a must read! ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 24, 2002~~PLANNINGFOR A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND: U.S. POLICY TO RESHAPE A POST-SADDAM IRAQ (fwd)

["Clement M. Henry" <chenry@mail.la.utexas.edu>]

Here is a brilliant analysis of a postwar Iraq, if there is to be a war,
that deserves careful reading by anyone who cares about America's future
in the world, not just the Middle East.  Think also how it may relate to
the efforts of the War on Terrorism that need to convince public opinion
in the Middle East that Bin Laden et al are the criminals and not the
United States!  Here is the strongest advice against going to war by an
insider to whom the Bush Administration should listen.

*****************************
Clement M. Henry
Professor of Government
University of Texas at Austin
Austin TX 78712
tel 471-5121, fax 471-1061

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2002 00:04:04 -0600
From: GulfWire e-Newsletters <GulfWire@arabialink.com>
To: *GulfWire* <gulfwire@arabialink.com>
Subject: ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 24,
     2002~~PLANNING FOR A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND: U.S. POLICY TO RESHAPE A
    POST-SADDAM IRAQ

                  ****************************************
                  ********GULFWIRE ~ PERSPECTIVES*********
                  ****************************************

          INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
             NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
        THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

                             NOVEMBER 24, 2002

                   PLANNING FOR A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND:
                 US POLICY TO RESHAPE A POST-SADDAM IRAQ
                          by Anthony H. Cordesman


===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

EDITORS NOTE

Dr. Anthony Cordesman's "If We Fight Iraq" studies, previously available
through GulfWire, are comprehensive, exhaustive analyses of the situation
the U.S. faces in structuring its plans of action to depose Saddam
Hussein.  The studies include otherwise difficult to obtain information
and views from U.S. political and military officials.  This GulfWire
Perspectives provides an analysis on the perils and pitfalls facing the
US in a post-Saddam Iraq.

GulfWire would like to thank Dr. Cordesman for sharing these reports with
our readers.

Dr. Cordesman's earlier contributions to GulfWire can be accessed through
the GulfWire on-line archive [see below].  The archive, normally a members'
only venue reserved for those who purchase the GulfWire resource CD-ROM, is
currently open for access by all visitors.

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

PLANNING FOR A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND: US POLICY TO RESHAPE A POST-SADDAM IRAQ
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies

The hardest part of war is often the peace, and this is particularly likely
to be the case if the US goes to war with Iraq. It is not that the US is not
planning for such contingencies; it is the quality of such planning that is
at issue. Unless it sharply improves, it may well become a self-inflicted
wound based on a series of "syndromes" that grow out of ignorance,
indifference to Iraq's real needs, and ethnocentricity.

The US does not have to suffer from "Iraq War Peace Syndrome." Some good
studies and planning efforts are emerging, but they are the exceptions and
not the norm, in an uncoordinated and faltering effort. Far too often, we
are rushing our planning efforts without making adequate efforts to make up
for our lack of knowledge. As a result, planners both outside and inside the
US government may end in doing more harm than good, and in laying the
groundwork for serious postwar friction and problems. In fact, a pattern of
Iraq war peace syndromes has begun to emerge that is deeply disturbing.

1. The "We Know What We're Doing Syndrome"

One of the most important things we need to do is to admit our level of
ignorance and uncertainty. Far too many "experts" who are now working on
postwar planning have (a) never been in Iraq to the point of having
practical knowledge of the country, and (b) have concentrated on the threat
so long that they have little intelligence data on the workings of its
government, civil society, and economy.

More generally, the US government does not have much of the data it needs to
formulate a detailed peace plan. Looking back over the last 10 years, we
generally failed to seriously examine what was happening inside Iraq in
social and economic terms, and to collect and honestly analyze much of the
data on social change, the economy, and the way the government functioned.

We should be actively pulling together all that exiles, friendly businessmen
and others working in Iraq, the UN, NGOs, and others know about the
day-to-day functioning of given national, regional, and local government
activities in Iraq.  We should be examining existing Iraqi structures and
institutions in detail to know what needs changing and what we can build
upon. We should be looking at the Iraqi constitution and legal system to see
what could be a valid base for change.

