~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 10, 2002~~PART II~~ISSUES OFENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS, POST 9/11 (fwd)

["Clement M. Henry" <chenry@mail.la.utexas.edu>]

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Sun, 10 Nov 2002 23:52:15 -0600
From: GulfWire e-Newsletters <GulfWire@arabialink.com>
To: "<<GULFWIRE>>" <GulfWire2@arabialink.com>
Subject: ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 10,
     2002~~PART II~~ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI
    RELATIONS, POST 9/11

                  ****************************************
                  ********GULFWIRE ~ PERSPECTIVES*********
                  ****************************************

          INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
             NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
        THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

                             NOVEMBER 10, 2002

              ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE
                 U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS, POST SEPTEMBER 11
                            BY MARY E. MORRIS

                                   PART II

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

EDITOR'S NOTE:

This GulfWire Perspectives advances the discussion of U.S.-Saudi relations
to a new level.  Mary E. Morris has written a masterful exposition on the
interests that form the special relationship, the changing dynamics in the
relationship and the road ahead for a relationship that is essential for
both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

This Occasional Paper, published by the Center for Saudi Studies in
Washington, presents Morris' well-researched and thoughtful study of the
U.S.-Saudi relationship through the lens of post-September 11 events.
However, she sets that stage with a thorough examination of the
relationship's history -- its breadth and depth across the spectrum of
interests that have bound the two countries for more than half a century.

GulfWire would like to thank Ms. Morris for contributing this excellent
paper to the dialogue on U.S.-Saudi relations, and thank the Center for
Saudi Studies for permission to present it to you.

[Due to the length of this paper we will distribute it in two separate
e-mailings.]

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

[This is Part II - Part I was distributed in a separate emailing]

TERRORISTS, DISSIDENTS AND SEPTEMBER 11th

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., many
Americans have been dismayed and infuriated by the extent and vehemence of
anti-American feeling that is apparent throughout the Middle East and the
Muslim World.  These Americans see the Middle East as the region where
Washington liberated Kuwait, and they point to the U. S. role in saving
hundreds of thousands of Somalis in the early 1990s, fighting two wars to
protect Muslims in the Balkans, and providing more humanitarian aid than any
other country to the people of Afghanistan.[25]

For many Arab analysts, however, the roots of anti-American feeling lie not
only in American insistence on continuing a punishing embargo on Iraq, but
also in U.S. failure to broker and ensure a just settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has taken on new and virulent life since
the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000.  The seeming
inability of the U.S. to understand the Palestinian position and situation
in the midst of clear destruction of the Palestinian economy and any
instruments of civil society has had disastrous effects on the peace
process, on regional perception of the United States, and on the stability
of the region.

But it is also clear that antagonism to American policies exists
independently of the Palestinian question.  The first attack on the United
States, after all, was the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center, "a
mere dress rehearsal for the calamity of September 11, 2001."[26] It was
inspired by the Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, at a time when
Yasser Arafat was beginning his transformation from outcast to statesman,
when consciousness of Palestinian nationalism and identity —- and the
possibility of a Palestinian state -— was beginning to be accepted, and when
the "Oslo process" was almost universally expected to be an effective recipe
for an end to conflict.  Several terrorist acts against the United States
occurred during the 1990s, including bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and the
Al-Khobar Towers in 1996, embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998,
and the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 -— all during years when the
peace process was at least nominally alive.

The Riyadh and Al-Khobar bombings in particular, where large numbers of U.S.
military personnel were present, raised questions in the West about
stability within the Kingdom and created concerns among Gulf leaders over
threats from local elements opposed to a Western military presence. The
first explosion occurred at the Office of the Program Manager for the Saudi
Arabian National Guard in Riyadh on November 13, 1995, and killed seven
persons (including five U.S.–citizens -— one military and four civilian or
retired military) and injured 60 others, including 37 U.S. citizens.  Three
little-known groups —- the "Tigers of the Gulf," the "Movement for Islamic
Change," and the "Combatant Partisans of God" -— claimed responsibility.
Four Saudi nationals were arrested, confessed to the crime on Saudi state
television on April 22, 1996, and were executed on May 31, 1996.[27]

A more deadly explosion occurred on June 25, when a bomb containing
3,000-5,000 pounds of explosives destroyed the Al-Khobar Towers apartment
complex housing U.S. Air Force personnel near Dhahran Air Base, killing 19
U.S. servicemen and injuring 547 persons including 148 U.S. citizens.  Two
previously unknown groups claimed responsibility: the Iranian Saudi
Hizbollah organization, and the Lebanese Hizbollah organization.[28]  In
statements to the media on August 2 and August 3, U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry said the size and sophistication of the bomb indicated
international involvement in the atrocity, and U.S. officials reportedly
have said there were pieces of evidence pointing to possible involvement by
Iran and a Lebanon-based Shi'ite Muslim guerrilla organization.[29]

