~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~DECEMBER 1, 2002~~SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSITION,ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, AND TERRORISM (fwd)

["Clement M. Henry" <chenry@mail.la.utexas.edu>]

Cordesman again- with links to more complete version.

*****************************
Clement M. Henry
Professor of Government
University of Texas at Austin
Austin TX 78712
tel 471-5121, fax 471-1061

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Date: Mon, 2 Dec 2002 16:45:18 -0600
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Subject: ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~DECEMBER 1, 2002~~SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSITION,
     ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, AND TERRORISM


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                  ********GULFWIRE ~ PERSPECTIVES*********
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          INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
             NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
        THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

                             DECEMBER 1, 2002

           SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSITION, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, AND TERRORISM
                         BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives========================

EDITORS NOTE:

GulfWire is once again indebted to Dr. Anthony Cordesman for providing a
detailed, authoritative analysis of issues of the day that are of keen
interest to you.  This exhaustive report on the role of Islam in Saudi
Arabia is timely in view of the most recent flood of negative reporting on
the Kingdom.

Dr. Cordesman's report does not exonerate Saudi Arabia against some of the
charges it faces, but it does put Saudi religious practices in perspective,
notes that Saudi Arabia has done a great deal to fight terrorism already,
and stresses the need for reforms that strike at the sources of the
problems, not just serving as new efforts at counter-terrorism.

The report is a comprehensive analysis of the issue and provides more
discussion than we can reprint here.  This issue of Perspectives provides
the table of contents and an excerpt from the report and we have made the
complete report available to you in the GulfWire on-line archive.  See below
for the web link.

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives========================

THE COMPLETE REPORT CAN BE FOUND IN THE GULFWIRE ON-LINE ARCHIVES -- TO
ACCESS THIS REPORT VISIT:
www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/2002_11_27_Cordesman.pdf

THIS PDF FILE REQUIRES ADOBE "READER" SOFTWARE TO VIEW IT.  "READER" IS FREE
FOR DOWNLOAD FROM http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives========================

SAUDI ARABIA: OPPOSITION, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, AND TERRORISM
BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

CONTENTS
·	Opposition and Islamic Extremism
·	Working Within the System: The Role of Saudi "Modernizers"
·	The Character and Impact of Saudi Puritanism
·	Putting Saudi Wahhabi and Salafi Beliefs into Perspective
·	Most Islamic Puritanism and Extremism is Not "Wahhabism"
·	Islamic Extremism and Saudi Youth
·	Trying to Co-opt Islamic Extremism: The Rising at the Grand Mosque
·	Islamic Extremism and the Failure of Co-option in the 1980s and 1990s
·	Education as a Self-Inflicted Wound
·	Making Women Part of the Problem, Rather than Part of the Solution
·	Religious Extremism and Active Political Opposition
·	Moderate Opposition: Religious Fundamentalism
·	Hardline Peaceful Opposition: Sheikh Safar al-Hawali
·	Non-Violent Islamist Opposition: Salman al-Auda
·	"Quasi-Violent" Islamist Opposition: The Committee for the Defense of
        Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and Mohammed al-Mas'ari
·	Violent Islamic Opposition: The Saudi National Guard Bombing
·	Militant Islamist Opposition: The Al Khobar Tragedy
·	The Initial Course of the Al Khobar Investigation
·	Serious Progress in the Khobar Investigation
·	The US Issues an Indictment
·	The Role of the Saudi Hezbollah
·	The Detailed History of the Attack
·	The Role of Iran and the Threat of An American Follow Up
·	A Continuing Problem
·	Sunni versus Shi'ite
·	Militant Saudi Extremists: Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida
·	Militant Saudi Extremists: Other Threats
·	Opposition, Extremism, Terrorism and the Future
·	Endnotes
[For the complete report see the web link below]


OPPOSITION AND ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

 	Saudi Arabia does not face major political challenges from the mix of
progressives, democratic reformers, human rights advocates, Arab socialists,
Marxists or other secular political movements that shape the political
debate in many other Arab countries. Saudi Arabia has political advocates in
all of these areas, and some are quite active as individuals. There are many
progressive Saudi individual businessmen, academics, journalists and
technocrats who actively seek evolutionary reform. Nevertheless, Saudi
Arabia is one of the few countries in the world where the vast majority of
politically conscious adult citizens are more conservative than a
conservative regime.

