The Changing Political Space of Turkey from 2001 to 2004
Ali Çarkoğlu*
Sabancı University
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Orhanlı Tuzla, 81474 Istanbul Turkey
(alicarkoglu@sabanciuniv.edu)

Melvin J. Hinich
Applied Research Laboratories
University of Texas at Austin
Austin TX 78721-1087 U.S.A.
(hinch@ aust in. utexas.edu)

*Author who will receive correspondence.
The Changing Political Space of Turkey from 2001 to 2004

Abstract: The paper focuses on party preferences of Turkish voters within the spatial model of voting and its statistical implementation using survey data. The paper aims at depicting the cognitive organization of voters’ attitudes about issues and evaluations of political parties that compete for their vote across two consecutive surveys in urban settlements. The first one of these surveys in 2001 about 18 months prior to the general election of 2002 is used as an anchor in our analyses of another urban survey conducted in January 2004 only about 10 weeks prior to the local elections in April of the same year. We trace not only the changing nature of the political space that underlies political competition in the country but also locate the shifting positions of the major political parties therein. The spatial maps derived from our surveys show that the dominant ideological dimension sets secularists vs. pro-Islamists as expected from the centre-periphery framework often used in Turkish electoral analyses. The second dimension reflects the transient impact of the recent opposition in the country to the dominant party government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its reformist policies.
THE CHANGING POLITICAL SPACE OF TURKEY
FROM 2001 TO 2004

The coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) after the November 2002 general elections is seen by many as a turning point in Turkish electoral history. The AKP leadership cadres is socialized into politics within the pro-Islamist tradition of the National View (Milli Görüş) movement and the mass electoral bases of support can easily be traced back to the Welfare Party’s (Refah Partisi) election success in the early 1990s which was built on the marginal National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) of the pre-1980 period. However, despite similarities of intellectual origins and mass bases of support to earlier parties and movements, the AKP’s sui generis character is primarily due to its dominating electoral success by obtaining nearly 35% of the popular vote in 2002. This electoral success came with a contemporaneous collapse of the moderate-right parties in the Turkish political system. Although the retreating moderate-right in the electoral scene had been a continuous phenomenon in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, its replacement by a party whose historical intellectual and leadership bases are rooted in the pro-Islamist movement of earlier decades carrying traces of anti-systemic rhetoric has disturbed many in the country. Ever since their coming to power a continual debate has been about the extent to which the AKP can be taken to be the representative of a new moderate orientation in the system. We aim at contributing to this debate by tracing the changes in the character of the political space in Turkey. We estimate a two-dimensional political space and place the major political parties therein on the basis of two surveys carried out before and after the AKP came to power. We then compare the two estimated political spaces with reference to the conventional conceptualization along the left-right (LR) ideological dimension.

The use of the LR terminology in Turkish politics has long been controversial. The western political tradition that gives substance to the rhetoric and party system characteristics on the basis of socialist and communist ideologies that rests upon working class electoral support simply does not exist for the case of Turkey. Similarly, a market based conservative ideological stance rooted in the mass upper and middle class support is also absent. Instead, the Turkish polity rests upon a conceptual model based on the historical heritage of the Ottoman Empire. This model is build around Mardin’s (1973) influential article which argued that Turkish politics rests upon a continual interaction between culturally separated “centre” and “periphery”. The “centre” is conceptualised as a strong and coherent state apparatus run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military and bureaucracy which is built around Kemalist secular principles and follows a state run nationalist modernization program. This centre is confronted by its politically complementing heterogeneous and habitually hostile “periphery”, composed mainly of peasantry, small farmers and artisans. In contrast to relatively more modern centrist groups, the periphery reflects the salient features of a subject and parochial orientation built around often revolt and cynical sentiments toward hierarchical and coercive modernization of the centre and includes regional, religious and ethnic groups with often-conflicting interests and political strategies.

Starting in early 1970s parties have adopted the LR language. However, principally as a result of the rise of nationalist and pro-Islamist agendas and the increasing salience of identity politics in the country during the 1990s, the consequent collapse of the centrist parties, the conceptual appeal of the LR framework has diminished. Parties of the centre within the LR framework have adopted positions primarily in reaction to threats from
these newly rising electoral forces that contradicted expectations on the basis of their positions along the conventional LR perspective. The salience of the conventional constituent parts of the LR dimension, that is, distributional economic issues and the role of the state, seem to have diminished in comparison to newly salient issues of ethnicity, nationalism and pro-Islamism.

The explanatory power of the centre-periphery (CP) model has also become questionable in light of developments in Turkish society. The make-up of socio-economic cleavages in Turkish society has drastically changed over the past half a century. Predominantly rural Turkey of the 1950s with its mostly isolated villages, limited mass education, transportation and communication facilities was perhaps more fitting for the CP framework. Over the past five decades significant advances were made on all dimensions of development that may be taken as a reflection of an integration of the periphery with the centre. The village population share in the first population census of 1927 was 75.8%. A large segment of these villages at the time were isolated settlements without electricity, transportation connection to the rest of the country and educational facilities. Eight decades later, the rural population share is about 35% with nearly no village remaining without electricity, route connections to the national transportation system or primary school facilities. Typical villagers of earlier decades, who lived in closed communities and had little contact with outsiders, are fast disappearing. Rather, the typical villager is more likely to have relatives or former neighbours in the big cities of Turkey or Europe (Toprak, 1996, 94).

However, despite a more open Turkish society, which had largely been integrated through a widened access to communication and transportation, the extent of the transformation into a modern social order is not so clear. Esmer (1999) provides some clues as to the extent of differentiation between the value systems of the centre and the periphery. The level of trust in different institutions is slightly lower for the higher educated representatives of the centre than those relatively lower educated respondents (p.49) of the periphery. In the rural areas respondents seem to be much more supportive of a "powerful" leader and military rule. While the highly educated representatives of the centre seem to believe in the legitimacy of the democratic system in the country, among the peripheral representatives the legitimacy of the democratic system is considerably lower. More striking is the huge differences between the centre and the periphery representatives’ overall levels of tolerance in social relations (p. 88-90).

