Thailand's
Political Economy
Government 390L
The Political Economy of Globalization with Dr. Boone and Dr. Henry
5 October 1998
Christopher Burk
Thailand managed to escape Western colonialism but not the recent Asian
economic collapse. In between the era of European imperialism and the
current difficulties, the country has been a prime example of the
modernization theory in that its economic growth lead to and sustained an
increasingly democratic political system. This essay provides a brief
outline of Thailand's political economy from the colonial era to the intial
phase of the recent economic downturn. Particular attention is paid to the
role and structure of the financial sector. The Basics of Thailand's
Political Economy
The historic roots of Thailand's current political economy are unique in
Southeast Asia largely because the kingdom successfully avoided direct
colonial rule by a European power. While Malaysia, Burma, and Indochina were
all succumbing to imperial ambitions, Siam retained its state sovereignty,
its publicly respected monarchy, its centralized administration, and a
Buddhist-based sakdina hierarchical social structure. Siam slowly integrated
aspects of Western capitalism and introduced international trade into an
economy largely based on subsidence agriculture, especially rice production.
The country never experienced either the democratizing effects of the
transfer of colonial institutions or the political mobilization associated
with a popular independence movement. Calls from Western-influenced Siamese
elites and scholars for constitutional checks on the monarchy went ignored
by the Siamese Court and the absolute rule of the Chakri dynasty continued.
Capitalism and Western influence were, however, unavoidable for a Southeast
Asian country in the nineteenth century. Siam began to open itself up to
international trade in 1855 when it signed the Bowring treaty with the
British. Similar treaties with the other European powers followed shortly
thereafter. Annual rice exports to its treaty partners and the Southeast
Asian region increased sharply for the next fifty years. The Siamese court
also came to employ a permanent British financial advisor in order to ensure
the country's financial stability and the basic foundation of the Siamese
capitalist economy took an Anglo-American form. However, the country's
economy remained almost entirely rooted in agriculture.
The huge declines in commodity prices and international trade that came
with the Great Depression jolted the political system. In 1932, a group of
nationalist military officiers conducted a coup d'etat and forced the
monarchy to accept a constitution. A series of military regimes ruled the
country during the 1930s and World War II. In the new administrations, the
military and the bureaucracy held de facto authority and immediately
implemented a strict plan to industrialize and diversify the economy under
state direction. The first indigenous commercial bank, Siam Commercial Bank,
was opened later in 1932. The new governments also revised the
international treaties to increase the state's ability establish its own
economic policie. They also and created a central bank, the Bank of
Thailand, in 1942 following a plan designed by Englishman Sir Bernard Hunter
and explicitly modeled it on the Bank of England. Within six months, the
new institution began to enact monetary policies designed to contain the
inflation created by the war and the Japanese dominance of the Thai economy.
For all their efforts, the new military governments failed to achieve their
economic goals during their times in power but did create the foundations
for a diverse manufacturing base and entrenched the goals of national
development and economic diversification.
The Rise of the Thai miracle
The Thai post-war political economy firmly established the eventual bases
of late twentith century economic and political change. Despite continued
political turmoil at the top of teh political hierarchy, the Thai government
and bureaucracy has followed a rather consistent conservative economic
policy since the end of World War II. Thailand managed to integrate an
Anglo-American form of capitalism while retaining a strong indirect role for
government bureaucracies (including the commercially influential military
bureaucracy) and family-based economic associations. The result were decades
spectacularly high rates of economic growth and diversification away from
agriculture during post-war economic recovery.
In the decades following the war, military factions vied for power and
alternated between roughly democratic methods, semi-democratic
constitutionalism, and harsh authoritarian rule. Thailand retained the
conservative macro-economic policies attending British advisement and
retained excellent trade balances and a stable value for the baht. Indeed,
the 1928 Currency Act (drafted by Englishman Sir Edward Cook) dictated that
baht notes could not be issued for equivalent values in gold and that held
respected international currencies (initially pounds sterling then shifting
more to U.S. dollars) would be held in reserve. The governments retained
this policy and the ratio of foreign liquid assets to total baht issued
stayed above 1:1 from 1928 to 1988 (except during the brief disruption
caused by the Japanese "alliance"). The Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of
Finance also came to adopt to a hard budget constraint. A World Bank
advisory mission in the late 1950s reenforced the government's commitment to
a rather liberal capitalist economy.
This immediate post-war period also saw the rise of another lasting feature
of Thailand's political economy: corruption. High inflation in the years
during and immediately after the war significantly eroded the real wages of
government bureaucrats. Large portions of sectoral civil servants of all
ranks supplemented their incomes with kick-backs, bribes, and insider deals.