	Saudi politics still center around religious legitimacy, and the commitment
of the Al Sauds to the teachings of Mohamed ibn Abd Al Wahhab, and to
preserving the regime's religious legitimacy, is as important today as
during the first rise of the Al Sauds to power. Much of Saudi political
stability is shaped by popular perceptions of the aspect of the regime's
commitment to Islam rather than the elections and pluralism that shape
legitimacy by Western standards. Even the most reform-minded technocrats,
businessmen, and members of the royal family normally make Islamic values
part of all their decision-making, speeches, laws, decrees, and public life.

	While the Saudi regime did face serious "popular" challenges from Nasser
and Arab socialism in the past, there is little evidence that such movements
retain any political strength today. Modern Saudi society is focused on the
values of puritanical Islamic beliefs. While there are elements of Arab
nationalism in this Saudi belief structure, they are bound by the traditions
ingrained in Saudi society. As a result, most advocates of reform must work
through the Saudi royal family, the government, and the Kingdom's
technocrats. In fact, it is this elite that has led virtually all of the
Kingdom's efforts to modernize and reform Saudi politics and society.

	As one experienced observer, who served as a senior US diplomat in Saudi
Arabia, puts it,

"The rulers of Saudi Arabia today do not face major political challenges
from domestic progressives, human rights advocates, or democratic
reformers—nor from the local versions of socialists, Marxists, ethnic or
liberal political groupings that inhabit other Arab landscapes.

"Saudi ruling challenges come, instead, from an Islamic environment that the
rulers themselves have created, shaped, and maintained. It is a remarkable
Saudi phenomenon that a regime unrivalled across the Islamic world in its
conservatism presides over a body politic that for the most part is even
more conservative."

"Saudi society today is, and has been for several hundred years, built on
the values of what we in the West call 'Wahhabi' Islam. Relative to Islamic
cultures elsewhere, that of the Saudi Kingdom is strict, even harsh, in its
insistence on public observance of fundamental principles of Islam. Our own
history has a weak parallel, the age of the Puritans, but the extent of
Puritan control never matched that of "Wahhabi" Islam in Saudi Arabia.
Within the Saudi environment—and while seeking to keep it intact—Saudi
royals and western-educated elites and technocrats lead efforts to reform
and modernize their society, politics, education and the infrastructure of
modern global development."

"Within this environment too, there exists a culture that is inward-looking,
traditional and insular, a culture itself challenged by world and regional
events it cannot control or adequately understand. This is an environment
that gives rise to shaykhs and men of religion who rebuke their leaders on
Islamic grounds, and who assess the shortcomings of alien cultures by a
peculiarly high standard of Islamic principle. It is an environment where
young men who are true believers strain to see threats from outside through
the lens of a strict Islam, and then dare to fight accordingly, even while
violating precepts observed by Muslims everywhere."

Working Within the System: The Role of Saudi "Modernizers"

	Saudi Arabia does have its "modernizers." Many Saudi princes, educators,
technocrats, businessmen, Western educated citizens and more progressive
Islamists have favored more rapid social change than has been possible in
the face of from Saudi Islamic extremists and conservatives can influence
large elements of Saudi society has often delayed progress. Such elements in
Saudi society differ significantly over their vision of Saudi Arabia's
future, but most reject an ultra-conservative or radical interpretation of
Islam. They support educational and economic reform, and Saudi Arabia's
opening to the outside world – both Arab and Western spheres. Many favor the
creation of a more representative and active Majlis, and the eventual
creation of an elected assembly. Many complain about nepotism and the abuse
of power and legal rights by members of the royal family, other leading
families, and officials.

	Many also support the liberalization of current religious restraints on
subjects such as commerce, the role of women, and soother practices. For
example, such modernists and reformers petitioned the King at the time of
the Gulf War, and Saudi women have carried out protests for women's rights
by driving their own cars.

