The Domestic Economy
The main sectors of the Costa Rican economy are agriculture (18% in 1996),
industry, tourism, minerals and mining, and energy. The agricultural sector
employed 20 percent of the workforce and accounted for over 42 percent of
total export earnings in 1996. The most important cash crops are coffee,
bananas and sugar, but a considerable amount of beef, especially beef, is
also exported. Production of cash crops has risen in recent years , but
increased exports have tended to be offset by falling prices.
Non-traditional products include tropical fruits, ornamental plants, cut
flowers and the shrimp fishery of the Pacific coast.
The industrial sector as a whole contributed 27 percent to GNP in 1995 and
employed 24 percent of the workforce. The manufacturing sector contributes
18.8 percent to GDP and is concentrates on export-oriented processing of
agricultural products. Manufacturing is diversified and includes textiles,
cement, glass, packing materials, footwear and leather goods, food
processing, metal-mechanics and plastics. Other important industries are
petroleum refining and pulp/paper processing. The government's promotion of
the growth in the manufacturing sector with investment incentives and tax
holidays has largely been curtailed in the name of fiscal discipline. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative has contributed and could be enhanced by the USA
to give parity with NAFTA countries. There are also several industrial
free-zones.
Tourism accounted for 10 percent of GDP in 1996 and there is both domestic
and foreign investment. In 1996 however, tourism revenue declined by 0.9
percent. In the mining sector, the discovery of a bauxite deposit in
Boruca area has prompted large-scale investment in an aluminum smelting
plant. Small quantities of fold, silver, managanese and mercury are also
mined. There is foreign investment in this sector.
In terms of trade, there has been a gradual reduction of the dependence on
a few agricultural exports with the growth of non-traditional exports to
non-Latin American markets. Ability to import is restricted by regular
shortages of foreign exchange, due primarily to the heavy debt burden.
Costa Rica and Mexico signed a free-trade accord in March 1994. Costa Rica
and the other members of the Central American Common Market (CACM)- El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua - along with Belize and the
Dominican Republic, are seeking to negotiate entry as a group into the Free
Trade Area of the Americas customs upon projected for the year 2005.
The main exports are industrial goods (typically 37% of total), bananas
(22%), coffee (13%). Other products include assembled electronics,
chemicals and metal processing, cocoa, sugar, fertilizers and flowers. Main
destinations are the USA(typically 43% of total), Germany (12%), Guatemala
(10%), El Salavador (8%), Panama (7%), Italy (3%), Canada (3%), Netherlands
(2%) and UK (2%). Main imports are industrial raw materials (typically 40%
of total), capital goods (17%), non-durable consumer foods (14%), oil and
oil products (6%), transport equipment (3%), construction materials (3%),
and agricultural raw materials (2%). Main sources are the USA (typically
59% of total), Venezuela (7%), Japan (7%), Mexico (5%), Brazil (5%), and
Guatemala (3%).
In general Costa Rica has trade and economic policies in favor of open
markets, international competition and reduced trade barriers. The country
has a relatively open international trade and investment regime. In 1997,
exports and imports amounted to US $7.37 billion, 79 percent of GDP
(US$9.30 billion). However state monopolies in several areas limit
investment opportunities. In sectors not reserved for the state , there is
widespread recognition in both public and private sectors that increased
foreign investment is essential for increased exports and employment.
Since mid-1982 the government has placed considerable emphasis on improving
the investment climate, including the creation of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade (COMEX), which is coordinating government efforts in the trade and
investment areas. The laws governing private investment are identical for
nationals and foreigners, and foreign companies and persons may legally own
equity in Costa Rican companies, including real estate, manufacturing
plants and equipment, hotels, restaurants, and all kinds of commercial
establishments (except for those activities reserved for the state). The
laws controlling investment by foreigners are fairly transparent.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade has acknowledged the difficulty of
quantifying FDI in Costa Rica due to the absence of an official foreign
investment register, but estimates total FDI in Costa Rica at approximately
US$70 million annually, with the US being the main source of investment. A
recent ECLAC report, based on IMF data, concluded that FDI in Costa Rica
had increased substantially during the past decade. It cited the following
annual levels of FDI:1987 $80 m, 1989 $101 m, 1991 $178 m, and 1993 $280 m.
