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Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 369–392

Electoral
Studies

www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

A spatial analysis of Turkish party preferences

Ali Çarkoğlu^{a,*}, Melvin J. Hinich^b

^a Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, Orhanlı Tuzla, 81474 Istanbul, Turkey

^b Applied Research Laboratories, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78758-1087, USA

Abstract

The paper focuses on party preferences of Turkish voters within the spatial model of voting that proved to be a successful explanatory framework in various other countries. The analysis is based on spatial theory of electoral competition and its statistical implementation using survey data. The paper aims at depicting the cognitive organization of voters' attitudes about issues and evaluations of political parties that compete for their vote. The spatial map derived from a survey of urban settlers show that the dominant ideological dimension sets secularists vs. pro-Islamists as expected from the center-periphery framework often used in Turkish electoral analyses. The second dimension reflects the impact of recent conflict involving the Kurdish minority on rising nationalist sentiments. Given a general depiction of the Turkish political space, we examine the impact of various demographic characteristics as well as issue evaluations on individuals' ideal positions in the space.

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Over the last decade, once marginal parties with ultra nationalist and pro-Islamist mandates rose to a dominant position in Turkish politics leading to a collapse of the center-right competitors. Together with ethnic Kurdish support of about 5%, parties of the extreme ends of the Turkish ideological space came to receive about 38% of electoral support in April 1999 elections. In the next general elections of November

* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: alicarkoglu@sabanciuniv.edu (A. Çarkoğlu), hinich@mail.la.utexas.edu (M.J. Hinich).

2002, the centrist parties were able to gather only a mere minority of support with about 38%.

The limited number of analyses focusing on this recent electoral experience diagnoses demographic, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic bases of party support together with a dominant impact of religiosity on voting decision. However, these studies lack a coherent theoretical framework for explaining the voting decision. In consequence, a *sui generis* character of the Turkish electorate emerges and leaves the Turkish experience unlinked to a larger body of comparative and theoretical research on voting behavior.

Our analysis adopts the theoretical framework of spatial voting models and offers a multi-dimensional analysis of the emerging ideological space in Turkey during the years preceding the general elections in November 2002. Kalaycıoğlu (1998) and Hale (2002) provide intuitive two-dimensional representations of the political space of Turkey without formal voting theory or empirically based behavioral foundations. Our approach, however, is grounded on spatial theory of electoral competition and its statistical implementation with survey data from a nation-wide representative sample of the urban electorate in February–March 2001. We estimate the spatial positions of all major political parties along with respondent ideal points in a two-dimensional ideological space and show that these two dimensions capture the basic character of issue positions and social cleavages that shape the Turkish electoral scene.¹

Very much in line with the center-periphery framework of Mardin (1973), our two-dimensional ideological map reflects pro-Islamist elements of the periphery as opposed to the secularist center as its dominant dimension.² Turkish nationalism, defined largely in opposition to rising ethnic Kurdish identity of the late 1990s, appears as a secondary dimension of ideological competition. We thus present party positions for the Sunni pro-Islamist as opposed to secularist parties in contrast to parties that differentiate from one another on the ethnically defined nationalistic perspectives. Our simple spatial exposition of party competition accounts not only for the specificity of Turkish ideological competition but it also offers a reflection of

¹ The conventional left–right (L–R) framework has never been fully adopted in analyzing Turkish politics. From early 1970s on parties have used the L–R language. However, principally as a result of the rise of nationalist and pro-Islamist agendas, the increasing salience of identity politics during the 1990s and the consequent collapse of the centrist parties, the appeal of the L–R framework has declined. Parties of the center have taken positions primarily in reaction to threats from these new electoral forces that contradicted expectations. The salience of the constituent parts of the L–R, that is, the distributional economic issues, the role of the state have shrunk in comparison to issues of ethnicity, nationalism and pro-Islamism.

² The Turkish society is divided into two major sects of Sunnis and Alevis, among the Sunnis into Hanefi and Shafi schools of law (*mezhep*), and then between those who take Sunni Islam seriously in organizing their lifestyles and those who take a secular or anti clerical (*laik*) view of life. The Alevis historically being in a minority position have tended to support the secularist policies of the Republican era, which provided protection against Sunni infringements in their religious freedoms. Hence the term pro-Islamist here refers to Sunni reactionism to secularist Republican establishment.

the same framework of the spatial voting theory developed in [Enelow and Hinich \(1984\)](#) and extended in [Hinich and Munger \(1994\)](#).³

The Hinich–Munger theory of spatial ideology is superficially similar to the spatial ideological dimension of [Downs \(1957\)](#). Both theories treat the space as latent although Downs is not explicit about what can and cannot be observed in his theory. The major difference between the Downs and Hinich–Munger concepts of spatial ideology lies in how the ideological space is developed over time. [Hinich and Munger \(1994\)](#) assert that the dimension (or dimensions) arises out of competition for political power by politicians, parties, and their supporters. Parties and factions therein attempt to gain power by creating arguments as to why they should displace the status quo.

The latent space is the underlying reality of a society's politics even though it is not completely perceived by the politicians, their supporters, and the general public. Simplicity and heuristic appeal render single dimensional treatments abound despite the multi-dimensional complexity of the real world political competition. Journalists would describe politicians and parties as if they were points on a left–right (L–R) scale. The connections between these “points” and issues that the public is concerned about are typically either not stated or at best left fuzzy. However, a latent multi-dimensional ideological space can be estimated from data by a variety of methods. The striking finding from different studies of polities using various methods on perceptual and attitudinal data from public opinion surveys is that the latent spaces are either one dimensional Downs type spaces or more frequently have two dimensions. The meaning of these dimensions requires a linkage between positions on the latent dimension(s) and the salient issues. A theoretical model of how the latent ideological space links with issues was first made by [Hinich and Pollard \(1981\)](#) and then extended by [Enelow and Hinich \(1984\)](#) and [Hinich and Munger \(1994\)](#). In contrast to exploratory analyses in various forms of discriminant and factor analysis, the empirical extension of the spatial voting theory offers a direct link to a formal mathematical model of preference formation and choice. Besides the American elections, these models have been tested in a variety of political contexts including Ukraine ([Hinich et al., 1999](#)), Chile ([Dow, 1998a,b](#)), Russia ([Myagov and Ordeshook,](#)

