Take home test

["Jonathan D. Fisher" <jfisher-p2ww@mail.utexas.edu>]

Well, here it is!


Jonathan Fisher
03-05-02
Take Home Test



	If fostering the development of civil society in the Middle East is to be
a foreign policy goal, then a functional rather than compositional
definition of the concept must be used.  Certainly the definition "all
non-governmental organizations", though it requires little policy, also
encourages little change upon the societies in the region.  In states with
illiberal governments, NGOs are sure to be dissolved unless they provide
some sort of support for the regime.  American support for organizations in
repressive countries is unlikely to foster liberalism unless accompanied by
a program to strengthen the public's resistance to governmental control of
association.  Thus, a requirement of any definition of civil society that
is to be helpful is that policy implemented based on the definition must
necessarily improve the social liberty of Middle Easterners.
	A good starting point is Ibn Khaldun's concept group feeling, a
compositionally simple concept with far reaching functional import.
According to Khaldun, it is group feeling that empowers Bedouins to live in
the desert and gives imperium to dynasties.  The idea that even the most
repressive government cannot survive long without at least the consent of a
good portion of its people is helpful because the contrapositive statement,
that governments loved by the people are more stable.  If Khaldun is
correct, then America has a clear basis for foreign policy: make it so
Middle Eastern governments are more loved by the people.  However,
Khaldun's definition itself does not provide a means for this.  Indeed,
Khaldun believes that even the most popular governments will decay after
three generations of decay of group feeling.
	Gellner's answer to this is that group feeling can be maintained by
nationalism.  In short, civil society is national society.  To him,
citizens can be civil with each other only as long as they share a common
set of social practices, and that in the modern age this means nationalism.
 However, as Sheri Berman points out, Nazi Germany, one of the most
illiberal governments in recent history, came about because nationalist
group feeling was too strong.  Also, as Gellner says, the Middle East is
"an appallingly complex patchwork of diverse cultures"(131).  While this
may fail to explain illiberalism in the Middle East, it does force a move
away from nationalism as a viable definition.
	Another potential source of group feeling that could transcend national
boundaries is Islam.  Tocqueville devoted a chapter of "Democracy in
America" to the idea that "Religion in America avails itself of strong
democratic tendencies", and Gellner observes that Islam is as much a
"religion of enthusiasm" as is Protestantism, and echoes Hume's sentiment
that "enthusiasm is a friend to [civil liberty]"(125).  However, religious
enthusiasm in America took place during rising economic prosperity, and as
Tocqueville notes, was sheltered by two oceans, given a then unthinkably
vast amount of open land, and after the Revolutionary War total
independence.  The only thing that stood in the way of Protestant culture
was Native American culture.  Countries in the Middle East do not have this
advantageous setting or this isolation.  If all sects of religious
enthusiasm in the Middle East attempted to do what Protestant enthusiasm
did to Native Americans, total war would occur.  If bloodshed is to be kept
to a minimum, a more enlightened enthusiasm than religious fervor must be
utilized.  Barbaric enthusiasm is not civil society.
	This leads to a good working definition of civil society: that of
enlightened enthusiasm.  This is a still vague but at least measurable
concept.  And of course, there is no reason an interpretation of Islam more
enlightened than early American Protestantism couldn't provide the basis
for this, and thus also for civil society.  It is unreasonable simply to
expect that Islamist republics eventually become more tolerant when
surrounded by hostility, but absurd to reject that less political and more
enthusiastic forms of Islam could the Middle East toward liberalism.
	Since the probable contender for liberalizing the Middle East seems to be
enlightened religion, it is beneficial to focus on the story-telling aspect
of civil society.  Religion propagates values and culture through stories.
Similarly, it is the death of story-telling (due to overindulgence in
television) that Putnam blames for the weakening of civil society in
America.  So, perhaps the best definition of civil society for foreign
policy purposes is "the media through which stories which instill liberal
values are distributed".  Discovering which media and which stories are
best for the task may require many years of research, and would require
sensitivity and responsiveness to Islamic concerns, not to mention local
support and input, but implementing a program designed according to the
principle of "liberal story-telling" would certainly be more effective than
hoping that NGOs do the job on their own.





That's all!

Thanks,
Jon F.