Patronage can be defined as a vast array of practices not necessarily
involving money, and which can include nepotism, brokerage, and the
activation of old-boy networks. A universalist approach to economic
institutions, on the other hand, means that services and goods are
granted according to ability alone (Danet, p1-2). The Israeli
socio-economic system was designed to pay homage to this ideal, whereas
Morocco has relied on prominent families and their networks to create
business growth. Both countries have used institutionalized forms of
state-sponsored patronage, however, throughout their independence
histories. Morocco used the Makhzan (royal court) to advance state
goals when they were defined, and Israel’s biggest institution of
patronage is the Histadrut. This paper will explore the depth of those
networks, beginning with Morocco, in order to assess the
government-business relationships in both countries. This paper will
show how these relationships assisted or facilitated economic progress,
and how pervasive these networks are today. Discussion of banking
practices is included to illustrate how they served or hindered overall
economic development in their intermediary capacities. The
relationships with the European Union will also provide insight into the
process of economic and political liberalization for both countries.
The Makhzan began as a group of literate individuals, great tribal
warriors, and noble families descended from Mohammed the Prophet. Both
before and during the French Protectorate (1912-1956) it increased its
authority via the army and the government bureaucracy, and it also taxed
and legislated. Through the consolidation and enlargement of the
Makhzan, the French administered the population directly, and thus
helped extend royal authority to the entire country (Zartman , p35).
Today, central power is still based on the loyalty expressed by groups
organized around the Makhzan, who in turn conducts its relations with
the periphery through formal and informal networks of domination (ibid,
p36). These networks take essentially the same form in politics, the
military, and business.
The Makhzan has extended its influence in Morocco through the formation
of a series of political parties loyal to the government in order to
prevent nationalist movements from monopolizing political
representation. The Istiqlal and Socialist Union of Popular Forcers
(USFP) were very active in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, advocating a
more socialist and universalist society. To counter this force,
sometimes pro-regime parties were formed by direct prime minister
requests (Zartman , p45). Local power-sharers and sheikhs are widely
mobilized by the central power and encourage support of Makhzan
candidates through threats, promises, and bargaining (Zartman , p46).
"The electoral practices and their function in the political system
confirm the subordination of the political elite to the central power
and its administration," although one-fourth of the Parliamentary seats
are chosen by the people, providing the electoral system with some
flexibility and credibility (ibid). The King’s ability to control his
clients is "through his influence in government decisions about resource
allocation and his direct and widespread power to appoint, transfer, and
dismiss public officials." Those appointments include cabinet
positions, high civilian and military offices, senior judges, and other
high-ranking officials. Any opposition parties are marginalized either
by not being sensitive to rural norms and sensibilities, or through
government repression (Tessler, p69).
The King’s influence is not restricted to the urban areas. "Clientelism
also defines the most important mechanisms by which power is acquired in
the countryside" (Tessler, p65). Wealthy landowners and bureaucrats use
their ties to the government to reward their followers and enhance their
own position (ibid). The King's most important alliances are with rural
parties and the rural bourgeoisie, and the army. The rural leaders give
King Hassan a broad base of grassroots support, providing him with
counterweight to the more powerful, and sometimes threatening,
politicized urban elite (Tessler, p68).
The King has also steadily increased his bureaucratic control over the
religious system and the military, increasing army officers' pay and
their access to the world of business as a way of maintaining loyalty
(Zartman , p49). "Higher officials and officers of
the army could easily, with a palace or governmental recommendation, get
a loan from the state banks to buy agricultural property or enterprise
shares" (Zartman , p51). The king also ensured that power was
distributed to those loyal to him, keeping himself powerful in the
process. For example, after a plot was discovered of a general in the
army in 1983, King Hassan divided the responsibilities of that general
into several positions. One was given to King Hassan's uncle, and two
other positions to members of prominent families already loyal to the
King (Zartman, p49).