This system of conduct evolved into highly regular patron-client
relationships. The sectoral bureaucracy was increasingly politicized and
factionalized and became so influenced by these dealings that the process
became competitive. However, a small group of technocrats managed to secure
key macro- economic policy posts for themselves and insulate themselves from
the surrounding clientelism. The increased influence of the advice of the
these technocrats improved administrative functions in the bureaucracies and
as a result sustained growth in the private sector was realized. These
pro-industry, pro-export reforms were mixed into the economy slowly in the
1950s but came to be central to the economy in the 1960s and afterward. At
the same time, the government continued to pursue import- subsistution
policies and protect a few domestic industries with tariffs and limitations
on foreign ownership.
The results of these economic policies and institutions were spectacular
economic growth and diversification. Immediately after the war (1946-1948)
there was a large expansion in broad range major industrial products (e.g.,
beer, cement, and soap) as the domestic economy recovered. When
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) policies came to the fore, a flood
of foreign direct investment (FDI) inudated the country and growth
increased. In the period of 1960-1962, 337 million baht entered the economy.
That figure rose to 2,756 million baht in 1969-1971 and 20,697 by 1984-
1986. Since agriculture and banking largely remained in Thai hands, the
result was a large portion of the Thai manufacturing sector becoming owned
by foreign interests. For example, 55% of the representative textile sector
was not Thai owned. The economy emerged from its dependence on agriculture
as the boom in manufacturing occurred. Hewison notes that "87 percent of
economically active population aged over ten years remained tied to
agriculture and animal husbandry" in 1937. Agriculture still accounted for
half of gross national product in 1951 (GNP). Despite the introduction of
new high-yield rice varieties and the rest of the so-called Green
Revolution, agriculture had dropped to under 40% of GNP by 1960, 30% by
1970, 23% by 1980, and 16% by 1990. Industry, in turn, rose: 20% of GNP in
1960, 26% in 1970, 32% in 1980, and 38% in 1990. Services, especially
tourism, also became increasing important to the Thai economy as the number
of tourists rising from 100,000 annually in the early 1960s to over 2
million in the early 1980s and annual revenue increased from 250 million
baht a year to over 75,000 million baht.
The financial sector, however, began to reveal fundamental weakness in the
Thai economy. Prior to the economic crisis, there were sixteen commercial
banks of which only one (Krung Thai Bank) was a state enterprise while three
others (Siam Commercial Bank, and Thai Military Bank) had significant
government control. Private commercial banks consistently controlled about
3/4 of all household savings mobilized by household savings. State banks, on
the other hand, controlled only 11% by the end of the 1970s. Market shares
in deposits and credits of the four largest commercial banks (Bangkok Bank,
Siam Commercial Bank, the Thai Farmers Banks, and the Krung Thai Bank)
totaled 70% in 1990. Clearly, the commercial banking system is rather
de-centralized and highly concentrated. Commercial banks had undergone
significant expansion in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s as total assets
increased twelvefold in just the period from 1972 to 1986. Beyond the
commercial banks, there were also 91 other financial institutions operating
at the end of 1996. The financial sector remained owned and controlled
largely by Thais. In fact, the ownership of the commercial banking industry
(again, prior to the economic crisis) is dominated by sixteen Sino-Thai
families. The government has attempted to limit the number of shares allowed
to be owned by a single person but exceptions and extensions to the
compliance with this rule are regularly given. All sixteen banks loosely
cartelized themselves under the Thai Banking Association and this
contributed to oligopolistic capabilities of the leading four banks.
After decades of growth, a sizable middle-class had arisen in Thailand by
the end of the 1980s. Concentrated primarily in Bangkok and influenced by
Western political ideas, this new business class soon began to exert its
political influence. Military rule briefly came to an end when soldiers
fired on and killed student protestors in October 1974. However, the
civilian political leaders were unable to control their internal divisions
and the military once again seized power in October 1976. For over five
years various military factions sought to establish a firm hold on the
political leadership but, in the end, a new, more stable semi-democratic
political system developed in the 1980s. Despite the considerable influence
of both the military and money politics, the elections of 1983, 1986, and
1988 were increasingly free and fair. The arrangement seemed to provide the
political stability and influence many business leaders sought. Then, in
1992, the March election produced a crisis over the political role of the
military. This time, student demonstrators were joined by thousands of
Bangkok's middle class (with their cellular phone and imported luxury cars).
