particular if these were directed against the state, its representatives and its economic interests, or if they endangered public order. Whereas in the past such acts were largely punishable with modest fines, they now carried sentences of up to five years' imprisonment and the payment of exceedingly high fines.[12] One year after the enactment of the law, 99 journalists and editors, many of them from the official press, had been interrogated, charged, and in some cases sentenced by lower courts.[13] Even Ibrahim Nafi', chairman of the board of the pro-government daily *Al-Ahram*, and then chairman of the professional syndicate of journalists, was taken to court. After a year of unabated protests, the law was abrogated in June 1996. To date it remains the only measure of political deliberalization that has been abolished.

THE EROSION OF POSITIVE LIBERTIES

The erosion of positive liberties began before that of negative liberties and preceded the increase in political violence, which therefore cannot easily explain it. Its first major restriction was the very event which many Egyptians had hoped would inaugurate a period of improved participation in politics. This was the early elections which the regime called in 1990, two years before the mandate of the parliament elected in 1987 was due to expire. The regime thus bowed to a ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which had declared unconstitutional the provisions under which the sitting legislature had been elected.[14]

10. For the provisions governing the creation and activities of political parties, see the Egyptian constitution of 1971 as amended in 1980, Article 5, Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya, *Dustur Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya wa al-Qawanin al-Asasiyya al-Mukamilla lahu* (The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Principal Laws that are Appended to it) (Cairo: Al-Hay'at al-'Amma li-Shu'un al-Matabi' al-Amiriyya, 1995); Law no. 40/1977, in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 27, 7 July 1977 and amendments referred to above.

11. See for example, Moheb Zaki, *Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981–1994* (Cairo: Ibn Khaldun Center, 1995), pp. 78–79.

12. Law no. 93/1995. See *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 21 (*mukarrar*/ supplement), 28 May 1995.

13. See Markaz al-Musa'adat al-Qanuniyya li-Huquq al-Insan, *Fi Dhikr Murur 'Am 'ala Qanun 93 li-Sana 1995: Ma'an. . . Nuwasil Ma'rakat Usqut Qanun Ightiyal al-Sahafa* (In Memory of the Passing of a Year after Law 93 of 1995: Continuing the Battle to Bring Down the Law to Kill the Press) (Cairo: Markaz al-Musa'adat al-Qanuniyya li-Huquq al-Insan, May 1996); also in *Al-Sha'b*, 28 May 1996.

14. For details, see Richard Jacquemond, "Dix ans de justice constitutionnelle en Egypte (1979–1990)" (Ten Years of Constitutional Justice in Egypt [1979–1990]) in Centre d'études et de documentation économique,

Parliamentary Elections of 1990 and 1995

Already, the preparations for the elections did not bode well. Although the Supreme Constitutional Court had issued its ruling on 19 May 1990, the ruling was not promulgated until 29 September, only two months before the vote was to take place.[15] Opposition parties were not even consulted by the regime. Following partial modifications after an earlier ruling by the same court, party lists were now entirely replaced with a two-round majority-poll in which, technically, votes were cast for candidates, not for parties. Each constituency was to elect two deputies, one of whom, in line with constitutional requirements, had to be a worker or a peasant. The regime also fixed the new constituencies' boundaries even later, on 2 October, and again without consultation with opposition parties. Under these circumstances, and in order to campaign successfully, candidates needed the backing of a major organization. The procedure was thus biased in favor of members of the NDP, who could rely not only on the only party machine worth mentioning but also on other types of regime support.

In the event, the 1990 elections, instead of broadening the spectrum of political forces represented in the Egyptian parliament, resulted in a larger majority for the NDP than the party had had in 1987.[16] Candidates who were members of the NDP obtained 79 percent of the seats in the new parliament, compared to 68 percent in the outgoing one. Elected during a period of relative political openness, the 1987 parliament had included the largest number of opposition deputies since the dissolution of the single party system in 1976–77. The NDP parliamentary majority in 1990, however, did not reach its earlier levels of 87 percent in 1984 and more than 88 percent in 1979.[17] Taking advantage of the new electoral arrangements, numerous NDP candidates ran as independents against the candidates officially supported by their own party, but once declared elected they rapidly joined the NDP parliamentary group.

Undoubtedly the results of the 1990 elections were influenced by the decision of most opposition parties to boycott the elections. According to their own declarations, they sought to protest against gerrymandering and insufficient guarantees of fairness at the poll. Officially, only *Hizb al-Tajammu'* (the Tajammu' Party) and *Hizb al-Umma* (the Umma Party) participated. However, numerous members of *Hizb al-Wafd* (the Wafd Party), *Hizb al-'Amal* (the Labor Party), *Hizb al-Ahrar* (the Liberals' Party), and members of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Brotherhood) did not respect the boycott and ran as independent candidates. The boycott may in part have been an easy way out for parties

juridique et sociale (CEDEJ), *Politiques législatives: Egypte, Tunisie, Algérie, Maroc* (The Politics of Legislatures: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) (Cairo: CEDEJ, 1994), pp. 92–98.

15. Law no. 202/1990. See *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, 29 September 1990.

16. For additional details, see Iman Farag, "La politique à l'égyptienne: lecture des élections législatives" (Politics Egyptian Style: Readings of the legislative elections) in *Monde arabe Maghreb/Machrek*, no. 133, July-September 1991, pp. 19–33; 'Ala' al-Din Hilal and Usama al-Ghazali Harb, eds., *Intikhabat Majlis al-Sha'b 1990, Dirasa wa Tahlil* (The 1990 Elections: Study and Analysis) (Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1991).

17. See 'Amr Hashim Rabi', "Intikhabat 1995 fi Siyaq al-Tatawwur al-Siyasi al-Misri" (The 1995 Elections from the Perspective of Egyptian Political Developments) in Hala Mustafa, ed., *Al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr 1995* (The Parliamentary Elections in Egypt in 1995) (Cairo: Al-Ahram, 1997), pp. 15–34; and Zaki, *Civil Society and Democratization in Egypt, 1981–1994*, p. 80.

that realized that the electoral reform would not necessarily cater to their interests, but it was also a protest against attempts by the regime to prevent the ruling by the Supreme Constitutional Court from having any practical effect.

Yet equally important to the outcome of the elections were the interferences and fraudulent acts during the campaign, the election itself, and the counting of the votes by candidates' parties and the regime. Thanks to their links with the regime, the NDP and its candidates inevitably had the upper hand.

As the regime party, the NDP also found itself in a particularly good position to field candidates able to influence the vote in their own interest and that of the regime. It attracted financially resourceful candidates who considered a seat in parliament an investment for the future. In spite of the economic crisis and growing pressures on the public purse, resources controlled by the regime were by no means negligible. If official endorsement helped these individuals realize their ambitions, they in turn spared no expense to be elected. Thus the NDP could rely on candidates who were able to outbid their competitors whenever electoral success came to depend on money. The regime not only condoned and encouraged those candidates' efforts but also supported them with schemes of its own to ensure their electoral victory. Although present in all previous elections, regime interferences increased in 1990 even though the partial boycott of that election by opposition forces appeared to make such interferences unnecessary.

Technically, interferences in the 1990 polls were not unlike those that took place in the 1995 elections, which this author was able to follow closely in a number of constituencies.[18] In terms of the scope and violence, however, the 1990 events were only a prelude to those that surrounded and perverted the elections in 1995.[19] The latter are the most conspicuous illustration of the erosion of positive liberties so far, combining direct interference by the regime, fraud by NDP candidates, and impunity for them at unprecedented levels.

In 1990 and in 1995, candidates officially belonging to the NDP could ignore the many legal restrictions and harassments to which their competitors were subjected. Instead, they could rely on official support, ranging from the use of public sector vehicles to the collusion of state officials appointed to run the polling stations. Unlike their competitors, they could put up posters and banderoles before the official beginning of the election campaign. And unlike opposition candidates, they did not have their campaign furniture removed at night.[20] Regime agencies only interfered against individual NDP

18. For the 1990 elections, see Farag, "La politique à l'égyptienne: lecture des élections législatives"; for the 1995 elections, see Eberhard Kienle, "Désélectionné par le haut: le wafd dans les élections législatives de 1995" (De-selected from the top: the Wafd in the legislative elections of 1995) in Sandrine Gamblin, ed., *Contours et détours du politique en Egypte: les élections législatives de 1995* (Outline and deviations of things political in Egypt: the legislative elections of 1995) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), pp. 129-49.

19. For a more detailed account and analysis of the 1995 elections, see Gamblin, ed., *Contours et détours du politique en Egypte: les élections législatives de 1995*; Mustafa, ed., *Al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr 1995*; Al-Lajna al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya li-Mutaba'a al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya 1995, *Taqrir* (Report) (Cairo: 1995); Center for Human Rights Legal Aid (CHRLA), *CHRLA's Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995*, (Cairo: Markaz Ibn Khaldun, 1995).

20. It happened in the Cairo constituency of Sayyida Zaynab. For details, see Kienle, "Désélectionné par le haut: le wafd dans les élections législatives de 1995," pp. 129–49.

candidates where key opposition candidates had to win in order to guarantee a minimum semblance of pluralism, or where one NDP candidate opposed another NDP candidate.[21]

Electoral registers were frequently rigged in favor of NDP candidates and sometimes even on the latter's initiative. News bulletins on state-controlled television left Egyptians with the impression that the NDP was the only party running. Opposition parties were only granted a few short slots for campaign statements, which were also granted to the NDP. Even the judges who were supposed to supervise the elections were chosen by the minister of the interior. Their presence was, in any case, no more than a fictitious guarantee of the fairness of the elections, as a single judge could not supervise the chaotic counting by dozens of officials of all the votes cast in a constituency.[22]

In the 1995 elections, interferences and fraud were developed and used to an unprecedented degree.[23] In the Cairo suburb of Madinat Nasr, for instance, the official NDP candidate got more than 10,000 nonexistent or non-resident names added to the voters' register. Just before the beginning of the campaign, the regime referred to a military court several prominent members of the Muslim Brotherhood whom it accused of belonging to an illegal organization. Officially banned, the Muslim Brotherhood was generally tolerated but also regularly harassed. This time the choice of the court was no less significant than the timing of the charges, as hitherto only alleged members of armed Islamist groups had been tried by military tribunals.[24] The trial was, on the one hand, a financial blow as well as a warning to the Muslim Brothers; on the other hand, it was meant to demonstrate to the voters that votes cast for the Brotherhood's candidates would probably be lost votes. Their organization being banned, Muslim Brothers could, of course, run only as independents.

On the eve of the first round of elections, more than 1,000 members and sympathizers of the Brotherhood were arrested. Most of them were campaign workers or representatives of candidates, who by law were entitled to observe the voting in polling stations, as well as the subsequent counting of the vote. Representatives of other opposition candidates were also expelled or turned away from polling stations, where ballot boxes arrived stuffed with voting papers or else disappeared prior to the count. Numerous polling stations were ransacked by paid thugs, and several opposition candidates were prevented from voting while the police stood by. Finally, candidates were declared elected by the minister of the interior without any indication of the number or percentage of votes they had obtained. Following some 900 appeals, the Court of Cassation recommended that the election of

21. Examples are numerous. They range from public sector or government officials manning the polling stations, to the police taking ballot boxes to the centers where the vote was counted, to the interior ministry which announced the results.

22. For the 1990 elections, see Farag, "La politique à l'égyptienne: lecture des élections législatives"; for the 1995 elections, see Kienle, "Désélectionné par le haut: le wafd dans les élections législatives de 1995," pp. 129–49.

23. See Gamblin, ed., *Contours et détours du politique en Egypte: les élections législatives de 1995*; Mustafa, ed., *Al- Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr 1995*; Al-Lajna al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya li-Mutaba'a al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya 1995, *Taqrir*; and Center for Human Rights Legal Aid (CHRLA), *CHRLA's Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995*.

24. Based on author's own research.

more than 200 deputies out of a total of 444 be invalidated. The newly elected parliament that included the 200 deputies concerned, refused to follow these recommendations.[25]

Partly through direct interference and partly by condoning the activities of NDP candidates, the regime managed to get a parliament elected in which its own party obtained 94 percent of the seats, and indeed its largest majority ever. It is true that the opposition parties suffered from numerous weaknesses, ranging from material shortages to leaders and programs that failed to appeal to the voters. None of these weaknesses, however, was as crucial as their lack of a special relationship with the regime.

Participation Beyond Parliamentary Elections

Political participation was eroded not only at the national electoral level, but also at a more grassroots level. In the 1991 trade union elections, the regime had the casting vote, and had unwelcome candidates discarded by the Socialist prosecutor, an office established by Sadat to keep in check unwelcome critics and oppositional forces. As a result and despite the widespread discontent of workers, the overwhelming majority of NDP representatives at all levels of the pyramid-like structure of *Al-Ittihad al-'Am li-Niqabat al-'Ummal* (the Federation of Trade Unions) remained unchanged.

Important amendments to the trade union law, which were voted in 1995, constituted another step towards the deliberalization of union politics. The abrogation of some restrictive provisions payed only lip-service to international labor standards. At first glance, the new amendments seemed to widen participation as additional layers of high-level managers were granted the right to join the unions and thus to vote, though not to stand, in union elections. Only executives, exercising the prerogatives of employers, remained excluded from union representation. Workers employed on fixed-term contracts, however, simultaneously became ineligible to run in union elections, even though they still had the right to vote. Fixed-term contractual workers are most vulnerable in times of crisis and reform as they are the first to lose their jobs. Their numbers have been growing rapidly since the public sector stopped issuing permanent contracts. Thus, only workers and employees on permanent or open contracts were eligible to run in union elections. At the same time, the new rules allowed outgoing union leaders to stand for reelection on the sole basis of having been elected to their positions previously. They no longer needed to be reelected at their own firm before being reelected to the board of the Federation or to one of its 23 branches.[26]

As the drafting of the new provisions took time, union elections scheduled for 1995 were postponed to autumn 1996. The elections of 1996 duly consolidated the NDP majority obtained in 1991. While oppositional unionists again made some inroads at the

25. For detailed information on irregularities and interference in the 1995 elections, see for example Al-Lajna al-Wataniyya al-Misriyya li-Mutaba'a al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya 1995, *Taqrir*; The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, *Democracy Jeopardized: The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights' Account of the Egyptian Parliamentary Elections of 1995* (Cairo: The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, 1996); and Kienle, "Désélectionné par le haut: le wafd dans les élections législatives de 1995."

26. Law no. 12/1995, in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 13 (*tabi'*/appendix), 30 March 1995.

level of their firms, hardly any of them were elected to the boards of branch unions or of the Federation itself. On the board of the Federation, only five percent of the outgoing members were replaced, and only because they had left voluntarily or died; none of them was replaced with an opposition candidate.[27]

Deliberalization also touched the *niqabat mihniyya* (professional syndicates), which organize certain professions, including engineers, physicians and lawyers, represent their members' interests, cater to their material needs, and in some cases exert limited regulatory powers over the profession.[28] In February 1993, the Egyptian parliament with its vast NDP majority voted a law which substantially modified the rules governing elections to the boards of these syndicates.[29] Henceforth, at least 50 percent of the members needed to cast their votes for board elections to be valid. If the turnout was lower, the elections could be rerun twice, in which case a turnout of 33 percent guaranteed their validity. If this lower turnout was not achieved in the second rerun, the syndicate fell under the administration of officials appointed by the government until new elections were held. Although the law may not seem unreasonable, it ignores the fact that historically the turnout in the larger syndicates has been very low. The required turnout is even more difficult to achieve as elections cannot be held on Fridays or public holidays.

In two other domains, the election of officials has simply been replaced by appointments by the relevant state agencies. Under a new law passed in April 1994, *'umdas*, who are village chiefs rather than real mayors, are no longer elected but appointed by the minister of the interior.[30] Another law passed in May of the same year deprived members of university faculties of the formal means to participate in the selection of their deans. The latter are now appointed by the president of their university, who is himself appointed by the president of the republic.[31]

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REGIME AND ISLAMIST OPPOSITION FORCES

The 1992 amendments to the penal code followed an unprecedented increase in political violence in the country. Sporadic incidents between security forces and armed Islamist groups, in the early months of 1992, rapidly led to major clashes in and around Dayrut, Asyut and Bani Swayf in Upper Egypt, as well as in Cairo. The assassination of the secular intellectual Faraj Fuda, in June 1992, was the last straw that prompted the regime to modify the law.

27. For example, *Al-Wafd*, 6 November 1996; official report of the Tajammu' Party in *Al-Ahali*, 1 January 1997. For an analysis of union elections see also Kamal Minufi, ed., *Tahlil Nata'ij al-Intikhabat al-'Ummaliyya* (Analysis of the Results of Labor Elections) (Cairo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1997); Gamal Abd al-Nasser, "Les syndicats ouvriers en Egypte au miroir des élections syndicales de 1996," (The workers' syndicates in Egypt as reflected in the 1996 trade union elections) in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 34 (1998), forthcoming.

28. See for example, Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

29. Law no. 100/1993, in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 7, 18 February 1993.

30. Law no. 26/1994, in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 15 (*tabi'*/appendix), 14 April 1994.

31. Law no. 142/1994, in *Al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya*, no. 21 (*mukarrar*/supplement), 31 May 1994.

Repression, however, could not prevent the further increase of political violence in the country. While 30 deaths were counted in 1991—as many as in the decade since 1981—93 people were killed allegedly by Islamist groups in 1992, many of them after the amendment of the penal code. In 1993, the number of deaths rose to 208, and in 1995 to 373. The victims were mostly members of the security apparatus, but an increasing number were Copts and tourists as well.[32] Attacks against Copts undermined national unity, while those against tourists threatened one of the country's major sources of revenue. In fact, tourism was seriously affected after the Luxor massacre in November 1997, when more than 60 tourists were killed by armed Islamists.

Throughout the 1990s, the regime faced strong domestic challenges which undoubtedly led it to pursue more repressive policies at the level of both legislation and political practice. The rising numbers of political detainees, of civilians referred to military courts, of death sentences, and of other human rights abuses were by and large linked to the increasingly violent conflict between the regime and parts of the Islamist opposition. This conflict also prompted the modification of the party law concerning the contribution of foreign funds to domestic politics. The numerous declarations made by Alfi, the former minister of the interior, confirm that the regime sought not only to track down terrorists but also to marginalize and exclude from representation and participation those the state could present as the terrorists' allies or sympathizers. This attempt at marginalization applied in particular to the Muslim Brothers, who were accused of creating a front organization for armed Islamist groups; it even applied to human rights organizations, which the regime repeatedly lumped together with "terrorist organizations."[33] Finally, also the 1993 law on elections in professional syndicates was mainly directed against Islamists, who since the mid-1980s had taken over the boards of several important syndicates, including those of the engineers, physicians, teachers, and lawyers. They had won in part because of very low turnouts, which in the elections to the board of the lawyers' syndicate in 1992, hardly exceeded ten percent.[34]

32. Sa'ad al-Din Ibrahim, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Madani wa al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-'Arabi: Al-Taqrir al-Sanawi 1993* (Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in the Arab World: The Annual Report 1993) (Cairo: Markaz Ibn Khaldun, 1994), pp. 87–90; Sa'ad al-Din Ibrahim, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Madani wa al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-'Arabi: Al-Taqrir al-Sanawi 1994* (Civil Society and the Democratic Transformation in the Arab World: The Annual Report 1994) (Cairo: Markaz Ibn Khaldun, 1995), pp. 68–72; Al-Munazzama al-Misriyya li Huquq al-Insan, *Halat Huquq al-Insan fi Misr: al-Taqrir al-Sanawi li-'Am 1996*, p. 33.

33. For details see Alain Roussillon, "Pourquoi les frères musulmans ne pouvaient pas gagner les élections: les limites de la pluralisation de la scène politique égyptienne" (Why the Muslim Brothers could not win the elections: the limits of pluralism on the Egyptian political scene) in Gamblin, ed., *Contours et détours du politique en Egypte: les élections législatives de 1995*, pp. 101–27; Human Rights Watch/Middle East, *Annual Report 1996* (New York: Human Rights Watch/Middle East, 1996).

34. For details, see Reinoud Leenders, "The Struggle of State and Civil Society in Egypt: Professional Syndicates and Egypt's Careful Steps Towards Democracy," *Middle East Research Associates Occasional Papers*, no. 26, Amsterdam, April 1996.

ELECTORAL MECHANICS

As far as parliament is concerned, this strategy of exclusion was not implemented as thoroughly in 1990 as it was in 1995. In the absence of large-scale political violence, Islamist opposition forces could not yet be accused of being terrorists in disguise, and many of them boycotted the elections anyway. Nor were they the only victims of electoral manipulation by the regime, either in 1990 or in 1995.

Deliberalization at the parliamentary level was primarily caused by a combination of new uncertainties resulting from the switch to majority vote, and of old constraints, which continued to premise the reproduction of the political system on large parliamentary majorities. Thus, amendments to the constitution, the (re)election of the president of the republic, and a number of other matters still necessitated two-thirds majorities, whereas the abolition of party lists put together by party hierarchs enhanced the volatility of these and, indeed, of all parliamentary majorities.

While the new voting system allowed the defeat of non-NDP candidates as easily as in the past, it did not *ipso facto* favor official NDP candidates over NDP members running as independents. Thanks to their local and regime connections, and their financial largesse, the latter could as easily as the former persuade election officials in their constituency and beyond to credit them with the largest number of votes. Party and government agencies at the local and central level were sufficiently divided to allow this to happen.[35] Even though in 1990 and in 1995 all NDP members elected as independents quickly joined their party's parliamentary group, the very fact that they had run as independents raised doubts in the minds of regime representatives about their loyalty to the party. As deputies they might be even less reliable than those elected on a party ticket and fail even more easily to obey party orders or to show up for key votes.

Since majorities became less reliable than under the previous mode of election, they needed to be expanded well beyond the customary two-thirds. This expansion occurred first in 1990 and more significantly in 1995. The overall NDP majority of 79 percent of the parliamentary seats in 1990 remained short of a two-thirds majority if the 95 party members elected as independents were not counted. The overall majority of 94 percent of seats which the NDP obtained in 1995 finally guaranteed the regime a two-thirds majority even without its own independents, who accounted for some 20 percent of the seats.[36] The unprecedented interferences in 1995 appear to be linked more to the size of the victory than to the absence of a boycott.

One may safely assume that none of this was intended by the Supreme Constitutional

35. For the disintegration of the NDP, see Dina al-Khawaga, "Le parti national-démocrate et les élections de 1995: la conjonction de nombreuses logiques d'action" (The National Democratic Party and the 1995 elections: the meeting of numerous rationales for action) in Gamblin, ed., *Contours et détours du politique en Egypte: les élections législatives de 1995*, pp. 83–99.

36. For figures, see Mustafa, ed., *Al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyya fi Misr 1995*, pp. 44ff; Jamal 'Ali Zahran, "Al-Mustaqillin" (The Independents) in Hillal and Al-Ghazali Harb, eds, *Intikhabat Majlis al-Sha'b 1990: Dirasa wa Tahlil*, p. 200. In neither year did the ten additional deputies appointed by the President of the Republic make a difference.

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Court. It was nonetheless the consequence of its ruling in a context in which the regime was not only able but, from its point of view, forced to manage electoral mechanics.

ECONOMIC CRISIS AND REFORM

Important as they are, electoral mechanics and their manipulation by state agencies on the one hand, and the regime's conflict with armed Islamist groups on the other, still fail to account for all the different aspects of political deliberalization in Egypt. The erosion of liberties took place in the context of an economic crisis and subsequent reforms which, at least temporarily, had negative consequences for numerous Egyptians. Some of the restrictive measures imposed by the regime were either partly or primarily intended to prevent the losers from the crisis and the reforms from opposing the new economic policies.

On the face of it, the crisis of the mid-1980s was prompted by the effects of the fall in the price of oil, and the government's attempts to alleviate these effects. Ultimately, however, these factors only exacerbated budgetary and external imbalances,[37] which had been accumulating over the years because of low productivity, high consumption, and insufficient earnings from exports.[38]

Though limited in scope, initial state measures to overcome the crisis were inspired by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As early as 1987, Egypt had reached an agreement on macroeconomic stabilization with the IMF, but had then defaulted.[39] Reflecting the recessive effects of the crisis and those of the early economic reforms, the real growth of the GDP and of GDP per capita declined in the 1980s.[40]

37. In the second half of the decade the budget deficit amounted to 15 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), pushing up inflation to some 20 percent. Exports were a fraction of imports, the balance of the current account was negative and foreign currency reserves were on the decline. See, for example, Louis Blin, ed., *L'économie égyptienne: libéralisation et insertion dans le marché mondial* (The Egyptian economy: liberalization and insertion into the global market) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993); Françoise Clément, "Vers une économie libérale? Introduction" (Towards a liberal economy? Introduction) in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 9, 1er trimestre 1992, pp. 7–13; Arvind Subramanian, "The Egyptian Stabilization Experience: An Analytical Retrospective," *Working Paper Series*, no. 18 (Cairo: The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies), October 1997.

38. For instance, total public external debt, which reached US $39.8 billion in 1986 and $45.9 billion in 1989, already stood at $27.3 billion in 1982, compared to no more than $19.1 billion in 1980. Total debt service increased from 13.4 percent of exports of goods and services in 1980 to 27.0 percent in 1986 and amounted to 23.6 percent in 1989. For recently revised World Bank figures, see The World Bank, *World Development Indicators on CD-Rom* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997).

39. See Mahmud Al-Sayyid Mansur, "La libéralisation du secteur agricole" (The liberalization of the agricultural sector) in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 21, 1er trimestre 1995, pp. 174–82; Sami Aziz and Françoise Clément, "La libéralisation du commerce extérieur égyptien et l'accord du GATT" (The liberalization of Egypt's foreign trade and the GATT accords) in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 21, 1er trimestre 1995, pp. 196–207.