For business enterprises, the 1973 Moroccanization decree that was
passed had long-lasting affects on the Moroccan economy. From this
point and throughout the 1970’s and early 1980’s the emphasis is on
import-substitution, with a subsequent increase in size of the public
sector. While this was good for infrastructural development, it helped
some Makhzan interests by further concentrating ownership of business
among them. This decree said that 50% of private enterprise capital had
to be owned by Moroccan businessmen. The first to take advantage of
these measures were the royal family and other prominent families. The
palace also nominated higher civil servants and dependents for
management in one of Morocco's many public enterprises (Zartman 1987,
p51).
Maxfield and Schneider say that an insulated, meritocratic bureaucracy
is a first bulwark against corruption, (p5) and in Morocco there is an
educated class of civil servants among the government administration
chosen more for their ability than for the family to which they belong.
Because of their education, they pay more attention to correctly
implementing the legal principles of public services. Most of them do
not take advantage of corruption or rewards that the Makhzan provides to
its clients (Zartman , p54).
The patron-client relationships extend to the financial sector also.
As directors and managers of banks and credit agencies, the elite have
special influence in matters such as customs, currency, import-export,
and finance (Zartman, p52). This system ensures their cooperation with
the palace, where most decisions about the distribution of resources
among the elite are actually made. The decision to exempt farmers from
taxes until the year 2000 is because of opposition by the farmer
notables to the implementation of taxes and fiscal reform (ibid, p52).
Interestingly, notables in Morocco can appeal to the palace regarding
tax matters, an old practice from before the Protectorate. Also as in
the past, powerful notables use their influence with the government or
the King's entourage to obtain removal of high civil servants or even
governors whom they oppose (ibid, p52).
In 1973, the positive export trend that had existed before was hampered
by the Moroccanization process. Moroccanization took precedence over
other liberalization methods like the 1973 revision of the investment
code, which was intended to attract foreign investment. During this
same time, Moroccan agricultural exports were hurt by increased prices
of imported agricultural products into the EC (Zartman, p178). "The
actual selection of projects, however, was such as to give little
possibility of generating profits from which the loans could be repaid,
and the result was a debt crisis in the 1980's" (ibid p179). The
Moroccanization decree thus helped create a non-sustaining enlargement
of the public sector. Had Morocco sought to diversify its agricultural
export market, it might not have been hurt so much. Morocco did try to
find new markets in the mid-1970's, for example in Eastern Europe. In
1981, 5.7% of Moroccan exports went to USSR, but this share has declined
since then (ibid, p183).
The small size of the elite also encourages clientelism through
intimate connections and the homogeneity of the group, keeping the
clientelism system operating smoothly. The smallness of the elite does
not overwhelm the available resources, and this helps to maintain it
(Tessler, p64). Attempts by individuals to mobilize support against the
regimes are regularly suppressed, though some are coopted back into the
system (Tessler, p67). For those who do not play by the rules of
patronage, coercion by exile or arrest occurs, and the King
has forced the opposition’s printing presses to be shut down on more
than one occasion (Tessler, p70).
Just as in Morocco, Israel has its own unique expression of the
patron-client relationship. The Histadrut is an entity that united both
economic and political interests and began as a complex of trade unions
comprised of workers’ collectives. Its influence varies, from owning
the largest department-store chain to operating the largest health
maintenance system in Israel (Danet, p100). Its function and hegemony
expanded and was well-institutionalized before Israel’s independence
(Plessner, p115). By 1987, the Histadrut and its affiliates employed
18% of the working population and contributed 21% of GNP. Out of the
fifty largest industrial companies in 1988, it controlled twelve. The
founders of the Histadrut desired to organize the entire economy under
its umbrella. It did not seek profits but instead intended to
facilitate the absorption of immigration, whose operation was managed by
the Histadrut’s Worker’s Corporation (Plessner, p115).
"In addition to dealing with specific tasks, these organizations
constituted major sources of public employment, which was often
earmarked for supporters of the various political parties in proportion
to the latter’s relative strength in the population" (Roniger and Ayata,
p171). The majority of workers in Israel before 1948 were employed by
the Histadrut, and it was in a position by virtue of this fact to coerce
individual employers and demand that they only hire Histadrut members.