³ At first sight it might not be clear as to why Turkish politics has to be represented by two rather than a single or higher dimensions, or why it has to have the particular interpretations we focus on. Our analyses follow the recent tradition of spatial voting analyses and provide an empirical basis to our interpretation of the two dimensions derived from a priori analytical principles. The fact that our data supports a two-dimensional interpretation of Turkish politics, would not have necessarily implied an inherent superiority if there were no a priori theoretical reasons to guide our expectations in this direction. Such theoretical arguments were made by [Hale \(2002\)](#) and [Kalaycıoğlu \(1998\)](#), but our analysis is the first with an empirical basis. Our analyses below are not meant to be a test of the superiority of the single as opposed to a multi-dimensional framework. From the perspective of campaign management or individual rational voters trying to make sense of the political world as quickly as possible, the appeal of the simple L–R dimension still continues. Our multivariate analyses of the two dimensions derived also show the unique relevance of the L–R dimension. However, as we underline below, the L–R framework only accounts for a fraction of the variation of placements on the two estimated dimensions not explaining the specificities of placements therein.

1998) and Taiwan (Lin et al., 1996). These empirical applications in different country contexts offer a test of generalizability of the spatial theory. We observe in these works a continuing support for the low dimensionality of political spaces and diagnose that the estimated political spaces account for much of the country specific questions about coalition potential, stability of political rhetoric and the like.

In the context of Turkey, we want to learn the extent to which voters are able to form a coherent map of policy predispositions of the parties that seek their support. Did the collapse of the center-right leave them in a political vacuum that makes them easily mobilized by a candidate's or party's appeal on various issues that may bear reflections of destabilizing extremism? Or alternatively, do they possess a stable centrist conceptual scheme that acts as a buffer in front of highly volatile short-term preference shifts?

1. Motivation for a spatial analysis: an outline of recent Turkish electoral history

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of the pro-Islamist followed by the ultra-nationalist parties that had remained in the fringes of the electoral scene in the preceding decades.⁴ Starting from a mere 7.2% electoral base in 1987, the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) continuously raised its appeal to masses. In 1994 municipal elections, it captured the largest metropolitan centers and in less than two years later became the largest party with only 21.4% of the vote in 1995 election.⁵ Never before did the pro-Islamist tradition capture more than 12% of the popular vote alone.⁶

In the aftermath of the 1995 general election, RP formed a coalition with the centrist True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP) that led to a series of secularist reactions polarizing the Sunnis against Alevis and even widening the existing cleavages between the Turkish and the rising Kurdish nationalists.⁷ The months leading to the 1999 general election have witnessed the momentous capture of the

⁴ See Çarkoğlu (2002) on Turkish political parties in late 1990s.

⁵ RP had its roots in the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP) that followed the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*, MNP).

⁶ For being against the secular regime, both MNP and MSP had been banned by the military regimes of 1971 and 1980 respectively. See among others Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000), Göle (1997), Heper (1997), Mardin (1989), Sayan (1996), Toprak (1981), Yavuz (1997) on Islam and politics in Turkey.

⁷ The Constitutional Court (CC) closed down RP in January 1998 on the grounds that the speeches of several party leaders were against the secular constitution banning the former Prime Minister Erbakan and five other prominent members of the party from political activity for five years. By the end of April the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP) became the new address of almost all of the unbarred RP deputies. CC eventually closed down FP in June 2001 on similar grounds to those of the RP case. Following FP's closure the inner party struggle led to the founding of two separate parties; one for the old-guard in the pro-Islamist movement the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP) and the other for the young generation the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) which eventually came to power after the November 2002 elections.

leader of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partia Karkaren Kürdistan*, PKK), widening corruption scandals, mass demonstrations against the religiously sensitive ban of headscarves at the universities, as well as the death of the ultra-nationalist Alparslan Türkeş who was the founding leader of the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) that led to an eventual reshaping of the MHP image.⁸ As a result, the nationalist fervor in the country was on the rise. The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP) has greatly benefited from these developments and became the largest party in 1999 with 22.2% of the vote. MHP captured the second largest vote share reaching nearly 18%, up by about 120% from its share in 1995.⁹

The tenure of the coalition of DSP, MHP and ANAP in the aftermath of April 1999 elections began with two massive earthquakes in August and November. The perceived ineffectiveness of the organization of public relief efforts in the aftermath of the August 1999 earthquake not only enervated the grieving public but also proved once again the inaptitude of public authorities. However, the parliamentary seat distribution, together with the inability of the civic anger to raise the pressure on the government, helped the coalition to survive the political after-shocks of the earthquake. The impact of the financial crisis that hit the country first in November 2000 and next in February 2001 had been much more severe on the political front. Political manipulations of fiscal policies leading to an unsustainable public debt were commonly diagnosed as the underlying reason for these crises. The crisis peaked on 21 February, 2001 with an overnight devaluation of the Turkish lira by about 50%. By the end of the year, about 2.3 million people had lost their jobs and the economy had contracted in real terms as much as 8.5%. The coalition partners were perceived as responsible for the economic crises and their clumsiness in responding to the earthquakes. The centrist opposition however, could not take advantage of these developments.

Perhaps the most significant finding in all surveys of the Winter and Spring 2001 reported in newspapers is the large portion of the respondents (26.1%) who declare that they would not vote for any one of the existing parties and an equally surprising 10% who declare that they would cast an invalid protest vote.¹⁰ The fact that in November 2002 general election turnout rate remained at 79% lowest since 1977, points to the correctness of these diagnoses. In short, during the first part of 2001 when our survey was carried out, about one third of the electorate were not undecided, but rather decided not to cast their votes for any one of the then existing

⁸ MHP has its roots in the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*, CKMP) founded in the aftermath of the 1960 military coup. Alparslan Türkeş was its leader until his death in 1997. Türkeş was an active colonel in the coup of 1960 and a member of the ruling junta. MHP remained marginal in the Turkish party system from the very beginning, up until the 1999 election. See Landau (1995) and Poulton (1997) on the nationalist tradition in Turkey.

⁹ Throughout the last, nearly two decades, for which we have data, most of the Turkish voters remained around centrist positions along the conventional L–R continuum (Ergüder, 1980–81; Kalaycıoğlu, 1994; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000).