On the political front Kalayçoğlu’s (1994a) provides evidence of the continuity of CP cleavage. His analysis of the 1990 Turkish Values Survey data reveals “the continued importance of the conflict between the values of the centre versus the values of the periphery” (p.422) which has come to be signified by religiosity. Besides religiosity, other variables reflecting peripheral traits such as ethnicity and place of residence are also found to be significant in voting decisions of Turkish voters (Kalayçoğlu, 1999:64-66; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000:117-118).

From the perspective of the party system we also see a continuing relevance of the CP framework with notable shifts in its disposition. In the early years of competitive elections in Turkey the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) brought together the diverse peripheral forces and dominated the polls. This peripheral coalition of the DP was shattered by the 1961 coup into three groups, one representing moderate right-wing, the others ultra-nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. The centrist tradition of the CHP
which inherited the founding military and bureaucratic elites of the Republican regime was also broken by the 1980 coup. The relatively stricter secularist CHP was joined by the DSP portraying a more nationalist and concessionary position on secularism as the two major representatives of this tradition. However, in 2002 the DSP almost disappeared from the electoral scene. This CP picture of the state of the Turkish party system became more complicated with the rise to power of AKP in 2002 by almost disowning their Nationalist View heritage and trying to portray a conservative but nevertheless systemic right-wing ideological stand. Our ensuing estimates of the political space in 2001 are based on data preceding the founding of AKP in the summer of 2001. We thus compare the AKP positions with the preceding pro-Islamist party the FP and a hypothetical “very religious leader”. However, our findings provide clues as to the reasons for their remarkable success in November 2002.

Our objective here is to offer a framework of analysis for the changing political space in Turkey and address the issue of shifting character of Turkish ideological competition. We anchor our analyses back to an earlier estimation of the urban political space in 2001 about 18 months prior to the general election of 2002. Our new estimation is based again on an urban sample survey conducted in January only about 10 weeks prior to the local elections in April 2004. As such, we aim at tracing not only the changing nature of the political space that underlies political competition in the country but also aim at locating the shifting positions of the major political parties therein. Our 2001 estimation provides a point of reference for the then approaching watershed elections of 2002 that reflects a summary of linkages between different issues that shaped the agenda of the country moving towards the general election. Our 2004 estimation provides a similar linkage this time moving towards a local election under the control of the AKP in the executive office for a little more than a year.

We specifically ask the following questions: Is the underlying ideological structure of Turkish voters’ preferences of political parties changing after the AKP’s coming to power in 2002? Do we still observe in this new picture of the political space the reflections of the CPcleavage? Are the divisive issues around the Copenhagen political criteria adjustment reforms being reflected in the perception maps of the political space in Turkey? We thus hope to first diagnose any changes in the nature of the political space over a period of three years that overlapped with not only a significant electoral campaign but also about a year in government for a party that often is seen as a new breed of pro-Islamist politicians. Below we first present a short overview of the political background of the 2004 municipal elections and then present our new estimates of the political space in Turkey and its determinants to diagnose its shifting nature.

**Political Background for Local Elections of 2004**

Unlike previous ones, the March 2004 local elections have not generated much uncertainty or excitement and only dominated the public agenda over the last few weeks of the election campaign. From the very beginning, it was clear to the enthusiasts of Turkish electoral politics that the AKP and the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP) would be the two dominant parties in the elections. What remained uncertain was the size of these parties’ gains or losses relative to their vote shares in the general election of November 2002. However, the ideological debate and the party
positions adopted therein gives clues as to the direction the Turkish party system was headed for the next general election due to be held in 2007.

The much-publicized pre-election polls uniformly predicted large gains of support for AKP, while projecting a level of support for CHP similar to its November 2002 vote share. No other party in the polls came even close to these two parties (See Table 1 below). However, these were local elections after all. Their dynamics are quite different from a general election and their results are even harder to forecast than the often unpredictable general election.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Comparisons of the predictions and the realized vote shares show that AKP has indeed increased, while CHP decreased, their vote shares from November 2002 to March 2004. However, AKP remained well below 50%, which we were led to believe by some of the pre-election polls to be handily exceeded prior to elections. On the other hand, CHP’s vote share shrunk by a larger margin than expected according to most of the pre-election polls. Contrary to expectations, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP) as well as the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) received respectable shares of the vote with both parties receiving close to 10%. The pro-Islamist competitor of AKP, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP), the Union of Democratic Forces (Demokratik Güç Birligi) of the Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halk Partisi-SHP) and the Kurdish ethnicity-based Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP) all received around 4 to 5% of the vote. The Young Party (Genc Parti-GP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) and the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) each netted less than 3%. In short, the municipal election results show that while AKP’s support base was expanding two of the opposition parties from the peripheral constituencies, the MHP and the DYP were also maintaining their electoral credibility by expanding their support base at the expense of the main opposition the CHP which suffered minor loss of support.

The March 2004 participation rate was lower than the November 2002 level at 74% down from 79.1%. Plurality rule applied in mayoral elections and the already expected large margin of victory for AKP have both contributed to lower participation rate. However, the total number of votes received by AKP in the provincial general assembly elections increased by about 1.5 million compared to November 2002.

The geographical spread of the AKP vote shows a striking domination all over the country with 58 municipalities captured. CHP, in contrast, won a total of 8 municipalities, all being in coastal Anatolia and Thrace. MHP and SHP won 4 municipalities each. DSP won 3, DYP won 1 and SP won 1, while independent candidates won 2 municipalities in the Eastern provinces. AKP’s municipality losses were in the most developed coastal provinces and the least developed southeastern provinces where either strong personalities ran as mayoral candidates or the ethnic Kurdish vote predominantly supported AKP’s competitors.

