~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 10, 2002~~PART I~~ISSUES OFENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS, POST 9/11 (fwd)

["Clement M. Henry" <chenry@mail.la.utexas.edu>]

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Subject: ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~NOVEMBER 10,
     2002~~PART I~~ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI
    RELATIONS, POST 9/11

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                  ********GULFWIRE ~ PERSPECTIVES*********
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          INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
             NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
        THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

                             NOVEMBER 10, 2002

              ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE
                 U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS, POST SEPTEMBER 11
                            BY MARY E. MORRIS

                                  [PART I]

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

EDITOR'S NOTE:

This GulfWire Perspectives advances the discussion of U.S.-Saudi relations
to a new level.  Mary E. Morris has written a masterful exposition on the
interests that form the special relationship, the changing dynamics in the
relationship and the road ahead for a relationship that is essential for
both the United States and Saudi Arabia.

This Occasional Paper, published by the Center for Saudi Studies in
Washington, presents Morris' well-researched and thoughtful study of the
U.S.-Saudi relationship through the lens of post-September 11 events.
However, she sets that stage with a thorough examination of the
relationship's history -- its breadth and depth across the spectrum of
interests that have bound the two countries for more than half a century.

GulfWire would like to thank Ms. Morris for contributing this excellent
paper to the dialogue on U.S.-Saudi relations, and thank the Center for
Saudi Studies for permission to present it to you.

[Due to the length of this paper we will distribute it in two separate
e-mailings.]

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS,
POST-SEPTEMBER 11
by Mary E. Morris

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Occasional Paper addresses issues of engagement between the United
States and Saudi Arabia and assesses the future course of a fifty-year
relationship based on friendship and mutual interests.  At the present time,
the bond between the two countries has been challenged by differing views of
issues such as security, perceptions of Israel, Iran, and Iraq, military
cooperation, human rights, and terrorism.  This Paper looks at agreements
and differences between the two countries over these issues, as well as at
the ties that bind the U. S. and Saudi Arabia, including oil and other
commercial interests.  It then suggests some possible actions for both Saudi
Arabia and the United States in order to preserve and strengthen the
relationship, taking into account the vital interests of both countries and
the long-term congruence of those interests.

America's first "special relationship" in the Middle East was with Saudi
Arabia.  Together the United States and Saudi Arabia developed an oil
empire; together they resisted Soviet influence in the Middle East; together
they fought the Gulf War.  The United States continues to use Saudi bases to
counter Saddam Hussein.  Saudi Arabia, in turn, depends on U. S. military
equipment, advisors, and technical support to bolster its military strength
and its regional security.

The United States and Saudi Arabia, however, must deal with problems both
within their individual countries and in relation to each other. Saudi
Arabia, for example, faces internal challenges of a political, social and
economic nature that require attention and serious structural reforms for
the long-term benefit of the Kingdom as well as for its international
relations.

For its part, American blindness to issues of basic concern to the Middle
East, and its insensitivity to the vital interests of others, creates a
dangerous situation, a minefield that, if not reversed, will affect U.S.
interests far beyond its relationship with Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah, an increasingly important key player in the region, has presented
both the Middle East and the United States with a potential lifeline, a way
out of the morass into which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has descended.
His proposal outlines a vision of the future that acknowledges the existence
of two nations, Israel and Palestine, and lays out the basis for peaceful
co-existence between them.  United States' support of Abdullah's proposal as
an underpinning for a renewed peace process might bring about an end to the
cycle of violence—and at the same time give America an opportunity to
demonstrate a better understanding of regional dynamics.

For the United States and Saudi Arabia the stability of the Middle East is
paramount.  The reasons may be different for each country, but the goal is
the same, as it has been for almost a century.  In the end, the interests of
the United States and Saudi Arabia are likely to converge to an extent and
in areas not explored before, and the "special relationship" will endure.

CONTENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CONTENT
INTRODUCTION
OIL AND SECURITY: POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
MILITARY COOPERATION
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY
[Part II - distributed in a separate e-mailing]
TERRORISTS, DISSIDENTS AND SEPTEMBER 11th
DEFINING MUTUAL INTERESTS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION

This Occasional Paper will address issues of engagement between the United
States and Saudi Arabia, as they have emerged from the historic relationship
between the two countries. It identifies the principal issues that confront
the relationship, the causes for either agreement or controversy: oil,
security, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, military cooperation, human
rights and democratic reforms, and terrorism.  The Paper also looks at ways
in which differences over issues could drive apart the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia -- and what the consequences might be of a serious estrangement.  It
suggests some possible actions for both Saudi Arabia and the United States
in order to strengthen the relationship, taking into account the vital
interests that both countries bring to the table.