40. Real growth of GDP stood at between 7 and 11 percent per annum in the fiscal years 1980–81 through 1984–85, at between 2.1 and 2.7 percent per annum for the period comprising the fiscal years 1985–86 through 1990–91, and fell to 0.3 percent in 1991-92, compared to an annual increase of the population of 2.7 percent over this entire period. Growth of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita decreased to 0 percent in 1985, -1 percent in 1986 and -2 percent in 1990. The World Bank, *World Development Indicators on CD- Rom.* For the period starting in 1985–86, see also Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "Economic Reform or Dutch Disease: On the Macroeconomic Effects of ERSAP," paper presented at Cairo University, June 1997, Table 2, with higher growth rates only for 1987–88 and 1988–89; and Subramanian, "The Egyptian Stabilization Experience: An Analytical Retrospective," Table 1, referring to IMF sources. Higher figures given by the Ministry of Planning may confuse nominal with real GDP, see Arab Republic of Egypt, Council of Ministers, Office of the Minister of State,

The burden of the crisis was not borne equally by the various segments of Egyptian society. According to one of the most comprehensive and methodologically sound studies of diachronic changes in private consumption, poverty increased significantly between the fiscal years 1981–82 and 1990–91. In rural Egypt, the percentage of the poor rose from 16.1 to 28.6 percent of the total population over that period of time; while in urban areas it rose from 18.2 to 20.3 percent. Applying a higher poverty line, including those deemed moderately poor, the percentage rose from 26.9 in 1981–82 to 39.2 percent in rural areas and from 33.5 to 39 percent in urban ones. In terms of expenditure deciles, the bottom 80 percent of Egyptian society fared worse than previously, and only the top 20 percent fared better.[41]

Economic reforms gained momentum after March 1990, when the regime took additional measures to pave the way for a new agreement on macroeconomic stabilization with the IMF. The agreement was adopted in May 1991 and was followed in September by another agreement on structural adjustment, this time with the World Bank.[42] Tight fiscal and monetary measures were introduced to reduce Egypt's budgetary and external imbalances, and its large external debt. The liberalization of prices and of foreign trade and a reform of the public sector, followed by the privatization of several hundred of its companies, were to consolidate the economy in the longer term.

The living conditions of numerous Egyptians, however, failed to improve or continued to deteriorate under the reforms, even though inflation as well as fiscal and external imbalances were greatly reduced. Again reflecting the combined effects of crisis and reform, the real growth of the GDP failed to keep up with the population growth rate, which had declined to 2.0 percent per annum from 2.7 during the 1980s.[43] According to figures released by the international financial institutions, real growth of GDP stood at 0.3 percent in the fiscal year 1991–92, and at 0.5 percent in 1992–93. Only in 1993–94, GDP began to rise to 2 or 2.9 percent, depending on the source, and at 2 or 3.2 percent in 1994–95, before rising to 5 percent in 1996–97.[44]

Economic Profile, January 1997, p. 22. Population growth rate according to official statistics, in Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya, Al-Jihaz al-Markazi li al-Ta'bi'a al-'Amma wa al-Ihsa', *Al-Kitab al-Ihsa'i al-Sanawi 1991–1996* (The Book of Annual Statistics 1991–1996) (Cairo, June 1997), p. 15.

41. Government of Egypt, Institute of National Planning, *Egypt: Human Development Report 1996* (Cairo: Institute of National Planning, 1996), pp. 29–32, 66.

42. See for example Louis Blin, "Le programme de stabilisation et d'ajustement structurel de l'économie égyptienne," (The structural adjustment and stabilization program of the Egyptian economy) in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 9, 1er trimestre 1992, pp. 13–46; Simon Bromley and Raymond Bush, "Adjustment in Egypt? The Political Economy of Reform," in *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 60, 1994, pp. 201–13; Heba Handoussa, "The Role of the State: The Case of Egypt," *ERF Working Paper no. 9404* (Cairo: Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran and Turkey, 1994), pp. 21–25; Subramanian, "The Egyptian Stabilization Experience: An Analytical Retrospective," p. 3.

43. World Bank, *World Development Indicators on CD-Rom*.

44. According to government sources, per capita growth of GDP declined by 0.8 percent annually from 1991–92 to 1994–95. World Bank calculations put annual per capita growth of GNP at -2 in 1990, -1 in 1991, 1992 and 1993 and, at 1 percent in 1994. Government of Egypt, Institute of National Planning, *Egypt: Human Development Report 1996*, p.136; The World Bank, *World Development Indicators on CD-Rom*. For decimal figures from IMF sources, see Subramanian, *The Egyptian Stabilization Experience: An Analytical Retrospective*, Table 1; for single digit figures, see The World Bank, *World Development Indicators on CD-Rom*; trends confirmed by Abdel-Khalek, "Economic Reform or Dutch Disease: On the Macroeconomic Effects of ERSAP,"

Real wages, which declined during the second half of the 1980s, at least in some sectors never picked up or were even lower by the mid-1990s; in manufacturing, for instance, they fell by 40 percent between 1985 and 1995.[45] Even allowing for diverging definitions and figures, total unemployment seems to have risen from 8.6 percent in 1990 to at least 11.3 percent in 1995. Among high school graduates it rose in the same period from 24 to 35 percent; among university graduates from 16 to 21 percent.[46] While by 1995–96 the percentage of the poor in the total population had declined to 23.3 in rural areas, it had risen to 22.5 percent in urban areas. The percentage of moderately poor, meanwhile, had risen to 50.2 in rural areas and 45 in urban ones.[47]

These developments were significant enough for the regime to anticipate discontent and protests from those most threatened or affected by them. The "bread riots of 1976" had not yet been forgotten. The coverage of the reforms in opposition newspapers such as the leftist *Al-Ahali* and the Islamist *Al-Sha'b* may have further reinforced the regime's apprehensions. Those concerns were also heightened by the beginnings of organized mobilization. Opposition parties and trade unionists, critical of regime policies, set up various committees for the defense of the public sector.[48] Reported strikes rose from eight in 1990, to 26 in 1991, to 28 in 1992, and to 63 in 1993. In a major strike at Kafr al-Dawwar in September 1994, three people were shot dead by the police and many others were injured.[49] Though not seriously threatening its policies, such developments were highly disconcerting for the regime.

More concretely, there is a direct link between the erosion of specific liberties on the one hand, and the economic reforms on the other. Although the former may appear to be

Table 2. Population growth rate according to Jumhuriyyat Misr al-'Arabiyya, Al-Jihaz al-Markazi li al-Ta'bi'a al-'Amma wa al-Ihsa', *Al-Kitab al-Ihsa'i al-Sanawi 1991–1996*.

45. Ishac Diwan, "Globalization, EU Partnership and Income Distribution in Egypt," *Working Paper Series*, no. 12 (Cairo: The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 1997), p. 2.

46. Total percentage figures were given by Noshi, "Principaux résultats des trois premières années du programme de stabilisation et d'adjustement structurel" (Principal results of the first three years of the stabilization and structural adjustment program), in *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 21, 1er trimestre 1995, p.151 referring to quarterly labor force sample surveys carried out by CAPMAS, and by Government of Egypt, Institute of National Planning, *Human Development Report 1996*, p.133; according to Nadir Fergany, "Recent Trends in Open Unemployment in Egypt," *Research Notes 01* (Cairo: Al-Mishkat Centre, 1993) unemployment rose to more than 17 percent; Simon Commander and Ragui Assaad calculate an unemployment rate of 12 percent already for 1986 in "Egypt," in Susan Horton, et al., eds., *Labor Markets in an Era of Adjustment*, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of The World Bank, 1994), p. 339. While the Ministry of Planning puts unemployment at only 9.4-10 percent between 1992–93 and 1995–96, it nonetheless acknowledges a rise from 4.2 percent in 1986–87 to 8.4 percent in 1990–91, see Arab Republic of Egypt, *Economic Profile*, p. 22.

47. Government of Egypt, Institute of National Planning, *Egypt: Human Development Report 1996*, pp. 29–32, 66. Most participants in a survey conducted by the authors of this report moreover responded that their living conditions had not improved or deteriorated between 1991 and 1996. The conclusions of this report, according to which in 1995–96 22.5 percent of Egyptians were to be considered as poor, are roughly confirmed by Gaurav Datt, Dean Jolliffe and Manohar Sharma who, again in terms of basic needs, consider 23.2 percent of Egyptians as poor, in "What Do We Know About Poverty in Egypt? An Analysis of Household Survey Data for 1997," Draft Report, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 1997.

48. Marsha Pripstein Posusney, *Labor and the State in Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 230–37.

49. Sa'ad al-Din Ibrahim, ed., *Al-Mujtama' al-Madani wa al-Tahawwul al-Dimuqrati fi al-Watan al-'Arabi: al-Taqrir al-Sanawi 1994*, pp. 56–59; customary caveats concerning figures apply.

caused primarily by electoral mechanics and the conflict between the regime and its Islamist challengers, the measures taken by the state also serve to police economic reform. The 1992 amendments to the penal code may be invoked not only against members of armed Islamist groups but also against other opponents of regime policies. The broad definition of terrorism introduced by those amendments may be applied to strikes and demonstrations of all sorts. It may also be invoked against tenant farmers who refuse to respect the provisions of the law governing owner-tenant relations. This law came into effect in October 1997, but was passed in late June 1992, three weeks before the amendments to the penal code. Under this law, tenant farmers may be asked to pay higher rent or even to leave the land they have been cultivating for decades.

Serious incidents took place in the spring of 1997 to protest this law, and hundreds of farmers were arrested, though on the basis of other legal provisions.[50] However, in June 1997, leftist activists who supported tenant farmers against their landlords were arrested and charged under the new provisions which make it a serious crime to "obstruct the application of the law" or to resort to "terrorist means."[51] Thus, the amendments were used for the first time against persons who were not members of an armed Islamist group but who sought to oppose part of the economic reform program. Even though the amendments were not initially intended to cover this type of case, they were readily used for that purpose when it suited the regime.

CONCLUSION

Management from above of the general elections in 1990 and 1995 certainly aimed at excluding the Muslim Brotherhood from parliamentary representation, and at guaranteeing the self-perpetuation of the regime against all possible risks arising from an assembly which, due to the switch to majority vote, had become less reliable and more volatile. The large number of NDP parliamentarians, however, not only guaranteed the regime a two-thirds majority whenever needed, it also enabled the regime to pass more easily controversial legislation pertaining to economic reform. Those reforms were a condition for further support by the international financial institutions and for debt relief by foreign creditors. In some areas, such as taxation and public sector reform, new legislation had become a pressing issue around the time of the 1990 elections, when the agreements with the IMF and the World Bank were taking shape. Numerous other reforms needed to be legislated over the following years, and consequently a pliant legislature was needed by the regime.

The 1995 amendment of the trade union law demonstrates that economic crisis and reform were determining factors for political deliberalization. The redefinition of the boundaries of participation in union elections helped to create and consolidate majorities

50. Law no. 96/1992; for details, see *Egypte/Monde arabe*, no. 11, 3e trimestre 1992, pp. 259–60.
51. *Al-Hayat*, 19 June 1997; and *Al-Hayat*, 17 July 1997; interview with Hazim Munir, Cairo, 19 July 1997, who authored reports in *Al-Hayat*; Markaz al-Musa'adat al-Qanuniyya li-Huquq al-Insan, Press Release, 31 August 1997. The legal provisions concerned are articles 86 and 86 *mukarrar alif* (articles 86 and 86a) added to the penal code by Law no. 96/1992.

unlikely to favor aggressive union policies. The enactment of the short-lived "press law" was also connected to economic reform. New and more severe penalties were sought for "publication crimes," such as the spread of "false rumors" or "mendacious information" against public figures, their relatives and the state as such. The vast majority of the charges brought against the press, under the new provisions, referred to its allegations of corruption or embezzlement in high places. The opportunities offered by a more liberal economy indeed produced corruption on a large scale, and attempts at preventing the press from exposing it.[52] Finally, provisions such as those concerning the nomination of 'umdas and deans of faculties by their hierarchical superiors, ensured the smooth running of the state apparatus, the function of which was to support economic liberalization both technically and ideologically.

The recent experience of Egypt reminds us that the political effects of economic liberalization depend on a host of factors varying from case to case. Under the conditions prevailing in Egypt in the 1990s, economic liberalization has failed to redistribute economic power significantly and to replace state hegemony with an economic polyarchy more prone to competition and more favorable to political conflict and pluralism. While "liberating" the economy to some degree from direct interference by the regime, reforms such as privatization have often transferred assets, or the control thereof, to actors and groups close to the state.[53] At the same time they have entailed a redistribution of wealth which has penalized, at least temporarily, numerous individuals and groups, and thus curtailed *ipso facto* those of their liberties which depended on access to economic resources.

Economic liberalization is likely to produce not only winners but losers as well. From the point of view of the reformers, losers need to be excluded from the political game and removed from existing corporatist arrangements in ways similar to those described in the literature on bureaucratic authoritarianism.[54] Thus the losers quickly lose more than just those liberties which directly depend on access to economic resources. The ensuing structural adjustment of liberties disadvantages the losers while favoring the winners. Where losers are many and winners are few, the general picture is one of political deliberalization.

52. See for instance *Cairo Times* (Cairo), no. 9, 26 June 1997, pp. 12–13.
53. See, for instance, the argument developed by Clement M. Henry, *The Mediterranean Debt Crescent: Money and Power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996). For "crony capitalism" in Egypt, see Yahya Sadowski, *Political Vegetables? Businessmen and Bureaucrats in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991); Eric Gobe, "Les hommes d'affaires et l'état dans le capitalisme de l'*infitah* (1974–1994)" (Businessmen and the state in the capitalism of the infitah [1974–1994]) in *Monde arabe: Maghreb/Machrek*, no. 156 (1997), pp. 49–59.
54. See Albert O. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for its Economic Determinants," in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 61–98.

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Divided They Rule

The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition

Ellen Lust-Okar

Studies of economic adjustment and political liberalization often assume that economic crises promote political unrest. Increased popular discontent over declining standards of living may make it easier for political opponents to mobilize popular discontent and press political demands. Economic reforms also create new winners and losers among political elites. New coalitions of political opponents can form, mobilizing popular frustration to demand political change. Consequently, scholars and policymakers assume that economic crises increase the likelihood of political instability and institutional reform.[1]

Morocco and Jordan challenge this assumption. Since the early 1980s both experienced economic decline and increased discontent. In Jordan opponents responded as expected: they increasingly challenged the king. In Morocco, however, the opposition movements did not continue to mobilize the masses behind political reform. Indeed, opponents who had previously taken advantage of increased discontent to challenge the king became unwilling to continue, even as the masses became more frustrated.

How does the structure of government-opposition relationships affect when political elites use economic grievances to mobilize popular opposition? When incumbent elites have not created divisions between opposition groups, opposition elites are more likely to mobilize political unrest during economic crises. However, when incumbent elites have effectively divided political opposition into loyalist and radical camps, opponents are less likely to mobilize unrest as the crisis continues.

Morocco and Jordan are instructive cases. Both are monarchies, in which political power is centered in the palace. The king controls the distribution of resources and determines the political rules. He decides who may formally participate in politics and sets the boundaries within which they may do so.[2] Monarchs are not alone in creating rules governing political participation; indeed, all incumbent elites manipulate their environments. However, monarchs manage regimes quite openly.

Both Morocco and Jordan also faced prolonged economic crises. Morocco's crisis began after 1975, as phosphate earnings declined and oil prices rose.[3] Subsequently, it began implementing IMF structural adjustment programs. Real wages declined,

and unemployment rose throughout the 1980s.[4] The economic crisis in Jordan began by 1983, when Jordan found itself subsidizing Iraq's war against Iran. In 1988 internal debt increased 47.6 percent over the previous year, and in October Jordan accepted an IMF structural adjustment program. Real wages declined, and unemployment rates reached approximately 20 percent in 1992.[5]

Conventional analyses do not explain the different patterns of political unrest in Morocco and Jordan. For instance, where crises are short-lived or minor, or reform policies are piecemeal, economic crises may create less popular discontent. However, in both Jordan and Morocco reforms have led to an increase in mass discontent. A more developed civil society may allow the opposition to sustain pressure on a regime.[6] Yet Jordan has a weaker civil society than Morocco.[7] Unions, an important part of the support for Moroccan opposition parties, may become less capable of mobilizing during economic crises.[8] However, this argument explains why opponents become less capable of pressing demands, not why they become less willing to do so. There is strong evidence that Morocco's opposition parties are capable of mobilizing the masses but unwilling to do so. Finally, Morocco's opposition elites could simply be more satisfied with their political gains than their Jordanian counterparts. However, the parties' demands and the level of state repression did not change significantly. According to conventional wisdom, once these states experienced unrest, their oppositions should have been expected to remain mobilized until they either obtained their political demands or were repressed. This expectation was not fulfilled.

Mobilization in Divided and Undivided Environments

The distinction between divided and undivided political environments helps explain why political opponents become less willing to mobilize, even though they can do so.[9] Authoritarian elites determine which opponents may or may not participate in the formal political system. This variation yields three types of political environments. In the undivided, exclusive political environment no political opponents are allowed to participate in the formal political sphere. In the undivided, inclusive environment all political opponents participate in the formal system. Finally, in the divided environment incumbents allow some political opponents to participate in the political system while excluding others.[10]

The incentives facing different opposition groups when deciding whether or not to demand political change vary, depending on the groups' types and the political environment. The inclusion of some elites and exclusion of others yield two types of groups: the loyalist and the illegal opposition. Groups can also be distinguished by their ideological demands as moderate or radical. Because incumbents pay lower costs to compromise with moderate groups, in the divided political environment included groups are moderate, and excluded groups are radical.

In divided political environments legal and illegal opponents have divergent interests. As part of their role in relieving popular dissatisfaction, loyalists are allowed to challenge the regime. Thus, loyalists' mobilization costs are smaller than illegal opponents' costs. However, in return for this privilege loyalists agree to help maintain the system; thus, they pay a high price if they destabilize it. In contrast, illegal opponents can capitalize on increasing discontent to mobilize popular unrest.. They face higher costs for mobilizing popular protest than their loyalist counterparts. However, unlike loyalists, they are not penalized more for destabilizing the system. Thus, they pay smaller mobilization costs if they join an ongoing conflict than if they mobilize independently.

Consequently, divided and undivided political environments create different protest dynamics. In divided environments loyalists who previously mobilized popular movements may become unwilling to challenge incumbents when crises continue, even if their demands have not been met. Because loyalists have organizational structures and lower costs of mobilizing an independent protest, they are often able to exploit the early stages of crises to demand reforms. However, as crises continue, radicals gain strength and become more likely to join in demonstrations, even if they are unwilling to mobilize independently. Thus, to avoid the possibility that radicals exploit unrest to demand radical reforms, moderates choose not to mobilize. The very same elites who previously exploited economic discontent to demand political change now remain silent, while radicals who might take to the streets if the moderates mobilized are unwilling to do so alone.[11] Thus, in a divided environment moderates who previously challenged incumbent elites may choose not to continue to do so when radical groups join, even if incumbents have not accommodated their demands.

In an undivided political environment opponents remain willing to mobilize as crises continue. Loyalists do not fear the inclusion of radicals in their unrest. As the probability of successfully opposing the government increases, the expected utility of conflict increases. With only one opposition group, once the opposition is willing to mobilize, it remains willing as long as its probability of success increases and its demands have not been met. Even when important divisions exist between opposition groups, opponents willing to challenge the regime will continue to do so as economic crises continue. Knowing that another opposition group will challenge does not decrease the willingness of the first to challenge the regime. Thus, as the probability of success increases in an undivided political environment, a moderate group that has previously challenged the government will continue to do so, regardless of the radicals' strategy.

Economic Crises and Political Opposition

The different political environments of Jordan and Morocco explain the divergent dynamics of political unrest in the 1980s. This difference was not an inevitable out-

come of structural conditions. Prior to 1970 both King Husayn and King Hassan II fostered an undivided, exclusive political environment. However, following coup attempts in 1971–1972, King Hassan II reestablished a role for political parties. He signed a new constitution in 1972 and called for local elections in 1976 and national elections in 1977. Although King Husayn also faced political instability, he repressed opposition. He postponed general elections from 1967 until 1989 and closed parliament from 1974 until 1984.

Thus, the monarchs created different political environments. In Morocco political party elites were sharply divided from groups left out of the political system. The palace controlled the loyalist opposition's participation in the political arena and limited its demands. Loyalist opposition elites were required to accept the king's supremacy and support Morocco's bid for the Western Sahara. Within these constraints, however, they acted as the king's "spokesmen of demands," providing an important channel of communication between the masses and the palace and relieving popular frustrations.[12] In return, they enjoyed government subsidies and privileged access to the palace. Illegal opposition, mainly religious-based societies, remained outside this system.[13] Many questioned the legitimacy of the king and the political system, including the role of the included parties. Despite their potential for antiregime activity, however, King Hassan II allowed the growth of Islamic opposition in the early 1980s, attempting to counter his secular opponents. He thus fostered a divided political environment.

In contrast, King Husayn created an undivided political environment. He allowed the professional associations and the Muslim Brotherhood a limited political role and promoted divisions among opponents. Most notably, he promoted the Muslim Brotherhood to counter secular opponents and played upon divisions between Palestinian and Jordanian opposition elites to weaken the opposition. However, he did not separate opponents into loyalist and radical factions in the formal political system.

Challenge in the Divided Political Environment: Morocco

The divided political environment in Morocco helps to explain why loyalists became less willing to challenge King Hassan II as the crisis continued. The king created incentives for loyalists to refrain from promoting a conflict that excluded opponents could exploit. As radicals became stronger, loyalists became unwilling to mobilize protests to obtain political reforms.

Loyalists exploited the 1981 economic crisis to demand both economic and political changes. Although the government made economic concessions, it rejected political demands and refused to engage in dialogue with the opposition-led

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Confédération Démocratique du Travail. Indeed, although it allowed the *Union Maroc du Travail* (UMT), Morocco's progovernment union, to call a general strike, it prohibited the CDT from also striking. It hoped to defuse popular hostility, while containing the CDT.

The opposition nevertheless called a general strike on June 20.[14] The CDT saw the crisis as an opportunity to force the government to make concessions.[15] Held nationally on a Saturday, the strike challenged the regime's ability to maintain control. An energized, angry populace supported "their strike," and in Casablanca and Mohamedia unemployed youths rioted. The armed forces responded. By the end of June 22 there was a large number dead; thousands were arrested; and party newspapers were suspended.[16] On June 23 the parliamentary opposition called for an inquiry into the government's response.[17]

The palace responded with economic concessions but also increased security. The king denounced the CDT for instigating the riots and divided Casablanca into five administrative districts to strengthen local control.[18] As the 1983 elections approached, he also dangled the hope of future concessions if party leaders did not repeat the 1981 strikes.

Political contestation in the early 1980s remained primarily between the king and the parties. More radical opponents did not mobilize in concert with the strikes. Within a nonexplosive political environment, the opposition took advantage of the lower mobilization costs accompanying the economic crisis to demand reform, just as the conventional wisdom would predict.

However, as the crisis continued, more radical opponents gained popular support, while legal opponents appeared weak. Loyalists did not want to repeat their experience in the 1981 general strike. They also joined the government in preparation for new elections, with party leader 'Abd al-Rahim Bu'abid appointed minister of state.[19] This appointment put them in a difficult position. They wanted to mobilize against price increases, but they were afraid to sacrifice the chance for gains in the upcoming elections. Thus, they spoke against economic adjustment but did not mobilize a general strike.[20]

Nevertheless, in January 1984 demonstrations shook the country. In response to increased prices and rumors of impending tuition increases, students took to the streets.[21] With nearly one-half of its strength located around Casablanca, where the Islamic Summit Conference was convened, the security forces responded slowly. Demonstrations spread to approximately fifty cities and included a wide range of social groups.[22] It took nearly three weeks for security forces to restore order. Hassan II then appeared on television, promising not to raise prices on staple goods, something only weeks earlier he had argued was inevitable.[23] By January 23 all was quiet. Approximately one hundred persons were killed, and USFP party members were prosecuted, but the party did not react.

The 1984 riots were far more significant than the 1981 strikes. The demonstrations began without negotiations between the unions and the government. Indeed, although the parties' statements had fueled frustration, the parties did not call a strike. The 1984 rioting lacked a clearly defined leadership in officially recognized channels. This lack was evident in the speech from the throne on July 7. The king, waving a picture of Khomeini and tracts from the illegal opposition group Ilal Amam, blamed Communists, Marxists, Leninists, and Islamists for the unrest.[24] With the costs of mobilization during the Islamic Conference low, social forces outside the official channels of power now challenged the government.

After 1984 both included opponents and the palace recognized that more radical, excluded groups could exploit public dissatisfaction to make demands that neither liked. Consequently, the king sought to strengthen the loyalists' political control. The loyalists, fearing both the high costs of repression and demands of the radicals, became less willing to challenge the palace.

Following the rioting, the king sought to strengthen his control. In a campaign to foster his religious legitimacy he appointed a new minister of Islamic affairs.[25] In 1988 he also strengthened nonreligious associations in the larger cities to give individuals an alternative venue for political participation.[26] Most important, the palace reinforced the role of the legal political parties. As Zartman noted:

> After the 1981 and 1984 riots, the king required all candidates in the September 1984 elections to be members of a party. Henceforth, opposition was to be organized and organizations were to be responsible, thereby enlisting them in the government's job of control. With a common interest in avoiding anomie, government and unions bargain over demands in support of the polity.[27]

Loyalists hoped the partnership would expand their power, but they were disappointed. During the 1984 elections the nationalist parties, including the *Istiqlal* party, lost parliamentary seats to the promonarchy Constitutional Union.[28] The parties also suffered from internal weaknesses, in part due to internal debates over the extent to which they would benefit from cooperating with or challenging the king. By the late 1980s some party leaders argued that, unless they put pressure on the king, they would remain in an unacceptably stifling political situation. In 1989 the king asked the opposition parties to support postponement of the elections for two years to give time for the situation in the Western Sahara to improve. Although relations between the USFP and government were tense, the USFP eventually agreed.