More important, we should have teams ready to survey the situation in each
area, town, and governate as we advance. We should have teams ready to work
with key local and then governate leaders. We should have teams ready to
work with the ministries in Iraq's government once we get to Baghdad. We
should admit that we really do not know what we are doing, and cannot know
until the war unfolds. We should be flexible, and emphasize surveying Iraq's
postwar needs in partnership with Iraqis in Iraq at the local, regional, and
national level; making minimal changes in working civil structures.

2. The "US as Liberator Syndrome"

We may or may not be perceived as liberators. We are dealing with a very
sophisticated and long-established tyranny, and we really don't know how an
intensely nationalistic people with deep internal divisions will react, and
how the impact of the fighting will affect the people. We don't know how
long any support will last by a given group or faction the moment we become
involved in trade-offs between them.

We may well face a much more hostile population than in Afghanistan. We
badly need to consider the Lebanon model: Hero to enemy in less than a year.
We also need to consider the Bosnia/Kosovo model where internal divisions
leave no options other than stay and police or leave and watch civil
conflict emerge.

A little self-honesty on our past mistakes in nation building and occupation
would help; especially when we perpetuate the myth we did so splendidly in
Germany and Japan. Things eventually worked out in Germany and Japan because
we enforced minimum change and took advantage of existing institutions. We
only adopted this approach under duress, however, and because the Cold War
forced us to reverse many of our initial plans and policies. Economic
recovery took five years. For the first year, people died for lack of
medical attention, starved, and suffered. We could get away with because
most of the world was suffering and because of the legacy of anger towards
Germany and Japan coming out of the war. We cannot possibly expect such
tolerance today.

Couple this to an unpredictable but inevitable level of collateral damage
and civilian casualties, to what the word "occupation" means in the Arab
world because of Israel, to the historical memory of the British mandate and
US ties to the Shah, to Shi'ite tensions over US relations with Iran and the
Axis of Evil, and to factional tensions in Iraq, and we are almost certain
to face serious problems with at least some major blocs of Iraqis.

No study that does not deal at length with these risks, or prepare for them
on a contingency basis, can do more good than harm. We should focus on
giving Iraqis what they want, and not on giving Iraqis what we feel they
need. Our actions should be based on partnership and a high degree of
humility, not on occupation and arrogance.

3. The "We Lead and They Will Follow" or "Coalition of the Willing Syndrome"

Our coalition of the willing may well be much smaller than the coalition of
the unwilling. We need to understand just how deeply hostile the Arab world
is because of the Second Intifada and our ties to Israel.  Surveys show
around 80% of Arabs, and high percentages of other Islamic nations, see the
Palestinians as the key issue in politics and express anger at the US over
ties to Israel. We also need to understand that in the Gulf, many Arabs also
see the US as responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under
sanctions.

The UN debate shows we face a largely doubtful and antiwar world. In
practical terms, we will be subject to relentless Arab, regional, and global
examination and criticism from D-Day on. We cannot hope to get an Iraqi,
regional, or world mandate to act as occupiers. In fact, if we act in this
way, we are certain to encounter massive problems.

Any humanitarian failures at any point will come back to haunt us. So will
any mistakes in dealing with Iraqi factions, any delays in transferring
power, and any deals the Iraqis and Arab world see as being at Iraqi
expense.

We need to base our peace plans on the reality that we will be judged by
their success for years to come, and that any failures can have explosive
regional impacts. This time we virtually must succeed and we must be
prepared to make the necessary commitment in spite of the potential cost. At
the same time, we need to understand just how firm and enduring the linkage
will be to our success in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
Second Intifada. We may have the luxury of fighting one war at a time, but
we do not have the luxury of focusing on a single peace.

4. The "Best Case War Syndrome"

Far too often, we now base our postwar plans only on fighting a best-case
war. We have no justification for such planning. We may get serious urban
fighting. We may see the use of WMD. We may have to sharply escalate and
inflict serious collateral damage. We may see factional struggles and
warlords emerge, and we already are caught up in a messy struggle between
the Kurds and exile groups like the INC.

