BIOPHILIA AND EMOTIVE ETHICS

DERRIDA, ALICE, AND ANIMALS

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In view of recent research can we continue to argue for a superiority over other animals that justifies dominating and exploiting them? This question, now “in the center of ethical discussion,” invites us to “radically reconsider the terms of ethical inquiry” (Rolston 1993, 382). Those terms now include the feelings biophilia and biophobia as well as compassion, sympathy, and empathy. Are we prepared to value not only reason but also emotions that connect us to other animals? If we are to save ourselves and our planet, we need a more interdisciplinary model of ethics that includes “emotive” as well as analytic ethics. Derrida’s “L’Animal que donc je suis (ti suivre)” (1997) combines them, citing literature to demonstrate the role of feelings in situation-specific ethics. Though he does not use E.O Wilson’s terminology, Derrida suggests that what blocks biophilia is an apparently instinctive, superstitious fear of animals that has expanded into what we now call biophobia. Ultimately, Derrida focuses on a new experience of compassion that can bring about the political change needed to save our planet.

Exclusively analytical environmental ethics is being challenged by posthumanist, Continental, and feminist philosophy (Aaltola 2010; Plumwood 2002, Grosz 1993, Haraway 2007), but the biggest possible change may be a move toward a truly interdisciplinary model like that of animal studies. There the biological sciences are setting the pace. As they test
more and more of the traditional dividing lines between man and animal, some scientists are discovering an arational need to “live with” the animal, that is, the value of personal, experiential, emotional, and phenomenological as well as a scientific approaches.

**EMOTIVE ETHICS**

The ideal for environmental and animal ethics, if not all ethics, may well be an emotion, the feeling that we are deeply, instinctively connected to all living beings, now called biophilia. If “ethics is based in a love for all forms of life,” as the founder of sociobiology put it (Wilson 1984, 145), the ultimate question becomes: will we “love life enough to save it?” (Rolston 1993, 382; cf. Orr 1993, 430–31). Will we replace “our human reproductive instincts” with “biophilia and concern for environmental integrity” (Rolston 1993, 412)? To do that we will have to overcome our biophobia, which originated in our apparently instinctive, “superstitious fear of animals” (Oxford English Dictionary 1992) and has now expanded into an “active scorn for whatever is not man-made, managed, or air-conditioned” (Orr 1993, 416) that threatens ecosystemic and land ethics as well as animal ethics. The “emotional spectra” of this biophilia-biophobia conflict ranges “from attraction to aversion, from awe to indifference, from peacefulness to fear-driven anxiety” (Wilson 1993, 31).

Is analytic ethics, as we know it, prepared to discuss such feelings? The answer, in current Anglo-American moral philosophy, is usually “No.” Even Singer and Regan convey their “masculinst contempt” for emotions such as “love and friendship that are appropriate and necessary to animal ethics” (Slicer 2007, 113–14; cf. McCance 2013, 94). Yet if we are to save ourselves and our planet, we need a more interdisciplinary model that includes “emotive” as well as analytic ethics, one more aligned with eighteenth-century British moral philosophers of the sympathetic imagination such as David Hume (Treatise on Human Nature 1738) and Adam Smith (Theory of Moral Sentiments 1789), with Darwin’s theory of the emotional origin of ethics (The Descent of Man 1871), and also with modern philosophers of “quasicognitive,” “enlightened” sympathy such as John Fisher 1987 who argued that “almost any moral theory will have to find some place for our moral feelings, connected as they are to our moral intuitions” (204, 206, 198n2). More important than any theory perhaps, as Ulrich has observed, are “the public’s emotion-laden attitudes toward different natural environments [that] play a role in motivating political
and other support”—hence we must understand and promulgate “positive emotion-saturated attitudes with respect to the environment” (1993, 117–18; cf. Heerwagen and Orians 1993, 164).

Fortunately, because of the growing academic research on feelings and the increasing recognition that “emotional intelligence” is essential to many fields, it is now more intellectually acceptable to admit the need for thought and emotion to be in harmony (Damasio 1996; Gruen 1991, 351). This research, summarized by Goleman (1995), subsumes Howard Gardner’s earlier theory of multiple intelligences, including the interpersonal, intrapsychic, spatial, kinesthetic, and musical. In 2002 Zembylas cited new research on emotion “in virtually all of the disciplines, with philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, and anthropology taking the lead” (187). Scott McLemee’s 2003 cover story in The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Getting Emotional,” showed how the “study of feelings…is now spreading to…literature, and other fields…producing a body of work that regularly crosses the line between the humanities and the social sciences” (McLemee 2002, 1).

A Sand County Almanac (Leopold 1949; cf. Meine 2002; McCance 2013, 35) reminds us that the “philia” in biophilia is a feeling often communicated best by literature. E. O. Wilson, another great science writer, defines us as “the poetic species,” stressing that “the symbols of art, music, and language freight power beyond their outward and literal meanings” (1984, 74, 62–64; cf. Rohman 2009). Hence literature can become a calisthenics of that “sympathetic imagination” that is the basis of ethical behavior, according to many eighteenth-century British philosophers of ethics. They valued literature’s capacity to transcend “the barrier between us and another living being and, by actually entering into the other, so to speak, to secure a momentary but complete identification with the other being” (Bate 1945, 144).

Derrida conceded that this experience can seem arational, paradoxical, even paralinguistic: a syncopated beat of “continuity and interruption,” an “extreme paradox” at the limit of “distance and contact,” a “sharing out without fusion,” a “being-with without confusion” (Derrida 2000, 199, 195). No matter how brief or incomplete the identification, the effort to connect is the crucial ethical exercise. Nobel-Prize winner Coetzee showed how literature helps us “imagine our way into that way of moving [of an animal], to inhabit that body” (2003, 95–96). The “becoming animal” philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) inspired Meloy’s
(2005) and Chisholm’s (2010) entrance “into the other’s bodily orbit,” synchronizing with the other’s biorhythms “through the conduit of affective proximity” (Chisholm, 361–62). Haraway calls this “otherworlding”—glimpses into what the Other is “doing, feeling, thinking” (2007, 21). Rokotnitz 2007 defined this emotional intelligence as but one aspect of what might be called the knowledge of the body, “a primal form of understanding” (283).

This emotional knowledge has generated many abstractions. Weil includes Agamben’s “Shabbat of both animal and man” (2002); Acampora’s “transspecific conviviality” (1999) and Heidigger’s “attunement”—if it could be extended to other species (Weil 2012 xviii, 69, xvi, 34). However, Bennett’s “critical empathy” (2005),” Shapiro’s “kinesthetic empathy” (1990) and Gruen’s “engaged empathy” (2009) are moving to the fore now because new research in biology on mirror neurons and cognitive ethology proves that our actions, our perceptions of others, and our emotions are intimately linked with the those of other animals (Weil 2012, 19–20, 69, 164n). Of course “love,” as vague a term as it is English, is still a popular term for one set of emotions. For some, the simplest environmental ethic would be to extend Augustine’s “love and do what you will” to all species and to the planet itself. Donovan specifies “attentive love” (2011, 291–94; cf. Warkentin 2010). Weil cites the “real love” both for and from pets explored by Thomas Mann and Virginia Wolf, and the “true love—love worthy of its name” between man and dog in Coetzee’s *Disgrace* (Weil 2012, xxi, xviii).