The underlying theme in local elections of March 28th has been the perceived success of AKP since it assumed the executive office in November 2002. Despite two considerable foreign policy difficulties at the very start of this tenure, AKP successfully managed to maintain credibility through its keeping inflation under control and overseeing 5.8%
economic growth in 2003. On the European front, AKP’s December 2002 efforts to obtain a firm commitment for the start of membership negotiations did not result in much of anything other than a “date for a date” settlement. Turkey’s bid for membership reached the negotiation stage only at the end of 2004 after a stressful process of close watch by the European Commission on the progress in legal adjustments for compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and their implementation. The first few weeks of 2003 also witnessed AKP’s hesitant foreign policy on the then fast developing Iraqi conflict. The AKP-dominated Turkish Parliament unexpectedly failed to support the government’s recommendation to allow the United States to deploy troops to northern Iraq through Turkish territory. Rising tensions between Ankara and Washington peaked in July 2003 when US troops arrested a small Turkish military liaison unit in northern Iraq. The strategic alliance between Turkey and the United States, that had once seemed rock solid, then became, at best, questionable. However, on domestic front, the government’s popularity seems to have increased because of its ultimate non-intervention in the Iraqi war. One important consequence of these uncertainties in foreign policy was a strict adherence to the economic austerity program, which resulted in a noteworthy improvement in the economy. As a result, at the beginning of 2004, surveys showed significant rise in optimistic economic expectations for the future. A survey conducted just prior to the local election of 2004 reports that 55% of the respondents expect better economic conditions over the next one year while only 18% expects deterioration. More significant, 65% reports improvement in the economy over the next three years while only 14% expects deterioration over the same period. Similarly, ratings of central government service delivery nearly doubled and trust in central government institutions significantly increased compared to similar measurements in 2000 (Adaman, et al., 2005).

Turkish voters do not typically give foreign policy issues much consideration in their decision to vote. However, strong support for EU membership seems to have helped maintain support for the AKP’s commitment to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria and resolve the conflict in Cyprus. Relative improvements in relations with the US during the months leading to the 2004 elections also helped relieve the potential feeling of isolation in world politics among the electorate.

The fact that AKP’s number of votes has significantly increased in local elections despite lower voter participation rates than November 2002 indicates that AKP continues to carve into moderate electoral constituencies. Among its moderate-right competitors, DYP remained stagnant just below 10% while ANAP’s votes continued to shrink by about an additional 50%. On the other hand, extreme-right MHP managed to increase its share by about 25% compared to 2002. This could be attributed to the shrinking populist GP support. However, geographically speaking, MHP’s and GP’s support bases do not overlap at all. While MHP has predominantly a central Anatolian support base, GP receives its votes mostly from western coastal provinces. Micro survey evidence also suggests that the voter profiles of GP and MHP have very little in common. It is equally not plausible to claim that MHP voters from 2002 have totally remained loyal to the MHP and its candidates in 2004. A more reasonable explanation is that AKP was able to attract voters from the moderate as well as extreme right-wing parties, including the MHP. The fact that the MHP was able to keep, and even increase, its vote share despite AKP’s competition in the provincial general assembly votes is an indication of the organizational ability of the MHP to mobilize and attract voters. Some experts in the media have claimed that this is due to uneasiness among the electorate concerning the developments on the Cyprus front. The above-referred survey by Adaman et al. (2005) suggests that for the
Turkish electorate, foreign policy issues, including the debate over the Cyprus conflict or issues under the EU adjustment process do not constitute an important concern for the urban electorate. Yet as we will underline below, the impact of foreign policy and related issues might be larger in molding the political space and the ideological positioning therein.

What is critical in AKP’s classification along the conventional LR continuum is surely the degree to which it is committed to the pro-Islamist agenda and traditionally conservative constituencies. The expanded electoral base of AKP may be enough to safely claim that its support cannot simply be taken as a reflection of rising Islamic vote in the country. The voters, who joined the AKP support base over the last three years, come from a variety of centrist party bases and there is little basis for claiming that they were attracted to AKP on the basis of its emphasis on pro-Islamist issues. Two separate surveys conducted two years after our fieldwork in 2006 also provide evidence that while Islamic rhetoric might be on the rise, the political demands of the pro-Islamist agenda have not been rising in popularity among the masses. More specifically, we observe that approval of the Shari’a rule has continually dropped below 10% from its peak in early 1990s when nearly one out of five voters was supportive of a Shari’a rule.5

However, AKP voters still show a considerable degree of conservatism compared to competing party supporters. The content of this conservatism does include elements, which clearly see the banning of headscarves (turban) from higher education and administrative posts as an important issue to be resolved. Thus, they are clearly challenging the traditional secularist interpretations of the bases of the Republican regime. Similarly, demands for policy changes concerning the religious schools for preachers (Imam Hatip Okullari-IHO) are running high among some segments of AKP voters. However, it is questionable as to whether the AKP leadership will choose to cater into these pro-Islamist challenges or rather remain ambiguous and irresponsible to these expectations and demands. The enlarged electoral base of the AKP should allow party leadership more room to maneuver and resist these demands from segments of their electoral constituencies. Assuming that the AKP leadership is not ideologically pre-committed to pro-Islamist policy preferences and relying on the observation that Turkish electorate is predominantly located around centrist positions in single or multi-dimensional political space, the AKP seems to have more to gain by sticking to centrist positions and avoiding much association with the perceived extremist positions concerning the turban issue and IHOs.6 This is primarily because their newly gained voters are less likely to remain loyal if the AKP leadership chose to go down the path of polarizing the electorate on questions loaded with Islamic symbols and conservative argumentation.

Another element reshaping the political space during the AKP’s tenure in the executive branch concerns the performance of the economy. Since the recent increase in AKP support is primarily linked to widespread optimism about the economy, as long as the economy continues to perform acceptably well, it seems unlikely that AKP support bases will disintegrate and shift to other new or already exiting parties. If the economy continues to perform well then the only two other issues that could move and shake electoral positions are likely to be first, the debate on EU membership and the legal and political reform process underway to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria that touches also on issues of foreign policy and thus the Cyprus conflict. Although the accession negotiations with the EU had started at the end of 2004 after the municipality
elections of the Spring of 2004, the Cyprus issue remained blocked during the AKP’s tenure. At the time of the local elections of 2004 both of the EU and the Cyprus conflict were slowly but firmly being address in the political space. We illustrate below how both issues play within the new ideological constellations of the parties. Second issue of electoral relevance continues to be the Kurdish minority issues especially within the framework of a *sui generis* administrative Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq.