Rumors of dissension between the United States and Saudi Arabia -— indeed,
between the United States and most of the Arab world -— have surfaced since
the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001.   There is
much antagonism toward U. S. support for Israel, particularly as the crisis
between Israelis and Palestinians has descended into extreme violence.  But
there are additional differences in perspective, over the nature and extent
of the U. S. presence in Saudi Arabia, for example, which are exacerbated by
the U. S. position with regard to Israel and Palestine.  While the U.S.
tends to see its troops as a temporary presence, many critics of the Saudi
regime see the U.S. presence as a permanent foreign occupying force.  These
critics claim that the U.S. presence is colonial and demonstrates the
illegitimacy of the Al-Saud government, particularly at a time when U. S.
motives in the region are under question.  Additionally, many religious
conservative leaders in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world at large
characterize the U.S. military presence as blasphemous because of its
proximity to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah.

What appears to have been pushed to the sidelines is the strategic
opportunity presented by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal for ending
the Arab-Israeli conflict, exchanging Arab acceptance of Israel for the land
it has occupied since 1967 -— in line with long-standing UN resolutions and
international law.  The horrific increases in violence since March of 2002,
however, may have obscured the chance for regional peace embodied in the
Crown Prince's offer -— which surely cannot be characterized as part of an
extremist agenda.  To date, while the Crown Prince's plan received
endorsement from the Arab League, it has received little more than token
recognition from either Israel or the United States, and an historic
opportunity may have been missed.

On the whole, however, reports of rifts between the United States and Saudi
Arabia have been exaggerated.  Saudi Arabia has repeatedly condemned
terrorism and terrorist acts, and the Bush Administration has consistently
emphasized that the U. S. government is satisfied with Saudi cooperation and
emphasized its reliance on Saudi Arabia as a regional partner. Saudi Arabia
severed its relationship with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan on
September 25, 2001, and Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that the
Saudi government has "responded to every request we have made of them." [1]
Nonetheless, differences do exist in the interests of the United States and
Saudi Arabia, as well as in the perspective that both countries bring to
those interests.

OIL AND SECURITY: POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC

Saudi Arabia's oil business began with the United States, and with the May
1933 agreement granting exploration and production rights over some 360,000
square miles for sixty years to Standard Oil Company of California (Socal —-
now Chevron). The first major discovery was made five years later, in the
area of present-day Dhahran, at Well Number 7 in the Dammam Dome exploration
area.

The discovery opened a new era in both petroleum drilling and in the
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  Dhahran became the
administrative, industrial, and residential hub in Saudi Arabia for
employees of ARAMCO -— the Arabian American Oil Company—formed in 1944 as a
joint venture between Socal, Texaco, Esso, and Mobil oil companies.[2]
Scores of American workers and their families populated what came to be a U.
S. outpost in the Saudi desert, an American enclave within the remote
society of Saudi Arabia.  ARAMCO was fully purchased by Saudi Arabia in
1976, but U.S. executives and key engineers continued to recruit
replacements for more than ten years, until King Fahd officially established
the Saudi Arabian Oil Company —- Saudi ARAMCO -— by royal decree in 1988.
[3]

The effect of oil wealth on Saudi Arabia was phenomenal.  Saudi Arabia was
one of the poorest countries on the globe at its creation in 1932, when King
Abdul-Aziz united the Arabian Peninsula into the nation of Saudi Arabia.

The importance of oil in the U.S.-Saudi relationship cannot be
denied -—especially when one looks at projections of increasing dependence
on Saudi/Gulf oil over the next two decades and when one realizes that Saudi
Arabia's proven oil reserves are estimated at 263.5 billion barrels.[4]
However, oil is not the sole bond between the Kingdom and the United States.
Both countries have gained from the oil relationship, but significant
security benefits have accrued on both sides as well.

