~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~OCTOBER 10, 2002~~A FIRSTHAND LOOK ATSAUDI ARABIA SINCE 9-11 (fwd)

["Clement M. Henry" <chenry@mail.la.utexas.edu>]

Note how the Saudis perceive the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

*****************************
Clement M. Henry
Professor of Government
University of Texas at Austin
Austin TX 78712
tel 471-5121, fax 471-1061

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2002 20:00:34 -0500
From: GulfWire e-Newsletters <GulfWire@arabialink.com>
To: "<<GULFWIRE>>" <GulfWire2@arabialink.com>
Subject: ~~GULFWIRE~~PERSPECTIVES~~OCTOBER 10,
     2002~~A FIRSTHAND LOOK AT SAUDI ARABIA SINCE 9-11

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                  ********GULFWIRE ~ PERSPECTIVES*********
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          INFORMATION AND INSIGHTS ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
             NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S. ARAB RELATIONS AND
        THE U.S.-GCC CORPORATE COOPERATION COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

                             OCTOBER 10, 2002

                 A FIRSTHAND LOOK AT SAUDI ARABIA SINCE 9-11:
        ON THE ROAD IN SAUDI ARABIA WITH DR. ANTHONY C. CORDESMAN

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

EDITOR'S NOTE:

Are you among the many people wanting to know the true picture of
developments in Saudi Arabia since the events of September 11, 2001?  If so,
this GulfWire interview with Dr. Anthony C. Cordesman, of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies [see bio below], will provide
observations and insight not easily available to consumers of recent media
reporting.

It is the product of first hand meetings and discussions among members of a
US delegation of defense representatives, strategists and analysts, and
Saudi Arabian hosts and officials.  The visit was led by the National
Council on U.S.-Arab Relations from September 20-28, 2002.  Meetings were
held with some of the most prominent defense and diplomatic personnel in the
Kingdom, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education, oil company heads,
representatives of the Majlis Ash-Shura (Consultative Council), American and
Saudi Arabian corporate CEOs, 18 Saudi Arabian women leaders, and newly
elected officials of the country's 19 chambers of commerce and industry,
among others.

GulfWire was pleased to be represented on the delegation and to have the
opportunity to talk with Dr. Cordesman about developments in Saudi Arabia
since "9-11."  This interview was conducted in Jeddah on September 27 as the
visit neared its end.

Patrick W. Ryan
Editor-in-Chief, GulfWire

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

[GULFWIRE] What impressions are you taking away after a week of meetings,
discussions and observations in Saudi Arabia?

[DR. ANTHONHY CORDESMAN] What we saw on one hand was a great deal of Saudi
sympathy for what happened on 9-11 and a great concern for the deterioration
of the US Saudi relationship.

It is difficult to summarize what are often very different, personal views,
but I think there was recognition among Saudi officials that after 9-11
Saudi Arabia reacted initially with a combination of sympathy and denial.
They never communicated the fact that they recognized Saudi Arabia had real
problems, many of them had been domestic and that Saudi Arabia had faced its
own threat from Bin Laden.  They really did not communicate: the level of
cooperation that was given the United States in terms of counterterrorism,
the fact that Saudi Arabia recognized weaknesses in the educational system,
and the fact that the Islamic extremist movement was acting against them. As
a result it created a climate where many Americans felt Saudi Arabia
extended sympathy but took no action.

At the same time I think there was a feeling in Saudi Arabia that Americans
did not understand the real source of Saudi concern. It was not Islamic
extremists or the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia or any of the usual
factors discussed about the Gulf, but the Second Intifada.

There is a deep popular concern -- that has taken the form, in some cases,
of a popular effort to simply refuse or boycott American products -- that
the US had drifted away from seeking peace [in the Arab-Israeli conflict].
United States' support of Israel was creating a far more serious set of
tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia, than were being caused
by a small minority of religious extremists.

These concerns were raised virtually everywhere we went and at virtually
every level.  Of course the other compounding problem that was always
present was Iraq.  Here I think it is fair to say that the reaction, almost
universal, was that Saddam was an evil and incompetent leader.  However, no
one has yet made it clear that there is an urgent need to go beyond
containment, or what the US plans are if we do overthrow him.   Why will it
be better for the Iraqi people? Why will it be worth the cost of war?

[GW] What has been the impact of the drumbeat of criticism -- back and
forth -- most notably that playing out in our media.