¹⁰ Radikal Daily newspaper, 14 May, 2001.

parties. This alone was enough to bring uneasiness to the party system and thus possibilities of leadership changes, as well as establishment of new parties under possibly fresh leadership.¹¹

In this turbulent decade, religiosity, more than any other variable, is found to affect Turkish voters' choice among competing parties. In only two of the most recent surveys, researchers identify varying degrees of retrospective, as well as prospective economic evaluations on party choice.¹² Yet, even when these effects are present, their magnitudes are small compared to the religiosity effect.

The rise of pro-Islamism from a marginal to an almost dominant position in Turkish electoral politics has led many to worry that a deep-rooted schism has come to the forefront of Turkish politics. Similarly, the rise of MHP presents yet another challenge of changing an inclusive Turkish identity that was confronted by a growing Kurdish nationalism in the country.¹³ The ethnic-based conception of nationalism is in stark contrast to religious Islamic community conception of the pro-Islamist movement that draws on the Ottoman heritage of *millet* (nation). While MHP was thriving on rising exclusionist ethnic fervor due to Kurdish separatist movement, RP/FP was offering an inclusive Islamic unification with a tone of anti-secularism aiming, among other conservative constituencies, to appeal to Kurdish constituencies.

Rising pro-Islamist and nationalist attraction among the Turkish electorate can be taken as a reflection of strengthening peripheral forces within Şerif Mardin's (1973) center-periphery paradigm. Following Mardin's (1973) seminal work others have also argued that Turkish politics is built around a strong and coherent state apparatus run by a distinct group of elites dominated by the military and bureaucracy. The "center" is confronted by a heterogeneous and habitually hostile "periphery", composed mainly of peasantry, small farmers and artisans. The periphery can be seen as the complement of the center, which is built around Kemalist secular principles and follows a state run nationalist modernization program. The periphery reflects features of a subject and parochial orientation built around resentful cynicism toward hierarchical and coercive modernization of the center and includes religious and ethnic groups with often-conflicting interests and political strategies.

During the formative years of competitive party system in Turkey the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) brought together the heterogeneous peripheral forces and dominated the polls. The peripheral coalition was broken by the 1961 coup into

¹¹ FP's closure by the Constitutional Court in June 2001 immediately led to founding of two new parties reflecting the inner split of the pro-Islamists between the "old guards" under SP and the younger generation under AKP. The Young Party (*Genç Parti*, GP) was founded in Summer 2002 by Cem Uzan, a business tycoon with a blemished background adopting a populist agenda. AKP and GP were able to garner 41.5% of support in 2002 when the ruling coalition of DSP-MHP-ANAP lost 38.7 percentage points from their 1999 vote shares.

¹² See Esmer (2001); Kalaycıoğlu (1994, 1999) and Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) on religiosity and voting behavior.

¹³ See Kirişci and Winrow (1997) on Kurdish identity politics in Turkey.

three groups, one representing moderate right-wing, the others ultra-nationalist and pro-Islamist constituencies. The centrist tradition was also broken by the 1980 coup. Until the general elections of 2002, CHP and DSP remained as the two major representatives of this tradition. CHP was stricter on the secularist dimension while DSP, remaining more lenient on secularism, leaned more toward nationalist positions in the 1990s. This picture became more complicated with the rise to power of AKP in the 2002 general elections. Our ensuing analysis is based on data preceding the founding of AKP in the summer of 2001. However, our findings provide clues as to the reasons for their remarkable success in November 2002.¹⁴ We specifically ask the following questions: What is the underlying ideological structure of Turkish voters' preferences of political parties? Are the rising religious and nationalist movements reflecting traces of the center-periphery cleavage molding Turkish politics? Are the divisive issues of headscarf ban and education in Kurdish being reflected in the perception maps of the political space in Turkey?

We now turn to the methodology and data used in our analysis.

2. Methods and data

Intuitively our method is similar to the problem of estimating positions of a set of targets in a multidimensional Euclidean space from distances reported by a number of observers who do not know their own positions in the space. Each observer reports the distance from the observer to each target plus or minus a random error. This statistical problem is the basic model for the various forms of what is called *multidimensional unfolding* in the psychometric literature.¹⁵ The method used in this paper deals with estimating the target locations and the observer positions from data that are functions of the Euclidean or squared Euclidean distances between observers and targets observed with an additive random error. While the use of scaling and unfolding in psychological applications do not use a utility-based theory, we use the utility-based choice theory presented in [Enelow and Hinich \(1984\)](#).¹⁶ The utility-based choice theory in a spatial setting links utility maximizing voters (observers) to parties (targets) competing for voters' support in a multidimensional space shaped by salient issues on the public agenda. As such, our method estimates the structure of the party positions in a latent political space with respect to voters' own positions in

¹⁴ The fact that the pro-Islamists of AKP have won the premiership of the 2002 general election and as a consequence MHP was pushed out of the parliament does not mean that the nationalists are totally out of the Turkish electoral picture. The nationalists could regain their power if for example Turkey gets involved in an international conflict such as the one in neighboring Iraq or Turkish application for EU membership is somehow delayed or turned down.

¹⁵ Multidimensional scaling and unfolding has been applied in marketing, anthropology, psychology, and sociology ([Weller and Romney, 1990](#)), political science ([Poole and Rosenthal, 1984, 1991, 1997; Poole, 2000](#)), and in engineering signal processing ([Cahoon and Hinich, 1976](#)). See [Borg and Groenen \(1997\)](#) for a review of some of these techniques.

¹⁶ The method builds on the work of [Cahoon \(1975\)](#), [Cahoon et al. \(1978\)](#) and [Hinich \(1978\)](#).

a latent political space that then is directly linked to issues of importance for voters and parties alike in the electoral system.

The methodology we apply here requires a set of assumptions relating the data to a spatial model.¹⁷ First, the scores given to each party is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing function of the Euclidian distance between the position of the party in the space and the most preferred ideological position of the respondent. This position is called the ideal point. The respondent is not required to articulate that position but rather it is a latent position in the latent space. Second, the constellation of the party positions in the latent space is assumed to be the same across all respondents. The only thing that differs from respondent to respondent is their personal ideal points. From the individual scores we first determine the dimensionality of the political space. Next we estimate the party positions and the ideal points for the individuals.