The linkage of the Northern Iraqi situation to Turkish electoral space is through the positions taken and performances shown by the ethnic Kurdish political parties in the Southeastern Anatolia region as well as the rest of the country. Compared to DEHAP’s 2002 performance, the election coalition of SHP/DEHAP suffered considerable losses. Some have commented, prematurely, that these results show the erosion of ethnic-based Kurdish electoral politics in the country. If one takes into account the municipal service expectations in the southeastern Anatolia provinces, these results could only be interpreted as a sign of a safe bet on the part of the voters for receiving the much needed attention and service delivery to the region by the AKP administration. Moreover, the unfolding developments in northern Iraq also could have had a decisive effect on voters’ decision to support the ruling party in order to once again secure Ankara’s attention and electoral interest until the next general election. The left-wing ideological emphasis of SHP might also be partly responsible for lower than expected support from Kurdish constituencies, which also have traditionally shown conservative cultural tendencies and have in the past supported the pro-Islamist RP in significant numbers. One should also note that in the aftermath of August 2002 legislative packages that lifted bans on broadcasting and teaching of Kurdish was not yet fully implemented at the time of the municipality elections of 2004 and thus their impact upon the political space remained at best uncertain at the time.

Following mass protests against any military involvement in Iraq prior to the start of the war, up until the municipality elections the Turkish public remained very much silent to recent momentous developments in the occupied Iraq and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The media coverage of both conflicts was typically shallow and secondary to domestic politics. On the Iraqi front, the Turkish public opinion had almost single-mindedly focused on developments in northern Iraq and the policies of the Kurdish entity therein. Potential portrayal of developments in Kurdish controlled northern Iraq, as a prelude to a Kurdish state in the minds of the laymen on the street, was seen as a fertile ground by the opposition for building a nationalist reaction to AKP tenure.

What we see in these developments is first a normalization of the political agenda in the country where the AKP is the dominant party in government and thus opposition almost solely targets its policies in the government. Second, a continued divide along the center-periphery cleavage seem to take place between the governing representatives of the peripheral pro-Islamist masses with conservative leanings that often come together behind EU reforms for a better functioning democracy within the framework of adjustments to the Copenhagen criteria of the EU. This new and fragile coalition of pro-EU forces led by the AKP is increasingly opposed by a new coalition of cynical centrist secularists which seem to form a reactionary coalition with nationalist forces of the periphery which is mobilized by the EU related democratic reforms and new foreign policy environment that surround the country necessitating new and bold stands on the issue of Cyprus, the Middle East and Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Balkans and the wider Europe as well as trans Atlantic cooperation with USA and its policies in neighboring Iraq. Both of these
developments continue to be salient in the political agenda of the country heading for the next general election. As such, the context of the municipality elections of 2004 provides a first glance at the newly shaping political space in the country. Hence our analyses should provide valuable insights as to the trajectory of developments in the ideological party competition towards the end of the first term of the AKP in office.

We now turn to the methodology and data used in our analysis.

METHODS AND DATA

Our method involves estimation of a latent ideological space on the basis of individual voters’ evaluations of major parties in the party system. Intuitively our approach is similar to the problem of estimating positions of a set of targets in a multidimensional Euclidean space from distances reported by a number of observers who do not know their own positions in the space. Each observer, or voter in our example, reports the distance from the observer to each target plus or minus a random error.7 The method used in this paper deals with estimating the locations of political parties and the voter positions from data that are functions of the Euclidean or squared Euclidean distances between voters and political parties observed with an additive random error. Our approach has an additional advantage over the scaling and unfolding in psychological applications which do not use a utility-based theory. We follow Enelow and Hinich’s (1984) utility-based choice theory.8 This approach links utility maximizing voters to parties competing for their support in a multidimensional space shaped by salient issues on the public agenda. We thus estimate the structure of the party positions with respect to voters’ own positions in a latent political space. We then link issues of importance for voters and parties alike to these positions to provide a basis for interpreting the meaning of the estimated latent political space.

Without going into the details of our methodology we underline two critical assumptions relating the data to a spatial model.9 First, the scores given to each party is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing function of the Euclidian distance between the position of the party in the space and the most preferred ideological position (or the ‘ideal point’) of the respondent. No explicit articulation about this latent ideal point is required. Second, we assume that the constellation of party positions in the latent space is the same across all respondents. Only ideal points differ from respondent to respondent. We first determine the dimensionality of the political space from the individual evaluations of the distance of each party from their ideal points. Next we estimate the party positions and the ideal points for the individuals.

Our data comes from a nation-wide representative survey of urban population conducted in January 2004.10 A total of 1232 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 12 of the 81 provinces. The questionnaires were administered, between 10th January and 8th February 2004, by using a “random sampling” method with an objective to represent the nation-wide voting age urban population living within municipality borders, in which the urban eligible voter figures of 2002 election were taken as the basis.11

When asking for evaluations of our respondents concerning parties and their leaders we used the following wording: “How your family’s welfare would be affected in case the
following party leaders were to come to power alone and become the prime minister? 1
denotes the worst possible impact and 10 denotes the best possible impact. Increasing
scores from 1 to 10 denote improving impact on your family’s condition.” Then for each
one of the five major parties we reminded its party leader’s name and asked for an
evaluation. Additionally we also asked evaluations for the ex-Motherland Party leader
Mesut Yiğım and for the older generation Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan who stood
close to SP. Figure 1 below shows the relative standings of party leaders with respect to
one another.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The mean thermometer scores of party leaders show a clear advantageous standing for the
AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan. At the time of our survey in January-February 2004
Erdoğan’s mean evaluation score was more than twice as large as his closest followers
DYP leader Mehmet Ağar and CHP leader Deniz Baykal. The MHP leader Devlet
Bahçeli, the old generation Islamist SP leader Recai Kutan and the ethnic Kurdish
DEHAP leader Tuncer Bakırhan came surprisingly close to one another. The ex-party
leaders Erbakan and Yiğım were rated favorably above only for the GP leader Cem Uzan
who had suffered from corrupt business deals in the aftermath of the November 2002
election. Most striking in this picture is the observation that the ruling AKP government
and its leader at the time of our fieldwork are rated with the highest scores.