The Saudi relationship was particularly valuable to the U.S. during the Cold
War, amid mutual suspicions of Moscow's intentions in the Gulf.  The
principal focus of the United States, with little exception, was the Soviet
Union and the threat posed to the U.S. and to the entire free world by
Communism.  For Saudi Arabia as well, Communism and the spread of influence
by the Soviet Union presented substantive threats. These common security
concerns, as well as overt challenges to Saudi security posed by Iran and
Iraq, have led to a close military cooperation between the two countries,
one that has endured in spite of cultural and political differences and
disagreements, particularly over U.S.-Israeli policy. At its inception,
Saudi Arabia had a population of approximately two million in an area half
the size of India.  Recent estimates put Saudi Arabia's population at
anywhere between 14 and 20 million, depending on the proportion of non-Saudi
citizens who are counted in the total.

Oil explorations and discovery changed all of this: in a short period of
time, the Kingdom was beset by assaults on its religion, history, and
cultural traditions.

The "special relationship" between the United States and Saudi Arabia dates
back to World War II, by which time the extent of Saudi oil resources had
become known—along with their importance to the war effort and beyond.  In
1943 the first U.S. military mission to the Kingdom was dispatched, and the
Roosevelt Administration declared that the defense of Saudi Arabia was a
vital interest to the United States. That relationship was further cemented
in 1945, at a meeting between King Abdul-Aziz of Saudi Arabia and President
Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake.
The Kingdom's relationship with Washington became a cornerstone of Saudi
foreign policy and a critical element of U. S. interests in the Middle East.

With the outbreak of the war, Dhahran became an important way station for
air routes to the China-Burma-India theatre from North Africa.  Under the
Lend-Lease agreement, the Persian Gulf and Iran became the southern supply
route to the USSR and, geographically, increasingly important to U.S.
strategy in defeating Germany.  Newly-developed Saudi oil fields -— as well
as friendship with the Kingdom —- became significant to the U.S. war effort,
leading American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to declare in 1943 that
"I hereby find that the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of
the United States."[5] The first U.S. military mission was dispatched
shortly thereafter, with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers providing training
for the Saudi Army.

In recent years perceptions of the importance of the Persian Gulf to Western
security concerns have changed.  The collapse of the Soviet Union as well as
the entry of Russian and Central Asian oil into the open market have reduced
the strategic value of Saudi Arabia to some extent —- but it is unlikely
that these alternate sources will replace Arabian oil. At the present time,
the United States uses twenty-five percent of the world's oil production,
with 4 percent of the world's population and 3 percent of its reserves.
Two-thirds of world reserves —- more than 600 billion barrels -— belong to
the nations of the Persian Gulf, while the region continues to account for
approximately 30 percent of all oil traded globally.[6]

In fact, despite the development of alternative sources of oil, projections
are that the United States, and the world, will become increasingly
dependent on Gulf oil over the next few decades. Over the next twenty years,
fourteen percent of North American oil consumption will come from the
Persian Gulf—up from 8 percent in 1995.  For Western Europe, approximately
thirty-five percent of oil consumption will be provided from the Gulf,
compared to 25 percent in 1995.[7]

In the Gulf, ARAMCO manages the largest proven petroleum reserves on earth.
With enormous operations and assets, it is the world's largest oil producer
and exporter, and has unequaled spare petroleum production capacity.[8]
These assets came into play in the immediate wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States.  On September 12 Crown Prince
Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz and Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi announced that the
Kingdom would rush an extra nine million barrels of oil to the United
States.  For the next two weeks Saudi Arabia used its own tankers to ship
500,000 barrels of oil a day to the United States, reducing the price of
crude oil from $28 per barrel to less than $20 within a few weeks.[9]
Clearly, the partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia goes
beyond financial gains.  As Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal has
frequently stated, oil, from a Saudi perspective, can be an instrument of
stability, friendship and development rather than an instrument of war.

At the present time, Saudi Arabia is the largest U. S. trading partner in
the Middle East, with exports from Saudi Arabia in the year 2000 estimated
at $14.3 billion and imports at $5.9 billion.  Saudi Arabia's primary export
is oil; while U. S. arms are the principal imports, these are followed by
significant amounts of U. S. commercial equipment.  In 2000, for example,
Saudi Arabia imported over $6 billion of transportation equipment,
industrial machinery, computer equipment, and fabricated metal products from
the United States.[10]

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In early 2002 Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia took an historic step,
expanding upon ideas first proposed by King Fahd in the 1980s to suggest a
permanent resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has assumed
epic proportions in terms of bloodshed and brutality on both sides. Offering
recognition of Israel in exchange for the establishment of a truly viable
Palestinian state, the Crown Prince's proposal was presented to a meeting of
the Arab League in a March 2002 meeting in Beirut, and was subsequently
endorsed by those states in attendance.