What accounts for this rage against America? One perspective is that since
the end of the Cold War the United States has piled up a record of unabashed
national egotism and arrogance, "ripping up treaties, sending troops to
every corner of the globe, bombing Afghanistan, Sudan, Yugoslavia and Iraq
without troubling the United Nations, maintaining a string of murderous
embargoes against recalcitrant regimes," and throwing its weight behind
Israel's continuing illegal military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as
the Palestinian intifada rages.[30]

Another perspective, only somewhat less harsh but perhaps more to the point,
sees September 11 and the terrorist attacks that led up to it as yet another
proof that U. S. relationships in the Middle East were never built on a deep
understanding of the region's societies and people, and thus Americans are
continually surprised by events, as in Iran, when the Shah's overthrow took
the U.S. government by surprise.[31] U. S. misreading or ignoring of
domestic influences and policy shifts in these countries is commonplace—and
can lead to bad outcomes and bad policy-making in response (e.g., "dual
containment")[32].  The much-discussed (since September 11) U. S. withdrawal
from Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat and the ensuing radicalization of
both segments of the indigenous population and the remaining mujahedin are
also seen as causes for retaliation against America.

The Al-Qaeda terrorists are not "the man in the street." But they do feed
off anti-American sentiment.  It provides them with recruits, as well as
with people willing to give them aid and comfort.  It is therefore in the
U.S. interest to counter these feelings —- to cut off the oxygen that gives
them life -— and in the process to strive for a real understanding of the
complexities of its relationships in the Middle East, especially in Saudi
Arabia, our ally in strategic and operational areas, and our political and
economic mainstay in the Middle East.

In Saudi Arabia three entities have been cited as posing opposition to the
Saudi regime and to its relationship with the United States.  They are,
first, movements that operate from overseas, such as the Committee for the
Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) and the Movement for Islamic Reform
(MIRA); Saudi Shi'a -— who are monitored closely by the government, and
radical groups such as Al-Qaeda.[33] The question, of course, is whether
these groups are linked and, in fact, if they are really groups at all or
only individual dissidents with little to no following, since they are
mostly located in the United Kingdom.

In the post-Desert Storm era, the CDLR emerged in Saudi Arabia, challenging
the legitimacy of the Al-Saud government. In fact, dissidents like CDLR,
MIRA and Al-Qaeda may have been behind the 1995 bombing that killed five
Americans working in Riyadh with the Office of the Program Manager for the
Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM/SANG), as well as the bombing of the
al-Khobar Towers in 1996 referred to above.  However, were the bombings
anti-American or were they really aimed at the Saudi regime?  By hitting
Americans the perpetrators were able to embarrass the regime, not least
because the regime was forced to allow foreigners to enter and report on the
events.  These problems have been exacerbated by the uncovering of terrorist
cells, plots, plans, and support for terrorist movements by factions within
Saudi Arabia. Saudi government support of Islamic religious schools
throughout the Muslim world has also come under scrutiny, particularly in
Pakistan's madrassas, where radical Muslims have been trained.[34]

At the same time, it is essential for Americans to understand that the
actions of Al-Qaeda before and after September 11 were the activities of an
aberrant group that, in effect, has attempted to hijack Islam.  Usama bin
Laden has perverted the teachings of a great faith that, for 1,400 years,
has had no Inquisition, sponsored no Crusades, and perpetrated no Holocaust.

One of the principal issues of concern between Saudi Arabia and the United
States at the present time concerns the stationing of some 5,000 U. S.
troops in Saudi Arabia as part of the Joint Task Force Southwest Asia
(JTF-SWA).  Since 1991 the U.S. military has been enforcing no-fly zones
over Iraq out of Saudi Arabia —- Operation Southern Watch.  U.S. service
personnel were based in downtown Dhahran until 1996 and the bombing of the
Al-Khobar Towers. Military forces were subsequently moved to Prince Sultan
Air Base, fifty miles from Riyadh.  Washington tends to see these troops as
temporary rotations; while the opposition view such presence as permanent.
Such presence, in fact poses threats to internal stability and fueling
internal criticism of the regime.

Opposition to the U.S. presence tends be prevalent throughout the Gulf, but
the level of opposition varies.[35]  Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
have voiced token criticism, and Kuwait generally supports it.  In Saudi
Arabia, however, the criticism has been both frequent and vehement, and
ranges from complaints over the cost of maintaining the operational U.S.
presence and related arms purchases to the presence of non-Muslims and an
alleged spread of corruption.