However, when political and economic changes were not made by early 1990, CDT and USFP leaders began to rally for a general strike. By April 1990 the CDT called for a general strike, but other opposition parties refused to join.[29] Consequently, the CDT postponed the strike. A stalemate lasted until December. Debates within the parties and discussions between the CDT and the UGTM led to a jointly sponsored strike on December 14, 1990. The government warned public servants against participating, and security was tightened in Casablanca and Rabat. Yet, while the large coastal cities remained under control, parts of Fes went up in flames.

The violence in Fes mirrored earlier riots. People from the shantytowns rioted; police responded fiercely; death and arrest counts were high; and in the end the government and the unions blamed each other for the devastation.[30] The lesson for the palace was that it could no longer contain nationwide popular strikes. Unlike 1981, when the level of discontent may have surprised both sides, or 1984, when the government was caught offguard, the danger of the 1990 strike was understood. The palace had ample time to prepare, and both union and government officials expected it to remain under control.[31] Nevertheless, even with advanced warning the palace failed to control all parts of Morocco at once.

The palace and loyalist opponents sought to avoid a confrontation that radical opponents might exploit. The king formalized social pact negotiations with the UMT, the UGTM, and the CDT and established advisory councils including opposition members (for example, the *Conseil National de la Jeunesse et de l'Avenir*, CNJA, headed by USFP leader Habib El Malki). It also allowed the opposition to protest against the Gulf War through a well-organized demonstration in Rabat, and in 1992 the king announced plans to revise the constitution.

The opposition parties tried to exploit this opening. They formed the Bloc, or *Kutla*, composed of the *Istiqlal*, USFP, *Union Nationale des Forces Populaires* (UNFP), *Parti du Progrés et du Socialisme* (PPS), and *Organisation de l'Action Démocratique et Populaire* (OADP). This bloc was intended to increase the opposition's bargaining power in the negotiations over constitutional revisions. By presenting a single candidate in each district, it also sought to win more seats. Coordination failed, however, and only the *Istiqlal* and USFP presented a joint slate.

The opposition's demands were not met. In campaigning for the upcoming elections, the parties continued to demand political reforms.[32] Furthermore, while direct elections were a success for the opposition parties, indirect elections were disappointing. After the USFP, OADP, PPS, and *Istiqlal* won one hundred of the 222 seats in the direct elections, the minister of interior allegedly stepped in to reverse this success. In the indirect elections the opposition parties and their associated unions won only twenty-two of 111 seats, leading them to call "foul."[33]

Although the king offered the opposition a limited role in the government, he would not allow them to mobilize in the streets.[34] In February 1994 the CDT called for a general strike, but the UGTM, the UMT, and the opposition parties were unwilling to agree. A UGTM leader explained: "we could smell trouble in the air." The prolonged economic crisis raised levels of frustration. Combined with Ramadan fasting, they feared a general strike would become uncontrollable.[35] The king also announced that a general strike would be illegal.[36] If the CDT persisted in mobilizing, the penalties would be high. Within twenty-four hours of the deadline, the CDT delayed the strike. Consequently, the king responded publicly and directly to the

union's demands in his throne speech of March 3 and resumed social dialogue.[37]

By the mid 1990s opposition parties were unwilling to mobilize. In part, they were unwilling due to internal difficulties.[38] More important, many feared the demands and inertia of dissatisfaction among the masses. This fear was evident during the railway strike of 1995. Shortly before *Eid al-Idha*, railway workers called a nationwide strike. Their dissatisfaction had been mounting, and at last the three major unions, the UMT, CDT, and UGTM, announced an indefinite strike. Union leaders expected the work stoppage to be relatively short, but their members were prepared for a much longer, harsher struggle. For nearly one month CDT leader Nubir Amaoui tried to call off the strike. He was concerned that a prolonged struggle would lead to violence and that it could possibly spread to and be exploited by other groups. Undoubtedly, it could result in repression of the union and the party. It could also exacerbate already high tensions in the party. Despite his concerns and his popularity as a union and party leader, the strike continued for twenty-eight days, to June 6, 1995.[39] It won some concessions, but also demonstrated the extent to which the legal opposition feared an uncontrollable movement.[40]

The opposition ended the strikes despite unmet demands. Opposition parties had recently conducted difficult negotiations with the government. Hoping to entice the opposition parties to join the government, the king had offered them portfolios after the 1994 elections, but they refused, demanding the removal of the minister of the interior, Driss Basri.[41] The king responded that removing the heavy-handed interior minister would "dangerously affect the good running of the sacred institutions," and negotiations broke down.[42] After nearly one month, Prime Minister Filali formed a cabinet of traditional loyalists, and opposition demands remained unmet.[43]

The union also thwarted the strikes despite fewer government threats. In contrast to 1994, the palace took a less threatening tone. It argued that the strikes would hurt the economy, but it did not repress the opposition.[44] It did not need to do so.

The opposition feared that the Islamist opposition would use disorder as a springboard. Islamists in Morocco remained fragmented but were getting stronger.[45] Through the economic crisis they strengthened their ties with the people by providing social support services that the masses desperately needed. In contrast, the opposition parties seemed impotent and focused on political debates in which the majority of Moroccans had little interest. Islamist activity on the campuses and confrontations between Islamists and secularists became more common. Islamists rioted at the University of Fes in February 1994, leaving five seriously injured.[46] In addition, Islamists had access to potentially dangerous resources, as the discovery of arms caches in and around Fes in the summer 1994 showed. Party leaders made some efforts to diffuse competition with the Islamists by drawing them into the party structure.[47] However, the chasm between the two camps was wide. Many Islamists viewed the party system as conservative and ineffective and rallied for a more radical departure from the status quo. Similarly, most party elites considered the

Islamists' agendas to be worse than the current system and worried about Islamists' increasing strength.[48] Thus, they declined to promote popular unrest, which they feared Islamic elites would harness to demand radical change.

The parties also feared increased repression. Since 1990 the government granted some concessions. The revision of the constitution, public acknowledgment of the union's demands following the proposed general strike in 1994, the removal of Prime Minister Lamrani, a long-time opponent of the unions, and the resumption of social dialogue were all steps toward negotiation with the legal opposition. However, the palace also made it clear that opposition attempts to press demands through popular mobilization would not be tolerated. Party elites, who remembered the repression of the 1960s and the early 1970s under the current minister of interior, knew that, if they promoted unrest, they would pay a very high price.

The opposition parties were thus squeezed between explosion from the bottom and repression from the top, which narrowed their political space and made them less willing to mobilize for political concessions. Loyalists thus preferred to back down than to escalate conflicts with the palace.[49] As one Moroccan intellectual put it in 1995, "we look at Iraq, Algeria and Iran and know that we are much better off."[50]

Opposition-Government Interactions in an Undivided Environment: Jordan

Unlike Morocco, Jordan's political environment was undivided. In this environment opponents should continue to demand reforms until their demands are met, regardless of minor concessions made over the course of the crisis. They are also more likely to form coalitions across ideological divides.

At the beginning of the economic crisis, all opposition was illegal in Jordan. Nevertheless, political opponents used professional associations, informal organizations, and underground parties and publications to demand reform.[51] In 1982, responding to pressure, the king enlarged the number of appointments to the National Consultative Council (NCC).[52] The next year, the minister of interior allowed the formation of an illegal political party, the Democratic Unionist Association.[53] Finally, in 1984 the king reopened parliament, holding by-elections for empty seats in 1985.[54]

However, none of these changes met opponents' demands. As the economic situation worsened, opponents from secularist and Islamist tendencies as well as Transjordanian and Palestinian origins called for reforms. Most notably, the relationship between Islamists and the king, which was traditionally cooperative, deteriorated by the mid 1980s, largely due to their increased strength.[55] Islamists in Jordan capitalized on the Iranian revolution, the increased economic discontent after 1983, and their access to governmental institutions (particularly the ministries of education and religious endowments) to gain popular support. By 1985 'Abdallah Akaylah, a

Muslim Brotherhood (MB) representative, estimated that 10 percent of the population supported the Brotherhood.[56] The MB was the single strongest, best organized political force in the country.

As Islamists gained strength, they demanded reforms. Many in secondary schools and universities argued that the Jordanian monarchy was not "wholly Islamic" and that legislation should be based upon the principles of Islam. The king responded to the increasing discontent by recalling parliament in January 1984, but he did not compromise on the MB's demands. By 1985 he publicly attacked the Brotherhood.[57] The *mukhabarat* then moved against some of the MB's most prominent figures, and the government passed the Law on Sermons and Guidance in Mosques, giving the government the right to censor sermons and ban preachers.[58]

In part, the rift between the Brotherhood and the palace was due to the king's foreign policies. His engagement with Arafat in the peace process raised considerable opposition, which he hoped to reduce by repressing the MB.[59] Furthermore, as the economic situation worsened, he turned away from his alliance with Iraq and toward restoring relations with Syria.[60] Distancing himself from the MB could help, since Syria claimed that Jordan had supported its MB opposition.

Nevertheless, the Islamists in the undivided political environment were not deterred from confronting the king. As the MB gained strength, it became less likely to compromise with the king. Islamists did not fear other groups' joining in the fray but rather used popular discontent to demand political reforms.

The first unrest occurred in 1986 at Yarmouk University. On May 11 students demonstrated for the revocation of increased fees, the Arabization of the university's curriculum, an end to rigid control over students' lives, student representation on university committees, and the release of detained colleagues. Authorities arrested demonstrators, but the protestors grew to nearly 1,500. Students demanded both economic and political reforms. Riot police stormed the campus. Three students were killed, many injured, and nearly 800 arrested. Husayn angrily blamed the Communist party and MB for the unrest, recognizing that the opposition spanned the ideological spectrum and might coalesce.[61]

Throughout the late 1980s popular dissatisfaction increased, centering on charges of corruption, limited freedom of speech, the underrepresentation of the urban majority in the NCC, and the failure of national legislation to conform to Islam. Although the government allowed demonstrations in support of the *intifadah* and in May 1988 King Husayn relinquished control over the West Bank, tensions mounted. The government reportedly detained dozens of left-wing opponents.[62] The regime also dissolved the editorial boards of Jordan's major newspapers and replaced them with handpicked members. The editor of *al-Ra'i* then wrote, on behalf of the regime, that the professional associations had surpassed their role. As the associations boycotted the paper, the government threatened to shut the associations down, and most believed increased repression was inevitable.[63]

However, the economic crisis forced Jordan to accept IMF-directed adjustment plans. On April 17, 1989, Jordanians, who had seen their average annual per capita income decline 50 percent in the previous six years, awoke to significant price increases on basic goods.[64] Nearly immediately, rioting started in the south and spread to Amman. The violence escalated into what some opponents have called the "Jordanian *intifada*," lasting three days and leaving at least seven killed and thirty-four injured.[65]

Although the parties did not start the rioting, they exploited it to demand reforms.[66] Underground parties with links to the outlying areas promoted the unrest and pressed their agendas. A broad spectrum of civic organizations issued communiqués demanding reforms: personal freedoms, the lifting of martial law, relegalization of political parties, and the resumption of parliamentary life. They charged the government with nepotism, corruption, and fiscal mismanagement and called for the resignation of Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i.[67]

King Husayn recognized the significance of the unrest and returned from the U.S. The Palestinians, often considered the king's greatest political threat, had refrained from rioting. The violence occurred in the king's traditional stronghold, among the Transjordanians in the south, demonstrating the level of discontent and the limitations of a system based upon the cooptation of tribal elites. Furthermore, after the riots Jordanians of both East Bank and Palestinian origins voiced similar demands. As a senior government official explained, "the real issue was a popular rejection of a whole government system that does not allow for the minimum required level for political expression of participation."[68] Another argued: "the barrier of fear [had] collapsed. People [were] much more aware of their power to make change. They [were] saying, 'enough is enough.'"[69]

The king announced reform. He changed the government, called the first general elections since 1966, granted political prisoners amnesty, allowed reasonable criticism in the press, and, although martial law remained in effect, allowed political parties to reorganize publicly.[70] The palace and the opposition also negotiated over the rules of formal political participation. By June 1991 the National Charter (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*) was ratified at a conference of 2,000 leading Jordanians. As in Morocco, legal political parties in Jordan agreed to accept the legitimacy of the monarchy and also to operate without foreign funding or influence.

Political liberalization resulted from economic decline and increased popular discontent that strengthened the opposition.[71] In response to economic difficulties, Palestinians and Transjordanians demanded reform. In a formally undivided political environment all groups were excluded from the system and thus expected to gain from the confrontation. Thus, as the crisis came to a head in 1989, Islamists and secularists, Transjordanians and Palestinians, all demanded reform.

The changes after 1989 were dramatic, but they did not represent a loss in the king's control. As one observer noted:

What's happening here [in Jordan], then, is new and different—a fundamental, perhaps generational, transition that is both less threatening and more promising than the crisis-mongers would have you believe. Husayn is not so much losing his grip as he is loosening it in a calculated effort to tighten the hold of his Hashemite dynasty.[72]

Although press freedom increased, newspapers remained subject to close censorship.[73] Similarly, the courts remained under the palace's control, with little incentive to challenge the government.[74] King Husayn changed the political rules but not the distribution of power.[75]

More important, Husayn maintained an undivided political environment.[76] Moderates, such as Ibrahim 'Izzidine, argued for this strategy. "You cannot deny people the right to organize as they wish. The best thing is to give every group the chance to operate publicly. If you try to suppress any opinion or trend, you will have problems such as we have witnessed in many parts of the world."[77] Islamist and secular parties, as well as those connected to Transjordanian and Palestinian origins, entered the formal political system.

Although liberalization initially reduced opposition challenges, its demands increased over time. Opposition elites expected that the government would become more accountable and that corruption would decline. This expectation seemed warranted. The king decided to remain neutral during the Gulf War, rather than side with his Saudi and U.S. sponsors, and elites stated that democracy was necessary for economic reform.

However, the expectations went unfulfilled. In part, Husayn sought peace with the Israelis, hoping to rejoin the international community and ease his economic problems. An active, influential opposition could be a stumbling block to a peace agreement, and thus the palace took early measures to check the Islamists. The king appointed only one Islamist, Ishaq Farhan, to the forty-member senate, leaving it dominated by Transjordanian loyalists.[78] Furthermore, Mudar Badran offered the Muslim Brotherhood only one seat in his first cabinet, which it rejected. Although the palace subsequently allowed the Brotherhood to enter the government as tensions before the Gulf War mounted, it dismissed the government soon after the Gulf War, in June 1991.[79] Throughout 1991 and 1992 the ministry of interior banned large public meetings held by the Islamists, and in the Political Parties Law of 1992 the government officially barred political parties (broadly interpreted to include the Muslim Brotherhood) from using schools and religious institutions for political activities. Finally, while it accepted the election results, the palace downplayed the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, noting that only 25 percent of voters and only 10 percent of the 1.6 million eligible voters cast ballots for Islamic fundamentalists.[80]

A more significant reversal in liberalization took place after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993. King Husayn saw the agreement as removing the major obstacle to forging a separate Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement. Consequently, he

tightened control over policymaking. Revisions in the electoral law issued on August 13, 1993, just months before the November 1993 elections, disadvantaged leftist and Islamic opponents.[81] In addition, the palace limited the roles of both parliament and the cabinet, most notably failing to inform either of the details of the Washington agreement of July 1994 and the Peace Treaty of October 1994 prior to their signing.[82]

Nevertheless, the treaty exacerbated political tensions. Armed with increased popular discontent over the peace accords and a deteriorating economy and united in a common demand for political power, a broad political coalition formed to oppose Husayn's policies. By early 1995, Islamists and leftists formed an Anti-Normalization Committee, directing their attacks at the king's most fundamental policies and threatening his legitimacy. These attacks not only made the continuation of the peace process more difficult but demanded that the king go beyond the relatively easy political changes that had already been made.[83] They demanded significant concessions: more freedoms and a larger policymaking role.

The palace responded with repression. Continued criticism of the peace treaty was disruptive and unacceptable, and those willing to step across these lines would be punished. In November 1995 Prime Minister Zayd Bin Shakir warned that "any denial of [Jordan's] achievements is tantamount to treason" and took steps to tighten the Press Law to "safeguard a 'responsible' press."[84] One month later King Husayn repeated that he was prepared for "a show-down with the opponents of his policies towards Israel and in the region generally."[85] In part, he was reacting angrily to Jordanian opposition to the peace treaty, which only intensified after Jordanians watched King Husayn and Queen Noor grieve the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.[86] Yet, even when the peace treaty became a *fait accompli*, the escalation continued.

In an undivided political environment during a prolonged economic crisis, the opposition remained united. In 1996 the economic situation deteriorated. The government announced that it would once again lower bread subsidies, raising prices by 300 percent. Despite King Husayn's personal appeal on July 12 to Jordanians to support the government's decision, opposition escalated. On July 21 activists broke into the parliament on the first day of the extraordinary session. Parliamentary opposition members from the left to the Islamists spoke strongly against the price increases. Petitioners presented 30,000 signatures, including forty-one members of parliament, asking the government not to increase prices, and the parliamentary opposition warned that the government could face a no confidence vote.[87] Yet on August 16 the government raised bread prices while King Husayn closed the parliamentary session. Widespread public rioting shook Jordan for a second time in less than a decade, and the palace responded by calling in army units and imposing a curfew.[88]

The palace clamped down. Ignoring the opposition, it sponsored the 1997 Press and Publication Law, providing more restrictions on publications and more severe

penalties for infractions.[89] It also refused to engage in serious dialogue with the opposition about revising the 1993 Electoral Law. As a result, ten opposition parties boycotted the upcoming elections. Turnout nationally was a low 54.5 percent and in urban areas, where political parties were strong, as low as 20 percent.[90] Once again, the opposition coalition spanned ideological tendencies and the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide and was willing to pressure the king.[91]

As popular support for Husayn reached a nadir, the opposition called for public demonstrations in support of Iraq. The government banned the demonstrations, in marked contrast to the 1991 Gulf War. The opposition risked crossing the line by mobilizing the demonstrations despite the prohibition. On February 13, 1998, over 2,000 opponents protested after Friday prayers at a mosque in Amman. The following week demonstrators marched in the typically loyalist southern town of Ma'an, ending in a three day confrontation that left one killed and the town under curfew.

Nevertheless, the opposition remained united. By June 13, 1998, its members, now including the nine political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, the lawyers syndicate, and eleven prominent individuals, came together formally to form the Conference for National Reform. Despite continued threats of repression, it held its first national congress on July 25, 1998.

The importance of this broad coalition should not be understated. There is little love lost among the opposition groups. Secularist-Islamist tensions are high, and the Palestinian-Transjordanian divide is deep. Indeed, in 1989 some Islamists accused a prominent female secularist candidate, Toujan Faysal, of "apostasy," declaring her incompetent, dissolving her marriage, and promising immunity to anyone who would "shed her blood."[92] Furthermore, even after King Husayn's relinquishment of the West Bank alleviated tensions, there were important differences between Transjordanian and Palestinian views. Finally, power struggles between the coalition partners constantly threatened to tear them apart.[93] Yet the coalition continued to challenge the king.

In the undivided political environment such spiraling conflict between the king and the opposition is expected. As the economic situation deteriorates, the probability that the opposition can succeed in mobilizing unrest increases. Because no political opponents will be disadvantaged in an exploited conflict, they are willing to coalesce to press their demands. The king's only hope of controlling the situation is to coopt greater portions of the political field, while increasing the costs of mobilization through greater repression. Not surprisingly, by 1998 most activists and observers agreed that the system had returned nearly full circle to the dark year of 1988.[94]

Yet, while opposition groups feared the king's retribution, they did not fear each other. Indeed, repression only united them further. Political pluralism and a joint struggle to obtain it can benefit all. As MB leader Khalil al-Shubaki explained with regard to the Brotherhood's cooperation with leftist parties: "It is coordination over a

common cause. It does not mean that we recognize the legitimacy of their thoughts. We believe in political pluralism as long as it is within the general Islamic framework. What we want for ourselves, we want it for others too."[95]

Conclusion

The dynamics of political unrest during periods of economic crisis should vary systematically, depending on political environment. In an undivided environment political demands increase as popular discontent increases. During prolonged economic crises political opponents become more likely to demand political change. Their coalitions also widen as the crises continue. In a divided environment loyalists become less likely to press for political change. During prolonged economic crises excluded political contenders expand their popular support. This opposition becomes increasingly threatening to both the government and the loyalist opposition, and it nearly paralyzes the latter. Loyalist elites, fearing that radical forces may exploit political instability to press their own demands, become unwilling to mobilize the masses against incumbents.

It is thus theoretically rewarding to extend the analysis of government-opposition relations to include the way incumbents structure relations between competing opposition groups. The influence of political environments is not limited to monarchies. For instance, in Egypt the divided environment under Mubarak has helped keep the loyalist opposition in check, particularly in the early to mid 1990s. Similarly, in Iran the shah's decision to eliminate competing opposition parties in the mid 1970s removed the last vestiges of legitimacy from the party system. In the resulting undivided system, a broad coalition of opposition forces united to overthrow the shah.

Despite the importance of political environments, many questions remain unanswered. The most difficult is why incumbents promote certain institutional arrangements. Why do they admit a wider or narrower portion of political constituencies to the formal system? It is much more difficult to explain why than to examine how these institutions affect political behavior. Second, how well do incumbents in these institutional arrangements withstand severe political challenges? When does a degree of political liberalization limit opponents' demands, and when does it provide fuel for greater mobilization? Preliminary research suggests that a weak security system, in which opposition groups can exploit some political unrest, may help reduce opposition in the divided but not in the undivided environment. To understand fully the prospects for political reform in authoritarian states, it is necessary to explain more fully how incumbents promote and preserve different relations among their political opponents.

NOTES

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1. See Robert Bates, "The Impulse of Reform in Africa," in Jennifer Widner, ed., *Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). For empirical support, see Susan C. Stokes, "Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990–1995," *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (October 1996), 544–65; Jorge Buendia, "Economic Reform, Public Opinion and Presidential Approval in Mexico, 1988–1993," *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (October 1996), 566–91. See also, Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, eds., *Privatisation and Liberalization in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954–1984," *Comparative Politics*, 19 (October 1986), 1–24; Joan M. Nelson, ed., *Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., *The Politics of Economic Adjustment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Henri J. Barkey ed., *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 29 (October 1996), 23–42; Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy, *Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East* (London: British Academic Press, 1993); Richard Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *Adjustment Crises in the Third World* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1984). As Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), argue, not all economic crises yield political change, and not all regime changes are preceded by economic crises. While their work focuses on how regime types influence the likelihood of political change, this article examines how the ways regime types structure relationships between opposition groups influence the level of pressure on them during economic crises. Even similar regime types can experience very different changes in political opposition during economic crises.

2. See Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Laurie Brand, *Women, the State and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); P. A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin, *Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of the Tribes* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Fathi H. Schirin, *Jordan: An Invented Nation?* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1994); S. A. Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Mustapha Sehimi, "Les élites ministerielles au Maroc: Constantes et variables," in J. Santucci, ed., *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1992); I. William Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," in Giacomo Luciani ed., *The Arab State* (London: Routledge, 1990); Driss Ben Ali, "Changement de pacte sociale et continuité de l'ordre au Maroc," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris: CNRS, 1989), pp. 51–72; John Waterbury, *Commander of the Faithful* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

3. Abdelkader Berrada and M. Said Saadi, "Le grand capital privé marocain," in *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1992), pp. 313–23; Habib El Malki, *Trente ans d'économie marocaine 1960–1990* (Paris: CNRS, 1989); Hanane Larbi and Rachid Sbihi, *Économie marocaine: Une radioscope* (Rabat: Al Maarif Al Jadida, 1986); Serge Leymarie and Jean Tripier, *Maroc: Le prochain dragon?* (Paris: Editions EDDIF, 1992); Habib El Malki, "L'endettement international du Maroc: Un fait de longue durée?," in Abdlelali Doumou, ed., *L'État Marocain dans le durée (1850–1985)* (Mohammedia: Fedala, 1987), pp. 153–72; Rhys Payne, "Economic Crisis and Policy Reform," in I. William Zartman and Mark Habeeb, eds., *Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa* (Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 139–67; Driss Khrouz, *L'économie marocaine: Les raisons de la crise* (Casablanca: Les Éditions Maghrebines, 1988); Chaouki Benazzou and Tawfik Mouline, *Panorama économique du Maroc, 1985–1990* (Rabat: El Maarif Al Jadida, 1993).

4. The unemployment rate among those with secondary education grew from 27.6 percent in 1984 to 43.4 percent in 1990. Direction de la Statistique, *La Population Active Urbaine* (Rabat: Direction de la Statistique, 1990); Direction de la Statistique, *La Population Active Urbaine* (Rabat: Direction de la Statistique, 1993).

5. *Jordan Times*, July 22, 1992.

6. John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan eds., *Civil Society and the State in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vols. 1 and 2 (London: E. J. Brill, 1995, 1996); also, Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978). States can use civil society as a control mechanism. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil Society as Social Control," *Comparative Politics*, 33 (October 2000), 43–61.

7. In Jordan all political parties were driven underground in 1957, and the trade unions were effectively depoliticized in the early 1970s. In Morocco political parties operated openly from the early 1970s, and the two main opposition parties, the USFP and *Istiqlal*, have close ties with large unions, the *Confédération Démocratique du Travail* (CDT), tied to the USFP, and the *Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc* (UGTM), tied to the *Istiqlal*.

8. Barbara Geddes, "Economic Reform and Democracy: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," *Journal of Democracy*, 5 (October 1994), 104–18.

9. This analysis relies on rational choice theory, which provides the most room to examine the effects of state-provided, negative incentives to participation on the dynamics of political opposition.

