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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DECAY

By SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON*

AMONG the laws that rule human societies," de Tocqueville said, "there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased."¹ In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the "art of associating together." The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocqueville's precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the "art of associating together" and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS MODERNIZATION

Definitions of political development are legion. Most, however, share two closely related characteristics. First, political development is identified as one aspect of, or as intimately connected with, the broader processes of modernization in society as a whole. Moderniza-

* I am grateful to the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, for the support which made this article possible and to Edward C. Banfield, Mather Eliot, Milton J. Esman, H. Field Haviland, Jr., and John D. Montgomery, for their helpful written comments on an earlier draft.

¹ *Democracy in America* (Phillips Bradley edn., New York 1955), II, 118.

tion affects all segments of society; its political aspects constitute political development. Indeed, many authors seem to prefer the phrase "political modernization" as more descriptive of their primary concern. Second, if political development is linked with modernization, it is necessarily a broad and complex process. Hence most authors argue that political development must be measured by many criteria. The "multi-function character of politics," Lucian Pye has said, ". . . means that no single scale can be used for measuring the degree of political development."² It thus differs from economic development, on the character of which there seems to be more general agreement and which is measurable through fairly precise indices such as per capita national income. Definitions of political development hence tend to itemize a number of criteria. Ward and Rustow list eight characteristics of the modern polity; Emerson has five. Pye identifies four major aspects of political development plus half a dozen additional "factors." Eisenstadt finds four characteristics of political modernization.³

The definitions are many and multiple; but, with a few exceptions, the characteristics which they identify with political development are all aspects of the processes of modernization. Four sets of categories recur continuously in the definitions. One set, focusing on the Parsonian pattern variables, can perhaps best be summed up as *rationalization*. This involves movement from particularism to universalism, from diffuseness to specificity, from ascription to achievement, and from affectivity to affective neutrality. In terms of political development, functional differentiation and achievement criteria are particularly emphasized.⁴ A second set of characteristics identified with development involves nationalism and *national integration*. Almost all writers recognize the problem of the "crisis of national identity" and the necessity of establishing a firmly delimited ethnic basis for the political community.⁵ A developed polity, it is usually assumed, must,

² Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 16.

³ Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), 6-7; Rupert Emerson, *Political Modernization: The Single-Party System* (Denver 1963), 7-8; Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 17-18; S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 99.

⁴ James S. Coleman, in Gabriel A. Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 532; Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 122; Eisenstadt, in *ibid.*, 99; Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization*, 7.

⁵ See, e.g., Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and Political Change," *American*

with rare exception, be a nation-state. "Nation-building" is a key aspect of political development. A third approach focuses on *democratization*: pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power, and similar qualities. "Competitiveness," says Coleman, "is an essential aspect of political modernity. . . ." Hence, "the Anglo-American polities most closely approximate the model of a modern political system. . . ."⁶ Frey argues that "the most common notion of political development in intellectual American circles is that of movement towards democracy." He finds this a congenial notion and offers his own definition of political development as "changes in the direction of greater distribution and reciprocity of power. . . ."⁷

Rationalization, integration, and democratization thus commonly appear in definitions of political development. The characteristic of political development or political modernization which is most frequently emphasized, however, is *mobilization*, or *participation*. Modernization, Karl Deutsch has emphasized, involves social mobilization, and "this complex of processes of social change is significantly correlated with major changes in politics." Increases in literacy, urbanization, exposure to mass media, industrialization, and per capita income expand "the politically relevant strata of the population," multiply the demands for government services, and thus stimulate an increase in governmental capabilities, a broadening of the elite, increased political participation, and shifts in attention from the local level to the national level.⁸ Modernization means mass mobilization; mass mobilization means increased political participation; and increased participation is the key element of political development. Participation distinguishes modern politics from traditional politics. "Traditional society," says Lerner, "is non-participant—it deploys people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a center. . . ." Modern society, in contrast, is "participant society."⁹ The "new world political culture," say Almond and Verba, "will be a political culture of participation. If there is a political revolution going on throughout the world, it is what might be called the participation explosion. In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is polit-

Behavioral Scientist, vi (June 1963), 3-10; Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization*, 7.

⁶ Coleman, in Almond and Coleman, eds., *Politics of Developing Areas*, 533.

⁷ Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power, and Communications in Turkey," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 301.

⁸ Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, lv (September 1961), 493ff.

⁹ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe 1958), 48-50.

ically relevant—that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system—is widespread. Large groups of people who have been outside politics are demanding entrance into the political system.”¹⁰ Political development, Rustow argues, may be defined as “(1) an increasing national political unity plus (2) a broadening base of political participation. . . .” Similarly, Riggs declares that political development “refers to the process of politicization: increasing participation or involvement of the citizen in state activities, in power calculations, and consequences.”¹¹

All definitions are arbitrary. These definitions of political development as some combination or permutation of participation, rationalization, democratization, and nation-building are just as legitimate as any other definition. While all definitions may be equally arbitrary and equally legitimate, they do vary greatly, however, in their relevance to particular problems and their usefulness for particular ends. Presumably one major purpose of concepts of political development is to facilitate understanding of the political processes in contemporary Asian, African, and Latin American societies. To be analytically useful, a concept must be precise and relevant. It must also have sufficient generality of application to permit comparative analysis of differing situations. Many approaches to political development suffer from one or more of the following difficulties.

First, the identification of political development with modernization or with factors usually associated with modernization drastically limits the applicability of the concept in both time and space. It is defined in parochial and immediate terms, its relevance limited to modern nation-states or the emergence of modern nation-states. It becomes impossible to speak of a politically developed tribal authority, city-state, feudal monarchy, or bureaucratic empire. Development is identified with one type of political system, rather than as a quality which might characterize any type of political system. All systems which are not modern are underdeveloped, including presumably fifth-century Athens, the third-century B.C. Roman republic, the second-century A.D. Roman empire, the Han and T'ang empires in China, or even eighteenth-century America. None of these political systems was modern. Is it also useful to consider them underdeveloped? Would it not be more appropriate to consider development or underdevelopment as a characteristic which might be found in any type of political

¹⁰ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963), 4.

¹¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, “The Vanishing Dream of Stability,” *AID Digest* (August 1962), 13; Riggs, in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 139.

system? City-states could be developed or underdeveloped; so also could be bureaucratic empires or modern nation-states. This approach would cast additional light on contemporary modernizing societies by furnishing a second set of categories (in addition to the traditional-modern set) for comparing the processes of change in those societies with the processes of change in other types of societies. Such an approach, of course, would also liberate the concept of development from the even more limited identification of it with the Western, constitutional, democratic nation-state.

The second problem with many definitions of political development is the obverse but also the corollary of the first. On the one hand, development is limited to the characteristics of the modern nation-state. On the other, it is also broadened to include almost all politically relevant aspects of the modernization process. It acquires comprehensiveness at the cost of precision. There is a natural tendency to assume that political development is all of a piece, that one "good thing" is compatible with another. In addition, studies of modernization have shown a very high degree of correlation among such indices as literacy, urbanization, media participation, and political participation.¹² Hence, it is easy to assume that a similar correlation exists among the various elements identified as contributing to political development. In fact, however, the four, eight, or twelve criteria of development may or may not have any systematic relation to each other. They may indeed be negatively correlated. There is no particular reason, for instance, why more participation and more structural differentiation should go together; in fact, there is some *a priori* reason to assume that more of one might mean less of the other. If this be the case, two contradictory tendencies (A, —B; —A, B) could both be labeled "political development." The broader the definition of development, moreover, the more inevitable development becomes. The all-encompassing definitions make development seem easy by making it seem inescapable. Development becomes an omnipresent first cause, which explains everything but distinguishes nothing. Almost anything that happens in the "developing" countries—coups, ethnic struggles, revolutionary wars—becomes part of the process of development, however contradictory or retrogressive this may appear on the surface. Political development thus loses its analytical content and acquires simply a geographic one. At the extreme, it becomes synonymous with the political history of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹³

¹² Lerner, *Passing of Traditional Society*, chap. 2.

¹³ For the *reductio ad absurdum*, see Majid Khadduri, *Modern Libya: A Study in*

Thirdly, many definitions of political development fail to distinguish clearly the empirical relevance of the components going into the definition. Concepts of "developed" and "undeveloped" as ideal types or states of being are confused with concepts of "development" as a process which are, in turn, identified with the politics of the areas commonly called "developing." The line between actuality and aspiration is fogged. Things which are in fact occurring in the "developing" areas become hopelessly intertwined with things which the theorist thinks should occur there. Here again the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader processes of social modernization is also true for political changes. Modernization, in some degree, is a fact in Asia, Africa, Latin America: urbanization is rapid; literacy is slowly increasing; industrialization is being pushed; per capita gross national product is inching upward; mass media circulation is expanding; political participation is broadening. All these are facts. In contrast, progress toward many of the other goals identified with political development—democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration—often is dubious at best. Yet the tendency is to think that because modernization is taking place, political development also must be taking place. As a result, many of the sympathetic Western writings about the underdeveloped areas today have the same air of hopeful unreality which characterized much of the sympathetic Western writing about the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's. They are suffused with what can only be described as "Webbism": that is, the tendency to ascribe to a political system qualities which are assumed to be its ultimate goals rather than qualities which actually characterize its processes and functions.¹⁴

In actuality, only some of the tendencies frequently encompassed in the concept "political development" appear to be characteristic of the "developing" areas. Instead of a trend toward competitiveness and

Political Development (Baltimore 1963), and J. Clagett Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika* (Stanford 1963). In the titles and content of both, "political development" has no analytical meaning. It is simply a synonym (euphemism?) for "political history." Both books are good history, but they are not social science.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," to be published in John D. Montgomery and William Siffin, eds., *Politics, Administration and Change: Approaches to Development* (New York 1965). Esman bases his analysis on the assumption that the political leaders of modernizing societies are motivated by the goals of nation-building and social-economic progress and not by desire for personal power, wealth, status, or the territorial expansion of their countries. This assumption has about the same degree of truth and usefulness in explaining politics in the contemporary "developing" areas as the assumption that Stalin's policies were devoted to building communism has to the explanation of Soviet politics in the 1930's.

democracy, there has been an "erosion of democracy" and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes. Instead of stability, there have been repeated coups and revolts. Instead of a unifying nationalism and nation-building, there have been repeated ethnic conflicts and civil wars. Instead of institutional rationalization and differentiation, there has frequently been a decay of the administrative organizations inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.¹⁵ Only the concept of political development as mobilization and participation appears to be generally applicable to the "developing" world. Rationalization, competitiveness, and nation-building, in contrast, seem to have only a dim relation to reality.