	Yet most Saudi "modernizers"—which include significant numbers of deeply
religious Saudis—recognize that Saudi religious practices and traditions can
only evolve slowly over time. A few businessmen, technocrats, and
Western-educated professionals have been arrested, or have had difficulties
with the authorities, for such activities. However, such incidents are
relatively rare. Most "modernizers" understand that the Royal family and
Saudi technocrats offer a far more practical evolutionary road toward change
than opposition to the regime. Intelligent "modernizers" understand they are
in a minority, and must work within the system.

The Character and Impact of Saudi Puritanism

	The Islamic practices of the vast majority of Saudis are puritanical,
involve a conservative form of Hanbali jurisprudence, and are bound by
conservative tribal social customs. The Saudi interpretation of Islam, and
the actions Saudi clergy, reflect the teaching of Mohammed ibn Abd
al-Wahhab, a conservative and fundamentalist reformer who reshaped the
worship and social practices of virtually all elements of Sunni society in
the mid-1700s. Saudis generally regard Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab as the
kind of key reformer called for in Islamic Hadith (tradition), who is called
a Mujaddid. This is a voice that God sends at the head of each century to
call upon Muslims to return to the true revelations of the Koran, and bring
moral restoration to the umma (Muslim community.)

	Abd al-Wahhab's descendents—the Al Shaykh—still have great influence in the
clergy as well as in managing the pilgrimage (Hajj) and pious endowments
(Awqaf). They also play a role in shaping the policies of key Ministries
including Education and Justice. Abd al-Wahhab's teaching about Islamic
practices and legal interpretations dominate the legal system and must be
considered in shaping virtually every major public policy decision. While
Saudis generally do not use the name of a religious teacher or individual
like Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab to describe such religious practices—in fact
Al-Wahhab is one of the ninety-nine names of Allah—this has led outsiders to
use the term Wahhabi Islam or "Wahhabism."

Putting Saudi Wahhabi and Salafi Beliefs into Perspective

	Saudi Muslims think of themselves as "Muwahiddun" or "Unitarians." Muslims
who believe Allah is the one and only one, and is the only legitimate
derivation of correct Islamic beliefs. This consensus has been a basic part
of Saudi society and culture since the founding of the first Al Saud state.
Mainstream "Wahhabi" practices act as a binding force that holds Saudi
Arabia together.  Saudi Arabia is generally a remarkably non-violent and
polite society, where hospitality and good manners are the rule in dealing
with foreigners as well as fellow Saudis. Mainstream Wahhabi preaching and
thought rarely advocates the use of violence or terrorism in the name of
politico-religious disputes. The only major exception has been Saudi support

for the Palestinian cause in the Second Intifada.

	Even mainstream "Wahhabi" religious practices do limit critical aspects of
the Kingdom's progress, such as modernizing the financial services sector,
improving the quality of education, and expanding the role of women in the
Saudi economy.  Religious practices affect human rights and the
modernization of the legal system as well.  While there are progressive
Wahhabi thinkers, there are others who find it difficult to think beyond the
concerns of the Islam and Arab world, or to come to grips with the realities
of modern science and technology.  The Saudi inability to come to grips with
population growth and birth rates is also at least partly a result religious
conservatism.

	More significantly, there are darker undercurrents in Saudi religious
practices that advocate religious hatred and help encourage terrorism. Some
Saudi sermons do preach hatred and xenophobia.  Some Saudi textbooks and
religious books attack Christians and Jews, and the practices of other
Muslims. The fact that they rarely motivate the ordinary Saudi reader into
action is no excuse for their existence – any more than there is an excuse
for the similarly bigoted forms of Judaism or Christianity.

	A minority of Saudi religious hard-liners and extremists go beyond words
and either carry out terrorist and violent acts or support and fund them.
Most such extremists not only are hostile to the outside world and
non-believers, they oppose the Al Saud regime and virtually all efforts by
Saudi technocrats and businessmen to modernize the Kingdom. They perceive
the Saudi royal family as corrupt in religious as well as political and
social terms, and as being hypocritical in its professed religious beliefs
and claims to be the guardian of the Islamic holy places. They see Saudi
technocrats and the more cosmopolitan members of the Saudi business
community as near apostates from Islam and as being driven by Western or
non-Islamic values. In fact, this minority of violent religious extremists
currently poses the only serious political challenge to Saudi stability.

