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on AEI's conference series on rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq
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CONFERENCE
The Day After: Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq
Thursday, October 3, 2002
Unedited Transcript
Agenda:
| 8:30 a.m. | Registration, coffee and continental breakfast | |
| 9:00 | Introduction: |
Ambassador Ryszard Krystosik, former chief of United States Interest Section, Baghdad |
| 9:30 | Panel 1: Ambitions for Iraq? | |
| Presenter: | Kanan Makiya, Harvard University | |
| Discussants: | Ahmad Chalabi, Iraqi National Congress | |
| Rend Rahim Francke, Iraq Foundation | ||
| Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution | ||
| Siyamend Othman, independent Iraq analyst | ||
| Richard Perle, AEI | ||
| Moderator: | Danielle Pletka, AEI | |
| 11:05 | Panel 2: War Crimes | |
| Presenter: | Feisal Istrabadi, trial lawyer and Iraqi activist | |
| Discussants: | Munther al Fadhl, human rights author and legal scholar | |
| Hania Mufti, Human Rights Watch, London | ||
| Ruth Wedgwood, Yale University | ||
| Moderator: | Reuel Marc Gerecht, AEI | |
| 12:30 p.m. | Lunch | |
| 2:00 | Panel 3: Oil and the Iraqi Economy | |
| Presenter: | Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy | |
| Discussants: | Ibrahim Alolom, independent analyst | |
| Sinan al Shabibi, United Nations Institute for Teaching and Research | ||
| S. Rob Sobhani, Georgetown University | ||
| Moderator: | Danielle Pletka, AEI | |
| 3:35 | Panel 4: A Post-Saddam Foreign Policy and Iraq’s International Obligations, U.N. Resolutions, and Regional Relations | |
| Presenter: | Bernard Lewis, Princeton University | |
| Discussants: | Serif Egeli, Turkish-USA Business Council | |
| Nawaf Obaid, Saudi oil and security analyst | ||
| Olivier Roy, Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques | ||
| Moderator: | Reuel Marc Gerecht, AEI | |
| 5:00 | Adjournment | |
Proceedings:
MR.
DeMUTH: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. My name is Christopher DeMuth, and
I'm President of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
I'm delighted to welcome all of you to this AEI Conference: The Day After:
Planning for Post-Saddam Iraq. And I must say that my colleagues and I are very
honored among the many distinguished experts on the Middle East and Iraq to have
assembled here at AEI today such an important group of Iraqi expatriates and
emigrees to take part in our deliberations throughout the day.
The
dramatic proposition and challenge that President Bush has laid before the
American people and the free world has prompted spirited public debate over the
threat that Saddam Hussein poses to our security and our civilization, and no
doubt equally spirited private debates over the military and political
exigencies of removing the tyrant from power.
The
question we will be considering today and in subsequent sessions throughout the
coming months is equally important, and although it has received less attention
to date, it will move to the forefront as the political and military plans go
forward.
That
is the construction of a free and liberal and peaceable Iraq, one which in the
hopes of many Iraqis and their friends in America and elsewhere will be much
more than a reconstruction of what was before Saddam came to power, but the
inauguration of a new political era for all of the Middle East.
I
would like to thank my colleagues, Danielle Pletka and Reuel Gerecht, who have
been laying plans for this conference for many months now, and who will be
moderating the sessions throughout the day, and Elizabeth Bowen, our Director of
Seminar and Conferences, who put together all of the logistics for the event in
this newly redesigned conference center, which we just moved into last week.
Because
of the very large response we have received and the many people who have come
from around the country and around the world to the conference, I must introduce
a small apology. The logistics of managing such a large crowd throughout the day
may present some challenges, and in particular it's not going to be possible to
have everybody sitting around large tables with linen cloths at lunch, and some
of the arrangements will be somewhat informal.
But
I think given the intensity of the matters we will be discussing, that I could
ask your patience with some of these details.
I
want to mention that following--well, today's session is going to be concerned
with issues of great immediacy and overarching importance in the post-Saddam
period, questions of political and constitutional structure, war crimes and
justice, oil, and the immediate effects on politics, the politics of the Middle
East--we will be holding a series of monthly seminars following up with more
detailed issues.
This
will begin with a session on Friday, November 15, on demobilizing, reforming and
rebuilding the Iraqi Army. Subjects to be addressed in subsequent months
throughout the winter and spring include de-Baathification, reform in the
educational system, reforming the judicial system, questions of debt,
reparations, sanctions, environmental rehabilitation, health care, and many
others.
To
provide introductory remarks, I am very honored that we have with us Ambassador
Ryszard Krystosik, who was for many years a distinguished Polish diplomat with
long service in Washington, D.C. and at the United Nations. Ambassador Krystosik
was in the early 1990s, from 1990 to 1994, Deputy Director in the Polish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and was then for many years and up through 2001 the
Chief of the United States Interests Section in Baghdad.
Following
his remarks, Danielle Pletka will introduce our first panel and moderate that
panel. Please give a warm welcome to Ambassador Krystosik.
MR.
KRYSTOSIK: Before I start, let me apologize for my Polish accent. A long time
ago when first in the United States, I was traveling from New York to
Washington, and I stopped at the roadside cafe, and a man sitting next to me
asked me who are you? I said I am a Pole. What did you come to the United States
for, he asked? I said I came to polish my English.
[Laughter.]
MR.
KRYSTOSIK: He looked at me and then said you don't have to. Your English is
already Polish.
[Laughter.]
MR.
KRYSTOSIK: It is with a great honor and pleasure to deliver the introductory
remarks today. I don't know whether I will be able to meet this challenge, but
certainly I will try my best. First of all, let me sincerely thank the President
of the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Christopher DeMuth and the members of
the institute for their kind invitation.
Secondly,
let me congratulate you for choosing the most topical issues to be discussed
today and at the seminars that will follow the conference.
If
there are to be changes on the Iraqi internal scene, there will be nothing of
greater importance than a successful transition to a democratic system in Iraq.
Not allowing the rebirth of present dictatorship in a different form with a
different face will become politically indispensable.
Hence,
without the democracy being established in Iraq, and the present ruler being
toppled down, the international security and stability of the Middle East will
always be threatened, and the Iraqi people will continue to suffer.
Since
a few weeks, as we know, Iraq has been non-stop on the headlines. Almost
everything has been said, written or broadcasted--the news on war plans, return
of weapons inspectors, political struggles behind the scenes in the United
Nations, moves by the decision-makers and policy planners. From time to time,
there were reports on the air strikes carried out in the pursuit of policy of
no-fly zone enforcement and the reply of the Iraqi air defenses.
On
the TV screens, you could often see Saddam Hussein either presiding over the RCC
and government meetings or shooting from the hip his Mauser rifle over the heads
of parading Iraqi troops to prove his fitness and determination, both to his
supporters and to those who sometimes question his health.
However,
for obvious reasons, not that much could have been shown, written or sent about
the realities of daily life in Iraq. Having spent six years in Baghdad, as a
senior Polish diplomat, charged with protecting the interests of the United
States, I had the rare opportunity to eyewitness many dramatic events.
I
had a chance to see the sharp contrasts between the regime and the people; to
compare the realities with the illusions; to recognize the differences between
the wishful thinking presentations and real problems; to juxtapose some slipping
on the surface reports with the true facts.
And
I had a chance to deal with the Iraqi Foreign Ministry and other government
officials. So I could compare the official policy statements made on different
occasions with the daily practice and true acting of the Iraqi state
authorities.
As
much as I can, let me share with you some observations, assessments and opinions
on these facts of daily life in Iraq, which are less exposed and usually do not
take much of the prime time in the media.
For
overwhelming majority, life is extremely difficult in Iraq. To be really well,
one has to belong to the top elite, be a prominent member of the government or
Baath Party leadership, a wealthy businessman, possibly on government
procurement contracts, or a chieftain of the clan. Also, a few writers, folk
singers, and actors belong to the elite.
Even
high ranking officers of the Iraqi armed forces, security and police
functionaries, as well as the administration officials are not that well paid.
They do not get special bonuses or rewards which occasionally are even paid in
foreign currency.
Directors
general heading big offices in the ministries earn approximately an equivalent
of 20 to $25 per month. The university professor salary is approximately eight
to $10 monthly.
Therefore,
in Baghdad it is not uncommon to find out that it is the university professor
who is driving his used car as a taxi you have just hired. Your driver might be
telling you how much he heard before 1991. His salary was then two or even three
times higher than that of his European or American colleague. Now, he must have
some additional income to support his family.
Before
he belonged to the elite, he was a strong supporter of the regime. Now, his life
has been drastically changed. The same could be said about lawyers, medical
doctors, architects or engineers and executives. Before, they maintained close
contacts with the West. They traveled abroad every year, staying in best hotels,
walking to the best restaurants. Now, they hardly afford a sidewalk restaurant
in Baghdad. Only a few of them can keep the same living standard now.
The
support of the middle class for the regime now is not as strong as it used to
be. It's getting weaker and weaker day by day. Yet, there is in my opinion
rather resignation than an active protest. It would be too difficult, too
dangerous, openly to manifest even some dissatisfaction.
Still,
the middle class is better off than the lower income group. A woman weaver in
the state-run carpet factory earns 3,000 Iraqi dinars. That is US$1.50 per
month. She depends on food rationing only. A rookie in the Baghdad police force
is paid $2.50 monthly. He is better off as occasionally he takes some small
bribes, an important addition to his income.
Anyway,
life in Baghdad for everyone who lives there is much better than life in other
places, even big cities like Masul, Ramadi or Basra, not to mention life in the
countryside.
The
city of Baghdad day by day deteriorates. Many houses are not properly maintained
as the owners do not have enough money for repairs. Streets, quite clean before
the Gulf War, are dirty now. The sanitation trucks are running on major streets
and in the better neighborhoods, where the workers can get some tips for
collecting the garbage. The sewerage system is really in a bad condition.
Of
course, the authorities put the blame on the sanctions and the bombings, which,
as they say, heavily affected the system. Not much is being done, however, to
improve the situation. During the rainy season, parts of the city are completely
flooded.
On
the other hand, in some parts of the city, close to the riverbanks in Mansur and
Adamiya or in Masbah, you can see not only family members' palaces, but also
some other huge mansions built with Carara marbles, indoor and outdoor swimming
pools with the top equality equipment that is brought from the Gulf, Europe or
Asia.
Some
of these houses are guarded by the soldiers and police, some by private security
guards. Some stay unoccupied as the owner might have two or three mansions like
that to be rented for hard currency to diplomats, the UN personnel, executives
of international companies or businessmen from United Arab Emirates, Lebanon,
Syria or Jordan.
When
you look at the city traffic, you have an impression of being in the junkyard of
1980s. Most of the cars are kept running thanks to the ingenious labor of Iraqi
mechanics and spare parts imported, or better to say, smuggled from India,
Malaysia, Pakistan and Taiwan, often as original General Motors, Japanese or
German products.
From
time to time, you can still see a Porche or Maserati roadster, maybe from the
motor pool of Uday, allegedly burned by the order of Saddam Hussein.
However,
with the Oil for Food program running already for five consecutive years, there
are new cars coming day by day, not only the trucks which might have the dual
use and the oil tankers. They are top models of Mercedes for the government and
presidential ministers, luxury Toyota Lexuses and Avalons become a new standard
for top ranking Mukhabarat and security officials, while Land Cruisers, Toyota
Land Cruisers for higher operatives from these intelligence and security
formations.
These
models gradually replace white Chevy Celebrity sedans, notoriously known before
in Baghdad as the secret police cars. Regular police has a small Hundai. The
brass, bigger Sonatas. Occasionally, you can see young men, shortcut or
skin-headed, Al Khass special security agents, in their BMWs, wearing designer
sunglasses, fashionable knit shirts, brief leather jackets and blue jeans as
they drive slowly Arasat Hindiya Street, known as the Champs Elysee of Baghdad,
placed close to the palaces and mansions on the river where the family of Saddam
Hussein lives.
This
is the place full of boutiques, selling Gucci, Yves St. Laurent, Pierre Cardin
and other designer dresses and South Korean top and fancy audiovisual equipment.
There are also fashionable restaurants open by the Iraqi-Jordanese or Lebanese
joint ventures. They are frequented by the regime, high society, and Baghdad
international community, including diplomats, UN people and before '98, the
UNSCOM inspectors.
However,
there are other places in Baghdad, Saddam City for example, the taxi driver will
refuse to take you there after the sunset. The cabbie knows that he might risk
not only his car and money but even his life. Strolling Mansur or Arasat Hindiya,
visiting restaurants and ice cream parlors is a popular way of passing free time
for these Iraqis who can afford it.
There
are not many cinemas. These which still exist are showing mostly karate and
Indian drama movies. From time to time, there is a play staged on the National
Theater or Chinese circus visiting town.
So
you do not have much choice but to watch state TV or Uday's Shabab Television.
Mostly, the news is broadcasted. It is illustrated with chronicles of the
meetings held by Saddam Hussein. You are never sure when the chronicles were
shot, a day, a week, a month or a few years ago.
Although
you may notice that the news coverage of international events has been
broadened, the political censorship remains unchanged or became even tighter.
The rest of the program is limited to propaganda, and clips with pop-folk songs.
In the evenings, the feature movie might be shown.
One
must admit sometimes it could be a top-Oscar winning movie or a blockbuster like
Titanic or Speed. I don't believe the Iraqi TV spends a lot of time to buy
screening rights. I presume they save, either buying or making themselves the
pirate copies.
If
you don't want to watch official television, and you own a CD or DVD player, you
may easily buy a pirate disk with most recent Hollywood production, uncensored
and sometimes technically almost perfect, made on Chinese or Malaysian digital
recording equipment.
The
satellite TV formally is not forbidden. But you cannot have it. There is no law
forbidding the installation of the antenna and possession of the receiver.
However,
Saddam Hussein once has allegedly said that those who watch imperialistic
propaganda and immoral entertainment should be punished. So, in practice,
everything depends on your friendly neighbor. If he reports on you, your house
will be searched and the equipment confiscated. Some other of your valuables
might also be disappear. You will be arrested and put in jail for six months.
This
will certainly happen unless the Mukhabarat official is one who understands, and
after taking some money to lessen his doubts, he will file a report on your
neighbor, charging him with disseminating false information, with purpose to
mislead the security authorities. Your neighbor might then be in serious trouble
indeed.
Of
course, there are some who can watch the satellite TV. Some ministers, like
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Information and Culture, and I suppose in the
Foreign Department of Mukhabarat as well as in the offices of presidential
advisors, you can see the TV sets, tuned mostly on the CNN.
I
may add that the network enjoys number one position in Baghdad. It is considered
the most credible with the best access, maybe with the exception of Al Jazirah,
the network which assisted the Iraqis in transmitting of Saddam Hussein's
statements from his command post after the broadcasting power if Iraqi TV was
destroyed by the first airstrikes during the Desert Fox.
The
access to the internet is in practice forbidden. It is for official use only.
There is an internet cafe in Baghdad, but as some people say, one must have top
security clearance to attend it.
The
particular role of keeping ordinary people fed with correct information is
assigned to the press. The differences between the newspapers --the Government
Al Ghumhuriya, the Armed Forces Quadasiya, or Baathist Al Thawra--are only
slight. The different presentations could be noticed sometimes in the Babil,
Uday's newspaper. Only there you may find editorials of articles criticizing the
Iraqi foreign policy line, showing that the tasks for Mukhabarat are not
correct. And some criticism in Babil may lead to the dismissal of government
officials.
One
might consider that the newspaper is reflecting Saddam's informal position as
interpreted by Uday. The leading role of the newspaper diminished along with
lesser political importance of Uday after the attempt on his life in December
'97.
However,
Uday still enjoys a lot of power and influence. His is actually the only person
controlling TV, the newspaper and a dozen of magazines, and a special
paramilitary force so-called Saddam Hussein Fedains.
He
conducts special military camps, the booth training for youngsters where special
agents look for gifted boys to be recruited for special security or intelligence
apparatus. Uday still has a full access to university and cultural circles.
He
leads the Olympic Committee and presides over lucrative sports organizations. It
is not clear, yet it looks like he controls the finances of the family, banking
and international trade. He owns the bus line to Amman, the fleet of GMC taxis
used by all people visiting Iraq, but taxis shuttling between the two capitals,
the oil tankers and the big trucks.
His
people control the foreign currency exchange. To change foreign currency for the
Iraqi dinars is a must. Tourists, diplomats, foreign journalists, businessmen
have to pay their bills in dinars. You don't change money in the bank.
Banks
use the official rate, approximately $3 for one dinar. In the commercial
exchange in kiosks, you get the commercial rate, much, much better,
approximately 2,000 dinars for one dollar.
[Laughter.]
MR.
KRYSTOSIK: You may sell or buy foreign currency now in Iraq. Before it was a
crime for which you could be even hanged. The price difference between selling
and buying is only slight. However, it is a profitable business to run the
exchange kiosk. Uday's people do that.
Certain
changes, or better to say adjustments in the internal policy of the regime, do
not mean that the grip has been loosened. Life remains to be fully controlled.
The system of control is total and complex. There is no chance that something
could escape attention of the authorities if they want to know, and usually they
do.
Political
control is carried out on the first level by the Baath Party domestic affairs
department which prepares reports on the internal situation. Every Baath Party
member is obliged to inform in writing of the situation in his community, the
place he lives and works. Such a report is then analyzed, compared with other
reports. Then the recommendation is conveyed to the higher level. Police do have
their own reports. All the information is being checked by the internal security
division of Mukhabarat, and reported to the Palace, to the Saddam Hussein
advisors and the big boss himself.
From
the organizational point of view, the system is very efficient in this respect.
The branches of local administration are obliged closely to cooperate with the
security, and they eagerly do. They exact and very precise lists of people
prepared for food distribution and rationing purposes are also used for
balloting. They are subject to the security verifications. From time to time,
your house in Baghdad certainly will be visited by the Troika, a local
administration representative, Baath Party delegate and a security officer.
Let
no one be misguided seeing old people on bikes with old useless or almost
useless Kalashnikov rifles, good only for shooting in the air, who patrol the
city at night or sit at the checkpoints in faded party uniforms. This does not
reflect the real power and efficiency of the system of control in Iraq.
Perhaps
it is difficult to notice the state security officers in their plaincloth.
However, dark olive uniforms you could see everywhere, sometimes mixed with the
camouflage combat dress or red bandanna scarf of the Republican Guards, and red
berets of the notorious military police branding foreheads of the deserters with
the hot iron.
Well-known,
dreadful effectiveness of the security force is based on extreme brutality. The
security troops are ready to shoot to kill just to disperse the crowd.
The
Toyota or Mitsubishi pick-ups with machine guns mounted on platforms could be
always seen rushing to the places of trouble. They are very practical to use in
other sense as well. You can place the dead bodies on the platforms, drive away
and discard, dump, them in the other parts of town, far away from the place of
trouble. It will be difficult for the family to find the body and to bury it.
Given the religious traditions, it is so-called second punishment. It does have
a tremendous psychological terrorizing impact. That was exactly what happened
during the Shiie rioting in Saddam City in March 2000.
Sometimes,
quite seldom, instead of security force, Saddam Hussein Fedains are being used
to pacify the rioters. This was the case in Najef and Kerbala, the Shiie holy
places.
In
all such cases, the Mukhabarat and the Al Khass, special security organizations,
are engaged. All security force including the elite Republican guards is
coordinated by Little Brother, Qusay. He is now considered possible successor to
Saddam. The number of his followers and supporters in Tikriti family and in
other Sunni clans steadily grows. He does not have the rank of general. He's not
a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and cabinet member either.
He
does not hold any position in the Baath Party and never sits close to Saddam
during the official ceremonies. In the media, he is addressed as Warrior Qusay.
He is the one who enjoys the real power. He profited from the long battle for
control over the security force and intelligence community fiercely fought
between Uday and Saddam Hussein half brothers, Barzan at Tikriti, Watban and
Sabawi, who once were in command of Mukhabarat, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the police force.
Political
control of the people does not mean that common crime is eliminated. On the
contrary, the number of criminal acts, murders, armed robberies and thefts
grows. There are, of course, bloody family feuds and acts of violence. People
are afraid. They cannot count on police protection. Although it's not uncommon
to have a handgun or Kalashnikov at home, for ordinary people using it, however,
might mean a serious trouble.
From
time to time, the people are shocked by the circulating stories of young people
kidnapped and killed to have their life organs removed for sale, for illegal
kidney implants. Or gangs robbing the houses and killing whole families. There
is the drug traffic, gambling and prostitution, of course, with the proper
Mukhabarat and police connections and protection.
This
is very well illustrated by the murky story of beheaded corpses of Baghdadi
prostitutes found in front of their houses.
Everyday
life is extremely difficult in Baghdad for an average Iraqi. His old car might
be broken and there will be no chance to repair it. There could be limited food
based only on rationing basket consisting mostly of cooking oil, flour, sugar
and some eggs. There might be a power cut so his TV set and air-conditioning
split unit will be off. And when power is back, he might find out that his TV
set is broken as there was a high voltage surge of returning power. There might
be worker shortages or a difficulties to buy proper medicine in the drug store.
However,
he will not complain loudly. He will put the blame on the sanctions in
accordance with the official line. He will do that to protect his family and
himself. He knows that to be engaged against the regime means often a special
court where the names of prosecutor and the presiding judge will not be known.
They will be kept secret. There will be no record of the court proceedings and
no verdict in writing.
Actually,
only two sentences are possible: death or life imprisonment. The only document,
though not always received by the family, would be the act of demise signed by
the ward doctor after the execution.
Saddam
Hussein's presence everywhere dominates the daily life of everyone in Iraq. He
managed to survive the previous crisis. His days seem to be numbered at the end
of the Gulf War. It looked like no way out for him, yet he found the escape
routes. He was able to strengthen his domestic position after weathering very
serious family storms.
Whether
or not, for how long and how, he will be able to grapple with the situation now,
whether he will be able to cope with the present crisis? Will he only be
prevented from rebuilding his nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs
and using them as a threat in the major struggle for regional security, while he
continues to stay in power?
Or
he succeeds in changing the face of the regime, replacing himself with some
other family member? Or the Iraqi people, who will pay now the heaviest price
for his dictatorship, will be able to start a new life on the road of democratic
changes? One doesn't know yet, but one might learn quite soon what will happen.
I
thank you for your attention.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: Good morning, everybody. Welcome. I'm Danielle Pletka from AEI. I'd like
to make a few program notes, first of all. The first is my own omission. We owe
a great debt of thanks to, and I'm looking for him right now, Dr. Michael Rubin,
who talked into AEI some months ago to help arrange this conference, and
immediately abandoned us for the Pentagon, where he is now. He did wonderful
work and we are very grateful to him.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: There's his fan club. Okay. Moving on, if I may, I need to tell
everybody that there is no luncheon speaker today, and we will probably start
lunch a little bit late, because we're running a little bit late already.
Despite
the fact that invitations were extended throughout the administration, AEI was
informed on Tuesday afternoon that no senior Bush Administration official would
be comfortable in speaking on the question of Iraq post-Saddam.
Of
course, we are disappointed. Calling for an Iraq for the Iraqis is not a
substitute for a genuine foreign policy towards a new Iraq. If the United States
wants a democratic and representative Iraq, we need to start work now, and to
jump-start that process, we have a group of wonderful speakers with us today.
And
I'd like to get our first panel up here, if I might. Don't fall off the dias.
This is our largest panel. Sorry, we'll take a moment. I'm just going to give a
very quick and brief introduction of each of speakers today.
Our
first presenter on the question of how ambitious we should be for a future Iraq
is Kanan Makiya. Mr. Makiya is a scholar-in-residence at the Center for Middle
Eastern Studies at Harvard University and a past convener of the Human Rights
Committee of the INC.
Each
of our speakers, by the way, today has a full biography which is contained in
your folder.
Ahmad
Chalabi is president of the Iraqi National Congress.
Rend
Rahim Francke is a founding member and executive director of the Iraq
Foundation.
Michael
O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution is a senior fellow in foreign policy
studies.
Siyamend
Othman is an independent media and IT consultant, and an expert on Kurdish
issues.
Richard
Perle is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, co-chairman of
Hollinger Digital. He is also chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board.
Thank
you for being here.
MR.
MAKIYA: Thank you, Danielle. Thank you for inviting me to this very well
attended event. My comments are going to be somewhat different vein than that of
the Ambassador's who dwelt on the, very observantly, on the miseries of life
under Saddam. I am going to try and do the opposite, to paint a picture of what
a future Iraq post-Saddam might look like or could look like.
And
I should say at the outset that while the ideas I am dealing with take as their
starting point Iraqi realities, they are not self-evident. And by this, I mean
that they do not take as their point of departure what I call the lowest common
denominator of Iraqi politics.
They
are feasible, they are doable, but their feasibility requires imagination. Iraqi
imagination and American imaginative leadership, the kind of leadership that has
a long-term political vision for the area, a long-term political vision, I
should add, not only for Iraq but for the whole Middle East.
Now,
in addition to this all important question of leadership, the feasibility of
what I'm about to suggest rests on a number of assumptions, which I had best get
quickly out of the way because without them, what I am about to say will sound
no doubt like pious hopes and dreams without any chance of being realized in the
short term.
So
my first assumption is somewhat obvious one, but nonetheless has to be stated,
that the government of the United States actually proceeds with its stated
policy of regime change in Iraq.
Secondly,
that the unseating of the Saddam Hussein regime does not take place at the cost
of large scale civilian casualties, Iraqi or Israeli, which could introduce
consider volatility and unpredictability into the political situation.
And
my third assumption is that these ideas that I'm presenting or some such
variation and amendment of them are actually adopted at a large and
representative meeting of the Iraqi opposition to be held in the medium or short
term.
And
my fourth assumption is that the government of the United States as the partner
of the Iraqi people in liberating Iraq sees its role in Iraq as being again for
the long term for democracy and reconstruction, i.e., for nation building.
Now,
in making this assumption, this last assumption, on nation building, I am
comforted by the words of Condoleeza Rice last week--I think it was last week or
ten days ago--when she was quoted by the Financial Times that this time around,
she said the United States will be, quote, "completely devoted" to the
reconstruction of Iraq as a unified democratic state in the event of a military
strike.
Ms.
Rice suggested that the U.S. was willing to spend time and money, rebuilding the
country after the fall of Saddam Hussein. She said that the values of freedom,
democracy and free enterprise do not "stop at the edge of Islam." That
was her phrase. And she underlined U.S. interest in the, quote,
"democratization or the march of freedom in the Muslim world."
I
said I am comforted by these words, but I am unfortunately by no means persuaded
that Ms. Rice was stating what is the position of the United States government
in this regard at this point in time.
My
fifth assumption, last assumption, I promise you, is that the government of the
United States further to a treaty with a new duly constituted Iraqi government
agrees to keep a military presence inside Iraq for whose purpose it is to
guarantee the territorial integrity of the country.
And
it agrees to do so for a period measured in years, not in months. Now this
having been said, it should be emphasized that nothing in what I am about to say
requires the United States to police or to manage into existence on a sort of
hand-to-hand basis the new and budding institutions of the country. That is a
challenge that I believe the people of Iraq can and will face up to on their
own.
So,
given these rather numerous, I admit, assumptions, I want to suggest that the,
and I think the gist of my remarks are, that the removal of this regime presents
the United States in particular with a historic opportunity that I believe is
going to prove to be as large as anything that has happened in the Middle East
since the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the entry of British troops into Iraq
in 1917.
Iraq
is not Afghanistan. It is rich enough and developed enough and has the human
resources to become as great a force for democracy and economic reconstruction
in the Arab and Muslim world as it has been a force for autocracy and
destruction in the past.
But
for the rest of the world to be able to see the challenge in this way, it is
necessary to change the terms of the debate over this coming war with Iraq, and
that has not happened yet. And that is why I said I am merely comforted by the
words of Miss Rice to the Financial Times and not yet convinced that it is going
to be the actual position of the United States government, not yet at any rate.
Now,
unfortunately, much of the debate--I don't know if you are hearing me very
well--is this reaching--okay. Much of the debate over Iraq that has taken place
in Europe, in the Arab world and even in this country has been what I would call
a selfish one, centered on the threats to the West and its friends on the one
hand, and on the moral issues arising out of so-called American hegemony on the
other.
It
has been all about quote "us" in the West and not about those who have
to live inside the grip of one of the most brutal dictatorships of modern times.
I
should say here that it has been a thousand times more selfish among non-Iraqi
Arabs, if there can be said to have been any kind of a debate at all on the
possibility that this war might end up being something that is actually a force
for good in the Middle East as opposed to the unmitigated disaster that almost
all non-Iraqi Arabs seem to think it will be.