Derrida’s translators use the traditional term “compassion.” His “*L’Animal que donc je suis (ti suivre)*” (1997), integrating ethics, literature, and religious studies, is famous for its comparison of industrialized livestock production to the Holocaust. However, we fail to notice how his compassion for animals supports emotive ethics in general and the feminist ethic of care in particular. We also often fail to recognize the role of literature in his essay. Though he is himself a philosopher, at times he assigns as much value to the heart as to the head, to imagination as to reason, to poetry as to philosophy. Most of Derrida’s readers have focused on his abstract reasoning, overlooking his belief that “thinking concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry” (Derrida 2002, 377). For Derrida a poem is “that very thing that teaches the heart, invents the heart, that which, finally, the word *heart* seems to mean” (1988, 223, 231).
Ultimately if, while reading Derrida’s philosophy and his literary allusions, we pay attention to our memories of childhood emotional experiences and our current personal feelings, our family-sized “emotional fields” (Kerr 1988), and our larger, collective, sometimes political “structures of feelings” (Williams 1961, 74; cf. Zembylas 2002, Matthews 2001, Cvetkovich 2010, 2012), we may begin to define “attentive love” (Donovan 2011, 291–94), the kind of biophilia that some say is the ultimate goal of all ethics. Most of the time, however, we will become more fully conscious of the biophobia that blocks this feeling and drives our need for domination and what may be a uniquely human form of sadism. Hence, though it is less familiar word, what we may need most at this time is an awareness of how deep and extensive biophobia is, and to what extent it is instinctive and to what extent it is a product of language, literature, and culture.

EMOTIVE ETHICS AND LITERATURE

In his essay Derrida cites Rilke’s “Schwarze Katze” and “Der Panther” but his most extensive literary allusions are not to lyrics but to Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1865) and Through the Looking Glass (1872). Indeed, he said, “although time prevents it, I would of course have liked to inscribe my whole talk within a reading of Lewis Carroll” (Derrida 2002, 376–77). Why? Admittedly, we will never know for sure, but Carroll’s preface leads us to expect a “friendly chat with bird and beast” (7). This is an important ethical goal because, as Kant put it, “we can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals” (1775–81, 241). Secondly, the Alice books illustrate very well the biophobia that sabotages that goal. Third, Derrida was probably aware that his own high level of abstraction needed exemplification (Grosz 1997), and the Alice books provide a narrative context that calls for situation-specific ethics, instantiating biophilia and biophobia as only narratives can. Fourth, written by an Oxford lecturer on logic, they have been popular with a variety of philosophers. Fifth, the Alice books revolve around the basic posthumanist questions, “Who Are You?” and “What Are You?” Sixth, they exemplify Derrida’s belief that poetry “precedes cognition,” is “beyond languages, even if it sometimes happens that it recalls itself in language” (1991, 227). For him poetry is the “learned unconscious of Verdichtung” (1991, 225) and Alice in Wonderland, of course, is represented as a dream. Seventh, the Alice books were addressed to a child who had emotional, experien-
tial knowledge but was unaware of most symbolic meanings of animals and thus illustrate the challenge of teaching the need for biophilia and the danger of biophobia to future generations. Eighth, as famous examples of popular culture, they reach a more global audience than poetry or academic philosophy. Ninth, because they invoke canonical Western texts such as the Bible, they also invite cultural criticism. Finally, the Alice books in their own right can advance our understanding of the tensions in ethics between biophilia and biophobia, compassion and fear, the group and the individual, and the power and limits of language and reason.

Unfortunately, as Derrida’s definition of poetry implies, an academic essay such as this cannot fully convey the Alice books’ appeal to “the whole self” (Moustakas 1969; Brand 1980 and 1989). Their illustrations and their invitations to performance obviously invite an interdisciplinary approach to “reading.” As Alice puts it, “what is the use of a book without pictures or conversations?” (11). Carroll’s book originated in a dreamy, highly imaginative “conversation” performed for an audience as a boat drifted down the Thames. In his time “poetry was originally meant for either singing or reciting...till it is spoken, it is not performed, it does not perform, it is not itself” (Hopkins [1885] 1980, 137). The most we can do here is point out a few stories in the Alice books that instantiate Derrida’s arguments, invite the reader to perform them, and explore some reader-response emotions.

ETHICS AND LANGUAGE

We may start, as Derrida did, with Adam’s response to the other animals in Genesis (Derrida 2002, 369), a source of many primary Western structures of feeling. The key questions are both “do we have something in common with other animals?” and “can we open ourselves to, and value, their radically different modes of being?” In this regard, Adam’s naming the animals epitomizes what Derrida calls “carnophallogocentrism,” the domination of the carnivorous, male human over other animals, often by “the symbolic and real mouth,” especially its “eat-speak-interiorize’ way of relating to the other,” that is, eating the Other’s “difference” before, finally, consuming its corpse (Derrida 1991, 114; cf. McCance 2013, 148-9.) According to Derrida, Adam’s naming symbolizes “the historical exclusion of animals because they lack words,” but this should remind “us that ethics itself is caught up in language, and therefore cannot lay claim to the kind of self-presence or mastery that it often denies to living oth-

Take, for instance, Carroll’s stories of the Gnat and the Fawn (Looking Glass, Ch. 3). The power of names is often conceptualized, but is more easily felt as the Gnat suggests to Alice the freedom of being nameless: when “the governess wanted to call you to your lessons,... she would have to leave off,... and of course you wouldn’t have to go” (175). A reader may wonder: if I could free myself momentarily from the net of language, would I feel as free as a child who need not obey the dictates of civilization and its irrational fears? Later, when Alice enters the Wood of No Names, we encounter Derrida’s scene of unknowing: a vulnerability, a paralinguistic openness to the life of the Other (2002, 125). In his cat’s eye, for example, Derrida sees “a bottomlessness”, an alterity that is finally “uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable” by reason alone (2008, 12; cf. McCance 2013, 147; Pedersen 2010, 9–10). Acknowledgment of the impossibility of ever fully “knowing” the other animal intellectually forces us to call on all our senses, our emotions and our sympathetic imagination.

In the Wood of No Names, for example, successful communication is not by “chat” but by the eye and by feelings. Derrida argued that the key to ethics is not your “eye/I” but the eye of the Other, looking at you, inviting you to adopt an ethics in which you are the addressee of the animal, rather than its addressor. Consider the Fawn: “it looked at Alice with its large gentle eyes, but didn’t seem at all frightened…. So they walked on together though the wood, Alice with her arms clasped lovingly round the soft neck of the Fawn” (177). When this story is performed, some readers can more easily feel “lovingly” toward an animal: that Edenic biophilia they may have felt more strongly before they knew language. Derrida is “speaking depuis ce temps. My passion for the animal is awakened at that age” (2002, 390).