10. This typology overlaps in part with those of Dahl and Tilly, but neither examines the effects of divisions in the formal system on the opposition's willingness to mobilize. See Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Tilly, ch. 3. Although informal institutions are important, this analysis focuses on the role the formal institutions play in influencing the dynamics of political opposition. It thus has some commonalities with work on political opportunity structures in social movement theory. See, for instance, J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

11. For a more formal presentation of this argument, see Ellen Lust-Okar, *State Management of Political Opposition: Lessons from the Middle East* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.)

12. Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," p. 223.

13. Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Remy Leveau, "Islam et contrôle politique au Maroc," in Françoise Burgat and William Dowell, eds., *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989); Abderrahim Lamchichi, *Islam et contestation au Maghreb* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989); Driss Ben Ali, "Emergence de l'espace socio-politique et stratégie de l'état au Maroc," in Ali Sedjari ed., *État, Espace et Pouvoir Locale* (Rabat: Les éditions guessous, 1991), pp. 61–74.

14. See *Ittihad Ishtiraki*, June 12, 1981. The UMT leadership argued, however: "18 juin 1981: succès total de la grève générale à Casablanca et Mohammadia dans l'ordre, la détermination, l'enthousiasme et la responsabilité." *L'Avant garde*, June 18, 1981, p. 1.

15. Interviews with party leaders, members, and observers.

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16. The minister of interior recorded sixty-six deaths and eleven injuries; opposition parties, the *Association des Marocains en France*, and a Canadian member of the International Commission of Jurists argued that 600–1,000 died. *Le Monde*, July 1, 1981; *Africa Diary*, Nov. 19–25, 1981, pp. 10747–48. The USFP and CDT claimed that 162 of their members were arrested. *Maroc Soir*, June 28, 1981; *Al Bayane*, July 16, 1981.

17. Muhammad Jibril, "Les évenements et les problèmes de fond," *Lamalif*, 127 (July-August 1981), 28–31; *Maroc Soir*, June 27, 1981.

18. *Le Temps*, July 10, 1981.

19. *Africa Diary*, Oct. 9–15, 1983, p. 11621.

20. Interview with Dr. 'Abdalmajid Bouzouba, Adjoint Secretary General and Secretary of Information of CDT, Council Member of USFP, Rabat, July 14, 1995. Other party members and observers confirmed this insight.

21. Prices increased 67 percent on butter, 33 percent on cooking oil, and 16 percent on lump sugar.

22. The most serious demonstrations took place in al-Hoceima, Nador, and Tetouan in the north. See Jean-François Clément, "Les révoltes urbaines," *Le Maroc Actuel* (Paris: CNRS, 1993), pp. 392-406; Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 156; Majdi Majid, *Les luttes de classes au Maroc depuis l'indépendence* (Rotterdam: Editions Hiwar, 1987).

23. *Washington Post*, Jan. 23, 1984.

24. *Africa Diary*, July 1–7, 1984, p. 11944; David Seddon, "Popular Protest and Political Opposition in Tunisian [sic], Morocco, and Sudan 1984–1985," in Kenneth Brown, ed., *État, ville et mouvements sociaux au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient* (Paris: CNRS, 1986), pp. 179–97.

25. Sam Younger, "Morocco and Western Sahara," *Africa Review*, 9 (1985), 205–11.

26. For example, the Grand Atlas in Marakesh, Bou Regreg at Sale, Fes-Saiss in Fes, Angad Maroc Oriental in Oujda, and Figuig and Taza and the Mediterranean in Tangier. Their leaders included El Hadj Mediouri (head of royal security), Muhammad Awad (palace adviser), Muhammad Kebbaj (minister of finance), Ahmad Osman (king's brother-in-law and former prime minister), and Maati Bouabid (former prime minister).

27. Zartman, "Opposition as Support of the State," p. 230.

28. The Constitutional Union received 24.79 percent of the votes (eighty-three seats); USFP 12.39 percent (thirty-nine seats); and *Istiqlal* 15.33 percent (forty-three seats). "Une nouvelle géographie politique," *Lamalif* (October 1984), 4–5; Alain Claisse, "Èlections communales et législatives au Maroc," *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1985* (Paris: CNRS, 1987), pp. 631–68.

29. Interview with Mustapha Terrab, adviser to King Hassan II, Rabat, July 12, 1995; interview with Bouzoubaa; 'Ali Yata (secretary general of the PPS, MP), "Le PPS, la question nationale et le mouvement national et progressiste," *Économie et Socialisme*, 11 (January 1992), 87–114.

30. Hizb al-Istiqlal, *Hizb al-Istiqlal Bayna al-Mu'tamarayn (1985–1994)* (Rabat: Al Sharakat al-Maghrabia, 1995); Lijnat al-Tansiq al-Watani wal-Dawli, *Nubir Amaoui, Rajal wa Qadiah* (Casablanca: Matba'a Dar al-Nashir al-Maghrabi, 1993); Robert Radcliffe, "Fulbright Student Letter, Fez, Morocco, December 20, 1990," unpublished manuscript.

31. Interview with Muhammed El Merghadi, member, USFP, Fes, May 16, 1995; Nubir Amaoui, Secretary General of CDT, member of USFP central committee, Casablanca, May 1995; Bouzoubaa.

32. FBIS–NES–93–179, Sept. 17, 1993.

33. The MP won fifty-four seats; UC, sixty-six seats; PND, twenty-two seats. In the democratic block, the USFP won fifty-three seats; *Istiqlal*, forty-nine seats; PPS, fifteen seats; OADP, two seats; CDT, four seats; and UGTM, two seats. Among the loyalist parties, the RNI won thirty-three seats; MNP, twenty-five seats; PDI, three seats; UMT, three seats; and independents, two seats. FBIS–NES–93–181, Sept. 21, 1993. Henry Munson, Jr. "International Election Monitoring: A Critique Based on One Monitor's Experience in Morocco," *MERIP*, 209 (Winter 1998), 37–39; Henry Munson, Jr., "The Elections of 1993 and Democratization in Morocco," in Rahma Bourgia and Susan Gilson Miller, eds., *In the Shadow of the Sultan: Culture, Power, and Politics in Morocco* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp. 259–81; Thomas C. Bayer, *Morocco: Direct Legislative Elections Monitoring/Observation Report* (Washington, D.C.: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 1993).

34. The opposition refused to join the government, arguing that real political change was impossible if Driss Basri remained in office. Limited government participation might also have weakened the parties. *Middle East Economic Digest Quarterly Report* (November 1993), 12; interviews with party leaders; *Le Matin du Sahara*, Oct. 9, 1993, cited in A. Agnouche, "La fiction de l'alternance politique au Maroc," manuscript; Susan Waltz, "Interpreting Political Reform in Morocco," in Bourgia and Miller, eds., pp. 282–305.

35. Interviews with party and union members from both the *Istiqlal*/UGTM and USFP/CDT.

36. Under Article 14 of the constitution, a law would outline conditions for strikes. Since the law had not yet been drafted, the king argued that he could declare the planned strike illegal.

37. Most notably, the king dismissed Prime Minister Lamrani, who was hostile to trade unions, and appointed Prime Minister Filali.

38. At this time there were major changes in the OADP leadership, explosions within the USFP, and for a first time a fervently divisive PPS congress. *La Vie Économique*, July 28, 1995, pp. 3–4; *Maroc Hebdo*, July 28–Sept. 7, 1995, pp. 6–7; *La Vie Économique*, July 21, 1995, pp. 3–4; *Maroc Hebdo*, July 21–27, 1995, pp. 24–25; interviews with party members.

39. It was widely rumored that union and party leaders shared these concerns. Interviews with party members and with a western diplomat, Rabat, June 27, 1995.

40. The unions were reimbursed half salary for the strike period and won an annual bonus and a new national advisory council. *Ittihad Ishtiraki*, June 3, 1995, p. 1.

41. Driss Basri was dismissed only when King Muhammad VI assumed the throne after his father's death. See FBIS–NES–95–007, Jan. 11, 1995, p. 19.

42. FBIS–NES–95–008, Jan. 12, 1995, pp. 15–16; FBIS–NES–95–010, Jan. 17, 1995, p. 129.

43. The cabinet included the MP, UC, and PND; Ahmed Osman's RNI and Mahjoubi Ahardan's MNP remained outside government due to a dispute over their choice of ministers and portfolios. FBIS–NES–95–035, Mar. 22, 1995, p. 23; FBIS–NES–95–040, Mar. 29, 1995, p. 37; FBIS–NES–95–238, Dec. 12, 1995, p. 22.

44. Interviews with party and nonparty members, 1995.

45. USFP internal memorandum, cited in *Jeune Afrique*, June 22–28, 1995, pp. 16–17. Politically involved Moroccans who voiced concerns of increasing Islamist strength and the related threat of military intervention included Najeeb Akesbi, member of USFP, Professor of Economics, Agricultural Institute, Rabat, July 13, 1995; Abdelhay Moudden, Professor of Political Science, Rabat, July 6, 1995; Abdallah Saaf, Professor of Political Science, Mohamad V University, Rabat, July 24, 1995; Aissa Elouardighi, member of Central Committee of OADP, member of SNU-Sep, Rabat, June 26, 1995; also, U.S. Economic Officer, Casablanca, March 8, 1995.

46. *Foreign Report*, Feb. 24, 1994, pp. 1–2.

47. For example, a Friday Islamic supplement in the *Istiqlal* party newspaper and the USFP's return of Mohammad Basri. *Maghreb: MEED Quarterly Report* (November 1993), 24–25.

48. As Clement Henry Moore, "Political Parties," in Zartman and Habeeb, eds., pp. 42–67, noted, "time may be running out for the parties." Similar concerns were expressed in a meeting of PPS youth before the 1995 national congress, Centre d'Étude et de Recherche Aziz Bellal, Rabat, July 8, 1995, and in an interview with Hafez Amiri, USFP member and youth recruiter, Rabat, July 7, 1995. The U.S. Political Officer in Casablanca estimated that, among youth, Islamists outnumbered leftists ten to one. Interview, Casablanca, March 8, 1995.

49. Party members noted "now was not the time" to mobilize the masses, but students argued that the parties had become unwilling to challenge the palace. Interviews with observers, economics students, and party members, 1995.

50. Interview with Moudden. Other party members and the U.S. Political Officer concurred, Rabat, 1995.

51. In March 1982 a notable family published *al-Ufuq Al-Iqtisadi* to campaign for democratic freedoms. The government stopped it after twenty weeks.

52. The NCC was established in 1978 with no power to set or reject legislation. It served primarily to "co-opt intellectuals and businessmen, to appease the traditional sectors of society and to mobilize support for the regime." A. W. Khouri, "The National Consultative Council," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 13 (1981), 427–39.

53. Interview with Jamal Sha'ir, April 27, 1997.

54. Fathi, p. 103. Some suggest the he opened parliament also in preparation for Palestinian-Israeli-Jordanian peace talks. *Washington Post*, Jan. 10, 1984, p. A10.

55. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations*.

56. *Washington Post*, Dec. 27, 1985, p. A21.

57. *Jordan Times*, Nov. 11, 1985, p. 1.

58. Most prominent was Akayla, forced to resign from his position in the ministry of education and barred from returning to the University of Jordan. In total, the government "retired" seven Ikhwan from their positions in the education ministry.

59. *Washington Post*, Dec. 27, 1985, p. A21.

60. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Alliances*.

61. *The Middle East* (July 1986), 12.

62. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 13, 1988, p. 9.

63. First noted in an interview with Muhammad Masri, researcher, Center for Strategic Studies, Amman, November 10, 1995; other Jordanians and western observers concurred.

64. Income declined form $1,800 per capita in 1982 to $900 in 1988. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 1988, p. 4.

65. *Washington Post*, Apr. 21, 1989, p. A22, Apr. 24, 1989, p. A11.

66. Interviews with Radwan 'Abdallah, November 1995; 'Issa Madanat, November 20, 1995; *Washington Post*, Apr. 14, 1989, Apr. 22, 1989, pp. A1, 20.

67. *Washington Post*, Apr. 22, 1989, pp. A1, 20.

68. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 1, 1989, p. 4.

69. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, 1988, p. 3; *Washington Post*, Mar. 14, 1989, p. A21.

70. Kamel S. Abu Jaber and Schirin H. Fathi, "The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections," *Orient*, 31 (March 1990), 67–86; Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan," *Comparative Political Studies*, 32 (February 1999), 100–29; Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30 (August 1998), 387–410. Twenty-two Muslim Brotherhood adherents, fifteen Islamists with other affiliations, and ten secular antigovernment candidates were elected. Mudar Badran was appointed prime minister because of his better ties with Islamists.

71. Public opinion is based upon how well the economic grievances were met, not the political demands. Center for Strategic Studies, *Public Opinion Survey on Democracy in Jordan, Preliminary Findings* (Amman: University of Jordan, March 1993), p. 3.

72. *Washington Post*, Oct. 3, 1989, p. 3.

73. George Hawatmeh, "The Changing Role of the Press," in George Hawatmeh, ed., *The Role of the Media in Democracy: The Case of Jordan* (Amman: University of Jordan, 1995), p. 9.

74. Ahmad Obeidat, "Democracy in Jordan and Judicial Control: The Actual Situation," in H. Dobers, W. Goussous, and Y. Sara, eds., *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Jordan* (Amman: Jordanian Printing Press, 1992), pp. 39–47.

75. Discussion to the Report of the Committee of Formulation of Conclusions," in Dobers, Goussous, and Sara, eds. pp. 92–121.

76. Two radical groups remain on the fringe: Islamic *Jihad al-Bait al-Muqaddas* and *Hizb al-Tahrir*. Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in James Piscatori, ed., *Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp. 88–108; Suha Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate* (London: Grey Seal, 1996). Also, Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power in Jordan* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).

77. *Jordan Times* (Amman), July 27, 1993.

78. Abu Jaber and Fathi, pp. 61–83.

79. Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A Temporary Alliance with the Crown: The Islamic Response in Jordan," in Piscatori, ed., pp. 88–108.

80. *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 16, 1989, p. 4.

81. Previously, voters cast ballots for as many candidates as there were seats in the multimember districts. Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, *Post-Election Seminar: A Discussion of Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary Election* (Amman: al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1995).

82. The palace dominated the executive branch after liberalization. Noted by Jordanian activists, non-activists, and western observers, 1995.

83. A study conducted in 1994 found 80 percent of Jordanians opposed the peace treaty. Economic Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Jordan*, 4 (1994), 8.

84. *Jordan Times*, Nov. 19, 1995, p. 1, Dec. 1, 1995, p. 1; Abdul Karim Kabariti (Minister of Foreign Affairs), "Opening Remarks," Seminar on Democracy and Rule of Law, Amman, November 19, 1995 (author's notes).

85. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan: Democratization in Danger," *Middle East International*, Dec. 15, 1995, pp. 16–17. The arrest of Islamist Layth Shubaylat on December 9, 1995, sent a signal to opponents of normalization. *Jordan Times*, Dec. 10, 1995.

86. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, King Husayn's partner in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, was assassinated on November 4, 1995. The author witnessed Jordanians watching as the official television station carried a live broadcast of clearly distraught King Husayn and Queen Noor attending the funeral. Jordanians, many of whom sympathized with the Islamist paper's headline, "Death of a Murderer," were shocked.

87. *Middle East International*, Aug. 2, 1996, p. 11.

88. Curtis Ryan, "Peace, Bread and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund," *Middle East Policy*, 6 (October 1998), 54–66.

89. Russell Lucas, "Institutions and Regime Survival Strategies: Collective Action and Path Dependence in Jordan" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 2000).

90. *Middle East International*, Dec. 5, 1997, pp. 12–13.

91. Boycotting parties included the Islamic Action Front, Jordanian People's Unity Party, HASHD, the Constitutional Front Party, the Jordanian Arab Partisans Party, and the Nationalist Action Party (*al-Haqq*). Former interior minister Sulayman 'Arar, leading the Mustaqbal Party, and former prime ministers Taher al-Masri and Ahmed 'Ubaydat joined the boycott.

92. *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 2, 1989; interviews with Toujan Feisel and Issa Madanat, November 1995.

93. Interviews with academics and party members, 1995, 1998; *Jordan Times*, June 17, 1992, pp. 1, 5.

94. Interviews with party elites and observers in 1998.

95. *Jordan Times*, Oct. 12–13, 1995, p. A1; Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case Jordan," *Middle East Journal*, 51 (Summer 1997), 373–87.

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7.

From Social Contracts To Extraction Contracts

The Political Economy of Authoritarianism and Democracy

JOHN WATERBURY

The subtitle of this chapter bears the promise that political regimes—authoritarian and democratic—generate or are accompanied by predictable political economic arrangements. The promise, I fear, cannot be kept. The most that can be said is that there are elective affinities between regime types and certain patterns of resource utilization, but just about anything can go with anything else.

The main title of this chapter suggests a political economic transition along two major dimensions: a shift from inward-looking, state-dominated to outward-looking, private sector and market-oriented development; and from corporatist, inclusionary to more pluralist, exclusionary political arrangements. What propels the transition is economic crisis of both a structural and conjunctural nature: structural in the sense that state-led, import-substituting industrialization (ISI) is no longer economically viable, and conjunctural in the sense that the collapse of oil rents in the decade since 1982 has laid bare the structural flaws of decades of inward-looking growth strategies.

With the exceptions of "simple" economies in the regions, such as those of Somalia and Mauritania, or of oil-exporters such as Libya, Kuwait, Oman, and the UAE, virtually all countries (including Israel, but not Lebanon) experimented with and relied upon ISI that was built around large public sectors (Richards and Waterbury 1996: chap. 7; Waterbury 1993: chap. 3; World Bank 1995; Amirahmadi 1990: 145). It is an empirical fact with no obvious deductive corollary that these experiments were accompanied by political authoritarianism. That authoritarianism, in turn, was founded on broad-based corporatist coalitions that were party to "social contracts," according to

which regimes pledged welfare benefits in exchange for political discipline and quiescence. Conventional forms of direct political accountability were eschewed with the result that dissatisfaction could be expressed and accountability exerted only by indirect means. Those means included (and still include) shirking and moonlighting in the public sector workforce, government crop sabotage by smallholders, and capital flight by both entrepreneurs and migrant workers.[1]

Political legitimacy, therefore, was rooted not in approbation through the ballot box but in the ability of the regime to meet its welfare commitments. Success was measured by the absence of contestation; and if one looks at Algeria (1967–88), Tunisia (1970–90), Morocco (1972–90), the Sudan (1970–83), Egypt (1952–91), Syria (1970–), and Iraq (1975–91), the record of stability and noncontestation is depressingly consistent. I do not mean to belittle cost-of-living riots or bloody events such as the Hama massacre, but these merely showed that, although coerced as much as bought by state largesse, quiescence it was.

For the most part, then, authoritarianism and broad-based coalitions went hand in hand. But there are important exceptions which suggest that there is no necessary connection between the two, nor between political repression and inward-looking growth. For example, between 1965 and 1980, Turkey sustained a formal multiparty democracy with alternation of power (there was a blip in 1970) *and* inward-looking, state-led industrialization. In this case, political accountability was exacted through conventional means, and elected coalition governments serviced broad-based constituencies through state largesse. Since 1947, and until 1990, India has exhibited the same ability to combine an inward-oriented growth strategy and electoral democracy. The converse is also true: Outward-oriented growth strategies, relying on private sector initiative, can be combined with authoritarianism, as both Taiwan and South Korea demonstrated for nearly three decades. It is safe to say that the incumbent political elites of the Mid-dle East and North Africa, having variously recognized that their economies need far-reaching restructuring, would like to emulate the authoritarian controls that the East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) have successfully maintained.

It has become commonplace to argue that existing social contracts can no longer be maintained due to the overall economic crisis. Subsidies to urban consumers, protection and soft-budget constraints for public enterprise, bloated civil service ranks, university-biased educational systems, and military establishments routinely claiming a tenth or more of the national product constituted demands on public expenditures that could no longer be met short of fueling triple-digit inflation.

Indeed, this fiscal crisis had existed for years but had been masked by flows of petroleum rents, worker remittances, and foreign borrowing from governments.[2] All these sources began to dry up nearly simultaneously. The collapse of international oil prices had its corollary in contracting labor markets in the oil-exporting states and diminishing worker remittances to the labor-rich, oil-poor. The end of the Cold War reduced the incentives for the two superpowers to pay strategic rents to their regional clients, and in the case of Russia, continued payments were no longer economically possible.

In schematic form, the transition we have been witnessing in the Middle East and elsewhere consists in the following failed expectations: For decades most countries of the region tried to avoid foreign direct investment, while relying on foreign borrowing and external assistance; many eschewed domestic private investment, replacing it with nationalization and the expectation that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) would generate a constant surplus for the state treasury; most saw only risk in exports and instead expected domestic and regional markets to expand exponentially.

When SOEs generated consistent losses instead of surpluses; when Cold War lending dried up (although Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued to lend to Iraq during its hot war with Iran); when domestic demand grew and domestic production failed to keep pace; when imports swamped exports, then crisis drove economic reform which in turn drove political experimentation.

By and large, then, most countries in the Middle East entered into the era of structural adjustment by the mid-1980s. The experience was more or less brutal according to the case. There may be a political economy of adjustment, but as was the case with ISI, there is no obvious politics of adjustment. The general pattern consists of the following elements: Government expenditures are more or less sharply curtailed, the tax burden—direct or indirect—is increased, the coalitional base of the regime is narrowed, and compensatory payments are allocated to (a) crucial strategic allies and (b) those most severely affected by the adjustment process. There may not be much overlap between the two. Compensation functions like a lottery: Everyone has a theoretical possibility of benefiting, but only a few will actually be compensated.

Even more than was the case with ISI, we do not know if adjustment requires, or is enhanced by, authoritarian controls or by greater political liberalization. There are plausible arguments on both sides of this issue. Because public resources are so curtailed and the victims of adjustment so numerous, only authoritarian regimes, it is argued, can contain the demands of society and impose the discipline necessary to weather the crisis. Chile under Pinochet would be the model for this kind of adjustment. By contrast there are those who argue (myself included, but see Przeworski 1991 or Richards 1992) that political liberalization can help sustain the reform process in essentially two ways. First, by breaking down the state's monopoly

on the allocation of resources, liberalization obliges all or most elements of civil society to share in the apportionment of the pain of adjustment. Second, economic adjustment is often popular, *if the antecedent crisis has been deep enough,* and the architects of adjustment do not always do poorly at the polls. In short, by allowing zones of autonomous political and financial power to develop (what are commonly referred to as the components of civil society), states can displace some portion of the welfare burden and the setting of the social agenda onto the shoulders of private or quasi-private actors.

There is, of course, a price to be paid, and it is not merely the relative loss of political control that the state must absorb. Rather, it may include steps toward a new kind of contract, one that I see as approximating contracts of extraction. Part of what is at stake is the old injunction: no taxation without representation. But as I shall argue below there is far more to extraction than taxation.

Throughout the 1970s, inclusionary social contracts could be maintained through high levels of public spending and subsidy outlays. It did not much matter if one exported oil or exported labor (or, as in Algeria, both). Petroleum rents rolled in to the exporters while the oil-poor found they could borrow at negative real rates of interest. In addition, they exported their labor to the oil-rich and received substantial financial assistance from them as well.

Between 1982 and 1986 the bottom dropped out of international petroleum markets, rents shrunk, labor markets contracted, and most of the financial assistance of the regional oil-rich was redirected to Iraq—a fact that allowed a few other regional actors, principally Jordan and Turkey, to benefit by supplying the burgeoning demands of Iraq's war economy. The collapsing regional oil economy had the added effect of scaring off nonregional foreign investment that had begun to enter in the 1970s. In 1980, Arab oil exporters alone had earned $178 billion from petroleum sales, while by 1986 that figure had plummeted to $41 billion (Sadowski 1993: 6). The trends in major economic indicators are represented in figure 7.1. The only indicator that is up over the period is debt service, while arms imports on average hold their own.

Whether one tries to account for the inception of ISI and its accompanying broad-based coalition, or for its collapse, the external environment is crucial. I do not go as far as Barbara Stallings (1992) or Stephan Haggard (1990) to argue that it is, or can be, determinant, but it must be taken into account in explaining far-reaching change in economic strategies and perhaps in political arrangements as well.

The regional shifts we see today could not be explained without reference to the collapse of socialist economies and of the former USSR, which could no longer project its military power or extend economic support to its erstwhile clients in the Middle East. The statist, populist, "secularizing" regimes of the

Figure 7.1. Trends in Hard Currency Revenues and Expenditures of Arab States, 1980–88 (1980 value = 1)



Source: Sadowski 1993: 7.

Middle East fell simultaneously into economic crises that resulted from inherent flaws in the growth strategies they themselves had pursued, and into crises of legitimacy resulting from years of military humiliation coupled with the loss of successful external referents and models for their statist experiments.

There are, as well, substories that can be told only in an international context. Turkey's quest since the 1960s to join the Common Market, or now the European Union, necessitated both political and economic changes in order to bring Turkey into greater conformity with European standards and practices.

In brief, the political economy of authoritarianism and democracy does not stop at a given country's border but is in fact closely connected to international markets, sources of credit and arms, investment flows, strategic rents, and the instruments of international clientage and dependency.

Praetorianism

I have written elsewhere (Waterbury 1994) that if there is one factor that sets the Middle East apart from most of the rest of the developing world, it is the level of armed conflict that has prevailed in the region since 1947/48. It may be futile to debate whether or not praetorian regimes[3] have been the principal cause of military conflict or the result of it, but the fact remains that the Middle East has suffered six large-scale conventional wars and five major and prolonged civil wars. No other region of the world has devoted so large a share of its gross product to the military as the Middle East. Because in several states the military has monopolized political and coercive power, its invasion of the civilian economy has been inevitable and extensive (see Stork 1987; Richards and Waterbury 1996: chap. 13; Sayigh 1993).