The
spectrum unfortunately of what it is possible to talk about in Arab politics
these days runs from Palestine at one end to Palestine at the other with no room
for the plight of the people of Iraq, the overwhelming majority of whom believe
that military action is the price that has to be paid for the removal of the
regime of Saddam Hussein.
The
change that has taken place in American policy towards Iraq is, of course,
driven by strategic American considerations post-September 11. This change has
been heartily welcomed in Iraqi opposition circles, even as it is feared and
criticized in the rest of the Arab world.
But
as I say this is not the time to pay attention to those Arab fears. They will
come to nothing in the end, as they came to nothing during the Gulf War and the
war in Afghanistan. The 1991 divide inside Arab politics is still alive for
understandable reasons.
But
what might become of it in the months and years to come depends on how willing
the United States is to follow through with nation building as opposed to mere
regime change. To be blunt about it, there is a great deal more at stake than
what we are addressing, all of us together, at this conference today than the
subject of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the removal of
Saddam Hussein, important and fundamental as these also are as considerations.
And
it is in that spirit of interesting you in what is possible in Iraq that I would
now like to share with you the kind of thinking that is going on in some Iraqi
circles with which I happen to be involved and which are working closely,
intimately, in fact, with some agencies of the government of this country.
[Sound
system difficulties.]
MR.
MAKIYA: So I said I was going to share with you some of the ideas that are being
discussed among a group of Iraqis working on these questions of the future of
Iraq. But I also wanted to add before we got interrupted by the sound system
that nothing that I am going to say is in any way, shape or form the policy of
the United States government, not yet at any rate, or even that of the Iraqi
opposition, although the whole point is to make them so.
So
let me begin first with a question, an issue that has for historical reasons,
assumed an inordinately large role inside the Iraqi opposition, and that is the
idea that the new Iraqi state that would emerge out of the ashes of the Ba'thi
regime should in some way or another be federal in structure.
Now
the origins of this idea began in 1992 when the, first of all, the Kurdish
parliament voted for it, and then a few months later the Iraqi National Congress
adopted this policy in its historic conference in Salahuddin, northern Iraq, an
event which I was privileged to attend and where I was asked to deliver a
keynote talk on the subject.
I
came down strongly then in favor of the idea as I am in favor of it now, as a
solution to the problems of the Iraqi state. Incidentally, the INC later
reaffirmed the position of federalism at its 1998 conference in New York--1999,
sorry.
These
votes were the first of their kind in the modern history of Iraq. Taken
together, I submit they break the mold of Arab politics. There is no literature
in Arabic on this idea of federalism to speak of, just as there is no experience
of federalism, and yet today, and this is what I mean by breaking the mold, most
Iraqi organizations that oppose the regime in Iraq, whether they are in the INC
or not, advocate one interpretation or another of federalism.
No
Iraqi political organization in fact can afford not to these days, especially
not one that calls itself democratic. That is an immense gain for the people of
Iraq, one which should not be frittered away by the disagreements which have
also broken out naturally over what this moveable feast of a word might actually
mean.
Now,
two features unite all definitions in play in the Iraqi political arena at the
moment on this question of federalism. The first is the idea that federalism,
whatever else it might mean, is a form of division of power, of separation of
power from the center, Baghdad, towards the regions.
And
the second is that no future state in Iraq can be democratic if it is not at the
same time federal in structure. Now, the novelty of federalism is a reflection,
I argue, of that of the novelty of the whole phenomenon of the post-1991 Iraqi
opposition, an opposition grounded not in issues of, quote, "national
liberation" and, quote, "armed struggle" and the struggle against
"Zionism" and "imperialism," the catchall phrases that you
all know of that have become part and parcel of Arab politics since 1967, but an
opposition in Iraq whose be-all and end-all is hostility to its own homegrown
dictatorship.
Now,
admittedly, this opposition has not always been easy to deal with. It
encompasses many diverse traditional and modern elements of Iraqi society. It is
fractious. It is prone occasionally to in-fighting. Nonetheless, I say it is
remarkable that virtually all constituent parts agree on the need for
representative democracy, the rule of law, a pluralist system of government and
federalism. Federalism, therefore, should be a cornerstone of the new Iraqi body
politic.
Unfortunately,
however, neither the Kurdish Parliament nor the INC have yet developed in detail
what they mean by this new idea. We are in the course of doing so in the INC and
amongst Iraqis in general. Nor have we yet as an opposition developed the
practical implications of this idea with regards to the mechanics of power
sharing and resource distribution.
For
Kurds, as we know, the word "federalism" has become a condition sine
qua non for staying inside a new Iraq, and not trying to secede from it. Without
a federal system of government, in which real power is devolved towards the
regions, the currently autonomous predominantly Kurdish north will sooner or
later opt for separation, and rightly so. After all that has been done to the
Kurds in the name of Arabism, no Iraqi should expect otherwise, and certainly no
one who calls him or herself a democrat.
As
a result of this, there has arisen a purely utilitarian argument for federalism,
one derived from a pragmatic calculus of what the balance of power in the
immediate aftermath of Saddam's overthrow is going to look like.
One
must concede federalism, the argument goes among some Arabs, in the interest of
getting rid of Saddam, and because the Kurds are today in a position to force it
upon us.
On
the other hand, on the Kurdish side, the argument goes, we must accept
federalism, not because we really want it, but because the regional situation
does not allow for us to secede and have a separate state in northern Iraq.
Now,
I want to say that I don't think that the project as big as restructuring the
state of Iraq on a federal basis should be undertaken on the grounds of this
kind of utilitarian calculus. No ordinary Iraqi citizen can be expected to opt
for it as an idea on such grounds of mere expediency.
Federalism,
if it is to become the founding principle of a new beginning in Iraq, must
derive from a position of principle, and what might that be?
To
begin with, federalism is an extension of the principle of the separation of
powers, only this time power is being divided as well as separated. The
divisions I'm talking about are those of the regions from one another. Without
the divisions of powers, there can be no federalism worthy of the name. Because
the regime of Saddam Hussein was never willing to relinquish power except under
duress, for example, in the 1970 accords, none of its past concessions to the
Kurds could ever be taken seriously.
They
were here one day and gone the next. By contrast, a truly federal system of
government is a structurally new system in which power itself is from the outset
both separated and divided.
From
this point of view, federalism is what you might call the first step towards a
state system, resting on the principle that the rights of the part or the
minority should never be sacrificed to the will of the majority.
The
fundamental principle of human rights surely is that the rights of the part, be
that part defined as a single individual or a whole collectivity of individuals
who speak another language and have their own culture, that these parts of
inviolable by the state. Federalism, therefore, becomes, is about the rights of
those collective parts of the mosaic that is Iraqi society.
Now,
how should these different parts of the new Iraqi federation be defined? One
important approach or argument rests on the idea of ethnicity as the basis of
the constituent parts of the federation. An idea at play in the Iraqi arena at
the moment is to have Iraq composed of two regions, the first Arab, the second
Kurdish.
Ethnicity
is, according to this point of view, the most fundamental basis for federalism
in Iraq. Not illogically and for understandable reasons, the Kurds are the
driving force behind this definition.
By
and large, non-Kurdish Iraqis have three problems with this formulation:
First,
it will cause ethnicity to become the basis for making territorial claims and
counterclaims especially with regards to high profit resources located in one
region and not another. The fight over Kirkuk, for instance, is already moving
in this direction with Arab, Kurdish and Turkoman claims fighting with one
another over this oil-rich city.
Second
objection is that when a federation is defined as being about two ethnic groups,
then clearly all the other ethnic groups who do not have a share in the
federation are being to some degree or another discriminated against. Why should
an Armenian or a Chaldean or a Turkoman citizen of Iraq have any less rights as
an individual than an Arab or a Kurd in a post-Saddam Iraq? Such discrimination
in favor of the two largest ethnic groups in Iraq is inherently undemocratic.
The
third objection is that we cannot, we simply cannot map out on the ground a
federation that included all the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.
These groupings are not all territorially concentrated. There are Kurds in
Baghdad and Arabs in Sulaymaniyya and there are Turkomans and Armenians and
Chaldeans mixed in with Arabs and Kurds everywhere in many locations.
Therefore,
a federation of many ethnic groups would be no improvement on a federation made
up of only two large groups.
Now,
the clear alternative to ethnicity is territoriality in which each separate
region receives its share of national resources, for instance, oil revenues,
according to the relative size of its population.
That
is what is in effect going on in northern Iraq at the moment through the Offices
of the UN's Oil for Food Program. A good argument can be made, as I believe
Michael Rubin has made in a recent article that I read. In fact, I took the idea
from his article, that for the extension of this UN formula to the whole of
Iraq.
The
future all-Iraqi federation should not be one of different ethnicities but one
of different geographically defined territories within which different
ethnicities may form a majority.
The
point becomes not to dilute or diminish the Kurdishness of a Kurd or the
Arabness of an Arab. It is to put a premium on the equality of citizenship for
all.
Now,
if we follow this way of thinking to its logical extreme, we end up with a
corollary of territoriality as a basis for federalism. And that is a very
important new idea for the Middle East, namely, that the new Iraqi state cannot
be thought of any longer in any politically meaningful sense of the word as an
Arab entity.
This
is a novel idea for the region. And one that it will take some time for it to
assimilate. But it follows inexorably from a territorial definition of regions
as opposed to an ethnic one. Israel is today a Jewish state in which a
substantial number of Arab Palestinians, more than a million, have Israeli
citizenship, but are not and cannot in principle ever be full-fledged citizens
of the state.
The
fact that they live in better conditions than their brethren in the West Bank
and Gaza, or certainly in better conditions than those in refugee camps all over
the Arab world, is not an argument for second-class citizenship. In principle,
because they are in a religiously or ethnically defined state, they are in some
sense on a different status and it seems to me that one day in the future,
perhaps a very long way down the line, these two principles upon which the
modern state of Israel was founded, ethnicity and democracy, are probably going
to have some form of, come to some sort of conflict with one another.
I
argue we should not want such a formula for Iraq. Iraqis deserve to live in an
area in which a Kurd or a Chaldean or an Assyrian or a Turkoman, be they male or
female, can all in principle be elected to the highest offices of the land.
That
means that even though the Arabs form a majority in the country, their majority
status should not put them in a position ever to exclude anyone else from
positions of power and influence, as has been the case in a regime led by a
party that calls itself the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and that views itself as
part of a larger Arab nation.
A
democratic Iraq has to be an Iraq that by definition exists for all its citizens
equally, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion, and that means, let's face
it, a non-Arab Iraq.
Which
brings me to the third precondition of a genuinely democratic state in Iraq, its
relationship to religion.
I
said before that I was speaking only for myself and I emphasize on this subject
especially I am only speaking for myself.
Nothing
has so diminished Islam in recent times as its politicization. The quality of
Islamic education, scholarship and spiritual guidance declined dramatically once
the nationalist secular regimes of the post-colonial period came into existence
and took over these functions.
Nor
has the resurgence of political Islam from the 1970s onwards improved matters.
On the contrary, the youth of Iran today are turning against the very clergy
whom their parents had helped bring to power a generation ago. One hears
criticism on the streets of Tehran these days coming from some of the more
enlightened ulama who played a leading role in the '79 revolution.
Nonetheless,
Iran has to be counted a success story in comparison with the atrocities that
have been perpetrated in the name of Islam and among Muslims in Algeria and
until recently in Egypt and the Sudan. Or in comparison, needless to say, with
September 11, and the name of Osama bin Laden, and what that has done to the
image of Muslims throughout the world.
The
substitution of jihad for worship is the gravest travesty perpetrated upon Islam
in modern times. It will take much, much work by Muslims to undo its deeply
pernicious effect. And when Saddam Hussein hails the
"martyrdom"--so-called--of Palestinian suicide bombers and distributes
large sums of money to their families or when he uses the resources of the Iraqi
people to build mosques as propaganda during the Iraqi-Iran war, he too is
degrading Islam by using it to further a political agenda.
The
cumulative effect of these decades of abuse has served ultimately to conceal
from Muslims and Arabs, in particular, Muslim Arabs in particular, the immense
and still unexamined terrain of their own great contribution to human
civilization. Culture and the life of the spirit have been degraded in Iraq by
action of the state. To guard against the resurgence of such abuse, Iraqis need
to invent a concept of statehood that will give all religions in the country the
opportunity to flourish once again.
Christianity
and Judaism have very deep roots in Iraqi history. The Babylonia Tlmud was
written just south of Baghdad. And the many, very many branches of the Eastern
Church, which flourished in Iraq, predate Islam and are among the very earliest
churches in the history of Christianity.
So
what, if any, is the relationship which ought to exist between the new Iraqi
state and Islam, and religion, specifically the religion of the overwhelming
majority of Iraqis, Islam? That is something which ultimately, of course, only
the people of Iraq can decide upon in the course of their deliberations during a
transitional period.
But
one way of thinking about these issues is to pose them in the very way that
Iraqis have experienced this abuse of Islam by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and
I would do that not by asking Iraqis the simplistic and somewhat ideological
question, do you want a secular state or not, but by asking more concretely
something like the following:
Do
you want your future state to be involved in any way in your religious beliefs
either by way of compelling or persuading you towards a religious belief?
Do
you want your future state to define individual citizens as members of different
religious cases, as is the case, for instance, in the confessional system in
Lebanon?
Do
you think, in other words, one should ask in Iraq that an individual's religious
beliefs are relevant to his or her rights as a citizen, rights and obligations
as a citizen?
Do
you, fellow Iraqi, want your future state to promote, regulate, direct, or
otherwise interfere in matters of religion through, for instance, the Ministry
of Awqaf, which has a long history of such involvement?
Do
you trust your Iraqi politicians enough, given your experience with them, to
give them any kind of influence of control over your religious affairs?
And
finally, do you think Iraqi clerics, or ulama, in their religious capacity, not
as individual citizens, have the knowledge and experience required to decide
upon your political affairs?
Now,
if you put the question that way, I think that--but this is just a
supposition--that Iraqi experience would suggest that the answer to all of these
questions is no. And if I were to hazard a guess, that is how I think they would
vote. That, in effect, means that the Iraqis have chosen to keep matters of
politics and matters of faith separate from one another.
But
I want to move on to the fourth precondition for what I consider a genuinely
democratic experience in Iraq, and that is the demilitarization of the Iraqi
state.
Now,
I have left what is perhaps the most important question of all, given the
history of Iraq's wars of aggression and build up of weapons of mass destruction
until the end. And perhaps that's because my views on this have not changed
since 1991, when I joined up with more than 400 other people to put my name--and
by the way, 400 other Iraqis, of course, from every ethnic and religious
domination, and from all walks of life, to put our names on to a document called
then Charter 91. And the relevant passages of that document in relation to this
question of demilitarization read as follows:
Quote:
"The notion that strength resides in large-standing armies and up-to-date
weapons of destruction has proved bankrupt. Real strength is always internal, in
the creative, cultural, and wealth producing capabilities of a people. It is
found in civil society, not in the army or in the state. Armies often threaten
democracy. The larger they grow, the more they weaken civil society.
"This
is what has happened in Iraq. Therefore"--the document
calls--"conditional upon international and regional guarantees which secure
the territorial integrity of Iraq, preferably within a framework of the overall
reduction in the levels of militarization in the Middle East, a new Iraqi
constitution should:"
(a)"Abolish
conscription and reorganize the army into a professional, small and purely
defensive force which will never be used for internal purposes."
(b)"Set
an absolute upper limit on expenditure on this new force equal to say two
percent of Iraqi National Income."
(c)"Have
as its first article the following, quote: "Aspiring sincerely to an
international peace based on justice and order, the Iraqi people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as a means of settling international disputes. The right of the belligerency of
the Iraqi state will not be recognized."
Now,
this last paragraph, no doubt many of you will recognize is an adaptation of the
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and it's highly significant, I think,
that so many people put their names to that idea.
I
am convinced that if the territorial integrity of the country were to be
guaranteed by treaties and by an outside power, the overwhelming majority of
Iraqis, certainly its Kurdish and Shiite populations, will vote for such a
far-reaching completely transforming program of demilitarization.
Quite
understandably, some sections of the Iraqi population will worry about the
implications on them of such of a loss of an institution that has been important
in guaranteeing some stability in the country. Those fears, particularly those
of the Sunni population in Baghdad are legitimate fears, and they need to be
properly addressed. The country will after all, like post-war Germany, need very
powerful internal law and order institutions.
But
like Germany and Japan, after World War II, Iraq's future lies in unshackling
itself in no uncertain way from the burden of its past and focusing all the
creative energies of the country on reconstruction and renewal, and cultural
renewal.
I
began by talking about regime change providing a historic opportunity for the
United States government and the Iraqi opposition, an opportunity I said that
was as large as anything that has happened in the Middle East since the fall of
the Ottoman Empire.
By
that, you now know I meant a federal, non-Arab, demilitarized Iraq. This vision
or something approximating it is achievable. Moreover, an Iraqi leadership able
to work in partnership with the United States to bring it about exists. The
question that I cannot answer, however, is: Will the new resolve that America
has found in itself post-September 11 rise imaginatively to the level of the
opportunity it is itself about to create in the Middle East?
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: I'm a little bit afraid to speak into this now, but thank you very much.
That was wonderful. We're going to move on to our discussants. We have at
different times asserted that the shape of the peace may determine the shape of
a war, and I invite our discussants to comment on Mr. Makiya's presentation
and/or to talk a little bit about how peace such as the one that he describes
could shape how the United States and the world moves forward.
Each
discussant will take up to five minutes, and then we will have Q and A, and I
apologize. We are slipping on time. Rend, perhaps you would be kind enough to
begin?
MS.
RAHIM FRANCKE: Thank you. I have to speak up because my voice is real low. Kanan,
thank you very much. Of course, as you know, I wholeheartedly agree with almost
everything you said, or everything, not almost. I have two cautions. One of them
is Kanan was rightly skeptical about U.S. resolve to follow through on this kind
of vision and a commitment to democracy.
And
I want to say that the signs right now are absolutely inauspicious. It seems to
me that the U.S. should now and not after the fall of Saddam be thinking in
terms that Kanan outlined in terms of a democratic Iraq, a federal Iraq, and
Iraq which is demilitarized and so on, and unfortunately, I see no signs of
that.
I
was very disappointed to see that the resolution, the congressional resolution,
neither in the shape that it went to Congress from the White House nor in the
shape that it was rephrased by the Gephardt caucus, had any mention of the U.S.
contributing to establishing democracy in Iraq.
I
find myself perhaps even more skeptical than Kanan on this issue, and the reason
I judge that is because of the way that I see the U.S. administration working
with the Iraqi opposition, which seems to me to entrench anti-democratic
tendencies in the Iraqi opposition rather than the democratic tendencies.
One
of the problems that the American administration will not face up to is that it
has enormous leverage with Iraqis. It has now and it will have later, and that
any vision that it espouses is going to influence the way that the Iraqi
opposition works now and that Iraq is going to be shaped in the future.
Unfortunately,
the way that the U.S. administration is working is against such democratic
vision rather than for it. And one example that I will give is this
extraordinary reluctance of the U.S. administration to endorse the formation of
some kind of transitional authority that would be able to handle at least
civilian affairs in Iraq on the day that Saddam falls.
In
fact, before Saddam falls. And to actually announce its endorsement for such a
transitional authority. So that we do not go into Iraq in a complete vacuum of
security and a vacuum of command and authority control, which I anticipate
happening.
I
find that the administration is very coy in endorsing the democratic elements
and the democratic vision of certain segments of the Iraqi opposition, and much
more inclined to endorse what I will call in the next two minutes the regressive
forces in Iraq. This leads me to my next fear in terms of actually bringing
about Kanan's vision, and that is if you look at Iraq, there has been an absence
of politics for 35 years. Politics really froze in 1968 in Iraq.
And
what we see now, in fact, in the Iraqi political scene, there is no such thing
as the Czech Civic Forum, for example, in Iraq, and this is an enormous gap, a
hole, in fact, in our thinking. What do we have instead? We have political
parties or political groups, political thinking, that emerged in the '60s and
froze in 1968-1970.
This
is the kind of political thinking that I think called extraterritorial. In other
words, we have Arab nationalism. We have Islamists. We have communists. These
are the sort of major culls. Of course, there are variations on these themes,
but all these themes are themes that emerged in the '50s, in the '60s, and
essentially froze in time, ossified in time. And there has been no injection
except for the attempts by people like Kanan to inject any new type of political
thinking in this Iraqi opposition.
And
I think this is a very dangerous situation because when we talk about the
balance of power in Iraq on the day that Saddam goes, what we have ready-made
are these ossified extraterritorial ideologies with an insufficient momentum of
new thinking, of modernizing thinking, that can actually emanate from the
reality of Iraq and for Iraq's present and from Iraq's needs in the future.
In
other words, an Iraqi politics and not an extraterritorial politics. I feel very
concerned because this is a great disadvantage, and we are not going to have
very much time. This kind of formation, political formation, needs to begin now,
and needs to be done by Iraqis and needs to be supported by the U.S.
administration, and this is where I see the administration sorely lacking.
I
will stop here, Danni, and give time to other people. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR.
OTHMAN: Kanan and Rend have left little for me to add. Being the only Kurd on
this panel, I am culturally tempted to think this is a conspiracy designed to
sideline the Kurdish people.
[Laughter.]
MR.
OTHMAN: But seriously, though, I think it shouldn't come as a surprise to you
that Iraqis of all hues are both skeptical and apprehensive about U.S.
commitment to democracy in post-Saddam Iraq. After all, it's not long ago that
it was official U.S. government policy to keep the Iraqi people locked in a cage
with their tormentor.
I
think over the last decade, we Iraqis have come to understand that the battle of
Baghdad can only be won after winning that of Washington. In the latter case,
and my remark here is going to be very brief, we are in dire need of the help of
all Americans who believe that U.S. national interests lie in promoting
democracy and human rights beyond its borders.
And
I put it to you, ladies and gentlemen, that if such assistance was forthcoming,
Iraqi democrats could take care of the rest.
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MR.
CHALABI: I think we should not line up Iraqis one after the other.
MS.
PLETKA: Okay. Richard, can take care of you.
MR.
PERLE: As I've listened to our Iraqi friends, my thought has been that the
disappointment that the failure of the senior administration officialdom to show
up is not so much because of what he or she might have had to say, but because
of what he or she might have had an opportunity to hear. And we've heard some
important and I think greatly encouraging views, because despite the criticism,
which seems to me entirely justified, of the lack of vision that has thus far
been demonstrated with respect to Iraq after Saddam, that challenge ultimately
is in the hands of Iraqis.
It's
in your hands, Kanan, and yours and yours. And whatever deficiencies may exist
on the side of the liberators, one can't help but be impressed about the
strengths of the liberated. And I have little doubt that the people of Iraq will
be liberated, will get through the discussions at the United Nations, and will
come to understand that inspections are not enough, won't work anyway.
And
we will ultimately be driven from the default position to which governments
invariably retreat, which is to alter the status quo as little as possible. It
is, in fact, the natural posture of governments to accept the status quo, and
when it becomes monstrously inconvenient, to change it to the minimum extent
necessary.
But
the liberation of Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, can't be a
halfway measure. It can't stop with a short-term objective, however important,
of removing from his hands the weapons of mass destruction. Can one imagine
sending the Chicago police into take Al Capone's weapons away, and leaving him
there? Can anyone imagine that if the weapons of mass destructions were
disgorged tomorrow, we could be confident with Saddam in place that we wouldn't
face the same problem again?
Of
course not. The only solution in Iraq is the substitution of the thugs who now
run the place with the kinds of people you see at this table.
I
want to make only a couple of very brief additional comments. One of the more
dangerous ideas that is already around is the idea that in the immediate
post-Saddam situation, power will flow to Iraqis who are now in Iraq. One hears
this notion about the Department of State. It's based on, it seems to me, the
idea that people who have labored outside Iraq for the liberation of their
country somehow have less credibility than those who have found a way to get
along with Saddam's regime.
I
think this is profoundly mistaken, and it is yet another example of the magnetic
attraction of the status quo. I think it will turn out to be nonsense. The
people of Iraq are not going to empower those who have lived among them as part
of the oppression that they will be determined to root out.
So
it is people like the people on this panel who will return to Iraq, and Iraqis
in an Iraqi diaspora, who in large numbers I believe will return to Iraq, to
work together with those millions of Iraqis who have been the victims of Saddam
Hussein.
A
second notion that it seems to me is all too readily accepted around the
diplomatic establishment, but needs to be challenged, is the idea that the whole
of the Arab world is somehow going to align itself with Saddam Hussein, that if
military action against Iraq takes place, Arabs everywhere will associate
themselves with what is one of the most vicious regimes in human history.
I
think that is a demeaning, condescending view of Arabs. And I think in the
event, when it becomes clear that the end result of military action against the
regime of Saddam Hussein will produce the opportunity, the kind of vision you've
heard around this table, the Arab world or most of it, and certainly most of the
Muslim world, will consider that their honor and dignity has been restored by
removing from among them a regime that they have every reason to despise along
with the rest of us.
[Applause.]
MR.
CHALABI: I hope that the brave, well structured and novel ideas that Kanan has
put before you and the comments of both Rend and Siyamend about the future of
Iraq should put to rest any notion that Iraqis have not thought about the future
and that there is going to be a vacuum of ideas and of leaders after the removal
of Saddam Hussein.
I
hope that this also will put to rest the notion that because people cannot
identify concepts and leaders that nothing should be done to remove Saddam
Hussein. Democracy and freedom in Iraq are not the enemy of stability in the
region. This vision of how Iraqis will behave that is composed and discussed
many times in the press and in policy circles here and in European countries and
in Arab countries is not true. It is not accurate.
The
concepts that Kanan has put before you are well developed ideas for a modern
democratic federal state in Iraq. They may not be universally accepted now.
There may be dissensions among them, but this dialogue, this discussion, is
reminiscent of a discussion for nation-building in a society, in a modern
society, which one must nurture and encourage to develop.
I
am particularly pleased to say to you that President Bush's speech in the United
Nations on September 12 was a galvanizing influence for Iraqis. Iraqis were
ecstatic that the President of the United States in his speech before the United
Nations adopted the program and the grievances of the Iraqi people alongside the
threat of Saddam to international peace and security and his possession of
weapons of mass destruction.
He
spoke about genocide that Saddam has perpetrated in Iraq. He spoke about
torture, about the lack of freedom and about the Iraqi people deserving a better
government. This was a very strong message to the Iraqi people that finally the
United States is not only concerned with Resolution 687 about disarmament, but
the president was speaking about Resolution 688, which said that the government
of Saddam Hussein should stop the oppression of the Iraqi people before all
other United Nations resolutions in his speech.
I
am also particularly gratified that after a decade of struggle, the principles
that were adopted by the Iraqi National Congress Conference in Salahuddin, in
1992, have come to be seen as the unifying principles for a future Iraq. All
Iraqi opposition forces accept them. The United States has come around to
accepting them, and this process now is enshrined in law in the United States,
which is referred to in the new congressional resolution.
And
I speak of that liberation act that was passed by Congress in 1998. Rend made a
very important point here. Iraq according to the prevailing political ideologies
that have done battle on the Iraqi people for power are--all of them do not see
Iraq as a final country. Arabism sees Iraq as part of the Arab world. Islamists
see Iraq as part of the Islamic Uman [ph]. Kurdish nationalist parties see the
Kurds as part of a larger Kurdish nation, and as if all those political parties
and competing ideologies who have fought on the Iraqi body politic do not, are
telling the people that Iraq is not worth preserving.
Of
course, this is patently not true. Although Iraq was carved out of the remnant
of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious allies after the First World War, the
Iraqi people are an ancient people living in this society. The borders of modern
Iraq are not so important as the fact of cultural continuity that have prevailed
in this land since the first structure of modern societies, of society and human
experience.
Iraqis
are heirs to the tradition of the Sumarians, to Hammurabi's legal code, are
heirs to the Jewish intellectual tradition that prevailed in Iraq, are heirs to
the Muslim renaissance that prevailed in Iraq, and are heirs to the struggle of
the Iraqi people in the 20th century, and the Iraqi people can move forward. I
think now the way to move to translate those ideas into action and to satisfy
the prerequisites that Kanan has put forward for a successful outcome in Iraq
must be that the United States is engaged fully now in enabling Iraqis to seize
political control of the debate now and transform this.
As
soon as free Iraqis can land on any part of Arab Iraq, that this landing will be
simultaneous with the proclamation of a provisional coalition government in Iraq
which will seek to assert sovereignty and authority over any territory of Iraq,
evacuated by Saddam, and those pieces of Iraq that continue to be under Saddam's
control, and then this government should be the ally of the United States in the
coming military conflict, which we don't see as a war between Iraq and the
United States, but rather as a war of national liberation that the Iraqi people
are waging and that the United States has now for its own purposes decided to
support and to win.
