Putnam's Society
joseph nelson (bien@mail.utexas.edu)
Mon, 15 Feb 1999 21:13:23 -0600
Why do some democracies prosper while others languish in mediocrity? It is
this seemingly simple question to which Robert Putnam applies his
considerable expertise in Italian governmental function. The democratic
system of Italy is particularly well suited, we are told, for answering
this question because it has undergone a modern age restructuring; A
restructuring well documented and studied by Putnam. The story goes like
this:
In 1970, in response to pressure to adhere to a constitutional provision,
the highly centralize Italian national government created fifteen regional
governmental bodies with essentially identical constitutions. These
fifteen regional governments, along with five other "special" regional
bodies, were viewed by their proponents to be the cure-all to Italy's ills.
Increased governmental responsiveness, greater democratization, and rapid
socio-economic development were among the prophesized benefits. The degree
to which the citizens of each of the regions realized these benefits is the
interesting part.
Though the regions were all created equal, so to speak, there soon
developed inequalities in the regional governments abilities to promote
social and economic prosperity. More specifically, the regions of the more
industrial north seem to have made greater gains in governmental efficiency
and responsiveness than those regions in the more agrarian south. The
question then becomes what might account for the differences.
First, it will be helpful to know the basis for Putnam's determination of
inequity in regional performance. Putnam sets forth twelve indicators of
governmental performance with which he evaluates the regions. Day to day
internal operations are evaluated by examining criteria such as cabinet
stability, budget promptness, and the comprehensiveness of a region's
information services. These criteria indicate the relative ability of the
regions to govern efficiently. Additional performance indicators fall
under the heading of policy pronouncements. The theory here is that a
government that is actively pursuing the good of the people. These include
reform legislation, (where in policies are evaluated for comprehensiveness,
coherence and creativity or originality) and legislative innovation, (where
regions are rewarded for recognizing adopting the good ideas of other
regions). Next, a region's ability function in the various policy areas
for which it is responsible is evaluated in three categories. The delivery
of services is characterized by the number of daycare centers and family
clinics. The variety of policy tools utilized by the regions are indicated
by its industrial policy, and regional "spending capacity" is judged by
examining agricultural, healthcare and urban developmental policies.
Finally the responsiveness of the governments to their constituents
complaints is evaluated. With these twelve criteria, Putnam claims a
strong correlation between his objective evaluation of regional governance
and the opinions of the citizens of the corresponding regions.
Evaluation of the regional governments based on the preceding criteria
resulted in the aforementioned determination of inequality among regions.
This inequality, as Putnam sees it is directly related to the degree of
civic engagement practiced by the constituents of each region.
By civic engagement, Putnam implies a wide range of behaviors. First the
most tangible aspects of civic engagement include public involvement in
political issues, and participation in civil associations. Those aspects
of civil engagement that are somewhat less tangible include the existence
of a "horizontal" bond among citizens, (as opposed to a paternal or
hierarchical structure) and perhaps the most important characteristic (for
the purposes of Putnam's later analysis- as we shall see) is the
recognition among the citizens that their own interests are best served
through consideration of the interests of the rest of society.
To what degree of certainty can we say that the northern Italian regions
show more civic engagement than the southern regions? Luckily for Putnam,
as well as us, the Italian census puts a number to all kinds of association
memberships from bird-watching groups to recreational football (soccer)
leagues. Such information along with information about newspaper
readership, voter turnout in more mundane elections, (which shows that a
voter really cares) and the use of the preferential ballot, (which
indicates the favoring of the patronage system-which is not very civic
oriented according to Putnam) indicate the level of societal civility (or
"civic community index").
The level of civic engagement in the various governmental regions
accurately predicts the government's performance for that region. In fact,
Putnam claims such a profound correlation that it serves to explain other
theorized causes (such as economic factors) also. To take it further,
Putnam claims that not only does the existence of civil society mirror the
existence of good government but that it (civil society) is essential to
the existence of good government. How does Putnam explain such an unlikely
assertion? As mentioned earlier, civil society mandates that the citizens
realize that their own interests are best served by recognition of
society's interest. The mechanics of this proposition are the basis for
Game Theory.
As illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma game, (described by Putnam) it
would appear that the players are doomed to a strategy of mutual defection.
If one player hopes for a greater payoff and chooses cooperation, he can
be sure that the opposing player will take full advantage of the situation
by defecting (thereby receiving the highest payoff and leaving the sole
cooperator with the sucker's payoff). This is the type of situation which
Putnam claims serves as a model for the southern regions. The way that the
northern regions manage to avoid this mutual defection is by employing a
strategy that he refers to as "brave reciprocity". This strategy is also
referred to as cooperative Tit-for-Tat. Basically this means that a player
will cooperate on the first move and then reciprocate their opponents move
on the next iteration. For this strategy to be successful the game must
have an unknown number of iterations, (if the players know when the last
iteration is the game will domino back to mutual defection) and the players
must have the ability to keep track of the outcomes, as well as not
discount the future too heavily. This requirement is what Putnam calls
social capital. The citizens of civil societies know that they will have
to deal with each other over and over and they will remember who cooperates
and who defects. This social capital helps to ensure that people will play
cooperation, because if they chose not to they will win a short-term gain
at the expense of future gains. This theory works very well to explain the
Italian phenomenon.
Unfortunately Putnam glosses over the sticky part of the Prisoner's Dilemma
game. How does cooperation in ever get started in a Hobbesian world of
mutual defection? Somehow people had to start cooperating for the first
time. His theory naturally must discount the Leviathan that Hobbs proposed
as too costly for the participants (though "bad" governments keep popping
up all over). His explanation for the origin of these societies of
cooperation, he claims, is hidden in the mysterious Dark Ages likely never
to be found. This could be better handled today.
One of the things that Putnam does not address is the fact that the
strategy of brave cooperation (or cooperative Tit-for-Tat, CTT) works not
only when everyone else employs it but even in a community with a high
number (majority) of defectors. By trail and error those practicing CTT
will find each other and, assuming the scarcity of resources and survival
of the fittest, the higher average payoffs of the CTT'ers will allow them
to prosper where the defectors struggle.
Despite this small criticism, Putnam's Making Democracy Work is an
interesting and persuasive piece. Though critics will undoubtedly label
his extrapolation of the Italian model to other developing countries as
Orientalist, it seems fair to assume on his part that the lessons learned
in Italy could be important to the understanding of other struggling
democracies.