There are however, no limitation on capital exports by either local or
foreign residents or enterprises. In recent years, there has been very
little bank credit available for financing exports to Costa Rica because
the country defaulted on its bank debt in the early 80s. However, Costa
Rica restructured its debt in 1990 with its successful buy-back arrangement
under the Brady plan. Consequently there has been a progressive opening of
financing for exporters to Costa Rica for the short term (less than one
year) for international banks.
The current exchange rate and price policies are indicative of the
globalization pressures on Costa Rica. The exchange rate policy reflects
practices established in March 1993 by the Central Bank, involving daily
minuscule devaluations of the currency. During 1996 the exchange policy
resulted in a 13.4 percent devaluation of the local currency against the US
dollar (18 percent in 1995) in line with the Central Bank's goal of
maintaining an "neutral" exchange rate. Freely traded dollars from tourism
and capital investment continued to flow into Costa Rica, partly offsetting
the impact of the trade deficit on the current account. The free and
sufficient supply of foreign currency continued to be a significant factor
in increasing imports during 1996 and 1997.
In addition until January 19, 1995 consumer protection laws in Costa Rica
regulated prices and profit margins and prohibited price speculations,
although most price controls and all margin controls had been suspended by
executive decree. On that date, Law NUmber 7472 removed most price and all
profit margin controls, while imposing antirust rules and protecting
consumers against product misrepresentation and price fixing.
In Costa Rica the direct participation of the state in certain economic
activities is still widely accepted as legitimate and beneficial. Though
this sentiment is eroding, as of 1995 it remains difficult to enact serious
reform of some of the principal state institutions because of the broad
popular and political support they enjoy. Reform must be shown to be
absolutely necessary to develop the needed consensus for change. State
participation in the economy is not new. Tobacco and alcohol production
were state monopolies by 1830 (alcohol production continues to be) in order
to finance the government of the young republic. Insurance was made a state
monopoly in 1929, in order to buy out a foreign private monopoly. National
health and social security (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social - CCSS) was
founded in 1940. The largest commercial bank, Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
(BNCR), was created by the state in 1920, with a currency issuance
department later separated to form the Central Bank in 1950, resulting from
the Bretton Woods agreements soon after the WWII. Other institutions were
created as specific solutions to political problems during the depression,
or in order to buy out foreign monopolies: the Atlantic coast railroad;
ICE, the electricity and telephone monopoly; and RECOPE(Refineria
Costarricense de Petroleo), the state petroleum refinery.
In 1994 the business community stepped up calls for opening of sectors
dominated by the state. Efforts to repeal the state monopolies on fuels,
and electricity and telecommunications, by allowing private competition,
may be more likely to succeed than attempts simple to close state
enterprises. The primary reason for the government's desire to retain
control of certain profitable state enterprises is that they yield a
substantial surplus to the consolidated public sector budget. Without the
profits from the state banks, RECOPE and ICE, the government would be
unable to finance itself without asking the Legislative Assembly of major
new taxes.
The Financial Sector and the Structural Power of Capital
By far the two most important government and Central Bank policies
regarding the nature and evolution of the capital markets and financial
institutions have been the 1948 decision to nationalize the banking system
and the decision to support the value of the colon and isolate the Costa
Rican market from external inflationary pressures at the expense of
international reserves and the possible expansion of the country's exports,
while creating conditions favorable to export of capital and savings. Until
very recently the national banking system had been repeatedly reaffirmed,
even by advocates of free market economics.
Among the many regulatory measures enacted over the years affecting the
financial markets, the following have had a lasting impact on the behavior
of the private sector: the use of ceilings instead of market demand to
allocate credit between various sectors of the economy; the arbitrary
pricing of loans and low interest rates paid to depositors; high tariff
protections for finished and semi-finished goods with exemptions for
capital goods and selected materials imports; ease of borrowing from abroad
and of capital repatriation (or even net export of capital); and finally,
emphasis on the CACM and import substitutions policies for the economic
transformation of the private sector, even at the expense of traditional
and nontraditional agricultural exports (which were the original creators
of capital).
The stated intent of these policies in the financial area was to support
industrialization and benefit from Costa Rica's participation in the CACM,
providing credit to the private sector in "developmental" terms
(long-term, lower tan market interest rates, high leverage, reduced
guaranties and requirements, etc.). Preferential treatment for small- and
medium-sized enterprises was contemplated in donor interventions (IDB/Banco
de Costa RIca, USAID/COFISA) in order to broaden ownership and the private
sector concept.
