Two troubled democracies share a subcontinent isolated by
geography from the modern western world. Geographic distance and history
have perpetuated the common belief among scholars and individuals in the
west that the Indian subcontinent is a separate world, irreconcilable with
any of the three power centers surrounding it. The prevailing ideologies
of India and Pakistan intend to guarantee that assessment politically as
convincingly as western scholars do pedagogically. The Middle East and
North Africa lie over a desert frontier and traditional invasion route.
Russia, and the former soviet republics dominate the North. Finally, the
Himalayas buffer the frontier with China and its expanding sphere of
influence. India has been a crossroads, trade center, battlefield and
pawn in Asian conflicts throughout recorded history, but until recently it
has never held political power parallel to its impressive cultural
significance. Indian culture, both Hindu and Moslem, has survived and
flourished, shaping its invaders as much as it has been shaped by
millennia of occupation by one group or another. The British attained
political hegemony over present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, during
the 19th Century, but they never truly ruled, merely reigned. The Hindu
bureaucracy, inherited first by the Mongols, then by the Moguls, continued
under the British Raj, and on to the present day. Partition, separated the
bureaucracy from Pakistan and Bangladesh, leaving each nation handicapped
and poorer. Modern India is surrounded by her traditional conquerors, and
a fourth potential hegemon; the United States, and the Western World it
seems to personify in Indian eyes. This work is intended as an entry point
and guide for future research into Indian and Pakistani banking practices
and their impact on each nation's response to globalization, in support of
a forthcoming comprehensive comparative study. India and Pakistan present
a unique case, only touched on in western sources, but well explored on
the subcontinent, which will hopefully be covered in detail by the larger
work. Before westerners can explore banking practices, and the political
economy of the subcontinent, we must build a lexicon to enter the context
of the cultures which have developed this unique response. India and
Pakistan are driven by history, tradition and internal political realities
to resist globalization at every turn, and retain their independence from
all potential hegemons for as long as possible, by whatever means
possible.
In the first paragraph I have framed the Indian subcontinent, and
established the prevailing Indian and Pakistani paradigm as established by
intensive reading of secondary historical documents and commentary over a
period of years, confirmed by the latest political and economic news from
the subcontinent. These are each high context societies, and as a
Catholic U. S. American I do not pretend to understand the full
ramifications of the social, economic, and political foundations of modern
Indian and Pakistani thought and policy. That would be a worthy
interdisciplinary dissertation, but impractical in the time and ink
immediately available. In the succeeding paragraphs I'll develop the
social, political, and economic background necessary to develop literacy
and begin further research. This will be largely repetitive of the first
two papers of this semester. Following that discussion, I will cover the
current state of the Indian and Pakistani economies, and globalization
using IMF and World Bank Group data, and other sources. Finally, I will
conclude with my speculation of the next five years of development on the
subcontinent, the limits of this current introduction, and recommendations
for future research. I am not an expert on the subcontinent or banking,
which will be readily apparent in the course of the paper, but I am an
enthusiastic amateur, who may be able to provide some insight to the
Subcontinent as I understand it.
Modern India is the successor state to more than three millennia
of civilization and recorded human history, while Pakistan is a recently
severed limb. The national character of both has been shaped by
extraordinary diversity of thought, opinion, religion and practice. A
warlike collection of peoples the subcontinent has never enjoyed peace
such as the last fifty one years. The character of the subcontinent as it
exists today has developed in response to its recent past. One thousand
years ago the Hindu peoples of India were invaded in turn by the Mongols,
Persian Muslims, Arabian Muslims, Mugals, and fought amongst themselves
for already scarce resources, pride, and ideology. Four hundred years
ago the Indian Subcontinent was invaded by European settlers. The
remaining Moslems had been integrated into secular Indian culture by this
time, in a process that would soon repeat itself among the various East
India Companies . The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French
arrived in turn. Each party fought over various parts of the subcontinent
with the aid of various Hindu or Muslim Subidars, in a complex web of
alliances and counter alliances, frequently but not by any means
exclusively divided among religious lines. The British finally defeated
the French in the early 19th century, and the British Crown administered
the colony without pretense of indigenous government form 1857, though
employing the existing Hindu bureaucratic class. Reliance on this class
proved very destructive to the Raj. Ninety years of struggle followed
under the auspices of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.