When soldiers again fired upon and killed hundreds of people, national
sentiment turned again the instability and the King intervened to resolve
the crisis. New election were held in September and Democratic Party leader
Chuna Leekpai became the first non-military PM in almost two decades.
Decades of economic growth had produced a sizable middle class that, for the
moment, seemed to support a more democratic political system. In July 1995,
another relatively free and fair if highly corrupt election brought Banham
Silpa-archa to the Prime Ministership. Administration of the country
quickly became a secondary priority as scandal after scandal gripped the
country's political life (sound familiar?). The coalition supporting Banham
collapsed in September 1996.
The Economic Crisis
The first augurs of a coming crisis arose in October 1996 when the
political instability of the fall of the Banham government combined with
poor performance in the country's export growth to weaken Thailand's
economy. The annual GDP growth rate for FY1996 fell to 7%--the lowest rate
of growth in ten years. Thai stocks and bank profits dropped sharply
through 1996 and the value of the baht was threatened by speculative
attacks. The November 1996 election installed retired General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh as PM but the process was heavily corrupt and violent, even by
Thai standards. The banks and financial companies continued to get hammered
in 1997 as property loans in over-built Bangkok began to go bad--some
estimated that 10% of all loans had "turned sour." The administration, the
Bank of Thailand, the Ministry of Finance, and the banks themselves were
unable to agree on an acceptable solution and the baht soon came under
increasingly strong attack. The Bank of Thailand expended over $10 billion
by May 1997--$4 billion in that month alone--in an attempt to support the
value of the baht. The Bank was acting primarily to protect the financial
sector because many financial institutions had taken huge loans in dollars
and any devaluation would cripple their ability to repay those loans. In
late June, the government suspended the operations of sixteen (of 91)
financial institutions.
Finally, the Bank was unable to continue its fight for the baht and it
attempted to allow a managed float on July 2, 1997. The baht failed to float
and, instead, immediately sank 17% against the dollar. The economy and the
baht continued to decline over the summer and into the fall. The political
fallout came quickly. Pressure grew for the resignation of PM Chavalit as
expected growth rates fell and the government suspended business for
forty-two more financial institutions (ironically, the larger commercial
banks actually became more stable as the crisis deepened because of a flight
to quality and security by depositors). On October 14, 1997, the Finance
Minister, Thanong Bidaya announced a plan, backed by the IMF and the World
Bank, to resolve the financial crisis. However, by that time, the financial
sickness that had begun in Thailand had spread across East Asia and the
entire region was heading for even greater economic and political turmoil.
In November, PM Chavalit resinged under pressure and Chuna became PM again.
As 1998 progressed, Thailand and the rest of the region continued to be
mired in a continued economic downturn and the resulting political
instability.
Key Dates in Siamese/Thai History
Regional Colonialism (-1932)
1688 Political crisis over succession to the throne results in the
expulsion of all French
traders from Siam and the beginning of a long period of limited contact with
European traders.
1767 Burmese forces destroy the capital of Ayutthaya.
1782 Bangkok becomes new capital of Siam and the Chakri dynasty founded.
1855 King Mongkut (Rama IV) signs Bowring Treaty with Britain, allowing
international trade in the kingdom. Land taxes and foreign trade duties
are frozen
at very low levels. Begins trend of international trade treaties with European
colonial powers.
1868-1910 Reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V). He tours Europe and attempts to
implement political and economic reforms. During his tenure, the civil
service is
reformed and financial advisors from the Bank of England are enlisted to guide
Siamese economic policy. Siam manages to avoid direct control by a European
colonial power.
1874 Beginning of the legal reforms to end slavery/servitude.
1887 A group of princes and scholars submitted a petition for
constitutional monarchy
to the King but it is not implemented.
1888 A branch of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation opens in
Bangkok, the first bank in the country.
1902 The government employs J. Homan van der Heide, a Dutch irrigation
engineer, to
draft plans for a major irrigation system in the Central Plains. However, no
irrigation project of any significant size in actually undertaken by the
government
until after World War II.
1904 Prince Mahisra Raj Haruetai, who is also minister of finance,
establishes the Book
Club Association, the first banking office owned by a Siamese national.
1905 Slavery/servitude completely ended.
1905-08 Government-financed railway system constructed for largely
political, not
economic, reasons. The rail lines were primarily intended to improve central
government control over the entire country and ensure rapid troop
deployment in a
crisis.
1910-25 Reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI).
1914 Ministry of Finance employs Sir Bernard Hunter, a British national, to
prepare a
plan for upgrading the Book Club Association to a full central bank. A
plan is
produced by not implemented.