The results of these policies were a weak financial system and capital
market. The evolution of the Costa Rican capital market indicates that the
nationalized banking system failed to mobilize the internal capital market
at a pace commensurate with the dynamic growth of the CACM and the Costa
Rican private sector. Because the government and the Central bank
consistently pursued a policy of supporting increasingly overvalued
exchange rates, the Costa Rican private escort, and even the public sector,
were in fact encouraged to go outside the country to seek financial
resources to expand the productive infrastructure and later to meet current
obligations, rapidly adding to a mounting foreign debt.
International financial institutions, flushed with very large deposits from
oil exporting countries, especially during the mid 70s, facilitated this
process by providing credit to Costa Rican borrowers without much apparent
concern for long-term trends in the country. The results of the mutually
reinforcing effects of a fairly inefficient banking system, an overvalued
colon, the over protected internal market, expansionist fiscal policies, an
obvious loss of efficiency in the public sector, and the easy lending
policies of IFIs have been a staggering foreign debt and technical
bankruptcy of the state banking system and COFISA ( and probably a
significant portion of Costa Rica's private sector.
Structure of the Financial Sector
The financial system in Costa Rica consists of two major groups: a
domestic, regulated sector and an offshore sector, which is outside of the
scope of the Superintendence of Financial Entities (SUGEF). The leading
player in the regulated sector is the banking system, which in turn is
dominated by three state-owned commercial banks. There are also 25 private
banks , 20 nonbank financial firms, 7 savings and loan associations, 34
credit cooperatives, 3 public banks created by special laws . These special
public banks are the Banco Popular y de Desarrollo Comunal funded through a
mandatory 1.5 percent annual revolving deduction from salaries, the Caja de
Ahorros y Prestamos from the association of teachers, and the National
Housing Bank (BANHVI).
The state monopoly in banking was granted in 1948 when several private
banks were nationalized. The largest commercial bank, Banco Nacional de
CostaRica, has always been public. 1994 saw the failure of the oldest state
bank, Banco Anglo Costarricense. The government closed the bank after it
incurred losses attributable to investments Venezuelan debt, non-performing
loans and possible malfeasance. Legislative and judicial investigations
continue in an effort to determine those responsible for the bank's
failure. Over the past twenty-five years , the barriers allowing private
sector banks to operate have been eroding and today there are 23 private
banks.
The three state-owned banks supplied about 80 percent of domestic credit in
1995 (IMF 1998). In 1997, these banks also held 73.3 percent of deposits to
the regulated financial system, indicating a concentrated banking sector.
Private banks, however, are increasing their share of credit by employing
innovative ways of borrowing funds and by operating in a more business-lime
manner, free of political considerations imposed on the state-owned banks.
The private sector has access to a variety of credit instruments. However
the local market is characterized by very short-term loans, high interest
rates and high spreads between deposit and loan rates. The very high
spreads(that help make private financial intermediation the fastest growing
sector of the economy) are made possible by the relativeely higher
inefficiency of public sector commercial banks, the high commercial bank
reserve requirements ad high inflation. Given that the government
dominates the banking and financial system, high portion of funds available
are absorbed directly by the public sector to finance the fiscal deficit.
Long-term capital is very scarce, primarily because eof high inflation and
currency devaluation rates that cannot be controlled by the banks.
As of 1995 the stock exchange remained small with only about twenty
companies listed (1995), due primarily to the size of the economy and the
fact that most enterprises are owned and controlled by a limited number of
persons who wish to retain control. The total market capitalization of the
stock market in 1995 was US$434 million, 1.7 percent of GDP. However, it is
growing quickly and by 1996 this figure had risen to $782 million.. Costa
Rica's debt market has also soared, with trading increasing to $689 million
in 1996, according to Emerging Markets Traders Association, up 90 percent
from the previous year. Still ,trading volume in Brady bonds only came to
$132 million for the first nine months of 1997, down from $532 million at
the end of 1996. Low trading volumes could indicate that investors are
opting to hold on to their positions. One type of debt instrument that has
caught the eye of foreign investors is an entity called Promeric Fond de
Costa RIca. The stock is still not a viable source of new investment but it
is in rapid development. Stock exchange regulations protect the public,
rather than encourage and facilitate portfolio investment.