The days of U. S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, at least as they are
currently constituted, are likely numbered, as that presence becomes an
issue used increasingly against the Saudi monarchy by its opponents.
Indeed, following a March 2002 visit to the Kingdom by Vice President
Richard Cheney, indications were that most, if not all, troops currently in
Saudi Arabia will be located to other bases in the area, including Qatar.
But Saudi Arabia alone provides the geography essential for effective U. S.
deployment of land forces: "the country is the heart of the Arabian
Peninsula; everything else is either peripheral or, like Iraq or Iran, not
available to the United. States."[36]

The United States has, in the past, been sensitive to the implications of
its presence in Saudi Arabia.  In December of 1990, for example, prior to
Desert Storm, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Herman Eilts commented:

"…As soon as this crisis is over, whether ended by war or by another means,
the Saudis are going to want us out.  It is not good for the Saudi monarchy
in the eyes of its own public, in the eyes of Arabs as a whole, and in the
eyes of Muslims as a whole.  Saudi Arabia is the trustee for the holy
places, and it is not good to have large numbers of American troops..." [37]

U.S. presence in the Gulf goes beyond the stationing of troops, of course.
It includes a variety of security and access agreements essential to U.S.
defense of the Gulf against an aggressor. A serious vulnerability
accompanies this presence, however: "a vast and diverse range of potential
military targets for anti-U.S. radicals to strike.  Large numbers of U.S.
personnel in all the states can be attacked by terrorists, as can U.S.
facilities, as the 1995 and 1996 terrorist killing of U.S. military
personnel in two attacks in Saudi Arabia attest."[38]

DEFINING MUTUAL INTERESTS

At the present time, the relationship between the United States and Saudi
Arabia appears to be at a crossroads as both countries define their
interests, look for points of congruence, and learn to tolerate differences.
Oil is still a preponderant factor in the relationship: Saudi Arabia
occupies a critical position in ensuring the flow of world oil and the
support of the global economy.  With an estimated 25 percent of the world
supply of oil, and with Saudi oil production capacity projected to rise from
14.5 percent of all world capacity in 2000 to 19.2 percent of the world's
total capacity by 2020, the oil factor is clearly significant.[39]

As noted above, however, the United States has interests other than oil in
its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf; it has strategic and
geopolitical interests in preserving security in this part of the world.  It
has security commitments with other countries in the region, including
Israel and Turkey, which preclude allowing the domination of the region by
hostile anti-Western regimes that might threaten the interests of all by
attempting to change the borders and governments of the region and by
controlling the flow of oil in ways that would disrupt the global economy.

Many Arabs believe that U.S. support for Israel is more to blame for
fostering terrorism than any movements within Saudi Arabia and across the
Islamic world.  President Bush's support of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon is incomprehensible and infuriating to most Arabs and Muslims, many
of whom consider the Israeli leader a war criminal who engineered Israel's
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent massacre of Palestinian
refugees by Israeli-allied Lebanese militiamen. The American
administration's apparent indifference to Palestinian suffering is also
incomprehensible as are perceived attitudes toward Saudi Arabia since the
September 11 attacks.

Many Saudis believe that both the American media and the American people
have unfairly and incorrectly attacked them.  Prince Turki al Faisal (son of
the late King Faisal and brother of the Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal),
former head of Saudi intelligence, recently commented, "The people of Saudi
Arabia are not enemies of the United States.  We have had a close
relationship for 70 years… Who put us in this difficult position?  America,
because of its duplicity to the Arab world and because of its relationship
with Israel…. We have always looked to America as a friend of Saudi
Arabia."[40]

In a February 2002 interview, Prince Turki also pointed out that there has
been extensive cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia over
the issue of Usama bin Laden, noting that since 1997 a joint U.S.-Saudi
committee has met on a monthly basis to share information regarding bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda. [41]

The events of September 11, 2001, have opened a door that both Saudi Arabia
and the United States might have preferred remain closed.  For almost a
century, much of the relationship between the two countries has existed in
an unexplored area, one not confronted by either country.  Within that area
are wide cultural and political differences: one of the parties is a closed
society and an Islamic monarchy ruled by one family; the other is the
world's oldest democracy.  Until now, it has been convenient for both
countries to leave these issues largely unexamined.  That door, however, is
now open, and it may be time for the United States and Saudi Arabia to
confront their differences -— and reaffirm their mutual interests, which are
likely to continue to transcend cultural differences.

Oil and joint security interests provided the foundation for the U.S.-Saudi
relationship.  In the past 30 years Saudi Arabia has been transformed from a
medieval desert kingdom to a modern and wealthy state. "Saudi money greased
the relationship and supported U.S. policy goals from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua, while Saudi leaders often defended U.S. interests in the councils
of Arab states." [42] Both the United States and Saudi Arabia were able to
overcome -— or ignore -— dramatic differences in religious, culture and
politics to share strategic goals and provide for each other's needs.

Should Saudi Arabia develop a more assertive position in the Persian Gulf
and in Arab affairs, should it develop a more modernized government and take
a more professional approach to policy making and implementation, it may be
less willing than in the past to automatically accept U. S. advice -— with
potential negative impact on the relationship, at least in the short term.
The United States, however, must recognize that it is natural for allies to
disagree on matters secondary to the relationship -— and that other
countries have vital interests as well, which do not necessarily coincide
with U. S. interests, but which are also not necessarily antithetical to
those interests.