Producers only hired Histadrut members and denied jobs to workers
belonging to other labor federations. There was at least one incident
of violence in 1938 in which Histadrut operatives forcibly expelled
non-Histadrut workers from a construction site. This was reflective of
an early tension between Labor (represented by Histadrut) and Capital,
and the huge Histadrut organization worked against early capitalism
(Plessner, p160) by subverting universalist means to the monopoly on
labor that the Histadrut demanded.
Political influence even now remains more pervasive in the Histadrut
and the Jewish Agency than in the government bureaucracy. These
bodies, not central national institutions, organized immigration,
settlement, and other services in the pre-independence period "and doled
out benefits to the public in exchange for political support" (Danet,
p107). "Today, top-level posts considered legitimate avenues for party
patronage are the personal staff of ministers, ambassadors,
directors-general, advisors, accountants-general, and budget directors,
among others" (ibid).
For Israel, the government was the primary organ to raise funds for the
economic development of the new country. Originally, the majority of
the funds collected by the government put into private domestic savings
were used to finance the budget deficit and development budget. The
remaining funds, combined with borrowed foreign funds "were allocated to
the business sector for investment" and other investment such as
residential investment (Razin and Sadka, p186).
The government used several methods for collecting funds and directing
investment flow, but only methods dealing with the banking sector are
addressed here. The government channeled savings such as pensions and
long-term savings directly to its budget, bypassing all other
organizations, including banks. It explicitly directed investments of
the business sector toward favored geographic locations and types of
industry and "the main mechanism employed was the commercial banks’
reserve requirements" (ibid, p187). Thus the investment capital of
firms was actually raised by the government, and additional money came
from the banks which raised their capital from tax-exempted medium and
long-term deposits of the public, and from share capital raised on the
stock market (ibid, p190). Despite the fact that as of the early 1990’s
Israel did not have
the same regulatory and administrative procedures as the EU in its
banking system, it still has a liberal licensing policy for foreign
banks (Razin and Sadka, p179).
The Histadrut had its own bank, Bank Ha’poalim, founded as "the
financial arm of the Histadrut economy" in 1921. Initially, public
funds provided a substantial amount of the new bank’s resources
(Plessner, p90). "Its express aim was to provide credit to the workers’
economy; that is, to cooperatives in agriculture and elsewhere" (ibid,
p153). After independence in 1948, however, the government became the
major supplier of banks’ investment capital, but the Histadrut was still
able to use money that its members provided
to the government through Gmal, the financial intermediary of the
pension funds of the Histadrut. Gmul could use a substantial portion of
the money acquired from these funds to make loans to the Histadrut’s
industrial enterprises by the following:
"It received a blanket approval from the government, thereby being able
to allocate finance more freely among Histadrut corporations. This
constituted a specific kind of discrimination, because it granted the
Histadrut economy a greater freedom in the allocation of funds than was
generally available. The confinement of these funds to the Histadrut
economy made it even less likely that capital would be allocated to the
better investment prospects" (Plessner, p52).
Thus the Histadrut was able to put a significant amount of money it
provided the government back into its own industries, bypassing more
conventional channels of acquiring capital through bank loans. Today,
Ha’Poalim is Israel’s largest commercial bank. Although it has recently
sold 43% of its shares to a private investor consortium, some do not
think that this sale signifies a good example of Israel’s pledge to
privatize. At least one critic of Israel’s banking system says "Bank
Ha’Poalim is an incestuous, monopolistic creature that penetrates into
every corner of the economy and it will be nearly impossible to break it
up now that it is privately owned" (Financial Times, September 1997,
p40).
Traditionally, agriculture has played a prominent role in the economic
development of Israel, as in Morocco. And as in Morocco, favoritism
affected which farmers would be
offered breaks according to their association with the patronage
network. In 1962, the Israeli government created a policy dealing with
those holders of farm loans. A government appointed commission decided
that payments on loans could be exempt from indexation for three years,
and the remaining part of the loan would be indexed to inflation.