1925-32 Reign of King Prajadhipok (Rama VII).
1928 Currency Act of 1928 enacted. It is drafted by Sir Edward Cook,
current British
financial advisor to Siam. The Act requires that baht notes cannot be issued
without an equivalent value of gold and pounds sterling was held in the
country's
currency reserves.
1929 World-wide depression hits South-East Asia and Siam. Real wages, economic
output, international trade, and government revenue fall while
unemployment rises.
Domestic Political Change and International Turmoil (1932-1974)
32 Coup d'etat lead by military officers (the group calls itself the
People's Party) ends
the absolute rule of the Chakri dynasty and King Prajadhipok (Rama VII).
Military
leaders proclaim install a new Constitution and the country becomes a
constitutional monarchy. De facto power lies with (Westernized) government
bureaucrats and the military, the strongest group of bureaucrats. A rapid
succession of cabinets follows (eight in the next six years). Drive for
industrialization begins and state-run business begin to dominate the
manufacturing
of paper, textiles, spirits, and cigarettes, and rice milling in an effort
to reduce the
dominance of foreign (esp. Chinese) interests (although the industrial
sector of the
economy remained very small relative to agriculture)..
32 New government transforms the Book Club Association into the Siam Commercial
Bank, the country's first complete commercial bank.
38-44 Authoritarian military leaders (first Pibul then Sarit and Thanom)
rule strongly.
39 Military government changes the country's name from Siam to Thailand and
establishes the National Banking Bureau, which performs some of the
functions of
a central bank.
41-45 Japanese forces conquer most of Southeast Asia. Thailand remains
independent
but is compelled to align itself political and economically with Japan.
International trade with countries and territories not under Japanese
control is prohibited and
the baht is officially tied to the yen (it had been fixed to the gold
standard). Rapid
inflation occurs.
42 Bank of Thailand founded along British lines. Officially opens on
December 10.
Prince Wiwat is its first governor.
43-46 The Bank of Thailand uses monetary policy in a large effort to
contain war-time
inflation and its after-effects.
46 De facto political parties emerge as serious players but exist without any
controlling legal authority.
46-63 A series of conservative military governments rule the country under
a series of
five constitutions. Anti-colonial and anti-communist conflicts in neighboring
countries flares up. The country increasingly becomes tied to the United
States and
other western powers politically and economically.
47 Mysterious death of King Ananda (Rama VIII) leads to a military coup. King
Bhumipol Adulyadej (Rama IX) begins his reign. New military faction begins its
rule.
51 Same group consolidates its power with an internal purge and begins to
become
deeply involved in large parts of the country's political and economic life.
55 Political parties recognized as legal entities.
Sept. 57 Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat ousts his political rivals and
temporary suspends the
current constitution and dissolves the Parliament.
Dec. 57 General election held. No single party gains a majority in Parliament.
Oct. 58 New government proves unable to rule effectively. Sarit stages
another coup. He
abrogates the constitution, dissolves the Parliament, bans political
parties, arrests
some resisting politicians and dissents, declares martial law, and imposed
press
censorship. This marks the effective end of the 1932 system.
58-63 Sarit rules the country with an iron fist but begins a huge
government-directed
development scheme. He also closely aligns the country with the West and its
anti-communist war to the east.
57-59 World Bank mission investigates and advises the government. In
response, the
role of the public sector in the economy is shifted from direct production to
infrastructure and the Board of Investors is created to assist private
investors.
63-71 Following the death of Sarit, a series of constitutions, parliaments,
and military
rulers fail to return political instability to the country.
Nov. 71 Coup by a military faction. Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, son of the
prime minister
and son-in-law of the deputy prime minister, soon emerges as a strongman.
This
unprecedented pseudo-dynastic succession provokes public discontent.
Oct. 73 Student movement protest the Narong regime and call for a new
constitution.
Political violence rocks Bangkok. The King orders Thanon, Praphet, and Narong
to leave the country. The military's dominance of the political scene is
discredited.
A Brief Attempt at Democracy (1974-1976)
74 A new, more democratic constitution is written and implemented.
Political parties
campaign in a more open political environment.
74-76 The country's political life becomes highly active and increasingly
polarized as the
new system attempts to function in the new environment. New factions and
coalitions form and disband. Bankers and business hold many high government
posts for the first time. Communists forces come to power in South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Jan. 75 General election held. The single largest vote getter (the Democrat
Party) gains
only 18% of the vote and 27% of the seats in Parliament. Twenty-two
parties gain
seats in the new legislature. Coalition government composed of fourteen
parties is formed. Political polarization and instability continue.