While many of the issues currently under discussion between the United
States and Saudi Arabia are, indeed, secondary issues, it is clear that
better cooperative efforts could be developed between these old allies.
Some areas of cooperation include ensuring that Afghanistan is no longer a
nation that breeds terrorists.  Saudi Arabia, because of its status as a
major Islamic nation, can play a critical role in healing the tension
between Afghans and Arabs.  Saudi Arabia can also assist in vigorously
rooting out Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and
Central Asia, ensuring that funds for charity are not diverted to extremist
causes, and publicizing the message that acts of terrorism cannot be
justified by Islam and are, in fact, a perversion of Islamic teachings.
Saudi Arabia, in fact has condemned terrorism as un-Islamic, and its
religious establishment has issued numerous religious decrees condemning
terrorism.  This is a message that is not being heard in the West, where
familiarity with Islam and its teachings is minimal.  But it is an essential
element; it is critical that both America's leaders and its public
understand that the United States and Saudi Arabia stand together against
terrorism.

As for the United States, it needs to assure its friends and allies that a
common approach for dealing with Iraq, in agreement with regional allies,
will be sought, that Iraqi territorial integrity will be preserved and that
the United States will assist in creating a stable neighbor in the process
of nation-building.  Recent rumblings about a U.S. strike on Iraq are
extremely unsettling to a region already characterized by uncertainties and
instabilities.  Rejecting or ignoring advice from long-term friends in the
Middle East regarding Iraq —- and other issues -— is likely to be both
short-sighted and antithetical to genuine U. S. interests in the region.

With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the United States needs to
reestablish its bona fides on the Palestinian question, focusing on a joint
effort to renew a legitimate peace process that will result in giving Israel
security and creating a viable Palestinian state.  The U.S. must act as a
superpower, taking the long view to determine what is necessary for lasting
peace.  This must include a political component in addition to demands for
military disengagement.  In particular, the United States must insist not
just on an end to Israeli settlement expansion, but, most important, to
removing the Israeli presence from the Occupied Territories.  In turn, the
Saudis must pressure Palestinian extremists to renounce the use of
terrorism, in any form, as un-Islamic, morally repugnant, and
counter-productive to political gains. [43]

Both the United States and Saudi Arabia should recognize the role of
economics and demographics in providing an impetus for terrorism.  The
United States can assist by supporting Saudi economic reforms and
diversification, ensuring a steady flow of private investment and an
expansion of trade and joint ventures that will create jobs.

Political economist Alan Richards has said that "the Siren song of fanatics
becomes most seductive when economic, political, social and cultural crises
combine, and when people feel that they have been repeatedly humiliated."
[44] These are issues that resonate beyond the Saudi-U.S. relationship to
the Middle East as a whole; but they are also issues of which the Kingdom is
a part. The United States must finally become aware of the Middle East's
core problems:  high unemployment, a decline in real wages and living
standards, unmanaged urbanization that has overwhelmed public services, and
a profound discontent with ineffective government policies that transcends
economic hardship.

These problems subtly but surely are destabilizing the region.  They are
also issues that can only be addressed by indigenous governments, with the
support of the United States and the international community, because they
are the breeding grounds for terrorism.  They are also a palpable, immediate
threat to Middle East regimes, including Saudi Arabia's, and to the
long-term interests of the United States.  It is in America's own best
interests to understand the roots of discontent and despair that run so
deeply in the Middle East and, with its allies, to begin to alleviate the
economic and sociological issues that stunt growth and breed terror. Until
and unless some of these basic societal needs are addressed, the threat of
regional instability will remain high.

CONCLUSION

It seems inevitable that, for the foreseeable future (and perhaps well into
the 21st century), the world will get its oil from the Gulf. America will
not, under such circumstances, be able to ignore the region.  More than
likely, we will be intensely involved there for quite some time.[45]

Since September 11, the future of the Saudi-U.S. relationship has been
thrown into question.  Yet the United States, for the foreseeable future,
will need good relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.  No other country
or region can provide the oil capacity that the United States, and the
world, requires in the case of a supply disruption.[46]  Of course,
regardless of Western policies, Saudi oil will flow onto the market, since
oil is no use buried under the desert.  Nor, in theory, does it matter who
controls the oil, since even "rogue states" must sell their assets to
survive.  This assumes a set of rational actors, however, i.e., oil
producers who act in the interests of themselves and/or their countries.

One danger is that a Taliban-like regime might gain control of the oil
spigot, leading through either ideology or incompetence to a prolonged
interruption in the flow of oil.  The consequences of such an interruption,
for the United States and the global economy, would be highly disruptive,
particularly if emergency oil production elsewhere could not be brought on
line quickly.[47] Damage to the oil fields, or to their vulnerable
processing sites, could also disrupt oil flow.

There is another kind of danger, however, and that is the danger that
over-simplification of both the relationship and its problems can bring.
This is not a contest between the defenders of democracy and Puritanical
Wahhabis, nor is the choice in Saudi Arabia one between a Western-allied
absolute monarchy and a revolutionary, anti-Western Islamic regime.  Saudi
Arabia faces challenges of a political, social and economic nature that
could fuel the radical flank of Islamists and that require attention and
serious structural reforms. The grievances of the Islamists include
"authoritarianism and repression, maldistribution and inequity [of
resources], the absence of representation in the political system, and the
seemingly permanent stationing of United States military forces in Saudi
Arabia."[48] These are issues that must be addressed by the Saudi monarchy,
not least because they threaten the Al-Saud's claim to legitimacy as
protectors of the faith, based on the success of military conquests in the
early 20th century and the Al-Saud's long-term alliance with religious
authorities and with the Al-Wahhab family.