It is for these reasons that the nature of the military's economic and political entitlements is the single most important variable in determining the political economy of authoritarianism and democracy. Only in Israel and Turkey do we have evidence of the possible accommodations that powerful military establishments may make with civilian, democratic regimes—and even in these two instances the evidence is not always reassuring. Turkey's military has seized power three times, in 1960, 1970, and 1980. While the country has been under civilian control since 1983, the military has received a virtual blank check to crush the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in the southeast of the country. One can only suppose that Turkey's civilian leaders believe that if they were to restrain the military, a coup might well follow. In Israel, the possibility of a coup appears remote, but the fact is that military leaders play a direct role in civilian politics (Rabin, Dayan, Eytan, Sharon, Allon, Weizman, etc.) and the military's claims to resources have seldom been seriously challenged.

Most other Middle Eastern countries are under the direct or indirect control of their military establishments. Those under direct control are Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Sudan, and Algeria. These are the true praetorians of the region.[4] Those under indirect control include Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. The military in those three countries can exercise veto power over virtually any aspect of national policy, and they maintain unchallenged claims to national resources. The Tunisian case is of particular interest. It was a commonplace that the civilian head of state, Habib Bourguiba, maintained a small military establishment in order to avoid the plague of coups that had swept the Middle East in the 1950s, as well as Algeria in 1965 and Libya in 1969. Although the evidence is inconsistent, sometime in the mid-1980s, Tunisia's defense outlays began to rise sharply. Leveau (1993: 105 and 226–27; see also Zartman 1993 and appendix, p. 306) claims that they reached over 5 percent of GDP by 1990. Standard military expenditure yearbooks

show a somewhat lower rate of expenditure (see fig. 7.2). It is unwarranted to claim that the deposition of Bourguiba in November 1987, and the assumption of the presidency by General Ben Ali, was the result of this growing assertion of military claims; but the startling fact is that by 1992, while "praetorian" Algeria's military expenditures had fallen to 2.7 percent of GDP, Tunisia's were (at least) 3.3 percent of GDP.

Lebanon offers a unique case of indirect control by the military of other countries, primarily that of Syria but also that of Israel. There are three cases of ruling monarchs—Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan—who ultimately rely on the loyalty of their military establishments to remain in power. We come finally to Iran which, perhaps surprisingly, exhibits well-entrenched civilian rule, a highly circumscribed democracy, and a relatively well-contained military establishment. Huntington gave us no category to encompass rule by fractious mullahs and militias, but that is what Iran displays.

I have gone through this exercise to make the point that the most important vested interests in the Middle East are the region's military establishments. They were the linchpin of the dominant coalitions that held

Figure 7.2. Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP: Select Middle East Countries

	1960	1978	1983	1990	1992
Algeria	2.0	5.5	3.4	1.8	2.7
Egypt	5.5	16.0	13.4	5.1	6.0
Iran	4.5	15.3	5.2	2.1	7.1
Iraq	7.3	19.2	45.3	27.4	21.0
Israel	6.5	23.0	23.1	13.0	11.1
Jordan	16.7	27.9	19.8	12.2	11.2
Kuwait	–	3.6	5.3	5.0	62.4
Lebanon	1.7	4.8	8.2	–	5.0
Libya	1.2	16.7	15.3	7.2	5.0
Morocco	2.0	6.0	8.4	4.5	4.0
Saudi Arabia	5.7	–	–	14.0	11.8
Sudan	1.5	3.0	2.0	4.0	15.8
Syria	7.9	14.6	21.8	13.5	16.1
Tunisia	2.2	1.5	4.9	2.1	3.3
Turkey	–	5.2	5.0	–	4.7
Yemen (Aden)	–	26.2	21.0	–	–
Yemen (Sanaa)	–	26.6	33.9	14.9	93.0

Source: Columns 1 and 4, Sivard, ed. 1993: 44–45; columns 2 and 3, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1989: 36–70; column 5, IISS 1993: 224–26. Inconsistencies among those sources are glaring and not easily reconciled. One can only hope that trends and relative orders of magnitude are not grossly distorted.

sway during the decades of import-substituting industrialization and inward-looking growth. They will determine the nature, speed, and ultimate success of any transitions toward democracy. We know from the voluminous transitions literature on southern Europe and Latin America how crucial it is for civilian challengers to reach accommodations with military incumbents, whose hands are inevitably bloody and dirty. Eastern Europe's experience is too recent and too much in flux to have provided a similar literature (although see Przeworski 1991).[5]

Some analysts have discerned in the economic crisis prevailing in the region the signs of a necessary and perhaps bristling reengagement of governments with their citizens. The reengagement comes about through the needs of regimes to deal with their fiscal crises through higher direct and indirect taxation. Equally, if not more, important are signs that the resource entitlements of the military establishments of the Middle East are diminishing as a result of the economic crisis. Nonetheless, as figure 7.2 shows, the pattern is very uneven, and even in those cases where a substantial decline has occurred, it has been from a very high base. The total of the resources devoted to the military in the Middle East is quite simply appalling.

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A second development, the uncertain steps taken toward a settlement of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, may also contribute to the erosion of military entitlements. Thus economic crisis and conflict containment, if not resolution in one critical theater, are weakening the war economy (Sadowski 1993: 25–32). Regular military personnel per 1,000 inhabitants may be declining as well. Diminished resources for the military do not, however, have clear implications for the loosening of authoritarian controls. Praetorianism is not solely a function of the size of the military establishment nor of its control over resources, but of its ability to preempt the political arena through repression and delegitimization of all rivals. For instance, in Algeria the level of resources devoted to the military has steadily declined in the last decade, but since the aborted elections of 1991 the level of praetorianism has steadily risen.

It is also important to keep in mind that democracies do not always devote fewer resources to the military than authoritarian regimes. Israel's electorate, for example, has consistently tolerated high outlays of national wealth on the Israeli Defense Force, and the same can be said for Turkey's electorate.

A further cautionary note is in order. The huge outlays for imported arms and for the maintenance of armed forces out of all proportion to their population bases have not been driven by the Arab–Israeli conflict. If that conflict is somehow ended we can expect the following conflicts to endure:

Turkey–Greece — Yemen–Saudi Arabia
Iran–Iraq — Saudi Arabia–Iraq
Iraq–Syria — Saudi Arabia–Iran
Turkey–Syria/Iraq — Egypt–Upper Nile states
Libya–Chad — Morocco–Algeria

I have broken these conflicts down into oversimplified dyads; reality is far more complex. I have also left out civil wars such as those raging in the southern Sudan, on hold in Lebanon, and perhaps on the horizon in Iraq. Turkey's Deputy Prime Minister, Murat Karayalçin, stated in 1994 that 5 percent of Turkey's GDP was then being devoted to the "suppression of terrorism" in the southeast of the country and that 160,000 troops were taking part in the operations there (*Turkish Times*, January, 15, 1994).[6] The military in Turkey and elsewhere will continue to invoke internal and external threats to national security in order to protect its entitlements. The best that can be hoped is that the military will do no more than hold its own.

Extraction and Accountability

Political theory, and sometimes practice, has posited that taxes constitute the implementation of a contract between citizens and their government. Taxes go to pay for public goods that private agents would not provide. Taxpayers are the consumers of those public goods, and public officials are subject to the contractual obligation to provide them honestly and impartially. Citizens have the right to hold public officials accountable for the kind, quality, and cost of public goods. Democratic theory suggests that the most efficient way to monitor implementation of the contract is through elected representatives of the taxpayers. Hence "no taxation without representation."

It flows logically from the above that the process of democratization or its absence may have a great deal to do with the incidence, nature, and variability of taxes. Lisa Anderson (1992) takes this logic a step further and argues that "the taxed devise ways to be represented." Something causal is being suggested here, but just what it is, is very hard to pin down. I want to broaden both sides of the equation, expanding taxation to include all forms of extraction, and representation to include all forms of accountability. The question then becomes, how do we measure extraction, and having measured it, what do we expect in terms of the effective holding of public officials to account? I begin the analysis by considering conventional tax regimes.

On the issue of "optimal" taxation, political scientists and economists have sailed past each other in the night. When (some) economists talk about optimal taxation, they have in mind levies that minimize distortions in markets, correct for market failures, maximize welfare, and maximize government revenues (see Newberry 1987 and Stern 1987). There is an implicit assumption of a benevolent leviathan with legitimate claims to revenue to cover expenditures for the public good.[7] The question then becomes finding the most efficient way to raise those revenues.

Some political scientists, perhaps especially those who have studied the rentier state phenomenon in the Middle East, have come to the conclusion

that external rents impede accountability, and that only when states have to extract their revenues from their own citizens will the demand for accountability rise (inter alia see Anderson 1992; Von Sivers 1992; Brand 1992; Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Shambayati 1994). Fiscal engagement between citizens and governments is thus to be welcomed, and the more that engagement is mediated by *direct* taxation the better.

With respect to the issue of direct taxation, the conventional economic wisdom appears to be on a different wave length. A few decades ago, those who advised developing countries on tax regimes, such as Nicholas Kaldor or Richard Musgrave, advocated reliance on direct taxes accompanied by some redistribution. But the tide has changed dramatically since then. The conventional wisdom now stresses indirect taxes, especially value-added taxes (VATs), despite their regressivity (Burgess and Stern 1993: 778). Redistribution through taxation is no longer on (Goode 1993; Due 1988). Poor administration and powerful upper income groups will probably defeat any attempts at redistributive taxation, and the costs of collection will probably outweigh the yield (Bahl 1989). Indeed, as Stern argues (1987: 51), it is through subsidies, infrastructure, and other public goods that redistribution may be effected, and the challenge then becomes to link *indirect* taxes to the financing of subsidies and infrastructure.

As economists dealt with the crises that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s in both developing and developed countries, what passed for optimal conditions changed in subtle and not so subtle ways. Gross imbalances in macroeconomic equilibria had obvious short- and long-term negative consequences for welfare. Most of the imbalances stemmed from the governments' expenditure patterns themselves so that markets could not be expected to correct them. Large budget deficits, monetized debt, inflation, overvalued exchange rates, trade imbalances, and escalating foreign borrowing were all standard features. To begin to deal with the crises, governments had to lower expenditures and increase revenues. Tax advice focused on the latter challenge, and the standard advice became to simplify and reduce direct taxation and to increase revenues through various forms of VAT.

The equity implications of this advice escaped no one. Consumers would bear the brunt of most indirect taxation, and inasmuch as the poor devote more of their income to consumption than the rich, the poor would be disproportionately, *but indirectly,* taxed. Targeted consumer and, in the agricultural sector, producer subsidies could cushion some of the impact but obviously not all of it.[8]

Thus trends in economic advice and actual tax regimes moved in the opposite direction from that espoused by the critics of the rentier state, i.e., greater reliance on direct taxation with high progressivity (after all, it is likely to be the wealthy that first demand greater accountability). Developed countries moved in this direction even as swiftly as the developing. The explosion in state-managed or taxed gambling casinos and lotteries in the United States is a case in point.

In the 1970s, specialists in European politics began to discern both a fiscal crisis in the welfare state and a tax "backlash."[9] Backlash, in the eyes of these observers, was bad in that, if successful, it might lead to diminished state revenues. Harold Wilensky analyzed a genus of "success" stories that combined corporatist peak bargaining associations with a reliance on indirect taxes (Wilensky 1976; Hibbs and Madsen 1981). The message in this kind of analysis is clear but not always stated: Governments should have some minimal level of revenues, say 25 to 30 percent of GDP, in order to provide necessary public goods. Citizens, following narrow individual interests, try to and often succeed in evading direct taxes. Therefore, taxes must be taken by stealth, indirectly. A recent International Monetary Fund study on the United States recommends that the IRS rely less on direct taxes and more on VAT so as to "alleviate problems of tax enforcement" (*IMF* 1993: 56). The *Economist* argued for "more VAT" with the following justification: "Deluded taxpayers" accept taxes more readily on goods than on incomes, although a tax is a tax. Their conclusion was: "If people do not feel heavily taxed (although they are), they will behave accordingly" (*Economist,* December 4, 1993, p. 65), that is, they will not resort to a politically destabilizing "backlash." Backlash is a term of disapproving evaluation of citizen behavior, but should it not be seen as a demand for accountability?[10]

What seems to be missing in the economists' and some social scientists' calculus is the nature and quality of public goods. My own feeling is that backlash comes not only because of the level of (and, as in Denmark, sudden increase in) taxes, but also because the public goods provided to citizens—education, health, transportation, policing, communications—decline in quality or are simply denied to significant numbers of taxpayers. It may be only through continued reliance on direct taxation that the kind of accountability necessary to maintain or improve the quality of public goods can be established. Who wants "deluded taxpayers"? They must surely be a frail base on which to sustain democratic government and an impossible starting point for those countries that have not even begun a democratic transition.

Taxes and Extraction in the Middle East

Noneconomists who study the Middle East have frequently come to roughly similar conclusions concerning structural flaws in the region's political economies that allegedly account for the persistent authoritarianism, clientelism, weak civil society, and lack of accountability of political leaders. The major flaw is that Middle Eastern populations are undertaxed and that

those taxes which most people bear are indirect rather than direct. Governments have been able to avoid directly taxing their populations because, in the last twenty years or more, they have had access to external rents of various kinds: rents from sales of petroleum, strategic rents paid to clients by the superpowers, strategic rents paid by the oil-rich to the people-rich in the region itself, and worker remittances. Only when these rent streams begin to dry up, it is argued, will governments be obliged to turn to their own citizens for revenues, and only then will the chemistry of accountability be activated (see Beblawi and Luciani 1987, Anderson 1991, Chatelus 1993, Von Sivers 1992, Brand 1992).

Anderson breaks down the issue in the following manner. The colonial era in the Middle East tended to build powerful state structures while stifling the development of indigenous bourgeoisies (1992). Moreover, it was during the colonial era that the states of the region became habituated to a flow of external resources and to weak local tax bases (remarks, Princeton, Near East Studies brown bag meeting, February 2, 1994). This triad of factors has then been accentuated in the post–colonial period: States have become stronger, indigenous bourgeoisies have remained weak, and rents have figured more prominently in government finance. The lack of articulation between the state and civil society has provided an opening for Islamic movements to attack governments, not on issues of the use of tax revenues, but on issues of corruption and moral turpitude in the governments' disposal of rents (Anderson 1991: 95; Von Sivers 1992: 24; Addi 1995).

At the risk of crude reductionism, I will summarize the consensus as follows: Governments that rely on rents for a substantial portion of their revenues will stifle democracy; governments that tax their citizenries will foster democracy. Let us look at the facts of taxation and extraction in the Middle East to test the hypothesis.

Are Middle Easterners undertaxed? At an aggregate level, and in comparison to other developing areas, the answer is no. In 1985, for example, both total taxes as a percentage of GDP (23 percent) and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes (56 : 46) in the Middle East averaged higher than in all other regions of the developing world (see fig. 7.3). When we look at specific countries in the early 1980s (fig. 7.4) we see great variation, with Iran, Kuwait, and Syria perhaps being "undertaxed" while Israel and Egypt exceed or approximate taxation levels of advanced industrial nations. There is no observable correlation between level of taxation and degree of authoritarianism or democracy, although Israel would come closest to conforming to the expectation that high and *direct* taxation may foster democracy.[11]

If level of taxation is an inconclusive indicator of accountability, then we should perhaps turn to trends. Over time most Middle Eastern societies have become more heavily taxed. Askari, Cummings, and Glover assert (1982: 202): "[I]t is clear that over three decades [1950–80] the ratio of taxes to

GNP has risen in every country, and in some cases dramatically. In fact, the weighted average tax ratio nearly tripled to more than 35% of aggregate gross product." The increase was most dramatic among oil-exporting states (9.3 percent in 1950 to 49.3 percent in 1978) while for non oil-exporters the increase was from 16 percent in 1950 to 23 percent in 1978. Thus, part of the surge in the aggregate level of taxation has come about through the taxation of an economic enclave (state-owned petroleum companies or foreign companies) rather than through fiscal engagement with the citizenry at large. Figure 7.5 shows the growing reliance on petroleum rents of nine Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries over the period 1950–77. For these countries, at least, the proposition that rent dependency and authoritarianism are likely companions appears to hold.[12]

So far we can conclude that average tax burdens in the Middle East are not noticeably low, and they have been steadily increasing. Yet, it would be hard to argue that the tax burden has stimulated much government accountability or that the few democratic experiments in the region have anything obvious to do with levels or trends in taxation.[13] How might we account for this? One factor is that all of the states in the region have relied on state enterprises to lead their development efforts. While these are often chronic after-tax loss-makers, they are nonetheless captive sources of tax revenues (see Ahmed 1984; World Bank 1990a: 88). One would hardly expect state-owned enterprises to be at the forefront of demands for accountability. Similarly, the bulk of direct income taxes falls on captive wage and salary earners in the public sector, while those in the professions and private service sector are routinely delinquent. We would not expect to see civil servants and public sector labor lead the charge for greater governmental accountability.

A second factor may be the incidence of indirect as opposed to direct taxation. Most states in the region reveal a ratio of indirect to direct taxes of about 2 : 1 (see, e.g., fig. 7.6). If we assume that taxpayers are more conscious of direct than of indirect tax bites, then we may have a partial explanation of the lack of linkage between tax level and accountability. It appears to be the case, however, that in many Middle Eastern countries the share of direct taxes in total tax revenues has been rising during the last five years or so.

We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no relation at all between the levels and kinds of taxation and accountability, although intuitively that does not sound plausible. It may also be that it is "only" a matter of time before accountability catches up with the tax burden which, as noted, has been growing over recent decades. The troubling problem here is that democratic systems of accountability have emerged in countries with similar or lower tax burdens, for example, in Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia (above all India). If it takes longer in the Middle East for taxes to do their magic, perhaps we have to turn to other factors to explain the lag (see Waterbury 1994).

Figure 7.3. Variation in Level and Composition of Tax Revenue by Region, 1985 (as Percent)

	Developing Countries				
Item	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East and North Africa	Asia	Latin America	Industrial Countries
Revenue level					
Tax revenue–GDP ratio	17	23	15	18	32
Revenue composition					
Income and wealth (direct)	39	56*	37	46	69
Company	(20)	(19)	(19)	(10)	(7)
Personal	(12)	(13)	(8)	(5)	(27)
Property	(1)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(2)
Other[a]	(4)	(13)	(7)	(9)	(2)
Goods and Services (indirect)	61	46*	63	54	31
Domestic					
Sales, VAT, turnover	(15)	(10)	(14)	(13)	(17)
Excises	(9)	(7)	(19)	(17)	(10)
International trade					
Import	(26)	(22)	(21)	(14)	(2)
Export	(8)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(0)
Other[b]	(3)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(2)

Source: World Bank 1991.

[a]The most significant taxes in this category are manpower and payroll taxes. It also includes some schedular nonrecurrent taxes.
[b]This residual category includes a series of miscellaneous taxes such as stamp duties, airport taxes, and vehicle taxes.

*I cannot account for the fact that indirect and direct taxes total 102 percent of government revenues.

Figure 7.4. Selected Industrial and Developing Countries: Direct and Total Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP

	Direct Tax		Total Tax 1980–82 Average
United States			28.9
Austria			41.0
Japan			27.0
United Kingdom			36.0
Iran	(1981–83)	2.2	8.1
Kuwait			3.3
Morocco	(1981–83)	4.5	21.6
Tunisia	(1980–82)	4.9	25.1
India	(1981–83)	2.4	16.0
Korea	(1982–84)	4.3	16.0
Egypt	(1982–84)	7.0	30.0
Israel	(1981–83)	16.1	49.0
Jordan	(1981–83)	3.3	18.0
Syria	(1978–81)	2.5	9.5
Yemen Arab Rep.	(1982–84)	2.9	19.1
Turkey	(1983–84)	9.1	16.0

Source: Gandhi et al. 1987: Tables A1, A2.

Figure 7.5. Oil Revenues Relative to Total Revenues: Major Oil Producers (as Percent)

Country	1950	1962	1970	1973	1977
Bahrain	55.2	72.0	66.2	65.2	78.1
Iran	11.6	40.1	49.7	67.0	73.6
Iraq	17.3	64.1	53.7	80.9	85.5
Kuwait	81.7	94.6	91.2	92.7	96.6
Libya	0.0	7.6	83.1	75.1	83.2
Oman	0.0	0.0	98.0	94.3	92.6
Qatar	84.1	94.0[a]	88.9	92.5	97.0
Saudi Arabia	68.0[a]	86.4	86.9	93.3	88.3
United Arab Emirates	0.0	25.0	96.6	89.3[a]	94.5[a]

Source: Askari, Cummings, and Glover 1982.

Note: Total revenues excludes borrowing.

[a]Estimated.

Figure 7.6.



Source: Government Financial Statistics Yearbook 1991.

We need to say something about the actual dynamics of accountability. A first cut would be to imagine two interactive variables. The first is the size of the tax burden to GDP. This would tell us what proportion of national wealth is captured by the government. Hibbs and Madsen (1981) have suggested that anything above 50 percent is politically unsustainable, and as we have shown, Middle Eastern burdens are in the range of 20 to 30 percent of GDP. This variable is a proxy for citizen awareness of government impositions. Yet it says nothing about the quality of the public goods the government delivers back to the taxpayers. It is conceivable that a low tax burden could be associated with such poor quality, or with such a discriminatory delivery of public goods that evasion or a political backlash are provoked. It also says nothing about the perceptual blind spots that may prevail among citizens who are taxed by and large indirectly (through customs, excise, sales, and stamp duties).

The second variable is that of direct and indirect tax revenues to total government revenues. This variable indicates the degree to which governments are dependent upon taxpayers for their revenues. The higher that dependency, the more likely it is that governments will have to listen to their citizens. A combination of high government tax dependency and a high direct tax burden will presumably provide the best enabling environment for accountability. As shown in figure 7.7, Israel comes the closest to satisfying that condition among the countries of the Middle East.

These two variables, though they explain a lot, miss other crucial elements that are not susceptible to ex ante analysis. The rate at which taxes increase (an issue which triggered a backlash in Denmark), the introduction of new taxes (such as that proposed on social security payments in the United States, or the 1991 consumption tax in Jordan), and the horizontal and vertical equity of taxes may all have major implications for the taxpayers' reaction to government impositions.

The preceding discussion presupposes that accountability is driven by conventional fiscal measures. But if the crux of the dynamic is the extraction of private surplus in exchange for public goods, then we must move beyond conventional fiscal measures. Subsidies and their removal must enter into the equation. A subsidy can be conceived of as a negative tax or a positive income transfer. The removal of a subsidy is equivalent to a tax increase. The January 1977 riots in Egypt in that sense can be seen as a taxpayers revolt, and a successful one in that the government rolled back the price increases.

There are many other ways in which governments extract and transfer wealth. Administered prices are common in the Middle East. In Syria, support prices for wheat are well above world market prices and thus constitute an implicit transfer of wealth to wheat farmers. In Egypt, by contrast, administered agricultural prices have generally worked to lower rural incomes by

Figure 7.7.



Source: Government Financial Statistics Yearbook 1991.

turning the intersectoral terms of trade against agriculture. In addition, overvalued exchange rates have worked against the incomes of exporters of agricultural products (Dethier 1989: 138–45). The counterpart to administered prices in rural areas is consumer subsidies (on food, fuel, and transport) that generally favor urban populations.

Governments often set wage levels for specific sectors of the workforce, such as civil servants, teachers, and public sector workers. If they allow real wages to lag behind the rate of inflation, an implicit tax is being levied. On the other hand, the government may routinely supply a considerable portion of income to its employees in the form of allowances, bonuses, and free services that are untaxed.

Finally (though this list is not exhaustive), there is the inflation tax. The economic boom years of the 1970s triggered inflationary episodes in several Middle Eastern countries. As the crisis of the 1980s evolved, inflation continued at the same rate or worsened as governments failed to curtail expenditures while their revenues declined. Through deficit financing, governments fueled inflation but enjoyed first advantage in using the money they printed while all subsequent users received diminishing real value for each unit of currency.[14] Turkey, Egypt, the Sudan, Iran, and Algeria have all levied high inflation taxes at different times.

The point I wish to make is that any citizen may act according to a complex calculus of state extraction that combines levels and kinds of conventional taxes, reactions to sudden price shifts, diminution of entitlements, perceptions of the inflation tax, and attention to the quality of public goods. Because the calculus is not likely to be uniform across entire sectors of the citizenry, it is hard, if not impossible, to predict the conditions under which citizens will take action, let alone what the dominant form of action will be (cf. Hettich and Winer 1993: 8).

Having said that, I will nonetheless consider some likely possibilities. The inflation tax is seldom perceived as such. Few people see the direct connection between government expenditures, monetized public debt, and inflation. They may cope with inflation by increasing their labor in both the formal and informal sectors, or by migration. The inflation tax cannot be gathered indefinitely, however. The Shah of Iran may have paid a high political price for the inflation of the late 1970s, while the Motherland Party in Turkey experienced electoral setbacks in the late 1980s that can be attributed in substantial measure to unhappiness with continued inflation. In the first instance, protest was violent and formally illegal while in the second it was expressed legally through the ballot box.

Similarly, administered pricing systems that turn the terms of trade against specific sectors can generate public revenues without any immediate reaction from the taxed. We may posit, however, that sooner or later persistently

negative price signals will lead to altered economic activity. Egyptian farmers have been evading cotton cultivation for a couple of decades, and to some extent the government, in the face of this behavior, has had to concede substantial procurement price increases in recent years.[15] As Goren Hyden demonstrated years ago in Tanzania (1980), the cumulative impact of thousands of individual cultivator decisions can force governments to change policies. In this same vein, we may consider migrant workers faced with an overvalued exchange rate (again, the overvaluation leads to an implicit tax on their foreign earnings). Their likely response is to hold their earnings offshore or to repatriate them through "black market" channels. Governments in the Middle East have devalued in recent years, partially in response to the loss of remitted earnings through official intermediaries. In both instances, we have accountability of a sort, but certainly not of the democratic variety.