At the same time that the Crown Prince was presenting his proposal, however,
the Israeli-Palestinian situation was rapidly deteriorating even further,
making consideration of a peace process in the near term almost
inconceivable. As noted above, it appears that the initiative, a strategic
opportunity for both Israelis and Palestinians, has been largely sidelined
because of the cataclysm of violence consuming Israel and Palestine.
Nonetheless, one of the notable elements of the Crown Prince's proposal was
that it indicated the readiness of a key Arab leader to take a controversial
stand at the highest Arab forum and to campaign for it.

Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative and its acceptance by other Arab
countries also indicates the increasing awareness of Middle East countries
of the importance of regional political stability as a prerequisite to
economic growth and integration with world economies -— a step forward to
avoid being left behind.  All countries in the Middle East, including Saudi
Arabia, face a demographic explosion over the next generation.  Economic and
social issues must dominate agendas: jobs must be created, children must be
educated, families must be housed and fed, and the institutions of civil
society must be nurtured.  Indeed, finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict is not an option, but a necessity for world peace.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a millstone around the region's
collective neck, in the short run providing excuses for regimes to delay
reforms, but in the long run dragging down efforts to restructure and cope
with increasing social and demographic stresses.  Crown Prince Abdullah's
plan was an acknowledgement of reality, and an invitation to Israel and the
rest of the Middle East to join in a common vision of a viable future.

At some point, there will be a final settlement of this catastrophic
conflict, a settlement that ultimately must be negotiated directly between
Palestinians and Israelis.  Crown Prince Abdullah's plan offered a basic
framework for that settlement, an opportunity for moving out of the corners
into which both protagonists have painted themselves.  It refocused
discussion on the central issue: territory.  It was based on universally
accepted UN resolutions, and one of the most respected figures in the Arab
world, crown prince of the largest and strongest country in the Arab world,
backed it.  While the world has looked to Israelis, Palestinians, and the
United States to produce a "deal-maker," it is quite possible that in the
long-term Saudi Arabia, instead, may fill that role.

The U.S. relationship with Israel has been a complex and exasperating
problem for Arab countries, and an increasing difficulty in America's
relationships with them.  In the years since 1967 particularly, as U. S.
support for Israeli interests and policies grew into a new "special
relationship" complete with arms sales and the provision of sophisticated
American weaponry, concern grew in Saudi Arabia that the Israeli connection
would adversely affect the U.S.-Saudi relationship.  Congressional reduction
or cancellation of some proposed arms sales to the Kingdom during the 1970s
and 1980s convinced many Saudis of undue Israeli influence on Washington.

Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab states, was fiercely opposed to
establishment of a Jewish state on Arab land at the expense of fellow Arabs,
and to American recognition of it following the Second World War.
Regardless of Arab objections, the United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine recommended the partition of Palestine, which was accepted by the
General Assembly and by the Jewish Agency in 1947.  By 1948 Great Britain
withdrew its army and administration, and in May of that year the Jewish
National Council proclaimed the State of Israel.  It was recognized by the
Soviet Union, then the United States -— and these actions were followed
immediately by the attack of neighboring Arab states on Israel to restore
the rights of Palestinians.

Although King Abdul-Aziz threatened to shut down ARAMCO and cut off supplies
to the United States and Great Britain, the concession was the sole source
of Saudi Arabia's rapidly increasing wealth; in addition, the U.S.
relationship with Saudi Arabia guaranteed the country's territorial
integrity and independence —- and the United States was firmly behind the
establishment of the state of Israel.

The following years saw a closer relationship between the United States and
Israel, and an ambivalent relationship between the United States and the
rest of the Middle East.  Despite Israeli depredations in Lebanon in 1982,
the casualties that the U.S. suffered in Lebanon in the early 1980s affected
American relations with the Arab Middle East profoundly.  The primary focus
of the Reagan administration was the Soviet Union, and the attempt to put
together a "strategic consensus" among Arab states, particularly in the
Gulf, that would be directed against potential Soviet aggression.[11]  Arab
states, however, were more focused on immediate threats—such as Israeli and
Iranian actions.

