Colonialism as Civil Society
The history of colonialism and dominance has been explicitly, and implicitly, linked to a normative
conception of otherness whereby power and knowledge are exerted over foreign lands based upon the
dominant belief in civility. The natives are considered underdeveloped or hedonistic, their rulers are
considered crazy leaders, and the indiginious way of being are called into question by the dominance of the
proper society. Political and ideological manifestations of difference and ëbackwardnessí are used to
marginalize and exclude voices from discourse and to create a cycle of opposition between the colonizer and
colonized. Instead of this conception of civility freeing and enlightening the other, as some would have us
believe, it works interactively to dominate and order these foreign lands based upon an Eurocentric, western
belief in the way in which the world should operate. The Western democratic tradition of civility strives for
equality while ignoring the dominance and exclusivity of its claims. The inability to recognize the practical
way in which civility operates results in an unquestioned normative ordering of the world, a consolidation of
imperial rule, and a misplaced focus as to where power lies in the world.
Before we discuss the practical applications of civil society and its ability to explain political
developments in both Western and Eastern countries(Iím not endorsing these as oppositional), I would first
like to examine one dominant definition of civil society:
ì For most scholars, civil society refers to the collection of autonomous
social organizations that resist arbitrary exercises of state power. This
conception goes back to the 18th century, when thinkers like
Montesquieu and Thomas Paine argued that the despotic tendencies of
Europeís absolute monarchs could be checked in ìintermediate powersí
such as the nobility, the bourgeoisie, the churches, and the press united
to assert their independence. Today corporations, labor unions,
....public action groups, local governments, lay religious fraternities,
voluntary associations and assorted collectivities would all be
considered elements of civil society inasmuch as they help curb the
powers of the state.î
This definition, from Yahya Sadowskiís article in the July-August 1993 Middle East Report, is indicative of
a traditional Western democratic approach to civil society that isolates the state as the point of oppression.
Furthermore, its important in that it isolates resistance within the space of civic organizations that is
independent of the government and its dominant ideology.
A second, and contrasting definition of civil society can be found in Bryan Turnerís discussion of
Antonio Gramsciís idea of civil society. As Turner writes:
ì In Gramsciís writing, civil society is the area within which ideological
hegemony and political consent are engineered, and it is therefore
contrasts with the state, which is the site of political force and
coercion.î
Gramsciís idea of civil society is important because it breaks down the idea that hegemony is centralized into
a dominant framework, like the government. Instead Gramsci recognizes how hegemony and consent can be
engineered throughout all of the complex networks of our society, not just a governmental bureaucracy.
Gramsciís recognition of the diffuse sites of hegemony allows for resistance in questioning all forms of
normative ordering, instead of tacitly accepting something like a football club as being emancipatory.
Now that we have established these two competing conceptions of civil society, we can now discuss how
these definitions explain political developments in Western and Eastern societies. The first way that civil
society effects political developments is by ordering the society based upon a normative conception of right
and wrong. When civil society establishes these normative constraints it excludes all voices and discourse
that fall outside of these conceptions. This approach manufactures an ëobjectiveí ideal of a limited and
constrained conception of civility, while ignoring how the limits and constraints it produces are political.
Civil society attempts to distance itself from all of the cultural, historical roots from which it stems while
trying to deny its puritan, Protestant, Western base from where it derives its meaning. Within both an
ëEasterní and ëWesterní political tradition, this definition of civility by Sadowski and other Western thinkers,
has marginalized the voices of all those who are unwilling to play by the pre-given rules of advocates of civil
society. This creates a domestic and international dynamic where people are terrorists for not following
dominant norms, and where these so-called terrorists feel more inclined to incite extremism as a response to
their exclusion. Examples of this dynamic can be found historically in the US with those extremist Native
Americans who got violent against the colonizers taking their land. Additionally, with the US governmentís
racist and bigoted treatment of Arabs and Islamist as being radicals because they fight US imperialism or
attempt to resist the dominant ideology. We label and group Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians, Algerians....
as dark, skinned extremist who just need to be civilized and use that as a point to justify colonial domination.
This normative ordering isnít limited to the government(or the public sphere) as many would have you
believe, but throughout all of the cultural institutions, from literature to media to language, all of which are
cites of domination. All of these cites of domination are called into question when we recognize, as Gramsci
did, that domination isnít just in the state, but instead the state is where we most believe domination to be
manifested.
The second way that traditional definitions of civil society affect political developments vis-ý-vis
East/West relations is to consolidate imperial rule. This is can be seen in two approaches to the world as it
relates to the nature of civilized empires. The first is the approach taken by Samuel Huntington and similar
like-minded individuals who say that because of our civility we are an empire who must fear others who are
out to get us. Huntington and the like point to culture as an essential starting point in interactions, and
because of the essential qualities of these cultures, conflict is inevitable. What this type of thinking ignores is
how cultures are part of an interrelated network of power and knowledge, where the ability to define an
essential cultural characteristic is equally constituted of our own cultural identity. To speak of a ëWestern
civilizationí thatís independent of, and in opposition to, Confucianism or Islam is to ignore how that
ëWesterní identity is largely devoid of meaning outside of the historical contexts of the intermingling of
peoples of different cultures and races, the conquests and imperialism of
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