Ibn Khaldun characterizes Bedouin dynasties as being comprised of two major
elements-group feeling and money. He theorizes that these elements are
required for the formation and success of a dynasty and their abuse will
result in the dynasty's disintegration. His well-established and researched
theory on the secrets to a successful government share common ground even
with Robert Putnam's theory of social capital. Although the definitions of
group feeling and social capital differ-group feeling focusing more on
family ties and military loyalty in dynasties with social capital
concentrating more on non-governmental civic activity-each speaks of the
importance of economic wellbeing and community cooperation. Albeit that
Khaldun's dynasties in no way resemble the modern western democracies,
their trials and Khaldun's conclusions bring insight to modern western
readers on patterns of government growth and disintegration.
First, a clarification of terms. Ibn Khaldum uses "group feeling" to
signify Asabea*, a loyalty of a group of people, more specifically a
military group, to its ruling family or leader. Persons with high group
feeling believe they are directly related to their ruler (the actual
validity of this relation seems to be irrelevant) and they protect their
government as they would defend their life. A nation with high group
feeling is seen as having high numbers of loyal tribe members. Dynasties
that were founded with a high level of group feeling, numbers, and economic
stability were predicted to maintain strength and duration longer than
those without. The loss of this monetary status and group feeling is
generally attributed to generational trends towards affluence and
individualism by the leadership and constituency of the dynasty.
Ibn Khaldun's specifically outlines patterns of social success and
disintegration. His first prediction of a new dynasty notes that one
leader will rise to power, "taking charge all by himself, as far as
possible. Eventually he leaves no part in is authority to anyone else." (On
Dynasties, 132) The ruler claims all property, law, and commerce as
regulated exclusively by himself. This trend of royal authority does not
apply to a democracy because by definition, one ruler does not dominate all
aspects of government. The western world has successfully dodged this step;
however, it is not long before it finds itself identifying with a few of
Khaldun's patterns.
Next, the dynasty leadership evolves into a habit of indulgence and
needless expenditure that breeds an uncooperative underclass. This pattern
harms the leadership's mobility to continue to raise money or otherwise
function successfully. This insatiable appetite for luxury begins once the
leader's dynasty is established and the military occupies secure borders
and internal power. The leader then begins to exclude himself from his
constituents, surrounding himself with a new group of followers, who remain
loyal in their own self-interest-to maintain their preferential status. As
luxury for these new followers and the leader increase, so does expenditure
and laziness on the part of the ruler. Economically, tax revenue becomes
less effective for covering basic costs and new approaches to revenue
raising must be introduced. The leader begins to implement injustices on
his constituents by confiscating their property and mandating forced labor.
The leader concentrates solely on the acquisition of new land and revenue,
leaving previous administrative responsibilities unattended.
Lack of trust from a government's constituent's leads to animosity amongst
the people, and eventually to a lack of group feeling and economic success
(or social capital, depending on what rubric you use.) "The feeling of the
people of the dynasty become diseased as a result of the contempt in which
they are held and the hostility of the ruler." (On Dynasties, 147) The less
dramatic democratic equivalent to this pattern would be a drastic raise in
taxes to cover frivolous government expenditure resulting in the
electorate's loss of incentive to achieve economic success. This change in
people's attitudes harms the economy of the nation, consequently
diminishing the power of its oppressive leaders. This paradox of
governmental greed resulting in loss indicates a responsibility of
successful leaders to maintain just practices. According to Khaldun, a lack
in a dynasty's group feeling results in military descent and disrespect. In
turn a dynasty will attempt to regain respect by increased expenditure and
allowances for its soldiers. This strategy only increases the duties of the
tax collector, and leads to a larger increase in constituent frustration.
This pattern of alienation seems to be a keynote in staginess for an
unsuccessful government. Although economics is not Putnam's thesis
argument for a successful democracy, he also sights the negative result of
governmental economic and procedural alienation. The Italian regional
governments, whose leaders bred from an exclusive upper class, rather than
a less luxurious middle class, tended to be less effective and harbor
unsatisfied constituents. Members of these regions reported lower levels
of competent government policy implementation and a perception of their
leadership as unconcerned with the satisfaction of the electorate.
The leadership class's concern for individual gain rather than collective
productivity seems to be a front runner for government disintegration.
With the onset of luxury, Khaldun's dynastic equivalent of local civic
leaders-the military-becomes "cowards" and "lazy fellows." (250) They
relinquish their unity and begin to "seek power through assiduous
competition for leadership." This denouncement of individualism correlates
directly to Putnam's main thesis-that social capital, trust and concern for
others within society, rather than ramped individualism, is the key to a
successful government. He agrees with Khaldun's analysis that such
engagement in selfish luxury can only lead to a society's inevitable
destruction.
Eventually, each of Khaldun's dynasties come to an end, the group feeling
at last completely gone. The competing military figures who are not
suppressed or killed by the dynasty's leader, will travel to the edge of
the dynasty where they wait for the main leader to loose power before
forming a new dynasty. After a split in the dynasty, there is no turning
back. The dynasty comes to its inevitable end; however, the lessons of
individualism and tyrannical leadership are not forgotten. They are passed
on to the new generation of leaders as a message for the nature of human
organization and struggle for power.
Or are they? Putnam predicts that America's individualistic nature will be
at the heart of its fall, its civic leaders at the forefront. As America's
future leaders, will we learn from these societal mistakes and place more
importance on loyalty, trustworthy action and cooperation? Will we make an
increase in Putnam's social capital a goal? Will we apply the lessons of
history to future generations?
Or are we exempt from them?
*I am unsure as to the spelling of this word.