Our data come from a nationwide representative survey of urban population conducted during the chaotic weeks of the second economic crisis of February 2001.¹⁸ A total of 1201 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 12 of the 81 provinces. The questionnaires were administered, between 20 February and 16 March, 2001, by using a “random sampling” method with an objective to represent the nation-wide voting age urban population living within municipality borders, in which the urban population figures of 1997 census data were taken as the basis.¹⁹ Since the new pro-Islamist parties, i.e. SP and AKP, were formed in the aftermath of the closure of FP in June 2001, our data only reflect the evaluations concerning FP and not SP and AKP.

The wording of the questions used in our analyses to obtain an estimate of each respondent's cardinal evaluation of parties is given in [Appendix A](#). For each question the same set of evaluations for the seven major parties were asked. These parties obtained 94.8% of the urban vote in 1999 elections ([Table 1](#)). However, as of February–March 2001, these parties comprise only the preferences of 42.3% of our urban sample. Similar to opinion poll results reported in the media, our findings also indicate that 6% of the respondents will not cast their vote and about 5% are undecided as to which party to vote for. More significantly, nearly 33% of the respondents indicate that they will not cast their vote for any one of the existing parties. Given the continual crisis atmosphere in the country, the erosion of electoral

¹⁷ Since our analysis here is merely an application of the techniques developed elsewhere we refrain from going into any technical details which can be found in [Enelow and Hinich \(1984\)](#), chapter 9; [Enelow and Hinich \(1990\)](#); [Endersby and Hinich \(1992\)](#); [Hinich \(1978\)](#); [Hinich and Munger \(1994\)](#).

¹⁸ Nearly 35% of the Turkish population lives in rural settlements that are not included in our sample. Just a generation ago in 1980 the share of rural population was 56%. Accordingly, a large segment of the urban dwellers are either born in rural areas or are newcomers to the cities and thus are expected to possess preferences and attitudes similar to rural settlers. The timing of our research could also conceivably have temporal peculiarities. However, until new data become available we have no basis for judging the extent to which rural–urban divide is significant or to what extent our results are time wise sensitive.

¹⁹ Details of the sampling procedure can be obtained from the authors. Under the assumption of simple random sampling, a sample size of 1201 is expected to have a confidence interval of 95% with an error margin of $\pm 2.8\%$.

Table 1
Party preferences after distributing the undecided respondents*

	Urban sample (<i>N</i> =1201) %	Urban vote share in 1999 %	Rural vote share in 1999 %	Country total in 1999 %
ANAP	4.9	13.2	13.4	13.2
CHP	9.6	9.4	7.7	8.7
DSP	3.5	24.5	18.3	22.2
DYP	5.9	9.3	16.5	12
FP	5.9	16.1	14.3	15.4
MHP	7.5	17.1	19.3	18
HADEP	5.0	5.2	4.0	4.7
Seven party total	42.3	94.8	93.5	94.2
Will not vote	6.0			
Will vote	32.6			
for none of the existing parties				
Undecided	4.8			
Will vote for one of the existing minor parties	5.8			
No answer	8.4			
Total	100			

* Respondents were first asked which party they would vote for if an election were to be held today. Those who indicated that they are undecided (10.8% in our sample) were then asked whether they feel closer to voting for a party. The results in the table are obtained after distributing the choices indicated in this second question to the their respective parties in the first question. The reported 4.8% undecided respondents are those who remained undecided in the second question.

support for the coalition partners, which amounts to a total of about 39 percentage points in the urban areas, is not surprising.²⁰ Among the opposition, only the left-leaning CHP and pro-Kurdish HADEP seem to maintain their urban constituencies. The rest of the opposition parties are also found to have lost their supporters.²¹

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the thermometer scores for all major parties, three hypothetical leaders and an evaluation of the coalition performance of DSP–MHP–ANAP. The highest mean score is given to our hypothetical labor leader closely followed by a prominent businessman. As a reflection of the above underlined alienation of masses from the political parties in the aftermath of the economic crises, respondents perceive the potential benefit of our hypothetical

²⁰ At the time of our writing of this article the urban–rural divide in 2002 general election was not officially available. However, looking at the overall nationwide vote percentage of the two parties that did not exist at the time of our fieldwork, that is AKP and GP, we see that their total nationwide support totaled approximately 41.5%, which is quite close to our urban sample results from nearly 18 months before the general election.

²¹ In all of our questions the non-response rate remained quite low for all our parties at about 5–7%. As noted earlier, participation was the lowest in the post 1980 period. The fact that coalition partners also received 14.7% of the vote in 2002, down from 53.4% in 1999 shows that our sample results give quite an accurate picture of the electoral scene in the pre-election months for the November 2002 election.

Table 2
Descriptive statistics of thermometer scores

Party/ (hypothetical politician)	Mean	Std. Deviation
A labor leader	4.88	2.67
A prominent businessman	4.59	2.74
CHP	4.44	2.32
ANAP	4.43	1.97
DYP	4.24	2.17
MHP	3.89	2.70
DSP	3.88	2.30
FP	3.81	2.78
A very religious leader	3.74	2.96
HADEP	3.06	2.85
The present coalition of DSP–MHP–ANAP	2.66	2.40
Valid <i>N</i> (listwise)	1148	

working class or business leaders' tenure in the executive office to be significantly higher than those of the known major political parties. Among the political parties CHP obtains the highest score followed by ANAP, DYP and MHP. HADEP, FP and DSP have the worst performance among the parties. A "very religious" leader is rated better than only HADEP, which predominantly was being rated non-favorably by respondents who have a non-Kurdish background. Most striking is the observation that the ruling DSP–MHP and ANAP coalition at the time of our fieldwork is rated with the lowest scores. On face value of these thermometer scores it is inconceivable that a purely religiously oriented party could capture the alienated masses in the party system. Our discussion below indicates that within a two-dimensional space such an interpretation has to be qualified.