A SPATIAL MAP OF ISSUE DIMENSIONS IN TURKISH POLITICS

As a first step in our analysis we estimate the spatial positions of the seven parties
evaluated by our respondents following the procedures in Enelow and Hinich (1984,
chapter 9). Figure 2 presents the two-dimensional estimates of these party positions in this
space in comparison to our earlier estimate of the political space and positions of parties
therein with a similar urban sample data. Looking at Figure 2, we observe that parties are
clearly differentiated on the two dimensions.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

Concentrating first on the 2004 estimates we see several interesting patterns. First, we
observe that while the first dimension differentiates the right-wing opposition of the DYP
and MHP on the right hand side from the left-wing CHP opposition, the second dimension
posits ethnic Kurdish DEHAP on the upper end standing apart from the CHP on the lower
end. The only party whose relative position on the political space remained constant is
DEHAP which remains on the left end of the first and the upper extreme of the second
dimension. All other parties’ relative positions have significantly shifted. Looking into the
movements of the parties on this political space we secondly observe that by far the most
significant shift in the perceptions of the voters has taken place in the positioning of the
CHP which now defines the extreme position on both dimensions. In 2001 however, the
CHP had a defining position on the left end of the first dimension while remaining centrist
on the second. In 2004 however, the CHP has traveled the longest distance in the
perceptions of the voter to the south-west end of the political space.

The two right-wing opposition parties, the DYP and the MHP, have both moved to
the right-end of the first dimension. While the DYP’s repositioning tended towards more
extremist positions on both dimensions (a south-eastward movement in other words), the MHP had moderated its position in the second dimension while moving more towards the extreme on the first (a north-eastward movement).

Since the AKP was not in existence at the time of our first fieldwork we cannot present a direct movement of its positions from 2001 to 2004. However, we have a position estimate for the FP in 2001 and a position estimate for both the younger generation AKP and the older generation SP in 2004 for the Islamist camp. Both of these positions are to the north-west of the FP in 2001 suggesting a moderation in the perceptions of the voters on both dimensions. Such a repositioning suggests first that in the eyes of the Turkish urban voters the AKP’s position in the Turkish ideological space is no longer extremist on the first dimension and has a clear upper center location on the second dimension which used to be in the colorless center for the 2001 estimates. The CHP’s relocation on the political space looks like a mirror opposite of the movement of the AKP. The CHP abandons the centrist position in the second dimension and adopts a clear extremist stance in both dimensions. The right-wing competitors of the AKP seems to attempt to fill in the gap left open on the right-end of the first dimension while maintaining a clear lower-end position on the second remaining close to the position of the CHP in the second dimension. In other words, what seems to surface from these movements is a new ideological positioning within the party system that seeks polarization primarily along the second but also to some lower extent on the first dimension as well.

Looking at the same picture from the perspective of vote choice by respondents as of early 2004 we observe several important patterns (see Figure 3 below). First is the observation that the two parties that experienced a rise in their vote share, that is the MHP and the DYP, are closest in the perceived positions in the estimated political space to their constituencies. In comparison, the CHP constituency is farthest away from the assumed stance of their party. Similarly, DEHAP constituency is farther to the north-east of our estimated political space and take up an isolated position compared to the other party constituencies. Both parties with a pro-Islamist background the AKP and the SP, have constituencies that are relatively more moderate than their perceived party positions along especially the second dimension. However, it is clear that the AKP constituency is more to the center of the two dimensions than all other parties except the GP and the undecided voters as well as those who assert to cast their vote for none of the available parties. The DSP constituency takes a position similar to that of the CHP in 2001. The most striking feature of this picture is the isolated positions taken up by DEHAP, DSP, CHP, MHP and DYP constituencies and their parties. It seems that unlike the previous political space obtained with 2001 data, the extreme ends of our two dimensions are occupied and thus defined by the positions taken by the DEHAP and the CHP on the second dimension and the CHP, MHP and DYP on the first. It is remarkable that the AKP remains relatively moderately positioned on both dimensions staying close together with the GP, ANAP and the SP. This picture looks more like a reflection of different strategies followed by the opposition to the AKP government pressuring their tenure from different angles. The DEHAP exerts a pressure on the basis of ethnic Kurdish nationalism demanding more democratic reforms and recognition of cultural minority rights of their Kurdish constituency together with economic policy initiatives to address rampant poverty in the Kurdish dominated regions of the country. The CHP takes a contrary position and stress a nationalist stance against any initiative for further democratic reform within the EU adjustment framework. As such it remains farther apart from economic policy pressures for further emphasis on policies that address poverty in the country. The DYP and MHP
share the spirit of the nationalist emphasis levied by the CHP while leaning more to the right extreme end of the first dimension suggesting that they aim at exploiting weaknesses of the AKP facing their conservative constituencies in moving towards the center of the political space.

Keeping these movements in mind we now seek to provide an interpretation of the political space on the basis of some salient issues and demographic characteristics of our sample respondents. Figures 4a and b show mean ideal point estimates for different groups and issue stands for the 2004 sample.

We see from Figure 4a that average positions of two large minority groups in the Turkish polity help define differentiation along the two dimensions. Those who speak Kurdish and those who do not are not only differentiated on the first but also on the second dimension. Kurdish speakers are to the left and non-Kurdish speakers are to the right of the first dimension. Alevis however, are to the left of the first but to the lower end of the second dimension. However, Kurds and Alevis are distant to one another on both the first and the second dimension. Similarly, larger province center dwellers are to the south-west of the smaller district center dwellers. This also makes sense when one considers the fact that Alevism has become a phenomenon of the larger province centers over the last decades and smaller Anatolian centers had lost significant portions of their Alevi communities (see Shankland, 2003).