No plan is worth considering that does not explicitly examine what can go
wrong in the fighting and how it will impact on the post-fighting outcome.

5. The "Rebuilding Effort Begins After the War Ends Syndrome"

Our rebuilding effort in Iraq must begin on D-Day, not after the war.
Everything we do from bombing to the first ground contact with Iraqis will
be conducted in a media fishbowl, with the world observing and often
searching for any fault or flaw. We cannot be perfect, but we can be
prepared and act with the knowledge that even seemingly trivial actions
during the war can have powerful global effect and shape postwar attitudes.

We must realize that one day after our forces enter any area, the world will
hold us to blame for every bit of Iraqi suffering that follows, as well as
for much of Saddam's legacy of economic mistakes and neglect. The first
minute of the war is the beginning of the peace, and any plan that does not
explicitly recognize this is dangerous.

6. The "Let's Ignore the Iraqi Media and Information Issue Syndrome"

It seems incredible, but a number of studies ignore the need to provide
detailed media coverage to the Iraqi public the moment we go to war, and
then to immediately take control of the Iraqi media and Ministry of
Information and change them to become legitimate sources of information.
Even some good studies of psywar efforts to deal with the Iraqi military
treat the problem as one of dealing with the career military and not the
Iraqi people and the different factions within it.

We are already engaged in a battle for hearts and minds we have done little
to win. We will confront a desperate dictatorship in combat, and what we say
over radio and TV, and to the Iraqi people as we advance, may be critical in
limiting or avoiding urban warfare and prolonged resistance. We also have to
be able to talk to the factions in Iraq and reassure those we plan to work
with. The Ministry of Information, the state controlled radio and TV, and
the press need to be reshaped the moment we have access to them. The
Ministry of Information, in particular, is one of the worst single
instruments of repression in Iraq and needs to be abolished or restructured
the moment we can do so.

7. The "Overthrow the Regime is enough of a US Policy Goal Syndrome"

Our failure to clearly define our postwar policy goals for Iraq is another
area where we need early action. In fact, the Bush Administration has
already faltered badly. There is serious confusion and hostility in the Arab
world and much of the rest of the world over our objectives in going to war.

We face an Arab world where many see us as going to war to seize Iraq's oil,
barter deals with the Russians and French, create a new military base to
dominate the region, and/or serve Israel's interest. Our lack of clear
policy statements has encouraged virtually every negative conspiracy theory
possible.

In short, our ultimate intentions in Iraq are already a major issue that
vague words cannot deal with. There a is a critical need to clarify our
intentions in enough detail to show we really will act in the interest of
the Iraqi people, to refute the major conspiracy theories that have already
developed, and prove we are not a "neo-imperialist" or "occupier. In fact,
we need to act as soon as possible.

8. The "UN and the World Doesn't Matter in Shaping the Peace Syndrome"

We face a massive legal problem that many US studies current ignore. A range
of UN resolutions already govern what can and should be done in Iraq, of
which "oil for food" is only the most obvious. In the real world, we have
only the following options: (a) reject the primacy of the UN and the UNSCR's
dealing with oil for food and calling for democracy and human rights in Iraq
and create our own plans and structure; (b) rely on the UN to do what it is
clearly prepared to do and act for us; and (c) rely on an unpredictable mix
of US, UN, and NGO institutions we will have to build when and if war comes.

All of these options are bad, but (c) is best and we need to face this fact.
We also need to face the fact that we cannot pass our problems on to a
non-existent international community that is willing to sweep up after our
military parade. We may well get UN and international cooperation but only
if we lead and contribute actively. We have to stay as long as it takes, or
at least until we can hand a mission over to the Iraqis.

9. The "Democracy Solves Everything Syndrome"

Broad generalizations about democracy suddenly solving Iraq's problems are
mindlessly stupid. Iraq will benefit from added pluralism of the kind
already called for in UN resolutions. Moreover, Iraq already has provision
for such steps in its existing and draft constitutions. However, the
practice in Iraq has been strong men and dictators for nearly half a
century. Iraq no has no viable political parties, no exile or internal
leaders with proven popular legitimacy, and deep ethnic, religious, and
tribal/clan divisions.