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War provided a test of the U.S.-Saudi
relationship -— a test that was to be repeated with greater resonance in
1973.  Oil, an essential resource to the West, was used as a political
weapon by the oil-producing countries of the Gulf, following Israel's
preemptive strike on Arab forces under the leadership of Egypt's Gamal Abdul
Nasser.  The result was Israeli occupation of land in the Sinai, Jerusalem,
the Golan Heights, and the West Bank.  In response, Arab oil ministers
formally called for an oil embargo against the United States, the United
Kingdom and Germany.  Within days, the flow of Arab oil was reduced by sixty
percent; Saudi facilities were completely shut down, as were the Suez Canal
and the oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. In
July civil war broke out in Nigeria, which resulted in the removal of
another 500,000 barrels a day from the world market.

Despite temporary panic on the part of oil importers, the Arab boycott was
short-lived, with the real losers the countries that instituted the embargo.
In addition to losing revenues, they were also asked to provide large and
continuing revenues to Egypt and other "front line" Arab states.[12]  By
September the embargo was lifted.  In fact, as a result of the surge in
production following the Six-Day War, available supplies exceeded demand,
leading to fears of a glut and the imposition of import quotas.

Arab states used the oil weapon far more successfully in the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, when Egyptian forces attacked Israel in a surprise move.
Oil suppliers withheld access to oil to supporters of Israel, sending
petroleum prices to levels that never again subsided to their previous
level.  The United States, which had established a supply line to provide
Israel with massive quantities of goods for its war effort, was badly hit.
Israel turned the tide of battle and both the Soviet Union and the United
States, in conjunction with the United Nations, arranged a ceasefire.

The war was a watershed for Arab oil countries, with a huge enhancement of
oil wealth.  Higher oil prices drove up prices of anything requiring
heating, cooling or transportation, and increased prices of innumerable
petroleum by-products.[13] While the embargo was short, it changed the
future of Saudi Arabia as well as its relationship with the United States:
by March 1974 the price of oil rose from less than $3 a barrel to more than
$11.   Hundreds of billions of dollars were transferred from oil-consuming
nations to oil producers, providing the foundation for the building of the
modern Saudi-American relationship and for the modern Saudi state.[14]

Once more, Saudi and U. S. interests converged -— the United States wanted
to ensure access to oil at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future,
while Saudi Arabia had need for Western administrative and technical skills.
Accordingly, following the oil crisis, U. S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William Simon proposed a Saudi-U.S. Joint
Commission on Economic Cooperation, creating a mechanism for the U.S. to
provide technical advice and assistance to Saudi Arabia on a wide range of
issues, "from how to create a modern customs service and how to collect
statistics on a fast-growing economy to how to desalinate and distribute
drinking water… The recipient of the assistance, Saudi Arabia, paid for all
of it,"[15] eventually paying over $1 billion to the U. S. government for
services including salaries and living expenses of the Americans who created
the infrastructure of a modern state in Saudi Arabia.

On March 26, 1975, Faisal bin Musa'id, one of King Faisal's young nephews,
slipped into the king's majlis (meeting) as he was about to receive a
delegation from Kuwait. The prince produced a pistol and fired several
times, killing King Faisal almost instantly.  Faisal's successor was his
half-brother, Khalid, whose poor health resulted in the accession to real
power of Crown Prince Fahd—and a general meeting of minds, particularly over
oil pricing, with the United States.[16]

THE IMPACT OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

U. S. and Saudi interests have frequently conflicted over Israel and its
activities in the region.  But differences have existed as well over U. S.
policy toward Iran, at least until 1979.  The collapse of the Pahlavi
regime, as well as the perceived increase in threat from the Soviet Union,
brought Saudi Arabia and the United States together with a series of
informal military agreements that ranged from basing rights to
intelligence-sharing.

The British withdrawal from the Gulf had led eventually to the "twin
pillars" strategy established by the United States to enhance regional
security.  Iran and Saudi Arabia were the pillars, with Iran perceived as
the "big pillar" until the 1979 revolution. As a result of this
relationship, the U. S. gave the Shah of Iran a virtual blank check to buy
as many American weapons as he wished, including the most technologically
advanced, as long as they were not nuclear weapons. Thus, by the mid-1970s,
"Iran was responsible for fully half of total American arms sales
abroad."[17] Iran was perceived by Washington to be an essential ally with a
major security role in the Middle East, not least because of its border with
the Soviet Union. The warning signs of Iranian domestic disruption were
overlooked: inflation, corruption, and increasing political and social
tensions that signaled broad opposition to the Shah's regime.