The efficiency of a financial system in mobilizing and allocating resources
is inversely related to the size of the intermediaton costs. Traditionally,
these have been measured by the spreads between borrowing and lending rates
prevailing in the financial system. Bank spreads have been historically
high in Costa Rica and the spreads of the state banks have been almost
double the size of that of the private banks, which is a clear sign of
market segmentations. After 1992, Costa Rican commercial banks continued
to show high but declining spreads , with spreads in the state banks still
double the size of the spreads in private banks.
Legislation that discriminates against private banks, distortionary taxes
and high reserve requirements have stimulated the growth of innovative
financial instruments , which constitute close substitutes for sight
deposits, and offshore transactions through affiliates of domestic banks,
largely to circumvent these regulations and distortions. There is no
official data on the actual size of the private offshore sector, but
estimates indicate that it may be as large as the regulated one, which
makes it difficult to get an accurate assessment of developments in the
financial sector and to formulate policy recommendations on the basis of
the information prepared by the central bank and SUGEF. Seventeen of the
twentythree private banks have a subsidiary abroad that performs offshore
operations. It is interesting to note that the state commercial banks also
own an offshore affiliate (BICSA).
There are other important participants in the financial sector that do not
fall under the purview of SUGEF, including the state insurance company
(INS), the social security agency (CCSS), self-regulated complementary
pension funds operating through trust accounts and investment funds, and
two stock exchanges. Significant financial intermediation also takes place
in the form of off-balance sheet activities offered by banks by setting up
trust accounts and services as financial agents (fideicomisos and
comisiones de confianza) , and through money market funds offered by
brokerage firms (OPABs and CAVs) and by mutual funds (investment funds).
The securities market is dominated by governmetn paper and short-term
deposit facilities with the central bank, with very little activity in the
form of equity transactions. The dominance of government and central bank
paper results from the financing of fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits
through the issue of government and stabilization bonds in the domestic
financial market. As of August 1997, the stock of government bonds was the
equivalent of about 75 percent of 6-month deposits in the financial system.
The quality of the loan portfolio of the regulated banking system has
improves since 1995, when it was seriously affected by a combination of
high interest rates and the slump in economic activity. Overdue loans have
decreased from 28 percent of the total portfolio in June 1995 to 17 percent
in August 1997. The state-owned commercial banks reduced loans in arrears
from 34 percent to 21 percent, while private banks lowered their loans in
arrears from 14 to 8 percent over this period. Historically the quality of
the loan portfolio of the state-owned commercial banks has been lower than
that of the private banks. As of August 1997, 83 percent of loans overdue
by more than 180 days were led by state banks. These indicators however,
may be biased in favor of the private banks since they can transfer a
non-performing loan to their offshore branches.
Central Banking
The Central Bank in COsta RIca (CBCR) has traditionally been responsible
for the determination and management of monetary, credit and exchange rate
policies. The credit policies are implemented through a complex system of
differentiated interest rates and ceilings (topes) on the amount of credit
that each commercial bank may extend to particular sectors of the economy.
By a 1970 amendment to its charter, CBCR was permitted to make loans for
productive purposes only directly to firms or indirectly via the state
commercial banks. Using foreign lines of credit , it financed equipment
purchases in the industrial sector and administered the $9 million Export
and Tourism Promotion Fund. In 1978, as a result on a loan from the World
Bank, CBCR established a new branch, FODEIN (Industrial Development Fund)to
make loans to the state commercial banks to relined for industrial
subprojects. FODEIN's primary objective was t provide financing to
export-oriented industries and to efficient import substitutions industries
with export potential. Despite the importance of the role of the CBRC as a
provider of credit to the private sector, by far its most important
functions are the determination and management of monetary, credit and
exchange rate policies and the facilitation of government borrowing from
the banking system.
The Politics of Financial Liberalization
Reform Record
The financial system in Costa Rica as described above is closest to
Zysman's "French" model. However, during recent years, authorities have
taken measures to strengthen prudential supervision, reduce discrimination
against private banks, strengthen the financial situation of the state
commercial banks, and improve the regulatory framework of the financial
system. However, Costa Rica's financial system is not well developed and
retains a number of inefficiencies and distortions. The banking sector
continues to be dominated by inefficient state commercial banks protected
by a number of institutional and regulatory controls, which in turn have
allowed private banks to prosper shielded by these inefficiencies. The
distortions in the regulatory framework have led to the development of
off-balance operations and offshore or parallel operations that reduce the
effectiveness of monetary policies and complicate effective bank
supervision. These distortions and the lack of effective competitiveness
have resulted in large interest rate spreads, which have contributed to
financial disintermediation.