3. A spatial map of issue dimensions in Turkish politics

As a first step in our analysis we estimate the spatial positions of the seven parties evaluated by our respondents following the procedures in Enelow and Hinich (1984, chapter 9). Fig. 1 presents the two-dimensional estimates of these party positions together with the voters' ideal points in this space. Looking at Fig. 1, we observe that parties are clearly differentiated on the two dimensions explaining about 61% of the variance.²²

The *x*-axis posits the pro-Islamist FP in one extreme as opposed to the secularist left leaning CHP. The relative positions of the rest of the parties fit our expectations about the religious cleavage in Turkish politics. The nationalist MHP turns out to be the closest one to the position of the pro-Islamist FP on this axis. Among the centrist parties DYP is slightly closer to the pro-Islamist end while DSP and CHP are on the

²² The first accounts for 38.5% whereas the second is 22.9% of the variance.




Fig. 1. Estimated ideal points and party positions, full sample.

opposing end placed to the left of ANAP's position in the center. It is noticeable that HADEP's position on this dimension is closer to the secularist left of DSP and CHP.

The y -axis places the Kurdish HADEP on one extreme and the nationalist MHP and DSP on the other. While ANAP, CHP and FP's positions come close to the center on this dimension, DYP is placed closer to the nationalist MHP and DSP's opposing end. It has been suggested that FP's strong showing in the East and Southeastern provinces where the bulk of Kurdish population lives is evidence of FP's appeal to the Kurdish electorate. Ideologically, the all-inclusive concept of *millet* advocated by FP is seen to target the Kurdish vote. Similarly, the religiously conservative Kurdish constituency was seen closer to FP. Our map however, clearly shows that in the perceptions of the urban population, HADEP is nowhere close to FP on the two-dimensional political space we derive.

HADEP and FP are equally isolated from the rest of the parties. Opposing FP on the x -axis, CHP also stands apart from the rest of the parties. While the centrist positions on the x -axis do not allow for much of differentiation among the MHP, DYP and ANAP, the y -axis representing the nationalist cleavage in Turkish politics clearly separates the centrist ANAP from the more nationalist DYP and MHP. According to the perception in the minds of the urban voters, DSP stands on the opposing extreme of the Kurdish HADEP. More importantly, we should note that a single dimensional analysis along the lines of our x -axis as reflection of a L–R ideological divide simply would not allow for such subtle differentiation on non-trivial matters as the ethnic nationalist cleavage.

Together with the seven major parties, we also asked evaluations of hypothetical candidates. Given the alienation of voters from the political establishment, inclusion of only the parties already in existence would not have provided enough information about the spread of choices in the political space. Clearly, these hypothetical personalities cannot be treated as political parties. However, their estimated positions are to be interpreted with reference to their closeness to real parties in existence at the time of our fieldwork. Not surprisingly, a “very religious” leader is estimated very close to FP while a prominent businessman stands close to ANAP. A labor leader is positioned very close to HADEP and apart from the rest of the parties, especially of the left. Given HADEP’s extremist left-wing rhetoric on many issues such a positioning is not surprising. In short, the information provided by the hypothetical leaders helps us identify the meaning of the dimensions of the political space.

The ideal point estimates for each individual in our sample is also shown on Fig. 1. The striking observation from these ideal point estimates is the centrist tendencies of a large segment of the voters. Although we observe voters dispersed towards the end points of the two dimensions, the bulk of the voters are found close to the center of the two dimensions.

When we calculate the mean positions of constituencies across different parties we observe the relative standings of the parties with respect to their supporters. Fig. 2 reveals that the mean ideal points of CHP, DSP, FP and HADEP voters are more towards the center on both dimensions than their respective party positions. The estimated location of DSP lies at the most extreme point on the second dimension revealing a strong Turkish nationalist standing as opposed to the Kurdish nationalist standing of HADEP. However, the mean ideal point estimates of those who declared their intention to vote for DSP is quite distant from this party location estimate and lie closer to the center of the two dimensions. Similarly, for both HADEP and FP constituencies we observe that they stand relatively at a more centrist position on both dimensions compared to the estimated party stand. In contrast, we observe that for both DYP and MHP the mean ideal positions of their constituencies tend more toward the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. In other words, the pro-Islamist constituency in Turkey is no longer dominated by the MNP/MSP/RP and FP tradition.²³

Given the high percentage of respondents refusing to vote for any one of the existing parties, the positioning of those voters on our ideological map becomes quite interesting. Those who assert that they will not cast a vote as well as those who assert that they will not vote for any of the presently available parties lie on average very close to the center of our map. The extreme ends of our map are not particularly attractive to these voters and they seem to lie on average close to ANAP and our hypothetical prominent businessman rather than any of the other major parties. First immediate implications of this observation is that despite apparent tensions in

²³ Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000, p. 23) also note that, besides the FP, DYP and MHP constituencies also tend toward religious conservatism.




Fig. 2. Estimated party (in capital letters) and mean constituency positions (in lowercase).

Turkish political scene arising from secularist versus pro-Islamist issue differences or recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity, the average alienated voter is in the center of the political space. Second, despite minimal voter support it apparently receives at the time of our fieldwork, ANAP more than any other major party lies closer to the preferences of those urban voters who are yet to make up their minds about their party of choice in the future. It is also worth noting that the appeal of a businessman in the political space at the time of our fieldwork is partially materialized in the personality of Cem Uzan and his GP, which garnered about 7.3% of the votes in 2002 election at the expense of primarily the incumbent coalition partners. A shortcoming of our survey was that no questions were asked about competence, credibility or honesty of the parties or hypothetical leaders. This prevented us from developing a valence dimension that could have allowed us to predict voters' party switching driven by the valence dimension. In short, the key question about the future of party competition at the time of our fieldwork was about the struggle to appeal to the centrist constituency of voters.

So far our diagnosis about the nature of the two dimensions remained primarily on our a priori expectations and knowledge about the nature of different parties' positions with respect to one another rather than on the content of argumentation that shape these two dimensions. When we turn to various other issue positions of the urban respondents in conjunction with their estimated ideal points, we obtain a much more meaningful picture of the simple dimensionality of ideological competition in Turkey.