American blindness to issues of fundamental concern to the Middle East, and
its insensitivity to the vital interests of others, creates a dangerous
situation, a minefield that in the end will affect U.S. interests even more
than those of Saudi Arabia.  The Saudis will still have oil -— and the West
will have a need to buy it.  But an unfriendly regime in Riyadh on the
eastern flank of the Arab world would likely become a hotbed of opposition
to the West, to Israel, to moderation within the Islamic community, and to
sensible oil-pricing policies.

Twenty years ago Raymond Close, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's
Station Chief in Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 1977, discussed U.S.-Saudi
relations as follows:

In the mid-1970s there was a mood here of excitement and anticipation as the
Saudis, aware of their new power, prepared themselves to be full partners of
the free world against Communism. That mood has now faded, largely because
the United States has been seen to pursue its own objectives without
sensitivity to the vital interests of its friends.  In Saudi eyes, America
still seems blind to the absolute necessity of achieving justice for
Palestinians, not just "Middle East peace," if it expects Arab cooperation
on the strategic level. Many American officials realize this, but until
discreet private convictions become forthright public policies, hopes for a
Saudi-American partnership, as originally conceived, will never materialize.
[49]

It is an unfortunate fact that little appears to have changed in twenty
years in terms of American understanding of Saudi Arabia or the Middle East.

As this Paper is written, Crown Prince Abdullah has emerged as a champion of
the Palestinian people with his proposal for an end to Arab conflict with
Israel in exchange for Israel's retreat to its pre-1967 borders. [50] The
Crown Prince's purpose in making the proposal was "to make clear to the
Israeli people that the Arabs don't reject or despise them, but the Arab
people do reject what their leadership is now doing to the Palestinians,
which is inhumane and oppressive."[51]

The Crown Prince's proposal also demonstrated his power within Saudi
Arabia—and may indicate that Saudi Arabia is now poised to promote its own
interests and those of the region.   Perhaps most significant for the United
States, the proposal and its acceptance by the Arab community of nations
indicates that there is a potential for a lessening of American influence in
the Middle East, that the United States may ultimately become much less
important in the Middle East peace process (as perhaps it should).

Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal was modeled on one presented over twenty
years ago by King Fahd -— but it went beyond that proposal even as it went
beyond what the current Israeli government has been publicly willing to
consider. It was embraced by a number of influential sources, including U.
S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who called the Crown Prince's proposal
an important step. It also came at a time when appalling conflict continued
to rage in Israel and the Occupied Territories, a never-ending cycle of
asymmetrical violence for which there is plainly no military resolution but
for which Israel, as of this writing, is unwilling to propose a political
solution.

It is increasingly clear that Israel and the Palestinians are locked in an
impasse of bitterness, hatred, and distrust; while many call upon the United
States to break the impasse and impose a solution, the Bush Administration,
until the dispatch of Gen. Anthony Zinni to the region in November 2001, was
reluctant to take on the challenge.  Saudi Arabia, however, stepped up to
the plate with a proposal that even contained a recipe for cooperation on
two previously intractable issues: Israeli control over the Western Wall and
over Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem.[52] It was a strategic
opportunity presented at a time of acute crisis.

Unfortunately, the outcome of the Arab League summit in March, which many
regional leaders did not attend due to the enforced absence of Yasser
Arafat, and the subsequent ratcheting-up of violence between Israelis and
Palestinians, has cast a pall over attempts at resolution of this consuming
crisis.  Additionally, there is increased regional anxiety over the
possibility of a spillover of violence that will affect not only the
long-term security and prosperity of the entire Middle East but the wider
world as well.

Thus, the Bush Administration was pushed into involving itself in the
Palestinian-Israeli crisis at a much higher level —- with greater political
risk —- than it ever intended. The dispatch of Secretary of State Colin
Powell to the region was a response to both continued suicide bombings by
Palestinians and massive military operations and a virtual reoccupation of
the West Bank by the Israeli government. But the Powell mission, as so many
before it, was essentially a failure.  Both sides remain rigid in their
claim to righteousness -— and the killing of innocents continues.

For the United States and Saudi Arabia, however, the stability of the region
is paramount —- for each the reasons may be different, but the goal is the
same, as it has been for almost a century.  At the end of the day, it may be
that the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia converge to an
extent, and in an area, not explored before. The "special relationship" will
endure.