[AC] I think inevitably whenever relations become tense and newspapers start
writing exaggerated articles, it is a mutually reinforcing process and it is
usually based on the worst common denominator.  Every country looks at the
worst thing the outside media says about their country and immediately feels
compelled to find a counterbalance and its rarely a quiet, smooth, reasoned
argument.  It's almost invariably, "Well, you may have criticized our
faults, but look at all of yours."

There have been conspiracy theories on both sides.  People have hidden
agendas that go far beyond US-Saudi relations.  Some feel they want to
separate Saudi Arabia from a power that is an ally of Israel.  Some
certainly see this as a way of undermining the Saudi regime.  Some see this
whole issue not just in the context of US-Saudi relations, but that the
entire Mideast should become of copy of the US, or who look more at Israel's
security interests than the interest of the US.  This problem is compounded
on both sides because if the US is an ally of Israel and see the Israeli
side of things to the exclusion of the Palestinian side, then Saudi Arabia
sees the Palestinian side to the exclusion of the Israeli side.

[GW] How would you characterize the level of cooperation between the two
governments based on your conversations with Saudi Arabian and US officials.

[AC] I think it is very clear when you talk not only to the Saudis but US
officials here that there has been a lot of cooperation.

Tensions over the US presence in Saudi Arabia are real. They have been
exacerbated by the fact that the Saudis really do not belief that military
intervention in Iraq is wise, or that the United States has a clear course
of action beyond intervention to overthrow Saddam.  In spite of that, I
think it is important to note, a lot of the cooperation, rather than being
reduced, is actually being restored.  There will be a new series of joint
exercises.   There is more flexibility on the use of Saudi airspace.   There
is less concern over the issues of stockpiling munitions or the use of
stockpiles in Saudi Arabia.  There is an effort to bring back some of the
common training in addition to exercises.

So when you look at a lot of these issues you discover that, below the
surface of the extreme commentary, a lot of the US-Saudi relationship still
exists.  It is not that Saudi Arabia plans to support the US in Iraq, but it
has not totally rejected it -- certainly not if the UN passes a strong
resolution under Article 7.  I think we sometimes look for a much more
polarized relationship than exists.

The same is true whenever you talk about the issue of counterterrorism.
Nobody thinks this cooperation is perfect but generally both US and Saudi
officials make the point that there is a lot more cooperation than people
wish to make public in detail.  And I think from talking with
counterterrorism specialists in the US they probably agree.   There is a lot
that still needs to be done but there is a lot that has been accomplished.
Certainly the countries are working together better than they were on
September 11.

[GW] What is your sense of the level of credibility the United States has
with partners in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, on the question of
Iraq?

[AC] First, I think you need to understand that most people in the world
have no understanding of weapons of mass destruction. The most they can do
is interpret white papers and speeches, in terms of how other people
interpret them.

In the Mideast, so far, the case that the Bush administration and Prime
Minister Blair have made has not been convincing.  Some of that, frankly, is
denial -- the refusal to really remember what UNSCOM found, the UNSCOM
reports to the Secretary General.  There is a feeling that if we pay too
close attention to this we're going to have to admit that Saddam is more of
a problem than we'd really like to admit.

Part of the problem is that the case has been made very late in the game.
The first substantive paper is Prime Minister Blair's.  The US has issued
speeches and one brief statement but no details.  There's no case that
people find convincing and that's true of Saudi officials at the classified
level just as it is in many places such as with our NATO allies. The
situation is complicated by the fact that some Saudis have been in a state
of denial too, about Saddam's failings and shortcomings, and of the problems
that need to be addressed.

It is also complicated by the fact that the US has issued papers on subjects
such as preemption and US officials have talked about democratizing the Arab
world.  The lack of focus in the US message has had a powerful impact -- the
lack of detail and consistency over time.  The tendency for US officials to
speak to American and Western audiences rather than the world has had an
impact.

As I mentioned earlier the most serious and persistent problem is that no
one knows what US intentions are.  Are we going to hold onto the Iraqi
oilfields, exploit them?  Are we going to go into Iraq, overthrow Saddam and
leave a mess, potentially a divided Iraq and a civil war?  Are we going to
go in, basically do things which will inevitably hurt the Iraqi people and
not have a clear recovery plan?  Nobody [in Saudi Arabia] can answer those
questions.  The question of what we will do if we act and when we win is, I
think, the constant dominating uncertainty, as much as the issue of whether
Saddam is evil and whether the weapons of mass destruction are an imminent
threat.

