Simplification Italian Style
It is a well established fact that statistics and numerical data are
sufficient, and indeed effective in matters of finance and accounting. Such
objective disciplines leave little room for argument, since the underlying
pursuit is the bottom line. It is not as easy, however, to translate such
numerical data into conclusions in social science. Poll data, survey results,
and interview responses do not lend themselves easily to the formulation of
universally applicable concepts. Such pursuits are inevitably plagued by the
persistent doubts of regional variation and respondent subjectivity. Since
there can be no control group, the scientific value of such data is subject to
constraints of time and place. Any conclusion reached from the analysis of
such data must be considered as idiosyncratic and the objective observer must
avoid the pitfall of over generalization of his findings. Yet it is just this
sort of folly that Robert Putnam commits in his landmark work Making Democracy
Work. Putnam reduces staggering amounts of empirical data into an overarching
conclusion that can not be held to apply across the board because of the
unique
circumstances under which the data was collected.
Throughout twenty years of research, Robert Putnam and his colleagues gathered
data on the efficacy of an experiment in Italian politics. After years of
central control, the government in Rome decided in 1970 to implement a system
of regional governments to handle a great deal of administrative matters on
behalf of their citizens. He interviewed the elected regional officials as
well as their constituents periodically to determine their feelings regarding
the effectiveness of the regional governments in looking after the needs and
expectations of the electorate. The results of his polling were then analyzed
to note trends and conclusions that could reasonably be made. His data
demonstrated that the overall efficacy of those regional governments in the
northern portion of Italy was rated much higher than those in the South.
Putnam contributes this discrepancy to the lack of social capital in the
Southa
nebulous term that is, essentially, the accrual of trust and common bonds
among
the people of a certain region.
Putnam cites the prevalence of sports clubs, trade unions, and
numerous
non-political, non-religious organizations in the North as evidence that
social
capital in this region was abundant. Social capital in the South, however, is
limited, due to the absence of such a plethora of recreational or voluntary
associations. Putnam assumes that if people in Southern Italy are not
organizing themselves into these groups, then their civic interest is less and
their governments are therefore ineffective in serving their constituents. To
support this theory, he proffers the results of polling that indicate that
people in the North tend to be more satisfied with the performance of their
regional governments than those in the South.
To counter arguments that such issues are matters of economic
disadvantage of the South, Putnam claims that “civic traditions help explain
why the North has been able to respond to the challenges and opportunities of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so much more effectively than the
South”
(Putnam, 159). It is somewhat circular to assert that the reason economics
can
be discounted is that the North has greater civic traditions and as a result
has had greater economic success than the South, thus allowing them the wealth
and free time to establish the requisite civic traditions. Putnam creates a
closed system that disallows the South the opportunity to increase civic
involvement. Civil society would lead to greater economic success, which
would
lead to increased opportunity for the establishment of civic associations and
therefore the increased efficiency of regional governments. Yet without the
initial civil society, there is no chance for its aggrandizement.
Putnam’s argument leaves little or no hope for the expansion or
efficiency of democracy to those areas in which Western-style civic traditions
do not exist. He sets up a system of civil society “haves” and “have-nots”.
The “haves” have a long standing tradition of civic involvement and therefore
have efficient democracies. The “have-nots” lack such a tradition and are
therefore excluded from the realm of successful democracy. Though he closes
his book with “Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to
making democracy work,” Putnam’s conclusion is based on conclusions whose
validity is tenuous, at best (185).
His most glaring fault is in trusting the results of polls whose
subject
matter and responses are solely subjective. In each of his interviews, he
asks
questions that are matters of opinion and feeling: “Do you think that…” and
“Do you agree that…” (58, 56). Opinions of governmental performance is not
necessarily an accurate reflection of the efficiency of that government. The
public is notoriously fickle, as evidenced by the fluctuations of the approval
ratings of politicians here in America, and relying on such data is to be
approached with great caution.
Aside from his methodological bases, Putnam’s theory is flawed in much
the same manner that Samuel Huntington’s treatise “The Clash of
Civilizations?”
is: they both rely on an outdated mode of viewing the world. Just as Putnam
places the world into vague categories of civil society “haves” and
“have-nots”, Huntington divides the world into an “us” versus “them”, with
“them” divided into six or seven subdivisions. Western liberal democracy,
whose roots Putnam claims are found in civic tradition, is bound to clash with
other cultures whose political systems emphasize foundations other than civil
society.
Putnam and Huntington both rely on the links among civic
involvement/social capital, economic development, and the efficacy of
government. Yet despite the volumes of data accumulated by Putnam’s team,
there is no conclusion that can be applied universally. It is difficult to
ascertain whether the economic development evolves as a result of civic
tradition or if economic success causes an increase in civil society.
Furthermore, the data applies strictly to Italy and Italian systems of
government and, although the data was collected over the course of two
decades,
that time was not sufficient to correct centuries of neglect of development in
the South.
If one accepts Putnam’s and, by extension, Huntington’s arguments,
there
is little hope for the development of democracy not only in Southern Italy,
but
indeed throughout the world. Yet these arguments overlook a fundamental
issue. It is all well and good to draw conclusions regarding a specific area
of the West under Western assumptions about Western people. But it is
foolhardy to apply such conclusions to peoples whose background, foundations,
and philosophies of governance are completely different. To correct Putnam’s
conclusion it would be necessary to rephrase it such that it read “Building
social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making Western-style
democracy work for Western people.”
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Kenneth M. Gazzaway
University of Texas at Austin
kmg@mail.utexas.edu
"I often wonder what future historians will say of us. A single
sentence should suffice for modern man: he fornicated and he read
the papers. After that rigorous definition the subject will be,
if I may say so, exhausted."
--Albert Camus, in "The Fall"
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