This gap between theory and reality suggests a fourth difficulty in many concepts of political development. They are usually one-way concepts. Little or no provision is made for their reversibility. If political development is thought to involve the mobilization of people into politics, account should also be taken of the possibility that political de-development can take place and people can be demobilized out of politics. Structural differentiation may occur, but so also may structural homogenization. National disintegration is a phenomenon as much as national integration. A concept of political development should be reversible. It should define both political development and the circumstances under which political decay is encouraged.

The failure to think of political development as a reversible process apparently stems from two sources. Insofar as development is identified with modernization, many aspects of modernization do appear to be practically irreversible. Urbanization is not likely to give way to ruralization. Increases in literacy are not normally followed by sharp declines. Capital once invested in factories or power plants stays invested. Even increases in per capita gross national product are, more often than not, permanent, except for minor dips or destruction caused by war or natural catastrophe. With varying slopes, with hesitancy in some sectors but with strength and steady progress in others, virtually all the indices of modernization progress steadily upward on the charts. But political changes have no such irreversibility.

In other instances, one feels that an underlying commitment to the theory of progress is so overwhelming as to exclude political decay as

¹⁵ On the "erosion of democracy" and political instability, see Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chap. 15; and Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (London 1963), chap. 2.

a possible concept. Political decay, like thermonuclear war, becomes unthinkable. Almond, for instance, measures not just political development but *political change* by "the acquisition by a political system of some new capability."¹⁶ The specific capabilities he has in mind are those for national integration, international accommodation, political participation, and welfare distribution. Before the Renaissance, Almond argues, political systems "acquired and lost capabilities . . . in anything but a unilinear, evolutionary way." Modernization, however, reduces "the independence of man's political experiments." Change is "far from unilinear," but it is toward "the emergence of world culture." Surely, however, modern and modernizing states can change by losing capabilities as well as by gaining them. In addition, a gain in any one capability usually involves costs in others. A theory of political development needs to be mated to a theory of political decay. Indeed, as was suggested above, theories of instability, corruption, authoritarianism, domestic violence, institutional decline, and political disintegration may tell us a lot more about the "developing" areas than their more hopefully defined opposites.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS INSTITUTIONALIZATION

There is thus much to be gained (as well as something to be lost) by conceiving of political development as a process independent of, although obviously affected by, the process of modernization. In view of the crucial importance of the relationship between mobilization and participation, on the one hand, and the growth of political organizations, on the other, it is useful for many purposes to define political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. This concept liberates development from modernization. It can be applied to the analysis of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones. It can be defined in reasonably precise ways which are at least theoretically capable of measurement. As a concept, it does not suggest that movement is likely to be in only one direction: institutions, we know, decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature. Most significantly, it focuses attention on the reciprocal interaction between the on-going social processes of modernization, on the one hand, and the strength, stability, or weakness of political structures, traditional, transitional, or modern, on the other.¹⁷

¹⁶ Almond, *American Behavioral Scientist*, vi, 6.

¹⁷ The concept of institutionalization has, of course, been used by other writers concerned with political development—most notably, S. N. Eisenstadt. His definition, however, differs significantly from my approach here. See, in particular, his "Initial

The strength of political organizations and procedures varies with their *scope of support* and their *level of institutionalization*. Scope refers simply to the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the population is politically organized and follows the political procedures, the scope is broad. Institutions are stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior. Organizations and procedures vary in their degree of institutionalization. Harvard University and the newly opened suburban high school are both organizations, but Harvard is much more of an institution than is the high school. The seniority system in Congress and President Johnson's select press conferences are both procedures, but seniority is much more institutionalized than are Mr. Johnson's methods of dealing with the press. Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. If these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their levels of institutionalization. Furthermore, it will be possible to measure increases and decreases in the institutionalization of particular organizations and procedures within a political system.

ADAPTABILITY-RIGIDITY

The more adaptable an organization or procedure is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the less adaptable and more rigid it is, the lower its level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic. It is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenge and age. The more challenges which have arisen in its environment and the greater its age, the more adaptable it is. Rigidity is more characteristic of young organizations than of old ones. Old organizations and procedures, however, are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. In addition, if over a period of time an organization has developed a set of responses

Institutional Patterns of Political Modernisation," *Civilisations*, xii (No. 4, 1962), 461-72, and xiii (No. 1, 1963), 15-26; "Institutionalization and Change," *American Sociological Review*, xxix (April 1964), 235-47; "Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution," *ibid.*, xxix (June 1964), 375-86.

for dealing effectively with one type of problem, and if it is then confronted with an entirely different type of problem requiring a different response, the organization may well be a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to the new challenge. In general, however, the first hurdle is the biggest one. Success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges. If, for instance, the probability of successful adjustment to the first challenge is 50 per cent, the probability of successful adjustment to the second challenge might be 75 per cent, to the third challenge 87½ per cent, to the fourth 93¾ per cent, and so on. Some changes in environment, moreover, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organizations. Other changes in environment may be produced by the organization itself; if, for instance, it successfully completes the task which it was originally created to accomplish. So long as it is recognized that environments can differ in the challenges which they pose to organizations, the adaptability of an organization can in a rough sense be measured by its age. Its age, in turn, can be measured in three ways.

One is simply chronological: the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization. The older an organization is, the more likely it is to continue to exist through any specified future time period. The probability that an organization which is one hundred years old will survive one additional year, it might be hypothesized, is perhaps one hundred times greater than the probability that an organization one year old will survive one additional year. Political institutions are thus not created overnight. Political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared with the seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development. In some instances, particular types of experience may substitute for time: fierce conflict or other serious challenges may transform organizations into institutions much more rapidly than normal circumstances. But such intensive experiences are rare, and even with such experiences time is still required. "A major party," Ashoka Mehta has observed, in commenting on why communism is helpless in India, "cannot be created in a day. In China a great party was forged by the revolution. Other major parties can be or are born of revolutions in other countries. But it is simply impossible, through normal channels, to forge a great party, to reach and galvanize millions of men in half a million villages."¹⁸

¹⁸ Ashoka Mehta, in Raymond Aron, ed., *World Technology and Human Destiny* (Ann Arbor 1963), 133.

A second measure of adaptability is generational age. So long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders with another, the more highly institutionalized it is. In considerable measure, of course, generational age is a function of chronological age. But political parties and governments may continue for decades under the leadership of one generation. The founders of organizations—whether parties, governments, or business corporations—are often young. Hence the gap between chronological age and generational age is apt to be greater in the early history of an organization than later in its career. This gap produces tensions between the first leaders of the organization and the next generation immediately behind them, which can look forward to a lifetime in the shadow of the first generation. In the middle of the 1960's the Chinese Communist Party was forty-five years old, but in large part it was still led by its first generation of leaders. An organization may also change leadership without changing generations of leadership. One generation differs from another in terms of its formative experiences. Simple replacement of one set of leaders by another, i.e., surmounting a succession crisis, counts for something in terms of institutional adaptability, but it is not as significant as a shift in leadership generations, i.e., the replacement of one set of leaders by another set with significantly different organizational experiences. The shift from Lenin to Stalin was an intra-generation succession; the shift from Stalin to Khrushchev was an inter-generation succession.

Thirdly, organizational adaptability can be measured in functional terms. An organization's functions, of course, can be defined in an almost infinite number of ways. (This is a major appeal and a major limitation of the functional approach to organizations.) Usually an organization is created to perform one particular function. When that function is no longer needed, the organization faces a major crisis. It either finds a new function or reconciles itself to a lingering death. An organization which has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one which has not. Not functional specificity but functional adaptability is the true measure of a highly developed organization. Institutionalization makes the organization more than simply an instrument to achieve certain purposes.¹⁹

¹⁹ See the very useful discussion in Philip Selznick's small classic, *Leadership in Administration* (New York 1957), 5ff.

Instead its leaders and members come to value it for its own sake, and it develops a life of its own quite apart from the specific functions it may perform at any given time. The organization triumphs over its function.

Organizations and individuals thus differ significantly in their cumulative capacity to adapt to changes. Individuals usually grow up through childhood and adolescence without deep commitments to highly specific functions. The process of commitment begins in late adolescence. As the individual becomes more and more committed to the performance of certain functions, he finds it increasingly difficult to change those functions and to unlearn the responses which he has acquired to meet environmental changes. His personality has been formed; he has become "set in his ways." Organizations, on the other hand, are usually created to perform very specific functions. When the organization confronts a changing environment, it must, if it is to survive, weaken its commitment to its original functions. As the organization matures, it becomes "unset" in its ways.

In practice, organizations vary greatly in their functional adaptability. The YMCA, for instance, was founded in the mid-nineteenth century as an evangelical organization to convert the single young men who, during the early years of industrialization, were migrating in great numbers to the cities. With the decline in need for this function, the Y successfully adjusted to the performance of many other "general service" functions broadly related to the legitimizing goal of "character development." Concurrently, it broadened its membership base to include first non-evangelical Protestants, then Catholics, then Jews, then old men as well as young, and then women as well as men!²⁰ As a result, the organization has prospered although its original functions disappeared with the dark satanic mills. Other organizations, such as the WCTU and the Townsend Movement, have had greater difficulty in adjusting to a changing environment. The WCTU "is an organization in retreat. Contrary to the expectations of theories of institutionalization, the movement has not acted to preserve organizational values at the expense of past doctrine."²¹ The Townsend Movement has been torn between those who wish to remain loyal to the original function

²⁰ See Mayer N. Zald and Patricia Denton, "From Evangelism to General Service: The Transformation of the YMCA," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, viii (September 1963), 214ff.