At the same time, the U. S. government was involved in building up Saudi
Arabia's military infrastructure. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers moved
its Mediterranean Division from Italy to Riyadh and supervised construction
of over $14 billion worth of work on three huge bases, including King Khalid
Military City, two deep-water ports for the Saudi Navy, airfields, barracks,
and housing estates.[18]

In a 1980 interview, Dr. Ghazi Algosaibi, Saudi Minister of Industry and
Electricity, stated, "the new Arab world is interdependent with America….
Your industrial way of life… will collapse without Arab oil.  The
independence of the Arab countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot

be maintained without your strength and resolve."[19]  Dr. Algosaibi's
remarks pointed up an additional point of agreement between Saudi Arabia and
the United States: their joint abhorrence of Communism.  The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979 only reaffirmed this aspect of the relationship, and
encouraged acceptance of the U.S. as a distant partner -— an "over the
horizon" presence, to be sure, but a definite strategic partner.

The Iranian Revolution, combining as it did republicanism with Shi'ite
Islamic fundamentalism, bound the United States and Saudi Arabia even more
closely; both countries were concerned with containing the spread of
Iranian-style fundamentalism.

For the United States, this period, especially after the fall of the Shah,
provided an opportunity for gaining a further foothold in the Arab world,
particularly in the Gulf.[20] The twin crises posed by Iran and Afghanistan
led to the development of steadfast U. S. relations in the Gulf, not just
with Saudi Arabia, but also with other Gulf states such as Bahrain and Oman.

The period also was one that sowed the seeds of future disaster, for it
witnessed the creation of the mujahedin, the Muslim religious fighting force
that ultimately defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan.  Supported by the U.
S."'s CIA, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and China, the mujahedin attracted
hundreds of young Arabs and Muslims to the fight against Communism.  Only a
comparatively small number of Saudis remained with the mujahedin at the end
of the Afghan war—but out of this remaining group grew a network of
hard-line extremists and terrorists, many of whom reportedly became members
of Usama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization.

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September of 1980 was not unwelcome
news to either the United States or Saudi Arabia.  In the view of many, it
was better to keep these two disruptive entities engaged with each other
rather than affording them the opportunity for a spillover of their
aggressions -—military, religious, and political -— throughout the region.
For the United States, Iran was the enemy, so Iraq was supported with
intelligence sharing and dual-use technology, as well as with some help for
its economy.  The outcome of the war, however, was disastrous:  it weakened
Iran, and left Iraq as the dominant power in the Gulf, wrecking
infrastructure in both countries and doing massive damage to oil and gas
fields.

In the meantime, the United States was moving frantically to put together an
operational strategy to protect its interests and allies from a seemingly
endless list of threats—from Iranian fundamentalists in Tehran to Soviet
troops in Kabul.   The concept of a Rapid Deployment Force, first discussed
in the Kennedy Administration, was revived, and American emissaries were
sent out to Gulf countries to secure basing rights for U. S. troops
throughout the region.  Included in these plans were strategies to defeat
the Soviets in Afghanistan, underpinned by arming indigenous resistance
forces in state-of-the-art weaponry such as Stinger anti-aircraft equipment,
along with training provided by U.S. forces.

MILITARY COOPERATION

Successive U.S. administrations have entered into military sales agreements
with Saudi Arabia because of its prestige in the Arab world, its importance
as a major source of oil, and its vulnerability to threats from neighboring
states supported in the past by the Soviet Union. Heightened threats from
Iran in the late 1980s and subsequently from Iraq provided rationale for an
expansion of the arms supply relationship, and some observers believe
further sales are needed to redress a continuing gap between Saudi weapons
inventories and those of potential adversaries. Also, the Saudi arms market
has helped maintain the U.S. industrial base and create jobs at a time of
economic stress.  Indeed, in the sphere of military relations, the United
States and Saudi Arabia have relied on each other for security, resources,
political support, money, and intelligence, an alliance convenient for both
parties.  Saudi Arabia received the security it required, while the United
States has had the assurance of a reliable supply of oil at affordable
prices.[21]  In addition, a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia
has been built up by a series of American administrations through informal
military agreements and military deployments -— from the 1963 deployment of
F-100 fighter aircraft during the Yemen civil war and Egyptian invasion to
the massive 1990 deployment of troops and equipment to turn back Saddam
Hussein.