After the first World War reforms accelerated and India was slowly given
the tools to function without the British Raj. The late revolutionary,
elites retained power after Independence. The scarring of Partition is the
source of present conflicts, like the remembered pain of a serious wound.
India's and Pakistan's history and fortunes diverge at this point, but
their world view, and attitude toward one another have been defined by
Partition, even if their differing fortunes demand a more conciliatory
stance on the part of Pakistan in negotiations with the IMF toward the
Washington Consensus.
The History of Pakistan began violently in the 1940s under the British
Raj. The country was granted independence August 14, 1947. Two domestic
Banks, the Habib Bank Ltd. and the Australasia Bank remained open,
preceding the State Bank of Pakistan, established July 1, 1948. The State
Bank was hastily set up as the central bank when the Indian capital and
expertise left along with most of the branch offices, and employees of
Indian Banks and industrial concerns . The nascent state was left with
only the bare minimum of financial reserves, an untrained shell of an
army, a two ship navy, and two squadrons of what had been the Royal Indian
Air Force. The 19 remaining foreign banks left only skeleton staff and
branch offices. While India retained most of the treasury, and the gifted
leadership of the Nehru-Gamdhi Dynasty, Pakistan was left only with the
advantage of a people united in their faith, and Islamic tradition. It is
as if the youth of a nation were left to fend for themselves, while the
remaining society limped along in terrific pain, after the loss of an
entire generation. Pakistan and India are both in dire financial straits,
though neither has fallen victim of the Asian Crisis, due to their limited
participation in currency or stock markets. The key difference in their
response to globalization is that India's billion people, divisive
politics of patronage and ideology, and established power in the region
provide a disincentive to reform, and a reluctance on the part of the West
to insist.
Between 1947 and 1991 Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and
her son Rajiv Gandhi, ruled India as Prime Minister for all but six years.
All but fourteen of fifty one years of Independence have passed under the
leadership of one party and one family. The events of the past week
suggest that the dynasty may continue with the emergence of Sonia Gandhi
as the leader of a resurgent Congress Party in State Elections held
November 25th .Only the past eight years have been spent with the Congress
party in the role of opposition. Those years may be numbered if the
Vvajpayee Bharatiya Janata Party, (BJP), government falls. The cumulative
effect of recent and modern Indian history has been an innate distrust of
the West, Russia to the North, and China to the East, and the development
of socialist nationalism. In the past year India's latent Hindu
nationalism has asserted itself over the more secular nationalism
practiced by the Congress Party. Even as pressure mounts for greater
liberalization of the financial sector India resists implementation.
The politics of the region are dominated in Western eyes by the explosion
of ten nuclear weapons in tests conducted in May of this year. The
internal politics of India are every bit as divisive as the external
conflicts with Pakistan and China, and negotiations with foreign firms and
lenders tend to be. External conflict has artificially built internal
consensus, especially in India. "The roots of India's growing problems of
governability are not socio-economic, but are located in its political
structure. A highly interventionist state dealing with a poor economy has
become an object of intense political competition. The spread of
egalitarian political values and opportunities provided by democracy have
in turn helped to transform what was once a heterogeneous social structure
into many groups of mobilized activists. Failure of leaders to make
timely concessions has intensified political demands and activity. The
growing weakness of fragmented political parties has made it difficult for
leaders to govern effectively. " Hindu nationalism has been a
contributing factor to the development of a socialist domestic policy and
isolationist foreign policy since independence. In recent years this
nationalism has expanded to create a more active, and even less
conciliatory foreign policy under the leadership of the BJP.. India's
foreign policy is a direct reaction to internal political conflicts and
quest for primacy among India's more than thirty parties represented in
Parliament and inestimable number of interest groups,. This is consistent
with the models presented by Snider, but he does not touch on India
specifically. The BJP has tried to shift the debate away from pressing,
and divisive internal issues toward less prescient international
conflicts. The detonation of nuclear weapons in May was a sort of
"national theater" aimed at seizing the national agenda, and maintaining a
fragile coalition. Internally this seemed to have worked in the BJP's
favor, especially in light of the Asian financial crisis, but may have
done great harm to the long term prospects of the Indian Economy, by
compounding the problems of bureaucratic barriers with disincentive to
make long term investments on an even less stable subcontinent. However
there has been another radical change characteristic of Indian Politics.