Carroll helps us feel the Adamic shift from gaze to language, from biophilia to biophobia. When they leave the Wood of No Names, Fawn recalls that she is named “Fawn” and that Alice is called “human” and “a sudden look of alarm came into its beautiful brown eyes, and in another moment it had darted away at full speed” (178). By representing a Fall into the net of language as well as into time (Derrida 2002, 386) Carroll anticipates Lacan (1964) and Jameson (1975) as well as Derrida.
THE ETHICS OF EATING

In Eden, according to Derrida, originally all were vegetarians. Adam’s mouth devoured the other animals’ “difference,” but not their corpses (2008, 110). Hence, in some stories of origin, meat is a forbidden food. To prefigure the Fall, Milton, for example, associates Satan with wolves, lions, and tigers stalking animals to devour (Paradise Lost 4:183–87; 400–08). In Kipling’s “How Fear Came” (1895) and Richard Adams’s The Plague Dogs (1977) “the Fall” is clearly from vegetarianism to what Melanie Joy calls “carnism” (2010, 30). Whatever the forbidden substance, when the humans eat it the killing begins, first of other animals, then of each other. According to Derrida, Cain “had been more faithful to God’s arch-primary commandment” to be a gatherer rather than a hunter, but after the Flood, God preferred the killer of animals, as if “the naming of the animals was only a stage between their taming and their sacrifice…. The fratricide that results from it is marked as a sort of second original sin, in this case twice linked to blood, since the murder of Abel follows—as its consequence—the sacrifice of the animal” (2008, 112–13).

Some of the results of this sacrifice are dramatized in chapter five of Wonderland, “Advice from a Caterpillar.” When Alice eats from the left side of the mushroom her neck grows so fast that her head emerges above the forest. At first she seems to experience biophilia: she is “delighted” that her neck is “like a serpent” (54), but as it extends up into the trees, Pigeon shouts the word “Serpent” to scare her away from her eggs. Now, caught in the net of language, she feels biophobia: afraid of being the “Serpent,” Alice keeps trying to find some other “name” for her self. “I—I’m a little girl,” said Alice, rather doubtfully,” but she is struck dumb by Pigeon’s repeated insistence that “there’s no use denying” that you eat eggs and are therefore “a kind of serpent.” While most readers of this chapter focus on Caterpillar’s key question, “Who are YOU?” Pigeon asks the ultimate question of posthumanism, “WHAT are you?” Alice can’t answer this question (in Derrida’s view there can be no definitive answer because one can never fully “know” one’s own animality). With the Pigeon’s conclusion, “I can see you’re trying to invent something!” (55), Carroll enacts a fundamental question of animal ethics as well as posthumanism: can we “invent” important, radical discontinuities between ourselves and the other animals that justify treating them as inferiors?
BIOPHILIA VS. BIOPHOBIA WITHIN THE SELF

After Pigeon forces Alice to bring to the surface the denial that makes possible devouring the corpse of the Other, we are not surprised that Alice is determined to eat from the other side of the mushroom to get small enough to escape “into the “beautiful garden” she saw soon after she fell into the Rabbit Hole. However, as “Serpent,” Alice is not just a carnivorous animal, but also, according to Genesis, the evil invader of Eden. Alice/Serpent is but one of thousands of examples of the great Victorian archetype of the divided self. From the beginning, “this curious child [Alice] was very fond of pretending to be two people” (18). As was her creator: “even in official life, he became more and more two men, Lewis Carroll and Charles Dodgson, sometimes with an imperative need to keep them apart” (Greenacre 1955, 256). Of course “the divided self” is a dangerous binary grossly oversimplifying our many subpersonalities, but it focuses our attention on two basic feelings of emotive ethics evident in the Fawn episode and throughout the Alice books: biophilia and biophobia. They are obviously “both/and” rather than “either/or” binaries: for most people there will always be some fear even when love takes over and some love even when fear dominates. However, Alice’s zoophobia, her fears of the animal inside and outside her, remind us that Derrida’s goal here, and often the primary work of emotive ethics, is to reveal the blocks to the ideal, in this case the biophobia sabotaging the “friendly” chat with bird and beast. Long before the word “biophobia” was in use, Carroll, pretending that he forgot the story of Alice, wrote, “I think it was about ‘malice” (1867, 48–49; cf. Auerbach 1973, 33).

Admittedly, Alice’s malice is rarely acknowledged. She remains a popular character throughout the world partly because she is unusually considerate, steadily developing her sympathetic imagination and her compassion, not only for other humans, but also for the anthropomorphitic Dodo, the Caterpillar, and even for the Frog Footman, whose eyes are on the top of his head. She even sympathizes with Bill the Lizard—after she kicks him as hard as she could. As we have seen, at times she feels zoophobia, love of animals, as in the Wood of No Names. However, Derrida is more interested in her biophobia, which often overwhelms her, partly because as a seven-year old she had a very limited ability to think for herself, and is thus a good mouthpiece for her society and species. That is to say, she is clearly caught in the net of language, in her case especially “several nice little histories about children who had got…eaten up by wild
beasts” (17). This totally irrational paranoia (for the daughter of the Dean of Oxford's Christ Church in the nineteenth century), carries over into the next chapter, “The Pool of Tears.” Here too Alice is preoccupied with the question, “Who in the world am I? Ah, that's the great puzzle!” (23). As so much of Alice’s identity is based on knowing human language better than others her age, she tries to recite from memory one of the most famous children’s poems of the time, Isaac Watts’s “Against Idleness and Mischief.” However, apparently still preoccupied by wild beasts, her “voice sounded hoarse and strange, and the words did not come the same as they used to do.” Now she answers the subterranean question, “What Am I?” rather differently: she replaces Watts’s busy bee with a lazy crocodile who “cheerfully” grins and welcomes little fishes into his mouth “with gently smiling jaws!” (23).

One way for a child to deal with fear of crocodile jaws when playing with others is to pretend to be the predator rather than the prey. Carroll usually reserved such roles for boys like Bruno in Sylvia and Bruno (1889). However, in the Alice books there is only one hero, so she must oscillate between the stereotypically gendered roles. Throughout the Alice books, instead of pretending to be a big, fierce male, Alice uses fear of one animal (crocodile, cat, or dog) to dominate the rest of the animals. There are more answers to the question “What Am I?” as she and the predator seem to merge, especially when the animal is a cat. Of course most of Carroll’s readers, and presumably Alice herself, were aware of popular ideals of morality such as “love thy neighbor as thyself” (KJV Leviticus 19:18), but when she calls on cats and other predators to instill fear in her prey, she reverts to an apparently more fundamental structure of feeling, God’s promise that “the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea” (KJV Genesis 9:1–2). Alice’s crocodile smile foreshadows the gleeful deception and devouring of the oysters by the walrus and the carpenter and the jovial physical abuse of animals for entertainment throughout the books, from the kicking of Bill the Lizard to the use of flamingos to hit hedgehogs, to the smothering of the guinea pigs, to the shaking of the kitten.
This kind of biophobia may well be the ultimate reason for Derrida's preoccupation with the Alice books. He concedes that “for Freud, the death drive, the destruction drive, the originary ‘cruelty’ of ‘sadism’ or ‘masochism,’ cannot be uprooted,” but Derrida insists that we oppose it (2004, 123, 47), as does Carroll (1875a, 1875b). To resist this temptation we must first admit its attraction. Carroll’s parodies tempt us to enjoy the sadism, implicating us in the plot. The lazy crocodile replacing Watts’s busy bee is in Carroll’s favorite genre, parody, is a “counter-ode or satyr play put on by the same actors—now in grotesque costume—who had just appeared in a more serious drama” (Meckier 1987, 76). In the crocodile poem, as so often in the Alice books, Carroll is “devastatingly sadistic but in so veiled and hidden a form as to produce tickling sensations rather than clear awareness of attack…he furnishes an unconscious outlet through humor for…primary destructive pressures without a provocation to action. Readers are charmed and comforted rather than stimulated” (Greenacre 1955, 145, 257).