NOTES
1.  Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations,"
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research
Service, November 2001, p. 2.
2.  ARAMCO was bought out by the Saudi government in 1988 and renamed
SAUDI-ARAMCO.
3.  In 1998, at a meeting in McLean, Virginia, Crown Prince Abdullah bin
Abdul-Aziz announced that Saudi Arabia would consider proposals for
re-involvement by Western oil companies in the Saudi energy sector, with
possible access to Saudi oil and gas fields. The catalyst for this decision
may have been the fact that the Saudi share of U.S. oil imports fell from 24
percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 1997. Exxon-Mobil subsequently was chosen
to lead two of three "core ventures" —- projects that would require an
initial $20 billion to develop gas fields, transmission lines, gas-fueled
electric power plants and desalination plants.
4.  Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations,"
Library of Congress: Congressional Research Service, November 1, 2001, p. 8.
Venezuela and Canada have exceeded Saudi Arabia in oil sales to the U.S. in
recent years.
5.  Federal Reserve Division, "Area Handbook: Saudi Arabia," Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1992, Section 1.
6.  "Ending the Oil Addiction," Editorial, The New York Times, February 18,
2002, p. 18
7.  Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Persian Gulf
Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions."  Santa Monica: RAND,
MR-1245-AF, 2001, p. 7.
8.  Nawaf Obaid, "The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi
Arabia," Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Policy Paper No. 55, 2000, p. 39.
9.  David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, "After Sept. 11, Severe Tests
Loom for Relationship," The Washington Post, February 12, 2002, p. A1.
10.  U. S. Census Bureau, quoted in U.S.-Saudi Business Council website,
http://www.us-saudi-business.org,  "Imports,"  Prados, op.cit. p. 7.
11.  Barry Rubin, "The United States and the Middle East," in "The Middle
East After the Invasion of Lebanon," Robert O. Freedman (ed.), New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 69.
12.  Ibid. p. 557.
13.  Bogle, "The Modern Middle East," op.cit. p. 416-417.
14.  Robert G. Kaiser and David Ottaway, "Oil for Security," op.cit.  p. A1.
15.  Ibid.
16.  Yergin, "The Prize," op.cit. pp. 641-642.
17.  Ibid., p. 644.
18.  Kaiser and Ottaway, "Oil for Security," op.cit., p. A1
19.  Robert Azzi, "Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom and Its Power," "National
Geographic," September 1980, p. 296.
20. The U. S. already had a presence, with MIDEASTFOR based in Bahrain and
the U.S. military missions in Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
21.  Robert G. Kaiser and David Ottaway, "Oil for Security Fueled Close
Ties," The Washington Post, February 11, 2002, p. A1.
22.  Prados, op.cit. p. 15.
23.  "The Aftermath of the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Saudi Arabian
Information Resources, http://www.saudinf.com/main/x002.htm; accessed
February 19, 2002.
24.  Initial forces arrived on August 7, the day after King Fahd's request
to senior American officials.
25.  Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nasty, Brutish, and Long:
America's War on Terrorism," Current History, December 2001, p. 407.
26.  Foud Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," "Foreign Affairs,"
November/December 2001, p. 3.
27.  Prados, op.cit. p. 3.
28.  Ibid.  p. 4
29.  Ibid.
30.  Seumas Milne, "Americans Can't See Why They Are Hated," Pharoahs,
October 2001, p. 43.
31.  Julia Nanay, "New Friends, New Enemies and Oil Politics: Causes and
Consequences of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," "Middle East Policy,"
Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001, p. 12.
32.  Martin Indyk, then Senior Director for Middle East Affairs of the
National Security Council, promulgated the policy of dual containment in
February 1994.  The policy was supposed to constrain the two most powerful
regional states, Iran and Iraq, by imposing harsh economic sanctions on
them, forcing them into amending behavior that the United States found
intolerable.  Among its other deficiencies, dual containment tends not to
differentiate between Iran and Iraq and the level of threat each poses to
the international security system and to regional politics.
33.  Byman, "Political Violence," p. 31
34.  Pamela Hess, "Levin Wants U.S. Out of Saudi Arabia,"
"CountryWatch.com," January 15, 2002.
35.  Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, "Political Violence and Stability
in the States of the Northern Persian Gulf," Santa Monica: RAND, National
Defense Research Institute, 1999, p. 26.
36.  George Friedman, "The Saudi Crisis," "Stratfor.com," accessed January
21, 2002.
37.  Statement of Herman Eilts, Director of the Center for International
Studies, Boston University, and former U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
"Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War," December 1990,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 604.
38.  Byman, "Political Violence," op.cit.  p. 5
39.  Anthony H. Cordesman, "Reforging the U.S. and Saudi Strategic
Partnership,"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm,
accessed February 1, 2002.
40.  Michael Slackman, "Saudis Feel Unfairly Tarred With a Terrorist Brush,"
Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2002, p. 1.
41.  NBC News "Meet the Press," Sunday, February 3, 2002.
42.  Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, "Saudi Leader's Anger Revealed
Shaky Ties," "The Washington Post," February 10, 2002, p. A1.
43.  Cordesman, "Reforging," op.cit.
44. Alan Richards, "At War With Utopian Fanatics," "Middle East Policy,"
Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001, p. 7.
45.  Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Land Power and Dual Containment: Rethinking
America's Policy in the Gulf," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, November 1999, p. 22.
46. Discussions over drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge may
remain just that, since analysis shows that Alaskan oil is neither
economically viable nor is it necessarily secure—and in any case would only
briefly reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil by a few percentage points,
beginning in about a decade. (Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins, "Fool's
Gold in Alaska," "Foreign Affairs," July/August 2001, p. 72-73.
47. Sokolsky, et al., "Improving Allied Military Contributions," op.cit. p.
16.
48.  Gwenn Okruhlik, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi
Arabia," "Current History," January 2002, p. 22.
49. Azzi, "Saudi Arabia," op.cit. p. 330.
50.  Daniel Sobelman, "Interest in Saudi Peace Initiative Grows, Gets U.S.,
Egyptian Backing," "Ha'aretz." February 21, 2002.
51. George S. Hishmeh, "An Arab Offer That 'Demands Immediate Action,'"
Jordan Times, February 20, 2002.
52. "A Peace Impulse Worth Pursuing," New York Times, editorial, February
21, 2002.