²¹ Joseph R. Gusfield, "Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union," *American Journal of Sociology*, lxi (November 1955), 232; and Gusfield, "The Problem of Generations in an Organizational Structure," *Social Forces*, xxxv (May 1957), 323ff.

and those who put organizational imperatives first. If the latter are successful, "the dominating orientation of leaders and members shifts *from the implementation of the values the organization is taken to represent* (by leaders, members, and public alike), *to maintaining the organizational structure as such*, even at the loss of the organization's central mission."²² The conquest of polio posed a similar acute crisis for the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. The original goals of the organization were highly specific. Should the organization dissolve when these goals were achieved? The dominant opinion of the volunteers was that the organization should continue. "We can fight polio," said one town chairman, "if we can organize people. If we can organize people like this we can fight anything." Another felt that: "Wouldn't it be a wonderful story to get polio licked, and then go on to something else and get that licked and then go on to something else? It would be a challenge, a career."²³

The problems of functional adaptability are not much different for political organizations. A political party gains in functional age when it shifts its function from the representation of one constituency to the representation of another; it also gains in functional age when it shifts from opposition to government. A party which is unable to change constituencies or to acquire power is less of an institution than one which is able to make these changes. A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism. A party which acts this way is less of an institution than one, like the Congress Party, which after achieving independence drops its anti-colonialism and quite rapidly adapts itself to the tasks of governing. Industrialization has been a major function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A major test of the institutionalization of the Communist Party will be its success in developing new functions now that the major industrializing effort is behind it. A governmental organ which can successfully adapt itself to changed functions, such as the British Crown in the eighteenth and nineteenth

²² Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," *American Sociological Review*, xx (February 1955), 10; italics in original.

²³ David L. Sills, *The Volunteers* (Glencoe 1957), p. 266. Chap. 9 of this book is an excellent discussion of organizational goal replacement with reference to the YMCA, WCTU, Townsend Movement, Red Cross, and other case studies.

centuries, is more of an institution than one which cannot, such as the French monarchy in the same period.

COMPLEXITY-SIMPLICITY

The more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number and variety of subunits, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members. In addition, an organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose. The diversified corporation is obviously less vulnerable than that which produces one product for one market. The differentiation of subunits within an organization may or may not be along functional lines. If it is functional in character, the subunits themselves are less highly institutionalized than the whole of which they are a part. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are fairly easily reflected by changes in the power and roles of its subunits. If the subunits are multifunctional, they have greater institutional strength, but they may also, for that very reason, contribute less flexibility to the organization as a whole. Hence, a political system with parties of "social integration," in Neumann's terms, has less institutional flexibility than one with parties of "individual representation."²⁴

Relatively primitive and simple traditional political systems are usually overwhelmed and destroyed in the modernization process. More complex traditional systems are more likely to adapt to these new demands. Japan, for instance, was able to adjust its traditional political institutions to the modern world because of their relative complexity. For two and a half centuries before 1868, the emperor had reigned and the Tokugawa shogun had ruled. The stability of the political order, however, did not depend solely on the stability of the shogunate. When the authority of the shogunate decayed, another traditional institution, the emperor, was available to become the instrument of the modernizing samurai. The collapse of the shogun involved not the overthrow of the political order but the "restoration" of the emperor.

The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual. It is also, of course, the least stable. Tyrannies, Aristotle pointed

²⁴ Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Neumann, ed., *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago 1956), 403-5.

out, are virtually all "quite short-lived."²⁵ A political system with several different political institutions, on the other hand, is much more likely to adapt. The needs of one age may be met by one set of institutions; the needs of the next by a different set. The system possesses within itself the means of its own renewal and adaptation. In the American system, for instance, President, Senate, House of Representatives, Supreme Court, and state governments have played different roles at different times in history. As new problems arise, the initiative in dealing with them may be taken first by one institution, then by another. In contrast, the French system of the Third and Fourth Republics centered authority in the National Assembly and the national bureaucracy. If, as was frequently the case, the Assembly was too divided to act and the bureaucracy lacked the authority to act, the system was unable to adapt to environmental changes and to deal with new policy problems. When in the 1950's the Assembly was unable to handle the dissolution of the French Empire, there was no other institution, such as an independent executive, to step into the breach. As a result, an extraconstitutional force, the military, intervened in politics, and in due course a new institution, the de Gaulle Presidency, was created which was able to handle the problem. "A state without the means of some change," Burke observed of an earlier French crisis, "is without the means of its conservation."²⁶

The classical political theorists, preoccupied as they were with the problem of stability, arrived at similar conclusions. The simple forms of government were most likely to degenerate; the "mixed state" was more likely to be stable. Both Plato and Aristotle suggested that the most practical state was the "polity" combining the institutions of democracy and oligarchy. A "constitutional system based absolutely, and at all points," Aristotle argued, "on either the oligarchical or the democratic conception of equality is a poor sort of thing. The facts are evidence enough: constitutions of this sort never endure." A "constitution is better when it is composed of more numerous elements."²⁷ Such a constitution is more likely to head off sedition and revolution. Polybius and Cicero elaborated this idea more explicitly. Each of the "good" simple forms of government—kingship, aristocracy, and democracy—is likely to degenerate into its perverted counterpart—tyranny, oligarchy, and mobocracy. Instability and degeneration can be avoided only by combining elements from all the good forms into a mixed

²⁵ *Politics* (Ernest Barker trans., London 1946), 254.

²⁶ *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Gateway edn., Chicago 1955), 37.

²⁷ *Politics*, 60, 206.

state. Complexity produces stability. "The simple governments," Burke echoed two thousand years later, "are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them."²⁸

AUTONOMY-SUBORDINATION

A third measure of institutionalization is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior. How well is the political sphere differentiated from other spheres? In a highly developed political system, political organizations have an integrity which they lack in less developed systems. In some measure, they are insulated from the impact of non-political groups and procedures. In less developed political systems, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences.

At its most concrete level, autonomy involves the relations between social forces, on the one hand, and political organizations, on the other. Social forces include the groupings of men for social and economic activities: families, clans, work groups, churches, ethnic and linguistic groupings. Political institutionalization, in the sense of autonomy, means the development of political organizations and procedures which are not simply expressions of the interests of particular social groups. A political organization which is the instrument of a social group—family, clan, class—lacks autonomy and institutionalization. If the state, in the traditional Marxist claim, is really the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," then it is not much of an institution. A judiciary is independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of those of other political institutions and social groupings. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is measured by the extent to which they have their own interests and values distinguishable from those of other social forces. As with the judiciary, the autonomy of political institutions is likely to be the result of competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, which expresses the interests of only one group in society—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less autonomous than one which articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups. The latter type of party has a clearly defined existence apart from particular social forces. So also with legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies. Political procedures, like political organizations, also have varying degrees of autonomy. A highly developed political system has procedures to minimize, if not to eliminate, the role of vio-

²⁸ *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 92.

lence in the system and to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence of wealth in the system. To the extent that political officials can be toppled by a few soldiers or influenced by a few dollars, the organizations and procedures lack autonomy. Political organizations and procedures which lack autonomy are, in common parlance, said to be corrupt.

Political organizations and procedures which are vulnerable to non-political influences from within the society are also usually vulnerable to influences from outside the society. They are easily penetrated by agents, groups, and ideas from other political systems. Thus, a *coup d'état* in one political system may easily "trigger" a *coup d'état* by similar groups in other less-developed political systems.²⁹ In some instances, apparently, a regime can be overthrown by smuggling into the country a few agents and a handful of weapons. In other instances, a regime may be overthrown by the exchange of a few words and a few thousand dollars between a foreign ambassador and some disaffected colonels. The Soviet and American governments presumably spend substantial sums attempting to bribe high officials of less well-insulated political systems which they would not think of wasting in attempting to influence high officials in each other's political system.

In every society affected by social change, new groups arise to participate in politics. Where the political system lacks autonomy, these groups gain entry into politics without becoming identified with the established political organizations or acquiescing in the established political procedures. The political organizations and procedures are unable to stand up against the impact of a new social force. Conversely, in a developed political system, the autonomy of the system is protected by mechanisms which restrict and moderate the impact of new groups. These mechanisms either slow down the entry of new groups into politics or, through a process of political socialization, impel changes in the attitudes and behavior of the most politically active members of the new group. In a highly institutionalized political system, the most important positions of leadership can normally be achieved only by those who have served an apprenticeship in less important positions. The complexity of a political system contributes to its autonomy by providing a variety of organizations and positions in which individuals are prepared for the highest offices. In a sense, the top positions of leadership are the inner core of the political system; the less powerful positions, the peripheral organizations, and the semi-

²⁹ See Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York 1962), 44-47.

political organizations are the filters through which individuals desiring access to the core must pass. Thus the political system assimilates new social forces and new personnel without sacrificing its institutional integrity. In a political system which lacks such defenses, new men, new viewpoints, new social groups may replace each other at the core of the system with bewildering rapidity.

COHERENCE-DISUNITY

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity of the organization, the less its institutionalization. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes on issues which come up within those boundaries. The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Non-participants or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system do not have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same extent as the participants.³⁰ In theory, an organization can be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. In actuality, however, the two are often closely linked together. Autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling the organization to develop an esprit and style which become distinctive marks of its behavior. Autonomy also prevents the intrusion of disruptive external forces, although, of course, it does not protect against disruption from internal sources. Rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or in the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence. The Ottoman Ruling Institution, for instance, retained its vitality and coherence as long as admission was restricted and recruits were "put through an elaborate education, with selection and specialization at every stage." The Institution perished when "everybody pressed in to share its privileges. . . . Numbers were increased; discipline and efficiency declined."³¹

Unity, esprit, morale, and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. Numbers, weapons, and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in politics. The problems

³⁰ See, e.g., Herbert McCloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, xviii (June 1964), 361ff.; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York 1955), *passim*.

³¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Abridgement of Vols. 1-vi by D. C. Somervell, New York 1947), 176-77.

of creating coherent political organizations are more difficult but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent military organizations. "The sustaining sentiment of a military force," David Rapoport has argued, "has much in common with that which cements any group of men engaged in politics—the willingness of most individuals to bridle private or personal impulses for the sake of general social objectives. Comrades must trust each other's ability to resist the innumerable temptations that threaten the group's solidarity; otherwise, in trying social situations the desire to fend for oneself becomes overwhelming."³² The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organizing the one have also been adept at organizing the other. "The relationship of efficient social organization in the arts of peace and in the arts of group conflict," one anthropologist has observed, "is almost absolute, whether one is speaking of civilization or subcivilization. Successful war depends upon team work and consensus, both of which require command and discipline. Command and discipline, furthermore, can eventually be no more than symbols of something deeper and more real than they themselves."³³ Societies, such as Sparta, Rome, and Britain, which have been admired by their contemporaries for the authority and justice of their laws have also been admired for the coherence and discipline of their armies. Discipline and development go hand in hand.

One major advantage of studying development in terms of mobilization and participation is that they are measurable. Statistics are readily available for urbanization, literacy, mass media exposure, and voting. Hence, comparisons are easily made between countries and between different stages of the same country. What about institutionalization? Are the criteria of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence also measurable? Quite obviously the difficulties are greater. The UN has not conveniently collected in its *Statistical Yearbook* data on the political institutionalization of its members. Nonetheless, no reason exists why with a little imagination and effort sufficient information could not be collected to make meaningful comparisons of the levels of political institutionalization of different countries or of the same country at different times. Adaptability can be measured by chronological age, leadership successions, generational changes, and functional changes. Complexity can be measured by the number

³² David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 79.

³³ Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War* (Columbia, S.C., 1949), 235-36.

and diversity of organizational subunits and by the number and diversity of functions performed by the organizations. Autonomy is perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to pin down: it can, however, be measured by the distinctiveness of the norms and values of the organization compared with those of other groups, by the personnel controls (in terms of cooptation, penetration, and purging) existing between the organization and other groups, and by the degree to which the organization controls its own material resources. Coherence may be measured by the ratio of contested successions to total successions, by the cumulation or non-cumulation of cleavages among leaders and members, by the incidence of overt alienation and dissent within the organization, and, conceivably, by opinion surveys of the loyalties and preferences of organization members.

Experience tells us that levels of institutionalization differ. Measuring that difference may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Only by measuring institutionalization will we be able to buttress or disprove hypotheses about the relation between social, economic, and demographic changes, on the one hand, and variations in political structure, on the other.

III. MOBILIZATION VS. INSTITUTIONALIZATION: PUBLIC INTERESTS, DEGENERATION, AND THE CORRUPT POLITY

MOBILIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Social mobilization and political participation are rapidly increasing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These processes, in turn, are directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these areas. As Kornhauser has conclusively demonstrated for the Western world, rapid industrialization and urbanization create discontinuities which give rise to mass society. "The *rapid* influx of large numbers of people into *newly* developing urban areas invites mass movements."⁸⁴ In areas and industries with very rapid industrial growth, the creation and institutionalization of unions lag, and mass movements are likely among the workers. As unions are organized, they are highly vulnerable to outside influences in their early stages. "The rapid influx of large numbers of people into a new organization (as well as a new area) provides opportunities for mass-oriented elites to penetrate the organization. This is particularly true during the formative periods of organizations, for at such times external constraints must carry the burden of social control until the

⁸⁴ William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1959), 145.

new participants have come to internalize the values of the organization."⁸⁵

So also in politics. Rapid economic growth breeds political instability.⁸⁶ Political mobilization, moreover, does not necessarily require the building of factories or even movement to the cities. It may result simply from increases in communications, which can stimulate major increases in aspirations that may be only partially, if at all, satisfied. The result is a "revolution of rising frustrations."⁸⁷ Increases in literacy and education may bring more political instability. By Asian standards, Burma, Ceylon, and the Republic of Korea are all highly literate, but no one of them is a model of political stability. Nor does literacy necessarily stimulate democracy: with roughly 75 per cent literacy, Cuba was the fifth most literate country in Latin America (ranking behind Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica), but the first to go Communist; so also Kerala, with one of the highest literacy rates in India, was the first Indian state to elect a Communist government.⁸⁸ Literacy, as Daniel Lerner has suggested, "may be dysfunctional—indeed a serious impediment—to modernization in the societies now seeking (all too rapidly) to transform their institutions."⁸⁹

Increased communication may thus generate demands for more "modernity" than can be delivered. It may also stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is normally dominated by the more modern groups, it can bring into the arena new, anti-modern groups and break whatever consensus exists among the leading political participants. It may also mobilize minority ethnic groups who had been indifferent to politics but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide the political system along ethnic lines. Nationalism, it has often been assumed, makes for national integration. But in actuality, nationalism and other forms of ethnic consciousness often stimulate political disintegration, tearing apart the body politic.

Sharp increases in voting and other forms of political participation can also have deleterious effects on political institutions. In Latin

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 146.

⁸⁶ See Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, xxvii (December 1963), 529-52; and Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," *Dissent*, viii (Spring 1961), 172-79.

⁸⁷ See Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 330ff.

⁸⁸ Cf. Deutsch, *American Political Science Review*, lv, 496.

⁸⁹ Daniel Lerner, "The Transformation of Institutions" (mimeo.), 19.

America since the 1930's, increases in voting and increases in political instability have gone hand in hand. "Age requirements were lowered, property and literacy requirements were reduced or discarded, and the unscrubbed, unschooled millions on the farms were enfranchised in the name of democracy. They were swept into the political life of the republics so rapidly that existing parties could not absorb many of them, and they learned little about working within the existing political system."⁴⁰ The personal identity crises of the elites, caught between traditional and modern cultures, may create additional problems: "In transitional countries the political process often has to bear to an inordinate degree the stresses and strains of people responding to personal needs and seeking solutions to intensely personal problems."⁴¹ Rapid social and economic change calls into question existing values and behavior patterns. It thus often breeds personal corruption. In some circumstances this corruption may play a positive role in the modernizing process, enabling dynamic new groups to get things done which would have been blocked by the existing value system and social structure. At the same time, however, corruption undermines the autonomy and coherence of political institutions. It is hardly accidental that in the 1870's and 1880's a high rate of American economic development coincided with a low point in American governmental integrity.⁴²

Institutional decay has become a common phenomenon of the modernizing countries. *Coups d'état* and military interventions in politics are one index of low levels of political institutionalization: they occur where political institutions lack autonomy and coherence. According to one calculation, eleven of twelve modernizing states outside Latin America which were independent before World War II experienced *coups d'état* or attempted coups after World War II. Of twenty states which became independent between World War II and 1959, fourteen had coups or coup attempts by 1963. Of twenty-four states which became independent between 1960 and 1963, seven experienced coups or attempted coups before the end of 1963.⁴³ Instability in Latin America was less frequent early in the twentieth century than it was in the middle of the century. In the decade from 1917 to 1927, military men occupied the presidencies of the twenty

⁴⁰ John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964), 98-99.

⁴¹ Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven 1962), 4-5.

⁴² See, in general, Ronald E. Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London 1963).

⁴³ These figures are calculated from the data in the Appendix of Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).

Latin American republics 28.7 per cent of the time; in the decade from 1947 to 1957, military men were presidents 45.5 per cent of the time.⁴⁴ In the 1930's and 1940's in countries like Argentina and Colombia, military intervention in politics occurred for the first time in this century. Seventeen of the twenty Latin American states experienced coups or coup attempts between 1945 and 1964, only Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay having clean records of political stability.

In many states the decline of party organizations is reflected in the rise of charismatic leaders who personalize power and weaken institutions which might limit that power. The increasing despotism of Nkrumah, for instance, was accompanied by a marked decline in the institutional strength of the Convention People's Party. In Turkey, Pakistan, and Burma, the Republican People's Party, Muslim League, and AFPFL deteriorated and military intervention eventually ensued. In party organizations and bureaucracies, marked increases in corruption often accompanied significant declines in the effectiveness of governmental services. Particularistic groups—tribal, ethnic, religious—frequently reasserted themselves and further undermined the authority and coherence of political institutions. The legitimacy of post-colonial regimes among their own people was often less than that of the colonial regimes of the Europeans. Economists have argued that the gap between the level of economic well-being of the underdeveloped countries and that of highly developed countries is widening as the absolute increases and even percentage increases of the latter exceed those of the former. Something comparable and perhaps even more marked is occurring in the political field. The level of political institutionalization of the advanced countries has, with a few exceptions such as France, remained relatively stable. The level of political institutionalization of most other countries has declined. As a result, the political gap between them has broadened. In terms of institutional strength, many if not most of the new states reached their peak of political development at the moment of independence.

The differences which may exist in mobilization and institutionalization suggest four ideal-types of politics (see Table 1). Modern, developed, civic polities (the United States, the Soviet Union) have high levels of both mobilization and institutionalization. Primitive polities (such as Banfield's backward society) have low levels of both. Contained polities are highly institutionalized but have low levels of

⁴⁴ Computed from figures in R. W. Fitzgibbon, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," paper, 7th Round Table, International Political Science Association, Opatija, Yugoslavia, September 1959, 8-9.