Alice’s “primary destructive pressure” escalates in proportion to her biophobia. For example, because the entrance to the garden is “not much larger than a rat-hole” (15), to get in Alice must give up domination by size and species and reduce herself to the lowly status of a prey animal that would be grabbed, shaken, and devoured by her cat Dinah or the neighbor’s rat terrier. Now not much larger than a mouse, Alice is far more susceptible to paranoia. Because the door to the garden remains locked, she cries until she slips into a pool of her own tears. “Up to her chin in salt water,” Alice sees in the distance “a walrus or hippopotamus” (25). Eventually she realizes it is a mouse, but the momentum of her fear, no doubt combined with her society’s fear of rodents, drives her repeatedly to call upon other predators to kill and eat him. As she does so the predators become her alter egos. For instance, when Rabbit orders her about, Alice supposes “Dinah will be sending me on messages next!” and replies to a summons from her nurse: “Coming in a minute, nurse! But I’ve got to watch this mouse-hole till Dinah comes back, and see that the mouse doesn’t get out” (38). As Dinah, she reveals the “cannibalistic hunger” which Auerbach 1973 identified as the Original Sin for which Alice is put on trial with the Knave of Hearts (36-41). According to Auerbach 1973, the Cheshire cat’ symbolizes “Carroll’s focus on the organ of
the mouth, [one that] seems to have been consistent throughout his life”; hence Auerbach argues that Alice’s mouth is the “ultimate symbol” of her animality (1973, 39n, 46). From this perspective perhaps we need to replace Derrida’s term “carnophallogocentrism” with a term that includes female oral aggression as well.

That aggression is quite striking when Alice asks Mouse if he knows the way out of the Pool of Tears. He responds, as the Fawn will later, with the eyes: “The Mouse looked at her rather inquisitively, and seemed to her to wink with one of its little eyes, but it said nothing” (26). In this first scene of unknowing in the Alice books, Mouse’s eyes invite a wordless openness to the being of the Other, a willingness to be the addressee of the animal, rather than the addresor. How do we usually respond to such an invitation? In this case, as in so many others, personal fear of the animal merges with collective, historical biophobia to extinguish any possibility of biophilia. Afraid that he was an enemy, “‘a French mouse, come over with William the Conqueror,’” Alice asked him a very scary question: “‘Ou est ma chatte?’” He does indeed seem to understand French: “Mouse gave a sudden leap out of the water, and seemed to quiver all over with fright” (26).

Alice told him she “quite forgot you didn’t like cats,” but only to toy with him, the way her cat Dinah might, but more sadistically, enjoying Mouse’s fear as “sport,” as only a human could. Carroll now lets Mouse speak human language: “‘Would you like cats if you were me?’” Mouse asks a key ethical question: you are now my size; can you see from my point of view? In other words, are you capable of extending the sympathetic imagination, the basic requirement of morality, to animals? The answer is more aggression: Alice tells Mouse that her cat Dinah is “a capital one for catching mice’” (26). When Mouse is again traumatized, Alice ostensibly promises that “we won’t talk about her any more if you’d rather not,” but she simply changes assault animal and attacks again: “‘There is such a nice little dog near our house… it kills all the rats.’” Soon “Mouse was swimming away from her as hard as it could go” (27). In this parody a little English girl becomes “the Conqueror” and the alien animal invader is defeated and sent swimming back across the English channel.

Nevertheless, once they all emerge from the Pool of Tears, the return of Mouse and the expansion of the “friendly chat” to include birds and other small animals seems to succeed: “after a few minutes it seemed quite
natural to Alice to find herself talking familiarly with them, as if she had known them all her life” (29). However, when Mouse gives a lecture on the successful invasion of William the Conqueror (30) and tries to explain his fear of cats and dogs; Alice once more ignores him. He flees, never to return, again leaving the field to Alice the Conqueror. Alice has another chance at a “friendly chat” with the birds, but, still overwhelmed with biophobia, she tells them “I wish I had our Dinah here…she’ll eat a little bird as soon as look at it!” (35). Needless to say, “Alice was soon left alone” (36), in the human condition: alienated from all other animals.

Biophobia also dominates chapter eight as Alice escalates from verbal sadism to physical abuse in the croquet game. Derrida notes that his “poor hedgehogs will be badly treated,” presumably because “Alice wanted to give the hedgehog a blow with the head of the flamingo she held under her arm, [but] ‘it would twist itself round and look up in her face.’ How can an animal look you in the face? That will be one of our concerns” (Derrida 2002, 377–78). It is also one of Levinas’s—the face of the other, pleading, “Don’t kill me” (Levinas 1979, 198—99; cf. Doniger 1999, 104)—but Derrida argues that Levinas’s critique does not go far enough (2008, 108). On the other hand, neither Derrida nor Levinas comments on Alice’s apparently distinctively human version of sadism: she “could not help bursting out laughing” (84).

BIOPHOBIA AND THE HOLOCAUST ANALOGY

We can hear similar amusement now in the documentary Earthlings (Monson 2005) when the desperate pigs are clearly trying to say the equivalent of “don’t kill me,” but the slaughterhouse worker is laughingly playing a game with them, killing as many as he can, as fast as he can.23 The scale of slaughterhouse murder now is, of course, much, much greater than in Carroll’s day. Derrida claims that “no one can deny [its] unprecedented proportions” (2002, 394). But almost everyone does deny the fact that we have organized “on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence that some would compare to the worst cases of genocide” (Derrida 2002, 394). Derrida reminds us how many whole species have been annihilated as well as the holocaust of the food animals: “as if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell,
that of the imposition of genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire” (2002, 395).

How would Derrida have inscribed this horrific sadism in the Alice books? Presumably, Carroll would have been shocked at the scale of the current animal holocaust. However, knowledge of links between cruelty to animals and cruelty to humans had been increasing since Hogarth’s *Four Stages of Cruelty* (1751), Kant’s “Lectures on Ethics” (1775–81), Trimmer’s *History of the Robins* (1786) and Schopenhauer’s “The Basis for Morality” (1839). Carroll himself made the connection in “Some Popular Fallacies About Vivisection” (1875b): “The hapless animal suffers, dies, and there an end...but the man whose sympathies have been deadened, and whose selfishness has been fostered, by the contemplation of pain deliberately inflicted, may be the parent of others equally brutalized, and so, bequeath a curse to future ages” (online). In “Vivisection as a Sign of the Times,” Carroll cited the Bible: “the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together,” adding, “travail it undoubtedly does still (more than ever so far as brute creation is concerned)” (1875a, 170). Looking ahead to increasing use of vivisection, Carroll anticipated “a cry of anguish from the brute creation that will ring through the length and breadth of the land” and predicted a time when the scientist “shall exult in the thought that he has made of this fair green earth, if not a heaven for man, at least a hell for animals” (1875a, 170).