Erosion of real wages and of consumer subsidies may provoke strikes and riots; but it is just as likely they will provoke continued migration from the formal into the informal sector, where second jobs can raise incomes and where goods, albeit expensive, can be found without queuing. If a large part of economic activity is informal, and hence beyond the fiscal reach of the state, then governments may extend legal recognition to a range of activities, such as money changing or unlicensed manufacturing, vending, and transportation, so that they can be registered and taxed. Deregulation of private activity may be the government's response to a growing exodus from the formal economy. Here, too, we are not dealing with formal mechanisms of accountability.

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Private Interests, Mobile Capital, and Extractive Contracts

The most crucial economic agents in the extractive equation are the providers of private capital and investment. The structural strength of capitalist interests can counter the numerical weight of, and force concessions from, those who own physical or intellectual capital, even in democratic systems (see Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988). In the setting of systemic crisis described in the first section of this chapter, capitalist interests may wield unusual leverage in bringing about governmental accountability. The governments of the region can no longer mobilize or borrow the investment resources needed to stimulate real growth in the economy. They must attract indigenous, regional, or foreign capital to undertake that task. They must trade policy concessions for investment. Those concessions will take the form of liberalized banking procedures, deregulation of markets, privatization, expansion of capital markets, and elimination of discriminatory taxes and reduction of corporate tax rates.

Initially, this process may not involve any direct bargaining between capitalist interests and the state. The government may try to anticipate the

policy measures required to attract capital investment and financial flows to the country. What the government most wants to avoid is the resort on the part of private interests to the twin weapons of investment strikes and capital flight. On a trial and error basis, the government will gauge the success of policy concessions and make more if necessary.[16] Policy changes may come about initially through the pressures of the international financial institutions rather than through the efforts of investors themselves.

The crucial turning point comes when indigenous private capital organizes and lobbies for policy changes. That moment came in 1979 in Turkey when, in the midst of Turkey's economic crisis, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD), went public with a stinging critique of the government's economic policies. Since then, TÜSIAD has been a proactive force for large-scale capital interests in Turkey.[17] A similar turning point may be taking shape in Egypt today, where government ministers regularly appear before the Egyptian Businessmen's Association to explain government policy and to enter into dialogue over policy reform.

While business interests bargain on their own behalf, they may still provide public goods, in the form of policy changes, that benefit much broader strata of society. More important, when state officials recognize such bargaining as legitimate, it is harder for those officials to deny the same legitimization to bargaining with other interests in civil society—from labor and commercial farmers to feminists, Islamists, and human rights advocates. The more such bargaining goes on, the greater the likelihood that accountability will grow. Economic crises are good enabling environments for policy bargaining.

The interaction one would want to see goes like this: Private investment and entrepreneurship are seen as necessary to stimulate real growth in the economy; real growth will yield higher tax revenues to the government; the government accepts being held to account by private interests. Eventually, formal institutions of representation, perhaps dominated by private economic interests, will be allowed to develop.[18] Crystal provides a vivid example of this dynamic. In 1909 the Shaykh of Kuwait attempted to impose new levies on merchant wealth. The merchants in turn "exited" to Bahrain. The Shaykh backed away from his exactions, and the merchants returned. During the 1920s there was a gradual enfranchisement of the merchant class, culminating in the legislative assembly of 1938. However, as the argument of Beblawi and Luciani (1987) would suggest, once the Shaykh got access to petroleum rents in the 1950s, the merchant class was politically marginalized and the assembly atrophied (Crystal 1990: 24–25 and 47–48).

The Kuwaiti merchants who fled to Bahrain had moveable assets and capital. The degree of capital mobility raises an important consideration. It has been argued by Albert Hirschman and others that historically it has been the owners of immovable assets (above all, land) who are most likely to contest tax-gathering states and to hold public authorities accountable. A

counterargument has been advanced by Bates and Lien (1985) and Bates (1989) that it is in fact the owners of moveable assets who enjoy the best bargaining position vis-à-vis the state because they are able to hide or transfer their wealth with relative ease.[19]

Bates and Lien do not adequately explain what the owners of moveable assets would bargain for, short of an exemption from any form of taxation. If it is costless for those owners to move their assets, then there is no reason why they would accept any form of imposition. If the dynamic suggested by Bates and Lien is to work, there must be transaction costs involved in the movement of capital and assets. That is obvious in closing down a factory and moving it elsewhere but not as clear in the case of capital movements. The incentive to bargain must lie in a combination of three factors: a preference to stay put, real costs incurred in moving, and alternative environments that may or may not be more accommodating.

Certainly in this day and age of computerized portfolio movements and currency transfers, the investment resources Middle Eastern states seek are extremely difficult to capture. How important are they? Diwan and Squire estimate the stock of savings abroad for nine Middle Eastern countries at $179 billion (1993: 23). In figure 7.8 they show capital flight for these same countries over the period 1970–90 as a proportion of GNP. "Native" capital in very large amounts is either held or is fleeing abroad. It is at least hypothetically possible that it could be lured back through the proper policy environment (and fig. 7.8 in fact shows a net inflow in recent years in some countries). In turn, that environment could be nurtured through direct, formal consultation between the governments of the region and the owners of capital.

A reverse image of this is the continued weakness of Middle Eastern capital markets. Compared to other emerging markets among the less developed countries (LDCs), such as Mexico, Malaysia, or India, Middle Eastern capital markets—with the exception of Israel's, and to a lesser extent, Turkey's (see fig. 7.9)—are distinctly undercapitalized. Only in those two countries is the policy environment sufficiently attractive to bring in substantial portfolio investment.

The changing balance between public and private investment in the countries of the Middle East is an important part of the accountability matrix. In nearly all countries, the private share has been growing relative to the public. This is, once again, a reflection of the economic crisis and of the general cutback in public outlays. In Iran, for example, where recession began in 1976 and has been sustained ever since because of the war economy, the share of the private sector in gross fixed capital formation rose from 44 to 50 percent in less than a decade. In the same period of time, the share of the Egyptian private sector rose from about 10 to 25 percent and by 1990 may have been close to 40 percent. The data in figure 7.10 show the level of private investment in select countries as a proportion of GDP.

Figure 7.8. Estimates of Capital Flight* as a Share of GNP (as Percent)

Country	1970–74	1975–79	1980–84	1985–89	1990
Algeria	3.1	4.5	-0.4	3.4	1.4
Morocco	2.1	1.1	1.1	5.6	-3.2
Tunisia	1.4	2.2	-1.7	3.5	0.3
Maghreb	2.4	3.1	-0.3	3.2	-0.6
Egypt	-0.1	14.5	12.5	9.2	-6.4
Jordan	1.8	1.7	6.2	9.7	5.4
Syria	2.5	7.4	5.5	9.6	–
Yemen[a]	–	–	–	1.6	–
Mashreq[b]	0.5	10.0	9.8	9.8	-4.0
Israel	5.1	6.6	3.6	1.9	3.1
Region[b]	1.8	5.9	3.6	5.1	0.2

Source: Diwan and Squire 1993: 9.

*Capital Flight = (External Borrowing + Foreign Direct Investment) - (Current Account Deficit + Increase in Reserves)

[a]1985–89 average refers to 1989 only.

It is important to recognize that the structural adjustment process (i.e., dealing with the economic crisis) has fostered a peculiar kind of owner of moveable assets. First, as interest rates are adjusted to positive levels, the domestic holders of debt begin to earn large returns. For example, Turkish government interest payments on domestic debt rose from 4.4 percent of total expenditures in 1981 to 20 percent in 1990 (Karatas 1992: 70). Turkey, and now Egypt, have resorted to the sale of treasury bills to finance their domestic debt. The interest paid on T-bills is tax free. Most of the Turkish public domestic debt is financed in this manner. Korkut Boratav (1990: 4; and see Handoussa 1993) has estimated "rentier" incomes in Turkey in 1988 at 14 percent of GDP.[20] While these domestic "rentiers" claim a very large portion of GDP, they are presumably atomized and do not act as an organized interest that might be moved to exact accounts from their government. If interest rates on T-bills are lowered, the holders of the bills will typically exit into the capital market or into gold. They will not take to the streets or the corridors of parliament.

In summary, economic crisis has forced states not only to cede pride of place to private capitalists but in many instances to woo and legitimize them. This is as true for Iran as it is for Egypt and Algeria, while Turkey and Morocco

Figure 7.9. Market Capitalization* in Select Developing Countries, 1992

Country	Market Capitalization in Billions of U.S. $
India	108.0[a]
Malaysia	94.0
Mexico	139.0
Egypt	2.6
Iran	1.2
Israel	50.0
Jordan	3.3
Morocco	1.8
Tunisia	0.046
Turkey	10.0

Source: Stock Markets Fact Book 1993.

*Market Capitalization = share price x number of shares outstanding.

[a]For 1994.

have for decades granted local capital a fully legitimate *economic* role. With tens of billions of dollars seeking higher returns outside the region, the era in which public officials called upon indigenous capital to do its patriotic duty has come to an end. Most policymakers now recognize that patriotic duty is a function of competitive returns to investment.

To reiterate an earlier point, owners of capital do not necessarily promote democratic accountability, but as a kind of by-product of their bargaining for favorable policy responses from the state, they may foster habits of interaction between the governments and citizens that can lead to a transition. There is nothing inevitable about this, as the happy cohabitation of Sunni capitalists with Alawite praetorians in Syria has demonstrated for some twenty years. Put another way, democracies need strong bourgeoisies more than bourgeoisies need strong democracies.

Figure 7.10. Private Sector Investment as a Proportion of GDP: Select Countries 1982–92

Country	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Egypt	9.1	6.5	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.0	8.7	10.5	9.1	8.7	7.8
Morocco	13.4	11.8	11.2	12.1	12.2	11.6	11.8	13.2	15.4	12.2	13.4
Tunisia	15.4	14.2	13.6	12.3	10.5	9.3	9.7	10.7	11.3	9.8	10.7
Turkey	8.1	8.3	8.3	8.4	9.8	11.2	12.6	12.4	12.8	12.3	11.7

Source: International Finance Corporation data, unpublished.

Nonetheless, there are many signs of growing accountability. In Jordan, a combination of the Jordanian Businessmen's Association and the Chambers of Commerce successfully lobbied to block a proposed sales/consumption tax that was billed as a precursor of a VAT. Moreover, one analyst has argued that the Jordanian government's effort to capture private surplus through reserve requirements in licensed banks was read by private interests as a signal of the government's dependence upon private wealth. This realization, in turn, has contributed to ongoing political liberalization (Roberts 1993: 10, 28; also Chemonics International 1993). In fact, Jordan has manifested a sequence that may be replicated elsewhere: macroeconomic crisis in late 1988 and early 1989; followed in 1989 by structural adjustment, increased taxes, and riots; followed by legislative elections in the same year; followed by increased business involvement in newly founded parties.

A sales tax was successfully introduced in Egypt in 1990, and by 1993 it accounted for over 23 percent of total tax revenues (*al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi,* November 22, 1993, p. 76). While a success from the point of view of enhanced government revenues and deficit reduction, this indirect tax has provoked a reaction from the normally docile Federation of Chambers of Commerce and its president, Mahmud al-Arabi. Noting that the business community had not been consulted before the introduction of the tax, he complained that it falls most heavily on middle- and lower-income consumers, reducing their buying power significantly. He went on to protest the confiscatory nature of stamp duties on businesses and to recommend that direct taxes at the source, but at lowered marginal rates, replace many of Egypt's indirect taxes. Finally, he called for the abolition of all laws of exception, including Egypt's emergency law, which has been the bane of human rights advocates for decades (al-Zayati 1993: 28–30).

A final sign worth noting is the storm provoked in Kuwait over the misappropriation or outright theft of $4 billion of the country's $100 billion Fund for Future Generations. This Fund had been fed by Kuwait's petroleum rents over several years. The newly elected Kuwaiti parliament debated setting up a watchdog system over management of public funds, which had been under the control of the ruling Sabah family and business interests allied to the family (Ibrahim 1993). In short, even the rentier state may be held to account.

Structural Adjustment and the Extraction Contract

Democracies are supposed to reflect the preferences of the numerical majority of voters. These, in turn, are most often influenced in their voting by

the economic situation they currently face. They are particularly sensitive to unemployment and the cost of living. The paradox is that the owners of capital, very much a minority among voters, are crucial to the economic growth that can generate employment and reduce inflation by putting more goods and services on the market. The paradox is that minority interests must often be served to the short-term detriment of the majority. For decades, Middle Eastern governments sought to undo this paradox by substituting state agencies for entrepreneurs and planned allocation of goods and services for markets. The process of substitution, with its emphasis on the state-determined allocation of consumption entitlements, obviated democratic accountability.

The economic crises of the 1980s and early 1990s have thoroughly handicapped, if not brought to an end, the Middle Eastern state's capacity to carry on as usual. Thus, at the same time that the state must turn to private capital to spur growth, it must sharply curtail a broad range of entitlements that it had fostered in previous decades. The major political challenge facing the regimes of the Middle East is thus the transition from social contracts to extractive contracts, under which states must concede greater accountability in exchange for shifting the burden of social costs directly to their citizens.

Middle Eastern states are by no means alone in confronting this challenge. There, as elsewhere, the result has been three-fold: a narrowing of the coalition that sustains regimes, rising unemployment, and stagnant or declining per capita income (see fig. 7.11; see also Waterbury 1989 and 1993). The evidence on worsening income distribution is not clear-cut.[21] Inflation may or may not be brought under control. If and when it is, it is usually because the crisis has placed limits on demand, not that there are more goods and services available. Two caveats are in order: First, these adjustments most often do not *cause* unemployment and inflation so much as reveal them. Second, the inflation and employment figures often reflect only the *formal* economy, thereby omitting the value of labor and production in the informal sector that may account for a third of GDP.

Summary and Conclusion

The constraints faced by Middle Eastern states are similar and are tending in the same direction. They are as follows:

1. The military establishment is witnessing the weakening of its grip on national wealth. Economic constraints will continue that trend.

2. Rents of all kinds have diminished. While international petroleum markets may tighten marginally in the next five years, the new producers of Central Asia and the return of Iraq to production will ensure that these markets remain soft. Thus, the Cold War–driven strategic rents, and the

Figure 7.11. Per Capita Real GNP Growth (as Percent)

Country	1970–75	1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990	1991	1992
Algeria	2.3	2.6	2.1	-3.0	-4.0	-3.2	-1.7
Morocco	2.2	3.6	0.4	2.0	2.9	2.2	-4.6
Tunisia	6.6	3.6	1.3	1.3	6.6	0.7	7.6
Maghreb (average)	2.9	3.1	1.9	-1.5	-1.4	-1.5	-1.2
Egypt	3.2	7.4	3.6	0.6	-2.4	0.0	0.3
Jordan	2.5	13.2	0.2	-15.8	-19.2	-9.9	8.8
Occupied Territories	11.2	5.5	-1.0	3.8	12.4	-9.1	–
Syria	9.5	3.2	-0.7	-0.9	11.9	4.1	3.0
Mashreq[a] (average)	5.3	6.9	1.7	-0.8	0.5	0.2	-0.6
Israel	4.1	1.5	1.1	2.5	3.1	1.6	2.8
Region	3.9	3.7	1.5	-0.6	0.1	0.2	0.6

Source: Diwan and Squire 1993: Annex 2, table 3.

[a]Does not include Lebanon and Yemen.

strategic rents paid by regional oil-exporting countries in the past fifteen years, will not resume.

3. Middle Eastern governments have nowhere to turn but to their citizens in order to finance the programs they regard as essential. Once-and-for-all nationalizations and land reforms, such as those witnessed throughout the region in the 1950s and 1960s, cannot be repeated and therefore do not offer a way out of the resource crisis.

The citizens of the Middle East, as we have seen, are not now, and historically have not been, undertaxed. The burden they bear through direct and indirect taxes will not go down, and the indirect tax burden is likely to go up. More important is that negative taxes provided through various kinds of direct and indirect subsidies will be, to varying degrees, eliminated, representing real income loss for many citizens.

Governments must try to arrive at contractual understandings with two constituencies whose short-term interests diverge. On the one hand, private capital, both domestic and foreign, must be granted a set of incentives—including well-established property rights, simplified regulatory regimes, and the right to influence the hiring and firing of employees—in order to invest in the economy. Rates of profit, net of the transaction costs of moving capital elsewhere, must equal or exceed rates that can be earned outside the region.

The social costs of adjustment, that is, the scrapping of social contracts, will be borne by the bulk of the citizenry, and it is with its members that the second understanding will be struck. It is moot whether or not the partial casting loose of entire segments of the active population will necessarily yield greater accountability. Many people will continue to resort to self-exploitation or to exit from the country or the formal economy in order to survive. Such reactions pose no direct political threat to incumbent rulers. Inevitably some of those most affected by the adjustment process will give voice to their grievances as they have done in the past, particularly through Islamic movements.

Turkey, for a time, found a way to meet the needs of private capital and of some of the aggrieved portions of the population. The strategy contains two crucial elements: First, there has to be growth in the economy so that there is some taxable surplus; and second, a portion (but not all) of that taxable surplus must be distributed in compensatory payments to carefully targeted groups such as organized labor, farmers, schoolteachers, shanty-town dwellers, or the Kurds of southeast Anatolia (Waterbury 1992).

Since 1987, however, the pressures of the electoral cycle have restimulated deficit spending through "populist" settlements of one kind or another in a manner that cannot be sustained (Öniş 1993; Karataş 1992). A direct effect of the reaffirmation of old populist entitlements was increased inflation and rising interest rates, which in turn dampened investment and curtailed growth. Sunar and Öniş (1992) have proposed that the only way out is through tripartite pacts on wages and prices, negotiated in a Social and Economic Council in which the government and peak organizations of business and labor would meet.

The constraints I have outlined can be defied for a time, but not indefinitely. The military may claim, by force so to speak, an economically unsustainable share of national resources; Saddam Hussein showed how it is done, and General Bashir in the Sudan is following in his footsteps. Algeria today resembles nothing so much as General Jaruzelski's Poland with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) playing the functional but unfortunately not the ideological role of Solidarity.

Praetorians, or even civilian authoritarians, can attempt to rule on the strength of an alliance with capital at the expense of the citizenry at large. No regime in the Middle East approximates this "Chilean" model, but there are hints of it in Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia. In these cases, and in contrast to that of Turkey, the dual contracting process evoked above is tilted in favor of capital at the expense of compensatory payments and enhanced accountability. Given the strong growth records in Tunisia and Morocco in recent years, this may be sustainable.

Egypt has come to the same kind of equilibrium as Turkey with two key ingredients missing. Egypt does not have an indigenous bourgeoisie of the size, strength, and organizational capacity of that in Turkey. Its adherence to democratic forms is shallow and unconvincing. Populist settlements in Egypt are prompted not by the electoral cycle but by fear of political Islam. Further political liberalization, through which responsibility for the economic reform process would be shared with elements of civil society, may be the only way to avoid a slide toward a politically untenable situation on the Algerian model.

Iran provides a model that is not easily described, much less analyzed. Its military is under "civilian" control, but the long conflict with Iraq has left the economy on a war footing. It has maintained a big state sector and has made a range of populist settlements through special funds, foundations, and revenues from confiscated properties. At the same time the Islamic regime has had allies in the merchant "bazaar" class, and under Rafsanjani there has been an active attempt to lure back Iranian entrepreneurs and Iranian flight capital. Inflation and joblessness are both high, but the country boasts a peculiar kind of democracy for club members only. If one is male and certifiably Muslim, one may participate fully in a system that tolerates wide-ranging debate over social, economic, and some religious issues. Elections for club members are not meaningless. One could easily imagine this system gradually tilting away from its populist base and toward the interests of private capital without the rules of membership in the club being changed.

Throughout the region, the major sources of demand for accountability today are the various embodiments of the Islamic movement. It is unlikely that these movements seek democratic forms of government per se. Rather, as Lahouari Addi has argued, Islamic groups denounce the failure of secular populist experiments and claim that once such experiments are properly Islamic they will succeed. Not only will they succeed socially and economically, but they will succeed militarily, against the Zionist enemy, as well.

As the Iranian example shows, there is no way that Islamic populism can change the fundamental economic reality of the region or of any particular country. If Islamic regimes are truly populist, they will suffer crippling fiscal crises. If they ally with Islamic capital, it will have to be in an institutional setting that honors private property, the sanctity of commercial contracts, and the mobility of capital. The only thing Islamic regimes can do that more secular counterparts cannot do is survive for a time on the religious fervor that would predictably accompany their coming to power. But even in Ayatollah Khomeini's lifetime, the fervor was evaporating.

In sum, citizens' demands for accountability from their government are likely to grow in the near and intermediate future, but the question is, what groups will do the demanding and what forms will accountability take. We have seen that private interests may lead the way in trying to institutionalize channels of consultation, if not of formal representation. It is, indeed, private sector interests that may be most sensitive to indirect tax burdens. Old corporatist interests, cut loose from their entitlements, may also demand an

accounting. The Egyptian Federation of Chambers of Commerce offers an example, but we should also expect to see this phenomenon among trade unions and professional associations. They have constituencies and interests that their governments can no longer help. They are not likely to disappear, and they have financial resources, mainly in their pension funds, and experienced leadership that may enable them to bargain with state agencies to which they were formerly corporatist appendages.

Anderson is probably right that the taxed will find ways to be represented; but it is likely that those ways will include exit from the system, sabotage, and violence as frequently as the search for conventional political representation. People will exact accounts in these various ways not merely because they are taxed at higher rates or more directly, but also because the public goods the state provides are no longer of acceptable quality. Does all of this add up to unavoidable transitions to democracy? The answer is clearly no. But what does appear unavoidable is a situation in which governments and regimes can no longer legislate by decree and in which they must bargain with the constituted interests—economic, religious, and ethnic—of their societies. That is enough of a break with the political status quo of past decades to stir cautious optimism.

Notes

1. Direct but unconventional movements for accountability have taken the forms of street demonstrations; cost-of-living riots; and, as in the Sudan, Turkey, Iraq, and perhaps today in Algeria, civil war.

2. Diwan and Squire (1993: 7) report that in the period 1970–89, the loans and grants, net of repayment, that accrued to the public sectors of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, North Yemen, and Israel amounted to an astounding $180 billion. On remittances, see Diwan and Squire (1993: 14) and Chatelus (1993: 151).

3. The term is borrowed from Samuel Huntington (1968: chap. 4), and means rule by the military in both the political and economic spheres. Huntington notes: "The stability of a civic polity thus varies directly with the scope of political participation; the stability of praetorian society varies inversely with the scope of political participation" (1968: 198).

4. Elizabeth Picard (1993: 263) has argued that by and large what we have witnessed in the last decade or more is the gradual evolution of military establishments toward less encompassing intervention in the political realm except insofar as "security" matters are concerned. In Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, she contends, "The army has lost its leading role within the polity." That judgment is certainly premature with regard to Algeria, and the distinction between internal security threats and external challenges may have little relevance for the constraints the military place on any forms of political liberalization.

5. The Islamic revolution of Iran reached no accommodation with the Shah's military. The collapse of the Shah's regime was accompanied by the total discrediting of the senior officers corps. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of regimes has been

accompanied by a total discrediting of the police apparatus, but according to Przeworski (1991), the military was largely supportive of change.

6. It is possible that the Turkish government of Tansu Çiller has purposely exaggerated these outlays in order to attribute the sharp rise in inflation to the internal security effort.

7. For critiques of this assumption, see Gwartney and Wagner (1988), Buchanan (1988), and Knut Wicksell (1988). Hettich and Winer (1993) present more formal critiques. I am grateful to Tim Besley for calling these sources to my attention.

8. In the 1980s, Turkey devised an ingenious rebate system on its VAT that at once gave incentives to consumers to make sure the tax was calculated and provided them cash rebates that varied with income level. See Waterbury (1992).

9. Joseph Schumpeter had anticipated this backlash half a century earlier. See his "Crisis of the Tax State," which was first published in 1918, reprinted in 1991.

10. The *Economist* forgot the turn-of-the-century wisdom of Knut Wicksell, who wrote (1988: 128): "The true magnitude and significance of the tax load have in the past been concealed from the people. The fiscal principle would have to yield to the economic principle; the *direct method* [emphasis added] of raising state revenues should become the rule and the indirect method the exception."

11. To show how complicated the issue of causality is, let us note that with the exception of three years, during the period from 1976 to 1987, direct taxes significantly exceeded indirect taxes in Iran. One might be tempted to attribute Iran's peculiar Islamic democracy to that fact until we see that the total tax burden to GDP in those years ranged only between 5 and 8 percent (Amirahmadi 1990: 167). Petroleum rents and income from public property were far more significant sources of revenue.

12. Kuwait has sporadically held parliamentary elections confined to males of proven Kuwaiti ancestry.

13. Israel may be the exception. Other experiments include Turkey (1950–60, 1965–70, 1971–80, 1983–), the Sudan (1956–59, 1965–69, 1986–89), Jordan (1989–), Morocco (1956–65), Egypt (1976–), Yemen (1993–94). Needless to say, the quality of democratic practice varies enormously among these countries. Only Israel and Turkey have come close to adhering to western European standards, but even in these two instances there have been egregious lapses.

14. The right to issue currency is referred to as seignorage. As growth is likely to stimulate demand for monetary instruments, seignorage need not be inflationary. However when governments monetize debts, inflation results. Burgess and Stern (1993: 769) usefully warn that the resulting "tax" does not represent real revenue to the government but rather capital losses to the holders of monetary instruments.

15. These concessions have come in at least equal measure as a result of pressure from the World Bank, the IMF, and USAID.

16. In 1974, Egypt passed Law 43 to attract Arab and foreign investment to the country. In 1977, it rewrote that law as Law 32, making several new concessions in light of the weak response of investors to Law 43. Then in 1981, it extended many of the concessions in both laws to private domestic capital. In no instance did it enter into dialogue with the interests it sought to attract.