Since the late 1970s, a series of informal agreements, statements by U. S.
leaders, and military deployments to the Gulf have demonstrated America's
strong security commitment to Saudi Arabia.  At the same time, U. S. support
for Israel has frequently had an impact on the issue of Saudi arms sales,
with several major transfers contested in the U.S. Congress.  Examples are
the F-15 aircraft in 1978, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
in 1981, and a package of air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-sea
missiles in 1986.  At issue was Congressional sensitivity to the potential
of increased threat to Israel, although some Congressmen supported the sales
as a means to bolster Saudi defenses in the Gulf while enhancing the U. S.
job market.[22]

After the initial Western euphoria at the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
the dangers of uncertainty emerged, particularly in the area of ethnic
conflict—not only between newly independent states but also within them.
Yugoslavia tore itself apart, while introducing a new euphemism into the
lexicon: ethnic cleansing.  "The ending of the Cold War had not brought
peace in our time; it had not engendered a new world order.  The implacable
hostility between two great monolithic systems had been replaced by an
increasingly fragmented world in which many of the old political certainties
had no place."[23]

At the same time, Saudi Arabia was able to take an interest in the emergence
of independent former Soviet Central Asian states and in their freedom to
practice Islam.  A vast swathe of land, with a fast-growing population and
considerable mineral wealth waiting to be efficiently exploited will once
again form part of the Muslim community of nations -— a factor that may be
increasingly important to Saudi Arabia's status as the leading Islamic
state.

The 1991 Gulf War once again demonstrated the coincidence of U. S. and Saudi
interests.  The idea of Iraqi control of the majority of the world's oil was
unacceptable to the United States, whose policy in the Gulf for decades had
rested on the concept of access to oil at reasonable prices.  For their
part, the Saudi fear was more proximate: they did not want to be the next
victim of Saddam Hussein.  Thus, the vast effort that was first Operation
Desert Shield and eventually Desert Storm came into being, deploying
hundreds of thousands of U. S. and allied forces and untold amounts of
military equipment into Saudi Arabia with the consent of the Saudi
government.  Once again, American and Saudi interests coincided.

Within a week of Saddam's invasion, the first U. S. military forces arrived
in Saudi Arabia, in response to a Saudi request for U.S. troops to defend
against a possible Iraqi attack.[24] In the months that followed, the United
States, under President George H. W. Bush, put together an extraordinary
coalition of forces to take back Kuwait. In the end nearly 630,000 allied
troops from all over the world, including the Middle East, were part of
Operation Desert Storm.

None of this could have been done without the support and cooperation of the
Saudi government, which provided military combat support as well as basing
rights for allied troops. The Saudi contribution was invaluable, and was a
true exercise in international cooperation as well as a vivid illustration
of the importance of the Saudi-U.S. relationship.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

A persistent and prickly issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia is
that of human rights. Critics cite Saudi government restrictions on the
press, speech, assembly and association, as well as the role of women in
Saudi society, and claim that there is no significant opposition to the
government only because the Al-Saud government quashes any overt signs of
dissent.

Political reforms initiated by King Fahd and augmented by Crown Prince
Abdullah, however, have begun the move toward more democratic processes and
individual freedoms.  At the same time, however, democracy as interpreted by
the West -— particularly the United States -— may not be the most
appropriate or effective means of government for Saudi Arabia.

Democracy in one form or other, however, is not antithetical to the Arab
World, or to Saudi Arabia.  Most opposition to democratic practices in the
Middle East stems not from Islam, nor from "tribal custom," but from the
reluctance of regimes to accept opinions from the people they govern.  The
United States and the West cannot impose its values on others; however, it
can certainly emphasize that the values of democracy are universal -— and
can over time be accepted by Arab governments.  Such values are in fact,
compatible with Islam and with authentic Arab traditions.

[This completes Part I of this paper.  Part II is provided in a separate
e-mailing.]

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

ISSUES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE COURSE OF FUTURE U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS,
POST-SEPTEMBER 11
Copyright © 2002 by Center for Saudi Studies
All rights reserved for the Center for Saudi Studies in Washington, DC. No
part of this Occasional paper may be used or reproduced in any manner
whatsoever without written permission except in case of brief quotations
embodied in critical articles or reviews.
ISBN 0-9722450-1-4

OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 2
AUGUST 2002

CENTER FOR SAUDI STUDIES
P.O. BOX 2847 MERRIFIELD, VA 22116-2847 USA

Opinions expressed in this occasional paper are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Center for Saudi Studies

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