This
provisional coalition government will be the focus of any defecting units of the
Iraqi military that do not want to defend Saddam and want a place to go, a home
to go to. It will be charged with dealing with the horrendous humanitarian
situation that may arise. This government will provide people with food, with
emergency relief, and also with increasing the purchasing power of the Iraqi
dinar to immediately improve the quality of life of the Iraqi people.
All
these are possible to achieve, and then this government would then at a later
stage draw up, call a constituent assembly and draw up a constitution, put to
public referendum, and have elections on the basis of this constitution. The
engagement of the United States is essential. The fears of Iraqis now cannot be
addressed by going into the past, but rather by coming to a settlement through
future hope for democracy.
And
I want to emphasize also now that Iraq is a rich country. Iraq has more oil
reserves than any other country in the Middle East, in the world, including
Saudi Arabia. Iraqi oil is available, close to the sea and close to the ground.
Iraq can pay for all those things, and Iraq with the assistance of the United
States must be able to transform its underground oil wealth into readily
available cash now.
This
can only be done through an international economic conference that is called by
the United States to deal with the issues of sanctions, reparations and Iraqi
debt. These are essential components for the stability of a future Iraq.
The
neighbors of Iraq are afraid of the vision that has been articulated today.
They're afraid of democracy. They're afraid of federalism. They're afraid of an
Iraqi state which does not proclaim a national ideology or a national identity
in terms of ethnic and egregious nationalist concepts. Those fears do not stem
from any misconception about the Iraqi opposition's ideas about the future of
Iraq. They stem from the successful example of the implementation of those ideas
in a country, in the Middle East as central as Iraq is.
I
think that the United States must take stock of these potential contradictions,
and I think the United States must follow the vision that is commensurate with
its own values and its own ideas. The United States cannot support dictatorship
over democracy, and the United States will not do that, and I don't think the
United States can support tyranny over freedom in Iraq.
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MR.
O'HANLON: It's an honor and an inspiration to be on this panel today, and it
makes me regret that my first comment may not go over so well, but I'm going to
try to get beyond that quickly into a couple of other comments that may go over
a little better.
The
first point I'd like to make simply is that I do believe we have to continue
with the President's September 12 UN strategy, putting a firm multilateral
ultimatum before Iraq, putting the onus on Saddam Hussein to have the last final
chance to accept international inspections and disarmament or otherwise have war
as the outcome.
There
is the very real chance that war will be the outcome; there is also a very real
chance that war will not be the outcome. And we will ultimately accept a
rigorous disarmament inspection process in my judgment.
I
think this is, from my point of view, as looking at this from an American
national security perspective, despite the unfortunate consequences for the
Iraqi people, this is still an outcome that I could accept.
But
also, perhaps more importantly for this audience today, I think it's an outcome
that we have to be willing to risk in order to make sure we have the kind of
support we would need to go to war if that becomes the outcome. I agree
partially with Richard Perle's point that Arab countries will be supportive of
this campaign regardless.
But
I don't think the support is yet sufficient. The Saudi support, for example, is
soft right now. If we go to war without Saudi bases, airspace and
infrastructure, we are not preparing properly in a military or political sense
for the kind of campaign that I think is needed. So I think you have to go
through the formalities and the effort of trying to get a tough inspection
disarmament process going before you make the decision to go to war.
And
I think if you do that, there's a very real chance actually that you will not go
to war, but if you do go to war, you will not have one hand tied behind your
back.
Why
is that important, getting into comments that I hope will go over perhaps a
little better? If we're going to do this, we have to do in the spirit that's
been articulated this morning, viewing Iraq's long-term future as a democratic
state, as a core American national security interest.
We
have to go in and win this war quickly, and then be prepared to help stabilize
Iraq over an indefinite period, five to ten years, at a minimum, I believe,
using a large fraction of American forces. This is a major undertaking. It's
going to require a number of steps that among other things make the importance
of Saudi bases and international participation central.
We
have to assume, for example, that we will have civilian casualties that could
very much and could very plausibly be large in number inside of Iraq, given the
nature of the fighting, should Republican Guard Forces put up even a couple
weeks of resistance. To sustain and tolerate that kind of civilian casualty
toll, we need strong international support, and we need a decisive force that
can win as quickly as possible, so you get beyond that phase of combat as
quickly as possible.
We
cannot afford a gradual war that essentially allows Iraq to become torn up and
descend into a sort of civil conflict that endures or to have what I might
describe as an Al Jazera effect where you have Iraqi civilians being
unfortunately and inadvertently killed on TV screens around the region and the
world because of American military action and have this process drag on.
If
we go in, it has to be win the war quickly and then be prepared to occupy and
stabilize for an extended period of time. Because I agree largely with the
points that have been made by my fellow panelists about the importance of
democracy and the importance of getting beyond dictatorship.
So
just to wrap up, what this really means is we as Americans, as we look ahead, as
much as I support the September 12 strategy and hope there will not be war as a
result of a tough multilateral ultimatum to Saddam, I also think that if there
is war, we have to be ready for a major undertaking. And what this means is not
just the possibility of real substantial American casualties that could be
several times the number from Desert Storm, it will not be an astronomical
number, and it won't be a quagmire, but it could be several times as many
American casualties as we suffered in Desert Storm.
We
have to be ready for Iraqi civilian casualties that could be ten times that
number into the many thousands, even the low tens of thousands, in the event of
war, and we have to be prepared then for a military occupation that could start
at 150,000 total international forces and could stay above 100,000 for several
years, based on the precedents and the models that I've seen in the Balkans, in
the U.S. military occupations in Germany and Japan after World War II, and in
the general need to help restore stability in this country.
That
means we're going to need a lot of American effort. We're also going to need a
lot of allied help. One more reason why you have to do this thing as a patient
ultimatum strategy through as many multilateral channels as possible because in
the end, we can't keep 150,000 American forces in Iraq for ten years. We don't
want to. We want to have our European allies and some of our other allies
helping us very much, and that means crafting as much of a consensus as possible
in advance to do this thing right.
Because
if we go to war, it has to be with the intent of winning quickly, minimizing
casualties, and then helping Iraq stabilize itself for perhaps a decade
thereafter.
Thank
you very much.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: We're going to move to questions and answers right now. We figured out
what our problem which is that our wireless microphones are picking up radio
frequencies. So, yes, so we're going to give it one last shot, and if they work,
then that's really good, and if not, what I'm going to as you to do is stand up
and say your question, and I'll repeat it into this microphone so everyone can
hear.
Lauren,
do you have the mikes? Okay. Why don't we go ahead. And if you would like to
identify yourself, please do.
MS.
RUBIN: Trudy Rubin from the Philadelphia Inquirer. There has been a lot of talk
about the German and Japanese models of occupation as being relevant to
post-Saddam Iraq. I wonder if some of you, particularly Kanan and Rend, and also
Mr. Othman, could just focus on this and say whether you think we are looking or
we need a substantial occupation, something like Michael O'Hanlon talked about
with 150,000, whether that occupation would be responsible for remaking
institutions or whether something much less is needed?
And
if you could also speak to the issue of what should the U.S. do to prevent a
conflict over Kirkuk between Turks and Kurds?
MS.
RAHIM FRANCKE: I'll hazard this, Trudy. In my view, I don't agree at all that we
need 150,000 troops for five to ten years and even more. This is, I'm sorry to
say it, I think a grotesque misrepresentation of the situation.
Certainly,
I believe, and I speak very personally here, I believe a certain U.S. presence,
military presence, is going to be needed and is desirable in Iraq for a number
of years.
However,
I also think that a very high presence of civilian institutions, both
governmental and non-governmental American institutions, and European for that
matter, is going to be needed. The military presence should be there. It should
be discrete, barracks and so on. It should be really largely used to secure
Iraq's territorial integrity.
And
in the meantime, and this is why I find the experience in Afghanistan so
disturbing, in the meantime I think there has to be a much, much more serious
effort rebuilding the police force, purging the military, in a sense remodeling
the military along apolitical, non-ideological modern lines, and a great deal
more has to go into Iraq that is now going into Afghanistan. So it does worry
me.
But
I certainly don't think that an occupation by 150,000 troops, American troops,
is needed for five to ten years or even more.
MS.
PLETKA: Anybody else have anything to add?
MR.
CHALABI: We agree, I think, with what Rend says.
MS.
PLETKA: Okay. All right.
MR.
OTHMAN: Well, I think on the issue of Kirkuk, so long as there is no outside
interference and so long as there is no mettling and so long as Turkoman and
Arabs and Iraqis and Kurds see themselves foremostly as Iraqis, then I think
this problem can be resolved internally.
MS.
RUBIN: Could I just pursue that a bit more? Because specifically if Kurdish
forces go into Kirkuk, I mean there might not be the time to resolve this
peacefully. So does it need to be resolved in advance by perhaps declaring
Kirkuk off limits, having U.S. troops there? I mean is that something that
should be resolved now before war starts?
MR.
OTHMAN: I obviously cannot speak on behalf of the Kurdish leadership but what I
can say is that I think there are tacit agreements that the Kurds will not go
into Kirkuk, but having said that, from a Kurdish point of view, we perceive
another danger, and that is of Turkish mettling and interference in Iraqi
affairs, and we are very worried about that as Kurds as a whole.
MS.
PLETKA: Bring the microphone. This gentleman here, please, if we could pass the
microphone to him, and I promise we'll look at the sides as well. I apologize.
Thank you.
MR.
LEWIS: Before I get to my question, may I make a brief comment on the previous
one, and my memory may be faulty, but I seem to recall that the large military
presence in Germany and Japan had something to do with a Cold War against an
entity called the Soviet Union, and if I'm not mistaken, the Soviet Union no
longer exists, and the Cold War has terminated. So that particular reason for a
large military presence no longer applies.
My
question relates to the issue of federalism, sort of federal, con-federal
institution, and I wonder whether something like devolution might not be more
appropriate, the kind of arrangement which exists within the United Kingdom,
rather than the complex and often difficult kind of institutions required to
operate federalism, particularly where, as in Iraq, the definition of the
federal entities is not all that clear?
On
the Kurdish question, I am reminded of a conversation I had some time ago with a
Turkish friend. I suggested that the solution might be something like the
arrangement which exists between the English and the Scots in the United
Kingdom. His reply was the Kurds are not Scots, they're Irish.
[Laughter.]
MS.
PLETKA: Which particularly not-Irishman is going to take this? Perhaps Michael
O'Hanlon would like to defend.
[Laughter.]
MR.
MAKIYA: Can I comment on the devolution idea? My understanding of devolution is
that it is something that is given up by the states but can be taken back again
very quickly. It's not built into the--
MR.
LEWIS: In theory, yes; in practice, no.
MR.
MAKIYA: In England, in practice, no, but I mean I just--whereas federalism is
something that from the outset you separate out. So that was the--I worried
about that example. After all, Saddam Hussein offered something he called
autonomy, which was viewed at the time, in March 1970, as a format. He was
really very generous by Kurdish standards, but of course it meant nothing. So
that was my only comment, why I chose the word "federalism" instead of
the notion of devolution.
MR.
LEWIS: It was a question, not an objection.
MR.
MAKIYA: Oh, no, no. I understand.
MR.
O'HANLON: I just wanted to make one quick comment on the ongoing debate about
occupation requirements. As you know, Professor Lewis, there were a period of
years when in both Japan and Germany when we did have to worry about getting rid
of the influence of the Nazis and getting rid of the influence of the Tojo
regime before the big post-war anti-Soviet occupations began, or not
occupations, but deployments, and that was a period of roughly five to ten
years.
Now,
I hope very much we can figure out a clever way to do this in Iraq that requires
fewer forces. It would be wonderful, and maybe the number is 100,000, maybe the
number if 75,000. I don't know what the number is, but you have to worry about
deterring neighbors of Iraq from encroaching.
You
have to worry about how much of the Iraqi military is still, not necessarily
going to be loyal to Saddam, but is going to be of questionable loyalty to
whatever new government you're trying to create. You would know more about how
to think about that than I do, but in the first year to two, at least, I would
rather err on the side of big numbers, and maybe that's a risk in and of itself,
but that seems to me the prudent course for these reasons. You don't know what
part of the Iraqi military is going to want to be supportive of the new regime.
It's
going to take you awhile to build up these new forces, and you have to worry
about the neighbors in the meantime, so I tend to think you want to stay
relatively big. Go in with a couple hundred thousand coalition forces in the
initial warfighting effort, and leave a large fraction of those people in place
for one to two years. But I'm very glad to hear that you're more optimistic
about the numbers possibly being lower.
MS.
PLETKA: Over here. Oh, Richard, were you going to add? Sorry.
MR.
PERLE: Yes. I do want to make a brief comment. I can't help but observe first of
all that in all the talk of quarrelsome fractious Iraqi opposition, there is a
bigger disagreement between the two Americans on this panel than there is among
the Iraqis.
And
I share Rend's view. I don't believe that anything like a long-term commitment
of 150,000 Americans would be necessary. The analogy with Germany and Japan it
seems to me ignores the difference between an ideology in both places that had
captured the allegiance of a significant number of people spread throughout the
country in both cases.
There's
no ideology that sustains Saddam Hussein, and it seems to me the situation is
likely to be rather more like that which emerged in Romania after Ceausescu. I
mean there was no support for Ceausescu the moment he was gone. There wasn't
much support in Italy for Mussolini after he was gone.
I
think Saddam has earned a unique position among the Iraqi people, which is there
will be no one fighting for him or his memory, once it becomes clear that he is
going to be defeated, and so the question of civil order under those
circumstances is entirely different.
Secondly,
to come back to the other point on which I disagree with Michael, and I don't
want to let pass, I can't imagine an inspection regime in Iraq that could give
us any confidence at all that we had Saddam's weapons of mass destruction under
control, and it seems to me ironic that Michael envisions 150,000 Americans to
police a post-Saddam Iraq.
The
number of inspectors that Hans Blix intends to produce in Iraq is, I believe,
220, for a country the size of France. It is not only inadequate, it is a farce,
and I think we should face the reality. There is no realistic prospect that an
inspection regime anything like the one that Hans Blix has in mind could unearth
Saddam's weapons of mass destruction.
And
I'll take it a step further. I can't even design in my own mind an inspection
regime that would be effective unless it begins to look like the occupation
force that Michael O'Hanlon has in mind. So inspections are not a serious
alternative. If we are concerned about weapons of mass destruction, to say
nothing about the importance of supporting the democratic aspirations that we've
heard around this table, inspections cannot remove weapons of mass destruction.
And
the belief that they can is one of the reasons why we haven't faced up fully to
the importance of post-Saddam Iraq.
MS.
PLETKA: I'm sorry. I was calling on that gentleman. I'm sorry.
MR.
ENGINSOY: This is Umit Enginsoy with Turkey's NTV Television. And my question is
for Secretary Perle. Mr. Secretary, do you think Turkey's concerns about the
creation of a Kurdish state in a post-Saddam Iraq are justified, and do you
think that the United States will dispel this, and persuade Turkey to cooperate
with them in one way or another? Thank you.
MR.
PERLE: You've heard today from Iraqis unanimity on the point that in a
post-Saddam situation, the ambition is for a nation, perhaps with a federal
structure or something like it, but in any case, a nation in which the central
authority of a central government for, and I'm elaborating here, for defense and
foreign policy and the like would exist, and that seems to me inconsistent with
the idea of a separate Kurdish state.
The
Kurds have every right to a degree of self-government that is entirely
consistent with that vision of the unitary Iraq. So I'm pretty confident that
having eliminated Saddam Hussein, we are not going to see the region torn by yet
another conflict over a Kurdish succession.
None
of the Kurdish leaders have said that that's what they want. You haven't heard
anyone here say that that's part of their vision, so I'm pretty comfortable
about that.
And
I think the Turkish leadership is increasingly comfortable with that, as they've
made progress in dealing with the PKK and that threat has subsided. Turks now
look, it seems to me, with much greater detachment and are not nearly so
concerned as they were a few years ago that any change in Iraq would inevitably
produce a situation in the North that would bad for Turkey. I don't hear that
argument any more the way I used to a few years ago.
MS.
PLETKA: Anybody else comment? No? Okay. May I turn to the gentleman over there?
Thank you, Lauren. Yes, you.
MR.
SHAWKAT: Mudhar Shawkat. Kanan, you know, we've been schoolmates and we've known
each other for a long, long time, and I've always commented to a lot of people,
friends, that you really, since I knew you when we were at the American Jesuit
School in Baghdad, you've always been sort of ten years ahead of any one of us
in terms of thinking of the future, especially the future of Iraq.
In
your comments, you touched on about almost everything except one thing that I
was sort of eager to listen for, which is the participation of Iraq in NATO. If
we see Iraq tomorrow as a democracy, as a nation that we build in the area
rather than destruct, a nation that would be an asset to the world rather than
what it is today, what would stop it from becoming part of the NATO, and
therefore the put the question of its national integrity question to rest?
I
believe that I would like very much to see what your thinking of that notion is.
And maybe that will put this sort of how many military troops we need to have in
the area or in Iraq, whether it's Americans or whether it's United Nations,
whether it's Iraqi--I do agree with you, demilitarization of Iraq is necessary
in the very near future--but I think if we become part of NATO, then that most
probably would put this issue to rest. Thank you.
MR.
MAKIYA: To be absolutely frank with you, Mudhar, this is the first time I think
about the proposal.
[Laughter.]
MR.
MAKIYA: It's a completely new idea, so I did make the point that Iraq needs to
be bound by treaty in some way to protect its territorial integrity. That's
crucial. Now, how that's going to be done is a very complex question.
You
know I wouldn't exclude anything myself, because my ultimate objective really is
to achieve that permanent cap, if you like, on the army so that we can focus the
energies of the country on reconstruction and not have the danger hanging in the
background, which our own past tells us is a danger of perhaps the army acting
and taking power in certain situations. So to put that to bed, for a whole
series of reasons.
What
form that takes, it's, you know, it's a tantalizing idea, but I haven't thought
it through. So I will just leave it there.
MS.
PLETKA: Okay. If the next people would be kind enough to keep their questions
brief. That lady over there, please.
MS.
ROSETT: Hi. Claudia Rosett with The Wall Street Journal, and a question for Mr.
Chalabi and Mr. Makiya. Could you tell us if you have received any kind of
support from other dissident groups in the Middle East or from any governments
there?
MR.
CHALABI: The answer is no and no.
MS.
ROSETT: Thank you.
MS.
PLETKA: That was brief.
MR.
MAKIYA: Absolutely. I just would add to that that not only no support.
Unfortunately, the Iraqi opposition is ostracized in the rest of the Middle
East. It's worse than not having support. It's an actual sort of an assumption
that it doesn't even exist, that it's not relevant. When the Arab world talks
about Iraq, it excludes the fact that there is an opposition, and that is a
very, very tragic state of affairs.
It's
by now, by the way, a very old divide. It goes back at least 11 years to 1991,
and to the whole reaction of the Middle East, the Arab world, to the Gulf War,
so it's a deepening divide, and hopefully it will be overcome by the example
that Iraqis set inside Iraq. That is the only way I see of overcoming it in the
short term.
MS.
PLETKA: Please go ahead. Hang on. Wait for the microphone.
MS.
NIRENSTEIN: Fiamma Nirenstein. I'm a journalist. I'm an Italian
journalist in Jerusalem. Now, I have a question for Ahmad and for Richard,
please. In all of your remarks, we have seen two actors on the stage which is
the United States and the Iraqi people of both sides. What about the presence of
Israel in the area? I mean Saddam can shoot a missile on Tel Aviv and makes
plenty of casualties, which is by the way quite a possible situation, what will
happen afterwards? How will the dynamics work between the actors on the stage?
MR.
CHALABI: The record of Israel is supporting freedom and democracy for the Iraqi
people over the past decade has been less than brilliant. It has been, they have
taken the attitude that democracy is impossible in Iraq. And that they have, on
the other hand, also taken the attitude that we better keep things as they are
for fear of either Saddam doing something against us or of getting the situation
out of control.
Israel
will decide to defend itself according to its likes. Whether they will accept
United States guarantees or move forward to react to Saddam doing something
against them is something that is up to them and to the United States. We have
very little to do it, because we are not involved in anything to do with them,
not because of us, but because of them. It is rather late for us to do anything
about that now.
MR.
PERLE: If I could just add on sort of the practical issue, Fiam, Saddam has some
capabilities certainly to deliver relatively short range missiles from positions
in the western desert, such that they could reach targets in Israel, and the
fear, of course, is that he would do that as he did it in 1991, this time using
more lethal warheads than the high explosives that were used in 1991, and in
particular chemical or even biological warheads.
I
think to the best opinion I can gather, the number of such missiles is
relatively small. Not all of them will function properly, which was the case in
1991 as well. Some of them may well be detected before they can be fired. We
have intelligence capabilities today that we didn't have in 1991. The Israelis
now have an intercept capability in a system called the ARROW, which there is
good reason to believe could be effective against a modest number of missiles
reaching the territory that would be defended.
So
no one can say there is no risk of this, but I think the risk has been
overstated. It is, I think, unlikely that large numbers of casualties can be
inflicted by this method, but in all of these matters, there is an irreducible
uncertainty. We just don't know. It could happen.
The
theory that Saddam will lob missiles at Israel in the belief that if the
Israelis respond that will somehow turn the tide, I think is a pretty feeble
theory. If he gives orders of that nature at a time when it's a desperate act
because he's about to go down, then it's fair to ask whether those orders will
be complied with by people who are also aware that he's about to go down.
And
I think the United States has made it clear that there will be no Nuremberg
defense, that we will hold individuals responsible for their action. The Iraqi
officer who orders such an attack, the soldiers who carry it out, will be acting
without any protection, and I hope with no mercy from the international
community when the war is over.
MR.
O'HANLON: Could I just agree with my pal, Richard Perle, on this point, and in
fact even add one more argument, which is that I believe Scud missiles will not
function very well at dispersing chemical or biological agent, because we've
seen how they break up on reentry.
One
thing the sanctions have done since the Gulf War is prevent him from testing
those even if he's managed to stash a few away. I don't think that the threat
will be as serious as many fear, and by the way, I hope Richard is right and
others are right on the occupation issue. There is room for debate about which
models one should consider, and I don't mean to imply that there's a perfect
correlation with any particular country like Japan or Germany. They're the
Balkans models to look at.
There
are other models to look at as well, and I hope very much the numbers wind up
being considerably smaller. So on that point, as well, even though we differ, I
hope very much that he turns out to be right.
MS.
PLETKA: Just a couple more questions if that's okay.
MR.
WOOD: David Wood, Vanity Fair Magazine. Several members of the panel have spoken
of their disappointment at what Kanan Makiya well described as the selfishness
of U.S. policy towards Iraq in seeing a purely utilitarian question of weapons
of mass destruction and so forth, and the failure to engage constructively and
support the Iraqi opposition.
I
observe that this contrasts strongly with the period that saw victory in the
Cold War under President Reagan when a whole variety of covert and overt
programs did an enormous amount to foster civil society and eventually successor
regimes in Eastern Europe. And I ask whether the reason for this apparent
discontinuity or the failure to support those programs is because what the U.S.
cannot do is make an exception of Iraq.
What
we seem to be saying is while supporting authoritarian regimes of various hues
from Egypt to Saudi Arabia and so on in the Middle East, we will support
democracy in Iraq. Now, is it even conceivable U.S. policy can actually do that,
can support the Iraqi opposition, without addressing these broader questions of
decades of ingrained attitudes and policy towards the region as a whole?
MS.
PLETKA: Why don't you go ahead, Rend.
MS.
RAHIM FRANCKE: Maybe an American should answer it.
MR.
OTHMAN: Yes, you are an American.
MS.
RAHIM FRANCKE: Let me--I am an American. Very good question. First of all, one
does wonder, but I have a couple of explanations. One of them is that I think
that the U.S., and this is irrespective of whether it's a Democratic or a
Republican administration, because in fact the institutions of state, I've
noticed from watching over the last ten, 11 years, have a certain continuity.
The momentum is undistracted and completely changed by a change in a political
party.
But
it seems to me that there is a very sincere belief that this entire region is
beyond redemption, and one can tinker along the edges and can make minor changes
here and there, but to expect this region, an Arab and Muslim region, to reform
and to move towards democracy in the same way that Central Europe was expected
to, and one hoped would do, simply doesn't occur to people in government.
And
so I think this is one of the reasons for the reluctance to engage the
democratic elements in the Iraqi opposition and the tendency of administrations,
successive administrations, is to fall back on the same old, same old type of
sort of organizations and visions of Iraq, as more of the same kinder, gentler
authoritarianism because this is the mode of the Middle East.
And
I think there may be other reasons because, well, if we do in Iraq, we have to
do in Saudi Arabia. That may enter into it. But I think fundamentally it's
because they see it as an unredeemable region, from that point of view.
MR.
PERLE: I think that's quite right. For a long time, it was widely believed that
the best we could hope for with the Soviet Union was an accommodation, whether
peaceful coexistence or detente, or some other arrangement that recognized the
permanence and the inevitability of a communist regime in Moscow.
And
you were quite right to identify Ronald Reagan who was the first American
president to challenge that notion, to say we don't have to accept the
permanence of the Soviet Union. It is vulnerable. People who rule the way the
Soviet leaders rule are bound to be vulnerable. Their economy can't perform, and
a number of things were done, including what I think was an absolutely
invaluable and critical moral dimension, which was contained in speeches like
the evil empire speech.
We've
had a succession of administrations that have been all too ready to accept where
the enterprise seemed hard or risky. The last administration, for example, had
no interest whatever in taking any risks with respect to Iraq, even insofar as
weapons of mass destruction were concerned.
This
is a different administration, and this President is a different president, and
you have heard things from him on issues like Palestinian reform, like the axis
of evil, that are reminiscent of Ronald Reagan in many ways, and I think
foreshadow a very different attitude.
He
has not yet brought a well established and deeply entrenched bureaucracy, as far
as ultimately I think it will be forced to go in support of the President's
policies. But I have no doubt that he has the vision that Ronald Reagan had, and
can envision, can contemplate change on a very large scale in Iraq and elsewhere
in the region.
MS.
PLETKA: I'm going to have to end this, I think, and I apologize to everybody who
didn't get to ask a question, but we're running about a half an hour late. And
so we'll take a five minute break, if we may, and move on to our next panel, and
thank you all very much. Wonderful.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: Ladies and gentlemen, if we could perhaps get going again, and could
the War Crimes Panel come up to the table. All right. This panel is going to be
on war crimes. I think it is possible to say that there's probably no more
emotionally provocative and socially disruptive problem that may confront a
post-Saddam Iraq than the issue of war crimes, how you maintain humanity and
also do justice, after such barbarism, after so many, you have so many
individuals who are guilty obviously of the worst forms of war crime and so many
others through fear have covered themselves with shame.
It
is needless to say a very, very provocative issue, and it's one that obviously
the Iraq people, first and foremost, and their American liberators are going to
have to deal with.
Today
our presenter will be Feisal Istrabadi, who is an attorney at Boesch &
Istrabadi He's also a member of the planning committee for the State Department'
Future of Iraq Project.
We
will also have on our panel Munther al Fadhal, who is an associate professor,
visiting associate professor of Middle Eastern law at the International College
of Law in London. He, too, is also a member of the United States State
Department's Working Group on the Future of Iraq, which I think given those two
jobs, he's obviously a man of very extraordinarily stout heart.
Also,
quite stout and heart is Hania Mufti, who is the London Director of the Middle
Eastern and North African Division of the Human Rights Watch, who will also be
commenting.
And
we're also very pleased to have Ruth Wedgwood, who is a professor of law at Yale
University. She has served on the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee for
International Law and is also the Director of Studies at the Hague Academy of
International Law.
I
just wish to note that we will have a translator for Mr. Al Fadhal. So there
will be a slight little time delay there. Mr. Istrabadi.
MR.
ISTRABADI: Thank you very much. I'm going to stand at the podium. Sitting at the
back, it was sometimes a bit difficult to see. So I thought I'd stand here.
The
American Enterprise Institute Seminars on Iraq ask the question: "Whither
Iraq"? Whither indeed. 22 million Iraqis in and out of diaspora ponder the
same question. There has been much talk from U.S. officials about democracy in a
future Iraq, but one can be forgiven for being skeptical of their reassurances.
Some
representatives of the Iraqi opposition have publicly stated their view that the
State Department is frustrating attempts by other departments to establish
democracy in Iraq. I think we heard echoes of that from Mr. Perle this morning.
Yet, when Secretary Rumsfeld was asked about the possibilities of a post-Saddam
government two weeks ago, he dismissively referred to the notion of democracy
there, stating that that was something the State Department was working on.
On
Tuesday, the President's spokesman equated regime change with a bullet in
Saddam's head. I understand there was much retrenchment yesterday.
A
cynic might well ponder, "Whither U.S. policy in Iraq?" But that is a
topic for another day.