Apr. 76 A general election, marred by violence, is held after Parliament is
dissolved by the
Prime Minister Kukrit. Four parties emerge as clearly significant and
conservative
parties make sizable gains.
Return of Military Rule and Emergence of a Stable Semi-Democracy (1976-1992)
Oct. 76 Return of Field Marshall Thanom from exile to Bangkok results in a
political crisis
and violence. The government is unable to re-assert control. Military coup
displaces the Parliament. The 1974 constitution, parliament, and all
political
parties are abolished; martial law proclaimed. New constitution
proclaimed. Ultra-
right and harshly anti-communist military government lead by Thanin Kraivichen
takes over.
76-77 Political polarization stimulated by the heavy-handed rule of the new
Thanin
government. Support for and membership in the Communist Party of Thailand
(CPT) insugency grows. Thanin authorizes Ministry of Finance to borrow
directly
from abroad in a large-scale.
Oct. 77 Young Turks faction within the military displaces Thanin with
another coup. It
deals more tolerantly with leftists and student activists.
Dec. 77 New government issues a new, more liberal but not fully democratic
constitution.
Moderate and internationally-backed (by both the U.S. and the P.R.C.) Army
General Kriengsak Chamanand offered premiership. He accepts.
77-80 Young Turks faction consolidate their position in the military and
politics in
general.
Apr. 79 General election held under the new constitution. No single party
obtains a
majority. Kriengsak invited to remain as PM.
80 Young Turks withdraw their support for Prime Minister Kriengsak and he
resigns.
General Prem Tinsulanond becomes new PM.
Apr. 81 Young Turks fail in their attempt to seized outright power, largely
as a result of
the King's continued support of PM Prem and refusal to capitulate to the Young
Turks. Thirty-eight high-ranking Young Turks are discharged and the army is
left internally divided.
83 General election held. No party gains more 29% of the seats in the
lower house.
Sept. 85 Coup attempt launched by an army officer and his military
supporters. It fails.
May 86 PM Prem dissolves Parliament.
July 86 General election is held. Again, no single party gains more than
29% of the seats
in the lower house. General Prem, largely because of the military's key
role and its
support for him, is asked to remain head of the government.
Apr-Aug. 88 PM Prem dissolves Parliament. Another inconclusive general
election. Prem
declines reappointment as PM. Party politician and long-retired military
officer
Chatichai Choonhavan becomes new PM in a six-party coalition government.
Aug. 88-91 Chatichai administration rules. Economy experiences huge
economic growth.
Armed forces are left to pursue their own corporate interests but are
angered by
the installation of civilian in key economic posts that had long been military
enclaves. Allegations of rising government corruption are made.
Feb. 91 Lead by Army commander-in-chief General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the
military
intervenes to depose Chatichai but it does not rule directly. Businessman and
former ambassador Anand Punyarachun installed as new PM.
Nov. 91 Political demonstrations regarding a new draft constitution and the
military's role
in politics in Bangkok. King appeals for restraint and patience until the next
election. In response to the critics, General Suchinda announces that he
will not
seek the premiership following the next election.
Mar. 22, 92 General election held. No single party gains more than 30% of
the seats in the
lower house. Coalition of the five largest (and military-backed) parties
invite
General Suchinda to PM.
Mar.-May 92 A broad pro-democracy protest movement (including students but
also many
middle-class and profession people) stage protests. Apparently acting
under the
orders of Suchinda himself, soldiers massacre hundreds of demonstrators. The
King himself intervenes to prevent further strife. He calls for the end of the
demonstrations and the general political conflict. Suchinda resigns in
disgrace and
the King re-appoints Anand as PM and indicates that new elections will be held
soon.
Sept. 92 General election held. No single party secures over 23% of the
seats. Four-party
coalition government formed with Democrat Party as the leading member.
Democrat Party leader Chuan Leekpai becomes first person with no military
background to become PM since the mid-1970s.
Financial Crisis
Jan-May 97 Bank of Thailand spends $10 billion in an attempt to support the
value of the baht.
June 97 Government suspends the operations of 16 financial institutions.
July 2, 97 Baht allowed to "float." Immediately drops by 17% against the dollar.
Oct. 15, 97 IMF deal announced. Austerity measures imposed
Nov. 97 PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh resigns from office. Replaced by Chuan
Leepai.
Sources: Brown (1997); The Economist; Hewison (1989); Samudavanija (1995);
Warr and Nidhiprabha (1995).
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