failure notice

Danielle Cooper (dlc@mail.utexas.edu)
Thu, 04 Mar 1999 23:30:52 +0000

I'm sorry the paper is late. I didn't get this failure notice until today.

Danielle

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>Date: Tue, 02 Mar 1999 06:54:54 +0000
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>From: Danielle Cooper <dlc@mail.utexas.edu>
>Subject: Islam and Civil Society
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>Danielle Cooper
>459-67-3139
>
>
> According to Eva Bellin, some scholars are reluctant to use the term
>"civil society" as a tool for political analysis in the Middle East.
>Their reluctance may result from perceptions of theocratic rule and
>despotism in the predominantly Muslim region. Given the Islamic tradition
>in the Middle East, can the region develop a strong civil society? Civil
>society has been measured by many characteristics, from the plurality of
>voluntary associations to the strength of non-governmental political
>organizations. Most definitions describe civil society as possessing a
>strong sense of civic virtue, existing separately from government,
>consisting of broad networks of citizens with feelings of commonality and
>possessing the ability to unite to address common concerns.
> Arguably, in order for a society containing these characteristics to
>exist, certain conditions must be met. People must be allowed to freely
>associate. Government must be relatively responsive to the needs of the
>people. And most individuals must have a reasonable opportunity for
>economic security. Under this framework, people could have a chance to
>pursue their own happiness and security and create relationships with one
>another that nourish the development of a strong civil society.
> Are these conditions possible in the Islamic Middle East? According
>to Ahmad Moussalli, a variety of associations, free from government
>intervention, flourished in Islamic societies until the early twentieth
>century. Moussalli asserts that the Islamic community that developed after
>the death of the Muhammad included a strong civil society, tolerant of a
>plurality of religious strains and lifestyles. Several groups acted
>independently within the society, such as scholars, or ulama, who provided
>opinions on law and order and notables, or al-ashraf, who were informally
>organized to intervene in government on behalf of the public. Craftsman
>united in professional organizations that interacted with the notables,
>creating complex political and social structures, separate from government
>institutions. All members of society had a civil duty, hisbah, "to enjoin
>good and forbid evil" by publicly debating government policies.
> But in the 19th century, European influence led to the absorption of
>legislative duties by the state and the disintegration of the power of the
>ulama, Moussalli contends. The civil role of professional organizations
>dissolved as the modern state emerged and as Islamic markets were brought
>into competition with world markets. Moussalli contends the breakdown of
>these civil institutions left Islamic communities devoid of a true civil
>society, and government attempts to rebuild associational life have been
>unsuccessful.
> According to Moussalli, many contemporary Arab states allow the
>formation of apolitical voluntary organizations but not the development of
>political parties. Robert Putnam has written that the level of apolitical
>voluntary organizations is a strong measure of a vibrant civil society.
>But the ability to unite based on common political beliefs, as well as
>shared non-political interests, is also necessary for a fully functioning
>civil society. More than other voluntary associations, political
>organizations provide a check on the activities of the government and
>establish a "buffer" between the state and the citizen. Political
>organizations articulate the common concerns of the people to the
>government so that the government might produce solutions.
> The history of organizational life within Islamic communities
>suggests that civil society can flourish in the Muslim world. However, the
>ascension of strong nation-states and restrictions on political
>associations have limited opportunities to organize in recent years. In
>"What you should know about Muslim Politics and Society", Martin Kramer
>wrote that the state continues to be much stronger than society in the
>Muslim world. Kramer contends that organizations that appear to constitute
>"civil society" are in fact, superficial, and do not present any legitimate
>power before the power of the state. But given the history of Islamic
>communities, the absence of a "true" associational life may be attributed
>to current governmental structures and not the nature of the religion.
> Is separation of church and state possible in a primarily Islamic
>state? According to Bernard Lewis in America and the Muslim Middle East,
>for most Muslims, Islam is a single world community, divided into nations.
>Lewis points to the scriptural heritage of Islam, which describes
>Mohammed's exercise of political and military power, to demonstrate that
>political and religious affairs are traditionally linked in Islam.
>Toqueville contends that because Mohammed did not confine his teachings to
>the spiritual world and provided maxims in the Koran concerning political
>authority and other secular activities, Islam is not compatible with a
>democratic age. But Moussalli writes that although moderate Islamists call
>for the recognition of God in governance, they allow for multiple political
>parties and diverse civil political participation because "no human being
>can produce a final interpretative judgment."
> Because Islam has not traditionally been separated from political power,
>it is not likely that the two spheres will become distinct in the near
>future. Opposition parties in the Muslim Middle East have even turned to
>Islam as a rallying cry to oppose current regimes. However, as Moussalli
>demonstrates, moderate Islamists have indicated that differing beliefs, at
>least within Islam, can be accepted by an Islamic state.
>Can a theocracy respond to the problems of its people? Moussalli asserts
>that a theocracy, based on the principles of radical fundamentalist Islam,
>would not effectively respond to the individual needs of its citizens. If
>the will of the government is divine will, then any opposition to the
>actions of government could be interpreted as direct opposition to Islam.
>Moussalli writes that such a government could develop institutions to
>enforce the moral and ethical teachings of Islam, leading to tyrannical
>imposition of the moral order as determined by the state. However, one
>writer examined by Moussalli insists that in an Islamic state, the people,
>not the state, issue final judgment on the society's moral legitimacy. In
>this paradigm, civil institutions would be essential to maintaining a
>virtuous state and would provide the interpretation of the Koran to be
>followed by society.
> The prevalence of strong state power within the Middle East could be a
>result of the propensity of leaders to claim that the will of their
>governments is the will of Islam, which leaves little room for opposition,
>or civil society. Leaders within such a government are not likely to give
>up the power that religion provides, and the traditional link between
>religious and political spheres is not likely to dissolve. The development
>of a strong civil society within such a state is difficult because of
>government restrictions on organization, and the government will not be
>very responsive to the needs of its people because of the absence of
>legitimate opposition.
> Despite these difficulties, Bellin writes that civil society is an
>applicable term in the Middle East and can be used to describe numerous
>groups desiring to combat despotism. Modern-day Islam is often associated
>with despotic rule, but an examination of its history suggests that
>although political power and religious power are traditionally linked,
>traditions of civil society extend into the early years of the religion.
>The moral duty, hisbah, requires individuals to be active in civil society
>and to publicly debate government policies. Islam and civil society are
>compatible, but state power in the Muslim Middle East must be willing to
>share power with society, to allow its people to freely associate and to be
>responsive to its people, before a true civil society can develop. Some
>writers suggest that those conditions are possible, even if the state
>contains elements of a theocracy, if the people are considered the final
>interpreters of the Koran or if the state accepts multiple interpretations
>because no "no human being can produce a final interpretive judgment."
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