	Many such extremists are strongly anti-Shi'ite, condemn many of the
practices of Sunnis in other Islamic countries and fear that there are vast
Judeo-Christian conspiracies against Islam. For them, Western society is
fundamentally corrupt, degrading, and leading Saudi society away from the
true faith of Islam. It has spawned equally corrupt Arab secular political
beliefs, all of which are betrayals of Islam regardless of whether they are
right or left wing. To such extremists, the US is a co-conspirator with a
Zionist enemy that has seized the third-most important Islamic holy
place–the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif. These extremists also believe the
US military is not securing Saudi Arabia but rather occupying it.

	A number of different influences have helped politicize virtually all Saudi
extremists, and give them a potential broader base of public support to draw
upon. These influences include the Arab-Israeli conflict, the social costs
of changes like hyper-urbanization, the educational system, the failure of
Arab socialism and nationalism. They also include the long history of
militancy that helped make the Ikwan, such a potent military force under Ibn
Saud as well as the kind of marginal movement that led to the attack on the
Grand Mosque in Mecca.

	Other influences include outside groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, and
the example of Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. More recently, they
include the constant images in Arab media of Palestinian suffering as a
result of the Second Intifada. So has the continuing US and British  Arab
military presence in Saudi Arabia since the Gulf War, and the Liberation of
Kuwait.

	As has been the case in many other Islamic countries, the Saudi regime has
inadvertently helped support such extremism even while it has made efforts
to suppress it. The continuing need of the Saudi monarchy to maintain its
political legitimacy by stressing its role as an "Islamic government" has
led the royal family to try to prove itself to be a worthy inheritor of the
Wahhabi legacy by fostering religious education, and by funding Islamic
charities and Arab causes. Far too often, it has done so while paying little
attention to such educators, charities and causes are actually doing.

	 Fortunately for Saudi Arabia, most Saudi extremists have had little unity,
although some have formed loose organizational links, and a few have created
formal organizations, and even serious terrorist bodies like Al Qaida. Most
leading extremist Ulema do little more that give sermons that attack the
royal family and Saudi government—often by indirection. Extremist believers
circulate cassettes, faxes, or Xeroxed sermons and other writings, or
communicate through the Internet. However, while such extremists often test
the limits of government tolerance, only a few have even gone to plan or
commit acts of violence.

	It is difficult to define the goals of Saudi Islamic extremists in terms of
the practical changes that wish to make in the Saudi government, society,
and economy. There are many diverse voices, and most focus on what they
oppose rather than what they want. However, many extremists do believe that
the nation's wealth should be shared more broadly and that religious
charities and taxes should be a key factor shaping Saudi society. Most claim
that a true return to a "pure" faith requires laws and social standards that
are far more stringent and demanding than are now the practice in Saudi
society.

	Saudi extremists also divide over how to deal with the West. Some openly
reject the West. Others are willing to exploit Western concerns for human
rights and "democracy" in seeking their own freedom of action without
showing any concern for the rights of their opposition. The end result is
more a matrix of critical ultraconservative voices, whose key members are
known to each other and to most religious Saudis, rather than a coherent
movement.

Charity and Extremism: The Flow of Money

	Osama Bin Laden has shown all too clearly that the impact of Saudi
religious thought can lead to extremism and violence outside Saudi Arabia as
well as within it.  However, once again, there is a need for perspective.
The poorly controlled flow of Saudi money outside the Kingdom has probably
done more to influence Islamic extremism outside Saudi Arabia than has Saudi
religious thinking and missionary efforts. A clear distinction must also be
made between the deliberate Saudi support of Islamic extremism and violence,
and the fact that many Saudis have contributed to what appeared to be
Islamic charities or gave money to what they felt were legitimate Islamic
causes – such as the struggles in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo – without
knowing the true character of the groups involved or where them money
ultimately went.