Though making cruelty to animals amusing was banned almost by definition from “children’s literature,” Carroll surpassed the Brothers Grimm in this regard. For instance, after Alice’s threats of violence destroyed the family that seemed to coalesce after the Pool of Tears, she encountered a family composed of a Duchess nursing a baby and a cook. Abuse of the baby human leads to abandonment of a baby pig as the distinction between human and animal dissolves. The baby “was sneezing and howling alternately without a moment’s pause” (60). Alice tried to intervene, only to feel the horror of again being named “animal.” Pigeon called her “Serpent” but the Duchess screamed the name “Pig!” with “such sudden violence that Alice quite jumped” (61), presumably not just because again she was being named “animal” but, even worse, identified as one that associated with the slum-dwellers in England who, apparently breeding as rapidly as pigs, rats, and mice were threatening to overthrow the upper classes, as they did in France. However, when Alice realized the animal name “was addressed to the baby, and not to her, she took cour-
The abuse quickly became physical: the cook started “throwing everything within her reach at the Duchess” and at the baby named “Pig”; Alice was soon “jumping up and down in an agony of terror” (61). This conspicuous, emotional “witnessing” of the cruelty soon made Alice herself a target of abuse: the Duchess, acting as if she had a guillotine or a butcher at her command, yelled “‘chop off her head!’” Then the Duchess “began shaking the baby violently…. tossing [it] violently up and down,” and then “the Duchess flung the baby to Alice and left” (62). Alice soon realized her ethical dilemma: “If I don’t take this child away with me…. they’re sure to kill it in a day or two: wouldn’t it be murder to leave it behind?” Just as she decides to save it, the baby’s animality is revealed and Alice says, “‘If you’re going to turn into a pig, my dear…. I’ll have nothing more to do with you.’” On some level Alice knew that it was still murder to leave the pig-baby behind. Admittedly, Alice did not kill plan on killing the pig-baby herself, or even seeing it butchered, but there could be little doubt what would become of it if it was captured. In Alice’s day, industrial slaughter had already begun in large cities. Yet as a member of “the rich and refined classes [who] shut these things out of sight and hearing,” as a contemporary put it (Kingsford 1884, 64), Alice “felt quite relieved to see it trot away quietly” (Carroll 2000, 63).

MUTINY OF THE OPPRESSED

But what if the animal doesn’t go quietly to its death? Domination and carnism are necessarily accompanied by fear of mutiny. Carroll was aware of the parallels between animals and other suppressed groups in this regard, protesting man’s “enslavement of his weaker brethren…the labor of those who do not enjoy, for the enjoyment of those who do not labor—the degradation of woman [and the] torture of the animal world—these are the steps of the ladder by which man is ascending to his higher civilization” (1875a, 170). Earlier in the century one of Thackeray’s characters also said of women: “let us be thankful that the darlings are like the beasts of the field, and don’t know their own power. They would overcome us entirely if they did.” In fact, a female instigates a mutiny against Queen Alice at the royal banquet attended by the animals at the end of Looking Glass. Like Pigeon, the Red Queen made Alice face the shock and shame of the carnism that Derrida and others would identify as Original Sin. The Red Queen boldly brought to the surface the dinner-table secret that everyone knows but wants to keep hidden: “‘You look a little shy; let
me introduce you to that leg of mutton’…. The leg of mutton got up in
the dish and made a little bow to Alice; and Alice returned the bow, not
knowing whether to be frightened or amused” (261). As the Red Queen
made Alice admit the fact that the “leg of mutton” was an animal mur-
dered for her, Alice’s fear soon triumphed over her fun. She threatened it
with her knife, but the Red Queen granted it the same status as a human:
“‘Certainly not,’ the Red Queen said, very decidedly; ‘it isn’t etiquette to
cut any one you’ve been introduced to.’” To “cut” was a pun, of course,
also meaning to insult by pretending not to see people whom you know,
ignoring them as if they don’t exist. It was obvious to all the animals at
the banquet that Alice pretended not to know that the “mutton” was still
alive as she prepared to cut and eat it. Because of Alice’s poor etiquette,
if not ethics, the Red Queen replaced the mutton with a plum pudding
(made with animal fat). This time Alice quickly proceeded to “cut a slice
and handed it to the Red Queen” (262).

Then comes the biggest surprise so far. The leg of mutton communi-
cated only by movement, but Pudding speaks human language: “What
impertinence!...I wonder how you’d like it, if I were to cut a slice out of
YOU, you creature!” Alice’s biophobia grew as the pudding “spoke in a
thick, suety sort of voice…Alice hadn’t a word to say in reply: she could
only sit and look at it and gasp” (263). The previous threat of cutting a
live sheep tapped into the powerful political feelings at the time gener-
ated by vivisection of animals, but Pudding’s threat of slicing Alice herself
drew upon the fears, later articulated by Carroll himself, that vivisection
research would be extended to humans (Carroll 1875a, 1875b, 1885).

Alice came up with a Final Solution. She pulled the tablecloth out
from under them, and they were all “disappeared,” with one exception.
The instigator of the mutiny, the Red Queen, “dwindled down to the size
of a little doll” was “merrily running” on the table: “As for YOU,’ she
repeated…. ‘I’ll shake you into a kitten, that I will!’” (2000, 266). A whole
chapter is then devoted to this “Shaking.” We recall the Duchess shaking
the pig-baby, but this time it is newly crowned Alice who deliberately
shakes the queen-kitten hybrid “backwards and forwards with all her
might” until the transformation from human to animal is complete (267).
For some readers, no doubt, the afterimage is that of a rat terrier shaking
a kitten with enough force to kill it. What would be the response be today
if a video of such a performance appeared on YouTube?
No doubt Derrida’s audience was grateful that he did not do show videos of cruelty to animals. “Instead of thrusting these images in your faces or awakening them in your memory,” he focused on “the sharing of this suffering.” He identified “a new experience of this compassion . . . voices are raised—minority, weak, marginal voices, little assured of their discourse, to awaken us” (2002, 395). Derrida’s essay thus moves farther beyond a Benthamite calculus of rights and values, to one that supplements analytic philosophy with Bentham’s famous statement, the “question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (1789, XVII).

COMPASSIONATE GRIEF

The compassion (“suffering with”) that Bentham called for can also be detected in the Alice books. After the croquet game, for example, Alice “saw the Mock Turtle in the distance, sitting sad and lonely…sighing as if his heart would break. She pitied him deeply.” Alice thus seemed to be making progress. In the beginning, she said to herself, rather sharply, “Come, there’s no use in crying like that!... I advise you to leave off this minute!” (18). Now, however, in addition to all her fears, she also feels what Aristotle called pity, thus experiencing both of the emotions that Aristotle ascribed to the reader/viewer of tragedy. However, Aristotle’s “eleos” is more accurately translated as “compassionate grief” (Stanford 1983, 23–24). “Pity” is too ambiguous because “in modern use” it sometimes implies “disdain or mild contempt for a person as intellectually or morally inferior” (Oxford English Dictionary 1992) Alice doesn’t dismiss the Mock Turtle’s sadness in this way perhaps because she is beginning to recognize the inferiority of her own emotional intelligence: she almost drowned in her own pool of tears.

In any case, the Mock Turtle’s grief becomes a chance for another “friendly chat” with an animal. “What is his sorrow?’ she asked his companion, the Gryphon,” who gave the stereotypical male answer: “‘it’s all his fancy, that: he hasn’t got no sorrow, you know. Come on!’” (95). In this context, the Gryphon represents the fear and “denial” 27 of emotion that is the foundation of “rational” civilization and, some feminists say, of analytic moral philosophy (Grosz 1993, Sanbonmatsu 2011, Adams, 2011, Plumwood 2000). Alice enforces this rule against the male in her
little family drama in the opening of *Looking Glass*: when the King tries to write down his feelings she immediately distracts him.