Happiness with the way Turkish democracy works does not differentiate much along the second dimension, but those who are not happy with the way Turkish democracy works are significantly to the left of those who are happy on the first dimension. The fact that those who are happy with the way democracy functions in the country are closer to the right-end of the first dimension which is defined by a peripheral pro-Islamism is worthy of note. It suggests that the left leaning secularist center constituencies are not happy with the way democracy works leading one to think that those evaluations are reflective of ideological closeness to the ruling party.

Those who prefer to cooperate with Israel are significantly to the left of the first dimension as opposed to others who prefer cooperation with the other Middle Eastern countries. Differentiation of these two groups along the second dimension is very little. Similarly, supporters of EU membership are at the center while those who are opposed to membership are to the right end of the first dimension with no differentiation along the second dimension. In other words, the right-end of the first dimension tends to be occupied by voters that support closer links with the Middle Eastern countries as opposed to Israel and tend to disapprove of the EU membership. As such they stand closer to the MHP and DYP than to neither the AKP nor the CHP.

Figure 4b provides depiction of stands among a different set of sub-sample groups. Largest differentiation in this group of variables appears between those who are happy at work and those who are not. The unhappy group is closer to the Kurdish speakers and those who are undecided about their party of choice as of early 2004 and to those who claim their not going to vote for any of the existing parties. Dissatisfaction with work and
unhappiness with the way the Turkish democracy works is thus closely associated with protest vote and no participation in elections. The happier group is closer to those who consider family income to be sufficient to meet needs. Attitudes towards neighborhood residents are differentiated along the first dimension but not much along the second. There appears no difference between men and women with respect to our two dimensions. Feelings of safety in one’s neighborhood differentiate voters more along the first dimension than along the second. Similarly those who think that different identities exist in their neighborhood thus that their neighborhood is identity wise heterogeneous are more to the left of the first dimension than to the right suggesting that the right end of the first dimension is composed of individuals who do not perceive much heterogeneity in their neighborhood compared to the other end of this dimension. The fact that Alevis are farthest away from this group is also noticeable suggesting that Alevi communities and those that are predominantly Sunni are not much mixed.

Figure 4c captures the conventional LR divide as reflected by our two-dimensional depiction of the Turkish political space much better. We see that the previously noted overlap with the LR dimension in our first dimension is still valid three years after the first diagnosis. To the left end of the first dimension, individuals who consider themselves to be not religious are to be found whereas on the opposite side those who consider themselves to be religious are placed. Interest in politics and hope for the future differentiates individuals along the second dimension but not much along the first. Those who are (not) interested in politics are closer in our political space to those who are not much hopeful (who are hopeful) for the future.

What is most striking in this picture that captures the newly rising dynamics of political reactions towards the single-party government of the AKP concerns the EU and Greek-Turkish relations in Cyprus. Those who agree with the statement that the EU rejects Turkey for its being a predominantly Muslim country are placed to the south-east corner of our map. This group is distant to CHP but closer to the DYP and MHP and far out on the Islamist end of the first dimension. Similarly, those who do not support Greek and Turks living together in mixed fashion on the island of Cyprus are closer to this Islamist reactionary group while their opponents who support some degree of mixed existence on the island are distant in the north western corner of our figure.

When we turn to a multivariate analysis of the variation among our respondents along our two estimated dimensions we obtain the following results in Table 2 below. Table 2 shows several notable patterns that suggest a significant shift in the structure of the political space compared to earlier analysis in Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006). One is the insignificant impact of religiosity upon the first dimension but a significant positive impact upon the second which in comparison to the first one enjoys a higher rate of explanation. This alone is a significant shift from the earlier map where the first dimension fitted the data relatively better. Ethnicity impact is insignificant on both dimensions again in stark contrast to 2001 results that showed a defining influence of Kurdish ethnicity upon the second dimension. Similarly, after controlling for the influences of other variables the Alevi community members are not significantly different from the rest of the sample on both dimensions. Education levels are also insignificant in explaining variation along both of our dimensions. This again is in stark contrast to earlier map estimates of 2001 where education levels had significant impact on especially the second dimension.
However, ownership of different goods and family expenditures turn out to be significant in adding some explanatory power to our models. The ownership status has positive impact on the first and negative on the second dimensions. This suggests that more well-off respondents are moving south-east on our political map where the DYP and MHP are placed. Relatively lower status individuals however are moving north-west where the AKP and DEHAP are placed closer. On solely the ownership status basis such a placement is obviously beneficial for the mass attractiveness of the AKP and problematic for the case of the CHP which does not seem to benefit from any upward or downward move on this variable. Higher income levels however have a counterbalancing impact on the first dimension where increasing family income pushes the individuals toward the left hand side of this dimension. Future expectations about the family income and country’s economy have opposite influences upon the two dimensions. While a pessimistic expectation about family finances push individuals to the right on the first dimension an optimistic expectation pulls them to the left. However, neither of these expectations appears significant for the second dimension.

Interest in politics and LR self-placement scores are also significant with positive coefficients on the first dimension. This suggests that other things being equal individuals who are more interested in politics tend to be on the right hand side of the first dimension. Movements towards the right on self-evaluated LR scores also tend to be associated with rightward movement on the first suggesting once again that this dimension largely overlaps with conventional LR. However, LR is not significant in explaining movements along the second dimension which in 2001 was not the case.

EU support does not appear to be significant for either one of the two equations. This is again surprising since the second dimension is portrayed as reflection of the changing Turkish landscape under the influence of EU related reforms. However we see that evaluations about EU are alleged or impending rejection of Turkish membership provides a clue as to the nature of this dimension. Our survey included assessment of the following assertion: “EU does not want Turkey simply because it is Muslim country.” Those who tend to agree with this statement lie on what we call the reactionary end of the second dimension. We see that the second dimension is defined primarily by this evaluation, the partisan preferences, religiosity, age and ownership status. Higher self-evaluated religiosity, younger aged and lower ownership status respondents who think that EU’s rejection of Turkey is not necessarily due to its being a Muslim country appear on the higher end of this dimension where AKP and ethnic Kurdish DEHAP are also to be found. The CHP, MHP, DYP constituencies are all negatively predisposed on this dimension.

