A Summary of Making Democracy Work

Mesbah Motamed (mudflap@mail.utexas.edu)
Wed, 12 Feb 1997 00:09:18 -0600 (CST)

In 1970, a power shift drastically changed the face of Italian government. A reluctant national government devolved domestic decision-making responsibilities to regional councils, intermediary institutions between the local and national level. With the government as the control factor, an opportunity to observe how the different regions of Italy handled their newfound power emerged, and Putnam set to the task of studying the results.
Putnam reserved the bulk of his argument to explain the apparent success of regional governments in the North and their relative failure in the South. For any study to evaluate success, it must define "indicators of institutional performance," quantify these values, and compare them. Putnam lists twelve diverse indicators: cabinet stability, budget promptness, statistical and information services, reform legislation, legislative innovation, day care centers, family clinics, industrial policy instruments, agricultural spending capacity, local health unit expenditures housing and urban development.
By calculating an quantitative index of these government services, Putnam reasoned, the quality of government performance could be gauged empirically and compared between regions. A graph of each region’s respective performance index visually calls to attention the differences between the North and the South. Surveys on public satisfaction corroborate these conclusions. "Some places are better governed than others, even when the governments involved have identical structures and equivalent legal and financial resources," Putnam summarizes (82). But why?
Putnam’s answer to this question lies in his concept of the "civic community." A civic community has components of civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and association. Particularly stressing the importance of associations, he quotes Tocqueville. "An association unites the energies of divergent minds and vigorously directs them toward a clearly indicated goal" (90). The presence of a "dense network of secondary associations" provides a groundwork for successful democratic government, while its absence breeds Banfield’s "amoral familism," where participants basically act selfishly for immediate returns. Associations include any group of individuals gathered in common interest. Italy, in particular, boasts numerous sports clubs, and literary societies, leisure groups, and cultural and scientific organizations also qualify. Putnam identifies and quantifies the high degree of activity of the civic community in the North and its neglect in the Sou!
th. His data, and consequent graph, directly correlates the intensity of civic community to the performance indices of the regional governments. Putnam’s thesis, from this point, becomes obvious: A vibrant, active civic community plays the crucial role in the operating success of democratic governing institutions.
The presence and absence of civic communities in Northern and Southern Italy begs the question, how did they originate? Putnam hypothesizes the roots of civic community in Italy began over one thousand years ago during medieval times. Weak governments in the North and the South collapsed, and new leaders came to power. In the South, Norman conquerors seized power, and "the imposition of social order was the supreme issue of governance" (122). Social and political arrangements were built vertically, with the king at the top. With the death of the king Frederick II, the regime heavily relied on the social hierarchy to maintain rule.
Conversely, regions of Italy in the North, traveled an alternate path to government. From original horizontal collaborations arose pacts of mutual defense and economic partnership. And from these loose organizations emerged a variety of social contracts, designed to benefit the community as a whole. Participation in these contracts exceeded even current standards. "The structure of authority in the communal republics was fundamentally more liberal and egalitarian than in contemporary regimes elsewhere in Europe, including, of course, the South of Italy itself."
Delving even further, Putnam asserted that the social contracts gradually emerged into voluntary associations that provided legal assistance and settled disputes. "This rich network of associational life and the new mores of the republics gave the [Northern] medieval Italian commune a unique character precisely analogous to what…we termed a ‘civic community’" (126). With the roots of civic community planted deep, the regions of the North succeeded in legislating laws, expanding commerce and trade, and fostering a consciousness of trust and honesty.
Putnam continues, why doesn’t the South do something to change their social setup? Witnessing the North’s success should certainly inspire the South to emulate their government tactics. Putnam suggests that concepts of game theory and collective action apply to the Southern populace where individuals behave for the immediate, least painful outcome. This strategy for living proves rational in the short term, but the long term consequences are severe, as the habits of uncooperative behavior repeat themselves. Overcoming the dilemmas of collective action can only work in a community well stocked with social capital, in other words, trust, norms, and networks.
Putnam presents a comprehensive and convincing argument for civic community’s role in democracy and government. However, he stretches to apply his Italian model on a global scope. The characteristics and history of Italy are unique; thus, lessons learned there must be applied to other nations with caution. In maybe an awkward example, North Korea demonstrates a society, ignorant, yet content, operating efficiently without a trace of civic community. Relevant to this discussion will be the Communist takeover of Hong Kong this summer, as all evidences of civic community promised to be suffocated under Party doctrine. Will the civic community of Hong Kong refuse to buckle under the subordination of a repressive regime? This likely scenario presents itself as another Italian experiment, waiting to be studied and charted. How will the governments of Britain and China compare to one another? Will public satisfaction vary?
Putnam and his studies in Italy clearly indicate the relevance of civic community and social capital to the success and failure of governments, though experts disagree as to the degree of relevance. Experts such as Richard Norton assert civil society’s (synonymous to civic community) essential and indispensable role in fostering an efficient, effective government, while Michael Hudson and others maintain th

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