For
the purpose of this presentation, I have assumed that the Baathist government in
Baghdad will not be replaced by another dictator more or less beneficent than
Saddam. No dictator would be interested in my topic, which is the title of my
topic is "Questions of Justice in Iraq's Transition to Democracy."
No
dictator would be interested in addressing my topic or the previous regime's
human rights crimes, establishing processes which might be used against him one
day. Therefore, I assume that the transition following the Baathists will be one
to democracy.
I
will accordingly briefly consider the legal context both international and
domestic under which mechanisms might operate for holding individuals liable for
their crimes committed on behalf of the state. I will then outline my views of
how accountability and reconciliation might unfold. I will explore the tensions
between accountability and reconciliation and how those tensions might be
resolved.
I
will conclude with a brief consideration of amnesty and why I believe that
amnesty as such must be avoided, though I am willing to accept a nolle prosequi
under the right circumstances.
It
is disappointing, though perhaps not surprising, that the legal framework for
holding officials liable for crimes committed during international conflicts is
far more sophisticated and well defined than it is for crimes committed by
governments against their own people.
Because
this regime is guilty of both classes of crimes, however, it is useful to start
with a consideration of the legal framework within which members of the Iraqi
regime can be held liable for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,
by considering their culpability under international norms.
It
is jarring to recall that the current Iraqi leadership has involved itself in
three distinct international conflicts over the past 22 years, and it may embark
on a fourth. It has been in a technical state of war continuously for 22 of the
last 23 years since Saddam Hussein assumed the presidency.
In
this connection, that is to say in discussing the issues relating to
international norms, I begin by noting that Iraq bound itself to the terms of
the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which it acceded on February 14, 1956.
Now,
to set the flavor, and that's just all I'm going to do--in fact, my remarks
about the norms of international law, I'm going to digest a little bit here
because they sort of have the effect of being something of a catalogue which may
or may not be interesting if you're not a lawyer.
But
to set the flavor of the international norms relating to this topic, let me
refer specifically to one of the Four Conventions, one of the Four Geneva
Convention, 49, the convention protecting civilians in time of war. The list of
proscribed activities contained in this convention and the concomitant list of
Iraq's violations of it is ponderous.
Occupying
powers are, for instance, required to facilitate the proper working of all
institutions devoted to the care and education of children. I have a big lacuna
here. Penal laws may be altered by an occupying power under limited
circumstances, and then only after adequate notice has been published for the
occupied in their own language.
The
application of changes to the penal code ex post facto is prohibited. The death
penalty can be imposed by an occupying power only if certain procedural
protections are followed, and in any event, never against an occupied person
under the age of 18 at the time of the offense.
The
right to call witnesses, to the assistance of counsel, to present evidence, to a
interpreter, and to an appeal are all guaranteed. And so it goes. Article after
article after article providing substantive rights chargeable to an occupier of
a population by foreign aggressors. Even the dead have rights.
But
that convention concluded as it was in 1949 was not merely a recital of the
aspirations of a world still fatigued by five years of war. Article 146--and the
Convention is in about 180 articles--Article 146 of the Convention mandates,
first, that the high contracting parties undertake to enact legislation
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or
ordering to be committed any of the grave breaches of the Convention.
More
importantly, the Convention requires the contracting parties to search for
persons who are alleged to have committed these acts and also to bring, and the
legal language in it--it's a legal term of art--shall bring such persons
regardless of their nationality before its own courts. Each high contracting
party has the obligation of bringing violators of the Convention before their
own courts or before its own courts.
Protocol
I additional to the 1949 Convention, to which I shall return in a moment, is
even more blunt in respect to the duties countries owe one another in terms of a
rogue leadership's criminal liability. The protocol emphasizes again that
countries have to afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect to grave breaches of the
conventions or of the protocol.
States
are required to cooperate in the matter of extradition as well as in all
criminal proceedings.
Most
importantly, in the context of international conflict, immunity, even for heads
of states is absolutely barred. Thus, for grave breaches listed in Article 147
in international conflicts, states and their leaders may not immunize
themselves, nor may they recognize immunities in others. That protocol, the
first protocol of 1977, is itself ponderous, occupying 102 articles and
containing an annex of 16 additional articles.
Once
again, I'm going to abbreviate the catalogue of applicable violations of that
protocol. But the protocol prescribes that the choice of the methods of war are
not unlimited. It is prohibited, for instance, to employ weapons and methods of
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and
severe damage, for instance, even to the natural environment.
Prohibitions
against the targeting of civilians are more to the point, and individuals,
indiscriminate attacks, reprisals against civilians and other such acts are
regarded--those prohibitions are regarded as always obligatory and threatening
or committing to threaten murder, torture, mutilation, outrages upon the dignity
or indecent assault, the taking of hostages, and collective punishments are, of
course, outlawed.
Commanders
have an affirmative obligation to take steps to prevent those in their command
from violating the conventions or the protocol.
Under
principles of international law, therefore, the Iraqi Transitional Authority,
about which we heard somewhat this morning, which I will refer to as the ITA,
and the permanent government of Iraq thereafter, will have a non-derogable duty
to investigate, prosecute and punish those Iraqis responsible for Iraq's war
crimes and crimes against humanity in waging aggressive wars against Iraq's
neighbors. The ITA in my view must not make a political accommodation by failing
to bring these individuals to justice.
Now,
the state of international law on crimes committed against a country's own
population leave much to the imagination. In contrast to the prolix documents
dealing with international conflicts, Protocol II of 1977, relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, can barely muster 28
articles. It is derived from Article 3, common to the Four Geneva Conventions of
1949, which states that in the case of an armed conflict not of an international
character, the parties to the conflict at a minimum, and that is the language
used, must treat civilians humanely, without distinction, and refrain from
violence, in particular, murder, mutilation, torture, the taking of hostages,
outrages upon personal dignity, and the passing of sentence and carrying out of
executions without previous judgment announced by a regularly constituted court.
That
brief list and my recitation of it is exhaustive, of what Article III contains
is more or less reproduced in Protocol II, except that more detail is provided.
Collective punishment, for instance, is added, as are acts of terrorism. Rape is
specifically mentioned as a prohibited activity as is slavery and pillaging or
the threat to undertake these activities.
Unfortunately,
none of the specific mandatory language appearing in the Four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 and Protocol I relating to international conflicts appears in Protocol
II.
Professor
Cherif Bassiouni notes, however, an implicit argument that such a mandatory duty
exists. I'm talking about the duty to prosecute, the duty to extradite, and the
duty to cooperate in those things. Bassiouni argues that there is, in fact, such
a duty under an international law. He considers such a duty, therefore, as jus
cogens, or a part of preemptory international law, imposing a non-derogable
obligation upon all to assist in investigations, extraditions and prosecutions.
Now,
regardless of whether Professor Bassiouni is right that Protocol II is jus
cogens and the other Latin term, obligatio erga omnes, which I think is
translated as obligations flowing to all, the ITA must announce that it regards
itself as bound to apply Protocol II.
If
vigilantism has any hope of being avoided in Iraq, its populace must come to
believe that for once its government will take the initiative to vindicate the
rights of its citizens to justice.
Two
other principles need to be mentioned, and we could obviously burn up the whole
day talking about international principles here. There is another treaty I don't
even mention in my prepared text. That's the treaty on torture and so on, the
convention on torture. But two other principles at least need to be mentioned,
if only in passing. At the very least, the leadership in Iraq over the last 34
years is guilty of the crime of genocide against Iraq's Kurdish population.
Iraq
signed the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
on 20 January 1959. The Genocide Convention makes it a crime under international
law, among other things, to kill any group because of its national, ethnic,
racial or religious nature.
Notice
the limitations. You can line up communists and shoot them. That's not genocide.
[Laughter.]
MR.
ISTRABADI: I could have said Republicans, but in this crowd I thought I
shouldn't.
[Laughter.]
MR.
ISTRABADI: The burden of proof for this crime, however, is a heavy one. The
actor must have acted with intent to destroy in whole or in part the protected
classification. Article 4 rescinds any attempt at immunity for heads of state or
other constitutionally responsible officers and Article 5 requires the
international community to enact laws "to provide effective penalties for
persons guilty of genocide."
Signatories
to the conventions agree to grant extradition in cases involving violations of
the convention. Obviously, this convention will be a source of indictment
against the Iraqi leadership responsible for Iraq's mistreatment of the Kurds
and other groups.
The
other source that I'll just mention very quickly are the Nuremberg an Tokyo
charters which help to establish the concept of crimes against humanity as a
part of the norms of international law. There are no conventions or treaties in
respect to that, however,
I
have thus far focused on international considerations for several reasons, not
least of these reasons is that international law appears to impose an obligation
upon Iraq and others to investigate, seek a extradition where appropriate and
prosecute those guilty of perpetrating war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity, even when these crimes were committed domestically.
That's
a bit of obviously endorsing Bassiouni's view, but that may be optimistic. But
by no means do I focus upon considerations of international law to the exclusion
of Iraq's domestic law. Those who carried out the acts of genocide in places
like Halabja or who participated in the Anfal campaign or the suppression of the
rebellion in southern Iraq, or in the systematic rape of women, or who tortured
and killed political prisoners must be held liable under provisions of Iraq's
criminal code.
Saddam
Hussein and his cronies who are indictable on the basis of command
responsibility under international law are obviously indictable under the
provisions of domestic law for committing and conspiring to commit these various
crimes.
There
is an important value to be served by constituting a tribunal to try Iraq's
leadership under both domestic as well as international law. The most important
value served by doing so may be entirely symbolic, to demonstrate that laws
against murder, rape, torture and the like have the force of law, even in a
country such as Iraq where the rule of law has been absent for 44 years.
Thus,
trying criminal defendants under domestic law not only sends a message
establishing a break with Iraq's immediate lawless past. More importantly it
sets a precedent for future leaders both at the national as well as for leaders
of provinces and federated states. Their abuses of civil and human rights of
those whom they govern will no longer be tolerated.
And
let me make a break here. We've talked about federalism, and I think that among
the things that the federal government ought to be charged, the Baghdad central
government, in addition to foreign policy, you know, defense policy, et cetera,
one of the things that I think will be important for it to do as well is to have
jurisdiction, not exclusive jurisdiction, but concomitant jurisdiction to
enforce civil rights laws.
Business
will no longer be done in the usual way in the Iraq of the future. There will be
transparency and accountability including criminal liability from Iraq's
leaders.
A
colleague who has already spoken this morning, Rend Rahim Francke, recently
suggested to me something which I must confess I had not thought of. Recalling
that the English Parliament executed Charles I on a charge of treason for waging
war against his own people, she wondered why the Iraqi leadership should not be
subjected to a similar charge?
No
foreign enemy could have destroyed Iraq so thoroughly, root and branch, as the
government of Iraq has done over the last 34 years. It has spilt the blood of
Iraq's citizens, dispersed its population, waged two aggressive wars, subjected
the nation to utter desolation in 1991 and is prepared to do so again 11 years
later. If this record does not establish treason, nothing could.
There
is another reason also pointed out by Mrs. Francke for why trials on a charge of
treason may be an indispensable part of the healing process that Iraq must yet
traverse. No doubt women who have been raped as a matter of state policy will
find a measure of vindication in seeing those who raped them and those who set
the policy tried for crimes against humanity and rape and conspiracy to commit
rape.
But
an Iraqi who has suffered no particularly direct depredation other than living
in the republic of fear might find that such trials have no direct bearing on
him. Holding the leadership of Iraq liable on a charge of treason vindicates the
nation as a whole.
It
acknowledges that even those who have not suffered physically from the regime
have, none the less, been profoundly injured by a ruling class which has ruled
too callously for too long.
This
brings us to the necessity of a domestic tribunal constituted under Iraqi
domestic law with jurisdiction to proceed under domestic and international legal
norms.
That
is something of which the Germans were largely deprived by the Nuremberg trials.
If the Iraqis are to begin building domestic political institutions, they might
as well start now. And start with what may be the most important such
institution a burgeoning democracy needs: an independent judiciary.
To
be sure, there will have to be much training on the part of the international
community. Judges will have to be trained in their obligations as will
prosecutors. Defense lawyers will have to be retrained to become zealous
advocates of their client's rights rather than mere pawns in a judicial
lynching.
But
the value of coming to terms with the enormity of what has befallen them over
more than a generation will, I hope, accomplish two goals. First, it will begin
the road of recovery from Iraq's national nightmare; second, it will contribute
to a resolution which Iraqis, too, must adopt: never again.
An
issue with which the ITA will have to deal in prosecuting Iraq's current
leadership under domestic law is that of immunity. Iraq's interim constitution
of 1970 and 1990 both contain an article immunizing all members of the
Revolutionary Command Council from prosecution.
Now,
before I go further, I should point out that that is a matter of some dispute.
That is to say as to which interim constitution currently applies in Iraq. Since
the coup d'etat of 1958 overthrowing the monarchy, Iraq has had several interim
constitutions but no permanent one.
It
is not entirely clear whether the interim constitution of 1990 was ever ratified
or whether Iraq continues to operate under the interim constitution of 1970. In
any event, I propose to dispose of the dispute by reference to Iraq's only
permanent constitution, and the only constitution on which Iraqis have ever had
the chance to vote and the only one ever adopted by them.
That
is again the constitution of 1925, and that is significant because that
constitution did not contain any immunity provision. Indeed, it contained a
specific provision for the trial of cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and
judges.
Accordingly,
any attempt to immunize Iraq's criminal ruling class under domestic law is void
as unconstitutional.
Accountability
will be amongst the first orders of business for the ITA. As I have suggested
earlier, accountability is the first principle of justice, and justice must not
only be done, Iraq's population must see it being done. Otherwise, reprisal and
revenge will be the order of the day, making the task of rebuilding and
reconstituting a civilized nation next to impossible.
The
process of holding Iraq's criminal ruling class and others criminally liable for
their malfeasance must be done largely in public. Trials must be open and prior
to their commencement, the processes must be explained in the media so that
ordinary citizens will understand what is unfolding.
Whatever
system of accountability and reconciliation ultimately obtains in Iraq, it will
only work if the population at large buys into the process.
There
are generally four categories of violators who should to varying degrees be
subjected to the processes of accountability. The first and most obvious
category is that of the decision-makers respecting the policies set by the
government of Iraq which violate international and domestic norms.
Obviously,
the president of the Republic of Iraq, its vice presidents, members of the RCC,
cabinet members, senior corps commanders, and other high ranking officials
presumptively fall into this first category.
For
these individuals, whether it is a decision-maker under the principle of command
responsibility or a conspiracy to commit domestic lawless acts, there should be
full prosecution under international and domestic laws.
I
understand that a rational approach would require some exercise of discretion.
Let me give an example, although I want to be very clear that I am not here
suggesting that this example as such is necessarily true, but it simply
illustrates a larger point.
The
health minister who served in that capacity in March of 1988, assuming he was
not a member of the RCC, might well have no criminal exposure on a charge
related to the gassing of Halabja. One might suggest that he should face no
prosecution at all. The alternative would encompass the prosecution even of the
health minister, but obviously allow him to defend it affirmatively by
establishing that he had, in fact, no command responsibility for the gassing of
Halabja.
While
I have much sympathy with this latter view--in fact, it's my view--indicting
commissions must have discretion in deciding whom to prosecute based upon the
evidence.
Of
course, liability within this category is not dependent on the title of the
individual, and here there is a mistake in my prepared remarks. I apologize to
my fellow panelists. Let me amend it and say it correctly. Even if Saddam's sons
occupied low level positions in the Iraqi government and/or the Baath Party,
which they did at one time, though at least one of them I think has moved up in
the world, they would still qualify as category one violators. The indicting
body must be allowed the freedom to exercise discretion ad hoc as it drafts
bills of indictment.
Its
considerations must center on actual power wielded, not simply on rank or title.
Now, others have taken the opposing view, arguing that the fact that someone is
a member of the RCC does not require him to be treated as a category one
violator. The specific example that I am thinking of is that an argument has
been advanced that say the current deputy prime minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz,
need not necessarily be regarded as a category one violator.
I
must state here my rejection of that view. Most if not all of Saddam Hussein's
decisions resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands and sometimes hundreds of
thousands of people have been unanimously approved by the sycophantic body of
rubber stamps styling itself the Revolutionary Command Council.
Individuals
such as Tariq Aziz and many others who have command responsibility were the
agents through whom Saddam Hussein has executed his barbarous will. For their
crimes against Iran and Kuwait, the ITA is legally obligated to prosecute these
individuals. For the sake of justice they must be prosecuted as well for what
they have done to Iraq.
I
gather, a further example, that an army chief of staff at the time of Halabja
has taken the position that he did not, in fact, have command responsibility,
because the decision-making process bypassed him. If that is true, and then he
can defend affirmatively on that basis, and if he can establish the defense, he
presumably would be entitled to an acquittal.
I
am also told that he has been defended on the basis that he helped reduce the
number of casualties. Now, even if that is true, that defense does not exculpate
the man. At best, it presents evidence in mitigation of sentence only. So if it
is with all high-ranking officers, military and political, whenever weapons of
mass destruction were used, whether on Iranians or Iraqis.
The
second category of offenders on mid-level violators--this would include
intelligence and military officers of somewhat lower rank, similarly situated
party officials, judges, prosecutors and the like. Again, discretion will have
to be exercised in determining who to prosecute and whom not to prosecute. At
this level, the numbers begin to increase. Indeed, based on the severity of the
crime, I would favor expanding this category to include even low level
individuals.
Certainly,
the soldier or officer who threw paper out of helicopters to test the wind
currents prior to the gassing of Halabja must be prosecuted if he can be
identified. The specialist in the Iraqi Air Force who may have loaded the bombs,
which were then dropped on Halabja has both moral as well as legal culpability
for those deaths.
I
know that in Rwanda a decision was taken to limit such prosecutions. But the
soldiers I have described belong in the same category as the executioners at
Dachau. I cannot imagine a rational decision not to subject these individuals to
the full processes of the law.
The
third category, and the last which I would propose to subject to prosecutions,
are for perpetrators of ordinary crimes under domestic law. They may be the
local head of a police station, for instance, or a local party official who may
have participated in a discrete act which falls under one or the other of the
sections of the Iraqi criminal code. Prosecutions on that basis must go forward
as well.
The
fourth and final category is the need for de-Baathification. I am an advocate of
total de-Baathification of government agencies on the model which Eisenhower
imposed in post-war Germany. I recognize, however, that not all members of the
Baath Party have joined the party for ideological reasons, although some have.
Those who were active participants in the function of the party at a local,
regional or national level must be subjected to lustration laws, barring them
from every holding office again in Iraq.
Any
individual who has held high rank in the Baath Party or in the Baath government
from July 14, 1968 to the present ought to be barred for life from holding any
office in Iraq.
A
final point in respect to prosecutions: the ITA must abolish or declare a
moratorium on the use of the death penalty. Capital punishment has been abused
with increasing frequency as each regime has succeeded its predecessor in Iraq.
It ought to form no part of the future of Iraq.
As
a general rule, I know that I take a relatively hard stand in respect to
accountability. I must confess that Kanan Makiya had to take me out of an even
harder position, which I intended to take here, that every single individual in
Iraq as to whom a prima facie case could be made should be criminally prosecuted
in a criminal court.
I
have somewhat backed away from that position, something I shall discuss in a
moment. Having said that, I am troubled by one aspect of my suggestion, and that
is the potential that there might be some general somewhere in Iraq who is
contemplating mutiny. His mutiny might mean savings hundreds or thousands or
more lives. If the almighty is willing to accept a death bed conversion, I
suppose I am hard-pressed to reject it. I am grudgingly prepared to accept the
proposition that a high-ranking individual within Iraq now who materially
aids--within Iraq now--who materially aids in deposing this regime might be
free. My written text says should be free. But I just can't quite say that.
[Laughter.]
MR.
ISTRABADI: Might be free from prosecution. The prohibition against future
service in government must still apply to such an individual.
I'm
very close to finishing. I hope I haven't--I'm sure I have gone over my time.
Perhaps the most difficult problem to solve for Iraq is what has been termed
truth and reconciliation.
The
magnitude of the crimes committed in Iraq over 34 years are staggering. Nearly
30 years after his death, we still recall that Steven Biko died under torture in
a South African prison. We cannot begin to list the hundreds of thousands who
have died under torture in a Baathist jail. Nor is there likely to be the
calming hand of an Iraqi Nelson Mandella, nor the wise compassion of a Bishop
Tutu.
In
more optimistic moments, I allow myself to hope that such individuals exist, but
we simply do not know their names. Regardless, truth and reconciliation will be
indispensable for reuniting Iraq and Iraqis.
Truth,
of course, is an essential component of accountability as well. The truth must
be brought to the light not only for the sake of society holding individuals
accountable for their misconduct, but also to allow those individuals to take
responsibility for what they have done. To that end, there is no substitute for
a truth commission. The very concept itself will be a breath of fresh air in
Iraq, a very closed society with many taboo subjects, where the most obvious
truth known by all must nonetheless be publicly denied.
The
names of informers must be released to the public as a part of this process. The
records of intelligence agencies must be made public. Financial records showing
those who have done business with Saddam Hussein and his family must be
disclosed.
On
the South African model, hearings ought to be held by a truth commission to
compel individuals to appear to take responsibility for what they have done.
Now,
whereas the goal of the truth commission in South Africa, as I understand it,
was to lead to amnesty, I categorically reject the very concept of amnesty in
Iraq. I'm sorry. I cannot. I just couldn't come up here and say I--I just
couldn't convince myself.
But
amnesty itself I categorically reject, and I'll return to that in a moment as
well. In Chile, where Augusto Pinochet still has a relatively wide following, no
amnesty process--and that's another mistake in my written text--no amnesty
process was engendered at the time of Pinochet's leaving office. He simply
announced that he was going to be immune as a senator and attempted an amnesty
on those who had committed crimes within a certain period of time.
In
Argentina, very little if any attempt at accountability has been pursued, and
this has led to tremendous resentment on the part of this population.
The
course I propose is an intermediate one between any form of generalized amnesty
and prosecuting every individual indictable for any political crime. That middle
course is an announcement of a nolle prosequi as to any individual who makes a
full disclosure and accepts full responsibility for his conduct. And when I say
any individual, I don't really mean that. I'll come back to that in a minute.
Nolle
prosequi is a device which is the precise opposite of the defense plea of nolle
contendere, or no contest. In the latter case, the defendant announces that he
will not fight the charge, although he does not concede guilt. In nolle prosequi,
the prosecution announces that it will not pursue the prosecution of the case.
It is not an admission of insufficient evidence nor a statement in the belief of
the innocence of the defendant. It is simply a statement that no further
proceedings will occur against the defendant.
Now,
the distinction between that and an amnesty may appear to be one without a
difference, but I don't think so. An amnesty implies forgiveness, perhaps
absolution. I am unprepared to allow Saddam Hussein's henchmen to luxuriate in
forgiveness. If they accept full responsibility for their acts and are not
sufficiently high ranking in Saddam's bureaucracy, to be left alone is the most
that these people can hope for. I would make this process available only to
people in categories three and four.
I
will not belabor the point of the tension between accountability, on the one
hand, and truth and reconciliation on the other. At least insofar as the
reconciliation aspect is concerned, I recognize that there is a real value in
calming outrage and ameliorating the desire for revenge.
I
recognize that protracted or prolonged prosecutions and public trials, likely as
they are to garner tremendous media attention, have the potential for fanning
the flames of outrage. The need for accountability, however, the need for
justice, act as a counterweight to considerations of peace and harmony. I'm not
actually true that's true, that it's a counterweight. I'm not so sure that you
can get to peace and harmony without that accountability. I don't believe you
can. I simply put my thumb on the scale of the side of accountability, at least
for the interim period.
During
the period of the ITA, particularly, the balance likely needs to be struck in
favor of justice rather than immediate reconciliation. Once truly legitimate
representative government is in place, decisions about amnesty, pardons,
clemency, and the like can be made by the true representative of Iraq's
population, its elected government.
I
stated at the outset that I assumed that the transition in Iraq will be a
transition to democracy and the rule of law. If policymakers in Washington, and
I am troubled by their absence, deliberate absence evidently, if policymakers in
Washington are planning anything else, then we in the United States are planning
a second betrayal of the Iraqi people in 11 years.
Before
hostilities commence once again in Iraq, assuming that they do, and while I know
that there are government officials sitting in this room, I want to take this
opportunity of concluding my remarks by saying the following:
Much
of the success or failure of the topics about which we are talking
now--democracy, the rule of law, transitional justice--will depend on the manner
and method in which the regime of Saddam Hussein is toppled. If the United
States and its allies, if any, once again target the civilian infrastructure of
Iraq in the gross terms which were done in 1991, then the population of Iraq
will see us as their enemies, and we will earn their hatred.
The
topics we discussed today and which are likely to be discussed in future AEI
seminars will be academic. Only if our military planners narrowly target only
the terror infrastructure keeping Saddam Hussein in power are we likely to win
the sympathy of the Iraqi people. Only under those circumstances will the
population of Iraq cooperate with and endorse our effort to restore Iraq not
only into the family of nations as such, but to transform it into a modern
Western-oriented democratic country.
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: Thank you, Mr. Istrabadi. We'll just work around the panel starting
with Hania Mufti, and I just say once again, please try to keep it to around
five minutes. Thank you very much.
MS.
MUFTI: I'll do my best. And what I have to say, in fact, is very much an
endorsement of what my co-panelist has said and perhaps just taking a slightly
different tact on some of the things that can be done before any changes take
place in Iraq in terms of preparatory work.
I
could start briefly by saying that having been in the business of investigating
human rights abuses in Iraq for more than two decades, I can say with some
authority that we do have sufficient evidence to hold the Iraqi government
accountable for the most serious crimes under international law.
And
as many of you know, part of that evidence comes from the horse's mouth in the
form of the documents that became available after the '91 uprising, and many of
you will also be familiar with the work that Human Rights Watch has done in
terms of documenting the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988.
Unfortunately, although we did try to bring a criminal prosecution and then a
civil suit against Iraq, we failed, and at the time it was because the brutality
of the Iraqi government was being shielded by the hypocrisy of the international
community.
And
we hope that the world is listening now, because the crimes continue unabated.
Last week I returned from Iraqi Kurdishstan as part of a human rights delegation
which was there to document continuing ethnic cleansing against the Kurds and
the Turkoman. And more than 120,000 people have been expelled from their homes
since 1991 and Arab families brought in their place.
And
yet at the same time for people who believe in human rights, it's crucial to
safeguard the rights of those suspected of having committed these crimes in Iraq
as well as to ensure justice for the countless victims of Saddam Hussein's
government. Human Rights Watch believes that the best option for that remains
Security Council action to establish an international criminal court for Iraq
that would have jurisdiction over past crimes and would ensure a fair, impartial
and timely trial for all those concerned.
And,
of course, I agree with my colleague that such a court would not only punish
those responsible for the atrocities, but would also serve as a deterrent to
future abuse, and it would help also to combat the culture of impunity that has
existed for so long in Iraq.
The
option of establishing a court that combines international and domestic
mechanisms and laws could also be considered and was touched upon by my
co-panelist. Its effectiveness, though, is dependent on the complete dismantling
and rebuilding of Iraq's judicial system, its de-Baathification as well, and on
ensuring that there is a future judiciary that is independent and partial and
free from political manipulation.
Our
efforts at seeking to indict numbers of Saddam Hussein's government and other
officials must continue regardless of any U.S.-led military intervention against
Iraq. But in the interim, there are certain measures that can be taken to
establish principles of international human rights and accountability and ensure
that these are incorporated in security and governance arrangements for Iraq.
I'd
like to highlight several of these. First, persons responsible for the most
serious abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law must not be
included in the new government for Iraq. And discussion on how to implement
these must begin now at the earliest stages of planning for a post-Saddam
government. And here I am referring not only to officials currently in positions
of authority in Iraq, but also to former military or intelligence personnel who
have fled the country to join opposition forces abroad in the hope that this
would buy them immunity from prosecution.
And
unfortunately, there are those within the U.S. administration that have
encouraged this hope. These individuals who may be implicated in crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes, other crimes of universal jurisdiction, must
not only be sidelined, they must be held responsible for their crimes. And
documenting and bringing to light such information is an integral part of Human
Rights Watch's work, and one that we take very serious, for experience shows
that past abusers who return to power often repeat their abuse.
Second,
there must be no amnesties from prosecutions for persons who have committed
grave violations of these international and human rights law. Amnesty
arrangements, while often seemingly expedient in peace building, ultimately
maintain a damaging culture of impunity.
Third,
we urge the creation of international monitoring capacity which can be deployed
as soon as possible and wherever feasible in Iraq to investigate past abuses and
to monitor continuing violations. And valuable lessons can be drawn from other
international missions which I won't mention here for lack of time.