TABLE I. TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION	POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION	
	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>High</i>	Civic	Corrupt
<i>Low</i>	Contained	Primitive

mobilization and participation. The dominant political institutions of contained polities may be either traditional (e.g., monarchies) or modern (e.g., political parties). If they are the former, such polities may well confront great difficulties in adjusting to rising levels of social mobilization. The traditional institutions may wither or collapse, and the result would be a corrupt polity with a high rate of participation but a low level of institutionalization. In the corrupt society, politics is, in Macaulay's phrase, "all sail and no anchor."⁴⁵ This type of polity characterizes much, if not most, of the modernizing world. Many of the more advanced Latin American countries, for instance, have achieved comparatively high indices of literacy, per capita national income, and urbanization. But their politics remains notably underdeveloped. Distrust and hatred have produced a continuing low level of political institutionalization. "There is no good faith in America, either among men or among nations," Bolivar once lamented. "Treaties are paper, constitutions books, elections battles, liberty anarchy, and life a torment. The only thing one can do in America is emigrate."⁴⁶ Over a century later, the same complaint was heard: "We are not, or do not represent a respectable nation . . . not because we are poor, but because we are disorganized," argued an Ecuadorian newspaper. "With a politics of ambush and of permanent mistrust, one for the other, we . . . cannot properly organize a republic . . . and without organization we cannot merit or attain respect from other nations."⁴⁷ So long as a country like Argentina retains a politics of coup and countercoup and a feeble state surrounded by massive social forces, it cannot be considered politically developed, no matter how urbane and prosperous and educated are its citizens.

In reverse fashion, a country may be politically highly developed, with modern political institutions, while still very backward in terms of modernization. India, for instance, is typically held to be the epit-

⁴⁵ Thomas B. Macaulay, letter to Henry S. Randall, Courtlandt Village, New York, May 23, 1857, printed in "What Did Macaulay Say About America?" *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, xxix (July 1925), 477-79.

⁴⁶ Simon Bolivar, quoted in K. H. Silvert, ed., *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York 1963), 347.

⁴⁷ *El Dia*, Quito, November 27, 1943, quoted in Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York 1961), 318.

ome of the underdeveloped society. Judged by the usual criteria of modernization, it was at the bottom of the ladder during the 1950's: per capita GNP of \$72, 80 per cent illiterate, over 80 per cent of the population in rural areas, 70 per cent of the work force in agriculture, a dozen major languages, deep caste and religious differences. Yet in terms of political institutionalization, India was far from backward. Indeed, it ranked high not only in comparison with other modernizing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but also in comparison with many much more modern European countries. A well-developed political system has strong and distinct institutions to perform both the "input" and the "output" functions of politics. India entered independence with not only two organizations, but two highly developed—adaptable, complex, autonomous, and coherent—institutions ready to assume primary responsibility for these functions. The Congress Party, founded in 1885, was one of the oldest and best-organized political parties in the world; the Indian Civil Service, dating from the early nineteenth century, has been appropriately hailed as "one of the greatest administrative systems of all time."⁴⁸ The stable, effective, and democratic government of India during the first fifteen years of independence rested far more on this institutional inheritance than it did on the charisma of Nehru. In addition, the relatively slow pace of modernization and social mobilization in India did not create demands and strains which the Party and the bureaucracy were unable to handle. So long as these two organizations maintain their institutional strength, it is ridiculous to think of India as politically underdeveloped, no matter how low her per capita income or how high her illiteracy rate.

Almost no other country which became independent after World War II was institutionally as well prepared as India for self-government. In countries like Pakistan and the Sudan, institutional evolution was unbalanced; the civil and military bureaucracies were more highly developed than the political parties, and the military had strong incentives to move into the institutional vacuum on the input side of the political system and to attempt to perform interest aggregation functions. This pattern, of course, has also been common in Latin America. In countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and Argentina, John J. Johnson has pointed out, the military is "the country's best organized institution and is thus in a better position to give objective expression to the national will" than are parties or

⁴⁸ Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 373.

interest groups.⁴⁹ In a very different category is a country like North Vietnam, which fought its way into independence with a highly disciplined political organization but which was distinctly weak on the administrative side. The Latin American parallel here would be Mexico, where, as Johnson puts it, "not the armed forces but the PRI is the best organized institution, and the party rather than the armed forces has been the unifying force at the national level." In yet a fourth category are those unfortunate states, such as the Congo, which were born with neither political nor administrative institutions. Many of these new states deficient at independence in one or both types of institutions have also been confronted by high rates of social mobilization and rapidly increasing demands on the political system (see Table 2).

TABLE 2. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AT MOMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

INPUT INSTITUTIONS		OUTPUT INSTITUTIONS	
<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
		India	North Vietnam
		Sudan	Congo

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS

A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces—between man and man, family and family, clan and clan, region and region, class and class—a competition unmediated by more comprehensive political organizations. The "amoral familism" of Banfield's village has its counterparts in amoral clanism, amoral groupism, and amoral classism. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realizing its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.

Traditionally the public interest has been approached in three ways.⁵⁰ It has been identified either with abstract, substantive ideal values and norms such as natural law, justice, or right reason; or with the specific interest of a particular individual ("L'état, c'est moi"), group, class (Marxism), or majority; or with the result of a competitive process among individuals (classic liberalism) or groups (Bentleyism).

⁴⁹ Johnson, *Military and Society*, 143.

⁵⁰ See, in general, Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe 1960); Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Nomos V: The Public Interest* (New York 1962); Douglas Price, "Theories of the Public Interest," in Lynton K. Caldwell, ed., *Politics and Public Affairs* (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), 141-60.

The problem in all these approaches is to arrive at a definition which is concrete rather than nebulous and general rather than particular. Unfortunately, in most cases what is concrete lacks generality and what is general lacks concreteness. One partial way out of the problem is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions. A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is, in this sense, more able to articulate and achieve its public interests. "Organized (institutionalized) political communities," as Friedrich argues, "are *better adapted* to reaching decisions and developing policies than unorganized communities."⁵¹ The public interest, in this sense, is not something which exists *a priori* in natural law or the will of the people. Nor is it simply whatever results from the political process. Rather it is whatever strengthens governmental institutions. The public interest is the interest of public institutions. It is something which is created and brought into existence by the institutionalization of government organizations. In a complex political system, many governmental organizations and procedures represent many different aspects of the public interest. The public interest of a complex society is a complex matter.

We are accustomed to think of our primary governing institutions as having representative functions—that is, as expressing the interests of some other set of groups (their constituency). Hence, we tend to forget that governmental institutions have interests of their own. These interests not only exist; they are also reasonably concrete. The questions, "What is the interest of the Presidency? What is the interest of the Senate? What is the interest of the House of Representatives? What are the interests of the Supreme Court?" are difficult but not completely impossible to answer. The answers would furnish a fairly close approximation of the "public interest" of the United States. Similarly, the public interest of Great Britain might be approximated by the specific institutional interests of the Crown, Cabinet, and Parliament. In the Soviet Union, the answer would involve the specific institutional interests of the Presidium, Secretariat, and Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Institutional interests differ from the interests of individuals who are in the institutions. Keynes's percipient remark that "In the long run, we are all dead" applies to individuals, not institutions. Individual interests are necessarily short-run interests. Institutional interests, how-

⁵¹ Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York 1963), 150; italics in original.

ever, exist through time: the proponent of the institution has to look to its welfare through an indefinite future. This consideration often means a limiting of immediate goals. The "true policy," Aristotle remarked, "for democracy and oligarchy alike, is not one which ensures the greatest possible amount of either, but one which will ensure the longest possible life for both."⁵² The official who attempts to maximize power or other values in the short run often weakens his institution in the long run. Supreme Court justices may, in terms of their immediate individual desires, wish to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. In deciding whether it is in the public interest to do so, however, presumably one question they should ask themselves is whether it is in the long-term institutional interest of the Supreme Court for them to do so. Judicial statesmen are those who, like John Marshall in *Marbury vs. Madison*, maximize the institutional power of the Court in such a way that it is impossible for either the President or Congress to challenge it. In contrast, the Supreme Court justices of the 1930's came very close to expanding their immediate influence at the expense of the long-term interests of the Court as an institution.

The phrase "What's good for General Motors is good for the country" contains at least a partial truth. "What's good for the Presidency is good for the country," however, contains more truth. Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best Presidents and the five worst Presidents. Then ask them to identify the five strongest Presidents and the five weakest Presidents. If the identification of strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will almost certainly not be less than 80 per cent. Those Presidents—Jefferson, Lincoln, the Roosevelts, Wilson—who expanded the powers of their office are hailed as the beneficent promoters of the public welfare and national interest. Those Presidents, such as Buchanan, Grant, Harding, who failed to defend the power of their institution against other groups are also thought to have done less good for the country. Institutional interest coincides with public interest. The power of the Presidency is identified with the good of the polity.

The public interest of the Soviet Union is approximated by the institutional interests of the top organs of the Communist Party: "What's good for the Presidium is good for the Soviet Union." Viewed in these terms, Stalinism can be defined as a situation in which the personal interests of the ruler take precedence over the institution-

⁵² *Politics*, 267.

alized interests of the Party. Beginning in the late 1930's Stalin consistently weakened the Party. No Party Congress was held between 1939 and 1952. During and after World War II the Central Committee seldom met. The Party secretariat and Party hierarchy were weakened by the creation of competing organs. Conceivably this process could have resulted in the displacement of one set of governing institutions by another, and some American experts and some Soviet leaders did think that governmental organizations rather than Party organizations would become the ruling institutions in Soviet society. Such, however, was neither the intent nor the effect of Stalin's action. He increased his personal power, not the governmental power. When he died, his personal power died with him. The struggle to fill the resulting vacuum was won by Khrushchev, who identified his interests with the interests of the Party organization, rather than by Malenkov, who identified himself with the governmental bureaucracy. Khrushchev's consolidation of power marked the reemergence and revitalization of the principal organs of the Party. While they acted in very different ways and from different motives, Stalin weakened the Party just as Grant weakened the Presidency. Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a strong Party is in the Soviet public interest.