The recent elections, decided largely by the price of onions and other
staple produce point to the failure of this policy's domestic political
objectives, which may shatter the fragile governing coalition .
Pakistan was the first proclaimed Islamic Republic. All social
interaction, institutions, politics, commerce, and banking are influenced
by the Holy Quran, and the teachings of the Prophet. A process of
Islamization of all strata of Pakistani life was begun under the military
dictatorship of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in 1977. The process has
outlived his government, and continued for the past ten years. Islam is
practiced by 95% of the population and serves as the unifying element in
Pakistan, and as a source of tension in relating to the outside world,
particularly India, in line with the development of Hindu nationalism
directed toward Pakistan and China. The 1971 war with India was a product
of this enmity and geography, resulting in further partition of the Indian
subcontinent and the creation of Bangladesh. . The political spectrum is
dominated by the Pakistan Muslim League, PLM, and the Pakistan People's
Party, (PPP), and a variety of Muslim orthodox parties These parties
wield tremendous power and influence in the Senate, National Assembly, and
the regional assemblies. Islamization has spread to the economy,
especially the banking sector which now operates virtually interest free.
The combination of these influences has produced a modern Pakistan as
conflicted today, as in any time in its history, with only its faith
holding the nation together.
Conflict borne of scarce resources and the dependence on
government among both populations has created serious social problems
which must be addressed. The population of Pakistan increased 9.5% from
1990 to 1995. The World Bank expects this trend to continue unabated over
the next forty years. The 1995 population of nearly 130 million is
projected to reach 148 million by the year 2000. The Pakistani
government, and the World Bank peg the current population at 137 million.
. If the World Bank population model holds Pakistan will have 167 million
people in 2005, 187 million in 2010, and 274 million by 2035, making an
already dire situation far worse, further destabilizing the regime, and
the region . Consider that 34% of the population is urban, and that 28%
of those people live in conditions of abject poverty and you have a recipe
for disaster. The population density is ranked second in the world, 443.1
people per square mile. Only 38% of the country is literate, and the
education system has been in decline for many years. In India the
majority of families cannot participate to any meaningful degree in the
market. The poor in India need a safety net which only the government may
provide. No other group has proven able or willing to do so. No
official measure of poverty was reported by the World Bank, but the
prevailing estimate is that more than 40% of the population, 400 million
people cannot afford even an adequate diet. An additional 40% cannot
participate in the economy for lack of education or resources. The
problems of poverty in India are exacerbated by the prevailing trends in
government. More than half a Billion people live in conditions of abject,
hopeless poverty on the subcontinent There is not a great deal of free
capital in India, and what capital does exist is concentrated in very few
hands. Conditions in South Asia have the potential to get far worse
before they get better
Now that the extent of the underlying social, political and
historical impediments to aggressive globalization have been outlined, it
is time to turn to a discussion of the economy, and outline the two
countries' response to the Washington Consensus.