Several questions about the self-ascribed identity of our respondents help us further clarify the nature of both dimensions (see Fig. 3). When we look at self-evaluation of religiosity we see that those respondents who consider themselves to be




Fig. 3. Mean party constituency positions and primary identity groups.

very religious on a 0 to 10 scale of religiosity tend to be placed on the extreme right end side of the first dimension opposing those who consider themselves to be non-religious. Those who primarily consider themselves to be Muslims rather than Turks, Turkish citizens, Kurds or Alevis are situated very close to the same extreme right end of the first dimension. Similarly, those who prefer Turkey to be part of the Islamic world are to be found at the same right-end of the first dimension. We also observe that the respondents whose ideal points lie at the right-end of the first dimension also tend to have a very liberal stand on the issue of headscarves and turban in universities advocating for no restrictions on religiously meaningful attire in universities (see Fig. 4). In contrast, those who support banning of headscarves and turban at the universities are found on the opposing side.

Looking at the ideal points of those respondents who consider themselves to be primarily Alevis we see that the mean of their ideal points lies on the complete opposite end of the first dimension suggesting that the religiosity of the pro-Islamist end reflects mainly the Sunni school. The first dimension thus mirrors Sunni Hanefi religiousness as opposed to Alevi's, which appear closer to not only the centrist left CHP a la Mardin (1973) but also those who do not consider themselves to be religious at all.

Looking at the first dimension from the perspective of simple demographic attributes of the urban respondents, we observe that the pro-Islamist respondents tend to come from the Eastern rather than the Western provinces. Primary school and junior high graduates are on average to be found near the pro-Islamist end whereas those with a university degree or higher level of education lie on the opposing end. Relatively younger voters between the ages of 18 and 24 are closer on average to the pro-Islamist end whereas older voters tend to lie on the opposing end.




Fig. 4. Mean positions across different issue stands.

Shantytown dwellers are more likely to be found on the pro-Islamist end whereas those respondents who live in luxurious dwellings are located near the opposing end.

We also asked the respondents to evaluate the controversial issue of education in Kurdish. Positions of respondents on this issue help clarify the nature of the second dimension (see Fig. 4). Those respondents who take a conservative stand and support complete banning of education in Kurdish are to be found on the lower end of the second dimension whereas those who support education in Kurdish are on average to be found on the opposing end. Those who consider themselves to be primarily Kurds lie towards the upper end of the second dimension opposing those respondents who primarily consider themselves to be Turks or Turkish citizens (see Fig. 3). Those who can speak Kurdish are at the upper end of the second dimension whereas those who cannot speak Kurdish lie on the opposing end. Those respondents who prefer Turkey to be part of the “Turkish world” lie on the Turkish end of the second dimension whereas those who prefer membership in the EU lie towards the centrist positions on both the first and second dimensions. On the ethnic Kurdish end we observe low levels of education. Low levels of income are associated with the Kurdish end whereas higher income levels are to be found among the respondents that are closer to the Turkish end. Western and relatively older respondents are also closer to the same Turkish end.

In short, the two dimensions derived from the data correspond closely to the fundamental cleavages that shaped the recent political scene in Turkey. The first dimension posits the secularists coalescing with the Alevis as opposed to the Sunni Hanefi pro-Islamists. The policy reflections of the first dimension appear in the contrasting positions concerning the turban ban in universities. Those who prefer

Turkey to be part of the EU (Islamic world) tend to be closer to the secularist (Sunni pro-Islamist) end of the first dimension closer to the Alevis (religious Sunnis). The second dimension separates the ethnic Kurdish from the Turkish nationalists. Those who speak Kurdish are closer to those who have a liberal position on education in Kurdish opposing those who cannot speak Kurdish and who are opposed to lifting of the ban on education in Kurdish.

Contrasting the first dimension to the second we also see traces of a metamorphosis in the Turkish political scene. One that evolves around secular modernization and its pro-Islamist reactionaries that find a reflection in still evolving L–R rhetoric in Turkish political debate.²⁴ Instead of a materialist clash between the working masses and the bourgeoisie we see a struggle between a modernizing centrist elite and the conservative parochial forces of the periphery. This perhaps is the Turkish version of the conventional western L–R framework. The second dimension however, is reflective of a more recent debate in Turkish politics that revolves around identity issues. These issues, are directly linked to the on-going EU reform movement in the country. As the Copenhagen Criteria adjustment packages were being debated and passed from the Parliament during the tenure of the DSP–MHP–ANAP coalition the expected and well-predictable stands of the parties in the system have had to change and re-positioned. Our two dimensions mirror a clear interplay between the status quo secularist vs. pro-Islamist (or, à la Turca L–R) debate and the newly salient issues of identity that form the agenda of the EU reform in the country.

Our estimated map also provides clues as to the nature of ideological competition in the Turkish party system. On our map there is no party that is placed on the pro-Islamist and Kurdish nationalist quadrant (Q.1 on Fig. 2). The Kurdish nationalism of HADEP is clearly placed in the minds of the urban Turkish electorate on the secularist end of the first dimension (Q.4 on Fig. 2). While HADEP is the only party on quadrant four, CHP and DSP dominate the secularist Turkish nationalist end of quadrant 3. It is clear in the minds of the urban Turkish electorate that the centrist right wing of the Turkish party system is not taking any position near the secularist end of the first dimension and rather leaning toward the Turkish nationalist and pro-Islamist rhetoric. Four major parties (MHP, DYP, FP and ANAP) at the time of our survey compete on the same quadrant that is the pro-Islamist and Turkish nationalist quadrant 2, where the toughest competition is expected to take place.

The CHP and DSP voters are estimated to lie close to those that consider themselves not religious and supportive of the ban on headscarves and turban at universities. Interestingly, the left secularist-end of the first dimension does not have a clear primary identity preference other than Alevi. The secularist end is also not very close to being supportive of the EU membership while its opposing end is quite close to being supportive of Turkey to take part in the “Islamic world” and clearly considering themselves to be primarily Muslim. ANAP and DYP voters tend to have a moderate view on turban and headscarf ban as well as on education in Kurdish. FP

²⁴ See Çarkoğlu (1998) on the evolution of L–R in Turkey.

voters are closer to the most liberal end of the turban issue while the MHP voters oppose education in Kurdish.