In terms of the theory of natural law, governmental actions are legitimate to the extent that they are in accord with the "public philosophy."⁵³ According to democratic theory, they derive their legitimacy from the extent to which they embody the will of the people. According to the procedural concept, they are legitimate if they represent the outcome of a process of conflict and compromise in which all interested groups have participated. In another sense, however, the legitimacy of governmental actions can be sought in the extent to which they reflect the interests of governmental institutions. In contrast to the theory of representative government, under this concept governmental institutions derive their legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of the people or of any other group, but from the extent to which they have distinct interests of their own apart from all other groups. Politicians frequently remark that things "look different" after they obtain office than they did when they were competing for office. This difference is a measure of the institutional demands of office. It is precisely this

⁵³ See Walter Lippmann, *The Public Philosophy* (Boston 1955), esp. 42, for his definition of the public interest as "what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently."

difference in perspective which legitimizes the demands which the officeholder makes on his fellow citizens. The interests of the President, for instance, may coincide partially and temporarily first with those of one group and then with those of another. But the interest of the Presidency, as Neustadt has emphasized,⁵⁴ coincides with that of no one else. The President's power derives not from his representation of class, group, regional, or popular interests, but rather from the fact that he represents none of these. The Presidential perspective is unique to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason, it is both a lonely office and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness.

The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Presidium) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones. The "ultimate test of development," as Lucian Pye has said, "is the capacity of a people to establish and maintain large, complex, but flexible organizational forms."⁵⁵ The level of organization in much of the world, however, is low. "Except in Europe and America," Banfield notes, "the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organizations is a rare and recent thing."⁵⁶ The ability to create public organizations and political institutions is in short supply in the world today. It is this ability which, above all else, the Communists offer modernizing countries.

DEGENERATION AND THE CORRUPT POLITY

Most modernizing countries are buying rapid social modernization at the price of political degeneration. This process of decay in political institutions, however, has been neglected or overlooked in much of the literature on modernization. As a result, models and concepts which are hopefully entitled "developing" or "modernizing" are often only partially relevant to the countries to which they are applied. More relevant in many cases would be models of corrupt or degenerating societies, highlighting the decay of political organization and the increasing dominance of disruptive social forces. Who, however, has advanced such a theory of political decay or a model of a corrupt political order which might be useful in analyzing the political processes of the countries that are usually called "developing"? Perhaps the most relevant ideas are the most ancient ones. The evolution of

⁵⁴ See Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York 1960), *passim*, but esp. 33-37, 150-51.

⁵⁵ Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 51.

⁵⁶ Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958), 7-9, 15ff.

many contemporary new states, once the colonial guardians have departed, has not deviated extensively from the Platonic model. Independence is followed by military coups as the "auxiliaries" take over.⁵⁷ Corruption by the oligarchy inflames the envy of rising groups. Conflict between oligarchy and masses erupts into civil strife. Demagogues and street mobs pave the way for the despot. Plato's description of the means by which the despot appeals to the people, isolates and eliminates his enemies, and builds up his personal strength is a far less misleading guide to what has taken place in Ghana and other new states than many things written yesterday.⁵⁸

Plato is one of the few theorists, ancient or contemporary, with a highly explicit theory of political degeneration.⁵⁹ The concept of a "corrupt society," however, is a more familiar one in political theory. Typically it refers to a society which lacks law, authority, cohesion, discipline, and consensus, where private interests dominate public ones, where there is an absence of civic obligation and civic duty, where, in short, political institutions are weak and social forces strong. Plato's degenerate states are dominated by various forms of appetite: by force, wealth, numbers, and charisma. "Those constitutions," says Aristotle, "which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms."⁶⁰ So also, Machiavelli's concept of the corrupt state, in the words of one commentator, "includes all sorts of license and violence, great inequalities of wealth and power, the destruction of peace and justice, the growth of disorderly ambition, disunion, lawlessness, dishonesty, and contempt for religion."⁶¹ Modern equivalents of the classical corrupt society are Kornhauser's theory of the mass society (where, in the absence of institutions, elites are accessible to masses and masses are available for

⁵⁷ For comments on the short time lag between independence and the first coup, see Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," in Sydney N. Fisher, ed., *The Military in the Middle East: Problems in Society and Government* (Columbus, Ohio, 1963), 10.

⁵⁸ See, in general, *The Republic*, Book VIII, and especially the description of the despotic regime (Cornford trans., New York 1945), 291-93.

⁵⁹ Perhaps the closest contemporary model comes not from a social scientist but from a novelist: William Golding. The schoolboys (newly independent elites) of *The Lord of the Flies* initially attempt to imitate the behavior patterns of adults (former Western rulers). Discipline and consensus, however, disintegrate. A demagogic military leader and his followers gain or coerce the support of a majority. The symbol of authority (the conch) is broken. The voices of responsibility (Ralph) and reason (Piggy) are deserted and harassed, and reason is destroyed. In the end, the naval officer (British Marine Commandos) arrives just in time to save Ralph (Nyerere) from the "hunters" (mutinous troops).

⁶⁰ *Politics*, 112.

⁶¹ George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Thought* (rev. edn., New York 1950), 343.

mobilization by the elite) and Rapoport's concept of the praetorian state where "private ambitions are rarely restrained by a sense of public authority; [and] the role of power (i.e., wealth and force) is maximized."⁶² Typical of the corrupt, praetorian, or mass societies is the violent oscillation between extreme democracy and tyranny. "Where the pre-established political authority is highly autocratic," says Kornhauser, "rapid and violent displacement of that authority by a democratic regime is highly favorable to the emergence of extremist mass movements that tend to transform the new democracy in anti-democratic directions."⁶³ Aristotle and Plato saw despotism emerging out of the extremes of mob rule. Rapoport finds in Gibbon an apt summary of the constitutional rhythms of the praetorian state, which "floats between the extremes of absolute monarchy and wild democracy."⁶⁴ Such instability is the hallmark of a society where mobilization has outrun institutionalization.

IV. STRATEGIES OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

If decay of political institutions is a widespread phenomenon in the "developing" countries and if a major cause of this decay is the high rate of social mobilization, it behooves us, as social scientists, to call a spade a spade and to incorporate these tendencies into any general model of political change which we employ to understand the politics of these areas. If effective political institutions are necessary for stable and eventually democratic government and if they are also a precondition of sustained economic growth, it behooves us, as policy analysts, to suggest strategies of institutional development. In doing this, we should recognize two general considerations affecting probabilities of success in institution-building.

First, the psychological and cultural characteristics of peoples differ markedly and with them their abilities at developing political institutions. Where age-old patterns of thought and behavior have to be changed, quite obviously the creation of political institutions is a far more difficult task than otherwise. "The Tokugawa Japanese could not, as did the Chinese, put family above government," one expert

⁶² Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society*, *passim*; David C. Rapoport, "Praetorianism: Government Without Consensus" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley 1959); and Rapoport in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 72, where the quotation occurs.

⁶³ Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society*, 125.

⁶⁴ Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York 1899), 1, 235, quoted by Rapoport in Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, 98.

has observed. "The samurai was expected to be loyal to his official superior first, his family second. In mores generally the primacy of the organization over the person was constantly reiterated."⁶⁵ This difference in Japanese and Chinese attitudes toward authority undoubtedly accounts in part for their differences in modernization and development. The Japanese peacefully and smoothly created new political institutions and amalgamated them with old ones. The weakness of traditional Chinese political institutions, on the other hand, led to forty years of revolution and civil war before modern political institutions could be developed and extended throughout Chinese society.

Second, the potentialities for institution-building differ markedly from society to society, but in all societies political organizations can be built. Institutions result from the slow interaction of conscious effort and existing culture. Organizations, however, are the product of conscious, purposeful effort. The forms of this effort may vary from a Meiji Restoration to a Communist Revolution. But in each case a distinct group of identifiable people set about adapting old organizations or building new ones. "Nation-building" has recently become a popular subject, and doubts have been raised about whether nations can be "built."⁶⁶ These doubts have a fairly solid basis. Nations are one type of social force, and historically they have emerged over long periods of time. Organization-building, however, differs from nation-building. Political organizations require time for development, but they do not require as much time as national communities. Indeed, most of those who speak of nation-building in such places as tropical Africa see organization-building as the first step in this process. Political parties have to be welded out of tribal groups; the parties create governments; and the governments may, eventually, bring into existence nations. Many of the doubts which people have about the possibilities of nation-building do not apply to organization-building.

Given our hypotheses about the relation of social mobilization to institutionalization, there are two obvious methods of furthering institutional development. First, anything which slows social mobilization presumably creates conditions more favorable to the preservation and strengthening of institutions. Secondly, strategies can be developed and applied directly to the problem of institution-building.

⁶⁵ John Whitney Hall, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Japan," in Ward and Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, 19.

⁶⁶ See Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), *passim*, but especially the contributions of Joseph R. Strayer and Carl J. Friedrich.

SLOWING MOBILIZATION

Social mobilization can be moderated in many ways. Three methods are: to increase the complexity of social structure; to limit or reduce communications in society; and to minimize competition among segments of the political elite.⁶⁷

In general, the more highly stratified a society is and the more complicated its social structure, the more gradual is the process of political mobilization. The divisions between class and class, occupation and occupation, rural and urban, constitute a series of breakwaters which divide the society and permit the political mobilization of one group at a time. On the other hand, a highly homogeneous society, or a society which has only a single horizontal line of division between an oligarchy that has everything and a peasantry that has nothing, or a society which is divided not horizontally but vertically into ethnic and communal groups, has more difficulty moderating the process of mobilization. Thus, mobilization should be slower in India than in the new African states where horizontal divisions are weak and tribal divisions strong, or in those Latin American countries where the middle strata are weak and a small oligarchy confronts a peasant mass. A society with many horizontal divisions gains through the slower entry of social groups into politics. It may, however, also lose something in that political organizations, when they do develop, may form along class and stratum lines and thus lack the autonomy of more broadly based political organizations. Political parties in countries like Chile and Sweden have been largely the spokesmen for distinct classes; caste associations seem destined to play a significant role in Indian politics. The disruptive effects of political organizations identified with social strata may be reduced if other political institutions exist which appeal to loyalties across class or caste lines. In Sweden, loyalty to the monarchy and the Riksdag mitigates the effects of class-based parties, and in India the caste associations must, in general, seek their goals within the much more extensive framework of the Congress Party. In most societies, the social structure must be largely accepted as given. Where it is subject to governmental manipulation and influence, mobilization

⁶⁷ These are not, of course, the only ways of slowing mobilization. Myron Weiner, for instance, has suggested that one practical method is "localization": channeling political interests and activity away from the great issues of national politics to the more immediate and concrete problems of the village and community. This is certainly one motive behind both community development programs and "basic democracies."

will be slowed by government policies which enhance the complexity of social stratification.