1. The budget deficit must be reduced to no more than 2% GDP.
The latest budget deficit figures for India and Pakistan reported for 1995
are 583 million and 89.29 Rupees respectively, 20% and 11% of market value
GDP respectively pegged at 3.29 trillion and 848 billion Rupees . The
financial Times reports that India has lowered its fiscal deficit to 9% in
the current year, but this level remains well above the prescription of
the IMF .
2. Accord budgetary priority to primary health education and
infrastructure investments.
Priority goes by necessity to debt service in both nations, India
26%, and Pakistan 36%, While transportation, communications, agriculture,
and social services combine for 26.8% of Indian expenditures. Pakistan
reports "development expenditures" at 22.2%. India spends 86% of its
budget on the military while Pakistan spends 26.5%. Both countries are
acting responsibly in light of their domestic constituencies and the
political uncertainty represented by the current border conflicts and
inscrutable Chinese foreign policy. Settlement of persistent conflicts is
essential to readjust spending priorities.
3. Broaden the tax base, including interest income on assets held abroad
and cut the marginal rates of taxation.
While India has made no recent pronouncements on restructuring its tax
base, and restructuring the bureaucracy is not expected even, perhaps
especially if Congress returns to power the government of Pakistan has
recently announced a series of reforms aimed at redistributing the tax
burden, easing bureaucratic red tape. Pakistan is making great efforts to
reshape its financial house into the image the IMF demands, at least
publicly, but their efforts have been frustrated by their own insistence
on developing nuclear weapons. Sartaj Aziz, the current Pakistani Finance
Minster, spoke on the lack of confidence in and resulting inefficiency in
tax collection and administration, and the commitment to correct this
through a less regressive tax structure, and civil service reform in a
speech before the national assembly. The Finance Minister explains that
the average Pakistani farmer has vivid memories of the treatment they or
their parents have experienced under the burdens of money lenders and
their debt collectors. The natural inclination of Pakistanis is to delay,
obstruct, or flee from both debt collectors and tax collectors for as
long as possible.. Tax collectors and moneychangers precede partition by
more than a millennium in India, and there the lineage of historical
abuses persists to the current bureaucracy. In India, the same class
collects taxes, and there is no expectation of change whatsoever .
4. Liberalize the financial system, at least abolishing preferential
interest rates and maintaining a moderately positive real interest rate.
Indian Interest Rates stand at 9% for banks, and 14% for borrowers, while
the last reported Pakistani Discount rate is 19% . Islamic banking
practices, particularly the Shariah restrictions complicate comparison.
The HHI ratio for India is 87.4% of deposits are held in the public
sector, with the Reserve Bank of India posting 26.7% of deposits,
nationalized banks holding 58.3%, and state owned rural banks retaining
2.4% of deposits, in 1993. Pakistan, with exclusively nationalized banks
retains 81% of deposits in 18 banks, and the State Bank of Pakistan for
fiscal year 1991-92 . Contract intensive Money, (KIM) in the two
countries is .795 in India, and .771, demonstrating a lack of confidence
in the banking systems, which has developed from often bitter personal
histories . In developed Countries KIM is generally listed around .96 .
5. Adjust the exchange rate to encourage nontraditional exports.
The IMF has recently, "commended India for an orderly 17 per cent
depreciation of the rupee against the dollar since the onset of the Asian
currency crisis in July last year. It said India should respond to any
further pressure on the rupee through further tightening of interest
rates, a measure to which India has twice resorted this year to steady the
currency's depreciation. " In Contrast, the government of Pakistan has
imposed exchange controls, delayed debt servicing, devalued the currency
through a dual exchange rate system, and tightened fiscal policy.
Immediately after the May nuclear tests the government froze $11 Billion
in onshore foreign currency deposits, anticipating a run on the banks.
Depositors were promised withdrawals, but only at the official conversion
rate, 20% above the market rate. The quick policy reversal has cast doubt
on other government promises, and weakened interest in FDIC. The World
Bank reports that even with these measures, the balance of payments
remains extraordinarily fragile, and the Pakistani economy is vulnerable
to external shocks.