However, this applied to only mixed-farming communities, and not
monoculture farmers, and "this constituted a very convenient way to
favor Histadrut-affiliated agriculture over fully private farming," the
latter usually being based on monoculture (Plessner, p91). Agriculture
retained an ideological supremacy over all other occupations, and since
most of private enterprise was non-farming, private enterprise was
viewed unfavorably (ibid, p150). Thus private enterprise was
subordinated to the identity of the Israeli pioneer-farmer, which was a
big key symbol in Israeli Jewish identity.
Still, some nonfarm enterprises were regarded as essential, like
construction, transportation, and medical services, and that these
occupations were viewed favorably "is evident from the fact that they
were largely in the hands of cooperatives formerly under the auspices of
the Histadrut" (ibid, p152). The idea that business enterprises should
serve as instruments for the attainment of national economic objectives
was widely held before and after 1948 (Plessner, p159). In 1987, the
CEO of Koor, Histadrut’s industrial holding company, said that the Koor
system is an uncommon creation that has both national and social
objectives (ibid). Although patronage has decreased in effectiveness in
controlling access to basic means of production and economic markets,
"it is still of value in shaping differential access to the public
distribution of private goods" (Roniger and Ayata, p177).
I would like to provide one more example of the continued hold on the
economy the Histadrut maintains because it illustrates the pervasive
power of this institution. Israel is now undergoing a push for
privatization which began in the early 1990’s. This was
preceded by bank reform in the mid-1980’s which gave the private sector
greater investment freedom and reduced the government direct and
indirect financing of investments. Majority shares of several
commercial banks are also on the market, shares which the government
acquired after the 1983 collapse of several of Israel’s largest banks
(Razin and Sadka , p190). A good example is Bank Ha’Poalim, which was
owned by the government after 1983. According to a report of Israeli
external advisors in 1997, at the time of its sale, Ha’Poalim controlled
40% of the banking sector in Israel; financial services for about 60% of
pension and long-term investment funds; and about one-third of the
market value of corporations listed on the Tel Aviv stock exchange
(Financial Times, September 1997, p40). The report concludes by saying
that "there is no such concentration, or control of such a broad
spectrum of sectors, in any banking system in the western world." This
raises some concerns about what real changes will be effected by the
transaction, and has led some to observe that if Ha’Poalim’s structure
stays the same, it will not matter whether it is owned by a private
group or the government (ibid).
RALLYING POINTS
Now I will comment briefly on the economic benefits of wartime
situations in both Morocco and Israel. When Spain announced in 1975
that it would withdraw from Spanish Sahara, Morocco used that
opportunity to act on what it feels is its legitimate historical claim
to Western Sahara (Zartman, p227). What is intriguing about this
situation is that Western Sahara is very rich in phosphates, and Spain
decided to relinquish its claim during the height of the worldwide
phosphate boom. This no doubt added more passion to King Hassan’s call
to bring the Sahara back into the Maghreb, which most Moroccans,
including the opposition, favored. Morocco received $500m-$1b annually
from 1975 to 1981 from Saudi Arabia, and lesser but still helpful sums
from Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, in their support of Morocco on the
Saharan issue. In return, Morocco offers monarchical
solidarity, security agents and bodyguards to these regimes. Saudi aid
was reduced in 1982 because of the worldwide oil glut (Zartman, p199).
It is true that some began calling for Western Sahara’s reintegration
back into Morocco as soon as the French left in 1956 (ibid). Most
Moroccans support the Saharan war in principle, and the riots in 1981
and 1983-4 were not related to the Saharan issue. But if the King
"fails to seize an opportunity to extricate the country from the long
and costly war", he may be held responsible by the Moroccan people
(Zartman, p229), and thus undermine his position as head of state. But
if he gives away too much or appears to weak, his credibility as king
would be questioned too (ibid).