17. Its power and cohesion have been questioned by several Turkish experts who emphasize continued Turkish corporatism, weak civil institutions, and governmental contempt for private interests. See Arat, Bura, Kalayçiolu, and Heper, in Heper, ed. (1991).

18. It was the debt crises of the late nineteenth century, and the search for tax revenues, that obliged the Ottoman sultan and the Egyptian khedive to dabble with

the first parliamentary institutions in the region's history. Iran was not far behind with the election of the *majlis* and the drafting of a constitution in 1906.

19. As suggested above, no bargaining between owners of moveable assets and governments need take place, because it is inherent in this situation that moveable factors are taxed at lower rates than tax-inelastically supplied factors.

20. Rentier is used here to refer to the domestic earners of rents, in this instance holders of deposits in financial institutions or of other debt instruments. Heretofore the term rent has been used to refer to external flows of rents accruing to countries.

21. We have few good studies of income distribution in the Middle East. It is probably the case that distribution in Egypt has become more skewed in the last decade (see Handoussa and Potter 1991, and World Bank 1990a). There has been very little change in Turkey over the entire period from 1963 to 1987 (see Sunar and Öniş 1993: 72). An unreleased study in Iran shows worsening distribution since the revolution in 1979. There is a prima facie case for worsening distribution when there are substantial shifts in national income from wage and salary to interest payments.

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8.

Crises of Money and Power

Transitions to Democracy?

CLEMENT M. HENRY

As in the late nineteenth century, the external debt crises of the 1980s provoked major restructurings of the internal financial orders of most of the North African countries. The changes in the nineteenth century led to direct political and military interventions resulting in the colonial conquest of Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco; but in the late twentieth century such political outcomes are ruled out. The independent political orders established in the 1950s and 1960s are all threatened, to varying degrees, by the burdens of economic adjustment programs, but they will retain their nominal sovereignty. The threat is that they may have to become more democratic.

The question to be addressed in this chapter is how financial reforms encouraged by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank may transform political power relationships within each state. Specifically, given the authoritarian regimes that presently prevail in the region, how might financial liberalization promote transitions to democracy? Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia offer a fertile field for comparative analysis. Libya must be excluded on several grounds, however. In his *Green Book,* Qaddafi does, to be sure, suggest a certain parallelism between money matters and power hierarchies in keeping with the spirit of the present inquiry, but only because he advocates abolishing both money and power (Qaddafi: 29). While he could not achieve either aspiration, oil wealth shielded Libya from adjustment programs, and international sanctions subsequently isolated Libya in certain respects from the world economy, something that is contrary to the aims of any adjustment program.

The other four countries all experienced debt crises in the 1980s followed by agreements with the IMF and structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, but to date they have experienced little democracy. Let us, with Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, define democracy as a mixture of three elements: "1) *contestation* over policy and political competition for office; 2) *participation* of the citizenry through partisan, associational, and other form

Fat Cats and Self-Made Men

Globalization and the Paradoxes of Collective Action

Melani Cammett

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Prevailing economic wisdom promotes private sector-led development and presumes that firms will take the political initiative to push for shared policy interests. Collective action, however, is never assured. When do businesspeople mobilize collectively? Is it possible for small firms to exert real political pressure? Morocco and Tunisia shed light on these questions. In response to nearly identical incentives and challenges from global markets, a numerically large, emerging class of small exporters in Morocco overcame Olson's presumed "logic of collective action" by constructing an effective lobbying machine, while their Tunisian counterparts remained politically dormant.[1] New economic conditions created business cleavages in both countries, but these divisions were politicized only to the extent that producer groups mobilized. The ability to generate a cohesive class identity, which arose in response to perceived threats from other producer factions, was critical for successful business collective action.

Studies of neither globalization and domestic politics nor business politics adequately explore collective action in explaining how globalization reshapes producer politics. Theories of globalization often deduce political behavior from imputed preferences, while studies of producer collective action largely ignore the varied organizational capacities of different categories of business. Few studies acknowledge crucial differences among subsets of business.

Two main variables, the timing of global economic integration and class structure before trade reform, set the context for postreform class formation and class self-perceptions. They shaped the prospects for business collective action in Morocco and Tunisia in the 1990s. Incorporation in global manufacturing circuits, which occurred over a decade apart in the two countries, and an influx of production opportunities on world markets created a new group of apparel exporters with similar policy preferences in both Morocco and Tunisia. But distinct capital structures constructed after independence fueled varied patterns of collective action among Moroccan and Tunisian industrialists.[2] In Morocco, delayed economic opening cemented a well-connected, protectionist elite, spurring a cohesive class identity among emerging small exporters. This group identity galvanized vigorous lobbying, enabling apparel manufacturers to gain increasing influence over policymaking. In Tunisia,

where large capital did not occupy a preponderant role in the state's traditional social base and comparatively early economic opening undercut the base of the small import substitution industrialization elite, a cleavage between business factions did not emerge, and business groups did not mobilize. Existing approaches to globalization and business politics can not fully account for these distinct outcomes.

Collective Action and Business Politics

Collective action is at the heart of political economy theorizing. Yet studies of how globalization alters domestic politics have paid scant attention to collective action processes. Dominant approaches, founded on methodological individualism, neglect how interest groups form (or do not form), instead deducing coalitions from presumed economic interests.[3] Approaches that contextualize interests also do not adequately depict how integration in global production systems can transform business politics. By viewing institutions as static, they can not grasp how new patterns of collective action arise.[4]

Theories of business collective action also miss key dynamics that arise with integration in global production systems. By focusing largely on the differential capacities for mobilization of business versus labor organizations, with comparatively little attention to differences within classes, they do not recognize that business groups may mobilize in response to others. Incorporation in global manufacturing chains creates entirely new classes of industrialists with distinct interests from established capital holders.

Olson's argument, which holds that group size is a key determinant of the ability to mobilize, is the starting point for much research on business collective action. Numerically smaller groups, such industrial lobbies, are more likely to act collectively than larger groups because individual members will achieve greater payoffs for participation and face lower organizational costs.[5] Offe and Wiesenthal use a different logic to arrive at a similar conclusion.[6] Instead, business class characteristics enhance its ability to act collectively. With "shared, uncontested and easily measured" interests, multiple channels to defend these interests, and concentrated material power, business allegedly has an automatic advantage.[7] But aggregating "business" distorts reality and minimizes the obstacles to collective action. Intense interfirm competition over fundamental issues such as price demonstrate that conflict within business often exceeds larger class struggles.[8]

The fact that not all business owners or subsets of business have equal access to decision makers introduces additional obstacles to effective group mobilization. Small business is often underrepresented, even in democratic contexts. For this reason, Shadlen proposes a "third logic of collective action" distinct from both labor and big business that dictates that small business relies more heavily on formal associations to press its claims.[9]

Extended to its logical conclusion, Olson's analysis might address differences between small and big business by suggesting that large producers are better equipped to overcome obstacles to collective action by virtue of their more limited numbers than dispersed hordes of small business owners. Indeed, Shafer argues that sectors with low barriers to entry, in which ownership is spread out among many small operators, face more formidable barriers to collective action than activities dominated by a few big players.[10] Still, the fact that analogous manufacturers in different countries behave differently, as in Morocco and Tunisia, exposes gaps in Shafer's logic. Clearly, barriers to entry and sectoral characteristics do not explain the whole story. Morocco supports arguments about the organizational imperatives of small business. Lacking connections to key decision makers in the palace as well as the material and social resources to exert pressure individually, small exporters found no other choice but to work through a formal organization.

However, because Moroccan small garment exporters, relative outsiders in an elite-centered system, successfully fashioned themselves into a visible and even effective lobbying bloc, the "third logic" can not explain when and how small business overcomes obstacles to collective action. Varied patterns of collective action among analogous Moroccan and Tunisian manufacturers beg the question why some small business groups organize themselves into pressures groups while others do not. Apart from firm structure, studies of business politics do not sufficiently address how business groups are constituted.

Cultures of Production: Group Identity and Collective Action

Insights about the relationship between perceived group identity and collective action have received short shrift in discussions of business mobilization. Instead, analyses have stressed common material interests and have downplayed the process of group formation. This emphasis seems reasonable, since boosting profits is arguably the ultimate objective of business lobbying. However, it is problematic to assume that the individual profit motive automatically creates collegiality among producers and in turn facilitates collective action. Business owners often have conflicting interests, confounding collaborative strategies, and face strong incentives to free ride rather than actively join lobbying efforts. Moreover, even if it is assumed that mutual economic interest is the primary basis for group formation among manufacturers, a sense of cohesion must precede or at least accompany recognition of shared material concerns. Not all producers who share the same interests choose to work together towards common goals.

Insights from studies of social movements can help explain the internal mechanisms of business collaboration in the political arena. Scholars of social movements have concentrated on three distinct foci to explain mass collective action: political

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opportunities, notably sufficient political openness to permit societal expression; organizational structures conducive to group mobilization; and ideological or cultural "frames" that forge or cement group identity.[11] Studies of business politics have pointed to the role of political opportunities and organizational structures but have not emphasized group identity in spurring collective action among producers.[12]

It is tempting to conclude that structural and institutional factors provide a complete explanation. Macropolitical conditions associated with specific regime types provide or foreclose opportunities for group mobilization. Accordingly, different Moroccan and Tunisian patterns of business collective action might be attributed to the relatively repressive political environment in Tunisia, where a single party state tolerates little opposition, and greater space for political parties and a vocal press to dissent in Morocco, although the monarchy is unquestionably the real seat of power. Relative political openness certainly permitted greater opportunity for producer collective action in Morocco than in Tunisia, yet collective action is never automatic. As a result, macropolitical explanations reveal little about how manufacturers mobilized. The use of regime characteristics to explain business political behavior assigns excessive explanatory power to the state. The class structure of business itself played an equally important role in sustaining distinct patterns of Moroccan and Tunisian business-government relations and, by establishing the context for the rise of oppositional group identities, shaped the collective political responses of producer factions to economic opening.

Can differences in organizational resources explain varied business political behavior in Morocco and Tunisia? Formal organizations such as business associations, as well as informal networks such as family ties and social relationships, are undoubtedly important vehicles for collective action.[13] In Morocco, where emerging exporters lacked unifying social networks, formal organization greatly facilitated collective action among manufacturers with diverse social and geographic origins.

However, the association was more than a site for pursuing shared material concerns. It also helped socially and geographically disconnected entrepreneurs to establish a group identity. Before seizing the opportunity to engage in collective politics, otherwise disparate individuals must view themselves as a collectivity.[14] They must do more than join an organization; they must construct a common identity, often forged in opposition to others through a reactive process of group differentiation.

In distinct ways, studies of class formation and social movements have emphasized the importance of "groupness."[15] As Thompson argues, classes do not automatically emerge from the structure of production.[16] How members of a class perceive their class position is a critical intervening step. Nonmaterial factors shape how individuals formulate their understandings of class, whether their own or others' class positions, influencing how classes emerge and behave politically.[17] For class to take on social and political meaning, it must be more than a category defined by the means of production. Through the development of a shared cultural identity, individuals are able to overcome differences that might otherwise prevent them from collaborating towards shared goals. In his study of bourgeois development in late nineteenth century New York, Beckert stresses that a "common cultural vocabulary" permitted elites from distinct ethnic and religious backgrounds to form a class identity and act collectively.[18] Emphasis on the importance of common identity has important implications for the study of how globalization reshapes domestic politics. If individuals need a shared outlook to perceive themselves and behave as a class, then teleological assumptions about the relationship between material interest and political behavior are not valid. Responses to global economic integration can not be predicted by deducing preferences from position in production-based stratification.[19]

Katznelson's model of class formation captures the relationship between economic structure and culture. The model incorporates four layers of class that together present a picture of how classes behave in specific contexts. The shared "dispositions" of individuals within a class closely approximates "class identity." By adding dispositions or "cognitive constructs" that "map the terrain of lived experience" to the abstract notion of class as a category in a structure of production, it is possible to explain how individuals will think or act in real circumstances. [20] How individuals interpret their material conditions, a process shaped by class dispositions, determines whether and even how they will behave as a group.

Similarly, studies of social movements recognize the importance of group identity as a component of collective action. In addition to opportune political moments and organizational structures, "framing," or the "collective properties of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action," is critical to mass mobilization.[21] Shared meanings and common interpretations compel individuals to view a given situation in common terms and to act as a group.[22] Rejecting the homogenizing assumption of individual rationality, research on the influence of cognitive processes on participation in social movements also emphasizes the importance of framing.[23] Individuals can choose from multiple identities as a basis for action, but individual and group identities must align for collective action to occur.[24]

On both class formation and social movements, considerable conceptual confusion surrounds the meanings of culture, dispositions, and consciousness and the way they galvanize collective action.[25] How does group identity arise and spur mobilization? Leadership and organization play a key role in fostering and disseminating class identity. Ideas do not spread spontaneously, and class conditions alone do not create class behavior or even consciousness.[26] Rather, leaders can work through organizations, such as parties or interest group associations, to create class consciousness, facilitating class-based political action. Class requires a sustaining organizational infrastructure and can not in itself create politically relevant social and political cleavages.[27]

Alternatively, political leaders may tap into extant social networks to create political cleavages.[28] But what happens when there is no preexisting social network, as in

Morocco? Where emerging small exporters had few social ties before engaging in collective action, did leaders bear full responsibility for whipping up class consciousness, if not the very existence of a "class"? The process was more complex. To create the group consciousness needed for collective action, leaders with agendas couched in the language of identity promoted images and ideas that resonated with members of a potential class.

Shared self-perceptions often arise through a reactive process. Oppositional class identities can emerge as part of a process of differentiation from other general class categories (for example, capital and labor) or subsets of the same category. Events with implications for the material well-being of a set of individuals can highlight "rather vague self-images" grounded in differences from other groups, who experience changes in different ways.[29] Consciousness of distinct relationships to material changes can generate a discourse of "self" versus "other" that fosters cohesion among the bearers of these identities.[30]

Group identity is a prerequisite for collective action, particularly in the absence of preexisting social networks linking individuals together, but collective action can not be parsimoniously reduced to a single factor. After achieving the requisite "groupness," members of a collectivity need organizational tools, whether in the form of formal interest associations or informal social networks, as well as a permissive political environment to pursue goals in unison. Successful collective action in Morocco and absent group mobilization in Tunisia illuminate the linkage between class formation and collective action and situate it in a broader political context. Where collective action succeeded, the construction of a class identity went in tandem with the revitalization of a business association, showing the importance of both symbolic and material resources in pursuing collaborative strategies.

Politics in Two Sectors and Two Countries

The textile and ready-to-wear garment sectors are valuable sites to examine the intra-business political struggles in Morocco and Tunisia after integration in global manufacturing networks. World competition in both sectors is intense. Although distinct, the two sectors are inextricably linked because textiles constitute the main input for apparel.[31] With distinct barriers to entry, textiles and apparel attract different types of players. Larger manufacturers dominate the comparatively capital-intensive textile sector, which requires significant start-up costs and technical expertise. Ready-to-wear garment assembly, often conducted on a subcontracting basis in low wage countries, requires minimal know-how and investment, inviting small entrepreneurs to try their luck. Because it is highly accessible, the apparel industry engages almost every country in the world and therefore constitutes an important site for globalized competition. These two

sectors in Morocco and Tunisia enable a controlled comparison of cross-national business responses to reform. Parallel relationships to the global economy, and particularly to European Union (EU) markets, as well as the adoption of virtually identical economic reform programs in the 1980s and 1990s also control for economic factors that might account for different patterns of business politics.

Textile manufacturing was important in Moroccan and Tunisian postindependence development strategies, but the balance between private and public capital differed in the two countries. In Morocco, local capital took over many French-owned factories and even launched new firms at independence. During the 1970s the textile sector expanded greatly thanks to a series of investment codes and economic policies promoting local private capital. In Tunisia the state was the primary impetus behind the development of textile manufacturing.

Apparel manufacturing and assembly took off later in both countries, largely in response to the overseas relocation of European clothing manufacturers and retailers in search of low cost producers for the labor-intensive segments of the manufacturing process. The timing of the creation of the export sector set the stage for intraclass struggles among manufacturers in the 1990s. In Tunisia, where the small domestic market called for export promotion, apparel manufacturing arose in the early 1970s.[32] As a result, small exporters were firmly entrenched in the Tunisian domestic political economy. In Morocco, the economic opening of the local market was postponed until the mid 1980s; its sheltering until then reinforced the position of big, protectionist capital.

In the 1980s both Morocco and Tunisia undertook trade liberalization, spurring integration in global manufacturing circuits. In 1983 Morocco adopted a structural adjustment program founded on export promotion, including reduced trade barriers and currency devaluations. The government committed itself to sharp reductions in trade taxes and tariffs, which dropped from as high as 400 percent to less than 40 percent. Similarly, it abolished the import license requirement for most goods, eliminating a key source of government discretionary power and an elite perquisite, and introduced a new code to promote private investment. By the late 1980s the reforms had a tangible impact on the textile and ready-to-wear sectors, eliminating public investment in the sector.

To profit from concomitant global manufacturing opportunities, local ready-to-wear assembly subcontractors took advantage of a preexisting law that permitted exporters to obtain duty-free inputs from overseas suppliers provided they reexported finished goods made from these products within six months. Although this in-bond system for export-oriented firms, known as the *Admissions Temporaires* (AT) regime, had existed on paper since the early 1970s, regulatory reforms introduced in 1985 greatly streamlined its operation. These policy changes enabled the creation and subsequent explosion of a Moroccan ready-to-wear export industry.

Tunisia in 1987 adopted a trade reform program that broadly resembled the plan adopted in Morocco four years earlier. The program included the gradual disman-

tling of quotas, reductions in trade tariffs, exchange rate devaluation, the removal of all quantitative import restrictions, and the implementation of lower and uniform tariff rates by 1991. The reforms began to affect the industrial sector in earnest after 1990, when raw materials such as cotton and fibers were liberalized, and the impact intensified after 1994. Although the results did not meet the program's initial goals, tariffs were reduced substantially, dropping from almost 240 percent to about 70 percent. The government also reformed investment codes, abolishing the need for prior authorization for certain projects, streamlining incentives, and providing additional export promotion measures.[33]

In the 1990s international treaty commitments also encouraged Moroccan and Tunisian integration in global manufacturing circuits and lowered trade barriers substantially. Both countries joined the World Trade Organization and thus committed themselves to comprehensive reductions in quantitative restrictions on trade. Further, the dismantling of the Multifiber Accords (MFA), scheduled for 2005, promised to expose the two countries to fierce competition in global apparel production by enabling equal access for all global suppliers, including low cost Asian suppliers, to the lucrative European market. The signing of bilateral trade agreements with the EU in the mid 1990s had the most immediate effect on Moroccan and Tunisian producers. The agreement stipulated the progressive dismantling of all trade barriers over a twelve year period.[34] Because both countries conduct the bulk of their trade with Europe, the agreement spelled near total liberalization of the Moroccan and Tunisian foreign trade regimes. Yet Moroccan and Tunisian industrialists responded in distinct ways to global economic integration.

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The Outcomes: Collective Action and Inertia

Two parallel sets of textile and ready-to-wear manufacturers with interests diverging cross-sectorally coexisted in both countries by the late 1980s. Figures 1 and 2 show striking cross-national similarities in articulated policy preferences.[35] The political behavior of industrialists, however, differed radically. In Morocco, factions of textile and ready-to-wear producers organized themselves into vocal interest groups, lobbying the state and attempting to discredit each other. In the face of similar challenges, Tunisian manufacturers did not mobilize. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that Moroccan and Tunisian textile and especially apparel producers reacted differently to trade liberalization, despite articulating nearly identical policy preferences. Across the two sectors, Moroccan industrialists were far more politicized than their Tunisian counterparts.

Morocco: Intraclass Conflict In Morocco, elite families have dominated the national economy since independence, yet the vast majority of ready-to-wear

Figure 1 Textile Manufacturers' Policy Preferences in Morocco versus Tunisia



Figure 2 Apparel Manufacturers' Policy Preferences in Morocco versus Tunisia



exporters who emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s came from comparatively modest origins. Prominent families often had large textile holdings but did not control ready-to-wear production. Big industrialists from well-known families such as the Lamranis, Kettanis, Settats, and Tazis focused on upgrading existing thread and cloth factories, which require substantial investment, while diversifying into other sectors such as finance and real estate.[36] Domestically oriented textile producers and ready-to-wear exporters were thus divided not only by their articulated preferences on trade policies but also by their social origins.

These social realities formed the backdrop to the political awakening of a faction of garment exporters in the 1990s. An economic bust in the early 1990s and the signing of the EU free trade accord in 1996 highlighted mutual interests among new exporters and compelled some to organize within the existing textile producers' association, the *Association Marocaine des Industries du Textile* (AMIT). Beginning in 1991, garment exporters embarked upon a number of missions—individually, as

Figure 3 Textile Manufacturers' Lobbying Methods in Morocco versus Tunisia



Figure 4 Apparel Manufacturers' Lobbying Methods in Morocco versus Tunisia



well as in organized groups—to seek new clients and convince existing clients and suppliers that business was running smoothly in Morocco. An AMIT committee, which was established in mid 1990 and charged with boosting local garment exports, decided to institutionalize these efforts by launching an official trade show, the biannual *Salon du Vêtement Marocain*, or VETMA.[37] The decision to launch VETMA constituted a break from prior association activities—or, more accurately, association inactivity. In 1993 Abdelali Berrada, a garment manufacturer who later became a vocal representative of ready-to-wear export interests, was named the full-time director of the exposition as well as the executive director of AMIT.

At the same time, factory owners from all AMIT constituencies called for a more proactive role for the association, and, again, ready-to-wear exporters took the initiative. A meeting in fall 1991 of clothing producers prioritized AMIT restructuring, giving rise to a number of important changes that strengthened the association's ability to represent its constituents. In 1991 AMIT moved from its small, informal office in the old Derb Omar quarter of Casablanca, the heart of the city's textile commerce, to its new headquarters in the posh Anfa neighborhood. In 1993 AMIT officially added the word

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habillement (clothing) to its name, changing its acronym to AMITH. Henceforth the association headquarters had thirteen permanent employees, including a four person managerial staff. Four subcommittees represented the major branches of the sectors, including weaving and finishing, thread spinning, knitting, and ready-to-wear garment assembly. By the mid 1990s, AMITH had almost 700 members, collectively accounting for about 79 percent of all workers, 84 percent of production, and 97 percent of total exports in the textile and clothing sectors. Members were required to pay 3,000 Moroccan dirhams (DH) in annual membership dues, which provided the bulk of the association's funding and subsidized participation in overseas trade shows.[38]

An important modification to the AMITH charter reflected the power struggles emerging within the association. In 1995 the association adopted an amendment limiting the tenure of the association's presidency to three years with a maximum of two terms. Previously, the official presidential term was two years, but Mohamed Lahlou, the manager of a major textile firm owned by the prominent Kettani family, had presided over the organization for more than twenty years. Until the early 1990s AMITH was an ineffective representative of its constituent sectors, and, members charged, its leaders largely served their own personal interests. Indeed, AMITH members from both the textile and ready-to-wear sectors claimed that Lahlou did little more than defend the interests of the Kettani family.[39]

Until the mid 1990s garment exporters and local textile producers maintained a delicate balance within AMITH. When trade liberalization gained speed, the fragile equilibrium between the on- and offshore market was threatened. The adoption of two international free trade agreements, the GATT Accords and the EU Association Agreement (EUAA), initiated a far-reaching liberalization process that aimed to fulfill and even surpass the goals of the structural adjustment program. The national debate over trade liberalization and a state campaign to prosecute black market activities, which especially targeted garment exporters, were the backdrop to the internal dynamics of apparel producer mobilization. By providing the material basis for the appeals of political entrepreneurs, these events set the stage for conflict between the two business factions.

Tensions erupted in full force within AMITH in the mid 1990s. The most visible disputes occurred between an extreme, proliberalization faction of garment exporters and large domestic textile manufacturers. In 1997 Badr Berrada, a high-profile garment exporter, and his supporters launched an offensive to accelerate the tariff dismantling process. With the backing of Abdelali Berrada, these exporters sought the abolition of reference prices, claiming that they increased production costs unnecessarily and discouraged investment in the sector.[40] Some ready-to-wear exporters also prioritized the abolition of the AT system, which would accelerate the production and delivery process while eliminating problems with the customs authorities. If successful, their demands would have totally abolished protection for domestic thread and cloth production. Not surprisingly, textile manufacturers vehemently opposed them and launched their own lobbying campaign to block comprehensive liberalization.

A bitter war developed within AMITH between garment subcontractors and thread producers, nearly causing a split within the organization. The various industry subcommittees of the association held separate meetings, largely focusing on the debate over reference prices. Tensions reached an all-time high in mid 1997, when textile and ready-to-wear manufacturers lobbied the government separately—particularly the ministry of finance, which oversees the customs authority, and the ministry of industry—to ensure that their trade policy interests would be included in the 1998–1999 Finance Law establishing the national budget. Despite vigorous lobbying by apparel subcontractors, the administration did not adopt immediate reductions in customs duties and reference prices on textile products in the 1998 Finance Law. The textile lobby temporarily staved off the more extreme demands of clothing exporters, but exporters successfully ensured that tariff dismantling adhered to the schedule established in the EU Accord.[41]

Producer politicization through AMITH following the rise of exporters with new lobbying techniques marked an important shift in the political behavior of the Moroccan private sector and its relationship to the state. In the late 1990s interactions between the administration and manufacturers became increasingly formalized. The emergence of exporters, notably in the ready-to-wear garment sector, and their virtual takeover of a preexisting professional association brought a new style of interest transmission as well as new kinds of policy demands. Changes in business-government relations were manifested in multiple ways, including the rising salience of producer associations as lobbying sites, increased access to public officials for a broader cross-section of the private sector, growing reliance on public modes of interest transmission, and the adoption of more confrontational pressure tactics. The exporter lobby within AMITH had growing influence on policymaking. The most immediate and concrete result of its efforts was on customs processing procedures and regulations, which the administration streamlined substantially in the late 1990s. Most important, in a system characterized by opaque business-government relations, interactions between administration officials and industrialists increasingly played out in public, formal channels such as business associations.