6. Liberalize trade, rapidly replacing qualitative restrictions with
tariffs and progressively reducing the tariffs to 10% "(or at most around
20%)."
Items six through nine of the Washington Consensus, are the most
problematic in India's internal politics, and trade policy. Though some
progress has admittedly been made towards reducing tariffs, and cutting
red tape in import and customs, "India's economy remains among the world's
most highly regulated, state dominated and protected; export performance
after seven years of reform remains dismal - India's share of world trade
declined last year - and full convertibility on the capital account is a
distant notion, under current circumstances more distant than ever. " At
this point it is necessary to remind the reader that India retains more
than four hundred years of bureaucracy, and its inherent institutional
memory. Nothing changes quickly in India. Pakistan, has made promises
regarding structural changes in trade regulations, but these promises were
minor points of a major speech for external consumption. These promises
have not been repeated since May of 1998. The response is expected to be
measured, and persist over a long period of time. No analyst off the
Pakistani payroll believes that any real reform will occur soon.
7. Remove all barriers to foreign direct investment and enable foreign and
domestic firms to compete on equal terms.
India and Pakistan each have erected complex webs of restrictions, which
represent the strongest possible reaction to their colonial heritage,
without resorting to complete isolationism. No foreign firm is allowed to
own more than 49% stake in companies based in either country, however,
overtures are being made to encourage foreign investment through tax
incentives, regulation easement, and the opening of strategic markets to
foreign investment. India and Pakistan each have serious shortages of
domestic investment capital, and since May of 1998, foreign investment
capital has fled. There is also a persistent trend towards attempts at
self sufficiency, and import substitution, which will not be broken
quickly if at all. In the final analysis, even as trade restrictions are
lifted, the ingrained sensibilities of the people will remain. "Local
brands can often survive even the toughest competition from well financed
international groups. For example, in India millions of consumers still
choose Thumbs Up, the local cola over competing attractions of Coca-Cola
and Pepsi-Cola .
8. Privatize state enterprises.
Privatization is another sweeping change for democratic yet essentially
socialist economies. Though reform is sorely needed in this area more than
any other in Indian and Pakistani society, this is also the least likely
segment to change because of institutional inertia and what Peter Evans
refers to as Embedded Autonomy in Business and the State in Developing
Countries, unfortunately Evans's more robust commentaries were not
available from the library until well after my deadline. Government is
the central actor in both countries, using its control of the means of
production to retain power, curry favor, and otherwise dominate the
foreign and domestic policy in each county. The abuses of all parties
seem to balance out, but in the absence of a strong financial or banking
sector, there is insufficient pressure to make any real change. The IMF
and World Bank are, finally making progress, however and both India and
Pakistan have begun making adjustments, divesting, but retaining a sizable
interest in public utilities, State airlines, and strategic Industries.
However the benefit associated with reform is not recognized in either
country, in light of their strategic, internal, and external security
concerns. Both countries governments are far more interested in appeasing
International actors. rather than articulating real reforms. India, more
self sufficient, accustomed to deprivation, and possessing a larger
economy is of course taking a harder line on any reforms.
9. Abolish regulations impeding the entry of new firms or restricting
competition and insure that all regulations of a given industry are
justified.
Colonial history again precludes the easy acceptance of this
recommendation for both countries. Even with extensive regulation by the
regimes which predated the western colonial period, and the relative
balance of power between the two sides, western joint stock companies were
able to subvert strong institutions within a generation. The people of
the subcontinent see no difference between those early pioneers, and
current multinational corporations intent on dominating Indian markets.
The ham handed tactics of the United States, IMF, and World Bank have not
inspired confidence. The fear persists that if foreign interests begin to
dominate the economies, political domination will follow. When this fear
is candidly expressed by people proven to control nuclear weapons in
stable regimes with weak economies. the west must take notice, muting
criticism, and taking positions as conciliatory as possible. The U. S.
will not be able to open India or Pakistan as the great powers were able
to do in China and Japan in the 19th Century, with nuclear weapons and
fundamentalism in the balance. The west will have to be content to allow
existing domestic pressures to produce the paradigm shift they seek, and
full globalization demands.