Fourth,
any plan for a future government of Iraq should contain measures specifically
aimed at the issue of future military and police forces. And that persons who
have been implicated in violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law should be disarmed and prohibited from joining the new armed
forces and the civilian police. And again, this is imperative to prevent a
continuing culture of abuse.
Lastly,
it is also imperative to ensure that future international assistance include
financial and other support for institutions involved in the administration of
justice at all levels, and where required international experts, penal experts
and human rights specialists, as well as civilian police must be made available
in sufficient numbers to strengthen the rule of law at various institutions.
I
will conclude by saying that ensuring accountability for the horrific crimes and
other abuses that have been the hallmark of governance under the ruling Baath
Party is of paramount importance if Iraqis are to have a future based on respect
for human rights. There is indeed a dire need to revitalize belief in the rule
of law in a society that has lost total confidence. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR.
AL FADHAL: [Interpreted from Arabic.] Ladies and gentlemen, I am very honored to
be present here from Sweden, the land of peace and snow, here in the United
States of America.
The
people of Iraq hope that the winds of freedom and peace will influence the new
Iraq. But the future of Iraq, the new Iraq, will not be realized without help
from the friends of Iraq in the United States of America.
The
point of discussion will focus on two important matters, which are that
accountability of the responsibles in Iraq and the rebuilding of the
infrastructure of Iraq.
With
regard to the prosecution of the accountable responsibles for Iraq, there should
be the implementation of an Iraqi judiciary body to prosecute the responsibles
for the destruction of Iraq.
We
had to limit the accountability to one particular period and that is what
occurred between 1968 to today. That in addition to instituting the law of
reconciliation and forgiveness, especially for certain crimes--especially with
regards to regular crimes rather than international crimes.
The
second point which regards the reconstruction of the state of Iraq on the
following premises: the federalism and the rights of the Kurdish people to
decide their own destination; the declaration of neutrality and normalization of
relations with the state of Israel; respect of the human rights and the rule of
law; the construction of the civil rule of law and the consideration of the
Baath Party as similar to the Nazi Party; the freedom of women, the Iraqi woman
in the new society and the help of her participation in the new society.
The
prosecution for the war crimes will be determined in three different points, and
I will be very brief in describing the three different. First the Iraqi accused.
There are many ideas as to how to prosecute the accountable. It is indeed very
difficult to prosecute all the people that are accountable for having committed
crimes against the Iraqi people.
We
must focus and concentrate on the very severe crimes solely. With regard to
regular crimes, they should be deferred to a regular prosecution. With regard to
gathering of evidence, we must distinguish between the crimes that were
committed--interior crimes and the exterior crimes.
With
regard to the interior war crimes, we'll focus on the war crimes that took place
in Halabja and the experimentation with chemical weapons against the Kurdish
people. Also, in the south of Iraq where the flag, the motto noshia [ph] after
today was implemented.
With
regard to the exterior war crimes, we will limit that to the war with Iraq--with
Iran--eight years, the invasion and the occupation of country of Kuwait, the
targeting of civilian population in Israel with 39 missiles, and support of the
international terrorism.
I'm
able to brief all my, what I have to say into one word. Because of time
constraints, I'm very aware of that. I say we wait for the new Iraq built on the
rule of law. And I am confident that when the law, the ruling, the dictatorial
ruling ends, the rule of law will begin. And I would end my discussion with a
quote from President Abraham Lincoln's in a 1863 speech that concerns the Iraq
of the future:
"A
government from the people, chosen by the people, for the people, shall not be
abolished from the face of the earth."
Thank
you very much.
[Applause.]
MS.
WEDGWOOD: Let me just, I guess, conclude as the wrap-up commentator by making a
few remarks. One, just a remark about Saddam's cynicism about the law. For
someone who was planning on being so wicked, he has certainly chosen to remain
in a great many treaty regimes that may redound to his detriment.
As
has been remarked, Iraq is still a member of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which
limit what you can do to prisoners of war. For example, you have to repatriate
them at the end of the conflict and also sets limits on what you can to
civilians in occupied territories.
Iraq
jointed the Genocide Convention in 1953 and has not exited. Iraq joined the
Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating Gases and Bacteriological Weapons in 1931 and
has not exited. And I think the most amusing remark is that Iraq joined the
Biological Weapons Convention in 1991 back when it was protesting that it was
going to be good in the future.
So
it's a little hard for Saddam to simply say these norms are not my norms. They
have been persistent in Iraq. But more to the point, even if there were no
treaty law as such, in international law, even in international criminal law,
there is this category called customary law, the laws and customs of war used in
the Rwanda Tribunal, used in the Yugoslavia Tribunal, what every honorable
soldier knows, that he is bound by certain norms of conduct that will spare
civilians, avoid disproportionate harm to civilians, avoid systematic torture,
certainly avoid genocide, avoid crimes against humanity.
Also,
the norms that govern international crimes have extended from wartime to
non-martial situations. So that even at moments when Iraq might not be
technically at war, the gross mistreatment of its own population can be
considered a crime against humanity, and it's the almost universal consensus of
international lawyers that the prohibition against crimes against humanity has
passed into customary law.
So
the issue is not really where the law comes from. It's a harder choice what kind
of tribunal to use. What the U.S. has supported in the past has been the idea of
Security Council authority to create an ad hoc tribunal. If you do that, you may
get into some of the same quarrels and politics that you often do when you're
looking for a Chapter 7 resolution to bless your intervention in the first
place. So you're exposing yourself to some political pressure if you commit
yourself to that as the only modality.
The
second way the U.S. has proceeded lately is with the idea of a mixed tribunal,
of having local judges, local actors take part as prosecutors and judges, along
with international. That has some advantages. It may avoid the kind of distant
auteur, the distant multilateral colonial atmosphere that has sometimes
surrounded the Yugoslav Tribunal, and brings the trial home where it can be
didactically of the most use. And yet provides some international voice which
will perhaps give some kind of gyroscopic assurance that the tribunal couldn't
be misused for revenge or for political factionalism.
The
old-fashioned way, though, of enforcing the law of war was in military
tribunals. Whoever conquered the battlefield then had the duty, as well as the
right, of putting his adversary on trial for any kind of systematic
malefactions, and indeed if there were no--one could use several modalities at
once.
The
more impish impulse which is not consistent with current American policy would
be to refer the matter to the International Criminal Court. But under Security
Council resolution that might or might not seem attractive, depending at what
time we establish a new democratic regime in Iraq.
And
finally, of course, using local courts. I will note that in Bosnia, there was a
concern that since factionalism was still rife, that even using local courts was
wisely limited by--this is the first Rome Treaty, 1996--that local prosecutions
should be approved by an international body of some sort just to avoid the use
of war crimes accusations as brickbats because we have learned from the Bosnian
experience that human nature is human nature, and whenever there's an available
kind of weapon, people can misuse it because of jealousy, business rivalries, a
host of reasons. So that kind of mixture of international and national can be
productive.
There
was a bill introduced in the House of Representatives this morning, I
understand, that we should indict in lieu of invading. I don't think that is
necessarily very helpful. Most folks in the international community don't
believe in trials in absentia, so simply having a hanging indictment doesn't do
too much. I think Saddam has certainly delegitimatized himself sufficiently. It
doesn't need a formal enunciation of charges.
However,
I think the action in the House International Relations Committee does remind us
that the legitimacy and legality usually end up being complicatedly intertwined.
The CD read only version of how you do international law is not the way it
really works out in practice. And insofar as the intervention would have some
aspects of Kosovo, that it might be, by the way, also a humanitarian
intervention, might not please classical European lawyers, but I think over time
would come to seem an additional legitimating basis for the discrete use of
force.
I
think we should learn very carefully from our earlier attempts in Bosnia, for
example. Do not take indictment and trials as a substitute for a careful
lustration process. One of the problems in Bosnia was that the Americans won the
argument that no one who is indicted should serve in government.
I
take it some European countries in the OSCE have insisted on the obverse, that
if you're not indicted, you do serve in government. And that's been a real
problem. So I do think a careful lustration process will be needed, all the more
because war crimes trials have, in practice, taken much longer than we ever
counted on.
These
trials take at least a year each. If you want to make an exemplary process so
it's the center of a new democratic culture, then you want the process to be
admirable. You don't want it to be the two hour defense counsel need not attend
version that the Tutsi government has on occasion used.
So
I do think we have to, while one can have a spiritual commitment to universal
justice, in practice, you have to be selective and careful about which folks you
choose to target.
I
also do agree with the point that you will need to use the law in politic way in
the most moral sense. That is you do want defections by contingents who may not
have always been the most charming in their prior battlefield behavior, and the
desire to limit civilian casualties is going to be in competition with the
desire for universal justice. Because you do want core commanders to understand
that they at least have a damn good shot at getting off if they will defect in a
discrete way. If they fight house to house in Baghdad, it will hurt the
credibility of any new regime as well as of the international community. So I
think you're just going to have, one's going to have to grit one's teeth and be
satisfied, as we have in every other war, with a set of trials that are
exemplary, but are not exhaustive. Lustration and ultimately a truth commission
have to substitute for a kind of house to house justice.
I
also think frankly we'll want some intelligence cooperation for
counterterrorism. Very carefully who you do it with and what you promise. You
don't want Unit 731 in Japan to be replicated where we gave complete amnesty to
everybody involved in Japanese biological weaponry but at the same time it's
going to be important for the region, I think, that whatever can be obtained
from Baathist officials about other actors who are still at large be harvested,
if only to save other innocent civilians from a painful death.
On
immunity, this I think is the least of your problems. Immunities often belong to
the governments instead of individuals. You can distinguish between immunities
of the person versus immunity of the underlying act, and immunities of the
person lapse when you leave office. So I think good and persuasive lawyering can
probably get around immunities that were created in a dictatorial regime.
The
final observation I'd make is just from the Slobo trial that's ongoing, 24/7
Slobo TV, in Belgrade, that I don't think--I think, sir, politics have moved on
despite the equivocal results in the election, but you do have to be careful to
design a trial process that is fair by our modern lives, and that means going
beyond Nuremberg, because whenever we teach Nuremberg, in law school classes, we
say, my gosh, do you realize how summary our procedure was, even though this is
our historical ideal.
And
yet you don't want the trial to be taken over by an attempt to rally political
zeal, as Slobo, has attempted to do in The Hague, where he said so is your
mother, I did stuff, but so did the KLA and so did NATO. That kind of extremely
elongated propagandistic exercise is not what a trial should be about. So I
think you have to be careful to have a trial procedure that clearly finds the
facts carefully, but still is does not allow the defendant to take over the
proceeding.
Finally,
I just would have a lesson from World War II. I do think there is often a
temptation among prosecutors to use the idea of command responsibility as a
shortcut, and for those of you who haven't had this stuff in law school, command
responsibility has two very different ideas.
One
is that you ordered something to happen. The other is that you're still liable
because you failed to prevent something from happening, a kind of criminal
negligence, a criminal abstention, and we used the latter theory in the trial of
General Yamashita in World War II, at the conclusion of the war in the
Philippines. It's less, I think it's less didactically satisfactory. You mean
want to establish indeed that Saddam did order these things, which you can do
either by having nice e-mail in air-tell orders or simply by the pattern and
practice of his government, but we don't want these to be tort trials about
negligence. We want them to be about the quite clear direct desire and
implementation of systematic abuses from the top.
And
if you have any hope for deterrence, I think you need to have that kind of moral
keystone to the lesson of the trials. So I think I would counsel a worldly
wisdom in this. There are many competing goods, worrying about local
credibility, worrying in a Mozambican sense of how to reintegrate Baathist Party
members into productive lives.
There
are going to be a lot of folks. You can't fall prey to the Stalzi problem where
you discover everybody has been an informer. I mean there really has to be a
sense that you both are warning for the future, but at the same time exiling
people to a permanent opposition to a new regime, and that I think is the lesson
of both Germany and the other more modern attempts at reconstructing a democracy
through war crimes trials.
MR.
GERECHT: I'd like to thank the panel. Now, I'm going to open it up for questions
and answers.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: And I'm going to unfortunately have to abbreviate this session, because
of nutritional concerns. So I will try to take as many questions as possible,
and I will try to use peripheral vision so I don't lose anybody. So questions?
If you wish to identify yourself, go ahead. If you don't want to, that's okay,
too.
MR.
SERWER: Daniel Serwer from the U.S. Institute of Peace. You were very clear that
the constitution of 1925 should apply. I wonder to what extent there's consensus
on that subject among both Iraqis outside the country and those who live in the
North free from Saddam control?
The
other question I had was apart from the constitution was a question of
applicable law. And I wonder if you could--this question has bedeviled some past
interventions and caused enormous delays in Kosovo in particular. Could you
comment on where you see the law coming from in the immediate aftermath of an
intervention?
MR.
GERECHT: Is that to one particular or--
MR.
SERWER: I think Mr. Istrabadi. Well, anybody who wants to comment, but I was
reacting to--
MR.
ISTRABADI: There is, you know, what I'm not trying to do by arguing about the
constitution back in '25, and I don't know if this is what your concern is or
not, but I'm not arguing that therefore the monarchy must be restored. That's
not the point. Obviously, July 14, 1958 occurred. I mean it has consequences.
But the extent to which that I think that legally it is at least the only
constitution that has legitimacy is insofar as it has, in fact, been voted upon,
and accepted, and duly promulgated in Iraq as a source of law and as containing,
you know, obligations on the part or limitations on the activity of government.
For
instance, it mandates due processes for trials and so on. Of course, so does the
constitution of 1970, but nonetheless, it seems to me that the transitional
authority will have to have some sort of basic law, organic law, under which it
operates. And that the suggestion has been made by one of my colleagues who is,
in fact, sitting in this room, that it is possible to use that constitution of
1925, sort of tacis motandies [ph] wherever we refer to the kingdom of Iraq or
the government of the kingdom of Iraq to be transitional authority, and make
that sort of the source of law.
And
I think that there is an appeal to me in that argument, and that it's not going
to be a free-for-all.
As
far as consensus is concerned, I guess the answer to that is I don't know what
the answer is. I don't know if there is much consensus on that point. It's been
discussed in the various working groups to which I belong. I've not heard at
least in those working groups, the Future of Iraq Project, where the Kurds are
represented, I have not heard any opposition to the idea.
Have
I heard a ringing endorsement of it? No. But it at least forms the basis of the
law. The applicable law question is very interesting one because I mean, you
know, there are laws against let's say rape or whatever, that have been passed
by the Baathist government, which sound--I mean if you read the 1990
constitution, it sounds like a reasonable constitution mostly.
And
so there are reasonable laws, but you know you get into questions of legitimacy
and so on, and there are different views on that as well. You can, for instance,
have a transitional authority which issues a law or issues a decree or whatever
proclamation that rescinds all say amendments to the criminal code from July 14,
1968 to the present.
That's
sort of a sledgehammer approach that may sweep away some pretty good laws. For
instance, there may be laws on--there's probably a law in Iraq on the privacy of
e-mails that's probably a pretty good idea, and it would be nice if it were ever
applied, and do you really want wipe that away. It's a very difficult problem
and I'm pleased that I'm only a very small part of the group that's trying to
assess the problem and come up with solutions.
MR.
GERECHT: Thank you. A question over here.
MS.
RAHIM FRANCKE: Rend Rahim Francke. This is a question to Ruth Wedgwood. You said
very in passing something that intrigued me about humanitarian intervention.
It's always been my view that intervention in Iraq should be presented as
humanitarian intervention. I don't know if I understood you correctly, and I
would like you to expand on that point. Thank you.
MS.
WEDGWOOD: Well, again, when Kosovo came up as a matter of legal justification
when the American Society of International Law was having its annual panel on
whether what the U.S. had done lately was illegitimate or legitimate, you had a
curious position where many international lawyers said glad they did it, but
can't square it with the UN charter. Surprising people said that, which is an
odd position for lawyers to take,
But
I thought there was an alternative coherent argument that whether or not Article
51, for example, technically applied to the defense of a people against its
parent government, that nonetheless the purposes of the UN Charter, its
teleology, if you're European, were well served even if the kind of procedural
perfectionism about how the Security Council should operate couldn't be
observed, or kind of substitute multilateralism.
I
mean here you have, much as you did in Kosovo, a multilateral diagnosis of the
problem, weapons of mass destruction and widespread violations of human rights,
even if the solution for it should ultimately be unilateral. And a wise
politician who I will not name in town here once said to me--I think
adroitly--that explain the problem and the law will follow, if the problem is so
evidently in need of a solution.
I
wouldn't front this as my only theory, but clearly the fact that the regime
whose political imperium is being interfered with is utterly autocratic means
that any claim that this violates Iraqi political independence is rather hollow.
MR.
GERECHT: Thank you very much. Now, regrettably, I'm going to have to cut it
here. However, Danni Pletka is going to make two very important announcements,
so just hold on a few minutes.
MS.
PLETKA: Two things. The first is about lunch, which is very important. Lunch is
ready and has been for a little while, so it's probably really warm, and it can
be approached either way, going that way or going this way. And in addition, we
wanted to tell everybody, and I know we've lost some of our people, that we just
received a very nice phone call from a senior White House official who explained
to us that they would like to come and talk about these issues, and although we
think that today perhaps it's a little late to do that, we've invited them to
come as soon as it's convenient, and they've committed to send a senior Bush
Administration official to come and talk about Iraq post-Saddam. So we're very
happy about that, and we'll announce it again, and bon appetit. Thank you.
[Whereupon,
at 1:05 p.m., the conference recessed, to reconvene at 2:15 p.m., this same
day.]
A
F T E R N O O N S
E S S I O N
[2:15
p.m.]
MS.
PLETKA: Everybody, could we start please? Thank you. Thank you very much. We'd
like to welcome you to our third panel on oil and the Iraqi economy. Presenting
today is Patrick Clawson, the Deputy Director of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. He was among many
other things a research economist at the IMF.
Next
to him, or I guess I'm going in alphabetical order now, we're also very lucky to
have Ibrahim Alolom with us. Mr. Alolom is a senior petroleum engineer at Duke
Engineering and Services in the United Kingdom. He's also the Director of Relief
International UK, an Iraq-directed humanitarian non-governmental organization.
Sinan
Al-Shabibi is a consultant on trade and finance and was previously a senior
consultant to UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
and he was in addition an official in the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and in the
Iraqi Ministry of Oil.
Finally,
we welcome Rob Sobhani. Rob is the President of Caspian Energy Consulting and an
adjunct professor of government at Georgetown.
Thank
you all very much.
MR.
CLAWSON: The most important point to make about oil and the Iraqi economy is
that these are not the issues which are driving U.S. policy towards Iraq. U.S.
policy towards Iraq is first and foremost concerned with issues about weapons of
mass destruction, support for terrorism, threats against neighboring states. Oil
has barely been on the administration's horizon in thinking about Iraq.
Look
at the paucity of statements about oil coming out of the administration, or more
generally look at the low priority which Washington has assigned to energy
security issues in its overall policy considerations over the last decade.
Energy
issues in the United States in the last decade have been debated primarily in
terms of their impact on environmental matters, whether it's the drilling in the
Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, whether it's the corporate average fuel
efficiency, or CAFE, standards for automobiles, whether it's the Kyoto Treaty.
The issues of energy which have been so burning for the United States government
over the last decade have not been questions about international supply.
Indeed,
in the last ten years, international oil companies have complained frequently
and loudly that Washington has taken decisions which hurt their business
interests, such as the unilateral tough U.S. sanctions on countries like Iran
and Libya.
And
if you want to understand just how much Washington shapes its policy, having in
mind the interest of international oil companies, consider the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act, which is renewed by Congress by an overwhelming vote--I believe
there were six senators who opposed it--despite substantial lobbying by the
international oil companies against it.
So
while it may be fashionable in anti-American circles such as those in American
University campuses to assume that Washington's policy is being driven by the
concerns of American oil companies, I would say that there is extraordinarily
little evidence that that has been the case.
And,
indeed, I would argue that American oil companies are not particularly
interested in seeing the United States overthrow the government of Saddam
Hussein. There is this 19th century vision, which is often held by left wing
conspiracy theorists, who sort of assume that the only place that American oil
companies will be able to make a profit is where the American troops are
present.
And,
in fact, international oil companies are much more interested in seeing the oil
business be de-politicized and seeing investment decisions in the oil business
be made on the basis of commercial considerations and not politics. Their
objections have been to the politicization of this business. Their objection is
to these repeated sanctions in the United States or from efforts regarding the
oil investments in Sudan to bring human rights considerations to bear.
So
American oil companies are not out there champing at the bit trying to figure
out how can we get the troops into Iraq. Quite the contrary. Indeed, by the way,
I have been speaking about American oil companies. That's not a good idea. What
we have is international oil companies now. Almost every major oil field
development is done these days by a consortia that involves oil companies from
several different countries.
And
it's worth noting that the international oil business is not particularly
dominated by American companies. Of the six largest producers in the world, only
two are American. The largest oil company producer in the United States is
British Petroleum. This is a terribly internationalized business, and the idea
that there is some tight connection between the oil barons of Texas and the Bush
administration that's driving Iraq policy is complete fantasy.
Indeed,
oil is one of the reasons the West is concerned about Iraq, but the reason is
indirect. The reason is that oil income provides Iraq with the revenue with
which it can engage in some programs like its construction of weapons of mass
destruction that we find so troubling.
But
let me pass on to the question of what impact a war with Iraq would have on oil
and more generally on the world economy, and there again I'm afraid I have to
differ with much of the opinion, many of the opinions that we've heard expressed
from circles so concerned about the horrible potential impact of a war with
Iraq.
In
fact, I find it very hard to come up with any plausible scenario under which an
Iraq war would cause disruptions to the world economy. The simple fact is that
the world has adapted well to swings in world oil prices. Gone are the days when
changes in world oil prices sent tremors through the financial and industrial
world.
Consider
in 1997 the price of oil, technically the spot price for Dubai crude, so in 1997
it's $18.13 a barrel. The next year, 1998, it's $12.16. It's fallen 50 percent
in one year. Two years after that, it's gone up from $12 to $26.24, an increase
of 115 percent.
Now,
pardon me, but I must have missed the profound international recession caused by
that increase of 50 percent in world oil prices, and so too I must have missed
the dramatic economic boom that took place--excuse me--I missed the drop that
took place at 50 percent, the boom then, and the recession when the price
doubled from 1998 to 2000. Some of us might even think the period from 1998 to
2000 was a reasonably prosperous one for the world economy, in spite of a
doubling of world oil prices.
The
world economy has become much more flexible than 30 years ago, and much more
open to market forces and so changes in oil prices simply do not have the kind
of impact that they had back in 1974.
There
are several powerful forces at work, which would limit the impact of a war with
Iraq on oil prices even in the short term. Let me just cite a few of those
powerful factors.
First
is that Iraq has become a negligible player in world energy supplies. Even with
a bounce back in the last couple of weeks from extraordinary levels in previous
months, Iraq is still producing less than 2.5 million barrels of oil a day,
which is about three percent of world output. That simply is not necessarily a
major force in the world oil markets, especially since oil markets have become
used to volatility from Iraqi supplies and quite adjusted to that.
Second,
world supply conditions are becoming quite ample at the moment. Non-OPEC supply
is likely to increase by a million barrels a day in the fourth quarter this year
compared to the third quarter, and OPEC producers have excess capacity of at
least four million barrels a day, which they could bring on-stream if necessary.
So
there's ample opportunity to replace Iraqi oil. In addition, there is the
question of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve here in the United States. There is
now relatively broad political consensus that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
should be used to combat politically motivated increases in oil prices or oil
price increases that are caused by extraordinary political events such as might
happen with the war with Iraq.
And
indeed, in the year 2000, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was last used.
Technically, what was done was a swap of 30 million barrels of oil that were
provided to oil companies in 2000 when the Clinton Administration thought the
price of oil was artificially high so long as the oil companies promised to
return a larger amount of oil at a future date. And such an arrangement could be
used this time as well if it looked like the price were starting to rise.
And
then finally let me just note that there is remarkably little potential that an
Iraq war would disrupt supplies from producers other than Iraq. There simply are
no credible military scenarios under which Iraq could disrupt production in
Arabian Peninsula countries and it is utter fantasy to think that the masses in
Saudi Arabia are going to rise in revolt if there is a war in Iraq.
First
off, the Saudi government, thank you, is very good at making sure that the Saudi
masses do not rise in revolt, and second, there is very little indication that
this issue is one that moves ordinary people in the oil-producing countries to
that extent.
Let
me pass on to perhaps the more interesting question of the post-Saddam period,
and in the post-Saddam period, Iraq has the potential to become a major oil
producer. Its oil reserves are the second largest after Saudi Arabia. There is
much potential to explore the country and find additional reserves.
From
a technical point of view, it will be quite possible for Iraq to increase output
from the present 2.5 million barrels a day to 4.5 million barrels a day within
less than three years, on the way up to six million barrels a day within five to
seven years, and eight million barrels a day within eight to ten years. Iraq has
ample reserves to sustain that.
But
that's the technical point of view, and the question of how much oil Iraq
produces is not primarily a technical question. The principal question is what
kind of relationship will Iraq have with the international oil companies? And
this is going to be a politically delicate issue, because there will be many in
Iraq who will want to tear up the existing contracts signed by the Iraqi
government, the Saddam government, with the Russians, the French and the Chinese
oil firms, for investments that could begin once U.S. sanctions have lifted, and
that's going to be a complicated decision-making process in Iraq.
Plus
there's going to be many in the Iraqi oil industry who are going to argue that
Iraqi oil engineers are quite capable, thank you, of doing these investment
projects themselves, and what they need from abroad is equipment and some money
and not necessarily the investments in international oil companies.
Now,
these are going to be delicate political issues to be resolved, and I would
counsel that these decisions should be made by the Iraqis themselves. The
debates about how to structure the Iraqi oil industry are going to be among the
most important for Iraq's future, and it will be tempting for friends of Iraq
like United States government to weigh in forcibly with their opinion. I think
that would be a mistake, because this issue of the relationships with
international oil companies is an extraordinarily sensitive issue for national
sentiments throughout the Middle East and most especially in Iraq.
And
so I think we should step aside and let the Iraqis decide on their own even if
they make what from our point of view is a rather peculiar decision.
And
indeed, let me use that to segue into what would be my main comment about Iraq's
economic potential post-Saddam, and that is that essentially how well Iraq's
economy does after Saddam is going to depend upon the kind of economic policies
that Iraq adopts, that Iraq is extremely well endowed with resources. It's
extremely well endowed with human resources. It's got a very educated population
and the universities in Iraq are still probably as good as those in any other
Arab country in spite of the deterioration under Saddam.
And
Iraq is very well endowed with natural resources, in oil, but water as well.
It's got the most water per capita of any country in the Middle East by far and
should have a basis for an excellent agricultural policy.
But
it is not resources, it is policies which are the principal determinant to
economic growth around the world, and here the Iraqi record, I'm afraid, has
been one of underachievement for decades. In the early 1950s, the World Bank
sent a mission to Iraq which did a very interesting and very detailed report,
full of recommendations, extremely few of which were implemented in the next 20
years.
And
that fits in a pattern that we've seen in Iraq over many decades, and that is
proud nationalist refusal to work with international companies. Oil is
discovered in Iraq in 1927, but production does not really begin until after
World War II, because of a stubborn confrontation about a well-to-do miner
concessions that Iraq was demanding from the foreign license holder.
And
similarly, Iraq got into a major dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Corporation,
the foreign company, about the development of an important oil field which was
discovered in the late 1950s, and which still had not really been developed at
the time of the invasion of Kuwait.
And
so the current 12-year dispute with the West since 1990 is really the third
episode in the last 70 years in which Iraq has gotten into a major confrontation
for nationalist political reasons that got in the way of lucrative oil
development, and in each of those three cases, Iraq blames the West for being
obstructionist.
This
does not augur well for the future. Indeed, it is discouraging to realize that
many of the problems of the Iraqi economy such as the heavy hand of the state on
the economy predate Saddam. Indeed, they predate the Baath Party taking power in
1968.
These
problems, to be sure, have gotten worse under Saddam and under the Baath Party.
I am particularly amazed at the ability of the Baath Party to take a country
which exported food for 3,000 years and make it into a country which has to
import 70 percent of its calories, and that figure, by the way, the 70 percent
imports, is from 1989, before the current difficulties.
Now,
post-Saddam, it's going to be very tempting for Washington, be in the U.S.
government in Washington or the international institutions I used to work for,
the IMF and the World Bank, it would be very tempting for them to rush forward
with advice to open up the economy to allow more room for market forces and to
facilitate international investment from trade, and indeed I think those would
be the best policies for Iraq's economy.
But
my advice would be let the Iraqis decide their own future even if the decisions
they make are not particularly wise ones.