As to the first dimension however, we see that the MHP and DYP are relatively more to the right of the AKP while the CHP and DEHAP are to the left of the AKP. Individuals who are on the rightist side of the of the conventional self-evaluation on the LR scale, who do not support closer ties with Israel at the expense of the other Middle Eastern countries and those who are interested in politics and who are of relatively higher ownership status with positive prospective evaluations about Turkey’s economy while at the same time have positive expectations about their own family’s financial conditions about the past year are to be found on the right side of the first dimension.
CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions are worthy of underlining from our analyses. First, we see that the overall structure of the political space has largely remained the same while significant deviations on certain aspects are also diagnosed. It seems clear that the first dimension is an *a la Turca* reflection of a dominant LR ideological divide. The Turkishness of this dimension derives from the fact that it separates the pro-Islamist “periphery” from the secularist “centre”. As such, the political space continues to reflect the CP cleavage with some modern day caveats to be underlined. Our second dimension posits the Kurds as opposed to the Alevi and as such is reflective of the minority politics of ethnic and sectarian grounds. It also sets the AKP and DEHAP against the CHP, DYP and MHP. On the northern end of this dimension reformist, pro-EU positions which co-exists together with ethnic Kurdish nationalism is more likely to be found. However, at the opposing southern end a reactionary anti-EU, status quoits Turkish nationalist positions are likely to be found.

The most striking feature of this picture is that the Alevi and the CHP constituencies with left-leaning secularist positions are isolated from the rest of the country’s constituencies. There seems to exist two other groupings of positions taken as polar opposites to these reactionary statist Turkish nationalist positions. One is the relatively more pro-EU and reformist constituencies with relatively higher levels of religiosity that lie closer to the AKP. This group also overlaps with Kurdish nationalist or pro-Kurdish minority rights rhetoric. The fact that Kurdish and religious groups overlap with pro-EU positions is a remarkable new development in Turkish politics. With AKP in power this no longer seems to be the case. Such new positioning is a potentially revolutionary transformation in Turkish politics where traditionally Islamism has remained distant to the EU cause. The second group distinctly opposed to the secularist Alevi CHP coalition in the Turkish political space is the one formed by the DYP and MHP constituencies that stand closer to pro-Islamists which remain distant to the EU and cooperation with Israel but closer to maintaining stronger ties with the Middle Eastern countries. In other words, one group of opposition to the AKP in power seems to be the secularist camp headed by the CHP in close proximity with the Alevi constituency. Yet another is the group that seems to adopt a position of hitting the AKP with its own strong Islamist heritage by remaining closer to the right end of the LR and the Islamist circles. The AKP is seems squeezed in between these two oppositions and left as the dominant party with a clear EU reformist position. The CHP have left the reformist, pro-EU camp as well as its support concerning the protection and advancement of the Kurdish minority rights. It is positioned to exploit the anti-EU, nationalist rhetoric. The “right of center” represented here by the DYP and MHP is back into its original anti-EU position. A similar position taken on this dimension by the CHP is likely to pull them further down on this axis.

Similar to the results obtained in 2001 the undecided and protest voters are closer to the center of these two dimensions where the AKP is the dominant player but a right leaning ANAP is also present. What is most striking for 2004 in contrast to 2001 results is that the centre is no longer left empty. It is still the most heavily populated area on our estimated political space but this time a major player like the AKP and two relatively minor players like the ANAP, the GP and the SP are also positioned to appeal to some voters therein. The position of the SP is most likely due to their similarity to the AKP in the eyes of
respondents but carries no credible appeal to the centrist constituencies as does the AKP. However, the ANAP and the GP together with the AKP standing close to the center of the political space is a new phenomenon. The fact that the center is abandoned by the CHP and the DYP and the MHP is also of potentially disastrous and far reaching consequences. If these parties fail to appeal to the centrist constituencies then their electoral performance may significantly suffer. As a result, the AKP could come to dominate the electoral results transforming the Turkish party system into a dominant party system. As such, the content and thus the nature of the Turkish political centre will also be transformed. More likely this transformation will reflect the issue positions that help bring the AKP to a dominant position and thus carry traces of pro-EU reformist policy stands and not the remnants of the AKP’s original ideological positions reflecting traditional pro-Islamist stances.
References

Adaman, F., A. Çarkoğlu and B. Şenatalar (2005). Toplumun Kamu Yönetimine, Kamu Hizmetlerine ve Reforma Bakışı (Approaches to Public Administration, Public Services and Reform in Turkish Society) in Turkish, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) publications.


Notes:

1 Two major sects dominate the Turkish religious scene: the Sunnis and Alevis. The society is divided further into competing religious schools (mezhep) primarily on the Sunni side. Equally important is the divide between those who take Sunni Islam seriously in organizing their lifestyles and those who take a secular or anti-clerical (laik) view of life. The Alevis minority tends to support the secularist policies, which provide protection against Sunni infringements in their religious freedoms. We thus use the term pro-Islamist here referring to Sunni reactionism to secularist Republican establishment.


3 For example, while 37 percent of the rural respondents agree with the statement that in democracies maintenance of public order will be difficult, among urban settlers only 26 percent seem to agree with this argument (p.80).

4 In local elections it is customary to compare the provincial general assembly vote shares, which are seen to move in close relation with the partisan attachments of the electorate, with the general election results, rather than the mayoral elections, which are seen to be affected more by personality of the candidates. Unless otherwise noted we will also follow this custom in the ensuing analyses.

5 Çarkoğlu (2004) clearly shows that despite these high rates of support for a Shari’a regime voters seem to have no support for the implications of a Shari’a rule in the country. Civic Law arrangements concerning marriage, inheritance law and legal rights of women in courts are predominantly supported by the masses. See Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2006) and Çarkoğlu and Kalayçoğlu (2006) on the development of popular bases of pro-Islamist movement in Turkey.

6 For examples of the centrist tendencies of the Turkish electorate see Çarkoğlu and Kalayçoğlu (2007) on a single dimensional left-right exposition and Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) on a two-dimensional perspective.