10. Secure private property rights without excessive costs for the
informal as well as formal sectors.
India and Pakistan have competence of this facet of the Washington
Consensus. Of all the criticism, available of political, economic and
social institutions available, and that body of literature is
considerable, only one author has made a serious case for attacks on
Indian or Pakistani democratic institutions. Kahn's Fresh Perspectives on
India and Pakistan , however has been surpassed by events. Even if the
populations in India and Pakistan are not overly educated on the Western
model, or literate, there is no dispute that their will is satisfied by
the democratic institutions in both countries since 1989. Even of the
people of either country are not politically sophisticated, there is no
doubt that they understand the price of onions, and will vote in a manner
consistent with their beliefs, removing regimes that do not provide for
the common good.
While the IMF and World Bank have muted their standard openness
prescription, both entities call for structural changes to the Indian
political economy. India must control its annual deficits, and practice
fiscal restraint by cutting deficits, and restructuring its slim tax base.
In addition to central government deficits the various states post fiscal
deficits as well, for a combined total of 9% GDP per year. This deficit is
said to be a major inhibitor to growth. 7-10% growth over the next
several years is required to attack India's tremendous poverty. It would
take 15 years of consistent 7% growth to reach the per capita GDP of
Indonesia, 37 years for Thailand, and 46 years to equal Malaysia. That
projection is measured against these economies' recession performance.
Pre recession these estimates would be far less reasonable.
Indian banking as expected from the preceding paragraphs is highly
concentrated, and strongly influenced by the bureaucracy. Since
nationalization the Indian government has retained control of 85% of
deposits through the State Bank of India (26.7%) and the nationalized
commercial banks. Less than 5% of deposits are held in independent banks .
This is consistent with a centrally planned economy, or mixed economy, and
India retains characteristics of both. Though heavily regulated
indigenous entrepreneurship is encouraged, and allowed to invest its
resources as it sees fit. However, the government does set fiscal policy
through their banks down to the lowest denominators, which limits any
concern's independence should it require a loan. The loans are flowing
again, but in a very controlled fashion to prevent past mistakes from
recurring.
When Pakistani finance Minister Sartaj Aziz stood before the National
Assembly, he was also speaking to the IMF and the world at large, making
sweeping promises. Mr. Aziz spoke of the following issues; 1. national
interest over small group, and self interest in government, banking and
industry, 2. expanding the role of small actors and larger industry in the
economy independent of government, 3. self reliance, 4. Development of
essential health, education, and welfare infrastructure, and 5.
Modernization of industrial information and practices . On October 10,
1998 the World Bank web site offered a summary of the current Pakistani
effort at Globalization. The publication is a progress report of sorts.
That progress is good, in planning, commitment, initiative, and
investment. Pakistan has managed significant economic growth in spite of
regional conflicts, and political instability. Social indicators have
improved steadily and are above regional norms, though literacy, and the
gap between men and women is far below that for most other low income
countries. Immunization rates, and access to health care have improved.
The government stabilization and structural reforms outlined in the
previous paragraph have resulted in Real gross GDP has grown 5.4% over
the 1997-98 fiscal year. The growth rate was a mere 1.3% for the 1996-97
fiscal year. Inflation declined to 8% from 12%, and the budget deficit
was kept within the planned ceiling. The current account of the balance
of payments was reduced from 6.3% to 2.7% of GDP. However, the overall
balance of payments performance fell short of program objectives due to
large shortfalls in the capital account . This laudable analysis fell
apart in May 1998, following nuclear tests, The balance of payments has
deteriorated rapidly, as have other financial indicators. Investor
confidence has also fallen, and capital has left the entire region.