Finally,
let me close with a note about debt and war compensation payments. Iraq has a
simply unsustainable burden of debt and war compensation payments. Including the
debts to Arab countries which Iraq thought would be forgiven and including the
interest which hasn't been paid in 12 years, Iraq's foreign debt could be easily
over $100 billion. And Iraq owes compensation payments which it's obliged to pay
under UN resolutions, Security Council resolutions.
The
remaining claims--they paid out about $15.5 billion so far. The two big
remaining claims are from the Kuwaiti government and the Kuwaiti oil company.
Now, those two have claimed that they're owed $160 billion. The UN Commission
has not adjudicated that claim yet, and they will probably reduce the amount
considerably, but anyway it's certainly the case that between the foreign debt
and compensation, Iraq owes a sum which is well in excess of what Iraq can
afford to pay.
And
Iraq is inevitably going to have to join that long list of developing countries
which paid off its debts at pennies on the dollar. And I think it would be
fitting for the United States to announce now that in a post-Saddam environment,
it would support a dramatic reduction of Iraq's debt and of its compensation
obligations. I think that would be much more important for thinking about the
future of Iraq's economy than some of the speculation about, oh, aren't we going
to have to step up with providing foreign aid to Iraq? No. If Iraq is relieved
of this clearly unsustainable debt and compensation burden, Iraq will be well
positioned to pay its own way in the world.
And
if Iraq adopts what I would regard as wise economic policies, it should become a
prosperous nation which is able in less than a decade to recapture the higher
incomes that it had before Saddam ravished the country.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: Why don't you guys just go ahead and do your commentary in the usual
fashion. And I'll sit down again.
MR.
SOBHANI: Well, thank you very much, AEI, for inviting me. Patrick's comments
about oil prices reminded me of a question that was posed-- some of you probably
have heard it before--of a U.S. diplomat as to what would have happened to the
world had it been President Khrushchev who was assassinated into of President
Kennedy. And his answer was I'm not sure what would happened to the world, but I
do know that Mr. Khrushchev would not have married Jackie Onasis, Jackie
Kennedy. So the uncertainty about the future aside, I think the foundation of
any post-Saddam economy has to be the rule of law.
No
capital investment will go into Iraq if there is not the rule of law. The first
thing that needs to happen is to jump-start the legal regime in order for
capital to flow into Iraq. That's the most important thing that can be done, and
while I'm speaking, I also would like to emphasize that much of what we're
talking here today, I think, should be on Radio Sawa and other media that are
going into Iraq so that before the first shot is fired, we are having a dialogue
with the people of Iraq as to what is important and that this campaign, I think
personally, should go beyond weapons of mass destruction. It's about the
liberation of a people who deserve a better future, and I think it's very
important for Radio Sawa and the other outlets that are talking to the Iraqi
people to start emphasizing this first.
I
agree with Patrick, one of the first ways to jump-start the Iraqi economy, I'd
go further and announce that Iraq simply does not have to pay any of those
obligations or debts because those were obligations and debts incurred by Saddam
Hussein, not the people of Iraq, and I think it's imperative for the Arab world,
if they have any interest in the people of Iraq, to stand up and see we forgive
those debts and obligations, because they were incurred by a dictator and not by
the people of Iraq, and that's very important to jump-start the Iraqi economy.
Third
factor--I'm going to get into oil because the discussion is about oil--but I
think it's also important that a central role be given as Patrick mentioned to
agriculture. In the 1960s, Iraq was a self-sufficient country in terms of
agricultural production export, and they can be a potential exporter of
agricultural good to their neighbors, and I think that Iraq should focus on
agriculture in addition to focusing on oil, so that it doesn't become an oil
economy.
A
few broad figures on Iraq's oil today. Many have quoted the figure of 112
billion barrels of proven oil reserves, second to Saudi Arabia. To put it in
context, we in the United States have 29 billion barrels of proven reserves. I
think with the proper amount of investments in Iraq and more exploration, you're
looking at double this figure of proven oil reserves. I think Iraq is probably
close to, if not a little less, but close to Saudi Arabia in terms of proven oil
reserves potentially.
In
fact, I would venture to say that when the last barrel of oil leaves the Persian
Gulf, it will say "Made in Iraq" and not "Made in Saudi
Arabia."
That's
in terms of its physical reserves. In terms of--and we're talking about oil,
gas, natural gas could be another engine for Iraq in the post-Saddam
environment. Iraq has roughly 109 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, easily
could be double this current amount. And Iraq--and I'm going to get into this a
little later--but gas, natural gas is also a factor in the future of Iraq and
Iraqi economy.
Now,
what can be done with this oil, with this resource? I think the model that could
be used, should be used, should be talked about by Iraqi experts and once again
by those who are talking to the Iraqi people are, for example, a production
sharing agreement can very well be the model on which Iraqi oil industry is
based.
It
is a model that has been tested in the former Soviet Union in countries like
Azerbaijan, and I think this is the key point. The Iraqi government after Saddam
that offers attractive rates of return will attract the capital that's necessary
from countries that are dragging their feet on attracting foreign oil companies.
So if the Iraqi government after Saddam offers a rate of return on a sliding
scale of let's say starting from 23 percent down to 20 percent, you will have
immediately attracted the attention of some of the major players in the oil
industry.
And
I would disagree slightly with Patrick here. I think it is important that we
emphasize the good work that American and European and other oil companies can
do for the people of Iraq in the future. And this once again goes to the heart
of U.S. policy. Before we fire the first shot, we need to educate the people
inside as to what it means to sign a production sharing contract with the people
of Iraq, because they will be the ultimate beneficiary of this contract.
The
production sharing agreement, until Iraq develops petroleum laws, can be signed
and ratified by a future Iraqi Parliament and have the rule of law within after
the Parliament signs it. In other words, if it's going to take some time for
Iraq to develop a petroleum law, in the meantime it can still sign production
sharing agreements that have the rule of law imbedded in it after the Parliament
agrees to it.
That's
on the way forward, and to give you a concrete example, to give you a concrete
example, a producing field in Iraq that has 300,000 barrels production per day
with in-place reserves of, let's say, three billion barrels can demand a bonus
from any foreign oil company that wanted to sign a production sharing agreement
of a billion dollars.
You
can jump-start the Iraqi economy by starting with identifying those fields that
need work and auctioning off the highest bidder. And you can get very attractive
offers from the international oil companies.
Natural
gas. Iraq has I think three very significant options on natural gas, because of
its abundance. One, it can explore with the help of the U.S. government. I think
here the U.S. government should through a grant maybe to the Iraqi National
Congress or some of my colleagues at this table to explore the opportunity of
gas to liquids in Iraq. Iraq's abundant natural gas could be used for GTL
projects, gas to liquid projects. I think LNG should be explored. There is a
pipeline, a natural gas pipeline that exists from southern Iraq to the border of
Syria. You extend that into Lebanon and you may be able to look into LNG process
for Lebanon.
And
the third and final option would be a pipeline carrying natural gas from Iraq
through Turkey into Europe, and once again I'll end by emphasizing that all that
has been discussed here today needs to be reflected through our public diplomacy
to the people of Iraq. It's very important that we educate the people of Iraq as
to the opportunity cost of Saddam and the opportunities that Iraq has through
its oil and gas resources. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR.
AL SHABIBI: Thank you very much. I'm really very glad to hear things about some
kind of position regarding the debt and reparations, and the awareness that
actually they are really a burden. We talked and lectured about that before, and
I recall since about six or seven years, and we were always saying that even
when the country is under sanctions, when sanctions are removed and you remain
with debt and reparations, you'll have actually another source of deficit. The
deficit will remain with you, and the deficit causes inflation.
Therefore,
it is very important as a start to show that Iraq no problems is to have a
package whereby sanctions are removed. I mean this is achievable, speaking about
that before, and the relief from debt and reparation.
Well,
just this is actually a point because I was really very glad that Mr. Sobhani
and Mr. Clawson were calling actually for this, because I think now the thinking
through on that, I think this is really very important, and it's important
actually not only for Iraq, it is important for increasing the importing
capacity of Iraq in the future.
And
it is, in fact, you either pay the creditor his debt or probably increase your
importing capacity in order to import it from the country of that creditor. So
the question is, is that increasing this capacity will, of course, contribute
very much to other countries.
Now
having said that, I would tend to agree with all that's said also about other
things. I will come to the question of foreign direct investment and these
things. What we need actually to see what is needed in Iraq is actually within
stages. I don't want, of course, to recall the problems in the past. We have
some ideas, of course, about the economic reasons for removing the regime that
are actually apart from political and human rights. I mean there are actually
policies which actually necessitate that this regime is removed because of the
wastage of resources.
But
I just want to sum up. The regime actually had for Iraq an oil for
militarization program, oil for weapons program. The UN gave us a program which
is called "Oil for Food." The Iraqis never saw an oil for development
program. This is actually I want, which means actually oil was wasted.
What
Iraq needs is to start with, and as a priority, is to restore stability,
macroeconomic stability. And then to maintain that stability. Afterwards
actually it should resume growth on the basis of this stability. Iraq is like a
sick man who is in a coma. I always bring this example. You cannot actually
bring him to run before actually you stabilize him, you wake him up, and he sits
and then he can run or walk. It depends on the speed of the growth.
So
within this strategy, I want to actually to stress one point here. Where the
international community comes, I said we have actually a first stage, which is
actually, let us say, the short term, or the very short term, is to restore
stability, which is really to lift the value of the dinar, because it is really
now the source of inflation. And, of course, the problems of Iraq is basically
related to inflation, all the social problems, all distribution problems
relating to the distribution of income and wealth. People are selling everything
because of inflation.
So
actually lifting the value of the dinar, the exchange rate of the dinar, is the
essence of this question. What is actually needed to be done in this? And here
actually where for this first period, where probably the international community
and the help from the international community is needed.
To
attack the problem of inflation, you have international and regional dimension
and domestic dimension. But I'm going to concentrate on the international and
regional dimension because the question here in the short term, because of the
fact there is no capacity for Iraq to produce or to trade. So the most important
input, the most important input in this stage is actually resources.
Later
on, policies are important. I mean, of course, there will be policies important
also, but I mean it's a question of weight. So here actually what you need is
resources, and where these resources come to. And this needs to be good
resources.
First,
actually there should be immediate release of Iraqi assets. Once the economy
feels that there is infusion of resources, there will be an immediate positive
effect on the value of the dinar, which we said actually is the objective of
this phase. And this actually will help actually lift the value of the dinar.
I
said the release of Iraqi assets. Secondly, the releasing of the unspent
balances in the escrow account of the "Oil for Food." Then, Iraq to
approach maximum oil export capacity. This is a question of negotiation with
OPEC members. Stand still on payment of debt and reparation. At this stage you
don't negotiate. You just say that these payments will have to be suspended.
Of
course, I mean we know that debt, as Mr. Clawson was saying, debt is not being
paid, but I'm talking here about standing still regarding the interest. Interest
shouldn't be accumulating because interest will be part of the gross debt if we
leave it like that.
Therefore,
we don't want the debt to be accumulating during this period. And then, of
course, substantial financial assistance. The question here is, of course--I
mean the question of debt and reparation, obviously there will be a need to
negotiate or to deal with this subject with the UN and with the creditors.
And
in this case, of course, you need, of course, assistance of the most influential
countries in the world and, of course, the international community. I mean even
with the Bretton Woods institutions, if you need to address the question of
debt--Mr. Clawson knows, of course --the question here, if you need to go to the
Paris Club, you have to go through an IMF reform program, and then you need, of
course, some support in this.
So,
regarding this, therefore, there should be a commitment, as actually Mr. Clawson
was saying, a commitment on the part of the international community to indicate
to the Iraqis its goodwill that it's going to address this problem and to
indicate that Iraq will get some help or technical assistance in order to attack
these problems.
Therefore,
this will be a signal to the economy and definitely, I mean obviously when there
is a change, there will be a lift to the Iraqi dinar, but these additional
measures will help, of course.
Then--one
minute please--the question of foreign direct investment. Well, I completely
agree. A country now afflicted with debt and reparation and shortage of
resources, foreign direct investment, if the debt and reparation are not
relieved, is going to be very important, definitely. But then it should be, of
course, discussed and should be subject to the development strategy of the
country.
The
question here is, of course, it is very important that an investor, that the
investor goes to the country if he sees that, of course, rule of law, but if he
sees also a stable macroeconomic stability. So the country who wants to invest
should also help Iraq in order for Iraq to attain macroeconomic stability, and
the relief of debt and reparations will be very important.
So
the two things are related. If you want to invest, you should help Iraq in order
to actually get these things relieved. Otherwise, no investor will come to Iraq
if he sees that the rate of exchange is very low on these things, and therefore
this is very important.
The
other point is that when we talk about development of Iraq, we talk about
development of the non-oil sector. So we would like to encourage investment not
only in the oil sector, but also in the non-oil sector, in agriculture, for
example, joint projects and these things.
And,
of course, all these things should, as I said, take development objective into
account and the development objectives should be set not only by the government,
and least by the government. It should be set in discussion with the private
sector in the country, so that there will be joint projects and joint
investments with the foreign companies.
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MR.
ALOLOM: Thank you. I'm happy to see some slight difference among the speakers
when they're discussing the issue of Iraq and oil and the future. I try to
bring, to put forward the following two questions, and from there I will take
it.
The
first question: does Iraq have the potential to become one of the top three
countries exporting oil? The question, yes, especially on the short-term. I'm
talking right now the first question regarding to the short term.
And
the longer-term, the following question comes: does Iraq have the potential to
become the leading country. Based on my experience and opinion, I say yes. And I
take that yes to make another conclusion is Iraq may play a bigger part in the
strategy of oil and Iraq become, could become a deciding factor in the balance
of supply and demand.
But
that big yes, there's another big if sitting beside it. If two conditions can be
provided. First, political instability; second, access to the oil technology. To
rebuild future Iraq, democratic Iraq, we need, well, on this point, I try to
follow up on some point that was mentioned in the first session in the morning.
I'm trying to suggest that in order to rebuild a strong democratic Iraq,
probably we may need a UN multinational force to be present in Iraq at least for
the four to five next years.
And
the reason for that, the dual objective in this suggestion. The first one is
sort of life insurance for continuing the social and political changes. Second,
it's a great incentive for attracting the international oil companies.
Now,
I would like to come to the point that Mr. Sobhani made. When it comes to the
oil resource, I definitely agree with him. The figure that has been reported
since 1992, that the proven reserve in Iraq is 112 billion. I think Iraq
deserves figure higher than this. And the possible reserve is double that I
think. If you consider only the south sector of Iraq and if you only look for
the way that the oil discovery comes to the existence in 1970 till '80s, more
than 60 oil discoveries in the south, and except maybe 30 to 40 of them have
been developed during the '70s.
And
we are not talking about the western Sahara. We are not talking about the
potential of oil reserve at the depth. If you put all of these together,
especially I'm saying the south, because really taking, the discovery is taking
some exponential care, and oil expert, they may understand what I'm saying,
exponential care.
If
we're talking about the oil reserve and oil reserves, that is the other
important point, I would like to bring it, and I agree with Patrick about it.
That Iraq has the human reserves capable of running the oil industry. What we
need is the technology, oil technology. We need the oil technology to repair and
fix the developing oil fields.
We
need the oil technology to develop the existing oil fields. We need oil
technology for the new oil discoveries, and we need oil technology to install
the service facilities. This comprehensive program cannot be achieved and can
only be feasible through active participation of the international oil company,
through deals that strike the right, that strike the right between the company
profit and the Iraq interests.
I
see the--thank you for that.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: We're going to take questions and we'll have a little while. I'm going
to actually do the hideously rude thing and indulge myself by asking the first
question. So I'm calling on myself.
I'd
really be curious to hear an answer from any one of you who advocated the
complete and total debt relief for Iraq, what effect do you think that would
have on our efforts to build an international coalition, particularly given that
a lot of those debts are to Russia and to France?
MR.
CLAWSON: Well, the way these things have been done in some other circumstances
is the debts, by the way, are almost entirely the governments. The debts to
private companies were taken over by governments. So, for instance, a number of
American companies, a number of American banks that made loans to the Iraqi
government for the purchase of agricultural commodities, guaranteed, and those
loans were guaranteed by the U.S. government. The U.S. government paid off those
banks long ago.
So
it's basically government to government debt we're talking about. And what you
would do is you would convene a meeting of the Paris Club and let's say all the
countries around the table would agree that-- some formula like this--we will
agree half of Iraq's debt and we will encourage individual member countries to
forgive more.
So
that that way you could knock Iraq's debt back in one stroke from 100 billion to
50 billion, and then you could have a number of the major countries like the
United States, France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, announce that they would then
forgive the rest.
So
then Iraq--then Russia would get back say half of what it's owed, and they like
to cite the figure of $8 billion which actually I think was an underestimate. So
they get back a fair chunk of money, but meanwhile the total amount that Iraq
owes would be greatly reduced.
And
as I say, I would stop the compensation payments after everyone has been paid
other than the Kuwaiti oil company and the Kuwaiti government and just simply
say those two payments are only going to be made at a very low level.
MS.
PLETKA: Thank you. Mr. Shabibi.
MR.
AL SHABIBI: Yes, I agree actually. The question, of course, Russia now has
started to participate with the Paris Club, and, of course, Iraq being, of
course, government to government debt, I mean it can, of course, deal with that
there partly. But, of course, I mean there could be so bad deals because of the
fact now there are some kind--I mean Russia was interested in having investments
in Iraq and these things. Part of the revision of those deals, because I think
they should be revised, is actually something of this sort now, is, of course,
to offer some kind of deals to Russia and to another country in order some sort
of debt equity swap or something like that.
I
mean this can be thought of. I mean one cannot be detailed now, but I mean the
question is there is a direction. I mean I just want to bring an example here.
Some companies who actually made, submitted the claims to the compensation
commission withdrew the claims because they were actually worried about their
investment opportunities.
I
mean the claims were very much less than--some of them were very much less than
the debt. So it might as well just happen to debt also.
MS.
PLETKA: Thank you. Thank you, all.
MR.
LEWIS: One word on this point, if I may.
MS.
PLETKA: Please and then let's go to questions.
MR.
LEWIS: On this question of forgiving debts, yes, I agree that there would be a
strong case for forgiving debts of the Iraqi state, but I don't see why the
debts of Saddam--
MS.
PLETKA: We can't hear you.
MR.
LEWIS: Thank you. On the question of forgiving debts owed by the state of Iraq,
yes, I agree that much, perhaps even the greater part of these debts should be
forgiven. But as was frankly said, these were debts incurred by Saddam, and I
don't see why debts should not be owed by Saddam and his heirs. There must be
quite a lot of money available.
MS.
PLETKA: Well, there's a solution. Okay. Question? Sir, in the back.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: My question is to Patrick. You made it very clear that the U.S. is
not going to war because of oil, but then you stated that they're going to war
because of WMDs and to protect its neighbors. As far as I'm aware, in any
language I've come across with that issue, the time neighbors has come up is
concerned during war, but not going to war because of neighbors. So I'm not
sure. Is that the case in your mind? That they're going to war to protect its
neighbors in addition to WMDs, of course.
MR.
CLAWSON: Look it's quite clear that in recent years, Iraq has not actively
threatened its neighbors such as Kuwait, but it's also the case that the Iraqi
government periodically or--excuse me--important members of the Iraqi government
periodically restate their claims to Kuwait. So we've seen, for instance, the
Iraqi Parliament has still got that famous map that shows Kuwait as part of Iraq
up there, and Uday loves to run articles and babble about Kuwait really is the
19th province and the like.
And
I think you're going to find that there's certainly a great many people in
Kuwait who firmly think that if the United States military presence were not
there, that Iraq would restate its claims to Kuwait and Iraq would threaten
Kuwait again.
So
I would make the argument that given the opportunity, Saddam would dearly like
to be able to conquer Kuwait and indeed given the opportunity, he'd like to
change the arrangement with the Iranians about the Shalarab [ph], if not even
exert more claims against Iran.
So
I would argue that the reason that Saddam's threat to its neighbors is in
remission is simply because of the large-scale U.S. military presence nearby.
MS.
PLETKA: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: I wanted to ask Mr. Clawson two questions. One is you suggested
that the world would be better off if the Iraqis themselves decide on how to
restructure their economy and that your former organization, the IMF and the
World Bank, United States, should not necessarily rush in to help them do that.
Can you explain why you feel that way and what would be the benefit to not
having those organizations coming in?
Secondly,
on a much different tact, I'm interested in your opinion on how you think a
regime change in Iraq would impact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
MR.
CLAWSON: Well, on the first question, Iraqis are a very nationalist people. I
mean the British show up after all with a mandate in 1919, and there's the great
revolt in 1920. The British have a lot of experience establishing colonial rule
in many parts of the Middle East, and this is really the only place that they
faced a major revolt as soon as they walked in.
And
we've seen a lot of nationalistic revolts even in the pre-Baath period in Iraq,
and if the United States were to invade Iraq, there would certainly be
suspicions among some Iraqis that we did not have the best interests of Iraqis
in mind.
And
under those circumstances, I think it's best for us to err on the side of
caution, and in particular given that Iraqis do have some quite competent
technocrats, I would think that it would be well for us to let them make the key
decisions about where Iraq's economic policy should lie.
I
say that firmly convinced that Iraq would do well to listen to the advice from
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but I just think that
politically it could be destabilizing. As my colleagues have pointed out, the
rule of law is the single-most important thing for reviving the economy. And if
there is instability in the country, periodic coups, resentment against the new
government that's caused by its perception that it's too much under Washington's
thumbs, that would undermine the rule of law and the prospects for the economy.
On
the second question about the impact of a regime change on the
Israel-Palestinian arena, that's obviously not the subject of this panel. Let me
just suggest that the last time that Saddam was knocked down in 1990-91, that
had a considerable impact in taking the wind out of the sails of those who
thought that Israel could be indeed eradicated.
Unfortunately,
there are still some people who think in terms of the elimination of the state
of Israel, and I would think that the defeat of Saddam Hussein would be yet
another deterrent to their perception that they could, in fact, eliminate
Israel.
MR.
AL SHABIBI: On this, actually the first point here is that Patrick was, of
course, saying something about the Iraqis can, of course, handle all these
things. That's largely true, but the question here is exchange of experiences in
the form of technical assistance projects are very important for Iraq. Whether
actually from UN agencies, UNDP, I mean even my organization, UNDP, and Bretton
Woods institutions, I mean there is always, of course, integrated program and
cooperation between those agencies.
The
question here is the technical assistance and Iraq doesn't have anything, any
system on debt restructuring, debt management, it doesn't have actually any
technical assistance about foreign direct investment. There are good laws on
paper. Integration to the world trading system, the world financial system. I
mean all these things, Iraq was isolated. So we are not saying here that Iraq
would need actually the experience of other countries, and this can be formed
through technical cooperation projects.
The
other point which actually Professor Lewis was mentioning, in fact, there is a
tendency now within Bretton Woods institutions and these things that the debt
relief should be given to countries that actually put participation as a
condition. I mean the HIPC initiative, for example, for debt relief is the
relief to be given to countries which actually believe in participation and
believe in transparency and these things.
I
think this should be applied to countries who actually, who are not
participating countries or representative countries. Their debt actually, the
debt which is actually contracted by them, should be actually exempted on the
countries.
MS.
PLETKA: Anybody else? Questions? Take somebody over here. The young man. You can
point to each other. You can take turns with the microphone. Go ahead.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Can he go first?
MS.
PLETKA: Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Thank you. My question may or may not be within the purview of this
panel. In the 12 years since the Soviet Union fell, the Russian government has
had a lot of difficulty constructing a state with an effective and enforceable
tax policy with property rights and strong contract rights.
And
some have suggested that the reason for that is that Russia has tremendous oil
reserves, and there would be no incentive for the new government to develop an
effective tax policy with all the attendant liberal rights.
And
my question is do you think there's a way to approach the oil question in Iraq
that avoids this problem?
MS.
PLETKA: Who is taking this one?
MR.
CLAWSON: I'm pessimistic. There have been a number of quite interesting economic
studies about oil is a curse and natural resource endowments is a curse. And
that it's going to be a problem. On the other hand, if I might point out, the
oil income which after all forms more than 90 percent of government revenue,
more than 90 percent export proceeds and over a third of the national income,
this is a powerful factor holding Iraq together.
And
there have been many people who have talked about the dangers that Iraq could
split up into three parts based on the three major ethnic groups, the Kurds, the
Sunnis and the Shiites, and I recently brought together a group of people for
the Washington Institute to study this matter, and if you don't mind my saying,
plugging our little book on it, How to Build a New Iraq after Saddam, one of the
things we said was, look, that this oil income is a powerful prize.
And
that while many people in Iraq may not particularly like living together in one
country with those other people, they all want their share of the oil income.
So, yes, the oil income may cause some of the problems you cited, but on the
other hand, it helps keep the country together.
MR.
SOBHANI: If I may just add, I think one of the fundamental problems of the
Persian Gulf is that the means of production are in the hands of the state. And
that's where I think the U.S. government while we're embarking on this Iraq
campaign should conduct a study with the private sector, with think tanks, as
what it would mean for Iraq and the Iraqi people if the oil industry was
gradually privatized, so that the oil did not belong to one person or one group
after Saddam Hussein.
We
in our country have a system where we auction off our blocks. Whoever puts up
the highest price gets that and just provides the royalty to the state of Alaska
if it's in Alaska or to Louisiana if it happens to be the Gulf of Mexico.
George
Bush does not control oil production in America. And I think the beginnings of
liberal democracy can be achieved if you start taking the means of production
out of the hands of the state.
Now,
in the case of Iraq, as Patrick said, there's nationalism, there's other issues,
but I think it's worth studying it.
MS.
PLETKA: Go ahead, please.
MR.
AL SHABIBI: Yes. The question of taxation is very important. I think the oil
curse and thus disease is actually making a lot of countries or oil exporting
countries dependent on oil, and they don't want actually to depend on any other
resource. But when we talk about diversification of the economy in terms of
production, and in terms of finance, this is actually very important.
And
this should be part of the objective, to have a tax, an efficient tax system,
and in addition to that, taxation, of course, will make people feel that they
have a share in the country and, of course, they can hold the government--I mean
we are thinking all about democracy and these things. Therefore, I mean they
will ask the government to be actually accountable.
MR.
ALOLOM: I would like to make a comment on the disintegration of Iraq. I heard
this rumor for long last ten years. I think the source of these rumors, if you
look at them in detail, is coming from Saddam regime and his friends. Neither
Kurdish nor Sunni nor Shiite people would like to create a state. They would
like to live together and that is their fate and they will stay forever for
that.
MS.
PLETKA: You have the mike.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Yeah, hi. The Wall Street Journal. Mr. Sobhani actually
preempted my question, which is what is going to happen, who in fact will own
Iraqi national oil company, but we could boot that up a level. In Russia, one of
the most critical things to what success they've had was privatizing oil, and
one of the most corrupt sectors was gas, which they did not privatize.
And
could I put the question on the table: can you possibly have the free democratic
country we're talking about if you have oil in the hands of government? The
connection being how would you have anything other than a substantially command
economy if the government controls all the oil revenues, it will have to dole
that out, to imagine that that will be done in some way that rivals the
efficiency of the market is impossible.
And
I see Patrick looking with skepticism here, but how do you square that basic
economic problem you're going to create if you keep it in government hands with
the political freedom that you're talking about?
MR.
CLAWSON: For 75 years, modern Iraqi nationalism has defined itself around the
issue of control of oil and resistance to foreign oil intervention. You walk
into that country and announce that what you're going to do is privatize oil
company, and you're going to be stuck there for decades until you leave with
your tail between your legs.
That's
a formula for disaster. I'm firmly convinced that the proposal that Rob made is
in the best interests of the Iraqi people. I'm not convinced that you can sell
the Iraqi people on that. And I'm certainly not convinced that you can do it if
you start walking in from the beginning doing that. And his caution about
studying it is well put.
What
we can hope for in Iraq, I think, over the next decade is that we can have a
government that becomes respectful of human rights and is representative, is
that, let us say, in a number of oil producing countries that have
semi-functioning democracies. I think of a Venezuela. I think of an Indonesia. I
think of a Nigeria. I think even of a Kuwait.
And
I would hope that--none of those are by any means perfectly functioning
democracies--but, boy, they are a whole lot better than what Iraq has got now.
And that I would hope over time, this issue would become less sensitive, but
this, I mean this is the third rail of Iraqi politics with a vengeance.
MR.
SOBHANI: Just by way of figures, one can estimate the value of those assets at
approximately 1.2, $1.3 trillion. Okay. That's the oil that I'm talking about.
One methodology could be, and I agree with Patrick--it can't be done
overnight--one methodology could be that the Iraqi national oil company becomes
a working interest partner in production sharing contracts, maybe up to 20, 30
percent for each contract.
Once
you've monetized those assets, then the Iraqi national oil company can start
selling its working interests to the public, and that might be the beginning of
a privatization process. But certainly it can't be done overnight, but I also
firmly believe--I think Patrick agrees as well--it would be to the interest of
the Iraqi people.