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
Opinions expressed in this occasional paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflects the views of the Center for Saudi Studies

REFERENCES

"A Peace Impulse Worth Pursuing," New York Times, editorial, February 21,
2002

Foud Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001

Robert Azzi, "Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom and Its Power," National Geographic,
September 1980

Emory Bogle, "The Modern Middle East: From Imperialism to Freedom,
1800-1958," New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.

Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, "Political Violence and Stability in
the States of the Northern Persian Gulf," Santa Monica: RAND, National
Defense Research Institute, 1999

"The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies," Santa
Monica: RAND, 2000

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Hearings: "Crisis in
the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War," Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1991

Anthony H. Cordesman, "Reforging the U. S. and Saudi Strategic Partnership,"
http://www.arabialink.com/CDSupport/GWArchives2002/GWP/GWP_2002_01_28.htm,
accessed February 1, 2002

Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America's
War on Terrorism," Current History, December 2001.

"Ending the Oil Addiction," Editorial, The New York Times, February 18,
2002.

Federal Reserve Division, "Area Handbook: Saudi Arabia," Washington, D.C.:
Library of Congress, 1992, Section 1

George Friedman, "The Saudi Crisis," Stratfor.com, accessed January 21, 2002

Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, "Persian Gulf Myths," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
76, No. 3, May-June, 1997

Jerrold Green, "Leadership Succession in the Arab World: A Policy-Maker's
Guide," Santa Monica: RAND, 2000

Simon Henderson, "After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia," Washington,
D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper No. 37,
1994

Pamela Hess, "Levin Wants U.S. Out of Saudi Arabia," CountryWatch.com,
January 15, 2002

George S. Hishmeh, "An Arab Offer That 'Demands Immediate Action,'" Jordan
Times, February 20, 2002.

Ivanhoe, L. F., "Petroleum Positions of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
UAE: Middle East Region," Hubbert Center Newsletter No. 2000/1, Colorado: M.
King Hubbert Center for Petroleum Supply Studies, January 2001.

Robert G. Kaiser and David B. Ottaway, "Saudi Leader's Anger Revealed Shaky
Ties," The Washington Post, February 10, 2002.

"Oil for Security Fueled Close Ties," The Washington Post, February 11,
2002, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55265-2002Feb10.html

Robert D. Kaplan, "Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans," the Middle
East, and the Caucasus, New York: Random House, 2000

Joseph A. Kechichian, "Saudi Arabia's Will to Power," Middle East Policy,
Vol. VII, No. 2, February 2000

David Lamb, "The Arabs," New York, Random House, 1987

Jim Landers, "Alienation is Feeding a Growing Resentment For U.S., Experts
Warn," Dallas Morning News, September 30, 2001

Sandra Mackey, "The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom," New York: Signet,
1987.

Peter Mansfield, "The Arabs," Great Britain: Alan Lane, 1976.

Seumas Milne, "Americans Can't See Why They Are Hated," Pharoahs, October
2001

Julia Nanay, "New Friends, New Enemies and Oil Politics: Causes and
Consequences of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks," Middle East Policy,
Vol. VIII, No. 4, December 2001

NBC News Meet the Press, Interview with Prince Turki Al-Faisal, February 3,
2002

Nawaf Obaid, The Oil Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in Saudi Arabia,
Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy
Paper No. 55, 2000

Gwenn Okruhlik, "Networks of Dissent: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia,"
Current History, January 2002

David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, "After Sept. 11, Severe Tests Loom
for Relationship," The Washington Post, February 12, 2002

Alfred B. Prados, "Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations,"
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research
Service, November 2001

Stephen C. Pelletiere, "Land Power and Dual Containment: Rethinking
America's Policy in the Gulf," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999

Alan Richards and John Waterbury, "A Political Economy of the Middle East,"
Second Edition, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996

Alan Richards, "At War With Utopian Fanatics," Middle East Policy, Vol.
VIII, No. 4, December 2001

Barry Rubin, "The United States and the Middle East," in The Middle East
After the Invasion of Lebanon, Robert O. Freedman (ed.), New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1986

"Saudi Arabia "'Still Friends' With U.S.," BBC News Online: World: Middle
East, January 29, 2002

Michael Slackman, "Saudis Feel Unfairly Tarred With a Terrorist Brush," Los
Angeles Times, January 17, 2002

Daniel Sobelman, "Interest in Saudi Peace Initiative Grows, Gets U.S.,
Egyptian Backing," Ha'aretz, February 21, 2002

Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Persian Gulf
Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions," Santa Monica: RAND,
MR-1245-AF, 2001

"The Aftermath of the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Saudi Arabian
Information Resources, http://www.saudinf.com/main/x002.htm

U. S. Census Bureau, quoted in U.S.-Saudi Business Council website,
http://www.us-saudi-business.org,  "Imports"

Daniel Yergin, "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power," New
York: Touchstone, 1991.