	One of the strengths of Saudi culture also proved to be a weakness. Saudi
Arabia has a long tradition of public and private charity, much of which is
given informally on a personal basis. Those Muslims that can afford it have
a religious obligation to charity called "Zakhat," which is a nominal 1.5%
of their income, but their actual contribution is often far higher and
sometimes closer to 10%. In the case of public figures, charity is combined
with patronage, and constant personal requests are made by those in need or
seeking funding for good causes. In many cases, the money is given with
minimal investigation, if any. Virtually any type of personal contact,
petition, or reference is often enough. In the case of senior princes and
wealthy businessmen, major contributions are often made to religious
organizations outside Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom has long been seen as the
key source of Islamic charity, particularly to conservative Islamic causes.
These customs have aided many Saudis and legitimate causes outside the
Kingdom. At the same time, they have made it easy to exploit the situation,
and Saudi giving to charities, and freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and the Second Intifada has blurred the often uncertain distinction
between freedom fighter and terrorist.

	Very senior Saudis privately admit that the Saudi Ministry of the Interior,
Saudi Foreign Ministry, and Saudi intelligence failed to properly
characterize many of the "Islamic" causes that have received Saudi money.
Even funds transferred to very reputable causes like the Saudi Red Crescent
seem to have been misused in some cases. The Muslim World League is a
heavily funded group whose missionary efforts are reported to have moved
money to elements of Al Qaida and different extremists groups like Gamiat
Islamiya and the Islamic Jihad in Egypt, and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.
Money also went to causes with hardline or extremist elements like the
Muslim brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan or Hamas in the Gaza.

	Even though the Saudi government put strict controls on Osama Bin Laden's
over sources of funding after 1994, Senior Saudi officials admit that money
went from members of the royal family and senior Saudi businessmen to
charities and causes that were extremist in character. The Saudi government
did not begin to properly analyze and control the flow of funds to movements
like the Taliban and extremist groups in South Asia, Central Asia, and the
rest of the  world until 1998. Even after 1988, the flow of Islamic charity
and funds, even from royal offices like those of King Fahd, was allocated
with remarkable carelessness to what was really being funded – not only in
terms of extremism but in terms of whether the money was properly being
spent and managed and actually served the claimed purpose.

	At the same time, at least some Saudi businessmen did fund such
organizations knowing they were extremist or violent in character. The
problem of controlling such funds was made still worse by the fact that so
much Saudi private capital is held and invested outside Saudi Arabia and is
beyond the government's control.

Most Islamic Puritanism and Extremism is not "Wahhabism"

	The West, however, has shown signs of its own form of extremism in reacting
to the situation. Some Western writing since "9/11" has blamed Saudi Arabia
for most of the region's Islamic fundamentalism, and used the term Wahhabi
carelessly to describe all such movements. In fact, most such extremism is
not based on Saudi Islamic beliefs. It is based on a much broader stream of
thought in Islam, known as the Salafi interpretation, which literally means
a return to Islam's original state, and by a long tradition of movements in
Islam that call for islah (reform) and tajdid (renewal).

	Blaming Saudi beliefs, or "Wahhabism," for the views and actions of most of
today's Salafi extremists is a little like blaming Calvin for today's
Christian extremists or Elijah for today's Jewish extremists. In practice,
it is more modern Islamist thinkers like the Egyptians Sayyid Qutb and
Hassam al-Banna (the founder of the Moslem Brotherhood) who laid the
foundation of modern Islamic puritanical politics and who called for Jihad
(struggle) to achieve their goals. Other figures like Aiman al-Zawahiri and
Muhammad al-Farag helped create movements like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad
and an approach to violence that helped shape Islamic extremism in
Afghanistan – although some Saudi clerics like Shaikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz
played a role.

	No one can ignore the fact that Osama Bin Laden is a Saudi and Al Qaida has
Saudi roots. Nevertheless, outside Islamists like Shaikh Abdullah Azzam—a
Jordanian-born Palestinian and a bitter, violent critic of the Saudi
regime—did more to shape the beliefs of men like Osama Bin Laden than
mainstream Wahhabi thinking. So did figures like Shaikh Omar Abdul-Rahman,
who founded the Egyptian Islamic Group and helped transform modern Salafi
beliefs into Islamic terrorism, and had a powerful influence on Bin Laden.