We also must deal with the different goals and priorities of Iraq's
neighbors and the UN. Turkey and Iran will be real constraints on how a
future government deals with the Kurds and Shiites. This means we already
have "non-democratic" priorities. We virtually must enforce territorial
integrity, and limit Kurdish autonomy. There will be no valid
self-determination or democratic solutions to these issues.

Iraq is not going to become a model government or democracy for years. It
faces too many problems in internal power sharing, dealing with regional
issues, and developing political parties that can look beyond selfish
interests. It faces too many other challenges in terms of developing a rule
of law, protecting human rights, and dealing with urgent economic and
security issues.

If we try to impose too much of our political system, we will also face
growing problems with both Iraqis and the Arab world the moment we try to
tell Iraqis how they should govern rather than help them find better
solutions. Rather than catalyze other Arab nations to become democratic, we
will catalyze Pan-Arab hostility and give the Arab world the impression that
we have joined Israel as "occupiers."

10. The "Limited Presence and Peacemaking Syndrome"

There are US war plans that call for an early US military presence in Kirkuk
to ensure that the Kurds do not attempt to seize it and to deter any Turkish
movements. It is less clear that the US has clearly tailored plans to occupy
Shi'ite areas in ways that would block Iranian adventures and halt uprisings
or efforts at control by Shi'ite factions. There also are some who strongly
oppose executing such efforts because of the risk or cost, and who want to
avoid a major US military peacekeeping role regardless of the risks.

Some form of clear peacemaking/peacekeeping strategy is vital and past wars
provide the lesson that the earlier the US forces are present, the easier
the task and the smaller the presence required. In the case of Iraq, this is
needed to prevent civil war, halt warlordism, and provide the security
needed to rebuild the nation. If it is not done, the alternatives will
either be to come in later with much larger resources, or fail in key
aspects of shaping the peace.

The US must be prepared from the start to deal with the broader territorial
issues - authority over the city of Kirkuk and its environs, shaping their
ethnic mix, and control of its key nodes of oil production and distribution.
The US must also be prepared to help the Iraqis deal with the constitutional
issue - what mix between devolution and centralization will be acceptable to
the Arabs and the Kurds alike? (The last time, the issue went to arbitration
under the League of Nations mandate, took years and years to resolve, and
eventually had to be enforced by the RAF using poison gas. Scarcely the best
precedent!)

11. "The Zero-Based Approach to Restructuring Iraq's Government Syndrome"

Iraq cannot be treated as an intellectual playground for political
scientists or ideologues, and must not be treated as if its people were a
collection of white rats that could be pushed through a democratic maze by a
bunch of benevolent US soldiers and NGOs. Iraq is a country of 24 million
people with a history of more than 80 years. It has a constitution and a
draft constitution. It has an existing National Assembly structure,
relatively modern legal system, and a history of past autonomy agreements
with the Kurds.

Iraq has a strong central structure based on a highly urbanized society. It
is critically dependent on food imports and allocating the revenue from oil
exports. It has some 23 existing ministries. Some are now tools of
repression and must be dismantled or totally rebuilt, but most are vital to
running the country. Many of its urban centers and complexes and governates
are tailored to local needs. A standardized, cookie cutter approach to local
or regional government would fail dismally anywhere in the world. It is a
recipe for disaster in Iraq.

There is no Iraqi with real-world experience in governing Iraq in countless
largely technical areas vital to the needs of some 24 million people other
than the existing structure of government. The courts, the legal system, the
lawyers have many flaws, but they are also Iraqi. The rule of law and human
rights, and security for the individual, are actually far more important
than democracy and they too must be built on the existing Iraqi structure of
government.

Yes, we need to work with Iraqis at every level to clean up the existing
system. We have to destroy the one existing political party, the Baath, and
"de-Saddamize" the existing government while establishing a modern rule of
law and reforming the economy. We need to give exiles a role, and not simply
exile groups like the INC that have more strength inside the beltway in
Washington than anywhere in the borders of Iraq. But, nothing can be
zero-based.