[GW] You raised the question of economic and demographic issues facing Saudi
Arabia with officials you met.  How would you characterize the implications
of demographics -- specifically the high population growth rate -- in Saudi
Arabia with the economic situation and whether Saudi Arabian officials are
addressing the issues adequately?

[AC] There are two dangers here. One is to forget that if we set the
standard for Saudi per capita income in 1980, that was a freak year.  The
fact that it's dropped from an excess of $20,000 to well under $9,000 in
constant dollars is not always relevant.

Nevertheless I think the Saudis recognize they are in economic trouble in
the long run.  The population, at least among the educated Saudis, is going
to present massive problems in terms of new jobs, diversification, and
dealing with the demands of a very young population with more and more
people entering the labor force.  Are the Saudis realistic in dealing with
the issues?  The answer quite frankly has to be no, they're not. If you look
at the numbers they quote it is striking that no one can even say there is a
meaningful estimate of unemployment.  Some of that seems to be deliberate --
if you issue the figures you would have to admit the problem. People are
celebrating the creation of a Water Ministry and the appointment of a Water
Minister.  But it is unclear anybody believes there is an effective plan to
deal with water and electric power issues, that there is a clear plan that
is economical for gas development.  For Saudi Arabia, these are incredibly
expensive activities which require a lot of foresight and technological
integration.

The Saudization plan often, depending on who you talk to, is either
recognized as having, at best, moderate value or sometimes seen as the
solution. But often the number of jobs that can be Saudized is exaggerated.

It is not that the Kingdom is under some kind of immediate pressure, but
when dealing with many of these areas it has good plans in broad terms for
reform.  However, they are being executed far too slowly to have the impact
that is needed and it is not honestly addressing the scale of the problems
it faces or the difficulty of solving them.

[GW] What struck you in particular during your visit to the Kingdom on this
trip?

[AC] I think the most striking thing is, not any one issue, but the fact
that we are talking about real pragmatic issues where there are legitimate
differences of opinion.

We are not talking about extremism, we are not talking about Islam as being
a threat.  We are not talking about Saudis who want to sever the
relationship or end all military cooperation.  We are talking about Saudis
searching for a way to restore the kind of friendship and relationship that
existed before 9-11.

If we are going to address this, it is not a matter of looking at some kind
of conspiracies, looking at this in any sense as a religious or national
issue.  It is dealing with differences that really have to be worked out.
These are going to be issues like Iraq, terrorism, the second intifada --
issues which are not going to go quickly away.  It is where we have to know
how to agree on disagreeing, as well as find ways to agree on making
compromises.

[GW] Thank you Doctor Cordesman.

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

ABOUT DR. ANTHONY CORDESMAN
Dr. Anthony Cordesman holds the Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and is Co-Director of the
Center's Middle East Program. He is also a military analyst for ABC and a
Professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown. He directs the
assessment of global military balance, strategic energy developments, and
CSIS' Dynamic Net Assessment of the Middle East. He is the author of books
on the military lessons of the Iran-Iraq war as well as the Arab-Israeli
military balance and the peace process, a six-volume net assessment of the
Gulf, transnational threats, and military developments in Iran and Iraq. He
analyzes U.S. strategy and force plans, counter-proliferation issues, arms
transfers, Middle Eastern security, economic, and energy issues.

Dr. Cordesman served as a national security analyst for ABC News for the
1990-91 Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia, Operation Desert Fox, and Kosovo. He was
the Assistant for National Security to Senator John McCain and a Wilson
Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian. He has
served in senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency. His posts include acting as the Civilian Assistant
to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Intelligence
Assessment, Director of Policy, Programming, and Analysis in the Department
of Energy, Director of Project ISMILAID, and as the Secretary of Defense's
representative on the Middle East Working Group.

Dr. Cordesman has also served in numerous overseas posts. He was a member of
the U.S. Delegation to NATO and a Director on the NATO International Staff,
working on Middle Eastern security issues. He served in Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Turkey, the UK, and West Germany. He has been an advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe, and has traveled extensively in
the Gulf and North Africa.

BOOKS BY DR. CORDESMAN

"Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass
Destruction"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275965287/arabialink

"Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332362/arabialink

 "Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom," (CSIS Middle East Dynamic Net
Assessment)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0813332427/arabialink

"Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending
the U.S. Homeland"
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0275974278/arabialink

===========================GulfWire~~Perspectives=========================

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