The communications network of a society is undoubtedly much more subject to governmental influence. Rapid gains in some of the most desired areas of modernization—such as mass media exposure, literacy, and education—may have to be purchased at the price of severe losses in political stability. This is not to argue that political institutionalization as a value should take precedence over all others: if this were the case, modernization would never be good. It is simply to argue that governments must balance the values won through rapid increases in communications against the values jeopardized by losses in political stability. Thus, governmental policies may be wisely directed to reducing the number of university graduates, particularly those with skills which are not in demand in the society. Students and unemployed university graduates have been a concern common to the nationalistic military regime in South Korea, the socialist military regime in Burma, and the traditional military regime in Thailand. The efforts by General Ne Win in Burma to cut back the number of university graduates may well be imitated by other governments facing similar challenges. Much has been made of the problems caused by the extension of the suffrage to large numbers of illiterates. But limited political participation by illiterates may well, as in India, be less dangerous to political institutions than participation by literates. The latter typically have higher aspirations and make more demands on government. Political participation by illiterates, moreover, is more likely to remain limited, whereas participation by literates is much more likely to snowball with potentially disastrous effects on political stability. A governing elite may also affect the intensity of communications and the rate of political mobilization by its policies on economic development. Large, isolated factories, as Kornhauser has shown, are more likely to give rise to extremist movements than smaller plants more closely integrated into the surrounding community.⁶⁸ Self-interest in political survival may lead governing elites to decrease the priority of rapid economic change.

The uncontrolled mobilization of people into politics is also slowed by minimizing the competition among political elites. Hence mobilization is likely to have less disturbing effects on political institutions in one-party systems than in two-party or multiparty systems. In many new states and modernizing countries, a vast gap exists between the modernized elite and the tradition-oriented mass. If the elite di-

⁶⁸ Kornhauser, *Politics of Mass Society*, 150-58.

vides against itself, its factions appeal to the masses for support. This produces rapid mobilization of the masses into politics at the same time that it destroys whatever consensus previously existed among the politically active on the need for modernization. Mobilization frequently means the mobilization of tradition; modern politics become the vehicle of traditional purposes. In Burma during the first part of this century, the "general pattern was one in which the modernizers first fell out among themselves whenever they were confronted with demanding choices of policy, and then tended to seek support from among the more traditional elements, which in time gained the ascendancy."⁶⁹ In Turkey a rough balance between the mobilization of people into politics and the development of political institutions existed so long as the Republican People's Party retained a political monopoly. The conscious decision to permit an opposition party, however, broadened the scope of political competition beyond the urban, Westernized elite. The Democratic Party mobilized the peasants into politics, strengthened the forces of traditionalism, and broke the previous consensus. This led the party leaders to attempt to maintain themselves in power through semilegal means and to induce the army to join them in suppressing the Republican opposition. The army, however, was committed to modernization and seized power in a *coup d'état*, dissolving the Democratic Party and executing many of its top leaders. In due course, the military withdrew from direct conduct of the government, and democratic elections led to a multiparty system in which no party has a clear majority. Thus from a relatively stable one-party system, Turkey passed through a brief two-party era to military rule and a multiparty system: the familiar syndrome of states where mobilization has outrun institutionalization. In the process, not only were political institutions weakened, but the traditional-minded were brought into politics in such a way as to create obstacles to the achievement of many modernizing goals.

CREATING INSTITUTIONS

"Dans la naissance des sociétés ce sont les chefs des républiques qui font l'institution; et c'est ensuite l'institution qui forme les chefs des républiques," said Montesquieu.⁷⁰ But in the contemporary world, political leaders prefer modernization to institution-building, and no matter who leads modernization, the process itself generates con-

⁶⁹ Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 114.

⁷⁰ Charles de Secondat, Baron Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des romains et de leur décadence*, in *Oeuvres*, 1 (Paris 1828), 119-20.

flicting demands and inducements which obstruct the growth of political institutions. Where modernization is undertaken by traditional leaders working through traditional political institutions, the efforts of the traditional leaders to reform can unleash and stimulate social forces which threaten the traditional political institutions. Traditional leaders can modernize and reform their realms, but, where substantial social elements oppose reform, they have yet to demonstrate they can put through reforms without undermining the institutions through which they are working. The problem is: how can the traditional political institutions be adapted to accommodate the social forces unleashed by modernization? Historically, except for Japan, traditional political institutions have been adapted to the modern world only where a high degree of political centralization was not required for modernization and where traditional (i.e., feudal) representative institutions retained their vitality (as in Great Britain and Sweden). If modernization requires the centralization of power in a "reform monarch" or "revolutionary emperor," it means the weakening or destruction of whatever traditional representative institutions may exist and thus complicates still further the assimilation of those social forces created by modernization. The concentration of power also makes the traditional regime (like the eighteenth-century French monarchy) more vulnerable to forcible overthrow. *The vulnerability of a traditional regime to revolution varies directly with the capability of the regime for modernization.* For traditional rulers, the imperatives of modernization conflict with the imperatives of institution-building.

If the traditional political institutions are weak, or if they have been displaced and suppressed during periods of colonial rule, adaptation is impossible. In societies which have undergone colonial rule, incubation can serve as a substitute for adaptation. Unfortunately, the opportunity for incubation was missed in most colonial societies, with a few prominent exceptions such as India and the Philippines. Incubation requires a colonial administration which is willing to permit and *to contend with* a nationalist movement for many years, thus furnishing the time, the struggle, and the slowly increasing responsibility which are the ingredients of institution-building. In general, however, colonial powers tend to postpone incubation for as long as possible and then, when they see independence as inevitable, to bring it about as quickly as possible. Consequently, most of the states which became independent in the 1950's and 1960's had little opportunity to incubate political institutions while still under colonial tutelage.

Where traditional political institutions are weak, or collapse, or are overthrown, authority frequently comes to rest with charismatic leaders who attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity by a highly personal appeal. To the extent that these leaders are able to concentrate power in themselves, it might be supposed that they would be in a position to push institutional development and to perform the role of "Great Legislator" or "Founding Father." The reform of corrupt states or the creation of new ones, Machiavelli argued, must be the work of one man alone. A conflict exists, however, between the interests of the individual and the interests of institutionalization. Institutionalization of power means the limitation of power which might otherwise be wielded personally and arbitrarily. The would-be institution-builder needs personal power to create institutions but he cannot create institutions without relinquishing personal power. Resolving this dilemma is not easy. It can be done only by leaders who combine rare political skill and rare devotion to purpose. It was done by Mustafa Kemal who, for almost two decades, managed to maintain his own personal power, to push through major modernizing reforms, and to create a political institution to carry on the government after his death. Atatürk has been a conscious model for many contemporary modernizing leaders, but few, if any, seem likely to duplicate his achievement.

The military junta or military dictatorship is another type of regime common in modernizing countries. It too confronts a distinct set of problems in the conflict between its own impulses to modernization and the needs of institution-building. The military officers who seize power in a modernizing country frequently do so in reaction to the "chaos," "stalemate," "corruption," and "reactionary" character of the civilian regimes which preceded them. The officers are usually passionately devoted to measures of social reform, particularly those which benefit the peasantry (whose interests have frequently been overlooked by the anterior civilian regime). A rationalistic approach to societal problems often makes the officers modernizers par excellence. At the same time, however, they are frequently indifferent or hostile to the needs of political institution-building. The military typically assert that they have taken over the government only temporarily until conditions can be "cleaned up" and authority restored to a purified civilian regime. The officers thus confront an organizational dilemma. They can eliminate or exclude from politics individual civilian politicians, but they are ill-prepared to make fundamental changes in political processes and institutions. If they turn back power to the

civilians, the same conditions to which they originally objected tend to reappear (Burma). If they attempt to restore civilian government and to continue in power as a civilian political group (Turkey, South Korea), they open themselves to these same corrupting influences and may pave the way for a second military takeover by a younger generation of colonels who purge the civilianized generals, just as the generals had earlier purged the civilians. Finally, if the military leaders retain power indefinitely, they need to create authoritative political organizations which legitimize and institutionalize their power. Concern with their own personal authority and unfamiliarity with the needs of political institution-building create problems in the fulfillment of this task. It is still too early to say for certain what sort of authoritative political institutions, if any, will be produced by regimes led by military officers such as Nasser and Ayub Khan.

THE PRIMACY OF PARTY

Charismatic leaders and military chiefs have thus had little success in building modern political institutions. The reason lies in the nature of modern politics. In the absence of traditional political institutions, the only modern organization which can become a source of authority and which can be effectively institutionalized is the political party. *The importance of the political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a modernizing political system varies inversely with the institutional inheritance of the system from traditional society.* Traditional systems do not have political parties. Unlike bureaucracy, the party is a distinctly modern form of political organization. Where traditional political institutions (such as monarchies and feudal parliaments) are carried over into the modern era, parties play secondary, supplementary roles in the political system. The other institutions are the primary source of continuity and legitimacy. Parties typically originate within the legislatures and then gradually extend themselves into society. They adapt themselves to the existing framework of the political system and typically reflect in their own operations the organizational and procedural principles embodied in that system. They broaden participation in the traditional institutions, thus adapting those institutions to the requirements of the modern polity. They help make the traditional institutions legitimate in terms of popular sovereignty, but they are not themselves a source of legitimacy. Their own legitimacy derives from the contributions they make to the political system.