The overall structure of the financial system has been strengthened since
mid-1995 through injections of capital, mergers ad acquisitions of private
domestic banks by foreign banks. In addition, the elimination of the
monopoly by state banks on sight deposits widened and lowered the cost of
the resources base of private banks. In part reflecting these developments,
the share of bank loans from the state banks has decreased 40 percent to 36
percent over the past two years. The distribution of credit by economic
activity has changed in the 1990s. Despite little change in the
participation of agriculture and manufacturing in GDP, their share in
credit . has declined steadily since 1990. By contrast credit to the
tourism, trade, and services sectors has expanded significantly. However,
the most marked growth has taken place in credit for consumption and
housing, reflecting in part the expansion in retail finance activities by
the domestic banking system.
Since 1984 the Central Bank, under the leadership of Eduardo Lizano, has
slowly undertaken another financial reform. The ceiling son the amounts of
credit by activity were gradually eliminated and the banks were allowed
greater independence in the setting of their interest rates. The scope of
credit subsidies was specifically defined a dlimited. Automatic access to
Central Bank credit by CODESA and other autonomous institutions was
eliminated, An increasing scope was provided for the activities of the
private commercial banks in competition with the state owned banks. The
Central Bank attempted to regulate monetary expansion with reserve
requirements and open market operations. Despite its success in containing
the losses of the central bank and in changing the behavior of the state
owned banks toward a more market-oriented attitude, this partial
deregulation also resulted in a very large increase in commercial and
personal credit, which was stimulated by tariff reductions and a larger car
import quota, an in reductions in loans to productive sectors, particularly
agriculture which had to be disbursed at a subsidized interest rate. The
banks also soon learned to by pass reserve requirements with creative
innovation so that domestic credit, and as a result, imports, increase more
than had been expected. Lizano's strategy had been to introduce the reforms
gradually and slowly in order to minimize political opposition. Gradualism
however, allowed time for those hurt by the elimination of the subsidies to
combine and exert increasing pressure for the reversal of the policy
reforms. Opposition came, in particular, from the agricultural sector ,
which had recently enjoyed substantial price, credit , insurance and other
subsidies. Strong political economy pressures may lead to a reversal of the
most appropriate liberalization attempts under Lizano.
State - Business Relations
The recent developments in relations to the country's internal debt
illustrates the dynamic of the relationship between the private sector and
the state within the recent context of economic and financial liberalizing
reforms. The internal debt issue has been viewed with considerable alarm
among a conservative group of influential Costa Ricans who formed a civic
group calling itself Costa Rica First. The group launched a public campaign
to sell off state assets to pay off the debt and revive the economy. This
has been the first serious call for privatization. However, Figueres dealt
hesitantly with the unpopular idea of deeper privatization. His handpicked
managers of the state telecommunications and power generating monopoly, the
Costa Rican Electricity Insitute (ICE), sent a proposal to Congress in
August 1996 to open the two sectors up to private competition by
transforming the ICE into a publicly-held corporation that would compete on
an equal basis with private companies. ICE public employee unions
vigorously opposed the proposal arguing that the true motive is to
dismantle the state company, offering as evidence the fact that Central
government required the company to maintain a hefty surplus to boost
government finances, while services suffer from a lack of investment. The
administration did not wait for congress to act to affect a limited opening
of the sector when Figueres legalized by presidential decree limited
private participation in telecommunications projects. In Ma 1997 , a
congressional commission rejected the government's proposed reform,
replacing it with a far less reaching compromise drafted by the two major
parties. This formalized the presidential decree and provides for the sale
of smaller electrical generating plants to raise revenues for additional
infrastructure (Matthews 1998).
In Costa Rica representation of interests is relatively balanced In
addition to numerous vocal business and agricultural association, including
well-organized peak associations, the fifth of the labor force in the
public sector was organizes into powerful though multiple and competing
unions. Nevertheless, the business community is most effective in pressing
its views and protecting its interests. Although the Carazo government had
been elected with broad support from business and agricultural interests,
the government rapidly lost the confidence of the private sector. The only
serious attempt of the badly divided government to cope with the crisis-the
package painfully negotiated with the IMF in late 1980 and early 1981-was
effectively scuttled in response to protests from a massive meeting
sponsored by the chambers of commerce and industry. Costa Rica's
state-business relations is characterized by "oligarchic" decision making
and by overlapping, extensive informal communications between business and
political elite. But interest groups are generally less centralized. Labor
federations are fragmented rather than centralized. Costa Rica has peak
business associations, but these are less inclusive and have less influence
over their own members than in the European democracies. Costa Rica boasts
a strong ideology of social partnership but until very recently that
ideology was not harnessed to a sense of economic threat and vulnerability.