Stereotypically, males must repress sorrow, yet it pervades Carroll’s writing, partly because he could not return fully to what he thought was the innocence of Eden and early childhood. His contemporary, Dickens, suggested that if we all had the hearts of children “what a heaven this earth would be!” but concluded that “the faint image of Eden which is stamped upon [us] in childhood, chafes and rubs in our rough struggles with the world, and soon wears away: too often to leave nothing but a mournful blank” (Nicholas Nickleby, Ch. 6, “The Five Sisters of York,” online). Derrida would add that those who are not entirely “blank” can feel at times our collective alienation from our animal past and from our own animality, as well as grief for habitually killing and eating members of our own extended family. For many, this grief just below the surface must not be acknowledged, much less tapped, lest they drown in their own Pool of Tears. In this regard, Derrida cites a “tradition [that] assigns to nature and to the animality named by Adam a sort of ‘deep sadness (Traurigkeit)’…the great sorrow of nature” which gives rise to a “mute but audible lament through the sensuous breath and rustling of plants” (2002, 388). A similar feeling can be detected at the end of *Wonderland* when “the lowing of the cattle in the distance [takes] the place of the Mock Turtle’s heavy sobs” (126). The book’s professional illustrator, John made this connection clear from the beginning when he drew the Mock Turtle with a calf’s head and hind hooves, reminding the reader that in Mock Turtle soup, brains and organ meats, often from cattle, are substituted for turtle. Today, sadness is inevitably associated with veal calves because they are now “tenderized” on the hoof in industrial agriculture by being put in tiny crates and tethered by the neck so they can’t move for the rest of their lives. Carroll’s calf-turtle, has another sadness: he apparently knows his fate is to be killed and devoured, perhaps in a few months. This aspect of the plot certainly poses possibilities for an Aristotelian sense of tragedy and “compassionate grief.”

**TOWARD A NEW ETHICS OF COMPASSION**

Emotional appeals like this, according to Derrida, are weapons in “a war being waged” between those who appeal to compassion and “those who violate not only animal life but even and also this sentiment.”
insists that we are all “obliged to become soldiers in this war” (2002, 397). Derrida’s talk of “thinking” this war would no doubt be dismissed by an activist as typical of a philosopher, one who produces only abstract documents ignored by the common people. But Derrida also stresses verbal emotional appeals and bearing witness, the first steps toward political action. Consider the final chapter of Joy’s popular activist book, titled “Seeing with the Heart: The Power of Witnessing” (2010, 137). In her definition of the word, “when we bear witness, we are not merely acting as observers: we emotionally connect with the experience of those we are witnessing. We empathize. And in so doing, we close the gap in our consciousness, the gap that enables the violence of carnism to endure” (Joy 2000, 138). But we must take sides: “as Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and Holocaust survivor Eli Wiesel points out, ‘Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented’” (Joy 2000, 150). “Witnessing the Zeitgeist,” as well as acknowledging our own denial, can lead to the collective witnessing of boycotts, “demonstrations, vigils… lectures, and artistic creations.” As one of those creations, literature has a vital role to play: “the power of speaking the unspeakable lifts the barriers of denial and repression” (139; cf. Herman 1997, 1).

An interview with Derrida recalls Alice’s “witnessing” the abuse of the pig-baby as well as her refusal to think about the pig’s fate. Derrida is asked, “how is it possible to reconcile this desire to reduce animal suffering with the necessity for industrial organization in raising and slaughtering animals?” (2004, 70). Derrida answers, “the consumption of meat has never been a biological necessity,” and then he interrogates the interviewer as aggressively as the Pigeon cross-examined Alice. First, he asks the interviewer to climb down the ladder of abstraction to be an “eye” witness: “when one sees an incalculable number of calves, raised on hormones and stuffed into a truck, on their way from the stable straight to the slaughterhouse, how can we not imagine that they suffer? We know what animal suffering is, we feel it ourselves. Moreover, with industrial slaughter, these animals are suffering in much larger numbers than before” (2004, 70–71). The interviewer ignores this example, seeming to “cut” the calves, by pretending not to see them. Derrida insists that if she sees the “spectacle man creates for himself in his treatment of animals [it] will become intolerable…. If you were actually placed every day before the spectacle of this industrial slaughter, what would you do?” The
interviewer finally responds, “I wouldn’t eat meat anymore, or I would live somewhere else. But I prefer not to see it, even though I know that this intolerable thing exists. I don’t think that the visibility of a situation allows one to know it better. Knowing is not the same as looking.” Indeed, it isn’t. Derrida refuses to let her “cut” the calves by the usual intellectual denial of substituting abstractions for seeing and feeling: “But if every day, there passed before your eyes, slowly, without giving you time to be distracted, a truck filled with calves leaving the stable on the way to the slaughterhouse, would you be unable to eat meat for a long time?” (2004, 71). The interviewer’s denial becomes more obvious: “I would move away. But really, sometimes I believe that, in order to understand a situation better and to have the necessary distance, it is best not to be an eyewitness to it” (2004, 72). Nevertheless, by forcing another to witness her own denial, however briefly, as the Pigeon did to Alice, Derrida too has shown us how to raise consciousness of the need for a new environmental ethic.

But what happened after Pigeon forced Alice to witness her own denial? What effect did that and her other interactions with animals have on Alice’s compassion? At the end of *Looking Glass* she says to her real kitten, “To-morrow morning you shall have a real treat. All the time you’re eating your breakfast, I’ll repeat ‘The Walrus and the Carpenter’ to you; and then you can make believe it’s oysters, dear!” (271). The most famous account of ethics in the Alice books is the deception that leads the young oysters to be eaten alive. It is the animal, not the human, who feels disgrace: "It seems a shame’, the Walrus said, / To play them such a trick’; the animal, not the human feels sympathy: “I weep for you’, the Walrus said: / ‘I deeply sympathize’.” Hence Alice prefers the Walrus because he was a *little* sorry for the poor oysters" (187). When Tweedledee points out that the Walrus, “with sobs and tears,” ate the largest ones, Alice prefers the Carpenter, until she is informed that he ate as many as he could—one of the best examples of the situation-specific ethics in the Alice books. The editor of the Alice books adds this note: “This was a puzzler” for her: “the ethical dilemma of having to choose between judging a person in terms of acts or in terms of intentions” (188n). Alice concludes that they “were both unpleasant characters” (188). Carroll’s operetta version of the Alice books confirms this judgment: both unpleasant characters sob, but when “they laid them down to sleep -- / And of their craft and cruelty / The punishment to reap, [oyster ghosts punished them both] by stamping on their
What did Alice learn from the Walrus and the Carpenter? Not much. Derrida presumably would point out she emerges from the underground as the most “unpleasant character of all,” with less sympathy for oysters than either the Walrus or the Carpenter. Indeed, as she “treats” the kitten to a performance of the story no doubt Alice vicariously enjoys again the subtle sadism of the betrayal and the eating of the live oysters.

Of course in this case the animals are already dead, and the kitten, like the walrus, has no choice: it cannot survive without meat. However, the challenges of the leg of mutton, the Pudding, and the Pigeon raise our awareness that for most humans eating meat is a decision, one to be made consciously. As Tolstoy put it, “‘A man can live and be healthy without killing animals for food; therefore, if he eats meat, he participates in taking animal life merely for the sake of his appetite. And to act so is immoral.’ It is so simple and indubitable that it is impossible to not agree with it” (1896, 170—71). Hence the answer to Pigeon’s question “What are You?” seems to be, “I am the cruelest animal: the one who chooses to kill and devour the other animals even though I need not do so.”