Where traditional political institutions collapse or are weak or non-

existent, the role of the party is entirely different from what it is in those polities with institutional continuity. In such situations, strong party organization is the only long-run alternative to the instability of a corrupt or praetorian or mass society. The party is not just a supplementary organization; it is instead the source of legitimacy and authority. In the absence of traditional sources of legitimacy, legitimacy is sought in ideology, charisma, popular sovereignty. To be lasting, each of these principles of legitimacy must be embodied in a party. Instead of the party reflecting the state, the state becomes the creation of the party and the instrument of the party. The actions of government are legitimate to the extent that they reflect the will of the party. The party is the source of legitimacy because it is the institutional embodiment of national sovereignty, the popular will, or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Where traditional political institutions are weak or non-existent, the prerequisite of stability is at least one highly institutionalized political party. States with one such party are markedly more stable than states which lack such a party. States with no parties or many weak parties are the least stable. Where traditional political institutions are smashed by revolution, post-revolutionary order depends on the emergence of one strong party: witness the otherwise very different histories of the Chinese, Mexican, Russian, and Turkish revolutions. Where new states emerge from colonialism with one strong party, the problem is to maintain the strength of that party. In many African countries the nationalist party was the single important modern organization to exist before independence. The party "was generally well organized. The conditions of the political struggle and the dedication of the top elite to the party as the prime instrument of political change led the elite to give the major portion of their energies and resources to building a solid, responsive organization capable of disciplined action in response to directives from the top and able to ferret out and exploit feelings of dissatisfaction among the masses for political ends."⁷¹ After independence, however, the dominant political party is often weakened by the many competing demands on organizational resources. A marked dispersion of resources means a decline in the overall level of political institutionalization. "Talents that once were available for the crucial work of party organization," one observer has warned, "may now be preoccupied with running a ministry or government bureau. . . . Unless new sources of loyal organizational

⁷¹ William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Deutsch and Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building*, 121.

and administrative talents can be found immediately, the party's organization—and, therefore, the major link between the regime and the masses—is likely to be weakened.”⁷²

The need for concentration applies not only to the allocation of resources among types of organizations but also to the scope of organization. In many modernizing countries, the political leaders attempt too much too fast; they try to build mass organizations when they should concentrate on elite organizations. Organizations do not have to be large to be effective and to play a crucial role in the political process: the Bolshevik Party in 1917 is one example; the Indian Civil Service (which numbered only 1,157 men at independence) is another. Overextension of one's resources in organization-building is as dangerous as overextension of one's troops in a military campaign. (The strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam is an example of both.) Concentration is a key principle of politics as well as strategy. The pressures for broad organizational support, however, seem to push towards the all-inclusive organization. In his efforts to create a political structure to bolster his military regime in Egypt, for instance, Nasser first created the Liberation Rally in 1953, which soon came to have from 5 to 6 million members. The organization was simply too big to be effective and to achieve its purpose. After the adoption of a new constitution in 1956, the Liberation Rally was replaced by the National Union, which was designed to be the school of the nation and also to be universal in membership (except for reactionaries). Again the organization was too broad to be effective. Hence in 1962, after the break with Syria, a new organization, the Arab Socialist Union, was organized with the advice of organizational and ideological experts from Yugoslavia. It was designed to be a more exclusive, more tightly organized body, its membership limited to 10 per cent of the population. Inevitably, however, it also mushroomed in size, and after two years it had 5 million members. In a fourth effort, early in 1964 President Nasser reportedly formed still another group limited to only 4,000 members and called the “Government Party,” which would form the core of the Arab Socialist Union. The new organization was to be designed by Nasser “to enforce a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of his policies if anything happens to him.”⁷³ Whether this organization, unlike its predecessors, becomes an institution remains to be seen. Its likelihood of success depends upon its limitation in size.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 123-24.

⁷³ *Washington Post*, February 9, 1964, p. A-17.

American social scientists have devoted much attention to the competitiveness of political systems, devising various ways of measuring that competitiveness and classifying systems according to their degree of competitiveness.⁷⁴ The more parties which exist within a system, presumably the more competitive it is. Yet the proliferation of parties usually means the dispersion of organization and leadership talents and the existence of a large number of weak parties. If sufficient resources are available to support more than one well-organized party, this is all to the good. But most modernizing countries will be well off if they can create just one strong party organization. *In modernizing systems, party institutionalization usually varies inversely with party competitiveness.* Modernizing states with multiparty systems are much more unstable and prone to military intervention than modernizing states with one party, with one dominant party, or with two parties. The most unstable systems and those most prone to military

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF COUPS AND COUP ATTEMPTS
IN MODERNIZING COUNTRIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

<i>Type of Political System</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>	<i>Countries with Coups Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Communist	3	0	0
One-party	18	2	11
One-party dominant	12	3	25
Two-party	11	5	45
Multiparty	22	15	68
No effective parties	17	14	83

SOURCE: Figures are somewhat revised and adapted from the similar table in Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), 65.

intervention are the multiparty systems and the no-party systems. The weak institutionalization of parties in the multiparty system makes that system extremely fragile. The step from many parties to no parties and from no parties to many parties is an easy one. In their institutional weakness, the no-party system and the multiparty system closely resemble each other.

⁷⁴ See James S. Coleman, in Almond and Coleman, eds., *Politics of the Developing Areas*, Conclusion; Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, eds., *Politics and Social Life* (Boston 1963), 569-82; von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations*, 54-64.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND AMERICAN POLICY

The Bolshevik concept of the political party is directly relevant to modernizing countries. It provides a conscious and explicit answer to the problem of mobilization vs. institutionalization. The Communists actively attempt to expand political participation. At the same time they are the most energetic and intense contemporary students of de Tocqueville's "art of associating together." Their specialty is organization, their goal the mobilization of the masses into their organizations. For them mobilization and organization go hand in hand. "There are only two kinds of political tasks," a leading Chinese Communist theorist has said: "one is the task of propaganda and education, the other is the task of organization."⁷⁵ The party is initially a highly select group of those who have achieved the proper degree of revolutionary consciousness. It expands gradually as it is able to win the support and participation of others. Peripheral organizations and front groups provide an organizational ladder for the gradual mobilization and indoctrination of those who in due course become full-fledged party members. If the political struggle takes the form of revolutionary war, mobilization occurs on a gradual territorial basis as village after village shifts in status from hostile control to contested area to guerrilla area to base area. The theory is selective mobilization; the political involvement of masses who have not reached the proper level of revolutionary consciousness can only benefit reaction. The "opportunist" Menshevik, Lenin warned, "strives to proceed from the bottom upward, and, therefore, wherever possible and as far as possible, upholds autonomism and 'democracy'. . . ." The Bolshevik, on the other hand, "strives to proceed from the top downward, and upholds an extension of the rights and powers of the center in relation to the parts."⁷⁶

Communist doctrine thus recognizes the need to balance mobilization and organization and stresses the party as the key to political stability. The American approach, on the other hand, tends to ignore the requirements of political organization and to deprecate the importance of party. American attitudes are rooted in the secondary, instrumental role of party in the American constitutional system. In addition, American distaste for politics leads to an emphasis on the

⁷⁵ Ai Ssu-chi, quoted in Frederick T. C. Yu, "Communications and Politics in Communist China," in Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development*, 261-62.

⁷⁶ V. I. Lenin, *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (*The Crisis in Our Party*), in *Collected Works* (Fineberg and Jochel trans., London 1961), 396-97.

output aspects of the political system. The stress, as Lucian Pye has pointed out, has been on the efficient administrator rather than the wily politician.⁷⁷ Aid missions advise governments on administrative organization and economic planning, but seldom do they advise political leaders on how to create a strong party. To meet the problems of interest aggregation, Americans have resorted to a variety of alternatives to political organization. Some Americans have urged that the military, as the strongest organization in many modernizing countries, should assume a major role in the responsibilities of government.⁷⁸ At times American policy has relied on individual political leaders, such as Magsaysay, Diem, or Ayub Khan. Alternatively, the American government has stressed adherence to particular structural forms, such as free elections.

All of these approaches are doomed to failure. Neither military juntas nor charismatic personalities nor free elections can be a long-term substitute for effective political organization. Charismatic leaders are reluctant to substitute party control for personal control. Military officers are usually even more explicitly anti-party. They contrast the venal party politics of the civilians with the honest devotion to the nation of the military. Military coups and military juntas may spur modernization, but they cannot produce a stable political order. Instead of relying on the military, American policy should be directed to the creation within modernizing countries of at least one strong non-Communist political party. If such a party already exists and is in a dominant position, support of that party should be the keystone of policy. Where political life is fragmented and many small parties exist, American backing should go to the strongest of the parties whose goals are compatible with ours. If it is a choice between a party and a personality, choose the party: better the Baath than Nasser. Where no parties exist and the government (whether traditional, military, or charismatic) is reasonably cooperative with the United States, American military, economic, and technical assistance should be conditioned upon the government's making efforts to develop a strong supporting party organization.

Several years ago Guy Pauker warned that "What is most urgently

⁷⁷ Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, 297-301; and Pye, "The Policy Implications of Social Change in Non-Western Societies" (M.I.T. Center for International Studies, Cambridge 1957, mimeo.), 69-80.

⁷⁸ Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, xi (April 1959), 325-45; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), 69-90.

needed in Southeast Asia today is organizational strength."⁷⁹ Organizational strength is also the most urgent need in southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Unless that need is met with American support, the alternatives in those areas remain a corrupt political system or a Communist one.

⁷⁹ Pauker, *World Politics*, xi, 343.