7 This statistical problem is the basic model for the various forms of what is called multidimensional unfolding in the psychometric literature (see Borg and Groenen, 1997). Multidimensional scaling and unfolding has been applied in marketing, anthropology, psychology, and sociology (Weller and Romney, 1990), political science (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1991, 1997 and Poole, 2000), and in engineering signal processing (Cahoon and Hinich, 1976).

8 The method builds on Cahoon (1975), Cahoon, Hinich and Ordeshook (1978) and Hinich (1978).

9 Since our analysis here is merely an application of the techniques developed elsewhere we refrain from going into any technical details which can be found in Enelow and Hinich (1984), chapter 9; Hinich (1978); Hinich and Munger (1994).

10 Nearly 35 percent of the Turkish population lives in rural settlements that are not included in our sample. Just a generation ago in 1980 the share of rural population was 56 percent. Accordingly, a large segment of the urban dwellers are either born in rural areas or are newcomers to the cities and thus are expected to possess preferences and attitudes similar to rural settlers. The timing of our research could also conceivably have temporal peculiarities. However, until new data becomes available we have no basis for judging the extent to which rural-urban divide is significant or to what extent our results are time-wise sensitive.

11 Details of the sampling procedure can be obtained from the authors. Under the assumption of simple random sampling, a sample size of 1232 is expected to have a confidence interval of 95% with an error margin of ±2,8%.
### Table 1. Polling Firms’ Predictions for March 2004 Local Elections*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm</th>
<th>Provincial General Assembly Election</th>
<th>General Election November 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A&amp;G</td>
<td>49,1</td>
<td>41,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAR</td>
<td>45,2</td>
<td>34,43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLLMARK</td>
<td>51,3</td>
<td>19,41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESAR</td>
<td>48,9</td>
<td>8,35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>19,1</td>
<td>18,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>8,3</td>
<td>10,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td>9,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHP/DEHAP</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>5,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>3,7</td>
<td>2,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>1,7</td>
<td>2,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>2,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 2. Determinants of Positions on the Two Dimensions-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Dimension</th>
<th>Second Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-1.93 0.13</td>
<td>-0.77 0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.01 0.26</td>
<td>-0.02 0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (=1 for men, 0 for women)</td>
<td>-0.22 0.48</td>
<td>0.55 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for primary junior high</td>
<td>0.06 0.91</td>
<td>-0.42 0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for highschool</td>
<td>-0.38 0.36</td>
<td>-1.13 0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for university plus</td>
<td>-0.60 0.44</td>
<td>-0.80 0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership (Additive)</td>
<td>0.02 0.05</td>
<td>-0.02 0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Expenses (Additive)</td>
<td>-1.90E-04 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness with family income</td>
<td>0.09 0.20</td>
<td>0.01 0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for those who indicate that gov policies had a bad impact on their family's finances</td>
<td>0.21 0.73</td>
<td>0.17 0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for those who are not satisfied with their present day finances</td>
<td>0.46 0.24</td>
<td>0.30 0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for those who indicate that their family finances will deteriorate over the next year</td>
<td>-1.27 0.05</td>
<td>0.91 0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for those who admit having made illegal payments to government officers over the last year</td>
<td>1.22 0.07</td>
<td>-0.56 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish speakers (Kirmanca, Zazaca) in childhood</td>
<td>-0.48 0.52</td>
<td>0.42 0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for Alevi</td>
<td>0.08 0.90</td>
<td>-0.54 0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity (self-evaluations)</td>
<td>0.05 0.57</td>
<td>0.19 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for those who are interested in politics</td>
<td>1.07 0.00</td>
<td>0.13 0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right self placement scores (1 Left most to 10 Right most)</td>
<td>0.19 0.02</td>
<td>0.11 0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for CHP</td>
<td>-2.90 0.00</td>
<td>-4.11 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for DEHAP</td>
<td>-1.33 0.06</td>
<td>3.85 0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for MHP</td>
<td>3.06 0.00</td>
<td>-2.32 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for GP</td>
<td>-0.02 0.98</td>
<td>0.22 0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D for ANAP</td>
<td>1.12 0.21</td>
<td>-0.65 0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D for SP  
0.34  0.75  -0.11  0.93

D for DYP  
-4.01  0.00  -3.00  0.02

D for those who prefer that Turkey should give priority to Israel in its foreign policy towards the Middle East  
-0.87  0.04  0.64  0.19

Supporters of EU membership  
-0.32  0.48  -0.20  0.70

EU’s rejection of Turkey is due its Muslim religion.  
0.02  0.67  -0.12  0.06

Adjusted R-Square  
0.23  0.28

---

**Figure 1. Mean Thermometer Scores for Party Leaders-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP (T. Erdoğan)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYP (M. Ağar)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP (D. Baykal)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP (D. Bahçeli)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEHAP (T. Bakrhan)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP (N. Erbakan)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP (M. Yılmaz)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP (C. Uzan)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. Changes in Party Positions in the Turkish Political Space, 2001-2004

Figure 3. Estimated Party (in capital letters) and mean constituency positions

Constituencies as reported by their vote choice as of early 2004.
Figure 4a. Mean ideal points for different groups and issue stands-2004

Unhappy with the way democracy works, living in relatively larger province centers. However, supports closer ties with Israel and the EU.

Ethnic (T) Turkish, happy with the way democracy works, living mostly in smaller district centers. However, does not support closer ties with Israel and the EU.

Figure 4b. Mean ideal points for different groups and issue stands-2004

Unhappy with work and income, does not feel safe at night in their neighborhood and thinks that different identities do exist therein.

HAPPY with work and income, feels safe at night in their neighborhood and thinks that different identities does not exist therein.
Turks and Greeks should live together in Cyprus

Islam is not the reason for EU's rejection of Turkey

Not religious

Not hopeful for the future

Not interested in politics

Religious

Hopeful for the future

Interested in politics

Islam is the reason for EU's rejection of Turkey

Turks and Greeks should not live together in Cyprus

Left-wing, Not-religious, Greeks and Turks should live together in Cyprus, Islam is not the reason for EU's rejection of Turkey.

Right-wing, Religious, Interested in politics, Greeks and Turks should not live together in Cyprus, not hopeful for the future, Islam is not the reason for EU's rejection of Turkey.