What are the alternatives to Alice’s recalcitrance? How does Derrida react to his own cat? In the opening scene of his essay he faces the gaze of his cat, eyes that seems to haunt him throughout the rest of the essay: “a real cat, truly, believe me, a little cat. It isn’t the figure of a cat” (2002, 375). After listing many literary cats he concludes, “it is not even the one who speaks in Alice in Wonderland” (the Cheshire cat); but then he adds, “‘really a little cat’ was a quote from Carroll’s penultimate chapter consisting of a single sentence: ‘it really was a kitten, after all’” (2002, 376). Nevertheless, Derrida objects to the ease with which Alice switches between literary and “real” animals, and especially to her Cartesian complaint that because animals do not respond in our terms they do not respond at all. Alice’s Dinah was also a real cat observed by Carroll and members of the Liddell household, and presumably her kittens were real cats (they certainly ignored Alice when she told them what to do). Derrida evaluates Alice’s speech to one of these “real” kittens: “You can speak to an animal, to the cat said to be real inasmuch as it is an animal, but it doesn’t reply, not really, not ever, that is what Alice concludes. Exactly like Descartes” (2002, 378).
CONCLUSION

Derrida, on the other hand, stresses that his cat is a mystery rather than a machine, an “irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space. Nothing can ever take away from me the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized” (2002, 377–78). Derrida’s rejection of an ethics composed only of linguistic abstractions is based on his belief that “ethics itself is caught up in language, and therefore cannot lay claim to the kind of self-presence or mastery that it often denies to living others” (Derrida 2008, 23, 41). Hence Derrida adds a feeling—compassion—to abstraction, focusing on the ultimate connection between himself and his cat, the ineluctable suffering of “mortal existence”: “for from the moment that it has a name, its name survives it. It signs its potential disappearance. Mine also, and this disappearance, from that moment to this, fort/da, is announced each time…one of us leaves the room” (2002, 377–78).

Haraway’s complaint that this is but abstract musing (Haraway 2007, 22; cf. Warkentin 2009, 101) ignores Derrida’s integration of literary citations into his philosophy. In this instance Derrida soon invokes many more deaths over a longer stretch of time: the perspective of the cat in Rilke’s “Schwarze Katze” (1907) who

turns her face to yours;
and with a shock, you see yourself, tiny,
inside the golden amber of her eyeballs
suspended, like a prehistoric fly.

This is a concise illustration of how the verbal imagination invites us to “see” with our mind’s eye. While Carroll pointed beyond words to the visual communication of the eyes of a mouse, a flamingo, and a fawn, Derrida’s focus on the eye of a cat reminds us that we have only begun to explore what we can learn about ourselves and the Other when we look “through the looking glass” that is the eye of animal. That eye embodies a history of all species, of all life, of the complete environment, the universe. The attentive reader is emotionally “moved by a single, surprising image” of biophilia, of “unity in a search back through time” (Wilson 1984, 63), awakening the feeling of oneness with all species that can replace the biophobia that drives environmental destruction, anthropocentrism and sadism. Promoting such “positive emotion-saturated attitudes with respect to
the environment” (Ulrich 1993, 117–18) will increase the probability that philosophical ethics can change the world. Consider Carroll’s citation of Herbert Spencer: “Not by precept, though heard daily; not by example, unless it is followed; but only by action, often caused by the related feeling, can a moral habit be formed” (Carroll 1875a, 169, italics added).

NOTES
1 Animal studies must be interdisciplinary because “none of our extant discourses is adequate for thinking and describing animal life and rethinking animal-human relations” (Colarco 2008, 5–6; cf. McCance 2013, 77). See also Gorman 2012; Rohman 2009, 160; McCance 2013, 136. McCance provides an excellent overview of the field as a whole, Weil 2012 of the philosophy. For literary animal studies see Rhoman 2009 and the twelve articles on literature and animal studies in PMLA 2009 124(2): 472–563. An animal studies teaching agenda has been initiated in “more than 143 universities in the U.S., and 48 more in” other countries, integrating “philosophy, English, criminology, history, sociology, religion, anthropology, women’s studies, social work, psychology, and counseling” (Arkow 2012, xiv); see also Pedersen 2010, 1–14, and Ambruster 2008, 72–80. DeMello 2012 is an excellent example of a graduate textbook in this new field and Gruen 2011 and Waldau 2013 of undergraduate textbooks.

2 Smuts (1999): “Open your heart to the animals around you and find out for yourself what it’s like to befriend a nonhuman person” (120; McCance 2013, 134).

3 “Biophilia” Oxford English Dictionary: “3. A love of or empathy with the natural world, esp. when seen as a human instinct”; “philia” is defined as “amity, affection, friendship; fondness, liking.” Versus “Biophobia”: “(b) avoidance of contact with animals, plants, or organic materials; strong aversion to aspects of the natural world”; “phobia”: “fear, horror, strong dislike, or aversion.”

4 The usual term is “affective” (Weil 2012, 7). However, “affect” for some readers connotes abstract psychological theory instead of feeling. The word “feeling,” on the other hand, suggests bodily sensations, especially touch; in psychology the word sometimes explicitly excludes thought. Because “emotion” has come to mean an agitation of mind or feeling, “emotive” may be the best name for an approach to ethics that integrates thought and feeling.

5 Homilies On The First Epistle of John 7:8, presumably a permutation of “perfect love casts out fear” (KJV 1 John 4). However, English is so impoverished in words for “love” that it is almost impossible to translate Augustine’s caritas. In the East apparently the ideal would be Buddhist “loving-kindness,” but an older and more widespread oriental ideal is ahimsa: nonviolence...
in thought, word, and deed, something more akin to Derrida’s “passivity” (2008, 27; McCance 2013, 68). In Jainism, on the other hand, the emphasis is on being with those who are suffering, more like Derrida’s “compassion.”

6 Cf. Schopenhauer 1839, “Compassion is the true moral incentive” (209). Also consider Kundera’s explanation of “compassion” in Eastern European and other languages as “feeling with” rather than just “suffering with” (1984, 30).

7 This was the first part of a ten-hour address Derrida gave at the third Cerisy-la-Salle conference devoted to his work, in July 1997. The title of the conference was “L’Animal autobiographique” Later segments of the address dealt with Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan, and Levinas (Derrida, 2002, 369n).

8 An analogy made in the sixties by Isaac Bashevis Singer and more recently by Coetzee, Derrida, and others. Szybel 2006 argued for thirty-nine similarities. Derrida, in his next talk in the series (“But as for me, who am I?”) cites Adorno’s assertion that in an idealist system “animals play virtually the same role as Jews did for a fascist system” and suggests that “one could easily extend [this], according to the now familiar outlines of the same logic, to a certain hatred of femininity, even childhood” (Derrida 2008, 103–04).

9 A feminist endorsement: “Derrida asserts that the mistreatment of animals is a scandal that is worth getting hysterical about and defends the emotional approach to animal ethics” (Donovan and Adams 2007, 15). However, there are many feminist objections to Derrida. His high level of abstraction has been critiqued by Grosz 1997, for example, and Haraway 2007 complained that “philosophers like Derrida are unlikely to read, cite, or recognize as philosophy the large feminist literature on animal studies that was often both first and also less entrammeled in the traps of misrecognizing animals as singular” (334n.)