Having validated our interpretation of the two dimensions, what factors then explain the urban voters' ideal positions on these two dimensions? Table 3 shows the results of multiple regression analysis for the two dimensions. We expect substantial noise to be present in our estimated ideal positions for respondents. However, since these estimated ideal points are used as dependent variables in our equations and since our independent variables are mainly demographic variables in which measurement error can be assumed to be reasonably small, the coefficient estimates should be consistent. Nevertheless, the standard errors of our estimates are likely to be quite large rendering statistical significance difficult to achieve.²⁵

Table 3 shows that despite expected inflation of standard errors of estimates we obtain quite successful fits in our equations (adjusted *R*-square values are 0.33 for the first and 0.22 for the second dimension). For the first dimension primary identity as Muslim, degree of religiosity and attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban in universities all have significant impact on ideal positions of individuals in the expected positive direction. Those who primarily identify themselves as Muslims tend to be placed toward the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension. As individuals' degree of religiosity, their degree of support for the lifting of the ban on turban and headscarves in universities increase, their position on this dimension moves closer to the pro-Islamist end. Those who are unemployed and who actively seek a job tend to be more towards the pro-Islamist end. The geographic divide continues to play a significant role in separating respondents on the first dimension. Those who live in Western provinces are more likely to be placed on the secularist end.

While the attitudes on education in Kurdish do not appear to have a significant impact, we observe that L–R self-placement scores are positively related to the first dimension ideal point estimates. Individual self-placement on the conventional L–R dimension has a significant positive coefficient suggesting that individuals on the right-end of the L–R dimension tend to be on the pro-Islamist end of the first dimension.

Primary identity choice appears to be much more effective in shaping the second dimension ideal point estimates. While those who consider themselves to be primarily Turk or Turkish citizens tend to be placed towards the Turkish end of the dimension, those who consider themselves primarily as Kurds tend to lie toward the Kurdish end. Muslim identity, which differentiated individuals on the first dimension, appears insignificant in determining positions on this dimension. Level of education, which is not significant in differentiating individuals on the first dimension, appears to differentiate positions of individuals on the second. The degree of religiosity and attitudes towards turban and headscarf ban both have small but significant impacts. As expected, increasing liberal attitude toward education in

²⁵ See Berry and Feldman (1985) on measurement error in multiple regressions.

Table 3
Explaining the ideal points on the Turkish political space

		Dimension 1 (x-axis)		Dimension 2 (y-axis)	
		Secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage		Kurdish vs. Turkish nationalism	
		Unstandardized coefficients	Level of significance	Unstandardized coefficients	Level of significance
	(Constant)	-3.13	0.00	-0.19	0.75
	Sex (= 1 for Female, = 0 for Male)	-0.04	0.86	-0.05	0.77
	Age	-0.01	0.14	0.01	0.33
Primary identity	Dummy for Turk	0.58	0.17	-0.91	0.00
	Dummy for Muslim	0.94	0.04	-0.44	0.17
	Dummy for Turkish Citizen	0.20	0.61	-0.91	0.00
	Dummy for Kurd	-0.05	0.95	1.48	0.01
Education	Dummy for Illiterate	-0.52	0.48	1.49	0.00
	Dummy for Literate but no schooling	-0.28	0.68	1.18	0.02
	Dummy for Primary school graduate	0.77	0.07	0.71	0.02
	Dummy for Junior High school graduate	0.44	0.38	0.58	0.11
	Dummy for High school graduate	0.49	0.25	0.94	0.00
	Number of people living in the household	0.05	0.51	0.01	0.77
	Degree of religiosity (0 to 10 scale)	0.21	0.00	-0.11	0.00
	Attitude about headscarf/turban in universities (0 to 10 scale)	0.13	0.00	0.08	0.00
	Attitude about education in Kurdish (0 to 10 scale)	-0.04	0.14	0.07	0.00
	Left–Right self-placement (1 to 10 scale)	0.38	0.00	-0.20	0.00
Dummy for unemployed	0.75	0.04	0.17	0.50	
Dummy for western provinces	-0.62	0.02	-0.22	0.23	
	Adjusted <i>R</i> -square	0.33		0.22	
	<i>N</i>	555		555	

Kurdish push individuals towards the Kurdish end. L–R self-placement is once again significant in differentiating individuals on this dimension. When individuals move toward the right (left)-end of the conventional L–R self-placement they tend to be placed towards the Turkish (Kurdish) end of the second dimension. The fact that L–R self-placement is significantly related to both our dimensions is a noteworthy finding suggesting firstly that L–R ideological divide is still relevant

in the Turkish political space, but also secondly that it only partially accounts for specific individual positioning along our estimated space.²⁶

4. Conclusions

Our analysis presents several important results. The first is the low dimensionality of the Turkish political space. As such, the Turkish case is yet another evidence of the low dimensional nature of ideological spaces in modern democracies. Two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the Turkish party system. The relatively more dominant dimension is the secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage. It largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics and also the L–R orientations similar in some respects to the Western traditions. The second dimension is the ethnic based nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities. Perceptions of voters clearly differentiate all major parties along these two dimensions. Compared to the conventional L–R ideological dimension our two-dimensional political space better grasps the rising salience of identity politics in the country while perfectly reflecting the conventional L–R differentiation.

The second is the overwhelmingly centrist character of the electorate. The rising disenchantment of the electorate from the existing parties is also evident in this picture. In the minds of the Turkish voter, there exists a centrifugal force that pushes the parties to the margins of the ideological space. The alienated voters, who assert that they are not going to cast a vote to any one of the existing parties or simply abstain from voting, comprised the largest segment of the electorate at the time of our fieldwork. This alienated segment lie at the center of the two dimensions. Perhaps surprisingly, but certainly relieving from the perspective of potential conflict implications, this alienated segment of voters is not close to hypothetical leaders from the potentially extremist labor or pro-Islamist movements. This segment is also just as distant to the nationalist MHP positions. There thus seems no ground for political extremism to be born out of this group of disenchanting segment of voters.

We should note here one predictive success of our findings for the November 2002 elections. Cem Uzan who leads GP that obtained 7.3% of the vote in 2002 is a prominent businessman with a controversial record. ANAP's close positioning in our map to the centrist majority of undecided voters appears to contradict the observed results of November 2002 elections. We believe that this is primarily a reflection of the fact that we had no measure of credibility of parties in our survey.