	The use of the word "Wahhabi" to describe Islamic extremist movements in
other countries is equally misleading. The Deobandi seminary movement in
Pakistan, and parties like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Party of Religious
Scholarship) did more to shape Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan
than "Wahhabi"   missionaries. While Saudi and US money made much of the
Afghan resistance possible, the Pakistani ISI controlled the flow of much of
this money and helped fund Afghan extremists like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and
his Hizb-e-Islami, Pakistani intelligence then provided direct Pakistani
support to the Taliban, although the initial rise of the movement led by
Mullah Muhammad Omar Akhund seems to have been a largely Afghan phenomena
with little ties to any outside Salafi  movements.

	Other Salafi movements have arisen in Yemen with few ties to Saudi Wahhabi
beliefs and practices. These have included the Islamic Army of Aden, led by
Zein Abu Bakr al-Mihdar  (Abu Hassan). There have been Kurdish Salafi groups
like the Jund al-Islam (Ansar al-Islam). The Syrian Muslim Brothers have
been a significant political force in Syria in the past and are still
active. Sunni Palestinian religious groups are equally independent of Saudi
influence, as are most Sudanese and Somali groups and key figures like
Hassan al-Turabi and the Sudanese Islamic People's Congress.

	Iran's various hard-line Shi'ite groups have backed Saudi Shi'ites in
carrying out terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia, but such movements have no ties
to Saudi Sunni extremism. The most violent Islamic extremist groups in the
world -- Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (AIG) and Salafist Group for Call and
Combat (GSPC) –are homegrown products of Algeria's corrupt military junta
and violent domestic political traditions. Virtually every country in
Central Asia has its own Salafi movements and extremists, and while many
have benefited from Saudi Arabia's careless funding of Islamic causes and
charities, none are Wahhabi in any meaningful sense of being  tied to Saudi
teaching and tradition and virtually all of the Madrassas in South and
Central Asia teach interpretations and practices that differ from mainstream
Wahhabi  teaching.  Lumping all of these diverse elements together  is like
calling all Protestants Baptists.

	Similarly, the fact some Saudi money has gone to Islamic extremists -- both
indirectly and directly – scarcely means that Saudi Arabia is the only or
even principle source of such funding. The other Southern Gulf states have
been equally careless in managing their charitable efforts in foreign
countries and the flow of funds to "charitable" causes. A great deal of
money from Muslims around the world that was intended to aid Muslims in
Kosovo and Bosnia ended up in the hands of Bin Laden and other
terrorist/extremist groups. Most of the extremist groups in North Africa are
largely self-financing, and drug money, Iranian and Pakistani government
funds and arms, have played a major role in supporting Islamic violence in
Afghanistan, Central Asia, and South Asia. The flow of money to the
Palestinian cause since the beginning of the Second Intifada also presents
the problem that for most Arabs and Muslims that Palestinian cause is
legitimate, as are violent Palestinian tactics, while Israel is seen as a
violent occupying power that attacks Palestinian civilians. This inevitably
means that most Muslims and Arabs – including Saudis – do not see movements
like Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or the Fatah Hawks as terrorists
but rather as freedom fighters.

THERE IS MUCH MORE OF THIS REPORT FOR YOU TO READ...

THE COMPLETE REPORT CAN BE FOUND IN THE GULFWIRE ON-LINE ARCHIVES -- TO
ACCESS THIS REPORT VISIT:
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ABOUT DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN

Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and
CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli
military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms
transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.

Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department
of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.

Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff,
working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in
the Gulf and North Africa.

PREVIOUS GULFWIRE APPEARANCES
"The West and the Arab World: Partnership or a 'Clash of Civilizations?'"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_11_12.htm
"Strategy in the Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic Theory and
Operational Reality"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_22.htm
"A Firsthand Look at Saudi Arabia Since 9-11"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_10.htm
"Iraq: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_07_12.htm
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and Its Weapons of Mass Destruction"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_02.htm
"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_01.htm
"Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli and Palestinian Strategic Failures"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_04_08.htm
"Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic Partnership"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm

BOOKS BY DR. CORDESMAN
"Iraq's Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0892064161/arabialink
"Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275965287/arabialink
"Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332362/arabialink
 "Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332427/arabialink
"Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending
the U.S. Homeland"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275974278/arabialink

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