10 Literature also has the advantage for emotive ethics of being associated with a long tradition of reader-response literary criticism that focuses on emotion. Aristotle’s discussion of pity and fear in the viewer/reader of tragedy and Wordsworth’s defense of a poetry of feeling are two of the more famous examples. In the last forty years some feminists, reader-response critics, and composition theorists have also stressed that truth is emotional as well as intellectual. Christian (1987) resurrected the traditional definition of literature as that which is written to evoke feeling as well as to express thought” (51), offering “the possibility of the integration of feeling/knowledge, rather than the split between the abstract and the emotional in which Western philosophy inevitably indulged” (56). The importance of student emotions in college literature and composition classrooms was explored (Bleich 1975; Tompkins 1977, 1987; Brand 1980, 1989; Steig 1989, Berman 1994, Bump 2000), and some literary critics reminded us that knowledge is produced by reader identification with characters’ feelings (Novitz, (1980, 1987; Feagin 1988, 1996).
By the end of the century the momentum shifted to other studies of emotion (Hjort and Laver, 1997). Now, in the twenty-first century, the rising popularity of queer studies and of Raymond William’s sense of emotions as cultural “structures of feeling” supports a new focus on feelings. In 2004, Dawes noted that “an interest in the . . . emotions that shake us when reading has in recent years come increasingly to the fore in literary and cultural studies” (437). In 2010 Bump called for an “‘emotive’ literary criticism focusing on the feelings, moods, and emotional fields in readers as well as texts” (148).

11 Take, for example, the family emotional atmosphere “that, in turn, influences the emotional functioning of each person. It is analogous to the gravitational field of the solar system, where each planet and the sun, by virtue of their mass, contribute gravity to the field and are, in turn, regulated by the field they help create. One cannot ‘see’ gravity, nor can one ‘see’ the emotional field. The presence of gravity and the emotional field can be inferred, however, by the predictable ways planets and people behave in reaction to one another” (Kerr 1988, 54–5).

12 Instead of a common phrase such as “casual cruelty” or a more controversial term such as “cannibalism” (Auerbach 1973, 37), “sadism” may be the best term here in the general sense of “enthusiasm for inflicting pain, suffering, or humiliation on others” (OED). This is the sense of the word as used by Derrida 2002 and Greenacre 1955, not the specialized sense of “a psychological disorder characterized by sexual fantasies” (OED). Martin Gardner, the editor of The Annotated Alice (2002), admitted that there are “sadistic elements in Alice” (xv). Carroll certainly knew the meaning of the word. In his vivisection letters he concluded that “It is a humiliating but an undeniable truth, that man has something of the wild beast [sic] in him, that a thirst for blood can be aroused in him by witnessing a scene of carnage, and that the infliction of torture, when the first instincts of horror have been deadened by familiarity, may become, first, a matter of indifference, then a subject of morbid interest, then a positive pleasure, then a ghastly and ferocious delight” (1875b). Carroll denounced “all infliction of death or suffering for the purpose of mere sport . . . mere pleasure” (1875b). His examples included the case of medical students at a vivisection of “living dogs. When the unfortunate creatures cried and moaned under the operations, many of the students actually mimicked their cries in derision “(1875b).

13 The word “friendly” conveys the meaning of the Greek philia in biophilia, distinguishing that kind of love from eros, agape, and storge; see Santas 2014. All quotations from the Alice books are from the Annotated Alice (2000). Incidentally, obsession with the Alice books is not unique: Joyce Carol Oates 2014 said, they “changed my life…made me yearn to be a writer as well as inspired me to ‘write’” (12).
14 Cf. Auerbach 1973: “Alice’s essential nature is revealed by her attitude toward animals” (43).
15 Slicer asks, “Should environmental philosophers pay attention to narratives because they contain certain truths that are only possible through story and because stories elicit practical wisdom? Should philosophers be writing such narratives?” (2003, 1).
16 See, for example, the bibliography in Heath’s The Philosopher’s Alice 1974, pp. 244–46.
17 Freud’s word for the condensation that occurs in dreams.
18 “The capacity for biophilia can be “snuffed out” or promulgated by education: “like the capacity to love,” it requires “instruction, example, and validation by a caring adult...active participation of parents, grandparents, teachers” (Orr 1993, 433, 428). Emotive ethics is best taught to children by example rather than precepts. As Claudia put it in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye (1970), when she listens to adults “the edge, the curl, the thrust of their emotions is always clear to Frieda and me. We do not, cannot, know the meanings of all the words, for we are nine and ten years old. So we watch their faces, their hands, their feet, and listen for truth in timbre” (15).
19 For examples of the role of popular culture see Caputi 2007 and Brooker 2004.
20 Cf. Kundera 1984. Animals “were never expelled from Paradise.” “Humani-
ty’s true moral test, its fundamental test, consists of its attitude towards those who are at its mercy: animals. And in this respect human kind has suffered a fundamental debacle, a debacle so fundamental that all others stem from it” (289, 297).
21 Cognitive ethology research has discovered an apparently instinctive association of humans with serpents: vervets have a distinctive sound to warn others of the approach of a serpent; the only other use of that sound is to warn of the approach of humans.
22 This kind of paranoia is much greater today thanks to the power of multimedia, whether children’s cartoons or “documentaries” about fearful predators. Fortunately, multimedia can also be used to combat these phobias: see, for example, Mooallem 2014. On the other hand, this kind of phobia reminds us that literature can be a cause of the problem as well as a solution. In other words, if literature can be bibliotherapy (Bump 1989, 1990), it can also be what I would call “bibliopathology.”
23 For some Victorian readers this may well have recalled how another female, Queen Victoria, used Sikhs to control the other natives of India during the mutiny of 1857, source of one of the greatest Victorian political fears (Her-
bert 2008, 2).
24 Cats, of course, if well fed, do seem to play with mice, but one could argue that they are only developing their hunting skills and/or that they have a kind of innocence no longer available to humans. Carroll’s Sylvie asserts that God
“loves every living thing. Even sinful men. How much more the animals that cannot sin” (1889, 154). Mark Twain provided a more secular explanation: “Of all the animals, man is the only one that is cruel. He is the only one that inflicts pain for the pleasure of doing it. It is a trait that is not known to the higher animals.... Cats are loose in their morals, but not consciously so. Man, in his descent from the cat, has brought the cat’s looseness with him but has left the unconscionness behind (the saving grace which excuses the cat). The cat is innocent, man is not” (Twain 2010, 119–20).


26 In the following century Orwell’s Animal Farm is an obvious representation of the parallels between fear of mutiny of animals and fear of mutiny of the lower classes (Vanity Fair, 1848, Ch. 4).

27 “Denial” is being used here not only in the Freudian but also the ecofeminist sense of “denial of human animality and of ecological embeddedness” (Warkentin 2010, 103).

28 Derrida’s imagery of a war in which we are called to be soldiers and do our duty against “those who violate not only animal life but even and also this sentiment” of compassion (2002, 397) is obviously a masculinist metaphor. Nevertheless, Adams accepts Derrida’s terminology without qualification, perhaps because she insists on the political dimension of a feminist ethic of care (2007, 33; cf. McCance 2013, 94–95).

29 This interview seems to have been ignored by those, such as David Clark (1997, 177; cf. McCance 2013, 148), who do not believe that Derrida supported vegetarianism.

30 An arguable point, especially for people who have little or no access to vegetation. See Sturgeon 2009.

REFERENCES