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives===========================

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Mary E. Morris is a Partner in Morris & Morris, a private consulting
partnership that provides research and analytical services on the Middle
East to private industry, individuals, and government entities.  She is also
the Vice President and Director of Programs for the Los Angeles World
Affairs Council.  Ms. Morris was previously the Associate Director of the
Greater Middle East Studies Center at RAND in Santa Monica.  For the past
two decades she has worked on a number of projects related to events in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia, ranging from military and political analyses
to enhancing regional potential for cooperation on environmental issues.

Ms. Morris is the author of several reports, monographs, and journal
articles on the Middle East, including:  "Water and Security in the Middle
East," Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, United Arab Emirates (May
1998);  "What Do Women Want? Gender and Politics in the Middle East," in
Middle East Policy (September 1997); "Water and Conflict in the Middle East:
Threats and Opportunities," in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Spring
1997; and "Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: Green
Conflict in Asia and the Middle East (RAND, 1995).

Ms. Morris received B.A. and M.A. degrees in History at Mount St. Mary's
College in Los Angeles.  She is a member of the Middle East Institute, the
Middle East Studies Association, and the Academy of Political Science, and
is a charter member of the California Council on U.S.-Arab Relations and a
member of the Advisory Council for the Von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern
Studies at UCLA.  She is a member of the Board of Visitors at Claremont
Graduate University's School of Religion.  Morris & Morris is a member of
the National U.S.-Arab Chambers of Commerce.


Mary E. Morris
Morris & Morris Middle East Consultants
8001 Kittyhawk Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90045
Telephone & Fax:  310-645-4159
E-mail:  mailto:mary@morrisx2.com
Website:  http://www.morrisx2.com

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS,
POST-SEPTEMBER 11
Copyright © 2002 by Center for Saudi Studies
All rights reserved for the Center for Saudi Studies in Washington, DC. No
part of this Occasional paper may be used or reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission except in case of brief quotations
embodied in critical articles or reviews.
ISBN 0-9722450-1-4

OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 2
AUGUST 2002

CENTER FOR SAUDI STUDIES
P.O. BOX 2847 MERRIFIELD, VA 22116-2847 USA

Opinions expressed in this occasional paper are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Saudi Studies

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

     **GULFWIRE 2002 CD-ROM ~~ NOW AVAILABLE AT SPECIAL SALE PRICE**
          FOR DETAILS, VISIT: http://www.arabialink.com/GWCD

ORDER YOURS NOW USING OUR SECURE ON-LINE SHOPPING CART:
https://secure.ioncart.net/ryanandassoc/shopquery.asp?catalogid=2

===========================================================================
                   For more visit the GulfWire Web site:
                      http://arabialink.com/GulfWire
***************************************************************************
                      TO SUBSCRIBE TO GULFWIRE GO TO
                http://www.arabialink.com/GulfWireSubscribe
***************************************************************************

Independent commentary provided in "'GulfWire"' and materials contained in
the linked Internet sites do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations or the U.S.-GCC Corporate
Cooperation
Committee.

"GulfWire" is an information service of the National Council on U.S.-Arab
Relations and the U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee Secretariat.
Please feel free to forward this "GulfWire" special supplement to your
friends and colleagues, and suggest additions to our mailing list. Contact:
mailto:gulfwire@arabialink.com

===========================================================================

National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations
President and CEO: Dr. John Duke Anthony

U.S.-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee
Secretary: Dr. John Duke Anthony
1140 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 1210
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: 202.293.0801
Fax: 202.293.0903

PATRICK W. RYAN
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire
mailto:gulfwire@ArabiaLink.com
C. R. TRISDALE
Deputy Editor, GulfWire
mailto:CRTrisdale@ArabiaLink.com
PETER M. WALTON
Contributing Editor
mailto:Pete@ArabiaLink.com
MARGARET L. PHILPOT
Editorial Assistant
mailto:Margaret@PWRassociates.com

The GulfWire e-newsletter and Web site are developed, produced and
maintained by Ryan & Associates -- http://www.pwrassociates.com

To unsubscribe reply to this message with the word UNSUBSCRIBE in the
subject line.

Copyright © 2002, GulfWire
All rights reserved.

The contents of this newsletter may not be reproduced in any commercial
document or in any material sold, nor used in any other manner without
permission of GulfWire.  Links to Internet sites should not be seen as an
endorsement of those sites, or the information contained in them.
4B&C