But
it's going to take a lot of selling to do, a lot of marketing to do.
MS.
PLETKA: Let me just look over here. Sorry. Let me ask this lady and I'll come
back to you, and just a couple more questions. Actually I think the lady in the
back in the red.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Hi. This is a question for Patrick but I'd also like to hear
what the rest of the panel has to say. You were talking earlier about oil and
the economy of Iraq downstream, and there's been some talk as the United States
is trying to get particularly Russia to come on board behind a new resolution on
Iraq, that the United States could possibly make some sort of offers to Iraq
regarding oil contracts downstream and also repayment of the debt.
Is
that at all practical, and if it were practical, is there a price to be paid for
making those offers?
MR.
CLAWSON: Tell me if I understood your question correctly. In other words, is
there something that we can offer Russia about the post-war Russian economic
relations with Iraq which would both be appropriate and influence Russia?
Well,
I would say that the question of debt we should be prepared to recognize that
Russia is not as well to do as many of the other creditors of Iraq, such as the
United States or Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, and that therefore that Russia might
well, special arrangements might well be made for Russia on the repayment side.
And
on the question of the interest of Russian oil companies, I guess my attitude
would be to say to Lukoil executives that it's not going to be in their best
interests of their company to try to develop an oil field on their own. They're
going to want to have consortia partners. And we would certainly want to see
Lukoil play a role in the oil fields which has got some contracts with the
Saddam era. But it has to understand that it's going to be natural that a new
government is going to want to redefine the terms and conditions.
In
other words, Russian oil companies aren't going to be locked out of Iraq, as
they're worried about. But no, they're not going to have the kind of special
privilege position which they may have hoped to have. And I think that that's a
reasonable offer to put on the table to the Russians.
MS.
PLETKA: Yes, sir. I think we better make this our last question. Sorry.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Mr. Clawson, again to you. I'm impressed by your pragmatism, but
I'm afraid a bit disappointed by your cynicism.
[Laughter.]
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: We're looking--
MR.
CLAWSON: It comes from years working at the IMF.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: All right. But we are, please remember we're looking at a new
vision in Iraq, we're looking at a change, we're looking at a whole new
dimension that was articulated so well this morning by Mr. Makiya.
Take
one quick trip in the Middle East, of all places to the Emirates, UAE. In the
Emirates, you have the UAE and then you have Dubai. One has the oil that the
whole economy is driven by the oil. The other has a semblance of a private
market, and it's thriving. When you go from one to the other, the stark
difference is very evident, and we have to look at Iraq in the same way. We
can't cloud it and frame it by, well, it may not, 75 years of nationalism, and
then have the tail between the legs and run off.
I'm
afraid that won't fly, because the proof of the past is not what's going to
direct the future of Iraq.
MR.
CLAWSON: Sir, Dubai works so well because there is broad consensus in Dubai in
favor of those kinds of open and free market policies. There isn't a way in
which you can implement those kind of policies effectively in any country unless
there is a broad consensus in favor of them.
And
I dearly hope that we can develop a broad consensus in favor of those kind of
policies in Iraq as quickly as possible. I'm just simply saying I think that
it's important that the Iraqis themselves come to that decision, because if we
walk in there and announce you have to implement the Washington consensus, as
it's often called, about free markets and open, that this would be seen by some
in Iraq, certainly seen by many in the Middle East, as America stuffing American
economic policies and advice down the throat of the Iraqis.
So
while I dearly hope that the Iraqis do decide to follow the Dubai example, I
hope that they decide to follow the Dubai example, and it is not one which we in
a post-Saddam government, especially if we are in a position of much authority
in that post-Saddam government, strongly recommend they impose on the Iraqis.
Let them develop themselves.
I
hope that that's direction they go in. I would advise them to go in that
direction, but I would err on the side of being cautious and that it seems to me
that the most fundamental thing to do post-Saddam is to rebuild the political
system and I wouldn't want to threaten doing that because I have been so fervent
in imposing economic policies that I think are best.
MS.
PLETKA: Anybody else? Final word?
MR.
SOBHANI: There was a question back there, I think, the gentlemen.
MS.
PLETKA: I think we have to cut it off though because we have to take a break.
No, can't wait anymore. Let's take a break. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: Ten minutes and we'll be back, so drink quick.
[Whereupon,
a short break was taken.]
MR.
GERECHT: Now, the fourth panel and the last panel for today is officially called
"Post-Saddam Foreign Policy: Iraq's International Obligations, UN
Resolutions and Regional Relations." I think to put that a little bit more
simply, it's about Iraq and the world or perhaps even more particularly Iraq and
the Middle East.
Now,
our presenter here today will be Bernard Lewis. I think of all the speakers here
today, he needs the least introduction. I will just simply that Professor Lewis
has been essential reading on the Middle East and Islam ever since the
publication of his dissertation on the assassins in 1939.
Also,
on the panel, we have Mr. Serif Egeli. Now, he is an accomplished Turkish
businessman and according to reliable sources an extremely politically savvy
businessman, who has extensive first-hand knowledge about the Middle East and
particularly about Iraq.
Also
with us today is Mr. Nawaf Obaid, who is a Saudi oil and security analyst who
was in the past a researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
and also a consultant to the State Department.
And
we also have from Paris from the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique,
and I just noticed someone misspelled that, is Olivier Roy, who is without
question one of the most original and provocative minds on Islam and the Middle
East, and certainly his writings on Afghanistan and Islamic militancy, at least
in my opinion, are seminal.
So
with that I shall turn it over to Professor Lewis.
MR.
LEWIS: Thank you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My assignment, as I
understand it, is to consider the position of a post-Saddam Iraq in a global and
regional context, dealing with what we more commonly call questions of foreign
policy and international relations.
There
are two great fears that trouble people over this question. One is that the
attempt to establish a democracy in Iraq might fail, a fear which causes great
concern in many parts of the world.
And
there is also the second, perhaps even greater fear, that it might succeed.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: Which causes immense concern in the greater part of the Middle East. I
want to look at these two separately and look also at the different ways in
which they are being considered, evaluated and interpreted.
Broadly
speaking, there are two points of view which predominate in the discussion of
these matters, and more particularly considering the question of whether it is
possible to establish a democratic regime worthy of the name in Iraq after the
departure by whatever method of Saddam Hussein.
Now,
as I said, there are two predominant points of view. One of them could be summed
up something like this: The Arabs are incapable of democratic government. This
is a purely Western phenomenon which works in a limited number of Western
countries. Most of continental Europe is only just beginning to learn about it.
And the idea of establishing a democratic regime in a country like Iraq is, to
say the very least, phantasmagoric.
Arabs
are different from us, and we just be more, shall we say, reasonable both in
what we expect from them and, of course, in what they may expect from us.
Whatever we do, these countries will be ruled by corrupt tyrants and the aim of
foreign policy, therefore, should be to make sure that they are friendly tyrants
rather than hostile tyrants.
That
I think is a fair summary of what is usually known as the pro-Arab point of
view.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: And the other one, the other point of view is somewhat different. It
begins more or less from the same point, that these countries are not
democracies, and that there will be some difficulty in establishing democracies,
but this point of view goes, they are teachable, and it is possible with our
help and guidance to establish democracies in these countries, to start them and
help them and gradually launch them on our way, on their way, I should say.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: This point of view is known as imperialism. This was the method adopted
in the British and French empires, in their mandated territories and in some of
their colonies, creating governments in their own image. In Iraq, in Syria and
elsewhere, the British creating constitutional monarchies, the French creating
unstable republics.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: None of them worked very well. But hope still remains. The Indian
example, I think, is the most encouraging of all and shows that it can work, it
can happen, provided that the circumstances are right.
Well,
then where does this leave us after this, shall we say, somewhat discouraging
opening? Let's begin with the hypothesis of failure. It can't work. It fails
because of the factionalism, the general incapacity of the people of Iraq to run
a democratic government.
The
specific dangers obviously are a break up of Iraq into--I was going to say into
its component parts, but that would be too difficult to define with any
precision. The break-up of Iraq. Let's pause at that point.
This
is no doubt a real danger as has been pointed out several times in the course of
the day. There are important differences within Iraq. There's the ethnic
difference, Arabs being the largest, Kurds the second-largest, and other smaller
groups of whom the Turkoman are certainly the most important, the only one that
could provide the basis for any sort of political claim.
There
are other religious differences, Sunni and Shiite, and there is the real
danger--it must be admitted that if Iraq does indeed break up, this would have a
disruptive effect on neighboring countries, and the emergence of a Kurdish state
in the north would certainly cause, shall we say, acute anxiety in Turkey. And
perhaps also in Iran and other places where there are Kurdish minorities.
This
would make Iraq a danger spot for the whole region, east and west and north and
south. The other, and as I said, for most people in the region the greater
danger, is that it would succeed, that there would indeed be a civilized, human,
decent, democratic government in Iraq, elected by and answerable to the people
of Iraq and maintaining the rule of law, civil liberties and other things which
we in the Western world take for granted, but which in the greater part of the
rest of the world are either new or still unknown.
Here
again the difficulties are obvious: inexperience being the most important of
them. I would draw attention here to the experience of the Turkish Republic. It
is true--no one, I think, can dispute it--that to establish democratic rule,
democratic institutions in countries with ancient and immemorial traditions of
command and obedience, as the two basic political roles, is a difficult thing.
Now,
I think that the experience of the Turkish Republic over the last half century
has demonstrated two points. One, that it is extremely difficult to create a
democracy in such a society, and the second is that though difficult, it is not
impossible. And I feel here that the example in this broader Middle Eastern and
Islamic context is a very encouraging one.
We
tend to speak of these immemorial traditionals of obedience and command as if it
had always been like that. It has not always been like that. There were, I won't
say, democratic but certainly less dictatorial or despotic regimes in the past
in the regime. Dictatorship is a modern innovation due largely to modernization
either inspired by the West or imitating the West. We should have no illusions
about that, and I think that for that reason a lot of the hostility, which is
directed against the West, blaming us in the West for these troubles, has some
justification.
Let
me just take two points which I think are important. Two things which the West
has done, which westernization has done, modernization if you prefer it. One is
the reinforcement of the sovereign power. Thanks to the modern apparatus of
surveillance and repression, a ruler in the Middle East today has authority over
his people far greater, far profounder, than was ever achieved by the legendary
autocrats of the past.
Saddam
Hussein, even a petty dictator of a mini-state, as authority vastly beyond the
imaginings of a Hiranaroshed [ph] or a Silaman the Magnificent [ph]. Those were
restricting regimes, autocratic, yes, but autocratic under law.
And
the second thing that modernization has done is further to strengthen the
autocracy by either weakening or abrogating the intermediate powers, those
elements and orders in society, and here I think of the late autumn and term
"aryiane [ph]," the usually translated the notables. Well, in French,
social, economic groups, which were able to exercise a restrictive effect on the
autocracy of the sultans and caliphs of old. Those also were abrogated or
enfeebled by the process of modernization.
So
the kind of dictatorship which exists in the Middle East now has to no small
extent been the result of modernization, which, in fact, means Westernization.
On the one hand, because of the changes which it wrought, and on the other by
providing the only European models that really worked in the Middle East, the
model of the one party state, the communist model and the Nazi model which for
this purpose do not differ greatly, where the party is part of the operators of
government and has a function of surveillance, repression and indoctrination.
The
Baath has a double ancestry, both fascist and communist, and still represents
both trends very well.
Why
then do I think there is hope? Well, as I said, there are these older
traditions, I will not say of democratic government but of government under law,
government by consent, and government by contract in the Islamic world. The
Islamic traditional perception of government is contractual and consensual. And
this I think holds possibilities for the future.
Now,
I was asked to deal specifically with questions of international relations, so
let me turn to those points and dealing with what I suppose are the two main
issues which will interest outsiders.
The
first is will there be, will the policies of a post-Saddam Iraq be pro-Western,
will they be sympathetic and friendly to us? I choose to add sympathetic and
friendly rather than subservient because if it's the second we're hoping for,
then we're defeated from the beginning.
I
see many reasons why they should be sympathetic and friendly, though I would not
put it past the powers of our diplomatists to snatch defeat from the jaws of
victory.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: Would there be peace with Israel? Here, again, a difficult question to
answer. Undoubtedly, the struggle against Israel is not very high on the list of
priorities of those who look for greater freedom in their own countries. But we
don't know where that will lead afterwards. It may be that a democratic
government, responsive to the wishes of its people, might become even more
hostile to Israel rather than more inclined to making peace.
But
I don't think so, and let me in concluding offer you one simple, but I think
effective, reason why that is not likely to be the case, if the governments are
truly democratic. It has often been said that democracies do not start wars,
though they usually finish them. It is true. Democracies do not start wars for a
very simple reason. Democratic governments are answerable to their electors, and
may be dismissed from office by their electors, and most electorates in most
countries do not like wars, nor do they like governments which start wars.
Dictatorships,
on the other hand, don't make peace, because they need a state of war. They need
an outside enemy against which to deflect the anger, the resentments, the
pent-up grievances of their own people. They simply cannot afford to make peace,
and we have seen several times in recent years to what desperate measures they
resorted when there was a real danger that peace might break out.
I
don't need to elaborate on that. I think you will get my point. For that reason,
it seems to me that a more democratic form of government in the greater part of
the region would be more inclined to seek peaceable solutions to problems, the
Palestine problem among others, than to perpetuate a state of war and conflict.
But,
of course, there is the other consideration, the more important larger regional
one. And here it seems to me that there has been a tremendous overall change in
the situation in the Middle East in recent years, the like of which we have not
seen for centuries. Modern history of the Middle East by common consent begins
with the arrival of General Bonaparte in Egypt in 1798. His arrival in Egypt and
his ouster by the Royal Navy commanded by Admiral Nelson, that established a
pattern that rivalry of outside powers seeking domination or at least
predominance in the region, and the role for Middle Eastern politicians was to
play them off against one another and take what advantage they could from these
external rivalries.
That
ended suddenly and dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union. There
have been a number of different actors in this scenario over the last two
centuries, but the scenario basically remained the same. And suddenly the
scenario was changed. Instead of two, there was only one outside power, and the
old imperial games seemed to have stopped.
No
one was playing it. The Russians because they couldn't; the Americans because
they wouldn't. They disclosed neither the desire nor the aptitude for that kind
of policy. They were attempts to, shall we say, create or discover a substitute
for the Third Reich in the Soviet Union in the leadership of the anti-Western
forces. This was offered to Europe. Some were willing to adopt it, but for the
most part they lacked both the will and certainly the capacity to play this
role.
So
where do we go from here? Let me conclude by quoting a conversation which I had
not long ago in Jordan in Amman with some Jordanian and Palestinian friends. We
were arguing all the different aspects of this question, and then one of them,
as he thought, ended the conversation with a line of argument which I'm sure
we've all heard before. He said we can wait. Time is on our side. We got rid of
the Crusaders, we got rid of the Turks, we got rid of the British, we'll get rid
of the Jews. You must all have heard this before.
I
said excuse me, but your history isn't right. He said what do you mean my
history isn't right? That's how it happened. I said, no. He said the Turks got
rid of the Crusaders, the British got rid of the Turks, the Jews got rid of the
British. In this sequence, I wonder who is coming here next.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: All right. We'll just go to the panel now, and we will just go around
the table starting with Serif, Mr. Egeli.
MR.
EGELI: Thank you. Professor Lewis is always very hard to comment after your
wonderful speeches as always, but I will try to put here the view of a Turkish
businessman who was one of the first pioneers of Turks going to do business in
the Middle East. I visited Saudi Arabia and Iraq in '71, and since then
extensively traveled around the Middle East and did a lot of jobs.
Now,
I am a citizen of the Turkish Republic. Turkish Republic was one of the 47
nations emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as well as all the
other nations in the Middle East. We have decided about our borders; the borders
of the Middle Eastern states was decided in London by a man drawing a ruler, so
these Middle Eastern states have never been as homogeneous nations as a Bulgaria
or Hungry or Romania or even Azerbaijan or Tunis or Algeria.
But
Iraq was the luckiest one of them because Iraq sits on a wealth, and that wealth
of oil and agriculture, it was not like the desert like the other Middle Eastern
states. It was the Mesopotamian Valley which produced also agriculture, created
the middle class in Iraq which got educated, and the British helped it, they
trained the administrative system, the banking clerks and engineers there to
build a real state.
Now,
when I started my travels in the Middle East, I thought that being a part of the
same history of 600 years Ottoman rule I would be welcome in every Middle
Eastern state, but wherever I went, they accused me that my republic was
established [?] which was against Islamic religion. The only non-negative
comment that I heard was in Iraq and from the beginning on, I could see that
Iraqis and Turks were very, had affinity between themselves, and they were like
two parts of the same old Ottoman grounds.
And
reading the history, I could see that the most important governance of the
Ottomans was government of Baghdad and government of Basra ruling the Sunnites
community in the north and the Shiite community separately in the south.
Started
doing business. It was difficult at the beginning, because we had to proceed the
Iraqis that there was business in Turkey, that there was industry in Turkey,
because nobody from Turkey thinking on business had ever traveled into the
Middle East before, but it became very quickly after we could invite them to
come to Turkey, see the Turkey, and Iraq became the second-largest trading
partner of Turkey.
It
was not in that capacity only, because we had other neighbors also, but Iran was
never like that. It was always forceful business. Syria was an impossible land
for the Turks, so the only country that was cooperating together was Iraq and
Turkey, and through Iraq only we could reach also the other parts of the Middle
East from Turkey, because only Iraq would allow our trucks to pass through Iraq
to reach Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Emirates, which would give us the necessary
comparative advantage against our competitors who had to go to the Middle East
through inhibition parts at that time.
This
honeymoon continued until 1990-91, the Gulf War. Throughout from '70s till 1990,
I witnessed with my Iraqi friends in Baghdad General Elbiquer's governance [ph],
then the Baath Party becoming much more stronger. Mr. Saddam seen taking over
power, and then the Iran War. With the Iran War, in Iraq going down of the
middle class started. The establishment started destroying them, first their
sons were taken into the army, then the Gulf War came, and the sanctions came.
From
the beginning when we were as Turkish business community very much against the
sanctions, not that we are losing through them, but we believed that we were
punishing to the Iraqi nation, which we cherished and loved in Turkey, and for
one man, we were giving impossible life to the Iraqis.
When
we look to today after post-Saddam, I don't think that any country in the Middle
East which would be much more happier if it could have a democratic secular
system reigning in Iraq. I don't think our neighbors will be very happy. I'm
sure Iran will not be very happy. Saudi Arabia will not be very happy. Kuwait
and Emirates are too small to discuss here, but Syria definitely would not be
happy.
But
in Turkey, we would be very happy, because we believe that being the only
secular democratic Islamic country, if it can add more friends to that category
in the Islamic world, most of the problems that we are having in the Middle East
today would be easier to pass over.
Turkey
made the strategy alliance with Israel five years ago, just because Turkey and
Israel are the only democracies between India and Europe, and we had to export
this idea of democracies to other parts of the Middle East.
So
Turkey is for democratization of Iraq. How to make this democratization in Iraq?
I think if we can rebuild the old middle class in Iraq, which you have heard
from the Ambassador this morning how miserable they are living, the doctors, the
engineers, the lawyers, the bank clerks, if it can bring their life and make
them happier.
The
second thing I'm afraid of which I heard this morning is this idea of a loose
liberation in post-Saddam Iraq with demilitarization. Now, the Turkish example
has shown us in Turkey that it's very, very difficult to put up a democracy in
an Islamic land. You can only do it if you become secular in your country,
because only through secularism you can separate the mosque from the good
governance.
If
you cannot separate it, your laws will be with the mosque, you can get life idea
with the mosque and you cannot be a democratic modern state. Iraq can be a
secular state. That's why I didn't hear any bad comments about Mr. [?] being our
leader because they believe on secularity in Iraq also.
And
the second worth of Iraq is their female population. For 30 years, every company
that I visited had as much female workers in it on top level down to the workers
level, as much as men, and today I don't know the figures, but after all these
wars, I'm sure the female population in Iraq is larger than the masculine
population.
[?]
in Turkey making the first reforms, his biggest asset was the female population
after the independence in Turkey when we started the reforms, 70 percentage were
females in Turkey and 30 percent men. They had all died in the First World War,
and gaining this female population and getting their backing behind you creates
the modern civilized state, because the failure of Islam is having half of your
viable workable population unproductive. You cannot create a modern country
having 50 percent of your population not working for you. You have to gain them
and bring them.
And
I think this is the hope of Iraq also, if it can do it. Now, another must I
think that we have seen also in the Turkish example is at the beginning, if you
write a secular democratic constitution for your country, you have to have
somebody to defend it for you. Otto designed the Turkish military army to defend
it, and they did it until today, and without the Turkish army, we could never
had the democracy we had in Turkey up till now.
We
saw it in the Iranian example. Shah couldn't lead because he didn't have an army
behind himself, although he paid all the money for it for many years. So we have
to have a transparent constitution defending army in Iraq also at the beginning.
If we don't have this army to defend the new Iraqi constitution, the cake in
Iraq is too big, and there are too many separated communities which will fight
for this cake, and then you will have another Lebanon like the ten-year wars
they had or a kind of Yugoslavia.
You
cannot have unity and integrity of the land without somebody there designed by
the constitution to defend it. So we have to have an Iraqi army. To come to a
conclusion, I wish that we could have a democratic, secularly democratic Iraq
with the help of all the international community very soon.
And
our ultimate aim in whatever years we reach it must be to make this new
democratic Iraq a part of NATO. Only then I think it could be a very valuable
asset to NATO, much more valuable than the countries like Slovakia, Slovenia,
Latvia, that we are putting in the NATO now without any importance.
That
country then can also bring the Western civilization ideas and values into the
Middle East and help us to make the Middle East a reconstructed democratic
region.
I
thank you now for these words.
[Applause.]
MR.
OBAID: Thank you very much for having me here today. I'm here to talk about the
Saudi position or more specifically generally a Gulf position, but more
specifically on the Saudi stance with what will happen in Iraq in case there is
an invasion.
I
actually personally believe, especially from the last two weeks on developments
that have happened in the Kingdom, that they are moving towards a full support
of a strong UN resolution for a control and for the complete disarmament of the
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but again the problem here lies in how it
will be done.
Initially,
there was a lot of reticence from the Saudi government on the issue of will the
U.S. go ahead alone, and will there be a unilateral invasion of Iraq by U.S.
forces? And since the UN General Assembly in September, since the U.S. general
assembly in late of September, and President George Bush's opening about having
a multilateral strong resolution, you've had the Saudi government come out and
fully support a UN mandate to first go in and to safeguard the weapons of mass
destruction that Saddam Hussein has been producing or is alleged to have
produced, and then ultimately if he does not cooperate, to have a full UN
resolution calling for force in order to extrapolate him and his regime.
And
as such, Saudi bases would be used in that regard, but there is one big element
that most people have missed here. And this directly deals with U.S.-Saudi
relations, and it has to do with U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. A lot of people
unfortunately miss the reason why U.S. troops are still currently in Saudi
Arabia, and this is to safeguard the no-fly zone over Iraq, and in essence to
make sure that Iraq does not again try to aggress Kuwait and ultimately invade
Saudi Arabia this time.
And
one of the big talking points that's been going back and forth between senior
members of the Royal family and senior religious figures in Saudi Arabia over
the last two or three weeks has been the issue of if the Saudis do back a U.S.
inspired UN resolution, or ultimately a U.S. unilateral action against Iraq is
the removal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia once there is successful U.S.
invasion and the dismantling of Saddam Hussein's regime.
And
this, although I have not seen it, I have not seen it reported actually at all
in the U.S. press or even talked about, is actually, it's been one of the main
points in the last couple of weeks over the dialogue that's been raging in the
Kingdom about if, when and how will the Saudis support a U.S. plan to
tentatively topple Saddam Hussein?
But
the concerns remain, and a lot of the concerns here is about the timing and
about the consequences, and as Mr. Egeli so eloquently portrayed it earlier on,
there's this issue of what happens once there is a U.S. attack, what happens to
Iraq? And this has been the main concern of the senior religious leaders in
Saudi Arabia, and some of the big tribes.
Because
the other issue that the Royal Family has had to deal with is obviously gaining
support for having Saudi bases being used as the launching pad, but more
importantly is the sheiks, the big tribal sheiks that have a lot of families and
tribal affiliation in the northern Saudi Arabia, southern Iraq, and there are a
lot of those tribes that are very influential today in Saudi society, and in
Saudi tribal politics, so to speak, and they are by fact of their power and
their numbers are also very influential in Iraq, especially around the area of
Basra, and so they have been very outspoken about their desires and their wishes
if the Saudi government were to fully authorize the United States to use Saudi
bases.
So
what you have today, what you have today in the Kingdom is this dialogue between
I guess three centers of power represented by the Royal Family, the religious
establishment, and those calling for the purpose of this discussion today, this
council of tribal leaders, which it's funny actually because some of them are
actually Iraqis where you have a cousin being a Saudi. In the National Guard,
you have an Iraqi being, you know, a general in the security service, and so
what you have is that they obviously all have different perspective on the
matter, and they all have different desires on where this will develop.
And
so, but they have been able to grapple around one main issue, and this is the
issue of if the Saudi bases are given use, that U.S. troops will ultimately have
to slowly leave. So this is one of the main issues that's been talked about.
The
other issue more generally on the regional level is how will a liberated Iraq be
perceived in Saudi Arabia, and here again there's been all kinds of different
opinions on that matter, and clearly, I mean if there is a liberated Iraq, one
and foremost is will it stay in the its form; and two, what kind of regime will
be in place, what will be the nature of the regime?
And
again, I personally do not believe that Saudi Arabia or that the Saudi
government today will have enough influence to determine what kind of regime
will ultimately end up being in place in Iraq. This considering that everything
goes well and that there's a liberation and so forth.
But
I do believe that--and this is a concern by many people within the Saudi
government today--is that they cannot see Iraq being a democratic state. There
is no, and this especially, this is especially vocal theme among those tribal
leaders, that they come back and they cannot see how there is going to be some
sort of democratic processes in Iraq emerging if Saddam Hussein does fall.
They
all actually, most of them are vying for for their own political positions. So
this is also another issue that I don't think people have really looked into is
this issue of what will happen and who, what kind of tribal leaders in Iraq are
to emerge? And ultimately on a more unilateral matter is the issue of U.S.
troops in Saudi Arabia, and that has been a very heated debate in the press and
the media and in the Congress over the last couple of months.
And
one of the promises by a certain member of the Royal Family to the establishment
ten days ago was that if Saudi bases are to be used by U.S. troops, that there
will be an understanding with the United States that ultimately over a slow
ultimate phased out level, process--excuse me--of the removal of U.S. troops
from Saudi Arabia.
Thank
you.
[Applause.]
MR.
ROY: Well, we go thin line with my colleagues. As far as the neighbors are
concerned, and by neighbors, of course, of Iraq I include Iran, I think that
first most all Iraqi numbers consider the present situation as a lesser evil.
They prefer to have the weak united Iraq, and they fear the consequences of a
U.S. campaign in Iraq, but they all expect if they don't wish it or even if they
don't wish it or even if they oppose it, they all expect a U.S. military
campaign in Iraq.
It's
considered now the given fact and one of the consequences is that if the U.S. do
not attack in Iraq, it will be a loss of credibility in the whole Middle East
now.
Third,
in case of such U.S. military campaign, the neighbors will not oppose, and they
may even participate at different levels, officially or unofficially, but none
of them will try to undermine by any means a U.S. military campaign in Iraq
including Iran.
They
all are driven by security and defensive concerns. None of the Iraqi neighbors
consider a U.S. military campaign and the fall of Saddam Hussein as an
opportunity. They all consider that this might provide opportunity for the
others, for the other neighbors or other political forces like the Kurds, for
example. But none of the, except Kuwait in a sense, but none of the Iraqi
neighbors have an interest, you know, in the territorial or anything else in
Iraq now.
In
defense, they will anticipate moves and benefits made by the others. And they
will try, you know, to prevent or to position themselves regarding any move that
could be done by another neighbor, other political forces like the Turks.
So
the main issue for the Iranians will not be what the Americans will do. The main
issue will be what the Turks will do, of what the Arabs might do in the Gulf,
what could be the benefits from the Gulf and so on and so on?
So
what will, to which extent the downfall of Saddam Hussein will have great impact
in the Middle East? You know there are many stories about taking the opportunity
of a U.S. military campaign not to redraw across the borders of the Middle East
but to redistribute the cards, playing a democratization and things like that.
Well,
I think there are three issues at stake. One is a Kurdish issue. It's a most
important issue. And in a sense, the Kurds will be the losers in case of the
fall of Saddam Hussein, if there is a democracy in Iraq, while the Turks, the
Kurds will give real autonomy and a lot of commercial benefits for an illusive
participation to a shaky central coalition government. They might, however, not
be very happy with this deal.