Israel faces a similar situation in its drawn-out conflict with the
Palestianians. Until the 1982 bombings of Lebanon and the subsequent
Sabra and Shatilla massacres by Lebanese Christian Maronites, most
Israelis were fully behind the government’s commitment to reduce the
threat of the PLO by force (Frenkel, p118). The United States has been
the main supplier of financial and military aid to Israel since 1967,
offering $3billion a year since 1986 (does not include military aid)
(Congressional Country Reports, 1987, p644). Israel also feels it has a
legitimate historical claim to Palestine and much of its resources are
dedicated to its ready state of war that it has maintained since 1948.
Sadly, these protracted conflicts often create intransigent ideologues.
Prime Minister Yitzshak Rabin's murder and a 1983 plot by senior army
officers in Morocco to rid the country of a King who might make
territorial concessions are two examples of how incubating ambivalence
will often lead to violent expression. The last one hundred years in
world history have shown a pattern of violence in response to unwanted
lingering presences, from the Boxer Rebellion to the Philppines at the
turn of the century, and from Palestine to Saudi Arabia in the 1990's.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PRESSURES OF PROGRESS
An association agreement was signed between Morocco and the EU in 1969
which stipulates free access to EU markets for Moroccan manufactured
exports, preferential access for agricultural exports, and EU financial
and technical aid to Morocco; another agreement was signed in 1976.
"Morocco has, however, held a rather privileged position within the
Mediterrenean hierarchy," receiving generous agricultural preferences
and financial aid (Zartman, p174). Agriculture contributes 20% to GDP
and employs 40-45% of the workforce (MEED, August 1992, p41), so
agricultural trade agreements with the EU are crucial.
France has always been Morocco’s primary trading partner and accounted
for 23% of Moroccan imports and 32% of its exports in 1991 (ibid), and
each year reveals the same basic trend. Spain is third, behind Germany,
but represents a potential problem for Morocco in the future because
their agricultural crops are so similar. Since Spain’s accession into
the EU in 1986, it competes directly with Morocco’s primary fruit and
vegetable exports to the EU. Since both countries have the same primary
and secondary agricultural products, and since Morocco is still not a
member of the EU, this might prove devastating. Morocco’s BMCE bank did
open its first branch in Madrid in 1994, allowing Morocco to open other
branch banks throughout the EU (MEED, December 1993, p24), so Spain will
likely always be economically important to Morocco in one form or
another. The 1995 signing of the Association Agreements with the EU
will also help compensate Morocco for not being a member of the EU.
This agreement calls for the integration of Morocco (and Tunisia) into a
free trade area by 2002, part of the EU’s Euro-Med project. In addition
to trade the agreement includes technological development and capital
mobility components (The Financial Times, November 1995, p4).
Some Moroccan exporters want to move away from the traditional markets
in order to deepen their trade portfolio. In the early 1990’s, Morocco
started looking for new
markets, including North America, Britain, and in Scandinavia, and the
Moroccan Export Promotion Center (CMPE) has assigned specialists to each
country. This private company has also opened four regional offices,
all outside of the Casablanca-Rabat area. The director of the CMPE said
that activities have been too concentrated in Casablanca and Rabat
(ibid). The decision to move from the Casablanca-Rabat area signifies
the desire of some to move away from the usual suspects in elite
domination whose activities are concentrated in that area.
Israel has been an associate member of the EU since 1975 and it has free
trade agreements characterized by unrestrictive exchanges in
manufacturing and agriculture (Razin and Sadka, p178). The last several
years have witnessed angry disputes between Israel and the EU, though.
Twice in 1994, the EU refused to grant Israel special status that would
allow vastly improved access to research and development programs and
agricultural markets (Financial Times, August 1994, p3). Israel said it
deserved a special agreement "in recognition of the economic concessions
it made to the Arabs" after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Prime
Minister Rabin threatened that unless the EU showed more flexibility in
trade negotiations, Israel would consider switching some of its public
procurement, substantial at $6billion a year, away from the EU (ibid).
Israel did join the research and development program in mid-1998,
however.