The economic profile of both countries is decidedly mixed. The
problems of scale, and an entrenched bureaucracy persist, though to a
greater degree in India. Real animosity for outsiders remains, both
internally, and internationally. The lessons of colonialism have not been
forgotten. Hindu, and Muslim nationalism are in flux, and attempts to
spin internal discontent with international "crises" have failed.
Sanctions forced by the Glenn Amendment have made analysis difficult and
blurred indicators. The region is not in fact in crisis, as I thought
when entering this research, but it remains a very interesting study, with
a better and more experienced author to frame it. My predictions for the
next five years, are as follows. The Congress party will reassert its
dominant role after the political tensions ease over nuclear tensions.
Both countries will sign the non proliferation treaty, and there will be a
period of rapprochement on the subcontinent, though the Kashmir region
will remain active. Real efforts o globalize will resume slowly as the
Asian crises eases, and both countries will take a lesson from the Asian
Tigers' experience with banking. Islamic Banking will develop further in
Pakistan, becoming a model for the Muslim world. Indian banking will
persist, though political pressure will in time make Indian banks more
transparent and responsive to international conventions, but only on a
time frame that sustains the regime, and established institutions,
including those informal ones which represent real power in India. These
predictions have no validity beyond my own experience based on the course
materials provided, and intensive study over the semester. Much more
research needs to be done before I can lay out explicit reasoning beyond a
general optimism, and faith in people to solve their own problems given
time and minimal resources. Through my research I have grown to
fundamentally respect the Indian and Pakistani people, and their ability
to make great things from simple resources. I have also developed greater
curiosity for Islamic Banking, increasing my confidence in the ability
of Pakistan to shake long standing corruption problems. If India and
Pakistan continue to globalize and adopt more of the Washington Consensus,
it will be on their own time, and in their own unique way.
This essay has been intended as an introduction, gathering data
from disparate sources in support of a much larger research project. I
have been careful not to propose a formula or thesis to generalize this
exceedingly complex region into any particular category. Given more time
I may have been able to draw better comparisons to the readings, and I did
make that attempt, but came to the conclusion that India and Pakistan are
unique cases for which no model exists, in the literature I have been
exposed to. The body of literature on the Indian and Pakistani economies
is primarily drawn from regional scholars, familiar with the underlying
context, to such a degree as to leave much of it implicit rather than
explicit in their analysis. Mastering this subject is a much larger
project than can be accomplished in a semester. My hope is that more
experienced researchers will find this paper useful in beginning an
exploration of these cases. This study is virgin territory in western
scholarship, and should be an integral part of a comprehensive study of
banking and globalization.
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23 Omar, Kaleem, "There is No Brownback Amendment as yet." The News,
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24 Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan,
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25 Pakistan Government Website
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26 Sharma, Shubhra, "Shubhra provided me with the HHI ratios in an
exchange of resources. Her source was the Reserve Bank of India: Banking
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Pakistan (Annual Report- 1991-'92).
27 Snider, Lewis, Growth, Debt, and Politics, Economic Adjustment and the
Political Performance of Developing Countries, Westview Press, Boulder,
CO, 1996.
28 The World Bank Group, "Countries: Pakistan," The World Bank Group,
Washington, D. C., http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/sas/pk2.htm
29 The World Bank, "Pakistan Population Projection Table," (pak_pop),
World Development Indicators CD-ROM, New York, NY, February 1997.
30 Wagstyl, Stefan, "Globalization, Not a One-Way Street to a Successful
Future." The Financial Times, London, England, September 19, 1997,
http://www.ft.com.
31Yaqub, Muhammad, State Bank of Pakistan Annual Report FY 1993-1994,
Islamabad, Pakistan, 1994.
32 Zysman, John, "Government, Markets and Growth," Cornell University
Press, Ithica, NY, 1983.
Christopher Kane
ckane@gov.utexas.edu
Teachng Assistant
The University of Texas at Austin
(512)491-5090