12. The "Let's All Form Another Giant Discussion Group Syndrome"

Iraq's mix of internal and external tensions make any slow, bottom-up, or
"discussion group"-oriented approach to restructuring power in Iraq a near
certain recipe for failure. We don't have time for time-consuming efforts to
create consensus. Cosmetic assemblies and advisory bodies are certain to
produce a major backlash.

We may well have to push Iraqis into some new form of power structure within
weeks of the end of the fighting. We certainly have no more than months. We
don't have time for long dialogue, although that can be used to adjust the
initial arrangements.

We need to take a hard look at Iraq's existing constitution and draft
constitution, and the idea of a constitutional convention and referendum
creating a follow-on system that has worked elsewhere.  This may also allow
us to deal with the realities of power struggles by changing Iraq's current
constitution to deal with a tailored form of republic or federalism plus
some form of Kurdish-minority rights.

But, we don't have months in which to get started or more than a year in
which to get a new system working. Any peace plan that does not include
clear and specific goals from the start, and takes more than six months to
get all of the key power sharing arrangements in place, is a failure from
the start.

We must find ways to produce rapid power sharing and to reallocate oil
wealth and do it in ways that emphasize political stability rather than
democracy per se. This is not only a Kurdish issue, it is a who will lead
the Shi'ites issue, and almost any postwar arrangement will inevitably
penalize today's ruling Sunni elite.

13. The "Let's All Ignore the State's Present Role in the Economy Syndrome"

More is also involved than governance and human rights. The National Iraqi
Oil Company is only the most critical of the many state entities that have
to be used to reshape and develop the economy. We need to work with Iraqis
immediately to clean up the NIOC and other economic institutions that affect
development, free up the private sector as much as possible, create an
honest Iraqi-based structure for international investment, and put Iraq back
on the track to development as soon as possible.

The economic reform issue is as important as the governance issue. There
must be explicit plans to deal with state industry, with a key focus on
energy. The issues of freeing up the private sector, encouraging honest
foreign investment, dealing with agricultural reform, and creating a body of
commercial law are critical.

14. The "Dismantle the Army and Police Force Syndrome"

The Revolutionary Guards, the secret police, and other Saddam loyalists are
contemptible, but the idea we disband the entire army and security forces
and start over with training and ground up new groups is impractical and
dangerous.

Many elements of the regular army are nationalist, not pro-Saddam. We don't
want 400,000 nationalists in the streets and hostile. We don't want to leave
a weak army in service and an angry army in the streets. Germany after World
War I showed the impact that can have. By all means clean the army up, clean
up the officer corps, provide political training, etc., but leave the
professional and competent elements in tact. Leave Iraq with some dignity
and coopt the army rather than destroy it.

Leaving the police in place, after the same purging, is even more important.
The first priorities are food and security and then jobs and security.
Trying to bring in inexperience mixes of outsiders, training a new police
force from the ground up, and recreating a police-legal system interface
from the ground up is almost mission impossible in terms of manpower, cost,
and timeliness.  Cleaning up the existing force is not.

15. The "Debt and Reparations, Weimar Republic and Let's Make a Deal
Syndrome"

We need to be extremely careful about even a hint that we are bartering away
Iraq's post-Saddam future to get political support, and saddling a new
regime with hundred of billions of dollars in debt, reparations, and
contingency contracts that will cripple it, just as we once crippled the
Weimar Republic.

We should decide on some policy calling for debt and reparations
forgiveness, and the voiding of contingency contracts by the new regime.

16. The "Oil Income Floats All Boats Syndrome"

Time for a reality check. The DOE estimates that Iraqi oil export revenues
were all of $14.1 billion in 2001 (including smuggling), out of total
exports of all of $15.8 billion and an economy worth $28.2 billion in market
terms. The GDP is less than one-third of what it was in 1989, and there are
two decades of war and sanctions to make up for.

Oil revenues cannot possibly solve all of Iraq's development problems. Real
oil wealth per capita will be under 1/10th of its 1980 peak given the rise
in population and the drop in oil prices. Oil can still pay for a lot, but
not for both rebuilding and development. Consider the following points about
Iraq:

·	Steady decline in relative wealth since 1982, not 1991; 70% of cut in GDP
per capita before Gulf War.