But the EU seems more concerned with the treatment and attitude toward
the Palesitinians than threats from Israel. In 1996, the EU called on
Israel to allow humanitarian aid assistance and materials to be provided
without delay to the residents of
the West Bank and Gaza (Financial Times, March 1996, p3). And in 1997,
resuming an old argument about the "rules of origin" of fruits and
vegetables coming out of Israel, EU members were made aware that Israel
had again falsely applied "made in Israel" labels to produce not grown
in Israel (in this particular incident the majority of the produce came
from Brazil) (Financial Times, December 1997, p3). This is important
because Israel has a 1995 duty-free agreement for orange juice exports
to the EU.
The EU, especially members Britain, France, Belgium and Ireland, takes
seriously the stipulations to its trade agreements. The most
significant blow to Israel's economic hegemony in Palestine, and surely
the most devastating symbolically, came in July 1997 when the EU signed
a free trade agreement with the Palestinian Authority, thus bypassing
Israel in obtaining Palestinian goods (Financial Times, July 1997, p4).
Israel objected, saying that the Oslo Accords do not permit the PA to
enter into independent agreements and it appealed to the WTO. The Oslo
Accords have been transgressed on more than one occasion and regardless
of Israeli footstamping, direct trade continues between the EU and the
PA.
STATE MOBILIZATION
Israel’s ability to mobilize and direct human and material resources
in order to obtain policy objectives has already been discussed. This
mobilization, referred to as relative political extraction, has usually
been strong, and the Histadrut helped facilitate that process. Its
legacy continues with Bank Ha’Poalim and its conglomerates such as
Koor. In fact, it is possible that Israel’s constant ready state of war
helps maximize political extraction, keeping many of its citizens in
politics, public service and the military mobilized to achieve policy
objectives. From this perspective, we can view Israel’s decision not to
allow foreign buyers to purchase maximum shares of its banks as not just
a way of keeping Israeli interests in Israel, but also as a way of
preventing those governments potentially hostile to Israel from
encroaching on vital economic territory. The policy of house
demolitions on the West Bank and in Jerusalem in the name of security
helps fulfill other
policy objectives of increasing Israel’s territory beyond its de facto
borders . Regarding institutional credibility and government action,
Israel also rates as more strong than weak, with only a small amount of
currency outside of the banks as compared with total money supply (World
Tables 1994).
By contrast, Morocco has a poorer showing regarding its relative
political extraction, possibly largely owing to the fact that its modern
and traditional economies are not well-integrated. If the informal
sector is included in the modern economy, then Morocco’s political
extraction is even weaker. Throughout its post-independence history it
has relied on tariffs for a large part of its revenue. However, trade
reforms in the mid-1980’s reduced the maximum tariff from 400% in 1983
to 44% in 1988 (Richards and Waterbury, p238). Morocco’s direct taxes
only accounted for 28% of total taxes in 1995 (WDI 1995), reflecting the
inability of the government to maximize its acquisition of revenue for
state use. If, according to Snider, a country’s tax structure reflects
the nature of government action (p10), then the inability or
unwillingness of Morocco to collect direct taxes reflects a more
ineffective government infrastructure.
Regarding its institutional credibility, reflected in part by a CIM
ratio of .77, Morocco follows a pattern of economic rent-seeking by much
of the elite. This inefficient allocation of resources has in part led
to the large informal sector. This quote by de Soto in Snider provides
a good explanation of how this scenario might evolve:
"When legality is a privilege available only to those with political and
economic power, those excluded…have no alternative but illegality…The
system is not only immoral but inefficient. Within it, success does not
depend on inventiveness and hard work, but on the entrepreneur’s ability
to gain the sympathy of presidents, ministers and other public
functionaries (which usually means his ability to corrupt them" (Snider,
p86).
Snider also says that the informal sector’s impact on growth is limited,
citing inability to mobilize sizable amounts of capital for large-scale
investment (ibid, p87). This is true for
Moroccans in the informal sector, and until informal sector industries
are privatized, the government will continue to lose money that could be
gained through taxation, and application fees and permits (Salahdine,
p35). The Moroccan government largely ignores those in the informal
sector, actively choosing not to integrate them into the formal economy
(ibid). However, the importance that the informal sector fulfills for
so many employers and workers in Morocco cannot be reduced to mere
negative impacts (implied in statements that say the informal sector
contributes little to the economy) simply because they make their living
absent any formal sanctioning of their operations.