Fore example, under the Oduber administration (1974-78), CODESA, the public
investment corporation, became an instrument for the state's intervention
in productive activities in direct competition with the private sector.
CODESA's nonrestricted access to Central Bank credit became a major
component of the deterioration of public sector finances. Because CODESA
was not restricted by the political controls typical of government agencies
or by the profit discipline of private firms, the agency became a factory
of quasi-rents. The larger the project, irrespective of profitability, the
greater its political visibility and the larger the rents created.
Nevertheless, competition with the private sector created tensions in the
symbiotic relationship that had developed between the state and the
industrialists. By the end of the Oduber administration, an important group
of manufacturing leaders left Oduber's political party and supported the
election of Carazo (1978-1982), who would preside over the eruption of the
economic crisis of the 1980s.
The latest figures available from the Labor Ministry put unionization at
about 15 percent of the total Costa Rican workforce. This percentage has
stayed relatively constant for years. According to best current estimates,
there are some 420 unions containing about 180,000 workers. A large
majority of union members are found in the public sector. While public
sector strikes remain technically illegal (the labor code forbids them),
criminal penalties have been repealed. Growing activity among public
sector unions in 1994 came largely in response to government austerity
plans designed to confront the country's fiscal crisis which include
possible large scale job layoffs and tax increases. Several one-day
walk-outs and marches were called but received little support and there was
no corresponding responses in the private sector. Strikes hardly ever take
place in the private sector , where workers attempting to form or join
unions or to organize walkouts can easily lose their jobs. Estimates are
that 2 - 3 percent of the private workforce is unionized and their
relative proportion is probably declining.
Foreign Debt management
Costa Rica's foreign debt totaled US$2.886 billion at the end of 1996 (31.6
percent of GDP), a decrease of $600 million from end of 1995. However, to
take advantage of lower interest rates the GOCR is attempting to convert
dome of its more costly local currency denominated internal debt to dollar
denominated foreign debt. Consequently, foreign official debt will increase
by about $400 million by December 1997, amounting to approximately $3.26
billion (35.9 percent of GDP). Costa Rica will continue to experience
pressure on its balance of payments, especially its trade account.
Continued foreign investment and tourism income would be needed to avoid
foreign exchange shortages. External debt as a percentage of GDP has fallen
from around 50% in 1992 to around 35% in 1995. At the end of 1997 Costa
Rica's net public external debt is around 44% of exports, while its debt
servicing costs come to manageable 19% of exports. Costa Rica undertook
adjustment programs with the IMF and the WB during the past decade, as well
as five Paris Club arrangements and a 1989 Brady debt buy-back scheme with
the U.S., which reduced Costa Rica official debt by $1.1 billion.
Multilateral institutions have focused on the immediate problem of internal
debt in addition to the normal dialogue on other issues. The government
spends almost a third of its budget in paying interest on outstanding
bonds, more than the amount spent on salaries to public employees.
Sources
Latin American Debt and Adjustment. Ed. Philip L. Brock, Michael B.
Connolly and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989.
Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment . Ed. Joan
M. Nelson. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
"EIU Country Report: Costa Rica," The Economist, 4th Quarter, 1997.
IMF. "Costa Rica: Recent Economic Developments," January 1998. .
Matthews, Janet. "Costa Rica." Americas Review World of Information March
1998.
Pratt, Robert. " Costa Rica Private Sector Study," USAID. 1983..
Reforma Financiera en Costa Rica: Perspectivas y Propuestas. Ed. Claudio
Gonzalez-Vega. Ohio State University, 1993.
Saint-Cyr, Philippe and Paul Kilby. "Preparing for Growth ." LatinFinance
December 1997. 77.
U.S. State Department. 1997 Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade
Practices. January 1998..
US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Business Affairs.
"Costa Rica Country Commercial Guide," Washington, DC., 1995..
World Development Indicators., Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997.
Global Development Finance, Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997.