2. Bertrand, J. "Growth and Democracy in SE Asia: Review Article,"
Comparative Politics, 30, 3 (April 1998).
Chris Burk and Nicole Mellow. September 26, 1998.
Przeworski and Limongi (PL) (1997) test a well-established hypothesis that
economic development leads inexorably to democracy. While the majority of
the authors we've read, broadly speaking, attempt to explain how different
economic and political structures affect development and states' capacities
to direct that development, PL raise the question of why we care about
development. The potential for improved standards of living is inherent in
economic modernization and greater national income, yet economic
performance, per se, does not dictate how resources are allocated. With
this week's readings generally, and with this piece specifically, the
relationship between development and political structure is brought to the
fore.
The authors test two specific models. First, economic development
increases the likelihood of democratic transition (the modernization
model). Second, democracy develops exogenously, and development increases
the probability that it will sustain. Using statistical analyses to
examine 224 democratic and authoritarian regimes (135 countries) in the
post-World War II era, PL conclude that development does not necessarily
eradicate authoritarianism (model 1), but that greater wealth does aid the
survival of existing democracies (model 2). The authors use these findings
to contradict conventional notions which posit authoritarianism as the
prerequisite condition for development which is in turn prerequisite for
democracy. Rather than deterministic conditions, they argue that democracy
results from actors and actions.
The PL article is useful in that it challenges a received orthodoxy
regarding modernization and it demonstrates the variation of political
activity associated with economic factors. However, a couple of general
points are worth mentioning. First, depicting regimes as authoritarian or
democratic may suggest a false dichotomy, particularly for countries newly
independent and/or buffeted by international pressures (i.e. the tying of
aid or arms to political conditions). Individual case studies may help to
elucidate more precisely some of the causal mechanisms at work. Second,
while the authors' goal was to test relationships between development and
regime type (as opposed to mapping all of the necessary conditions for
democracy or its sturdiness), it does not appear that they controlled for
other variables which, if relevant and missing, may bias interpretations.
As an example, a decline in religiosity has been correlated with increasing
per capita GNP, and it could be argued that this is a factor in explaining
the survival of democracies.
Illustrating these points, Jacques Bertrand (1998) provides a helpful
counterpiece to the PL article. Through a study of the comparative
literature on Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, Bertrand examines the
causal relationships between regime type and economic growth. By unpacking
the particular contexts of each country, he is able to identify more
precisely the intervening variables influencing the effect of regime type
on economic growth and, conversely, those influencing the effect of growth
on democratization. These Southeast Asian cases cast doubt on the standard
macro-level relational propositions between regime type and economic
growth. Rather, Bertrand emphasizes such factors as elite motivations,
societally-centered pressures such as ethnic divisions or the political
orientations of the middle class, and bureaucratic autonomy.
The importance of Bertrand's contributions to this seminar's themes are
twofold. First, by introducing ethnicity, Bertrand highlights the role
that non-business societal variables may play in the relationship between
politics and economics. Factors outside the state and business have been
largely missing or latent in our prior readings. His analysis opens the
door to deeper consideration of how societal variables, ranging from
ethnicity to class relations to labor activity, may mediate the effects of
globalization and/or constrain state autonomy. Second, Bertrand reinforces
the central role of bureaucratic autonomy (technocrats) in promoting
economic growth despite political transition or regime type. This is
consistent with authors in previous weeks.
One shortcoming common to both the PL article and the Bertrand article is
that considerations of the varieties of capitalism are largely absent. For
PL, economic growth has political implications but they fail to interrogate
fully the political economy by which growth is generated and which may have
political implications of its own. Similarly, Bertrand examines growth
vis-à-vis regime type but does not explain how this relationship is
impacted by the source of the capital allocation decisions. Do all three
countries have a similar style of capitalism? How might this affect his
analysis?