·	Massive population growth: 9.1 million in 1970, 22.7 million in 2000 and
36.9 million in 2020. 40% under 15. Unemployment in excess of 25%.

·	No longer has oil wealth in relative terms.  A little over $700 per capita
today versus over $6,000 in 1980.  See much worse in constant dollars.
Around $23,820 for Saudi in 1980 versus $2,563 in 2001.

·	Dependent on oil for food and "black" sector to operate. Heavily dependent
on food imports since late 1970s. Some estimate a 70% dependence on food
imports once the economy recovers.

·	Medical and educational crisis.

·	Many artifacts of a command economy that has been centered around a
dictatorship for three decades. Some solid economic institutions but no real
market system in terms of distribution, banking, uniform commercial code,
insurance, interest.

·	Industrial development is weak and has a poor history.

·	Oil revenue and development issue is critical, as is sharing revenue, but
NIOC has its thugs and killers. Saybolt indicates waterflooding and
overpumping; 24 of 73 fields working, and 20-40% of wells at risk.

Yes, money will be a serious problem, particularly if debt and reparations
are not forgiven.

17. The "Disarmament is Quick and Lasting Syndrome"

We need a clear policy towards Iraq's military industry and dual use
facilities from the start, and we need to understand that a postwar Iraq
will exist in a still threatening and proliferating region. Moreover,
whatever we get rid of, the human talent and major dual use facilities will
remain. Getting rid of nukes also can just push Iraq towards a reliance on
biological warfare.

We need both a short term and long term plan to disarm Iraq. The long term
plan must include some way use a combination of UNSCR and national action to
limit any risk of future proliferation and possibly some form of US security
guarantees to limit the incentive to future regimes to proliferate.

18.  The "No Exit Strategy Syndrome"

Every past peacemaking effort has shown that an explicit exit strategy is
vital. The key in this case is an entry strategy that makes a real peace
possible, setting modest and achievable objectives, treating the Iraqis as
partners, and leaving when they either want us to leave or are ready to have
us leave. It is to avoid any chance of civil war, clearly act in Iraq's
benefit, and plan to leave early rather than late.

Curing the "Iraq War Peace Syndrome(s)"

The first step in curing a complex disease like the Iraq War Peace
Syndrome(s) is to recognize the nature of the disease. As the previous list
shows, this often suggests the cure. The fact remains, however, that we face
at least a decade of further instability in the Gulf Region, whether or not
we go to war with Iraq, and no matter how well the war goes. Getting rid of
Saddam and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is an important set of goals
if the war goals well. No war, however, can do more than provide a basis for
making Iraq somewhat better and then giving the Iraqis control over their
own destiny. No outcome of the war can reshape the Gulf or the Middle East.

The idea of instant democratization coming out of the war and spreading
throughout the region denies the laws of cause and effect and is ridiculous.
So is the idea we know enough about national building to create an Iraqi
United States.

The best we can do is minimize our mistakes and the effect of the law of
unintended consequences. To do this requires both realism and commitment. If
we rely on miracles and good intentions, or act as occupiers rather than
partners, we are almost certain to be far more unhappy on the tenth
anniversary of the next war as we were on the tenth anniversary of the Gulf
War.


ABOUT DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN

Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and
CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli
military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms
transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.

Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department
of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.

Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff,
working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in
the Gulf and North Africa.

PREVIOUS GULFWIRE APPEARANCES

"The West and the Arab World: Partnership or a 'Clash of Civilizations?'"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_11_12.htm

"Strategy in the Middle East: The Gap Between Strategic Theory and
Operational Reality"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_22.htm

"A Firsthand Look at Saudi Arabia Since 9-11"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_10_10.htm

"Iraq: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_07_12.htm

"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and Its Weapons of Mass Destruction"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_02.htm

"If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and the Conventional Military Balance"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_06_01.htm

"Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli and Palestinian Strategic Failures"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_04_08.htm

"Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic Partnership"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm

BOOKS BY DR. CORDESMAN
"Iraq's Military Capabilities in 2002: A Dynamic Net Assessment"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0892064161/arabialink
"Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275965287/arabialink
"Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332362/arabialink
 "Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332427/arabialink
"Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending
the U.S. Homeland"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275974278/arabialink


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