Egyptian Civil Society and the Human Rights Movement

[anne.w@mail.utexas.edu (WOMER; ANNE K.)]

The Human Rights Movement as an Indicator of Civil Society in Egypt 

	People have often accused Arab countries of having weak civil societies.  It is true that many Arab regimes are harsh and repressive, leaving little room for the popular voice which is the basis of civil society.  The Western world, or at least the Orientalists, often view the Arab population as apathetic, lacking both the will and the proper democratic background to assert themselves against government oppression.  However, there are numerous NGOs in these countries working for various causes that seem to signal the presence and growing strength of civil society in the Arab world.  One cause in particular, that of human rights, claims to work for the cause of civil society itself.  One would think that by evaluating the effectiveness of the human rights movement in a country, one would be able to approximate the strength of that country’s civil society.  However, many of these organizations are plagued by internal conflict and may be viewed by the local people as a group of elite intellectuals promoting foreign, Western ideologies.  One could argue that for these reasons, the human rights movement may not be a legitimate social indicator.  
	In this paper, I will focus on the human rights movement in Egypt.  It has had a number of successes and maintains a fairly high profile, despite the fact that most human rights groups in Egypt are illegal.  For the purposes of this paper, I will define civil society very broadly as the network of organizations that is both a buffer protecting people against government and societal oppression and a link allowing them to assert themselves and make their voices heard to the government and to the rest of society.  In this definition, I include all NGOs, including religious organizations.  I choose to exclude the informal network of family and friend relationships that many people use for support, not because I necessarily believe that they have no place in civil society, but because I think it would be unfair to expect the human rights organizations to indicate the strength of these networks. It is simpler not to include them in the definition.  I also exclude political parties, which, in Egypt, are either co-opted by the regime or forced to the sidelines.
The major question that will determine whether or not the human rights movement is a sort of microcosm of civil society is, how close is it to the Egyptian people?  The Egyptian Organization of Human Rights (EOHR), the central group in the Egyptian human rights movement, decided during its Fifth General Assembly that its duties include both monitoring of the human rights situation and actions to protect human rights in Egypt.   This means that the organization hopes to directly affect the lives of Egyptians.  The fact that such organizations even exist is a testament to the commitment of human rights activists.  Egypt’s Law 32 places severe restrictions on NGOs , and many human rights organizations are denied permits that would allow them to operate.  The EOHR is one of these organizations, yet it continues to function illegally.  It seems unlikely that activists would risk government intimidation unless they were sincerely committed to their cause.  Still, they may gain some confidence from the fact that the United States, which gives significant amounts of aid to the Egyptian government, would be displeased if the government began to openly restrict human rights organizations.  This foreign support for the movement probably explains why the government tolerates its existence, and it may also explain why people remain committed despite their organizations’ illegal status.
	Although activists may be committed to their cause, it is still possible that they are removed from the mainstream of civil society.  Movements based on such universal principles as human rights run the risk of alienating themselves from the local population, who may view the cause as foreign and therefore of little importance.  Worse yet, in the case of human rights, people may view it as specifically Western, and therefore a distasteful form of imperialism.  There has been a long-standing debate between supporters of culturally specific and universal ideas of human rights. 
	In an article on Egypt’s human rights movement, Hani Shakrallah outlines how human rights movements in the developing world become isolated and alienated from the people they seek to help.   Basically, they become too focused on the UN and the Western world, seeking to please them and obtain their favor.  They eventually become extensions of a Northern network and are no longer in touch with the people of their country.  There is the concern that the human rights movement is perceived to be the realm of the highly trained intellectual, who has been “apprenticed to Western human rights organizations, who can speak the jargon.”   Ali El-Kenz noted this problem of the intellectuals who are completely cut off from their society.   In Algeria, the intellectuals were so out of touch that they could not even see the coming revolution. 
	The need for foreign funding has also alienated the cause.  Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt has always maintained an environment of nationalism.  Receipt of foreign funds casts suspicion on the cause.  Unfortunately, due to an apparent lack of interest from the wealthy in Egypt, foreign funds have become a necessity.
	There are a number of questions that remain to be answered in coming to an ultimate conclusion of the place of Egypt’s human rights movement in civil society. Could its numerous problems, rather than being a reason to disqualify it as a social indicator, instead mirror greater social problems thereby proving that it is indeed an excellent indicator?  Perhaps comparing it to a popular grassroots organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood would help to answer this question.  Do this organization and human rights organizations experience similar problems?  If they do not, then that might be a stronger basis for stating that perhaps human rights movements are not simply a microcosm of civil society.  
	As for the definition of civil society, is it right to exclude informal networking?  While it might make analysis simpler, it would also be excluding an important aspect of Egyptian culture.  In fact, it might change the answer to my overall question.  If people place more importance on these informal networks than on NGOs, and use them more frequently, this is a strong indication that the Egyptian human rights organizations are not a central part of civil society.
	Another approach might be to compare the human rights movement in Egypt with the human rights movement in other Middle Eastern countries.  Iran, for example, has a number of indigenous human rights organizations. Do they encounter the same problems in their movement?  Does it have the same characteristics?  Is it more or less in touch with the people? In other Arab countries, a brief search indicates a paucity of indigenous human rights organizations. Might this imply that civil society in Egypt is stronger? 
Another important question is how to define a human rights organization.  Should religiously based organizations count?  Although the EOHR has kept the Islamists out, there are no doubt Islamic organizations that support human rights, within an Islamic framework.  At what point would this religious framework become incompatible with the notion of human rights, as expressed by the UN and the EOHR?
These questions must all be addressed in deciding whether or not the Egyptian human rights movement is a legitimate indicator of civil society or simply an exercise in intellectual expression that is limited to an elite few.  



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