CONCLUSIONS
Insofar as the government-business relations reflect extractive
capacity, I suggest that if mobilization of resources reflects the
interests of most people, then government-business relations will be a
positive force in a country, irrespective of political orientation. In
Israel, the government-business relationship embodied largely by the
Histadrut and its conglomerates in association with the government
advanced the country’s economic and political goals. There were some
casualties of this system, notably the Palestinians and early
capitalists, but by and large the state of Israel and most people in it
benefited from the insular nature of Israeli economics. Israel has
incentive to change its economic and political policies, especially
where the Palestinians are concerned. That Israel has already
experienced the EU's stubbornness on the issue of fair trade and peace
might motivate it to deal more amicably with the Palestinians in the
future. Israel can only benefit from increased opening of its markets
to the Palestinian Authority.
Morocco, on the other hand, has faltered many times in its forty-two
years of independence. King Hassan’s economic policies have been marred
by riots, reneging of democratizing practices, and elite domination of
capital. Possibly the absence of a large
number of voluntary or professional associations has prevented the
government from becoming more transparent, thus facilitating
collaboration as Maxfield and Schneider explain (p24). Rural
associations encouraged by the government have begun to emerge, and they
provide basic services in Morocco to tackle the problem of rural
neglect. These associations build schools, water systems, and other
things necessary to improve the lives of rural Moroccans (Financial
Times, June 1997, p3). The exclusionary nature of King Hassan’s regime
is at least teaching people self-reliance. When we speak of Morocco, we
must be careful not to say that it has embarked on anything more than
democratic trends, trends which are often nullified when the King feels
threatened.
Like Israel, however, Morocco might have more incentive now to maintain
positive trading trends if it is to stay in favor with the EU. One of
the conditions and area of emphasis in the EU Association Agreements is
on the adherence and promotion of democratic political liberalization.
In the Middle East, Morocco is not a major transgressor of human rights,
especially clear when one compares it to Israel, Saudi Arabia, or
Egypt. Each of these countries has its own history of repressing parts
of its population regularly. King Hassan is more or less a benevolent
ruler, and state-sanctioned killings are unusual. If the EU holds
Morocco to its democratic standards on pain of canceling the Association
Agreements or threatening to, then in the future Morocco may increase
its democratic trends.
The patron-client relationships in both countries followed a pattern of
concentrating political and economic power to the exclusion of those who
were not able or willing to participate in the state-sanctioned
clientelism. It is possible that Israel will be forced to concede to
the political demands of the Palestinians and the EU if it is going to
continue to benefit from the multi-faceted aid that the EU provides. In
any case, its economic situation will certainly increasingly be a
consideration in its political policies. Morocco has little to do but
improve and probably will since the EU seems to have taken it on as a
special project in the Mediterrnean. Perhaps the next ruler of Morocco
will be less concerned with political and economic hegemony than with
political and economic stability. What is certain is that both
countries are increasingly dependent on international markets,
especially the EU, and will thus be more sensitive politically to the
voices in the international community. Whatever long-term changes are
in store for both countries should prove exciting for the rest of the
world since both countries have the ability to improve the lives of a
great number people within their respective domains, which is always
good news.
Congressional Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices,
1987
Danet, Brenda. Pulling Strings: Biculturalism in Israeli Society (State
University of New York Press, 1989)
Frenkel, Erwin. The Press and Politics in Israel: The Jerusalem Post
from 1932 to the Present ( Westport, 1994)
Maxfield, Sylvia and Ben Schneider. Busines and the State in Developing
Countries (Cornell, 1997).
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Comparison Paper
"The Nature of Patron-Client Relationships in Morocco and Israel"
for Comparative Political Economy of Globalization, GOV 390L, MES 381,
1998
Dr. Clement Henry and Dr. Catherine Boone