²⁶ When we use only the L–R self-placements as the sole independent variable explaining individuals' positions along our two dimensions, we would be leaving some of our relevant independent variables out and thus commit a specification error. However, as a simple reflection of the relative worth of the L–R in grasping the information in our two-dimensional exposition we note that L–R self placement scores account for 21% in the first and 9% of the second dimension's variation in individual placement scores. Considering that our full models had an adjusted R-square of about 33% for the first and 22% for the second dimension, our two dimensions contain information that cannot be fully accounted by the self-placements on the conventional L–R dimension.

Vote choice is not only a function of spatial proximity but rather it is a combination of proximity as well as credibility evaluations. If in other words, a party lacks credibility then its closeness to an individual ideal point may not predict the actual vote choice for that individual who might vote for a party further away that seem to be more credible and competent.²⁷ We believe that lack of credibility and low competence evaluations are responsible for the poor electoral performance of ANAP in 2002 elections rather than its positioning on the political space. It remains to be seen in further studies as to whether AKP, which came out to be the largest party in 2002 elections, has had high credibility and competence evaluations and is placed, as expected, somewhere close to the center where most voters are.

Thirdly, we observe that identity questions help to differentiate diverse groups from one another. While religiosity help differentiate the parties and their electorate on the first dimension, Alevi and Kurdish as opposed to Turkish primary identities differentiate voters on the second.

Demographic characteristics also help identify several distinct patterns. Pro-Islamist constituencies for example are more likely to be found in the Eastern rather than on the Western provinces. The Kurdish nationalist orientations are more closely associated with groups with relatively low education in contrast to highly educated groups identifying with the Turkish nationalist end of the second dimension.

The heart of political competition according to our estimated political space seems to be shaped around Turkish nationalism blended with varying doses of pro-Islamism. The future of Turkish democracy at the time of our survey in early 2001 seems to depend on the preferences of a large group of disenchanting voters. This group has centrist orientations and is unattached to any of the potentially extremist parties. Our analysis provides the critical issue linkages to the latent political space and as such stands in stark contrast to the conventional L–R framework, which remains too simplistic to grasp the complexities of the rising identity politics in Turkey. As such, our analysis also provides a direct connection to the on going reform process in the country that is aimed at starting the negotiations for full membership in the European Union (EU). The issues concerning education in Kurdish, headscarf/turban ban in the universities, the resolution of sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Alevis as well as expansion and maintenance of religious freedoms in the country are all issues directly addressed in the Copenhagen adjustment criteria that forms a prerequisite for the start of negotiations. Perceived positions on the estimated political space are also reflective of this embedded reform debate. A simplistic uni-dimensional L–R conceptualization simply does not reflect differentiation on this complex mixture of issues around the discussions of EU-related reform.

The traditionally state-centered Turkish left is still quite distant to such argumentation and occupies positions on the ideological space that predominantly reflects secularist stands opposing the pro-Islamist movements that seem to have captured the impetus of the Turkish right. The two important minority groups that

²⁷ See chapter 9 in Enelow and Hinich (1984).

overlap in some geographic locations of the country, that is, the Alevi and the Kurdish communities, are isolated on the Turkish ideological map. CHP, which is partially the continuation of the social-democratic elites who in the early 1990s unsuccessfully brought the Kurdish representatives into the Parliament, is still the closest party to both of these groups while the pro-Islamist FP is the most distant one. Such a distant position of FP to both Alevis and Kurds leave the pro-Islamist and ethnic Kurdish space totally unoccupied in the Turkish ideological space. Given the centrality of these issues in the EU membership adjustments, it remains to be seen how the Turkish party system can accommodate these identity debates into the mainstream of electoral politics.


The success of AKP in 2002 and its ensuing performance in executive office suggests that despite its pro-Islamist roots AKP was able to formulate moderate policies in at least the first two years of its tenure. It remains to be seen, however, as to whether and to what extent the centrist constituencies have turned toward the newly founded AKP. The framework of analysis presented above offers a simple, theoretically sound and policy-wise useful diagnosis tool that can be used to trace these developments. With new data on the recent elections in November 2002, the spatio-temporal stability of our results needs to be tested clarifying the positions of AKP as well as GP in the political space of Turkey.

More interesting from the perspective of comparative spatial voting studies would be a further study of the suggestion that arises from our above analysis that while the first dominant issue dimension may resonate the status quo political cleavage that is historically most likely to reflect a L–R differentiation, the second dimension appears more likely to grasp the debate around the political reform and change issues in the country. Tracing the issue reflections in the latent political space by contrasting the status quo to reform and change debate in electoral politics carries an attractive potential to reshape our understanding of the evolution of electoral competition that is larger than the implications of our above analysis for Turkish politics.

Appendix. Questions used in dimensionality analyses

The following items were used to secure an estimate of each respondent's cardinal evaluation of major parties. Each respondent was asked the following questions in the order given below.


On an often-debated issue in Turkey concerning the headscarf and turban in universities, some people assert that there should be no regulation on the attire of students and that everyone should be able to wear what ever they want at the universities. Others claim that wearing headscarves and turban at the universities should be strictly forbidden. What is your position between these two extremes?



**Headscarves/turban
should be banned**


**There should
be no regulation on attire**

In another debate on the use of different languages in education, some people assert that Turkish is the official language of the country and that education in schools should only be in Turkish. Others claim that education in one’s native language is a basic right and that everyone should be able to pursue education in whatever language they wish. What is your position between these two extremes?



Evaluations for the following question is obtained separately for a very religious leader, a prominent businessman, a labor union leader and the seven major parties reported in the article. Separately an evaluation of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition’s impact on general welfare of respondents’ family is also taken.

How would your family’s welfare be affected in case the following parties, institutions and hypothetical leaders were to come to power? 0 denotes the worst possible impact, 5 represents no change from the current condition and 10 denotes the best possible impact. Increasing scores from 0 to 10 denote improving impact on your family’s condition.



The primary identity question is as follows:

When asked to make a choice, would you consider yourself to be primarily a Turk, a Muslim, a citizen of Turkish Republic, a Kurd or an Alevi? Or alternatively would you define yourself primarily with different identity?

The conventional left–right self-placement question is used with a 1 to 10 scale and was worded as follows:

People frequently talk about “left” and “right” in politics. Below scale shows boxes on a line. The first box on the left represents left-most position in politics and as one moves to the right the views each box represents also shifts to the right. Finally the box on far right end of the scale represents the right-most view in politics. Where would you place your political views on this line of boxes?

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