And
if there is a strong central government in Iraq, well, we will back, you know,
to the usual patterns. Any strong government in Iraq will sooner or later push
again for the Kurdish issue, you know, the control of [?], and will also try to
find outlets to the Gulf, to the Gulf, you know. So a strong government--this is
point--a stronger government in Iraq will bring Iraq to the same traditional
patterns of threatening states in the Gulf and trying to control the Kurdish
areas as much as possible.
If--my
last point--there is a real democratization in Iraq, I don't think this will be
a model for the other countries in the area. The main driving force now in
Middle East including in Iran is nationalism, you know.
Of
course, Iranian people, they don't like the mullahs. They would like to have
democracy. They will not die to have democracy. They will die if the territory
of Iran is threatened by anybody, and I think it's the same in the area. We have
to take into consideration that the driving force is not Islamism, it's not
democratization, it's nationalism, and it will go on like that for some times.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: First, I want to thank everybody from the panel again, and we'll open
it up for questions. That was very quick. First question, Michael.
MR.
RUBIN: There was a poll released yesterday that had been taken in Iran that
after 20 years of an unrepresentative government, over 80 percent of the people,
I believe it was, over 80 percent of the people had said they looked back
extremely fondly on Resa Shaw as the founder of modern Iran and something to be
emulated.
Taken
it to the Iraqi example and given that Iraq has lived under a dictatorship for
much longer, I was curious do any of the panelists, especially Professor Lewis,
who has talked about the past, about how they might view the Hashimites and
whether how the Hashimites might view Iraq with regard to the future and with
regard to looking back to a perceived golden age?
MR.
LEWIS: It is very hard for Americans to contemplate the replacement of a
republic by a monarchy as a step forward. Nevertheless, I think one must accept
the fact that in several Middle Eastern countries, a restoration of a former
monarchy probably represents the best possibility for establishing some kind of
regime which is stable and decent at the same time. Usually it's one or the
other at most.
And
to which also does contain within itself the principle of succession. For any
kind of stability and regime, you need legitimacy and succession, and the
strength of that is demonstrated by the fact that we now have something
previously unknown to history and political science, that is hereditary
revolutionary leadership.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: And in Syria, it has happened. In Iraq it is obviously intended. And it
seems to me, therefore, that the heredity principle, in other words, the
monarchial principle, is still alive and well in the region. And I would think
that a real monarch with a past, a tradition and some acceptability has a much
better chance that a pseudo-republic.
MR.
EGELI: May I add something? I just want to give you an example. Maybe you are
not aware of it here. Bulgaria after 50 years of communist rule became--wanted
to become a democracy, and the first prime minister they elected popularly was
the old king. The king came not as a monarch, but he went into the elections and
got elected. And his coalition partners in the government is the Muslim society,
the Turkish society of Bulgaria, who voted for him is now governing Bulgaria
together in a coalition with the old monarch.
MR.
GERECHT: More questions? Yes.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: My question is for Olivier Roy. I was surprised to hear you say
that you thought that Iran would look more or less benignly on a change in Iraq,
and I was wondering why you think that is the case?
MR.
ROY: They consider that a U.S. campaign is now inevitable, and that it's not in
their interest to oppose it and to appear, you know, in the front-line of
anti-Americanism in the area. It's a purely pragmatic move from Iran.
And
by the way, they are in a very strange situation, because as you know, the
Iranian revolution was anti-American, but now after 20 years, they're almost
surrounded by American troops, you know, the last month was in Afghanistan. You
have American troops in Uzbekistan. You will have American troops in Azerbaijan
sooner or later in any form. So next time it's Iraq, you know. They are already
in Turkey, of course, and first they are used to now. If they wanted to move,
they should have moved during the Afghan campaign. They didn't move, and on the
contrary, in fact. They had a very low profile.
So
it's shear pragmatism from them. They know there might be some strike against
Iran and things like that. It's not in their interest to fight. They will not
fight.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Well, I didn't mean that only the possibility that they would
directly fight, but they have alternative options, in the sense that they could
encourage Hizballah to launch rockets into Israel?
MR.
ROY: The Iranians, it's in the interest of the Iranian to delink, you know,
issues on the borders from the [?] conflict. They have some sort of interest,
but it's very low, but it can conflict by supporting Hizballah, clear. They
consider that Hizballah--they need Hizballah's leverage in the Near East, but
they want to delink that. They will not endanger the Iranian territory for
support for Hizballah in Lebanon. It's two different issues.
And
look at what they did just now in Iraq. They expelled Molecucar [ph], you know,
the Mulakacar [ph]. He's the head of one of the Islamist leader in Kurdistan.
They sent him to Norway, to Netherlands at least. Okay. So it's a clear signal.
It makes a difference. It's a patient compromise, you know. But it's a clear
signal that they have no intention, you know, to play a tricky role now in Iraq
now. We'll see after.
MR.
LEWIS: I'd like to add a brief word on that. In February of this year, I
attended a meeting in Istanbul, a joint meeting of the European Union and the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, a very impressive gathering with more
than 40 ministers of foreign affairs and their attendants. And it was rather
striking that the Egyptians took a much more anti-American line than the
Iranians.
The
strongest term that Herazee [ph] used in condemning American policy was
"misguided."
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: So it was very mild. I think that the speech, which was then fairly
recent, had a considerable impact, and the Syrians, I understood, felt slighted
and humiliated at not having been included in the access to--
[Laughter.]
MR.
GERECHT: I'll go here and then over here and then the back.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: I wonder whether Mr. Roy would comment on the presence along the
Iranian frontier with Iraq, not only of the Ansa Alislam [ph] whose leader you
referred to, Mulikraka [ph], who's now in a high security prison in the
Netherlands, but the Iranian support, first of all, which made Ansa Alislam
possible, and which has acted, applied pressure to the authorities of the
patriotic union of Kurdistan, to accept an Islamist presence in the affairs of
that part of Iraqi-Kurdistan under the PUK rule, just as one thinks of how Iran
has used the situation in western Afghanistan through Ismail Khan, the man who
runs Harat [ph], and also by the curious way of getting rid of Gobin Hechnatia
[ph] by exporting him into Iran when he's perhaps the most virulently
anti-American of all the Afghans. Thank you.
MR.
ROY: So parallel between the Iranian policy in Afghanistan and Iraq is quite
relevant. They are working in the same way. They have different cards. They
sometimes they mix up their own cards, you know, they undermine somebody with
their own allies, through somebody who is supposed to be also one of their own
allies. They did that in Harat for years. They are supporting Ismailhan [ph],
but they also contributed to form and to help some groups who are anti-Ismailhan.
So it's kind of, you know, of a complex policy.
But
if we look at the global of all, they keep a low profile, but they want to be
players. But they don't want a confrontation. But they want to have people and
so and so. What they did about the Mukabachar [ph], they sent Mukabachar back to
Afghanistan, the same way they sent Mulikarchar [ph] back to Netherlands. But
I'm quite sure that they would hope to see Machar being killed by U.S. bombs at
some time in Afghanistan.
For
them, the benefit, you know, at all the levels. They can say that the Americans
are killers, but they have Machachar being killed so it's okay for them, you
know.
MR.
OBAID: Win-win.
MR.
LEWIS: Win-win.
MR.
GERECHT: Right here.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: My question will be to Professor Lewis. Furthering Michael's
question, would you please comment on the Hashimite point?
MR.
LEWIS: Yes, the question is on bringing us back to the possibility or
desirability of a restoration of a monarchy. Well, there, of course, the
question arises whether the Hashimites would be willing and able, and the
Hashimites have several possibilities before them at the present time, and there
are several possible candidates. I'm told that many in Iraq look back with on
the whole affection to the period of the monarchy, and certainly it's very good
in comparison with everything that has followed, and that in that way,
therefore, a restoration of the monarchy might be an attractive solution to the
problem of transition and succession.
And
I have no doubt that the Hashimites would be willing, if called upon, to play
this role, but I very much doubt whether they would be willing to play an active
part in bringing it about. In other words, if they're invited, their answer
would be yes, but I don't see them launching a royalist movement in order to
take over. That's just a personal impression. I can't say more than that.
Succession
is really the crucial question. I mean the normal methods in the region, as they
have been established in the second half of the 20th century, are putsch, coup
d'etat, premento [ph]. I give you the French, Spanish, German terms. English
history provides no equivalent.
[Laughter.]
MR.
GERECHT: Right here and then we'll go in the back.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: This question is also to Professor Lewis. I'd love to know what you
think about somebody mentioned nationalism is the driving force in the area. I'd
love to hear your opinion how that would compare, for example, with Islamism or
what are the driving forces?
MR.
LEWIS: In comparing nationalism and Islamism, it is very difficult to assess the
force of one or another ideology or policy among public opinion in the region,
because public opinion has very little meaning in a society which is ruled by an
autocratic government and where the media are either owned or manipulated by
authority.
So
that we really have no ways of measuring public opinion in a way that is
possible in Western societies. Nevertheless, one can have certain impressions.
And nationalism was certainly a very powerful factor in the second half of the
19th century. Nationalism and socialism are the bastard offspring of the two,
national socialism, commanded tremendous support in the region.
I
had the impression that both have lost ground. Socialism was discredited by its
failure, and socialist economies that were set up in one country after another
simply failed to produce the expected plenty and prosperity. We have derelict
socialist economies from Algeria all the way eastward.
And
nationalism was discredited not by its failure but by its success, and there was
some confusion between two different things, freedom and independence. People
thought they were the same thing. Nationalism succeeded in achieving
independence. What they discovered was that freedom and independence were two
very different things. And at times even appear to be mutually exclusive.
And
what independence often brought was the replacement of foreign overlords by
home-grown tyrants who were much worse because they were more adept in their
tyranny and less constrained. So I have the impression that nationalism has
become somewhat discredited among many people, and this has given a strong
impetus to Islamism as the alternative way.
Remember
the Islamists can claim a great success. The nationalists won their battles for
independence and were discredited by what they had achieved. The Islamists claim
one great victory, the overthrow of the Soviet Union. Remember, as they see it,
it was their struggle in Afghanistan which succeeded in driving out the Russians
and bringing about the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. As they see it,
the nationalists failed. Their policy of using the Western powers against one
another failed. Independence was a sad disappointment, and the case of the
Islamists is correspondingly stronger.
My
impression, and I stress this is only an impression, is that in recent years,
there has been a considerable growth of Islamist sentiment and a decline in
nationalist sentiment.
MR.
GERECHT: Back, the young lady in the back.
MR.
LEWIS: Wait a minute. Aren't you going to say something?
MR.
GERECHT: Olivier, did you have something to say?
MR.
ROY: Well, I disagree, of course.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: I wanted to hear you say it.
MR.
ROY: I think the first generation of nationalists have been discredited. During
the '80s, the '70s, we had the peak of Islamism as an alternative to
nationalism, but what we see now is a sort of mixing of Islamism with
nationalism. If you look at Palestine, if you look at [?], you can't make a
difference between an Islamist anti-American and a secular nationalist
anti-American. You know they're the same.
And
we have now I would say the divide line between Islamist and secular nationalist
is blurring more and more. So it doesn't mean that we have a return to the old
sort of Baathist nationalism or Baathism is, I agree, is discredited too. But
the things we can move people now is this kind of what I call Islamic
nationalism are sort of local nationalism blended with pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism
is a dream, you know, but it strikes a chord among people in the Middle East, in
the Arab Middle East.
And
pan-Islamism has no political appeal in the Middle East, maybe emotional appeal
but not at all political appeal.
MR.
GERECHT: Back of the room.
MR.
LEWIS: May I just add one word on that? I still believe that nationalism has
been discredited and in decline, but what I do see developing is another idea of
European origin and that is patriotism, which is the same as nationalism. This
is already a powerful force in two countries, Turkey and Iran, and it may yet
become more of a factor in the Arab countries. Thank you.
MR.
GERECHT: To the young lady in the back.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Thank you for the young lady. My question is actually to Professor
Lewis. Professor Lewis, you mentioned that actually one of the groups, the small
ethnic groups, all be it the third largest, Turkoman, has actually political,
has some valid claims. Unfortunately, in Turkoman communities fate in this whole
discussion is hardly ever brought to the light and also there is an effort to
rewrite sort of the history of the region, claiming that this is a predominantly
Kurdish region, and some Kurdish groups have made claims to Muslim Kurkut as
Kurdish cities.
Can
you please elaborate a little bit on how you feel the Turkoman question figures
in all of this? Thank you.
MR.
LEWIS: The Turkoman are a group of people whose language is a form of Turkish,
not very different from that spoken in the Turkish Republic. I suggest, though,
they are the most important after the Arabs and the Kurds for two reasons. One
is numerical. They are certainly a much larger group than any of the others. And
the second reason is their kinship with the neighboring republic of Turkey and
sometimes they may serve as a basis for Turkish intervention or even more than
that.
We
don't know which way things are going, but it is, I think, an important and open
question. I really can't say more than that.
MR.
GERECHT: I believe behind--
MR.
EGELI: Can I add something?
MR.
GERECHT: Oh, sure, sure, go right ahead.
MR.
EGELI: You see out of the 20 million population of Iraq today, we have about two
to three million Turkminis. They were living more concentrated in the Muslim
Catholic [?] area before, but through the efforts of Saddam and the Baath Party,
they scattered all over Iraq, so they are not concentrated. But it's a great
concern in Turkey also about this possible Kurdish area. You see at the moment
autonomist Kurdish community in the north are having their most prosperous time
ever in history.
They
are not harassed by any of the neighbors because the British and U.S. planes are
defending them. For the first time in history, they have a steady income,
monthly income, coming from the United Nations, and their food is coming from
United Nations, and because they don't have any problems, they are very well
organized.
And
if there is a military intervention in Iraq, they will come out the best of the
communities because nobody is going to bomb the Kurdish areas to enter Iraq. It
will be the Sunnite or Shiite areas in the middle or in the south which will go
through the military action.
Now,
all the neighbors of Iraq want Iraq with total integrity of their ground, and
unitary government or governance in Iraq. We don't want a separated Iraq. So any
attempt by the Kurdish community to take over Kirkuk or Mausil [ph], which would
mean having also loss of their income, new sources of wealth, would not be
welcome by any of the neighbors, and that would be a problem in the Middle East.
So
we all wish as neighbors of Iraq, that Iraq will be a unitary integral new
democracy to emerge from this operation that we are going to see to happen.
Thank you.
MR.
GERECHT: Now to the back.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: This is for Nawaf Obaid. Does the Saudi Royal Family have an
understanding of any kind, formally or informally, on paper or
wink-wink-nudge-nudge with the United States that on completion of a military
campaign in Iraq, and the ouster of the Iraqi government, the American forces
will go?
MR.
OBAID: No. If I gave that impression, then that was a misleading one. What I was
saying is that there is discussion among the different centers of power in the
Kingdom on that subject, but as to my knowledge, no, there is no agreement, and
I don't even think it's even been raised so far. Thank you.
MR.
GERECHT: Over here.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: I know this question wasn't part of the agenda, but I hope you can
answer it anyway. Maybe if American forces end up going into Iraq will they be
greeted as liberators or as incoming occupiers/oppressors?
MR.
OBAID: I'll just begin with that. There was one of the sheiks, he's from the
Zubear tribe [ph], and that was one of the sheiks that's been very vocal in
Saudi Arabia about the issue of Iraq, and he actually claims that if--now that's
him claiming--that if the U.S. does actually invade, that in some quarters,
especially around Basra, they will be received as enemies.
MR.
LEWIS: From all that I hear from many different sources, I don't have the
slightest doubt that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis would welcome the
American forces as liberators. I don't think that is the question. The question
is how long would they continue to regard them in that light?
MR.
GERECHT: We had another question towards the rear. I've been ignoring the rear.
Over there. If you could come forward a bit, I think the microphone starts to
click and make obnoxious noises back there.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: For Professor Lewis, do you think there is any tendency in the
United States right now to assume this imperial role you talked about in
history?
MR.
LEWIS: No, I don't. On the contrary. There's a reluctance to approach it. It's
interesting that if you look at the complaints which are made in the region
about the United States and which come again and again from all sorts of
different quarters, what they are complaining about is American failure to play
its proper imperial role.
And
if, for example, when you say you are applying double standards, this is
nonsense. You are not being even-handed. What does this mean? I mean to say
double standards is most unfair. Why should one be limited to two standards?
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: A sovereign power in a world of sovereign powers will have many different
standards for dealing with different people. The accusation, the need for a
single standard for even-handedness and so on, these are qualities which you
desire in judges, juries, police forces and other agencies of enforcement of the
law. They are also qualities to be expected from an imperial souzeratin [ph]
dealing with different tributaries and dependents and native princes.
That
is what they wanted, it would seem. Otherwise, this talk of double standards and
even-handedness is complete nonsense. And if you look more carefully, as I was
saying, the complaint is failing to meet, to fulfil the imperial role, and the
great danger of American imperialism is that they'll go away.
MR.
GERECHT: One more question from over here and then I'll switch back in this
direction. I think there was another individual. Yes, right there.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Thank you. My question is for Professor Lewis and the other
panelists. Just reflecting on today's conference, Planning for Post--sorry.
MR.
GERECHT: Could you move forward just a bit?
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Yeah, sure. Reflecting on the title of today's conference,
Planning for a Post-Saddam Iraq, how big of an enterprise is this, in your
judgment? How many years? How much American involvement? How much Western
involvement? What's the reasonable good case scenario? What in your judgment are
realistic scenarios that perhaps aren't so good?
MR.
LEWIS: I heard a story, and my business is dealing with the past, not the
future, and I feel very unhappy.
MR.
GERECHT: That's cheating, Bernard.
MR.
LEWIS: I feel very unhappy making predictions, particularly short-range
predictions. Long-range predictions are fairly safe.
[Laughter.]
MR.
LEWIS: But short-range predictions are very hazardous. Let me say just this.
That I think the task will certainly be difficult, and will take awhile. I think
it will take longer than people hope, but not as long as they fear.
MR.
GERECHT: Question here and then I'll go back there.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: In the light of the ideological void left after the Soviet Union, I
mean many of these dictatorial forces within the region relied ideologically and
otherwise on the Soviets, and, in fact, Iranian government and Iraq are two good
examples, where else do they have to go? I mean where else people in the region
can go when there is that--I mean before there was this struggle between the
Soviets and the West.
Now
that the Soviet Union is completely discredited and gone, do they have anywhere
else to go, but towards a democratic society? Is there any--and also in the
light of the first panel, in the light of what the first panel, the marvelous
appreciation of democracy this morning, I wanted to ask you what lessons have we
learned from Afghanistan that we can use in Iraq?
MR.
GERECHT: Anybody want to tackle that?
MR.
LEWIS: Well, as I tried to point out before, I think that after the collapse of
the Soviet Union, we have a situation which has not existed for centuries and
people have reacted to it in different ways. Some are still trying frantically
to find a replacement for the Nazis and the Soviets. And so far, with very
limited success.
Others
feel on the contrary, that this is their great opportunity, and it seems to me
that it principally the Islamic fundamentalists who feel that this is their
great opportunity, that they won the great victory, destroyed one of the two
powers of evil, and now feel ready to attack the other, and their ideology is,
of course, very clear. It's a revived Islamism.
So
far I don't see any other power or any other ideology, but that doesn't mean to
say that one will not emerge. There are various possibilities. One can imagine a
resurgent Russia, and Russia is not going to remain indefinitely on the
sidelines of history. Sooner or later a country with those numbers, those
resources, those talents will be back, and they will certainly take a vital
interest in the region as near to their southern frontier wherever that may
ultimately lie as the Middle East.
Another
possibility is the two great powers of Asia, China and India, who may be forced
into rivalry over the Middle East, which is vital to both of them for different
reasons. But as I say, I can sketch possibilities, but I wouldn't like to
predict with any greater precision.
What
I do feel very strongly is that the peoples of the Middle East have a limited
time available to them, to compose their differences, and to learn how to
cooperate. If they do, then they can do really great things in the Middle East.
It's
happened several times before, and they can do it again. If they don't, then as
I once said somewhere else, the suicide bomber will become a metaphor for the
whole region.
MR.
GERECHT: Olivier, did you want to add something?
MR.
ROY: Yeah, about the lessons of Afghanistan, of course, the situation is very
different, the history, political structure, tribal structure, and so and so.
But one of the first lessons is a problem in Afghanistan has been the delinking
between the political issues and the military issues. The U.S. Army was in
charge, you know, to destroy the Taliban. It was a victory, a success. Then it's
in charge to find bin Laden, and so, but until recently--it's changing now on
the ground--until recently they didn't care about the political implication of
the way they were campaigning, they were fighting.
And
the U.S. Ambassador who was in charge of dealing with particular political
affairs, was not seen for good reasons by the Afghans as the real man, you know,
because he had no weapons, no money, nothing like that. So when we have to be
very careful to link political issues and military issues from the beginning,
you know, and of course, a professional military have a tendency to, you know,
just to look at professional issues, how to make the war the best way, you know.
Nothing
necessarily on the political consequences. So that is the first point. The
second point, but it's linked with that, allies in a military campaign could be
liability in a political process. Now, beware of your allies sometimes.
And
last point--
MR.
GERECHT: Does that include France, Olivier?
[Laughter.]
MR.
ROY: I said allies in military campaigns.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Is France an ally of the United States?
[Laughter.]
MR.
ROY: And the last point, we should rely, you know, on domestic political
process, you know. I don't believe in the sort of political engineering when
you--from above, you find the best solution by country. It has to do through the
people. This means through sometimes a painful political process, and the
long-term political process.
MR.
GERECHT: I promise the gentleman right there.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Professor Lewis is not in a mood to make predictions about the near
term. So therefore I'll ask everybody else on the panel. I will, however, key
off a few things that Professor Lewis did say. I gather that the essence of your
view about the prospects of Arab democracy or even Iraqi democracy is that this
is difficult but not impossible.
This
presumes, therefore, some sense of a time table about under the best
circumstances when such a thing might come to pass. And on the other hand, too,
you just said in answer to a question that you don't see the United States as
having the sort of imperial appetite with regard to the Middle East, and yet
there are some people who see the democratization of Iraq as the vanguard of a
hearts and minds strategy, so to speak, to get at the underlying motivation of
the war on terrorism, of apocalyptical terrorism. So we would preempt their
missiles and their madman, but we would also try to preempt their motives by
democratizing their political culture.
MR.
GERECHT: Now, I don't mean to intrude. We're just running short. So pithiness is
a virtue.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Here's the question. Is there an imaginable time table for the
democratization of Iraq or the wider Arab world? Is there a time table that
could possibly be practical in the sense of dealing with our problems in the war
on terrorism?
MR.
LEWIS: I am what I would describe as cautiously optimistic about the prospects
for establishing a democratic regime in Iraq for a number of reasons. Let me
start with personal experience. And when I was still teaching in England, the
overwhelming majority of my graduate students came from Arab countries and were
graduates of Arab universities.
And
I had a fairly wide, shall we say, comparative experience of dealing with these
graduates and realizing what kind of a training and education they had had and
perhaps most important of all, particularly in the present day American context,
evaluating the significance of the grades and marks that they had.
I
found that the Iraqis were far and away the best. The Iraqi universities were
serious. People who came as graduates from Iraqi universities had had a good
education, both secondary and higher. And a degree meant something, and if it
was first class honors, one could rely on that, too. It meant something.
Now,
Saddam Hussein has done a great deal of damage, no doubt at all, to the Iraqi
educational system, but where you have an educated class, they generally manage
to educate their children somehow, even if the school system has gone to pot.
And
one can, I think, see indications of this. And I would add another point. I
think of all the oil countries, the Iraqis under successive regimes made the
best use of their oil revenues. They used it to build infrastructure, to build
an educational system and so on. And we see the results of that.
Someone
earlier referred to the position of women in Iraq. Yes, I think that's also an
important point. And in the Western world, we are accustomed to regard women's
rights as part of the liberal program. In the Middle East, it doesn't work that
way. The liberal program is giving people what they want and what the people
want is suppressing women, so that you find that women's rights fair better
under autocratic than under democratic regimes.
In
Iraq, this has produced, I think, interesting and valuable results. And I
remember Egyptian friends of mine, when Egypt was far more liberal and open than
Iraq, who wanted to publish feminist articles sent them to Iraq to be published
because it was impossible to publish them in Egypt, so for these reasons--one
could add others--I am, I would say on the whole, optimistic about the
possibilities for developing a democratic regime in Iraq.
Now,
one has to be realistic. Democracy is a difficult system to operate, and we see
that from the vicissitudes of democracy in continental Europe over the past half
century, not to speak of earlier times. And democracy is a strong medicine. It
has to be administered in small, gradually increasing doses; otherwise, you risk
killing the patient. I mean remember Hitler came to power as a result of a free
and democratic election.
MR.
GERECHT: Just a couple more questions and then we will stop. Right here.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: What will happen to Iraq, to the region and to U.S. relations with
the region if Saddam is not removed?
MR.
LEWIS: If?
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: If Saddam is not removed?
MR.
ALOLOM: Saddam disappears?
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: No, no, no, no. He's not removed.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: He stays.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: He stays. He stays.
MR.
LEWIS: More predictions.
MR.
EGELI: I would say it will be the same as today. As we are living today with
Saddam, the same way we'll live with him.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: Oh, no. What about the weapons of mass destruction?
MR.
EGELI: Well, being neighbors, and you being so far away, we don't believe that
there is so much weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: You probably have a better knowledge of that.
MR.
LEWIS: I look at it differently. I don't think the weapons of mass destruction
are the immediate issue. I wouldn't dismiss them, but as somebody remarked
earlier--yes, you did--there would be a complete loss of credibility. He would
then feel free to do as he pleases. He would be back to '90 and to what would
have happened if by a slender majority the U.S. government of that time hadn't
decided to do something about it.
He
would presumably return to Kuwait and we would reply with explosive sentences.
From Kuwait he would extend his control to the rest of the Gulf, and would
become master of much of the Middle East, I don't have the slightest doubt about
that.
MR.
GERECHT: Since I've discriminated against that corner, the entire time, I'm
going to go back right there for the last question.
AUDIENCE
PARTICIPANT: One of the panelists stated that all of the surrounding countries
would prefer to keep Iraq as a unified state. But I wonder how realistic that
assumption is, Professor Lewis, when you consider how many other multi-ethnic
states that began and were created at roughly the same time have now come apart,
and they could only be held together for the most part through autocracy and a
police state.
And
finally, that the Kurds, many are in herds, 100,000 or something, and many Shiim
were are ready to take up arms and certainly want to go their own way. Can the
state really be held together?
MR.
LEWIS: Again, on this I am cautiously optimistic, and I hope that wasn't a
comment. In Iraq, remember, there is a tradition of a strong centralized
government, and this I think would continue even after a change of regime and
even type of regime. Remember that the government of Iraq would have very
considerable financial resources at its disposal, and that again is an important
element in maintaining unity.
And
as far as the other countries in the region are concerned, I think most of them
would fear a break-up of Iraq, if only because of the general principal, that
once you start, where do you end? And this was the danger of the Lebanese civil
war. People finally agreed was too dangerous to continue and must be brought to
an end.
May
I make one other observation on this point, which I think is relevant to the
positions of the other countries of the region, and I would like to quote a
remark that was made by the late Turgut Ozal, and was an old friend. I went to
see him in Turkey in November '90, that is to say after the occupation of
Kuwait, before the Gulf War.
He
was then president, but as I said we were old friends. Our conversation was not
as formal as it would normally be between a head of state and a foreign visitor.
And at one point, I asked him whether Turkey was with us on this? He said
definitely. And I said why so? And he said when the victors meet, we want to be
at the table and we want to be on the guest list, not on the menu.
[Laughter.]
MR.
GERECHT: With those words, I'm going to call it to a close. I'd like to thank
again the panel.
[Applause.]
MR.
GERECHT: I'd also like again to thank the Bush Administration for its intention
to provide a speaker for the next "Whither Iraq?" forum. It's an
immanently sensible idea and we're very pleased it occurred to them.
And
for the final words, I'll turn it back over to Danni Pletka.
MS.
PLETKA: Several people have asked when we will have our materials, and the
transcript and I hope the rest of the materials will be up on our web site by
Tuesday, and everybody who signed up should get an e-mail about that. And I hope
you'll indulge me if I say thank you to the people who really made this
possible: Lindsey Powers, Elizabeth Bowen, Molly McKew, Lauren DiCicio,
Veronique Rodman and Jen St. Peters. They really worked enormously hard to make
everybody comfortable today. So thank you so much.
[Applause.]
MS.
PLETKA: And thank our panelists and all of you as well.
[Whereupon,
at 5:10 p.m., the conference was adjourned.]
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