Tunisia: Business Complacency The behavior of Tunisian manufacturers demonstrates that policy preferences, even when shared among a group of social actors, do not always lead to pressure for corresponding policy outcomes. Collective action and organized interest groups do not automatically arise out of common policy goals. Although textile and ready-to-wear industrialists conveyed remarkably similar policy preferences within their respective sectors, neither developed a set of coherent demands or organized politically in pursuit of their goals. Juxtaposed to Morocco, the behavior of Tunisian businesspeople is all the more puzzling. While Moroccan apparel exporters launched an all-out offensive in support of their demands, their counterparts in Tunisia adopted a business-as-usual attitude. Tunisian *textiliens* were

outwardly complacent in the face of looming disaster, and collective efforts in response to trade reform were virtually nonexistent. Lobbying took place individually and outside of the public sphere. Businesspeople consistently attested that the local business community never engaged in organized lobbying activities.[42] Even in the face of economic threats, industrialists avoided collaborative initiatives.

To explain private sector docility, Tunisian manufacturers and government officials maintained that Tunisia could not stop the "inevitable march" of globalization. But this explanation does not reveal why local industrialists in Morocco organized to halt a nearly identical set of reforms, while their Tunisian counterparts felt unable to do so. In part, a sense of powerlessness vis-à-vis the administration accounts for business passivity. Lack of access to information on economic policies compounded the situation. Rumors, rather than published or publicly announced decisions, were a primary source of information on policies and business transactions.

In the absence of organized business lobbying, individual capital holders frequently opted for "exit" rather than "voice" strategies of participation in the political system.[43] Manufacturers emphasized that their primary response to economic crisis was to shut down rather than push their policy demands. Nonetheless, the challenges of launching new business activities and the intricacies of bankruptcy laws limited the option to divest. When possible, industrialists closed their factories and took up commercial activities, such as the distribution of imported consumer goods.[44] A handful of prominent businesspeople conveyed their views privately to government officials, but business groups made no effort to pursue policy goals systematically.

Class Formation and the Making of Collective Identity

What explains such distinct responses to similar economic changes among analogous groups of manufacturers in Morocco and Tunisia? The politicization of new exporters in Morocco and the relative complacency of Tunisian manufacturers show that globalization does not automatically activate private sector cleavages. Trade liberalization and changes in global production trends reshaped class structure and offered new exporters a chance to develop their own interests but did not automatically bring about collective action. Instead, legacies of class structure and business-government relations interacted with new economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s to produce collective action or inaction. In Morocco, where big capital had a preponderant place in the national political economy, the conditions were ripe for an emerging group of exporters to band together against protectionist "fat cats." Distinct configurations of state-society relations and class structure produced a different dynamic in Tunisia.

Despite the common economic and social effects of French colonial occupation, the Moroccan and Tunisian postindependence industrial classes developed in distinct

ways.[45] The main reason for these differences lies in the diverging ways the state incorporated the business classes after independence. The distinct contexts of class structure and business-government relations within which industrialists maneuvered shaped their responses to economic opening in the 1990s.

Morocco Morocco has a long political tradition of the state centered around the *makhzen*, or the seat of central authority embodied in the sultanate. A solid urban bourgeois tradition sustained by the *Fassis*, or elite Moroccan families from Fes and other major cities, coexisted with the palace. This urban elite developed extensive local, regional, and international commercial interests before independence and even prior to the French protectorate. Immediately after independence, rural notables gained at the expense of urban interests, but, thanks to their support for the monarchy during the nationalist struggle, the latter also benefited.[46]

Nurtured over a long period through marriage ties and shared social experiences, a relatively cohesive class identity developed among the *Fassi* elite. When the French departed in 1956, these families, who enjoyed independent financial bases, constituted the embryo of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie. The power of the urban bourgeoisie was institutionalized directly in the public sphere as members of prominent families obtained key positions in the administration, national banks, parastatal organizations, and producer organizations in independent Morocco.[47]

In the late 1950s the newly independent Moroccan state implemented a series of measures to promote local industry. The 1958 and 1960 investment codes encouraged the creation of local firms through fiscal incentives, while customs duties increased progressively until liberalization in the 1980s began to dismantle the protective trade regime. A local private industrial class gradually developed, with extensive overlapping relationships with the administration and, most importantly, the palace. Families with vast economic interests placed members in key administrative positions, and major industrialists and bankers often held high-ranking government posts. Capital concentration in the Moroccan private sector, characterized by a small number of holders controlling a diverse array of activities and overlapping ties cemented through marriage and business contracts, reinforced the tight matrix of public and private interests.[48] Big private interests established horizontally integrated *groupes*, or holding companies, spanning the industrial, agricultural, and financial sectors. The largest, the Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), was controlled by the royal family and contained at least forty companies with activities ranging from mining to agro-industry, automobile assembly, transportation, real estate, and manufacturing. Many of the families at the head of the major holding companies originated in the textile sector or at least acquired shares in thread and cloth factories as they expanded their portfolios.

French investors remained heavily implicated in the Moroccan economy long after independence. In order to transfer majority ownership to local private interests, the government passed the Moroccanization law in 1973. In effect, the law enabled

the economic elite to consolidate its holdings while encouraging the formation of a few new big groups. Moroccanization also shored up urban elite support for the monarchy, which had recently suffered several failed coup attempts. Moroccanization and the increasingly protectionist trade regime reinforced, if not created, a powerful, small group of interests with vast stakes in the local market.[49] The predominance of this faction of the private sector, well-connected to the administration, shaped industrialists' struggles over trade liberalization in the 1990s.

Manufacturers needed both a catalyst for action and a sense of cohesion or group identity to mobilize. Dense personal and professional connections gave textile manufacturers from prominent families an intangible political advantage. But garment exporters, who emerged more recently and came from diverse geographic and social backgrounds, did not have the benefit of preexisting social ties and thus needed to construct a group identity. The postindependence legacy of a concentrated protectionist elite that monopolized economic opportunities and cultivated close links to the state propelled a sense of unity among export entrepreneurs. A perceived sense of marginalization in the local political economy gave rise to discourses promoting a collective identity among new business elements.

A twofold rhetoric of the textile "fat cat" juxtaposed to the "self-made man," articulated almost universally in interviews with garment subcontractors, enabled disparate exporters to construct a group identity. Garment manufacturers depicted thread and cloth producers as "rentier" industrialists who benefited from state protection for decades without investing in their businesses. Instead, textile producers purportedly kept their excessive profits for personal consumption without concern for the competitiveness of their own firms and, by extension, Moroccan industry writ large.[50]

This image of the "rentier" industrialist permeated descriptions of the origins of the Moroccan textile industry as told by new exporters. In describing the trade regime that gave birth to the local textile industry, a clothing subcontractor in Tangiers stressed: "In the past, reference prices reached as much as 200 percent, which led to a system of 'hyper protection' and encouraged an effective monopoly by local textile interests."[51] Similarly, a garment manufacturer in Salé recounted:

> When the textile and clothing businesses first developed in Morocco, the cloth weavers and thread spinners got all the laws passed in their favor. They became complacent and dependent on the favorable policy regime. After independence, businessmen took over companies left by the French, became fat cats and obtained easy money. . . . Thread and cloth producers benefited from years of protection but, in recent years, have complained about declining profits, which are due to the fact that they now pay taxes and social security charges whereas in the past they did not do so. Textile producers set up AMITH and the trade regime to serve their interests and, now that it is changing, they are complaining.[52]

Exporters repeatedly charged that "big families" dominated the textile industries and enjoyed special connections to policymakers. An amorphous lobby of protectionist tex-

tile interests, spearheaded by Lahlou, allegedly perpetuated outdated trade policies, prevented the passage of liberalizing reforms, and maintained a secure hold over AMITH.

The counterpart to the idiom of the textile fat cat was the image of the self-made man, also prevalent among owners of garment assembly factories. Exporters contended that they earned their profits in "legitimate, respectable" ways. Hard work and self-initiative, rather than state beneficence or privileged family background, enabled them to amass fortunes, which were invariably depicted as far inferior to those of textile manufacturers.[53] In reality, many new exporters did not fit the profile of the self-made man. Most did not come from the wealthiest families in Morocco, but few if any boasted a true rags-to-riches social trajectory.[54] Because wealth concentration and income disparities were extreme in Morocco, almost anyone with sufficient capital to launch an export-oriented business undoubtedly enjoyed a modicum of social privilege. Nonetheless, the vast majority of garment exporters and subcontractors did not hail from the upper echelons of the Moroccan elite.

The explosion of Moroccan ready-to-wear garment exports and the subsequent bust in international markets compelled local exporters to join AMITH in increasing numbers throughout the 1990s.[55] But neither the forces of globalization nor membership in an association by themselves created a coherent interest group out of disparate manufacturers. Construction of a shared identity, forged in opposition to the image of the textile "fat cat," provided an ideational impetus for collective action.

How did a group identity arise? Two processes, one bottom-up and the other top-down, were at work. On the one hand, the notion of the self-made man was increasingly celebrated in Moroccan society, partly due to the spread of ideas emphasizing the importance of private sector initiative in propelling economic reform. The Moroccan media promoted the cult of the entrepreneur and economic risk-taker. *2M*, the official television station, ran documentaries on Morocco's new self-made men who excelled in businesses ranging from apparel subcontracting to national airlines. A surfeit of new business-oriented publications also promoted the young investor who embodied self-reliance and "modern" business practices.[56] The new generation of businesspeople supposedly relied on business acumen rather than cronyism to succeed. In Moroccan society, particularly in elite, western-educated circles, the idiom of the self-made man was available for appropriation and conferred a sense of legitimacy on its bearers. At the same time, the pejorative fat cat motif resonated well among small business owners who had long felt cut off from local business opportunities to the benefit of a handful of elites.

The appropriation and dissemination of the self-made man also unfolded in more concrete, top-down ways among apparel exporters. The AMITH leadership, particularly association officials with export holdings and their supporters, played a key role in fostering the identity among its constituents. The head of the garment subcommittee and the former executive director of AMITH were instrumental in perpetuating the idioms

of the fat cat and self-made man. Both men claimed to speak for a larger class of manufacturers with shared grievances, and they gradually assembled a core group of politicized, "self-made" supporters within who agitated for specific policy changes. AMITH subcommittee meetings as well as informal discussions among apparel exporters were important sites for the transmission and perpetuation of these juxtaposed identities.

The dissemination and increasing acceptance of the self-made identity among new ready-to-wear exporters was a dual process involving attempts by business association leaders to attract potential constituents who in turn found great resonance in an identity celebrated in the broader public sphere.[57] The appeal of the idiom was rooted in historic patterns of class formation. The existence of a privileged, protectionist elite, nurtured by the state in the decades since independence, fostered a sense of marginality among capital holders outside of the superelite. The perception that well-connected elites wield pervasive political influence was critical in galvanizing a shared self-identity that propelled collective action among "self-made" producers.

Tunisia Distinct social relations led to relatively dormant business politics in Tunisia. During the colonial period many local officials cooperated with the French, fueling nationalist demands to end both colonial rule and the monarchical regime of the *beys*. As a result, former ruling elites, notably the old *beylical* families and the tiny urban bourgeoisie, played a marginal role in the struggle for national liberation and therefore had little influence on the character and goals of the new state.[58] Due to its limited size and economic restrictions during the French occupation, the local bourgeoisie was also a minor force.[59] Of equal importance, the postindependence state did not actively coopt urban private interests in the state-building process. Only the *petite bourgeoisie*, whose power was institutionalized in the Neo-Destour, the national party that played a crucial role in the struggle for liberation, and the national labor union, the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT), which was closely linked to the party, were able to take power at independence.[60]

By the early 1960s a faction of *dirigistes*, led by Ahmed Ben Salah, successfully implemented a state-led development plan epitomized by the collectivist cooperative movement. During this period, the state played a leading role in creating basic industries and established institutions to coordinate consumer imports and distribution channels. The *Office National des Textiles*, for example, was charged with preparing production and import plans of textile products and created over eight state-owned textile firms. Many textile manufacturers launched their careers in the organization, acquiring the knowledge and experience that enabled them to found private firms during the 1970s and beyond.[61] In effect, government policy during the 1960s created the foundations for a local industrial bourgeoisie.

By 1968 increasing reliance on domestic and foreign borrowing and mounting tensions between the state bourgeoisie and local private holders revealed the limits of the collectivization program.[62] In 1970 Hédi Nouira, known for his liberal economic views,

replaced Ben Salah as prime minister and introduced radically different policies. Fiscal and trade incentives to promote the nascent industrial bourgeoisie multiplied. The most significant measure was the 1972 law, which encouraged exports and foreign direct investment by creating a vast set of fiscal incentives for export-oriented companies, both foreign and local.[63]

Policies adopted in the 1970s had a crucial impact on Tunisian private sector development by attracting foreign investment while creating a local industrial bourgeoisie. The 1972 law gave rise to a class of exporters with extensive linkages to overseas markets and clients at a time when most developing countries were still pursuing import substitution industrialization, which tended to consolidate the position of protectionist elites. Still, production for the local market remained highly sheltered from foreign competition, setting up a dual market on Tunisian soil comprised of onshore and offshore activities.

The decision to pursue a preemptive export-oriented strategy and its attendant effects on local class formation shaped the ways in which local industrialists responded to trade liberalization in the 1990s. Although market reforms undercut the stable, dual market model, exporters and local manufacturers were not mutually antagonistic. Rather than assign blame to specific actors, such as the state or beneficiaries of import substitution industrialization, producers charged that the amorphous forces of globalization were responsible for their economic woes. Even local producers, who stood to lose the most, failed to pinpoint a tangible target for their frustrations. Identifying a faceless culprit deterred mobilization.[64] This dynamic was in large part a result of postindependence patterns of business-government relations and capital structure. Tunisia had a marginal protectionist elite that did not enjoy especially privileged linkages to the state, and the early creation of an offshore zone created a substantial class of exporters who were largely unfazed by trade liberalization. Hence economic opening in the 1990s did not become politicized through internecine private sector battles.

Conclusion

Class structure and business-government relations condition producer political behavior, in particular by shaping the prospects for developing a sense of group identity. Moroccan exporters were able to mobilize effectively in the 1990s by subscribing to a common identity. Export subcontractors considered themselves representatives of a new breed of Moroccan self-made man. Critically, this identity emerged in reaction to a shared perception of older elites as fat cats or beneficiaries of a rentier system. For the new exporters, well-connected big business owners had disproportionately consumed the economic spoils for too long, effectively preventing newcomers from gaining access to lucrative opportunities. The alleged self-made men professed to rely on modern business practices rather than personal connections or protective trade regimes. New exporters drew on the local and global cultural stock of pro-private-sector discourse to develop their self-image.[65] The absence of a comparable protectionist elite and the well-established export sector prevented a similar pattern of intraclass perceptions from emerging in Tunisia, where producer politics were remarkably quiescent.

The postreform behavior of Moroccan and Tunisian industrialists yields important insights for analyses of business collective action. First, capital is not homogeneous, as simplistic treatments of business would suggest. In fact, perceptions of the political influence of other business groups can drive collective action. Further, the experience of successful collective action in Morocco supports the argument that small producers organize most effectively through formal channels but adds that collective identity is a key ingredient for mobilization.[66]

Moroccan and Tunisian business politics thus raise the question when small producers organize collectively. Given the political opportunity to mobilize, developing a group identity is a critical step towards collective action, perhaps even preceding the need for organizational structure. Material conditions do not automatically create interest groups, and collective action is never assured. Legacies of class formation shape the prospects for generating the ideational cohesion needed for collaboration.

Even then, collective politicization is not a foregone conclusion. Individuals in leadership positions must actively promote a cohesive identity among otherwise disparate, small-scale producers. Key exporters in the leadership of the Moroccan textile and apparel producers' association claimed to represent a disenfranchised class of hardworking, self-made manufacturers. Increasingly, their would-be constituents, Moroccan apparel exporters, took up the call by subscribing to this group-based identity. Working through a formal business association cemented the shared identity, propelling exporters to pursue a set of common policy goals. By fueling the rise of oppositional identities, intraclass perceptions shape the collective action prospects of private sector factions as they adjust to economic change.

NOTES

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2. Both countries gained independence from France in 1956.
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5. Olson, pp. 48, 143.

6. Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Two Logics of Collective Action," *Political Power and Social Theory*, 1 (1980), 67–115.

7. Some of the controversy results from different definitions of organizability. Franz Traxler, "Business Associations and Labor Unions in Comparison," *British Journal of Sociology*, 44 (December 1993), 676–78.

8. See John R. Bowman, *Capitalist Collective Action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

9. Kenneth Shadlen, "Orphaned by Democracy: Small Industry in Contemporary Mexico," *Comparative Politics*, 35 (October 2002).

10. Michael Shafer, *Winners and Losers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), ch. 2.

11. Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch. 1.

12. Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," *Review of Politics*, 36 (1974), 85–131; Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., *Business and the State in Developing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Shadlen; Pete Moore, "What Makes Successful Business Lobbies?," *Comparative Politics*, 33 (January 2001), 127–47.

13. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, p. 3, refer to these as "mobilizing structures." On informal organizational resources, see Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

14. Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society* (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989); William A. Gamson, "The Social Psychology of Collective Action," in Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Bert Klandermans and Marga de Weerd, "Group Identification and Political Protest," in Sheldon Stryker, Timothy J. Owens, and Robert W. White, eds., *Self, Identity, and Social Movements* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).

15. In the face of non-class-based politics, class analysis is contested. See Andrew Sayer and Richard Walker, *The New Social Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 13–34; Rosemary Crompton, *Class and Stratification* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Erik Olin Wright, *Class Counts* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), ch. 13.

16. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1963).

17. Ira Katznelson, "Working Class Formation," in Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 9.

18. Sven Beckert, *The Monied Metropolis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

19. Some delink culture from class. Klaus Eder, *The New Politics of Class* (London: Sage, 1993), p. 2. But the division of labor remains a foundation of class. Sayer and Walker, ch. 1; Beckert, p. 348.

20. Katznelson, p. 17. See also Kay Deaux and Anne Reid, "Contemplating Collectivism," in Stryker, Owens, and White, eds., p. 186.

21. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, p. 2.

22. Gamson; David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 51 (August 1986), 464–81; David Snow and Robert Benford, "Master Frames and Cycles of Protest," in Morris and Mueller, eds., pp. 133–55.

23. Sheldon Stryker, "Identity Competition," in Stryker, Owens, and White, eds., p. 27.

24. David Snow and Doug McAdam, "Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social Movements," in Stryker, Owens, and White, eds., p. 48.

25. Mayer Zald, "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing," in McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, eds., p.

262. In studies of class consciousness, much of the debate centers on the question of objective interests, which imply readily mobilized, latent classes. See Giovanni Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 81; Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 20; Katznelson; Erik Olin Wright, "A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure," in Erik OlinWright et al., *The Debate on Classes* (London: Verso, 1989) p. 5; Wright, *Class Counts*, p. 387

26. Antonio Gramsci, in Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith, eds., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1995) p. 196.

27. Sartori, pp. 86–87.

28. Alan Zuckerman. "New Approaches to Political Cleavage," *Comparative Political Studies*, 15 (July 1982), 139.

29. Jürgen Kocka, "Classes, Interest Articulation, and Public Policy," in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 70.

30. Insights from social psychology show that in- versus out-group identities and a sense of collective relative deprivation can foster collective action. Marilynn Brewer and Michael Silver, "Group Distinctiveness, Social Identification, and Collective Mobilization," in Stryker, Owens, and White, eds., pp. 154–55.

31. Textile production incorporates spinning, weaving, and finishing (dyeing and printing). In many developing countries, apparel manufacturing entails assembly of precut materials for overseas buyers.

32. Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).

33. Antonella Bassani, "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization" (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1993), pp. 113, 136, 147–48, 154; World Bank, *Growing Faster, Finding Jobs* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), p. 29.

34. Because imports of inputs and intermediate goods were freed before finished products, some textile and all ready-to-wear exporters initially enjoyed high effective rates of protection.

35. Data are derived from standardized interviews with a sample of Moroccan and Tunisian textile and ready-to-wear manufacturers. They were asked about their attitudes toward reduced custom duties and nontariff barriers (NTB) on textile inputs (thread, cloth, dyes) and finished goods (ready-to-wear apparel), streamlined customs processing and export procedures, and tactics in conveying policy interests to the government. Political sensitivities prevented random sampling of respondents and limited the sample sizes to forty-one Moroccan industrialists (twenty-three ready-to-wear and eighteen textile producers) and twenty-six manufacturers in Tunisia (twenty ready-to-wear and six textile producers). To compensate, the sample included firms of varied sizes, geographic locations, and industrial activities. Interviews with government officials, labor leaders, factory workers, journalists, and academics corroborated the data.

36. A few families totally divested from textiles. Interviews with former AMITH official and apparel firm manager, Casablanca, Morocco, September 20, 1999; textile firm director, Casablanca, November 25, 1999; Melani Cammett, "International Exposure, Domestic Response," *Arab Studies Journal*, 7/8 (1999–2000), 26–51.

37. *La Vie Économique*, December 14, 1990, Mar. 1, 29, 1991.

38. *La Vie Économique*, Nov. 10, 1991; interview with AMITH official, Casablanca, February 3, 2000. 3000DH is worth approximately 320 U.S. dollars. AMITH was unable to supply cross-time data on its membership.

39. Interviews with former AMITH official and apparel firm manager, Casablanca, September 20, 1999; textile firm director, Ain Sebaa, Morocco, December 2, 1999; textile firm commercial director, Berrechid, Morocco, January 13, 2000; apparel firm director, Salé, Morocco, January 25, 2000.

40. Reference or floor prices establish a minimum price against which duties are calculated for a given import.

41. Interviews with former AMITH official and apparel firm manager, Casablanca, September 20, 1999; textile firm director, Casablanca, Nov. 16, 1999; textile firm director, Casablanca, Nov. 26, 1999; *Conjoncture*, October 1997.

42. Interviews with investment firm director, Tunis, Tunisia, May 21, 1998; technology consultant, Tunis, May 12, 1998; industrialist, Tunis, May 28, 1998.
43. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
44. Interviews with apparel firm manager, Sfax, Tunisia, June 8, 1998; financial counselor, Ferchiou Law Associates, Tunis, May 30, 2000.
45. Of course, French colonialism developed in distinct ways in each of the North African states, influencing postindependence class formation. Elbaki Hermassi, *Leadership and National Development in North Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Mounira Charrad, *States and Women's Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
46. Rémy Leveau, *Le Fellah Marocain* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985).
47. John Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 107; interviews with telecommunications equipment retail firm director, Casablanca, November 13, 1999; textile firm director, Casablanca, November 16, 1999; textile firm commercial director, Berrechid, January 13, 2000.
48. Ali Benhaddou, *Maroc: Les Élites du Royaume* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997).
49. Abdelkader Berrada, "La Marocanisation de 1973," *Revue Juridique, Politique et Économique du Maroc*, 20 (1988), 59–96; Mohamed Saïd Saâdi, *Les Groupes Financiers au Maroc* (Casablanca: Okad, 1989); Nourredine El Aoufi, *La Marocanisation* (Casablanca: Toubkal, 1990); Abdelkader Berrada, "État et Capital Privé au Maroc (1956–1980)," *Annales Marocaines d'Économie*, 2 (Autumn 1992), 29–68.
50. Interview with former AMITH official and former apparel firm manager, Casablanca, September 20, 1999.
51. Interview with apparel firm director, Tangiers, Morocco, February 16, 2000.
52. Interview with apparel firm director, Salé, October 5, 1999 (emphasis added).
53. Interviews with former AMITH official and former apparel firm manager, Casablanca, September 20, 1999; apparel firm director, Salé, January 25, 2000.
54. Interview with apparel firm director, Ain Sebaa, January 19, 2000.
55. Interviews with apparel firm director, Salé, October 5, 1999; apparel firm director, Marrakesh, Morocco, December 3, 1999; textile firm commercial director, Berrechid, January 13, 2000.
56. See the Moroccan weekly *Success*.
57. Personal communication with apparel firm director, May 1, 2003; interviews with apparel firm director, Salé, January 25, 2000; textile firm commercial director, Mohammedia, Morocco, January 24, 2000; apparel firm director, Salé, January 18, 2000.
58. Hermassi, pp. 66–67, 79–80.
59. Hassine Dimassi, "Accumulation du Capital et Repartition des Revenues" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tunis, 1983), p. 156; Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, "L'Accumulation du Capital et les Classes Sociales en Tunisie depuis l'Indépendance" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tunis, 1986), p. 52.
60. Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Libya and Tunisia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 229, 232.
61. Interviews with textile finishing firm director, Jebel Ouest, Tunisia, May 18, 2000; textile firm director, Ben Arous, Tunisia, May 31, 2000; textile firm director, Tunis, October 12, 2000; Dimassi, pp. 97, 209; Iliya Harik, "Privatization and Development in Tunisia," in Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, eds., *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 211–12.
62. Interview with former government official, Tunis Ariana, Tunisia, July 12, 2000; Dimassi, p. 296.
63. Centre National d'Études Industrielles, "Note de Synthèse de l'Étude Sectorielle de l'Industrie Textile," (Tunis: CNEI, 1976), pp. 2–4, 6–8; Dimassi, pp. 762–63.
64. For a similar argument, see Debra Javeline, "The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia," *American Political Science Review*, 97 (February 2003), 107–21.
65. Snow and McAdam, p. 56; Zald, pp. 266–67.
66. Shadlen.